Documentation:Torts/Invasion of privacy
Invasion of privacy
A "right to be let alone" has long been considered a fundamental value of the common law.[1] Yet, the nature of the recourse that the common law provides against invasions of privacy has been "debated for the past one hundred and twenty years" and has evolved slowly, even as technology and social norms rapidly change.[2] In considering novel claims of tortious invasion of privacy courts will often look to developments in other common law jurisdictions. Even still, the nature and scope of invasion of privacy torts varies considerably across jurisdictions.
Prosser's four categories of invasion of privacy torts
The development of a right to privacy at common law has been heavily influenced by two famous law review articles. The first was "The Right to Privacy" by Samuel Warren II and Louis Brandeis, published in the Harvard Law Review in 1890.[3] The second was UC Berkeley Dean William Prosser's "Privacy", published in the California Law Review in 1960.[4] Prosser examined hundreds of cases to understand overarching themes of privacy protection in the common law of the US states. Building on Warren and Brandeis's work, Prosser organized the US doctrine into four separate tort categories, which he labelled: misappropriation of personality, intrusion upon seclusion, public disclosure of private facts, and publicity in a false light.[5][6]

Varied influence across other common law jurisdictions
Prosser's categories continue to be influential even outside of the United States, although the extent of their influence varies considerably across common law jurisdictions.[7] They have had significant impact in the United States, in that "[n]early every state recognizes at least one form of the privacy torts by common law or statute."[8] Prosser's schema was also relied upon in several landmark New Zealand judgments recognizing the torts of public disclosure of private facts and intrusion upon seclusion.[9]
English law, on the other hand, does not tend to treat Prosser's schema as encapsulating rights of action at common law in that jurisdiction.[10] The House of Lords in Wainwright v. Home Office considered the seminal scholarship and, citing persuasive case law, rejected "the invitation to declare that ... there has been a previously unknown tort of invasion of privacy."[11] It was recognized that infringements of privacy are indirectly addressed by longstanding causes of action such as nuisance, intentional infliction of mental suffering, and trespass to chattels. However, after Wainwright, the landmark case of Campell v. Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd[12] set English jurisprudence on a path towards recognizing a right at common law to sue for invasions of privacy.[13]
Influence in Canada
Invasion of privacy in Commonwealth countries |
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In the Australian podcast Just Torts, host Brent Liang talks with Tom Lyons and Miriam Asar about how rights to privacy are recognized in the tort laws of Canada, New Zealand and the United Kingdom.[14]
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In Canada, recognition of distinct causes of action that respond to invasions of privacy have been a relatively recent development, influenced by evolving social attitudes and technological advances.[15]
Four Canadian provinces (British Columbia, Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and Newfoundland) have adopted statutory Privacy Acts which create privacy rights-of-action in the given province.[16] Curiously, none of these statutes "provides a precise definition of what constitutes an invasion of privacy".[17] In the absence of a uniform conception of invasion of privacy, courts must ascertain "the contours of that right" within the unique legal framework of each province.[18]
Courts in Ontario, which has no invasion of privacy tort statute,[19] have become particularly active in recognizing rights at common law to sue for various different kinds of invasion of privacy, as developed in seminal cases including Jones v. Tsige,[20] Jane Doe 464533 v. ND,[21] and Yenovkian v. Gulian.[22]
Provincial Privacy Legislation |
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British Columbia: Privacy Act, RSBC 1996, c 373.[23] |
Manitoba: The Privacy Act, CCSM c P125.[24] |
Newfoundland and Labrador: Privacy Act, RSNL 1990, c P-22.[25] |
Saskatchewan: The Privacy Act, RSS 1978, c P-24.[26] |
Intrusion upon seclusion
"[I]ntrusion upon seclusion in the digital era"[27] |
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As part of a series focused on cases that have shaped Canadian tech law, Jill Yates and Connor Bildfell discuss Jones v. Tsige.[27] |

The tort of intrusion upon seclusion occurs when a defendant "intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns".[29] Intrusion upon seclusion applies to situations where there is no public dissemination of the information intruded upon.[30] This tort was recognized by the Ontario Court of Appeal in Jones v. Tsige.[20]
Common law tort in Ontario
In Jones, the plaintiff sued after learning that the defendant had unlawfully viewed her bank records many times.[31] The Ontario Court of Appeal upheld the claim and recognized the tort of intrusion upon seclusion in Ontario, which is available to those who can prove the following elements, adapted from the Restatement (Second) of Torts (2010):[29][30]
The key features of this cause of action are, first, that the defendant's conduct must be intentional, within which I would include reckless; second, that the defendant must have invaded, without lawful justification, the plaintiff's private affairs or concerns; and third, that a reasonable person would regard the invasion as highly offensive causing distress, humiliation or anguish.
