Course:MGMT405 2023W2/Case-2v

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Wirecard

Wirecard Logo.svg
Company type: Aktiengesellschaft (AG)
Industry: Financial Services
Founded: January 1st, 1999[1]
Fate: Insolvent
Headquartered: Munich, Germany
Employees: 5,300 (2019)[2]
Website: https://www.wirecard.com/
Key Players:
  • Markus Braun (Former CEO)
  • Financial Times (News Publisher)
  • Jan Marsalek (Former COO)
  • KPMG (Professional Services)
  • EY (Professional Services)
  • BaFin (Financial Regulatory Authority)

Background

Wirecard is an insolvent German-based online payment processing and banking service provider founded in 1999. [1] At its peak it was one of the largest and most prominent financial technology (Fintech) firms in Europe, processing payments for its clients, both individuals and businesses, worldwide, as well as offering several other services, including virtual credit card issuing and risk management solutions. [1]

Corporate Governance Scandal

Cracks in Wirecard's facade began to emerge in the mid-2010s when various reports and allegations surfaced regarding irregularities in the company's financial statements and reporting. [3] These allegations primarily focused on inflated revenue figures, fictitious transactions, and discrepancies in profit reporting. [3][4]

As suspicions grew, Wirecard came under increased scrutiny from investors, analysts, and regulatory authorities. [3] Short-sellers, in particular, alongside critical investigative journalists from the British-based Financial Times (FT) newspaper, raised concerns about the company's financial health and the accuracy of its financial disclosures. [3] Despite these mounting concerns, Wirecard denied any wrongdoing, maintaining that its financial statements were accurate and reliable. [3]

The scandal reached a tipping point in June of 2020 when Wirecard admitted that €1.9 billion, supposedly held in trustee accounts in the Philippines, could not be located. [4] This revelation shocked the financial markets and rapidly deteriorated Wirecard's stock price and market value.[4] The company's shares plummeted, and its reputation took a severe hit as investors and stakeholders grappled with the magnitude of the missing funds and the implications for Wirecard's solvency. [4]

Amidst the chaos, Wirecard's CEO, Markus Braun, resigned, and the company filed for insolvency. [1] Legal investigations were launched into the company's affairs, with authorities scrutinizing the actions of Wirecard's executives, their Ernst & Young auditors, and the German regulatory oversight bodies, particularly BaFin, who were involved in this scandal. [4]

Timeline

1999:

  • Wirecard is founded in Munich, Germany, where the company began its life as a payment processor, assisting digital vendors in collecting credit card payments from customers.[3]

2002:

  • Markus Braun joins Wirecard AG's management board and formally becomes the company's CEO and CTO.[5]

2005-2007:

  • Wirecard is listed on the Deutsche Börse Group (Frankfurt Stock Exchange), taking over the listing from Infogenie AG, a declining call centre group organization. By doing so, Wirecard avoids the scrutinous procedures of a traditional IPO.[6]
  • With the newly raised capital from its public listing, Wirecard acquires XCOM, a German banking service provider, which they subsequently renamed Wirecard Bank AG.[4]
  • In large part due to XCOM’s prior certifications, this new consolidated entity is licensed by Visa and Mastercard, meaning it could issue credit cards and handle money on behalf of vendors.[4]
  • Wirecard Asia Pacific is formally established, becoming widely popular/successful in these various markets, especially Singapore and other areas of the South Eastern Pacific region.[4][3]

2010:

  • Jan Marsalek, a fellow Austrian and Markus Braun's young protege is appointed COO at Wirecard. This also marks the beginning of a shift in the company's global expansion plans, with young Marsalek at the helm.[3]

2015-2017:

  • The Financial Times publishes the first in a series of articles alleging accounting irregularities at Wirecard's Singapore office. Wirecard denies the allegations and commissions an investigation by Ernst & Young (EY), their auditor, which finds no evidence of wrongdoing.[4]
  • The Zatarra Report, a document issued by short sellers, Zatarra Research, accuses Wirecard of fraudulent activity, marking senior executives as guilty of money laundering offences, and the defrauding of both Visa and Mastercard.[4]
  • Wirecard denies all accusations, and the German financial regulator, BaFin, seemingly takes their side, investigating Zatarra and other short sellers for market manipulation.[4]
  • With a clean audit from EY, the backing from government regulators, and a successful prior year for reported cash generation, Wirecard becomes a new golden child for the European fintech industry and their share value skyrockets in price.[4]
  • Wirecard announces a formal deal to take on Citi Bank’s payment processing operations, throughout parts of Asia.[1]
  • Wirecard joins the Deutscher Aktienindex (DAX), Germany’s leading stock market index, reflecting its current status as one of the largest publicly traded companies in the country.[6]

