forum 4: week of 30 Jan: DeRose on skepticism

Fragment of a discussion from Course talk:Phil440A
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As it is 1AM, I won't be too ambitious, and try to take on the basic question. As I've understood it, Lewis' opinion on skepticism was that such a view would often leave the ascribers and the subject in question with either infallible knowledge or none at all. This is his segue into alternatives to skepticism: fallibilism and contextualism. DeRose doesn't seem to think that skeptics demand infallible knowledge. Rather, he thinks that by the means of AI, a skeptic raises the conversational standards by which the proposition is judged as knowledge. DeRose then specifies the level to which these standards need to rise by introducing the Rule of Sensitivity, and developing the rest of his argument. I think the most interesting point of this paper is the fact that DeRose bases his contextualist argument only on the 2nd premise and the (not-) conclusion; he says that "(2) is true regardless of its epistemic standard". (2) states, "If I don't know that not-H, then I don't know O" He does specify that, in his view, whatever warranted assertability is ascribed to not-H is also ascribed to O. Even if it is explicitly said that warranted assertability cannot be mistaken for knowledge, wouldn't that be an example of how you can fail to know consequences that you see following from things you know, if not-H is somehow chosen to be a consequence of O?

09:19, 2 February 2012