Elements of intrusion upon seclusion[30] |
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1. The defendant intentionally or recklessly; |
2. [W]ithout lawful justification; |
3. [I]nvaded the plaintiff's private affairs or concerns; |
4. [W]hich a reasonable person would find highly offensive; and |
5. [C]ausing the plaintiff distress, humiliation, or anguish. |
The Court also noted that "proof of harm to a recognized economic interest is not an element of the cause of action."[30]
Addressing the basis for recognizing the tort, the Court in Jones had regard to foreign and domestic jurisprudence, underlying Charter values, and seminal academic works.[31] The Court considered that there were limits on the scope of the tort, stating that liability only extends to "matters such as financial or health records, sexual practices and orientation, employment, diary or private correspondence that, viewed objectively on the reasonable person standard, can be described as highly offensive."[32] However, the British Columbia Court of Appeal, in Insurance Corporation of British Columbia v. Ari, stated that the plaintiff's reasonable expectation of privacy is not only demarcated by the type of information at issue, but also by the use of that information in the circumstances.[33] In addition, the Court affirmed that in the event of competing claims, the rights of freedom of expression and freedom of press enshrined in the Charter are paramount considerations.[34]
Public disclosure of private facts
The tort of public disclosure of private facts affords recourse in situations where an individual publicly shares private information of another without their consent.[35] The tort was first introduced in Ontario in 2016 in the case of Jane Doe 464533 v. ND[36] and the elements of the tort were later refined in 2018 in Jane Doe 72511 v. NM.[35]
Common law tort of public disclosure of private facts in Alberta
In 2021, the ABQB recognized the tort of public disclosure of public facts in ES v. Shillington.[37] The plaintiff, who was previously romantically involved with the defendant, sought a remedy after the defendant published intimate photos of her online. She experienced immense psychological and emotional suffering as a result of the defendants actions.[38] In finding for the plaintiff, the court effectively recognized the tort of public disclosure of private facts in Alberta.[39] The decision in ES v. Shillington relied upon two seminal Ontario cases that had recognized a tort of public disclosure of embarrassing facts.[40]
Elements of public disclosure of private facts[41] |
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1. [T]he defendant publicized an aspect of the plaintiff’s private life; |
2. [T]he plaintiff did not consent to the publication; |
3. [T]he matter publicized or its publication would be highly offensive to a reasonable person in the position of the plaintiff; and |
4. [T]he publication was not of legitimate concern to the public. |
"Revenge porn, tort law and the protection of privacy in Canada" |
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In a two-part podcast the McGill Law Journal details the evolution of tort law and privacy in response to "revenge porn".[42][43] The host reflects upon the scope of the tort, remedies, and speaks with a civil liberties expert to better understand the complexities involved in this emerging issue.[44][45] |
Revenge porn and legislative responses
Some cases of public disclosure of private facts involve the publication of intimate photos by former romantic partners.[46] In 2017, 4% of crimes in Canada reported to police involved non-consensual distribution of intimate images, commonly known as "revenge porn".[47]
Due to the prevalence of "revenge porn" in today's society, some legislatures have enacted laws specifically to address the problem. In January 2016, Manitoba passed the Intimate Image Protection Act, which created a cause of action for the nonconsensual online publication of intimate images.[48] Soon after, Alberta passed the Protecting Victims of Non-consensual Distribution of Intimate Images Act.[49]
Publicity placing person in false light
The tort of publicity putting the plaintiff in a false light involves circumstances where an individual publicly shares matters concerning another which portrays them in a false light.[50] The tort was first recognized by a Canadian court in 2019 in Yenovkian v. Gulian.[50] Prior to this case, Canadian law had addressed only three of Prosser's tort categories and had generally disregarded the false light tort.[51] For example, in the 1988 Manitoba case, Parasiuk v. Can Newspapers Co, a plaintiff's false light claim was rejected.[52] The Manitoba courted cited a lack of foundation for the cause of action in both statute and common law.[52]