2018:

  • After an internal whistleblower comes forward, an investigation within Wirecard’s Singapore headquarters takes place, specifically into plans for fraudulent sales and profit inflation activities being conducted by members of its financial team.[1] When this internal investigation is seemingly squashed in a potential cover-up initiative, new whistleblowers come forward and contact the FT.[1]

2019:

  • The FT publishes a new story on Wirecard’s Singapore affairs, which the firm quickly asserts as being false. BaFin, in the defence of its Fintech compatriot, opens an investigation into the FT over market manipulation allegations.[1][4]
  • The FT asserts that half of Wirecard’s business, including payment processing, is outsourced to fake/fraudulent partner firms that then pay Wirecard commission based on this arrangement (fake revenues).[4]
  • Wirecard formally sues the Financial Times over these allegations, stating that the newspaper had misrepresented much of the information in their findings.[4]
  • At the end of the year, Wirecard hires KPMG to complete an independent audit to address the allegations made by the FT regarding their finance team.[1][4][3]

2020:

  • In April, KPMG publishes their findings, reporting that Wirecard did not provide sufficient documentation to verify the authenticity of much of the firm’s profits from 2016 to 2018.[4] KPMG states that they could not confirm at least 34 of Wirecard’s commercial clients and at least €1 billion in cash.[4]
  • On June 16th, two Philippine banks inform EY, Wirecard’s main auditor, that documents that allegedly confirmed the existence of €1.9 billion were fraudulent, and just a few days later Wirecard publicly acknowledges that these sums of cash most likely did not exist.[4]
  • Within days of this public confirmation of mass faulty accounting, Wirecard’s stock price and reputability tank, with members of its executive team being arrested on charges of fraudulent book-keeping and market manipulation. The firm states its plan to file for insolvency.[1][3][4]

Key Players

Markus Braun
Markus Braun, Former CEO of Wirecard

Markus Braun

Before Wirecard During Wirecard
  • Austrian tech investor born in 1969.[7]
  • Degree in Computer Science and Business Studies from the Technical University of Vienna and a Ph.D. in Social and Economic sciences from the University of Vienna, earned in 2000.[8]
  • Previous roles included e-Strategy Project Manager for KPMG India in Munich from 1998 to 2001 and a Senior Consultant at Contrast Management Consulting between 1995 and 1998.[9]
  • Known as the predominant shareholder, CEO, and CTO of the largest German fraud ever.[7]
  • Accusations of fraud led to his resignation and eventual arrest.[7]
  • Faced heavy scrutiny, including allegations like commercial gang fraud, market manipulation, false accounting, and breach of trust.[10]
Dan McCrum
Dan McCrum, Journalist at Financial Times

Financial Times

Financial Times (FT) is defined as a British daily business newspaper that focuses on business and economic current affairs in New York and London.[11] In Dan McCrum’s 15-year career at the Financial Times, he has showcased exemplary investigative journalism, particularly in uncovering the Wirecard, which went as follows:[12]

  1. A phone call with the Company's CEO Braun that immediately raised red flags about the company's financial practices.[13]
  2. McCrum came across a short seller that in 2016 published the Zatarra report which McCrum quickly came to support through a post of his own.[13] This support earned McCrum the accusation of colluding with a short seller in market price manipulation.[13]
  3. He combined forces with Stefania Palma, who was in contact with whistleblower and former employee Pav Gill.[13]
  4. In 2019, Gill provided pivotal information and emails that permitted the FT to release another article accusing Edo Kurniawan of ‘cooking the books’ for Wirecard’s Asian operations.[13]
  5. In 2019, with the help of Pamala, FT found out and released a piece about fictitious business partners and transactions accounting for half of all the company's revenue and all of its profits.[13]The fake business partners included PayEasy Solutions, ConePay, and Centurion Online Payment International.[13]
  6. Wirecard unsuccessfully sued FT, which fueled FT to release a summarization of all the fictituous partners, transactions, and practices of Wirecard.[13]
  7. The summarization caused enough internal pressure from shareholders to force Wirecard to enstate a special audit from KPMG, which ultimately led to the collapse of Wirecard.[13]
  8. In recognition of his relentless pursuit of the truth and the impact of his investigative work, McCrum was awarded the highest prize for investigative journalism in Germany in November 2020, and the Journalist of the Year at the 2020 British Press Awards.[12]
Jan
Jan Marsalek, Former COO of Wirecard

Jan Marsalek

Born: 1980.[14]

