forum 5: week of 6 Feb. Hawthorne and lotteries

Fragment of a discussion from Course talk:Phil440A
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Hawthorne (at least not in the sections that we are reading) doesn't really address the issue of positive claims of knowledge that can counter the B claims before they are even brought up, as in the example of "faux zebra-stunt-double mules" and a visiting zoologist that DeRose brings up in his paper. The visiting zoologist has enough knowledge in his field to be able to tell that the creature in front of him is indeed a zebra, and not a zebra disguised as a mule, even if the latter possibility is brought up to his attention. The zoologist's belief concerning the genuine nature of zebras would then be a sensitive one. Consequently, (B) is still knowledge in the case of the zoologist, because it would be a lot harder to fake specific characteristics of a zebra aside from its peculiar coloration. Granted, this could lead down a slippery slope of measures of expertise in certain fields, which could then bring us back to justified true beliefs, but I think this issue is an important one in DeRose's distinction between "simple skeptics" and "AI skeptics", and, since Hawthorne takes DeRose's argument into account, it is interesting that he doesn't mention such a crucial part of it in his paper.

08:33, 7 February 2012