Common law tort of false light in Ontario
Yenovkian v. Gulian involved a plaintiff, who shared two children with the defendant and sought legal recourse after the defendant "engaged in years of cyberbullying" which involved serious allegations about the plaintiff.[53] The Court found the defendant's actions portrayed the plaintiff in a false light, stating that the courts must protect “a person’s privacy right to control the way they present themselves to the world."[54] In recognizing the tort, Kristjanson J. drew from the Restatement (Second) of Torts (2010), outlining the following elements:
Elements of publicity placing person in false light[50] |
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1. [T]he defendant gave publicity to a matter concerning the plaintiff; |
2. [W]hich placed the plaintiff before the public in a false light; |
3. [T]he false light in which the other was placed would be highly offensive to a reasonable person; and |
4. [T]he defendant knew or was reckless as to the falsity of the publicized matter and the false light in which the plaintiff would be placed. |
Difficulties recognizing the tort of false light
Other provinces have yet to adopt this common law tort explicitly, which has been considered as perhaps the "most contentious" of Prosser's four torts.[55] Critics argue that false light does not engage the essence of privacy and it may unduly constrain free speech.[56] Such criticism is complexly linked to legal trends in the United States, where the discourse on the tort of privacy is lively and longstanding.[57] On the other hand, Professors Goldberg and Zipursky have argued that the false light tort has become especially important in our digital world.[58]
Misappropriation of personality
Misappropriation of personality in Canada
The tort of misappropriation of personality was first recognized in Canada in 1977 in Athans v. Canadian Adventure Camps Ltd et al.,[59] and later affirmed in Jones v. Tsige.[60] Tortious misappropriation of personality provides the plaintiff with a right to control publication of one's name and likeness for the defendant's commercial gain.[61] For a defendant to be held liable for misappropriation of personality, they must "[take] advantage of the name, reputation, likeness or some other component of [the plaintiff's] individuality or personality which the viewer associates or identifies with [them].”[62]
The Ontario Superior Court affirmed the elements of tortious misappropriation of personality, in Hategan v. Farber, as follows:
Elements of misappropriation of personality[63] |
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1. [U]se of another's personality; |
2. [W]ithout consent; |
3. [F]or commercial gain. |
Misuse of private information: An adjacent tort in the UK
Although the tort of misuse of private information has not played a significant role in modern Canadian tort law, it has become a foundational right of action in English jurisprudence. Influenced by jurisprudence developed under the Human Rights Act 1998, English courts have recognized the tort of misuse of private information to address situations where there is a disclosure of private information or affairs where there is a reasonable expectation of privacy. Campell v. MGN Ltd famously developed this doctrine beyond the traditional confines of the equitable action of breach of confidence.[64] Today, English common law protects those who experience the misuse of private information, even outside of relationships of confidence.
Statutory invasion of privacy torts
The four common law provinces that have enacted statutory invasion of privacy torts are British Columbia,[23] Manitoba,[24] Saskatchewan,[26] and Newfoundland and Labrador.[25] While the four Acts differ somewhat in their drafting, they all share a common purpose of providing a cause of action for invasion of privacy.
British Columbia's Privacy Act
In Mohl v. UBC, the BCCA stated that “[t]here is no common-law claim for breach of privacy [in British Columbia]. The claim must rest on the provisions of the [Privacy] Act.”[65] This suggests that in British Columbia plaintiffs whose privacy is invaded are restricted to suing under the Privacy Act.