Role: Austrian businessman known as a fugitive in the wake of Wirecards collapse.[14]

Background: Marsalek is a mysterious man due to his complex list of ventures that often intersected, including Wirecard, personal investments, and activities that align with the operations of Russia’s intelligence agencies.[15] Marsalek's has had an intermediary role in facilitating interactions between Russian operatives and right-wing populists to exploit migration crises, particularly concerning refugee camps in Libya.[13]

Involvement in Wirecard: Marsalek joined the company in 2000 and served as the COO from 2010 until the collapse in 2020.[14] In 2017, he reportedly attempted to bribe Paul Murphy of the FT.[13] Following whistleblower Pav Gill's revelations about financial misconduct led by Edo Kurniawan, Marsalek was put in charge of the investigation, which notably failed to make any progress, resulting in Gill's dismissal.[13]

When Wirecard was collapsing he swiftly vanished.[16] The aftermath of the scandal has seen Braun pointing fingers at Marsalek, labelling him the mastermind behind the fraudulent operations and claiming ignorance of the ongoing schemes.[16]

Auditors: KPMG and EY

EY and KPMG, ranking as the 3rd and 4th largest auditors by revenue respectively, were charged with ensuring that Wirecard’s financial statements were accurate and conform to generally accepted accounting principles.[17] As Wirecard’s auditor for over a decade, EY’s involvement in the scandal has left people pondering the credibility of their work.[18]

Year EY KPMG
2019
  • Wirecard’s auditor for ten years, issuing clean audit reports.[18]
  • Financial Times raises doubts over the existence of Wirecard's clients in Asia, leading to Wirecard hiring KPMG for a forensic audit.[18]
2020
  • EY encounters forged bank documents claiming €1.9 billion was held in Asian banks.[18]
    • One week later, Wirecard collapsed.[18]
  • KPMG publishes its report stating it could not verify Wirecard’s business operations in Asia.[18]
>2020
  • EY insists its staff were deceived by a sophisticated fraud involving fake shops and fabricated bank branches in the Philippines.[18]
  • Under scrutiny, EY expresses regret for not detecting the fraud sooner.[18]
  • Hubert Barth, head of EY Germany, was replaced by Jean-Yves Jégourel.[18]

BaFin (German Federal Financial Supervisory Authority)

The Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin) was established in 2002 it aims to unify the German financial regulatory body that looks over banks, financial services, insurance, and securities trading.[19][20]

BaFin was involved in the Wirecard scandal in 2019 because it banned the shorting of Wirecard stock and filed legal complaints against FT journalists who brought up the accounting irregularities.[21] In hindsight, BaFin should have been investigating the fraud allegations.[21]

After Wirecard’s collapse, the Financial Services and Integration Act (FISG) got involved and aimed to modernize BaFin by making its powers and capabilities stronger to prevent future Wirecard Scandals.[22]

Stakeholders - Who they are & What they lost

Shareholders

“Everyone in Germany believed in this company. No one would have believed that this was the work of gangsters.”[13] - Cansel Kiziltepe, Member of German Parliament

Wirecard has a broad array of stakeholders because, though now insolvent, they were a major public company with many shareholders.

Exchange: Frankfurt Stock Exchange, Deutscher Aktienindex (DAX)

Peak Market Value: $27 billion / 120 million shares [23]

Total Estimated Losses: 1.5 billion euros / 30,000 investors)[24]

Timeline of Share Value:

Date Share Price USD[25]
31/08/2018 $222.66 (MAX)
01/05/2020 $104.55
01/06/2020 $1.75

Consequences

  • Dutch law has set up an investor campaign group called Better Finance to help investors recover the 1.5 billion lost.[24]
  • Major shareholder SoftBank lost their 900 million euro cash injection and looked to be compensated for their losses, threatening to sue Wirecard’s accounting firm Ernest & Young (EY) for damages.[26]
  • Investors experienced a major loss of trust and confidence in the financial system and its regulatory bodies. This loss of trust is harder to value than the actual funds lost.

Customers

“Everyone thinks Wirecard is this big payment processor doing legit things, and actually the heart of its business is laundering money for criminals.”[13] - Dan McCrum, Journalist for the Financial Times

Wirecard’s revenues stemmed from taking a small percentage of its merchants’ sales. This means they had a wide array of customers who were reliant on their payment processing system to receive their funds. In 2017, Wirecard’s stock soared after revealing their large and diverse customer portfolio.[27] An internal investigation by the Financial Times, however, proved their customer base to be much smaller and unequally distributed than they had claimed.

