forum 1, week of Jan 8, Dretske

Fragment of a discussion from Course talk:Phil440A

In reference to question 1. Along the vein of my comment in class on Tuesday, when we make a claim we overlook and take for granted our background knowledge and beliefs. A person claims to know that is a zebra in the zoo they over look all of their beliefs that they have, perhaps they have good reason to trust zookeepers, maybe they read an article about this zebra a few months back, perhaps they also see themselves as good judges of zebra ect... These subconscious conditions to the agents justification can show how the agent comes to believe that they know without fully processing their claim. But is this rational? The agent has yet to thwart the skeptic's argument, but would the skeptic still find it necessary to resort to the "mischievous demon" argument if the agent did fully articulate his claim? I guess what I'm trying to say is, I understand how epistemic operators are semi-penetrating, but I put forward can a combination of operators become fully penetrating?

Also can "know" just be high level of belief? To know is to say 99% certain?

WilliamMontgomery23:03, 11 January 2012