forum for week of 12 September
How would you react to the following comment on chapter one of A guide .. ? "There is an analogy with ethics running through the chapter. What you should believe, what you can be criticised for believing, and so on. But ethics is a matter of the standards you adopt in your culture. There is something personal and arbitrary about it. Is epistemology just an expression of values and biases, then? Morton's values are pretty clear: beneath a veneer of tolerance he prefers beliefs that are scientific. But those are just his preferences." Be sure to sign your contributions. (See the syllabus for why.)
How can one deduce knowledge by scientific reasoning without questioning what constitues scientific reasoning in itself? Is there not a level of bias in what is defined as "proper" scientific method?
The so-called "placebo effect" is an interesting way of showing how no matter if a belief is right or wrong, a belief that is simply strong can be enough to prove it is correct to the holder of the belief. Perhaps, however, this effect in itself is only the result of other beliefs the person holds. The truth of a belief then, may vary from person to person.
For example, if a person says they hear many different voices in their head, there is no scientific test that could completely prove this to be true. However, this does not mean that because it cannot be proven, it is simply untrue. It could be true to that person simply because they believe it to be so. VERONICA
The placebo effect is one aspect of scientific method that serves to accommodate the unknown factors involved in medical intervention. Within this context, you will be right to claim that if someone believed strongly in something, it may sometime come true (or otherwise known as miracle healing).
I agree with you in that there is a level of bias in what is defined as the proper scientific method. Scientific method relies heavily the existence and interaction of 'tangible' proofs in the universe. By doing so, and with the establishment of extensive procedures and experimentation criteria, it has advanced and accelerated our knowledge base in the last 200 years (at least). However, because of the success and reliance on these 'tangible' proofs to provide us with concrete evidences to prove and disprove our beliefs, the perception of scientific method has shifted into demanding exclusively for these 'tangible' proofs.
With public perception of scientific method swayed by the success and rigor of scientific method in improving our life, the resulting consequence is that any other unexplained phenomenon that cannot be explained by scientific method are almost either cast aside as pseudoscience or simply branded untrue, on the basis that these phenomenon does not fall within the definition of 'tangible' evidences and hence cannot be tested (or does not conform with the other scientific beliefs). The emphasis here is that there are other aspect of things in the universe that science has yet had a chance to even perceive it, let alone study (such as within the energy-energy interaction such as dark matter in space or particle physics).
So to answer your skepticism to the 'proper' scientific method. Although it may be bias, scientific method has so far served us very well at least in the last 200 years and continues to do so. We should remember that scientific method has its limitation, and although vastly popular and reliable, is not the only avenue of testing beliefs. In a way, it is not 'proper' to rely exclusively on the scientific method to verify the truth of a belief, as science is a knowledge base in progress and is not even close to exploring all the details of things in the universe.
But on a more realistic note, the public generally rely otherwise for the sake of practicality (or ignorance).
Ken Wong
Humanity uses reason to delegate what our conscience tells us is right or wrong. While we may agree almost unanimously agree that certain things are generally thought to be wrong (i.e. murder, theft, etc.), how can we be sure what is truly right or wrong? Ethics vary between cultures based on different perceptions of morality, which are subconsciously developed since birth. Nonetheless, under certain circumstances, we may justify even the most notorious “wrongs” if we adopt a utilitarian policy of ethics. For example, we would condemn an individual for killing someone else, but if one murdered a serial killer, we may justify the action (not necessarily as being “right” or “wrong”) if they were saving the lives of many others in the process. You can justify both sides of the argument, but there is no clear objective truth prevalent. Scientific reasoning relies on induction in the will to progress. This method of reasoning juxtaposes distinct notions into general axioms based on the process of trial and error. Even if something is said to be right, and justly proven so, we cannot prove anything to be ALWAYS [objectively] true. We are tied to our perceptions, and even if tried and agreed upon by others, we can never conceive of objectivity itself, as our measurements of reason are both consciously and subconsciously subjective. Therefore, epistemology is merely an expression of value and bias based on our subjective perception points, rendering any Absolute or Objective Truths to be unattainable by us. TY
Out of curiousity then, what would be the rationale behind progress through scientific reasoning?
It seems that the concept of objectivity only exists through its dialectic relationship with subjectivity. Then one could question whether or not it is rational for humans to strive for objectivity considering the inherent and inescapable subjective nature of human beings themselves. DEREK
ps. I hope you don't mind I quoted you in my comment below.