In more recent cases, including Tucci v. Peoples Trust Company[66] and Lu v. Shen, the courts have continued to consider what constitutes a "private" matter entitled to protection.[67] In the former case, the BCCA discussed whether there was a common law claim for a breach of privacy in addition to the statutory tort and concluded that the answer to such a question must "await a different appeal".[68]
British Columbia |
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Privacy Act, RSBS 1996, c 373, ss 1 and 2.[69] |
1. Violation of privacy actionable(1)It is a tort, actionable without proof of damage, for a person, wilfully and without a claim of right, to violate the privacy of another. (2)The nature and degree of privacy to which a person is entitled in a situation or in relation to a matter is that which is reasonable in the circumstances, giving due regard to the lawful interests of others. (3)In determining whether the act or conduct of a person is a violation of another's privacy, regard must be given to the nature, incidence and occasion of the act or conduct and to any domestic or other relationship between the parties. (4)Without limiting subsections (1) to (3), privacy may be violated by eavesdropping or surveillance, whether or not accomplished by trespass. 2. Exceptions
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In Milner v. Manufacturers Life Insurance Co, the court dealt with a suit under BC's Privacy Act.[70] As the practical elements of the Privacy Act remained largely undefined in the statute, Melnick J attempted to lay a framework for the tort of invasion of privacy, drawing in part from the common law. The first question was what constituted entitlement to privacy.[71] For the court in Milner v. Manufacturers Life Insurance Co, location was key, as "[a] person's entitlement to privacy is highest where the expectation of privacy would be the greatest".[72] The court considered that if the plaintiff is on public property or is easily viewed by one on public property there can be no reasonable expectation of privacy.[73] The second consideration concerned how privacy is breached.[74] The Privacy Act states that breach of privacy must be done "willfully and without claim of right."[75]
Statutory defences
Section 2 of the Act also provides a series of statutory defences.[76] For example, section 2(2)(b) states that an act will not be considered a violation if "the act or conduct was incidental to the exercise of a lawful right of defence of person or property”.[77] In Gokey v. Usher, the defendants' monitoring of the plaintiff's activities with security cameras was not unreasonable in the circumstances, as the RCMP informed the defendant that it was necessary to keep records of the plaintiff's activities in order for them to act on their complaints.[78]
Effectiveness of statutory torts of invasion of privacy
Some scholars have questioned the effectiveness of the various Privacy Acts. Fraser points to significant gaps in privacy protection, limited success of plaintiffs in the case law, as well as ongoing ambiguities as to how the courts should reconcile conflicts between social norms, technology, and privacy expectations.[51]
Additional privacy legislation
To read more about other privacy legislation in Canada governing the affairs of public sectors and private organizations, see the Canadian privacy law Wikipedia page.
Discussion questions
Organizing the tort of privacy
- Legal scholars have critiqued Prosser's four tort categories for its incoherence, rigidity, and incapacity to evolve to contemporary privacy landscapes.[79] What are the benefits and drawbacks of following Prosser's four tort categories in Canada?
- Ontario seems content to rely on the common law to develop privacy protections, while British Colombia has legislated protections in the Privacy Act. What are the downfalls and/or benefits of each approach? Is there a significant difference? Is there a particular approach you think is better?
Understanding the scope of privacy torts in Canada
- As stated by Yuan Stevens in "Revenge Porn, Tort Law, and Changing Socio-Technological Realities", what renders invasion of privacy as "highly offensive" is subject to contextual factors.[46] What are the implications of a broad conception of "highly offensive" behaviour and how does it play out in the case law?
- Courts have recognized that certain claims of privacy may be superseded by other legal interests such as freedom of expression. In what instances do you think that there is a legitimate countervailing public interest that should defeat an invasion of privacy claim?
- Milner indicates that one's entitlement to privacy is negligible in public spaces.[72] In addition, one's entitlement to privacy can also be diminished on private property if its viewable by an individual on public property. Does this suggest that the bar for protecting rights to privacy in British Columbia is too high? How should the line be drawn regarding entitlement to privacy in public and private spaces?
Quiz
- ↑ Wainwright v. Home Office [2003] UKHL 53 (§4.1.1) at para 15, citing Thomas M Cooley, Treatise on the Law of Torts, or the Wrongs Which Arise Independent of Contract, 2nd ed (Chicago: Callaghan & Company, 1888) at 29.
- ↑ Jones v. Tsige, 2012 ONCA 32 (§4.1.2) at para 15.
- ↑ Warren, Samuel; Brandeis, Louis (1890). "The Right to Privacy". Harvard L Rev. 4 (5): 193–220.
- ↑ Prosser, William (1960-08). "Privacy". California Law Review. 48. Check date values in:
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(help) - ↑ Prosser, William (1960-08). "Privacy". California Law Review. 48: 389. Check date values in:
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(help) - ↑ Dean Prosser, The Law of Torts, 4th ed (1971), p 804.
- ↑ Beswick, Samuel; Fotherby, William (2008). "The Divergent Paths of Commonwealth Privacy Torts". Supreme Court L Rev. 84 (2d): 235.
- ↑ Richards, Neil M; Solove, Daniel J (December 2010). "Prosser's Privacy Law: A Mixed Legacy". California Law Review. 98 (6): 1917.
- ↑ Beswick, Samuel; Fotherby, William (2008). "The Divergent Paths of Commonwealth Privacy Torts". Supreme Court Law Review. 84 (2d): 226.
- ↑ Duncan, Fraser (2020). "Illuminating False Light: Assessing the Case for the False Light Tort in Canada". Dalhousie Law Journal. 43 (2): 607.