Wirecard’s Claims Internal Investigation Results
Revenues arising from 33,000 large and medium-sized merchants and 170,000 small businesses[27] Less than 0.05 percent of Wirecard’s customer base made up over 40% of their total revenues [27]

Consequences

  • Investigations revealed some of their largest customers to be in the pornographic and gambling industries.[27]
  • The unusually high fees they were paying led investigators to believe much of it related to money laundering for criminals.[13]
  • Included in this small group of major customers was Marathon Alderney, the parent of online gaming cite Marathon Net and online brokers Rodeler and Hoch Capital, who were banned from operating in the UK after using fake celebrity endorsements.[27][28]
  • Despite their affiliations, Wirecard's customers experienced significant hardships due to the company's bankruptcy financial losses, disrupted payment processing services, and damage to their businesses' reputations and operations.

Employees

“They tried to destroy me.”[29] - Pav Gill, Former Wirecard Employee and Whistleblower

Number of Employees before collapse: 5300[2]

Roles: Data project managers, Linux engineers, data analyzers, telephone consultants/customer service representatives, senior management etc.[30]

While many employees may have been aware of the company’s wrongdoings (with some even contributing and stealing bags of cash from head office) it was ultimately this stakeholder group who contributed greatly to Wirecard’s demise.[31] Singapore-based lawyer Pav Gill became the infamous internal whistleblower after other unnamed employees told him about some of the fraudulent behaviours they were witnessing. [32]

Consequences

  • Following bankruptcy, 730 Wirecard employees were terminated in August 2020, with most finding out via email on the evening of the 24th.[33]
  • All of Wirecard’s companies and subsidiaries filed for bankruptcy in the summer of 2020, meaning a wide array of employees were terminated, with one stating “[m]any of the subsidiaries have no assets, even the office plants were leased.” [33]
  • Many did not receive payments for the final month of their work at Wirecard. [33]
  • Stakeholder group faced weakened reputation as employee of such a large and public fraud case.

Regulators

“BaFin haven’t covered themselves in glory at all. They are supposed to regulate - all they did was bow down to any requests from the company.”[34] - Neil Campling, Mirabaud Securities

BaFin is considered a major stakeholder in this case because many believe they did not adequately perform their duties as the German Federal Financial Supervisory Authority, leading to a multi-million dollar lawsuit. [35]

Consequences

  • Stakeholders including investors and former employees began searching elsewhere for compensation for their losses, including targeting third parties such as BaFin.[35]
  • BaFin has faced numerous lawsuits and investigations but continues to be Germany’s financial regulatory authority today.[35]
  • BaFin remains a major stakeholder in the case as they must continuously prove learning and growth to re-establish trust.

Ernest & Young (EY)

“We regret that the collusive fraud at Wirecard was not discovered sooner […] EY Germany is a different organization today.”[36] - EY Management

Ernest & Young (EY) was Wirecard’s auditor for over ten years, meaning that for over a decade, they provided unmodified opinions (or clean audit reports) for financial statements with major irregularities.[36]As a major stakeholder, EY’s credibility was tarnished within the financial industry regardless of whether they acted with intent or negligence.[37]

Consequences

  • As a previously well-regarded accounting firm, EY’s reputation suffered alongside Wirecard’s Demise
  • In 2023, they were fined 500,000 euros by the country’s audit watchdog Apas and were banned from taking on any new clients for two years. [37]
    • EY’s penalty reflects Apas’ belief that they had shown “breaches of professional duty” during their audit of Wirecard between 2016 and 2018, including failure to perform a routine audit procedure related to the request of account information from a bank in Singapore where Wirecard regularly deposited cash. [36][38]

Government Authorities

“The Wirecard scandal should not be viewed as an isolated incident, but, on the contrary, as a textbook example of the structural shortcomings of nationally organized supervision in the context of international economic competition in the EU’s single market.”[39] - René Jakubeit, School of European Political Economy

In major fraud cases such as this, the public eye is often directed towards the government; concerns begin to surface, with many questioning the systems set in place that are supposed to protect them.

Prior to and during the Wirecard era, or from the 2000s to 2010,  the German economy grew by 24%, and the German government was hungry for more growth. [40]

Consequences

  • Despite the many regulatory bodies set in place to prevent fraud causes such as Wirecard's, investors, customers and employees together lost millions.[39]
  • Many believe that the government failed to uphold their duty to protect its people as it felt pressured to protect national economic champions and boost the German economy.[39]
  • The German government was forced to investigate and redesign regulatory methods and regulations, including the termination of its partnership with the Financial Reporting Enforcement Panel.[38]

Litigation & Current Status

Questions regarding the company’s actions, staff and management competency in addition to the due diligence of the auditors have spurred dozens of litigations following the collapse of the organization, most of which are still ongoing with no definitive timeline on their resolutions.

