forum 10: week of March 19 - second order knowledge

Fragment of a discussion from Course talk:Phil440A
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What is an example of knowing something without knowing that one knows it?Not noticing that one knows?(what do"fail to register"and fail to believe"really mean?).It seems to me that one can only know something first hand,exclusive of second order knowledge,imminantly,or instantaneously.If any perception is held even for a moment in memory,it is by definiton reflected upon,and thus known in the second sense of being a known known(shades of Rumsfeld:-)This would mean that there are really two meanings contained in the single term "know":One meaning is experiential and the other is held belief.It is, perhaps psychologizing,but nevertheless tempting to presume that since S knows something,at some level then she must know that she knows unconsciously.("lapse of attention"p.590)This might perhaps suggest a belief that is unacceptable,and,in being denied thus occludes access to second order knowledge.(How does ISD,or Internal Self Deception sound,or,borrowing from Heidegger's tortured prose,undisclosing?)This would be to argue that KK's failure would rest on deliberate,though perhaps reflexive and involuntary,deliberate unknowing,especially in consideration of the first sentence,"Knowledge involves belief."In the case of children and animals,we might also add that they are not at a stage or level of sufficient guile to tactically avoid and thus successfully undisclose unpleasant or undesirable realities.(as in I just can't face the fact that the zebras are really painted mules) Regarding section 5:it might seem that the collectivised helping-each-other-out communitarian example of Bob and Jack would solve things as in the case given,and that there would be a positive outcome. U:nfortunately,the reverse can also be true,that denial of inconvenient belief can also be collectivized leading to collectively reinforced,rational,yet monstrouly delusional prosecutions of policy internally held by sufficient numbers of individuals and based on 'proven'facts with disastrous results.I have a question about the term 'warrant,'Is it a foundational(ist) term?"Warrant for belief"seems to me to involve some sort of idea of permissability,a kind of etiquette for belief.Does this suggest then that there are some beliefs which cannot be allowed without a warrant,and what constitutes unwarranted?It means a permit,or a guarantee.By whom and by what authority?It has a whiff of dogma to it.

22:24, 17 March 2012

Robert asked about the term "warrant". Partly it's just a fancy word for "justfied". But there are three other ideas connected with it. (They're different, so I avoid the word.)
1) externalists started using the word "justified" with an externalist flavour. So if you get your belief in a way that is usually reliable, even if it is failing to give you a true belief in this case, they call it justified. Internalists said "To hell with this; we'll use our own word, and we won't let them take it away from us."
2) it's part of a fake solution to the existence of Gettier cases. Knowledge is not the same as justified true belief, so we declare that it is the same as true belief with warrant. That is, all warranted belief needs to become knowledge is truth. But then it is utterly unclear how we are to define warrant.
3) There might be something in someone's situation that makes it reasonable to hold a belief, even though it is not part of what would traditionally justify it, for example the fact that the person who told it to you is trustworthy. Then we call this part of your warrant for the belief. (This is inconsistent with 1) - you can't have both motives for using the term. See how it's confusing.)

02:04, 18 March 2012

Re: SECOND-ORDER KNOWLEDGE Christoph Kelp and Nikolaj J.L.L. Pedersen

Excerpts: Knowledge involves belief. Belief is a propositional attitude, i.e. an attitude that a subject holds towards a proposition

principle of knowledge transmission: (KTP) KSKRP → KSP

KTP has some prominent advocates—Hintikka (1962), to mention just one. However, even if we suppose that advocates of KTP are right in maintaining that the principle holds, it is important to avoid confusion about what the principle says. In particular, although it is natural to read KTP as saying that subject S knows that P by knowing that subject R does so, the specific warrant involved in R’s knowledge is not automatically transmitted to, or inherited by, S. This can be so even if S is fully aware of what the source of R’s knowledge—and warrant—is.

I like the reference to Hintikka.

Between Staley and Cobb; and, Kelp and Pederson, it appears possible to bring the internalist knowledge of beliefs that include theology, space, time, quantum mechanics, and multiverses; together, into the externalist scrutiny of justification in scientific enquiry, with the help of Hintikka's logic.

07:35, 20 March 2012
 

I just wanted to talk a bit about what we discussed today the kk principle- that you can know something because you know that someone knows that. A part of me wants to say that this can't be a case of knowledge because in order to KNOW something you must have reasons or evidence for it. But then again how can we personally experience everything and know everything only through personal experience. Obviously we gain much of our knowledge through testimony. So is S knows that R knows that P is not necessary a case in which S doesn't have evidence or proof. I think S can in fact have evidence without personal experience. The fact that S even says I KNOW that R KNOWS means that obviously R is a legitimate source and expert or has enough evidence for S to be certain or to KNOW that R does in fact know it. So although S himself doesn't have the evidence and or did not collect it personally if he is in fact saying that he KNOWS R KNOWS it it is because he KNOWS that R HAS THE EVIDENCE. If R was just saying something which S was not sure about or wasn't sure that R really knew it or had good enough reason to know it then S would never say I KNOW. I feel like just the wording makes this statement correct because we are not saying that S believes that R has some reasons to know P rather we are saying that S KNOWS (he is certain because R is a reliable source etc) that R KNOWS (he has facts and evidence and experience) that R. Therefore I do think that S can in fact know that R also. His evidence may not be PERSONAL experience but his evidence is the fact that he can in fact trust R as a legitimate and reliable source.

03:19, 23 March 2012

I agree that it is appealing to be able to use testimony gain knowledge. However, I think this forces us to ask other questions, such as how do we know that one's source of information is reliable? Can we assume that if they have been a reliable source of information in the past, that we can trust them to be a reliable source in this case as well? Or is it a matter of checking to see that they have evidence to support their testimony? I guess I'm a little sceptical of second-order knowledge, when I think about how confidently one can know something based on testimony, my instinct is that one needs to see the evidence that the other person has, which leads us back to first-order knowledge.

05:44, 23 March 2012