forum 10: week of March 19 - second order knowledge

Fragment of a discussion from Course talk:Phil440A
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One thing I would like to talk about tomorrow if possible is the second-order knowledge that is derived from testimony. Kelp and Pederson seem to assume that the person who obtains the knowledge (the testifyee) can justify that knowledge internalistically, which I disagree with. Since the justification in such a second-order case would have to be the claim that the testifier is reliable (and the evidence why), a way in which this could be strictly internalistic evades me.

05:31, 22 March 2012

Like Andreea mentioned, second-order knowledge calls into questioning the source of the information itself. I also feel the reasoning behind any knowledge attribution can never fully be known, so high questioning and putting the KK principle under scrutiny. I feel it s the reasoning itself, tied with belief which governs the accuracy (and inaccuracy) of a knowledge claim, as it can steer both highly irrationalized claims such as thinking we're better drivers as Olsy mentioned, or rational assertions due to personal experience (although others experience of this knowledge will never be equivalent.) Interestingly, it is thought others account for our behaviour and our dispositions with our interactions or relationships with others are better predicted by our close acquaintances, compared to ourselves as they have a more accurate judgment on ourselves vs. our interpretation of our own experience. Another interesting account for self-knowledge is the behaviour of a 'memory', which becomes altered and changes every time we think of the memory again, skewing the accuracy and interpretation at any given moment, almost distorting the 'perfection' of the experience at the given time and place. This calls into question the relationship between what it means to remember and the level of self knowledge, or knowledge claims at any given point in time. (Hopefully this was relevant)

02:55, 26 March 2012