Markus Braun

“They will take the risk, let’s bet over a box of champagne,” he wrote to a colleague in a chat message seen by the Financial Times. Referring to Braun, he added: “MB always says that he has one foot in prison anyway".[16]

- George-Alexander Trümper, former Head of Legal

Former Wirecard CEO Markus Braun sits in the courtroom at the District Court in Munich.[41]

Charges

  • Prosecutors have charged Markus Braun with fraud, breach of trust, accounting rigging, and market manipulation regarding his actions to avoid writing down a 100m euro loan granted to a small business partner on March 10th, 2020.[16]
  • These charges carry a potential sentence of up to 15 years under German law. Two additional ex-Wirecard managers Oliver Bellenhaus and Stephan Von Erffa have also been charged regarding their conduct with this coverup.[42]

Current Status

  • The trial began on December 8th, 2022 with key evidence for the case coming from co-defendant Oliver Bellenhaus who has agreed to cooperate with German authorities as the chief witness.[42]
  • During the trial, investigators accused the defendants of organized gang fraud, embezzlement, balance sheet forgery, and market manipulation based on information provided by Bellenhaus.[43]
  • A district court found the directors and officers liability insurance company that he held a policy with not legally obliged to pay his claims.[44]
  • Markus continues to deny any wrongdoing. A verdict for this trial is not expected until late 2024.[42]

Stephan Von Erffa

Former Head of Accounting Stephan von Erffa arrives to give testimony.[45]

Charges

  • The former Head of Accounting was charged with fraud, breach of trust and market manipulation.[46]
  • Denied any involvement in the scandal, instead blamed Jan Marsalek during a parliamentary inquiry into the scandal.[46]
  • Faces up to 15 years if convicted.[46]

Current Status

  • The trial is still in process, with a verdict not expected until late 2024.[46]

Jan Marsalek

Charges

  • As a key player in this scandal, his name is mentioned in a majority of legal proceedings regarding the company’s actions in addition to his responsibility.
  • Jan Marsalek has been on the run since June 2020 following the impending collapse of the company.[47]
  • The International Criminal Police Organization, often referred to as INTERPOL, has issued a “Red Notice” for Mr. Marsalek, which is a request to law enforcement worldwide to locate and provisionally arrest a person pending extradition, surrender, or similar legal action.[48]

Current Status

  • In late 2023, the former executive broke his silence through a letter provided by his legal council to the Munich district court, although he made no specific comments on the allegations made against him and no statements on his intention to return to face charges.[49]

Thilagaratnam Rajaratnam

Charges

  • The 60-year-old Singaporean was charged with 14 counts of falsification of documents regarding transactions related to Wirecard as the director of Citadelle Corporate Services on July 3rd, 2020.[50]
  • He claimed that 47 million euros, 66.4 million euros and 30 million euros were held by Citadelle in escrow accounts as of Dec. 31, 2015, which were deemed false statements.[51]

Current Status

  • During his testimony, Mr. Rajaratnam accused the EY auditors of not doing enough due diligence in verifying funds.[44]
  • He subsequently pled guilty on January 11th, 2024 and was sentenced to four weeks of prison and disqualified from acting as a director for five years.[52]
James Henry O'Sullivan walks out for a lunch break at the Singapore State Courts during a hearing on the fraud case.[53]

James Henry O’Sullivan

Charges

  • The 48-year-old hard-partying Englishman allegedly established and orchestrated the opaque Third-Party acquirers (TPA) network, while working closely with Jan Marsalek and Thilagaratnam Rajaratnam.[54]
  • He has been charged with 5 counts of abetting Shanmugaratnam in the falsification of documents.[55]
  • These falsified documents were part of the paper trail that helped persuade EY Auditors that the company had extensive cash reserves.[44]

Current Status

  • His sentencing has yet to commence.[44]

James Aga Wardhana

Charges

  • The former international Finance Process Manager was charged with conspiracy to embezzle funds with superiors.[56]

Current Status

  • He plead guilty to one count of criminal breach of trust, one count of abetting the falsification of accounts, and one count of money laundering by the Singapore Courts.[57]
  • Convicted on June 20, 2023 and was sentenced to 21 months in prison.[57]

Chai Ai Lim

Charges

  • The former Head of Finance was charged with conspiracy to embezzle funds with superiors.[56]

Current Status

  • She plead guilty to one count of criminal breach of trust.[57]
  • Convicted on June 20, 2023, and was sentenced to 10 months in prison.[57]

Ernst & Young (EY)

Ernst and Young corporate logo.