- ↑ Wainwright v. Home Office, [2003] UKHL 53 (§4.1.1) at para 35.
- ↑ Campbell v. MGN Ltd, [2004] UKHL 22.
- ↑ Beswick, Samuel; Fotherby, William (2008). "The Divergent Paths of Commonwealth Privacy Torts". Supreme Court Law Review. 84 (2d): 227.
- ↑ Liang, Brent (20 Oct 2017). "Invasion of Privacy". Just Torts – via SoundCloud.
- ↑ Osborne, Philip H (2020). The Law of Torts (6 ed.). Toronto: Irwin Law. pp. 284–85.
- ↑ Jones v. Tsige, 2012 ONCA 32 (§4.1.1.2) at para 52.
- ↑ Jones v. Tsige, 2012 ONCA 32 (§4.1.1.2) at para 54.
- ↑ Jones v. Tsige, 2012 ONCA 32 (§4.1.1.2) at para 54.
- ↑ Jones v. Tsige, 2012 ONCA 32 (§4.1.1.2) at paras 47–51.
- ↑ 20.0 20.1 Jones v. Tsige, 2012 ONCA 32 (§4.1.1.2) at para 89.
- ↑ Jane Doe 464533 v. ND, 2016 ONSC 541 at paras 34–35.
- ↑ Yenovkian v. Gulian, 2019 ONSC 7279 (§4.1.3.1) at para 193.
- ↑ 23.0 23.1 Privacy Act, RSBC 1996, c 373.
- ↑ 24.0 24.1 Privacy Act, RSM 1987, c P125.
- ↑ 25.0 25.1 Privacy Act, RSNL, 1990, c P-22.
- ↑ 26.0 26.1 Privacy Act, RSS 1978, c P-24.
- ↑ 27.0 27.1 Bildfell, Connor (27 November 2023). "Podcast: Five Tech Law Cases Everyone Should Know". McCarthy Tetrault.
- ↑ Jones v. Tsige, 2012 ONCA 32 (§4.1.2) at para 2.
- ↑ 29.0 29.1 Jones v. Tsige, 2012 ONCA 32 (§4.1.1.2) at para 70, citing American Law Society, Restatement (Second) of Torts (2010).
- ↑ 30.0 30.1 30.2 30.3 Jones v. Tsige, 2012 ONCA 32 (§4.1.1.2) at para 71.
- ↑ 31.0 31.1 Jones v. Tsige, 2012 ONCA 32 (§4.1.1.2).
- ↑ Jones v. Tsige, 2012 ONCA 32 (§4.1.1.2) at para 72.
- ↑ Insurance Corporation of British Columbia v. Ari, 2023 BCCA 331 (§4.2.5) at para 84.
- ↑ Jones v. Tsige, 2012 ONCA 32 (§4.1.1.2) at para 73.
- ↑ 35.0 35.1 Jane Doe 72511 v. NM, 2018 ONSC 6607 at para 97–99.
- ↑ Jane Doe 464533 v. ND, 2016 ONSC 541 at para 46.
- ↑ ES v. Shillington, 2021 ABQB 739 (§4.1.2.1) at para 23.
- ↑ ES v. Shillington, 2021 ABQB 739 (§4.1.2.1) at paras 7–17.
- ↑ ES v. Shillington, 2021 ABQB 739 (§4.1.2.1) at paras 70–73.
- ↑ ES v. Shillington, 2021 ABQB 739 (§4.1.2.1) at paras 25–27.
- ↑ ES v. Shillington, 2021 ABQB 739 (§4.1.2.1) at para 68.
- ↑ McGill Law Journal (11 May 2016). "Revenge Porn, Tort Law and the Protection of Privacy in Canada".
- ↑ McGill Law Journal (25 May 2016). "Revenge Porn, Tort Law and the Protection of Privacy in Canada, part II".
- ↑ McGill Law Journal Podcast (May 2016). "Revenge Porn, Tort Law, and the Protection of Privacy in Canada". Spotify.
- ↑ McGill Law Journal Podcast (May 2016). "Revenge Porn, Tort Law, and the Protection of Privacy in Canada, part II". Spotify.
- ↑ 46.0 46.1 Yuan Stevens, "Revenge Porn', Tort Law, and Changing Socio-Technological Realities: A Commentary on Doe 464533 v ND" (2017) Canadian Journal of Law and Technology 15: 337.