Although people carry with them many beliefs such as the ones in the example, when they are confronted by people who disbelieve such statements, this disbelief is usually only founded in ordinary incredulity rather than in philosophical skepticism. It is therefore fairly easy to rebuke these disbeliefs, either by proving false or neutralizing the grounds for doubt. Take the example of Vancouver being in Canada. Suppose someone doubts this, arguing that Vancouver is, in fact, in Madagascar. This could be rebuked by either showing the person a map (or several if the doubt remains) or else by finding out that, for example, the person who told them that Vancouver is located in Madagascar was trying to play a trick on them. However, it becomes much more difficult to argue with philosophical skeptics since they question the very background of information that people generally rely on to verify facts like the examples in the question. It therefore becomes very difficult to falsify or neutralize any doubts since the reasons you would usually give to ordinary incredulity are themselves being undermined. It becomes difficult to argue with a skeptic due to disagreements on what counts as evidence. People are also likely to be convinced by skepticism, at least temporarily, when initially confronted with it since skeptics offer some very convincing reasons; how we are constantly disproving and re-formulating our scientific theories for example, or how we have been wrong so often in the past. Upon further reflection though, people will probably realize that many previous errors doesn’t mean we will not be able to discover truths in the future. Nevertheless, even if people are convinced by skepticism, they are likely to carry on with their life as they were before; by assuming they know certain things about the world or by at least working on the basis of what has been true for them in the past (though this may also be questioned in light of the dubious nature of our recollections), in order to function as humans. In this case, they would have to suspend their disbelief and suppose that we do live in a world in which there are facts; something that I would imagine even the most fervent skeptic does. In conclusion, I think that quite often an agreement to skepticism stems from a difficulty in knowing how to begin to rebuke such an argument as usual methods of disproving beliefs have been undermined by the skeptic's claim.
Sorry please ignore the above comment-I put it in the wrong dicussion-it is actually in response to the skepticism question from the 26th september
It's hard to judge beliefs concerning what is or is not ethical because different cultures often have different opinions on the matter. Still, I feel that good beliefs should be backed up by good reasons. Example: if a certain action causes direct harm to somebody else, then that backs up the belief that that action is wrong. If a belief is not backed up by any reasons showing why that action's right or wrong, then that belief is simply arbitrary. If a belief is backed up by poor reasoning, then it is much more likely for that belief to be wrong.
At the same time, it might be hard to judge whether the reasons backing up one belief are better than the reasons backing up another belief. With some difficult ethical questions, it might never be possible to decide whether some actions are right or wrong. But by evaluating the reasoning behind certain beliefs, we can at least begin to separate the good and the bad beliefs. Veronika Bondarenko
What separates a good reason from a bad reason for having a particular belief? For example, if we believe that stealing is wrong for the reason that individuals should not take something that does not belong to them, why do we believe this? What makes this a good reason for not stealing? Many of our reasonings for certain beliefs are grounded through conditioning by the society in which we are surrounded by. However, because every culture has different values, it is difficult to objectively determine which arguments behind every belief is "right" or "wrong". Another example: Causing physical harm to another human being is believed to be unethical because that person is suffering, one could argue that the person inflicting the pain is gaining pleasure from it, and thus the belief of hurting others as a good thing is justified. Although certain ethics are universal, we must ask ourselves why they are and by which means these standards are formed.
For a human to behold an ‘objective perception’ seems to be impossible and paradoxical. If the human mind and consciousness is developed and influenced by the environment and their perception of it, the limitations of exposure greatly restrict a human’s ability to perceive. The concept of objectivity would entail knowing everything. This would imply knowledge is definitive and absolute, which is unknown. So as humans "are tied to [their] perceptions, and even if tried and agreed upon by others, [they] can never conceive of objectivity itself."(Tclark66) Then epistemology, along with anything that humans have defined, would be an expression of values and biases.
Does relative objectivity exist? Can one be more objective than another? DEREK
I would like to apologize for not being able to contribute to this forum in time. Unfortunately, I have had some struggles getting the wiki to accept my email account. Needless to say, I would still like to share my thoughts on this week's readings.
