forum for week of 28 November: pragmatism

I found Rorty's discussions on relativism quite interesting, especially parts where he claims relativity in areas of knowledge that we traditionally assume to the the stronghold of objective truth. For example, in the essay, Rorty, claims that even scientific knowledge, truth as obvious and unquestionable as the heliocentric model of the universe, is relative.

It’s “incorrect” (I put it in parenthesis because Rorty would most definitely avoid the term) because our views on the solar system are not determined by the actual position of the sun and the planets. Rather, it’s the result of contingent narratives and their usefulness to use - I think in the essay that he mentions space travel as one of the uses of having a heliocentric model, and this is why actually subscribe to the view. Nothing is defined by its inherent worth, inherent truth - everything is judged through the lens of pragmatism. Therefore, there are no truths - only relatively more or less useful contingent narratives.

While I accept relativism in some places, I found the claim of relativism in the hard sciences disturbing. I wonder what view Rorty would take with regards to mathematics, given that math is an even more apparently and objective truth case than science.

Indeed, space travel is a great benefit arising from our conception of the solar system, but that could hardly be the reason why we had our conceptions in the first place. Galileo didn’t have the faintest clue what his theory would entail (e.g. space travel). He just sat in a field somewhere and looked up to the heavens with his telescope. What dictated his theory was the observations he saw and his unwavering dedication to it.

If he were practically minded, he might have been persuaded by threats from the church to cease with his hearsay. But he didn’t. His objective knowledge arising from his observations convinced him that it is the solar system is organized with the sun in the center, and not any other way. That is not only a true fact relative to him, but a true fact for all. It transcends whatever language games he may play, whatever contingencies he may have.

Rorty might respond by define pragmatism in another way. He might say Galileo still did what was pragmatic for him because the heliocentric view pragmatically explained Galileo’s empirical observations. He found the explanatory powers useful, and that’s why he persisted in face of the inconveniences posed by the church (e.g. house arrest). But this redefinition (no pun intended) of pragmatism is rather confusing. What is it actually different from truth (besides the name, of course). What is pragmatic in this sense is what is true. It was pragmatic for Galileo to describe the planets as revolving around the sun and not the other way around because that view better corresponds with reality. Therefore, if we define pragmatism liberally, it becomes the same thing as truth.

So, in my view, Rorty’s faces a central dilemma. Either his theory cannot account for many human events and developments or it looses its radical nature and becomes just another correspondence-to-the-truth theory.