Feedback

Hi Adnan,

Interesting read about improvements to Nash equilibrium.

For the comparison between models, can the formula for the log likelihood be stated? It isn't quite clear what is being compared, and how the confidence intervals are constructed.

As with the other two, I agree that the contributions of the two papers can be more explicitly stated.

For your 2-player 2-action example, I don't understand the statement "The pure-strategy Nash equilibria for this game are $(C,D)$ and $(D,C)$, where each player has no incentive to deviate." It seems that if the opponent chooses "Dare", then the player does have an incentive to deviate (chicken out). It may be better to change the example so that the Nash equilibrium is for both players to "Dare" and thus resulting in a crash. I think this would be a better lead into how "Nash equilibrium often makes counter-intuitive predictions." (Though I guess this is subjective..)

Thanks for the read,

Ricky

Hi Ricky,
Thank you for your suggestions. I have revised the page and have explicitly stated the incremental contribution of Paper 1 over Paper 2 at the end of the page. Let me try to explain what the statement you were referring to means.
Statement: The pure-strategy Nash equilibria for this game are $(C,D)$ and $(D,C)$, where each player has no incentive to deviate.
What this means is that these pairs of strategies which constitute the pure-strategy Nash equilibria are "self-enforcing", i.e. it makes each player's strategy an optimal (best) response to the other player's strategy. The main point is to show that while Nash equilibria is an intuitive notion of achieving equilibria, it is often a poor predictor of human behavior.