forum for week of 26 September: skepticism

forum for week of 26 September: skepticism

People are usually pretty sure that they know many things. They have no doubts that 2+3=5, that they have toenails, that Vancouver is in Canada, and so on. But when they meet philosophical scepticism (scepticism/skepticism: either way) they usually fold without resistance. Sure, they say, we don't really know anything. Why is this? Possible explanations:
- they can't be bothered to argue, so it is easier to give in
- they like grand weird-sounding philosophical conclusions
- they recognize a truth about knowledge and get confused, thinking it is skepticism. (I tend to this one.)
- they accept the truth that we know very little, but stick with their old opinions for the sake of harmony with others
- or...?

AdamMorton21:38, 23 September 2011

I suspect they see scepticism as possible but the lack of resistance is because it isn't a falsifiable theory. Karl Popper noted that the demarcation between science and dogma was whether or not there was a potential piece of evidence that could prove the theory wrong. Scepticism offers no such possible piece of evidence, making arguing with a sceptic both pointless and exhausting.

SpencerKeys16:51, 26 September 2011
 

Simply put, I believe that when people think about philosophical skepticism they indeed recognize a (possible) truth in it. However, I also believe most people don't care enough about its importance since it normally has little impact on our daily life. For sure you could accept this truth, realize you cannot know anything for sure and thus stop believing in anything, but how would your life then look like? You would have to question everything at every given time, which seems rather impossible. Instead, people would rather accept it as a possibility, yet one not significant enough to actually influence their way of life. It's impractical to let it lead your life.


I'd like to add something to the comment above about Karl Popper's Falsificationism. Popper developed this theory in response to his problem of demarcation; he was looking for a criterion to distinguish general "real" science from "fake" pseudoscience. His theory is a response to confirmationism; a theory which states that we can justify scientific theories and beliefs through observations, thus confirming them. Popper argued that this is impossible, you cannot start making (useful) observations without having some expectations already in place. Instead, he argued, we believe in theories not because they are confirmed but because they are not yet falsified. We can never exclusively conclude that a theory is true, but we can conclude that a theory is false. As long as a theory has not yet been refuted, we are justified in believing it.


This argument too can be challenged. Can we really ever conclusively disprove a theory?


To get back to the point, debating over whether or not there is anything we can really know for sure is for most people not going to lead anywhere. Philosophers have been debating over this issue for a long time and the problem is that we can never really know if any of their theories is true or not, they can never be confirmed because any method to confirm such a theory is in itself subject to skepticism. Many theories will sound plausible but have little value to make life-changing decisions accordingly.

YaradeJong02:41, 27 September 2011
 

Although people carry with them many beliefs such as the ones in the example, when they are confronted by people who disbelieve such statements, this disbelief is usually only founded in ordinary incredulity rather than in philosophical skepticism. It is therefore fairly easy to rebuke these disbeliefs, either by proving false or neutralizing the grounds for doubt. Take the example of Vancouver being in Canada. Suppose someone doubts this, arguing that Vancouver is, in fact, in Madagascar. This could be rebuked by either showing the person a map (or several if the doubt remains) or else by finding out that, for example, the person who told them that Vancouver is located in Madagascar was trying to play a trick on them.

However, it becomes much more difficult to argue with philosophical skeptics since they question the very background of information that people generally rely on to verify facts like the examples in the question. It therefore becomes very difficult to falsify or neutralize any doubts since the reasons you would usually give to ordinary incredulity are themselves being undermined. It becomes difficult to argue with a skeptic due to disagreements on what counts as evidence.

People are also likely to be convinced by skepticism, at least temporarily, when initially confronted with it since skeptics offer some very convincing reasons; how we are constantly disproving and re-formulating our scientific theories for example, or how we have been wrong so often in the past. Upon further reflection though, people will probably realize that many previous errors doesn’t mean we will not be able to discover truths in the future.

Nevertheless, even if people are convinced by skepticism, they are likely to carry on with their life as they were before; by assuming they know certain things about the world or by at least working on the basis of what has been true for them in the past (though this may also be questioned in light of the dubious nature of our recollections), in order to function as humans. In this case, they would have to suspend their disbelief and suppose that we do live in a world in which there are facts; something that I would imagine even the most fervent skeptic does.

In conclusion, I think that quite often an agreement to skepticism stems from a difficulty in knowing how to begin to rebuke such an argument as usual methods of disproving beliefs have been undermined by the skeptic's claim.