Charges

  • Scrutiny regarding EY Germany's conduct has resulted in investigations by the Munich Criminal prosecutors, the audit watchdog group APAS, and an avalanche of pending and active litigations from Wirecard stakeholders who claim the audit miss-practice lost billions in investments.[18]
  • Wambach, a senior auditor at Rödl & Partner has stated that EY’s accounting practices for the previous several years violated several standards set in the industry. Specifically claiming “Numerous fraud risk indicators with regard to the TPA business . . . could have triggered further audit acts”.[18]

Current Status

  • As a result of their oversight, EY’s German business was banned for two years from accepting major new audit mandates due to its failure to identify the fraud in addition to a 500,000 euro fine following the investigation by APAS.[58]
  • This ban specifically covers all publicly listed organizations in addition to the majority of the financial sector which includes but is not limited to insurance companies, banks, and consumer finance companies.
  • The company has overhauled its German partnership structure to repair the reputational damages that occurred.[59]

BaFin

Charges

  • Four shareholders took BaFin to court over their alleged failure regarding their legal duties to investigate evidence of illegal conduct by the company in addition to failing to inform the public of the potential hazards.[21]

Current Status

  • The Frankfurt district court dismissed these suits citing that under German law, BaFin explicitly works for the wider public interest rather than that of individual investors.[60]
  • BaFin filed a criminal complaint regarding potential intention of market manipulation against the publisher and approximately ten short-sellers.[61] With their investigation resulting in no charges while pressure from stakeholders rose, Felix Hufeld, head of BaFin during this period in addition to Elisabeth Roegele has had their positions terminated.[21]