After reading the first page of the text, I decided to look up a definition of "beliefs". I found one that I thought was in agreement with my own view of what constitutes a belief: "confidence in the truth or existence of something not immediately susceptible to rigorous proof." This lead me to believe that there must be a purpose for why many people choose to believe in explanations that perhaps don't have concrete evidence. Veronica D., you mentioned that the "placebo effect" is an example of someone having a belief that is so strong that it controls their perception and therefore what they experience. This is true of all people: what we know, what we feel and what we experience serves as our reality and therefore the basis for our knowledge. I think that is the purpose for why people choose to have beliefs, to explain something that they can't necessarily rationalize with scientific evidence. If we evaluate beliefs and modify them in order to obtain truth and create a universal epistemic ideal, are we creating conformity and agreement amongst all people? Would that disturb the unique characteristics across cultures? Morton re-iterates this on page 2 while writing about the epistemic ideal, asking us "what would be the price for satisfying this ideal: in order to have beliefs like this would we have to lose something else of value?" I think the pursuit for higher understanding is noble, but I think that trying to obtain relative objectivity is really difficult since people bring biases and stories based on their own experiences to the table. And that's what makes life so interesting, no two peoples' life narratives are akin, but does that make them untrue? -Claire Chevreau
I think beliefs/ethics are rather personal/societal matters than something that can be defined as right or wrong by outsiders. There has to be a reason for a person/society to believe why certain things are right or wrong, and that depends on the experiences that person/society has. However not every single person/society has the same experience as others do.For example, when some people in former British colonies think the British are the meanest people in the world, people in Britain in contrast think they are proud of themselves since Britain conquered so many places.Therefore we cannot judge others's belief or culture based on what our own standards are. Chen
When reading the first 9 pages of a guide through a theory of knowledge I find it useful to learn the definitions of many terms I had used in context but never really understood their true meaning. I could not help to think of a mathematics textbook when I was reading it. The view that humans being are "rational" animals in a world governed by reason is an interesting thought but I feel it is oversimplified. When a person is confronted with making a decision in life they have many factors they need to evaluate in order to determine what is the "right" or "wrong" thing to do. The problem in life is that there are not many situations where we can see a clear a black and white situation, the world is filled with shades with gray. When discussing decision making we must deal with emotions as well reason. People make decisions based more on emotion than they do on reason. If people were truly rational creatures we would view life logically. The problem is, we are influenced by a great deal of thoughts and emotions that sometimes we do not even understand or even realize. As much as it is useful to look at people as logical agents in a world governed by reason it is both idealistic and oversimplified. Just something to think about.
I don't think that can be straightforwardly answered. There are different categories of belief. Our mental perception of the world is the way it is because we have built up a system of beliefs over time to create that certain perspective. And no one can say that that certain perspective is wrong. No one can know really what our perspective is. Our beliefs about ourselves and who we are, are obviously biased and whatever it is we believe to be true about ourselves is the reality we create about ourselves and therefore the reality of the way we live our lives. There are however belief systems about the earth and the structure of the earth and the way it was formed like the geographical features of our planet for example, or the laws of nature (like gravity or electromagnetism). So say someone says the force of gravity is 9.5 m/s while it is actually 9.8 m/s. In an instance like that they are clearly wrong. So it really depends on the situation. I think unique situations have unique answers and we can't try to generalize and categorize. I don't think there is ever one unifying answer, we have to look at a specific situation and then develop a specific unique answer.
Morton prefers beliefs that are scientific. Physicist Freeman Dyson was awarded The Templeton Prize in year 2000. The Templeton Prize is awarded annually to outstanding originality in advancing the world's understanding of God or spirituality. In his acceptance speech, Freeman Dyson says his personal theology is consistent with scientific evidence. He also states that he doesn't say that his personal theology is supported or proved by scientific evidence. I think The templeton Foundation is progressive in their choice of awarding The Templeton Prize to Freeman Dyson. In his acceptance speech, Freeman Dyson says he thinks atoms and humans and God may have minds that differ in degree but not in kind. Freeman Dyson says he does make any distinction between mind and God. God is what mind becomes when it has passed beyond the scale of our comprehension. Freeman Dyson's scientific evidence is supported by quantum theory at the atomic level. Quantum physics is claimed to be the most tested theory. It has never failed a test. I think Freeman Dyson's personal theology beliefs qualify in the sense of Morton's preference for beliefs that are scientific. Am I accurate. James Milligan
previous should be:
Freeman Dyson says he does not make any distinction between mind and God.
James Milligan
They may be arbitrary but they are not without purpose. A cultures beliefs or values are rules for how to effectively live/succeed in that culture. This of course will differ by region and time period, but will always, at least at the time, reflect the endpoint in the evolution of that society. These values emulate how the fittest member of a certain society would think and act. Appealing to these morals, arbitrary they may be, is not a meaningless goal.