AlexandraKnott06:25, 27 September 2011
 

I have to agree in concept with the above post. There certainly is merit to the idea that even our most steadfastly held ideas may not stand on solid epistemological ground,which can be startling to individuals not used to philosophical skepiticism. In everyday life, however, even the most fastidious skeptic must set aside there beliefs simply in order to live. Like Hume said,you have to believe the world is essentially as it appears to be when you exit the classroom.

Does this mean that the average person is in fact an unknowing skeptic? Hard to say. Skepticism definately holds inate appeal, but if you choose to judge an individual by their actions and not their stated beliefs, then you would be hard pressed to find any skeptics at all even amongst those that write articles extolling its virtues.

ZacharyZdenek06:36, 27 September 2011
 

I think people tend to give in because philosophical skepticism, when argued properly, is pretty convincing.

People think they know a lot of things, without actually knowing why or how they know them. Few people live their lives considering the ramifications of the theory of relativity, or quantum mechanics. Those theories have a level of precision that is not useful to people during their day to day lives. The same goes for considering the source of knowledge, as the thought involved is beyond utility for most people. We can all get by pretty well without having to think very hard, most of the time.

That sort of shallow thinking can, and does, create an environment ripe for philosophical conversion. It's easy to change someone's mind when they hadn't really made it up in the first place.

AmandaJohnson06:51, 27 September 2011
 

I believe it's more about self doubt about beliefs and reasoning

RunZheLi07:24, 27 September 2011
 

I personally have to disagree with the statement that most people fold in the face of skepticism. Discuss religion with someone who is devoutly religious sometime and regardless of the fact that skepticism discounts most of the devout believer's arguments they will continue to hold fast or simply denounce you as a servant of Satan. If discussing the existence of God, for example, they will most often quote the Bible which is supposedly the word of God yet within the context of the discussion God's existence has yet to be determined and therefore it is unproven whether or not He has any word but in their belief their arguments are fully valid. Though we may not think of a belief in the existence of God as knowledge it is to the devout believer and so it is a valid example for out discussion. The believer knows God exists just as the conspiracy theorist knows 911 was an inside job. Try using philosophical skepticism on one of those guys.

What is knowledge? The question of this course. We claim that something is not knowledge unless we have evidence or better yet proof but the devout believer, whatever it is they believe, sees proof of his belief everywhere. On the other hand do I really care that 2 + 3 = 5? No. Is that knowledge to me? Not really. It is, rather, an assumed and commonly held fact. What makes it different than knowledge is I don't have to and have never really thought much about it and therefore have never really seen any evidence or proof for it. (I am sure I have I just never really noticed because it is, to me, an inconsequential piece of trivia.) So it is not really knowledge to me but just something I assume to be correct because it is what I am told and do not care about it enough to look into it for myself. This is a topic on which I would admit the skeptics point but it would not really be folding or relenting as I did not really have a starting position of my own anyway.

Whether or not I have five toes or four on my left foot of whether or not I have a physical body at all can be called into doubt when I become convinced that it is quite possible that everything I perceive is either created by my brain or exists in the form I perceive only as my mind's interpretations of a physical world which I could not otherwise comprehend. But what must force my mind to concede that it is possible that nothing I perceive is real? That I might really be sitting in a classroom in Romania at this moment listen to a lecture by some Adam Morton guy and not laying on my bed writing this before going to sleep? In short, why do people relent in the face of skepticism regarding their "knowledge" which is not self-centered (e.i.: scientific knowledge)? We once believed the earth was flat which proved to be wrong. We thought, some time before we were born, that the earth was the center of the universe but is it? Up until sometime in the 1800's people believed the earth could not be more than 6000 years old. Einstein used to have us all convinced that it was impossible to travel faster than a known finite speed defined as the speed of light but wait... . In truth we as humans are aware of the fallibility of so-called knowledge. It is "so-called" because unless we have personally found proof of the belief it is not our own knowledge just something we are taking on authority. In the shadow of the long history of disproven beliefs and theories we admit somewhere inside that everything we think we know may be false and only refuse to openly admit it when it comes to those things we believe about the world or the way it should be that make us happy with ourselves.


In short, people do not agree with skeptics unless the subject matter is something they don't really care about. You can easily convince me there is an animal called a snuffleupagus but you can never convince a Priest to doubt the existence of God no matter what argument you make or how you undermine his arguments. In fact, in his mind you haven't even undermined his arguments. A doubt in the someone's knowledge must be self-derived because to them they have already seen the proof and must see the counter proof in order to doubt.

