forum 1, week of Jan 8, Dretske

Fragment of a discussion from Course talk:Phil440A
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I said this in class. The formual a, if a then b, seems to be something Dretske can't manipulate if he considers them not knowledge, but truths, whether anyone has ever concieved of them or not. If there is a, there is b. But to speak about the formula like that is to take an impossible perspective, because gaining the prespective disolves it, similar to the elusivity of knowledge that Lewis talks about. Once you say that someone knows a, and that person also knows that if a then b, the formula becomes subjective, and like all things subjective, like all things ever said, they can be wrong. So sure, you can know a and know if a then b and not know b, but you would either result in a 'false' (the word loses a lot of meaning here) belief that you know b, or the reasoning that got you there would have fallen to the same problem.

02:10, 20 January 2012