References

  1. ↑ 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.9 Eckler, Mike (October 14, 2020). "The Wirecard Fiasco: Digital Payments Gone Wrong". PracticalEcommerce. Retrieved March 27, 2024.
  2. ↑ 2.0 2.1 Taub, Ben (February 27, 2023). “How the biggest fraud in German history unravelled”. The New Yorker. Retreived March 5, 2024.
  3. ↑ 3.0 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6 3.7 3.8 3.9 "The Rise and Fall of Wirecard". Reuters. December 5, 2022. Retrieved March 27, 2024.
  4. ↑ 4.00 4.01 4.02 4.03 4.04 4.05 4.06 4.07 4.08 4.09 4.10 4.11 4.12 4.13 4.14 4.15 4.16 4.17 4.18 4.19 McCrum, Dan (June 25, 2020). "Wirecard: The Timeline". The Financial Times. Retrieved March 27, 2024.
  5. ↑ Dohms, Von Heinz-Roger (February 23, 2017). "Das 250-Millionen-Euro-Rätsel des Börsenwunders Wirecard". Manager Magazin. Retrieved March 15, 2024.
  6. ↑ 6.0 6.1 Dörner, Astrid; Kokologiannis, Georgios; Kröner, Andreas (September 5, 2018). "Commerzbank fliegt aus dem Dax, Wirecard steigt auf". Handelsblatt. Retrieved March 16, 2024.
  7. ↑ 7.0 7.1 7.2 Christian, Schnell (August 14, 2018). "Markus Braun is the mastermind and major shareholder at Wirecard". Handelsblatt. Retrieved March 20, 2024.
  8. ↑ "Markus Braun - CEO/CTO - Wirecard AG | Linkedin". Linkedin. Retrieved March 20, 2024.
  9. ↑ “Markus Braun - Crunchbase Person Profile". Crunchbase. (n.d.). Retrieved March 20, 2024.
  10. ↑ AFP - Agence France Presse. (n.d.). "Ex-CEO Braun Denies All Charges In Wirecard Fraud Trial". Barron’s. Retrieved March 20, 2024.
  11. ↑ "Financial Times". (n.d). Eurotopics. Retrieved March 20, 2024.
  12. ↑ 12.0 12.1 McCrum, Dan (n.d.-a). "MONEY MEN A Hot Startup, A Billion Dollar Fraud, A Fight for the Truth". Dan McCrum. Retrieved March 20, 2024.
  13. ↑ 13.00 13.01 13.02 13.03 13.04 13.05 13.06 13.07 13.08 13.09 13.10 13.11 13.12 13.13 13.14 Erskine, James (Director) (2022). “SKANDAL! Bringing Down Wirecard”. [Documentary]. Retrieved March 19, 2024.
  14. ↑ 14.0 14.1 14.2 Lebowitz, Shana (June 28, 2020). "German fintech star Wirecard said $2 billion went missing from its bank accounts. analysts and accounting professors explain how it could have happened". Business Insider. Retrieved March 20, 2024.
  15. ↑ Jones Sam, Murphy Paul, & Warrell Helen (July 10, 2020). "From payments to armaments: The double life of wirecard’s Jan Marsalek: Free to read". Financial Times. Retrieved March 20, 2024.
  16. ↑ 16.0 16.1 16.2 16.3 Storbeck, Olaf & McCrum, Dan (March 22, 2022). "Wirecard: the case against Markus Braun". Financial Times. Retrieved March 27, 2024.
  17. ↑ "What Does an Auditor Do?". 4 Corner Resources. (n.d.). Retrieved March 20, 2024.
  18. ↑ 18.00 18.01 18.02 18.03 18.04 18.05 18.06 18.07 18.08 18.09 18.10 Storbeck, Olaf (October 25, 2021). "EY and Wirecard: anatomy of a flawed audit". Financial Times. Retrieved March 27, 2024.
  19. ↑ "What is BAFin Compliance?". Akamai. (n.d.). Retrieved March 20, 2024.
  20. ↑ "About Bafin". BaFin. (n.d.). Retrieved March 20, 2024.
  21. ↑ 21.0 21.1 21.2 21.3 McCrum, Dan (January 19, 2022). "Wirecard investor’s case against German regulator BaFin dismissed by court". Financial Times. Retrieved March 27, 2024.
  22. ↑ "After Wirecard: More powers for BaFin". BaFin. (2021, April 8). Retrieved March 20, 2024.
  23. ↑ Barnet, Jan-Patrick (November 21, 2021). “Wirecard chapter ends with stock set to delist from exchanges”. Bloomberg. Retrieved March 10, 2024.
  24. ↑ 24.0 24.1 Huw, Jones (April 6, 2022). “Wirecard investors target EY parent for 1.5 bln euros in compensation”. Reuters. Retrieved March 23, 2024.
  25. ↑ “Wirecard AG (WRCDF)”. Yahoo Finance (n.d). Retrieved March 20, 2024.
  26. ↑ Lacour, Jean-Phillipe (June 28, 2020). “Critics' ire turns on auditor EY after Wirecard collapse”. AFP News. Retrieved March 08, 2024.
  27. ↑ 27.0 27.1 27.2 27.3 27.4 McCrum, Dan (June 30, 2020). “Wirecard’s real business relied on small number of customers”. Financial Times. Retrieved March 15, 2024.
  28. ↑ Shome, Arnav (July 22, 2020). “Hoch Capital, Rodeler Renounce Cyprus' CIF license”. Finance Magnet. Retrieved March 20, 2024.
  29. ↑ McCrum, Dan (May 19, 2021). “Wirecard’s reluctant whistleblower tells his story: ‘They tried to destroy me’”. Financial Times. Retrieved March 18, 2024.
  30. ↑ Butcher, Sarah (June 30, 2020). “Wirecard employees say it was a really great place to work”. eFinancialCareers.
  31. ↑ Godfrey, Hannah (April 23, 2021). “Staff hauled out millions of euros in cash from Wirecard’s HQ in Aldi and Lidl shopping bags”. City A.M. Retreived March 12, 2024.