- ↑ "A quick guide on sexual image based abuse". YWCA Canada. 2017.
- ↑ The Intimate Image Protection Act, CCSM c I87, s 11(2).
- ↑ Protecting Victims of Non-consensual Distribution of Intimate Images Act, RSA 2017, c P-26.9.
- ↑ 50.0 50.1 50.2 Yenovkian v. Gulian, 2019 ONSC 7279 (§4.1.3.1) at paras 170–71.
- ↑ 51.0 51.1 Fraser, Duncan (2020). "Illuminating False Light: Assessing the Case for the False Light Tort in Canada". Dalhousie Law Journal. 43: note 23.
- ↑ 52.0 52.1 Parasiuk v. Can Newspapers Co, 1988 CanLII 7173 (MBKB).
- ↑ Yenovkian v. Gulian, 2019 ONSC 7279 (§4.1.3.1) at paras 1–2.
- ↑ Yenovkian v. Gulian, 2019 ONSC 7279 (§4.1.3.1) at paras 171.
- ↑ Fraser, Duncan (2020). "Illuminating False Light: Assessing the Case for the False Light Tort in Canada". Dalhousie Law Journal. 43: 611.
- ↑ Fraser, Duncan (2020). "Illuminating False Light: Assessing the Case for the False Light Tort in Canada". Dalhousie Law Journal. 43: 626–632.
- ↑ Fraser, Duncan (2020). "Illuminating False Light: Assessing the Case for the False Light Tort in Canada". Dalhousie Law Journal. 43: 631–34.
- ↑ Goldberg, John C.P.; Zipursky, Benjamin C. (2023). "A Tort for the Digital Age: False Light Invasion of Privacy Reconsidered". DePaul Law Review. 73.
- ↑ Hategan v. Farber, 2021 ONSC 874 (§4.1.4.1) at para 73, citing Athans v. Canadian Adventure Camps Ltd et al, 1977 CanLII 1255 (ONSC).
- ↑ Jones v. Tsige, 2012 ONCA 32 (§4.1.1.2) at paras 18, 28–31.
- ↑ Hategan v. Farber, 2021 ONSC 874 (§4.1.4.1) at paras 47–48, 109.
- ↑ Hategan v. Farber, 2021 ONSC 874 (§4.1.4.1) at para 69, citing Joseph v. Daniels, 1986 CanLII 1106 (BCSC) at para 14.
- ↑ Hategan v. Farber, 2021 ONSC 874 (§4.1.4.1) at para 43, citing Krouse v. Chrysler Canada Ltd., 1973 CanLII 574 (ONCA).
- ↑ Campbell v. MGN Ltd., [2004] UKHL 22 at para 14.
- ↑ Mohl v. UBC, 2009 BCCA 249 at para 13.
- ↑ Tucci v. Peoples Trust Company, 2020 BCCA 246 (§4.2.1).
- ↑ Lu v. Shen, 2020 BCSC 490 (§4.3.3) at paras 276–77.
- ↑ Tucci v. Peoples Trust Company, 2020 BCCA 246 (§4.2.1) at para 68.
- ↑ Privacy Act, RSBS 1996, c 373, ss 1–2.
- ↑ Milner v. Manufacturers Life Insurance Company, 2005 BCSC 1661 (§4.2.2).
- ↑ Milner v. Manufacturers Life Insurance Company, 2005 BCSC 1661 (§4.2.2) at paras 75–78.
- ↑ 72.0 72.1 Milner v. Manufacturers Life Insurance Company, 2005 BCSC 1661 (§4.2.2) at para 76, citing Getejanc v. Brentwood College Assn., 2001 BCSC 822 at para 18.
- ↑ Milner v. Manufacturers Life Insurance Company, 2005 BCSC 1661 (§4.2.2) at paras 77–78.
- ↑ Milner v. Manufacturers Life Insurance Company, 2005 BCSC 1661 (§4.2.2) at para 75.
- ↑ Milner v. Manufacturers Life Insurance Company, 2005 BCSC 1661 (§4.2.2) at para 80.
- ↑ Privacy Act, RSBS 1996, c 373, s 2.
- ↑ Gokey v. Usher, 2023 BCSC 1312 (§4.2.3) at para 200.
- ↑ Gokey v. Usher, 2023 BCSC 1312 (§4.2.3) at paras 194, 206.
- ↑ Richards, Neil; Solove (2010). "Prosser's privacy law: A mixed legacy". California Law Review. 98: 1887.