One person in class on Thurs had asked whether a rational belief can be unjustified... and then did Prof Morton use the easy-to-see example of a trial (DNA, hair...) to explain that the answer is Yes, a rational belief can be unjustified? Without that example, it seems hard to see that a rational belief can be unjustified... Out of interest and fun, has anyone thought of another easy to see example where a rational belief is unjustified? Jessica chen
In reading Morton I do find that he brings forth plenty of his arguments as if he is an objective authority on what constitutes knowledge, ignorance, rational, justification and so forth. However, he makes sound arguments that contribute to a larger discussion and I see no reason that he should stop and first acknowledge the inherent subjectivity in his sociohistorical context when writing about epistemology.
The ideal of epistemology is to discover the nature and scope of knowledge, or equivalently: epistemology is the study of the nature and scope of knowledge. Now, even if we change the definition of epistemology, there is still 'something' that can reasonably be seen as the study of the nature and scope of knowledge. For example, say we completely lose the concept of infinite - gone from all science. There is still 'something' that can be seen as infinite. Infinite will still be 'infiite' - still hold all the properties we know as infinite - even if we decide to define something else as infinite. The first mentioned 'something,' assuming it will always be labeled epistemology, is not just an expression of values and biases then as that's simply not what it is.
Morton, however, does bring his own fallible value and biases to the ideal of epistemology (albeit, the degree of this, I find, is only because he is human). But this only means that his arguments, and to take it further, every epistomologist's arguments is a subjective expression to some degree or another. It does not mean that epistemology is merely an expression of values and biases. There's similarly something exhilarating and arbitrary about sport brought about from one's cultural heritage. This does not mean that sport is merely an escape from boredom defined by it's sociohistorical context.
So... yes, we're all fallible but we can all bring something of value to the powerful discourses and ideals that we aspire to appropriate one day. Morton adds to his ideal and we can extract what we can from his competent writing and translate it into our context and subjective limitations as we continue to pursue that ideal of epistemology.
CORNELIS DIRK HAUPT
An interesting thought came to mind in the discussion we had in class with regards to belief in some ethical ideal (culturally, religiously etc) being a result of genetic disposition.
Take this and juxtapose it next to the placebo effect as discussed above.
Some people hold certain beliefs so strongly that neurologically speaking, we can measure that there is indeed empirical evidence that their beliefs do form part of a experience that is tied to their belief. One can try to rationalize this away by simply stating that we have a scientific basis for why that belief could be epistemically false (i.e. we can do experiments and see that the experience is merely the placebo effect in action). However, just as one could argue that one's sexuality is a part of one's identity, genetic disposition, and just a result of being human, so too can the same argument be made by someone who holds certain strong convictions (i.e religious beliefs).
The question posed then is whether Morton is being less human with his preference for scientific beliefs. Can one even be "less human" and are one's beliefs a basis for deciding this? Morton's essay suggest to me that having the right beliefs based on evidence is a crucial part to being a better human being.
But again, Seeing as certain ethics and standards are indeed somewhat arbitrary, personal and part of an adopted culture - and now more crucially: these beliefs are also in part biologically ingrained - is it not fair to argue against Morton that holding those beliefs in high regard is merely a consequence of being human? And that if anyone was to make a continuous affront or conspicuous rejection to those beliefs then it would be similar in all respects to someone making a continuous affront to one's sexuality. One's sexuality is also personal, a bit arbitrary, and shaped by cultural and genetic dispositions. Hence, it's merely a product of being human.
CORNELIS DIRK HAUPT
I believe that Clifford's argument is well-founded, if not worded in quite the way which he means to purvey it. What I glean from Clifford's argument of not believing anything without sufficient evidence is simply that we shouldn't believe something if the evidence for it is not there or properly convincing. James argues that if one goes by Clifford's argument, one will not be able to fully live one's life and will be in a constant state of paranoia. If you take Clifford's argument completely literally then I think that this would be something of a conundrum, but Clifford isn't saying that something has to be proven and without an ounce of doubt in order to believe it, he's simply saying one should have the proper information before one believes something, a practice which I personally believe is integral if one is to ever make informed decisions. After reading both arguments, I've come to the conclusion that while Clifford is more likely to miss out on something because of a lack of trust of others and the information presented to him, this is far superior to the stance of James which provides ample opportunity to be taken advantage and made a fool of.