GRSJ224/pro-natalist policies in South Korea

Pro-natalist policies refer to policies that are designed specifically with the purpose to encourage and increase the fertility rate through the use of incentives.

Overview

South Korea Fertility Rate and Number of Births from 1970 to 2015

The total fertility rate (TFR) measures "the average number of children a woman will have in her lifetime".

South Korea's fertility rate has been drastically falling from the 1970s and 80s and the country became the "ultra-low birth rate society" in 2001. As of 2018, South Korea became the first country to have TFR below 1.0 among the Organization of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries.

TFR of about 2.1 children per woman is called "replacement-level fertility", which represents the average number of children a woman needs to reproduce, in order to balance out the number of elder generation deaths and replace a population from one generation to the next.

If the decline in fertility rate continues, it is projected South Korea would be the first country in the world "to have an average life expectancy above 90" by 2030.

Factors Contributing to Low Fertility / Fertility Decline in South Korea

Low Fertility and the fertility decline in South Korea can be explained into three broad factors.

Cultural Factors

Delays in Marriages: Changed Values Among Younger Generations

Shifting from the necessity of marriage and Confucian Familialism, the younger generations in South Korea became to pursue more "secularized and individualistic values". This had led to an increase in delays in marriages or even no marriages and a decline in marital births.

The fertility rate of married women greatly influences its overall fertility rate as most births happen in marital relationships in South Korea.

The age at which a woman first gets married (FAFM) "corresponds strongly" to fertility rates and the statistics published by the Korean government show that FAFM has risen from "24.8 years in 1990 to 30.0 years in 2015". Given that FAFM has risen, the fertility rate has decreased as the prolonging of the female's age at first marriage reduces childbearing span and brings adverse effects on maternal and perinatal outcomes.

The increased percentage of unmarried women is also strongly associated with the fertility decline in South Korea. According to the National Statistical Office, from 1970 to 2015, the percentage of unmarried women of age group 25-29 and 30-34 increased from 9.7% to 77.3% and from 1.4% to 37.5%.

The rise in the FAFM can be attributed to the increased rate of women enrollment in the postsecondary institution and the increased participation in the labour force.

Social Factors

The rising rate of enrollment in a postsecondary institution and labour participation among South Korean women

Women in South Korea began to turn from familistic norms and gear towards more flexible life choices, including the opportunities for higher education and the success in their career

The statistics show:

• "The number of women who enrolled in universities increased from 50% in 1995 to 72.7% in 2017" (The National Statistical Office)
• "The employment rate of women aged 25-29 and 30-34 increased significantly from 53.7% in 2000 to 69.6% in 2017 and from 47.3% in 2000 to 61.0% in 2017" (The National Statistical Office)

These factors combined resulted in delays in marriages as well as increased rates of no marriages among women, which produced a fertility decline, as discussed above (see section Cultural Factors).

Low household participation of husbands

Low household participation of husbands was another reason to avoid having many children by South Korean women.

It is reported that "a number of macro-level studies using data from OECD countries have shown that fertility is positively related to men's share of childcare and housework relative to their wives". In other words, the greater the husbands involved in housework, the more the wives would have desires for having children and that the husband's support in the domestic sphere is likely to increase the probability of having intended births.

However, according to the East Asian Social Survey, about 60% of men in Korea prepare meals less than once a week, while over 80% of Korean women prepare meals every day. The report published from OECD in 2012 also shows that the Korean men spend the fewest hours on unpaid household works and their shares of household work hours are the lowest among OECD countries.

The figures for low household participation of Korean men illustrate that the heavy amount of household works makes childbearing not attractive to Korean women.

Lack of Universal Childcare Facilities and Services

Low availability of universal childcare facilities and services was an additional factor that discouraged couples from having more children.

Based on the findings from the Ministry of Health and Welfare in 2017, public facilities only account for 7.8% out of all childcare facilities in South Korea, which is not enough to reduce the financial stress of raising children.

It was reported, "high expenditure on formal childcare and private education for the first child had a negative relation to the intended birth of a second child" and that increasing the availability of childcare services for preschool children would be helpful to encourage to raise the fertility.