  32. ↑ Ayres, Liza (October 7, 2021). “What we can learn from the Wirecard whistleblower”. Fraud Conference News. Retrieved March 12, 2024.
  33. ↑ 33.0 33.1 33.2 Hinchliffe, Ruby (August 27, 2020). “Wirecard lets 730 employees go, more than half of its workforce”. Fintech: North American Edition. Retrieved March 12, 2024.
  34. ↑ Browne, Ryan (June 29, 2020). “‘The Enron of Germany’: Wirecard scandal casts a shadow on corporate governance”. CNBC. Retreived March 12, 2024.
  35. ↑ 35.0 35.1 35.2 “Wire-card: Court finds BaFin not liable for damages suffered by investors”. (February 17, 2023). Dentons. Retreived March 12, 2024.
  36. ↑ 36.0 36.1 36.2 Agency France Presse (April 3, 2023). “German watchdog sanctions auditor EY over Wirecard scandal. Barron’s”. Retrieved March 13, 2024.
  37. ↑ 37.0 37.1 Storbeck, Olaf (2023, April 3). “EY banned by German audit watchdog over Wirecard work”. Financial Times. Retrieved March 15, 2024.
  38. ↑ 38.0 38.1 Storbeck, Olaf; Chazan, Guy (June 29, 2020). “Germany to overhaul accounting regulation after Wirecard collapse”. Financial Post.
  39. ↑ 39.0 39.1 39.2 Jakubeit, René (March 22, 2021). "The Wirecard scandal and the role of BaFin: A case for unifying capital markets supervision in the European Union" (PDF). Luiss: School of European Political Economy: 1–30.
  40. ↑ "The German economy: from European leader to laggard". The Economist. August 17, 2023. Retrieved March 20, 2024.
  41. ↑ Stache, Christof (December 8, 2022). "GERMANY-JUSTICE-TRIAL-FRAUD-WIRECARD". Getty Images. Retrieved March 27, 2024.
  42. ↑ 42.0 42.1 42.2 Poltz, Jörn (December 12, 2022). "Former Wirecard boss' lawyer says prosecutors got the wrong man". Reuters. Retrieved March 27, 2024.
  43. ↑ Kroneck, Stefan (December 11, 2023). "Wirecard trial faces delays". Börsen-Zeitung. Retrieved March 27, 2024.
  44. ↑ 44.0 44.1 44.2 44.3 Storbeck, Olaf; Ruehl, Mercedes (August 16, 2023). "Wirecard's byzantine fraud grips courts in Munich and Singapore". Financial Times. Retrieved March 27, 2024.
  45. ↑ Johannssen-Koppitz, Liesa (March 18, 2021). "Former Wirecard AG Executives Face Parliamentary Enquiry". gettyimages. Retrieved March 27, 2024.
  46. ↑ 46.0 46.1 46.2 46.3 Poltz, Jörn (February 13, 2023). "'Day of pain': Wirecard boss denies charges in massive fraud trial". Reuters. Retrieved March 27, 2024.
  47. ↑ Taub, Ben (February 27, 2023). "How the Biggest Fraud in German History Unravelled". The New Yorker. Retrieved March 27, 2024.
  48. ↑ "Red Notices". INTERPOL. March 21, 2024. Retrieved March 27, 2024.
  49. ↑ "Germany: Wirecard fugitive Marsalek breaks silence". DW. July 18, 2023. Retrieved March 27, 2024.
  50. ↑ Alkhatib, Shaffiq (February 7, 2024). "Jail for company director who was unaware his firm received over $78m from Wirecard". The Straits Times. Retrieved March 27, 2024.
  51. ↑ Aravindan, Aradhana; Geddie, John (August 6, 2020). "Singapore charges Citadelle director with falsifying letters related to Wirecard". Reuters. Retrieved March 27, 2024.
  52. ↑ "Director Convicted and Jailed Four Weeks for Failing to use Reasonable Diligence when Signing Letters to Wirecard AG". Public Affairs Department - Singapore Police Force. February 7, 2024. Retrieved March 27, 2024.
  53. ↑ Rahman, Roslan (August 2, 2023). "SINGAPORE-FRAUD-TRIAL-WIRECARD". gettyimages.
  54. ↑ McCrum, Dan; Storbeck, Olaf; Ruehl, Mercedes (March 13, 2023). "The high-living entrepreneur brought low by his links to Wirecard". Financial Times. Retrieved March 27, 2024.
  55. ↑ "UPDATE ON INVESTIGATIONS AND NEW CHARGES RELATING TO WIRECARD". Public Affairs Department - Singapore Police Force. May 5, 2022. Retrieved March 27, 2024.
  56. ↑ 56.0 56.1 Hart, Robert (June 20, 2023). "Wirecard Fraud Scandal: First Criminal Convictions Handed Down In Singapore". Forbes. Retrieved March 27, 2024.
  57. ↑ 57.0 57.1 57.2 57.3 "TWO FORMER WIRECARD EMPLOYEES CONVICTED AND JAILED FOR CRIMINAL BREACH OF TRUST AND OTHER OFFENCES". Public Affairs Department - Singapore Police Force. June 20, 2023. Retrieved March 27, 2024.
  58. ↑ Poltz, Joern (April 3, 2023). "EY fined, banned from some audits in Germany over Wirecard scandal". Reuters. Retrieved March 27, 2023.
  59. ↑ Storbeck, Olaf (February 25, 2021). "EY overhauls German partnership in effort to repair Wirecard damage". Financial Times. Retrieved March 27, 2024.
  60. ↑ Storbeck, Olaf (January 19, 2022). "Wirecard investors' case against German regulator BaFin dismissed by court". Financial Times. Retrieved March 27, 2024.
  61. ↑ Storbeck, Olaf (April 16, 2019). "German regulator files complaint on alleged Wirecard manipulation". Financial Times. Retrieved March 27, 2024.
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