forum for week of 12 September

Although people carry with them many beliefs such as the ones in the example, when they are confronted by people who disbelieve such statements, this disbelief is usually only founded in ordinary incredulity rather than in philosophical skepticism. It is therefore fairly easy to rebuke these disbeliefs, either by proving false or neutralizing the grounds for doubt. Take the example of Vancouver being in Canada. Suppose someone doubts this, arguing that Vancouver is, in fact, in Madagascar. This could be rebuked by either showing the person a map (or several if the doubt remains) or else by finding out that, for example, the person who told them that Vancouver is located in Madagascar was trying to play a trick on them. However, it becomes much more difficult to argue with philosophical skeptics since they question the very background of information that people generally rely on to verify facts like the examples in the question. It therefore becomes very difficult to falsify or neutralize any doubts since the reasons you would usually give to ordinary incredulity are themselves being undermined. It becomes difficult to argue with a skeptic due to disagreements on what counts as evidence. People are also likely to be convinced by skepticism, at least temporarily, when initially confronted with it since skeptics offer some very convincing reasons; how we are constantly disproving and re-formulating our scientific theories for example, or how we have been wrong so often in the past. Upon further reflection though, people will probably realize that many previous errors doesn’t mean we will not be able to discover truths in the future. Nevertheless, even if people are convinced by skepticism, they are likely to carry on with their life as they were before; by assuming they know certain things about the world or by at least working on the basis of what has been true for them in the past (though this may also be questioned in light of the dubious nature of our recollections), in order to function as humans. In this case, they would have to suspend their disbelief and suppose that we do live in a world in which there are facts; something that I would imagine even the most fervent skeptic does. In conclusion, I think that quite often an agreement to skepticism stems from a difficulty in knowing how to begin to rebuke such an argument as usual methods of disproving beliefs have been undermined by the skeptic's claim.