WilSteele08:25, 27 September 2011
 

I think the reason that the general public is prone to philosophical skepticism is because of the ease to access information in the 21st century. Prior to the invention of the computer and the Internet, few people could access information about how certain things worked. For example, only a few group of elites had access to information such as how the solar system worked in the beginning of the 20th century, whereas now even a 5 year-old will probably know more about it than people in the past. Because more and more people can access these information, they start to doubt the authenticity of them. In the past, few people bothered to know why something is the way it is, and instead just relied on the information that were available to them (mostly through people around them). If one is exposed to these information for a long time, they will firmly believe it even though they have no idea why it is so. On the other hand, nowadays, the information and ideas that people are exposed to are constantly changing due to the availability of information; people's "beliefs" about one subject changes before they are exposed to them long enough. Hence I believe the reason skepticism causes people give in so easily is that since past beliefs have been easily overturned, there is no reason to stand firmly by one's own beliefs but better to just open themselves to new things instead (even though the doubt could most likely be wrong).

YangSunnyLi08:28, 27 September 2011
 

I think that many people accept skepticism whilst making a conscious choice to ignore it, because accepting that there is very little truth makes living in the "reality" that we live in too difficult.

ChloeLawson15:12, 27 September 2011
 

I think people consider skepticism as another way to either prove or convnice themseleves of their beliefs

RunZheLi17:49, 27 September 2011
 

I believe that people become skeptical of their own previously founded beliefs when faced with philosophical skepticism is a result of two principles; a) It's human nature that we exhibit some nativity to information, when someone tells us their argument or point of view. This is especially evident to our beliefs that are not properly grounded or these very same beliefs being well dissected, debunked or unraveled by the source of contradictory information in question. When one of our thoughts gets challenged, we immediately start to challenge other thoughts associated with it. b) This leads into my second point of conformity. Humans have a great tendency to agree with each other. We feel a sense of social insecurity, and awkwardness when we think, reason (and in this case) believe something different then someone else. Thus we feel more at ease when we doubt our own ideas, and agree to the more "grounded" reasons of others

DanielKostovicLevi18:29, 27 September 2011
 

When faced with someone who doubts the very nature of reality, most people find it very difficult to construct an argument as neither point can be proven. Thus it becomes an argument solely for the sake of argument which is not overly exciting concept. If we are actually just brains in vats and our reality is nothing more than a false perception, nothing in our day to day lives would change, other than a far greater rate of depression.

AlanLaking00:59, 28 September 2011
 

The reference of this entry is to Dr. Morton's discussion of neutrinos travelling faster than the speed of light. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy scepticism article, under the heading: 2. Two Basic forms of Philosophical Skepticism, has the inclusion ..."'possible world scepticism' because the arguments for it typically involve imagining oneself to be in some possible world that is vastly different from the actual world and at the same time absolutely indistinguishable (at least by us) from the actual world. What underlies this form of skepticism is absent to the proposition that we cannot know EI-type [Epistemically Interesting] propositions because our evidence is inadequate. In The Associated Press news release dated September 23, 2011 and titled "Physicists wary of junking light speed limit yet" a skeptic is reports Alvaro De Rujala, a theoretical physicist at CERN, the European Organization for Nuclear Research outside Geneva from where the neutron beam was fired, said he blamed the readings on a so-far undetected human error. What I find captivating is DE Rujala's choice of proposition for quotation to The Associated Press. "The average person, said De Rujala, 'could, in principle, travel to the past and kill their mother before they were born.'" I speculate, how much is De Rujala the skeptical physicist, who argues the average person couldn't just say hello to their future mother, as a future sibling, instead of killing their future mother, because something like quantum theory would interpret such an example as an interference and the sibling future event being altered; and, how much De Rujala's choice for The Associated Press of event as example for the average person to travel to the past, may be designed by DE Rujala to tarnish the physicists who may have successfully discovered neutrinos go faster than light--or neither of these speculations--is of great interest. James Milligan

JamesMilligan06:58, 28 September 2011
 

Preceding line 5 should read: "Physicists wary of junking light speed limit yet" reports a skeptic, Alvaro Du Rejala, a theoretical physicist at CERN, James Milligan

JamesMilligan07:30, 28 September 2011
 

Expanding on Spencer's point of non-falsifiability in relation to the idea of skepticism, I feel automatically skeptical and aversive towards any theory or conjecture that is non-falsifiable, which makes me skeptical towards that ultimate philosophical skepticism that states we cannot know anything. I feel it's a similar aversion to non-falsifiability that is what has helped push our scientific progress to where it is today. These NF ideas are rightly viewed to be, while interesting to think and talk about, less than useful in a practical sense.

