forum for week of 12 September

An interesting thought came to mind in the discussion we had in class with regards to belief in some ethical ideal (culturally, religiously etc) being a result of genetic disposition.

Take this and juxtapose it next to the placebo effect as discussed above.

Some people hold certain beliefs so strongly that neurologically speaking, we can measure that there is indeed empirical evidence that their beliefs do form part of a experience that is tied to their belief. One can try to rationalize this away by simply stating that we have a scientific basis for why that belief could be epistemically false (i.e. we can do experiments and see that the experience is merely the placebo effect in action). However, just as one could argue that one's sexuality is a part of one's identity, genetic disposition, and just a result of being human, so too can the same argument be made by someone who holds certain strong convictions (i.e religious beliefs).

The question posed then is whether Morton is being less human with his preference for scientific beliefs. Can one even be "less human" and are one's beliefs a basis for deciding this? Morton's essay suggest to me that having the right beliefs based on evidence is a crucial part to being a better human being.

But again, Seeing as certain ethics and standards are indeed somewhat arbitrary, personal and part of an adopted culture - and now more crucially: these beliefs are also in part biologically ingrained - is it not fair to argue against Morton that holding those beliefs in high regard is merely a consequence of being human? And that if anyone was to make a continuous affront or conspicuous rejection to those beliefs then it would be similar in all respects to someone making a continuous affront to one's sexuality. One's sexuality is also personal, a bit arbitrary, and shaped by cultural and genetic dispositions. Hence, it's merely a product of being human.

CORNELIS DIRK HAUPT