Economic Factors

Unstable job markets and rising inequality became a serious issue since the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997. As people faced increased unemployment rates and periods of high economic uncertainty, there has been a trend among younger generations in South Korea to delay marriage and childbirth.

The National Survey on Marriage and Fertility Dynamics conducted in 2009 presents that 50% of unmarried men reported financial reasons, such as "uncertainty related to income or employment and the cost of housing" for not marrying.

Furthermore, the burden of the cost of childcare and education has been identified as one of the key reasons for low fertility in the region. A study conducted by Anderson and Kohler claims that "at the provincial level in Korea, there is a negative association between household spending on children's education and TFRs".

South Korea's Political Response to Low Fertility: The Basic Plan for Low Fertility and Aged Society

Table 1. "Summary of the Basic Plan for Low Fertility and Aging Society"

	First (2006-2010)	Second (2011-2015)	Third (2016-2020)
Driving Factors	The burden of child-rearing and school fees The difficulty of balancing work and family Childcare support facilities that provide adequate environments for child-rearing	Declining population and large-scale shift to an ageing population Continual deferment of marriage and childbirth due to social and economic factors	Policy responses taking into consideration the drastic decline in childbirth and speed of ageing population that remained insufficient (need for increasing basic awareness of the issues around changing population makeup as well as long-term countermeasures) Necessity of pooling capacity from all sectors of society for a crisis response to the "population precipice"
Vision	Construction of a favorable environment for birth and child rearing	Building the basis for a gradual recovery in birth rates	Achieving a sustainable, developed society where all generations can be happy together
Aims	1. Removal of factors presenting obstacles to birth and child rearing 2. Expansion of social support networks for the healthy growth of children and young people	1. Normalization of a work-family balance 2. Alleviating the burden of marriage, childbirth, and child-rearing 3. Creation of an environment supporting the healthy growth of children and young people	1. A happy society with children 2. A productive and dynamic ageing society

In 2006, the Korean government had initiated "the Basic Plan for Low Fertility and Aging Society" as a political response to the declining birthrate and the ageing population.

The plan renews every 5 years and the result of the action plans are submitted to the National Assembly Budget Settlement Committee and the Ministry of Security and Public Administration every year for an evaluation.

First Plan (2006-2010)

• First Plan prioritized "the creation of an environment conducive to childbirth and. child-rearing, through initiatives that supported areas classed as vulnerable in terms of childbirth".

• It had limitations that it was unable to cover the support need of dual-income households for childbirth and childcare and that such services could not be delivered through nongovernmental organizations — due to lack of the participation of the private sector.

Second Plan (2011-2015)

• To overcome the limitations of the First Plan, the Second Plan focused on "adopting a comprehensive approach that supported a work-family balance extending to dual-income households and the middle class". It also made an attempt to raise the participation of businesses from the private sector and the citizens.
• At the same time, it received a criticism that it spent a budget which was three times higher than the First Plan and that the result of the Second Plan was not cost-effective.
  • "The total fertility rate bad been below 1.3, and the speed of ageing had not changed over 5 years (2011-2015)".

Third Plan (2016-2020)

• Based on the unsuccessful result of solving low fertility and ageing population issues, the Third Plan made a different approach from the First and Second Plan. This approach strives to understand "the causes of low fertility in terms of social structure, such as employment, education, and housing and emphasizes the necessity of improving these factors".

Future Directions

Going forward, the government should promote reducing and relieving the household work of women "through a more-gender equal division of domestic labour" to resolve the low fertility issue.

Lee and Zaidi suggested raising Korean men's involvement in household works and childcare, referring to successful policy implementation case in other countries such as "daddy quota".

Increasing the availability of affordable and public childcare facilities and services would be also helpful to tackle a constant decline in fertility.

Most importantly, the future policy should move towards from "state-led fertility policy" to a "human-centered policy", which not only strives for targeting the birthrate and number of birth, but also focuses on improving the quality of every individuals' lives and respects their ways of life.