Compared to a more healthy skepticism, which forces solid evidence to advance an argument, the 'we don't really know anything' skepticism only hinders or will completely end any sort of inquisitive discussion. There are no responses to "oh, there is no way can really know that," and, in the same way, any NF claim. This leads to my own first skeptical inquiry towards any new claim or idea or theory, which is to ask for or think of something that would falsify it. It is easy to think of numerous obvious examples that would immediately falsify any scientific theory.

Back to the main question, we fold because their is no real response to a statement like this. People will either accept it because they can't see anything wrong with it, or reject/ignore it because the statement itself loses all its meaning the moment it is uttered.

"We can't really know anything" also contradicts itself, in that it makes a claim about knowledge that calls into question the certainty of everything, including the statement itself.

Johnlewis08:49, 28 September 2011
 

Why do we acknowledge that we don't REALLY know anything when confronted with philosophical skepticism? I see the relevance of accepting our ignorance and limitations, especially in how we perceive the world, in making a response to this question. The first thing that popped into my mind while reading the discussion topic was a quote by Socrates, "The more you know, the more you realize you know nothing." We tend to think that more knowledge means more intelligence. It's true but I believe it is also a humbling experience. When we learn new, amazing, and controversial things to be true, I am sure some of us out there will realize how ignorant we actually are through the "enlightenment" (it could be proved to be false or fallible again in the future). In <The Invisible Gorilla>, the first two chapters give several examples and case studies that show how human perception and memory can be misleading and fallible. We believe we saw things one way but in reality, it was in another way. We are surprised to see a gorilla walking past the basketball court because we didn't see it while we were counting the balls being thrown around. Something that seemed so trivial to one individual was an traumatic experience to another leading to two different accounts of the same situation. We rely on these memories and perception to understand the world around us, and most of the time we are caught believing things the way we want to. The more we become aware of the misleading aspects of human nature we once had so much faith in, I believe it leaves room for us questioning already established "truths". We all once had a situation where something we believed so firmly to be true was proven or argued against to be false, either converting or weakening our beliefs. We live in a world where "truth/false" is proved to be "false/true", the irrational is explained to be rational or vice versa. Therefore, I believe that whether we fully comprehend it or not, we have an underlying understanding of our limitations which will leave us searching for an absolute truth and questioning the already established "truths". And thus, I think it may be a possibility that a person will end up agreeing that we do not REALLY know anything when encountered by philosophical skepticism for the very reasons mentioned above.

ShinHyeKang01:10, 29 September 2011
 

It seems to me that most people cave in when presented with philosophical "globally" skeptic scenarios because we have an intuitive grasp over how Karl Popper argues we should treat unfalsifiable hypotheses. It is rather obvious that Descartes' Demon, for instance, is unfalsifiable, because it undermines the entire process of attaining knowledge by suggesting that our thoughts themselves may be manipulations of some malignant architect. We tend to accept the potential validity of such fantasies because we recognize firstly that they are difficult if not impossible to argue against, and secondly that the unfalsifiable nature of such hypotheses means that they should not be considered with nearly the same weight as a hypothesis verifiable through the scientific process. Karl Popper claims (as a previous poster notes) that an unfalsifiable belief is essentially dogmatic. In short, people do not argue with global skepticism with the same rigor afforded to other philosophical topics because it doesn't allow for much of an argument, and that the acceptance or not of such a broad, overarching, dogmatic belief has negligible consequences for our everyday lives. As an analogy, consider how many people are bothered by the idea of Bertrand Russell's teapot. Few of us would argue that we could disprove the notion that there is a celestial teapot in orbit around the sun, but few of us think that it would result in a drastic change in our everyday lives if it were to be true.

Aled23:21, 29 September 2011
 

I believe that a lot of people intentionally choose not to argue against philosophical skeptics not only because their theory isn't falsifiable, but also because the theory has very little impact on people's lives. the "fact" that 2+3=5 may not be true, but at least this reality, 2+3 always seems to be 5 to everyone. because of this consistency, the world is able to function with no problem regardless of how true our knowledge(which may be a giant interconnection of wrongness) is. In a way, this is an attitude similar to that of an externalist's since it is like arguing that what really matters is the end result, in which case would be the functioning of the world, rather than the process of getting to the end result.

JinKim21:22, 1 October 2011
 

I believe people are less inclined to dispute the ideas suggested by sceptics, because of a lack of attachment to the argument. Non-sceptics accept reality how it is and whether a mass illusion exists in generally not a topic of interest. This debate is comparable to the debate between theists and atheists, however, people defend their religious beliefs more rigorously, because it is a topic of great relevance and debate in our cultures and has been for thousands of years. However, the idea that our reality could be a massive illusion has resulted in far less debate due to it's lack of relevance in our society.

ChadMargolus22:33, 7 October 2011