Sandbox:UNOCI Committee C
Hey everyone. I know we split up the mandate into different parts and had our own sections to manage, but I found that really difficult to do. I'm hoping everyone else had better luck with it... but I think we should keep in mind that the mandate we divided was only 1 version of the many revisions that have been made, and as long as we can address and evaluate the major components of the mission, we should be okay. In any case, I did some research and did some writing on the challenges/problems UNOCI currently faces. I'll post it below. Please go ahead and correct/add other stuff... (I'll fix the sources soon). If everyone else can post what they have then we can start putting our draft together? The writing here is approx. 1 page (double space, Times New Roman, 12pt) - Stella
The new government under President Ouattara will need to establish itself with the population and deal with the long-existing ethnic tensions resulting from citizenship issues, which have been an undercurrent of tension throughout the past decade. (CG, p5) The government is currently preparing for the legislative elections, which are due to happen by the end of 2011, and UNOCI’s mandate is to assist in monitoring the an inclusive, fair, transparent process, which would further solidify the democratic system. Still in recovery from the post-electoral crisis earlier this year, the greatest challenges for UNOCI will be to ensure the security of Cote d’Ivoire, prevent the reoccurrence of violent outbreaks and help the nation in its security and judiciary reforms. The region is presently under risk of violent conflict that could easily arise from armed ex-soldiers whom have gone into hiding, armed civilians, as well as over 12000 prisoners that have escaped from Ivorian prisons since March 2011. (p5) There still exists unexploded artillery and landmines in the western region as well as Tiébissou and Abidjan, which requires UN assistance in order to be dismantled and ensure civilian protection. (p5) UNOCI will also have to report humanitarian violations that have been conducted and to prevent them from happening while the country is still in a fragile state. (2000 p4) These tasks will be difficult, especially since the Ivorian judicial sector, including the police force, law courts and prisons have become damaged and dysfunctional during the crisis. (p6,7) UN forces will need to assist and monitor the reformation of the practically non-existent police force, as well as redistribution and implementation of these forces throughout the nation. (Resolution p5) UNOCI also faces the challenge of returning military command to FRCI, which should be seen as the new, sole military force of Cote d’Ivoire. (p5) FRCI has issues with discipline and the integration of former FN soldiers, who are ill-trained and lack order, will be a taxing job to retrain before they are ready to enforce the rule of law. (CG)
--StellaTung 18:07, 22 September 2011 (PDT)
Hey everybody. So this is my part of the rough draft, so keep in mind that it is very, very rough. I haven't added citations or a bibliography yet, as I don't know if we need to do that stuff yet. This is just a rundown of what I thought was the most important stuff, but there is definitely a lot more we can add if this isn't enough, or we need to substitute something that might be more important. Thanks.
Erik Thorsteinsson
Despite the United Nations Operation in Cote d'Ivoire (UNOCI), the country remains very weak and fragile. After the most recent conflicts in the region following the 2010 election, there are still many areas that need to be addressed, especially in terms of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR), along with matters concerning law and order. According to UN Resolution 2000 (2011), there is still fear among the peacekeeping community that the volatile security situation on the ground could result in Cote d’Ivoire falling back into another armed conflict. From this Resolution, it is clear that DDR procedures towards multiple armed groups has not yet reached full maturity, and that there are still enough armed personnel (left over rebels, militias, and even civilians) to warrant a serious threat of renewed conflict. The Resolution also states that continued support is needed in stabilizing the security situation and that while security sector reforms have been undertaken, they are far from being accomplished and need to be closely monitored. This further shows that while measures are being taken to stabilize the country, these measures are not yet fully implemented and the threat of violence is still very real. In the Crisis Group’s most current analysis of the peacekeeping process and general situation on the ground, titled “A Critical Period for Ensuring Stability in Cote d’Ivoire”, they continue to state the fact that Cote d’Ivoire is not out of trouble yet. While one of UNOCI’s mandates has been to oversee fair and organized elections, the atrocities and general violence after the elections in 2010 shows that they were not adequately prepared for this possibility. Further elections are to take place in 2011 to decide a new legislature, and the worry is that similar events may occur. While Cote d’Ivoire has been trying to reorganize its security sector (part of both the DDR and the policing aspect of its law and order mandate) and form the new Forces republicaines Cote d’Ivoire (FRCI), many of the members of the military are former rebels of the Forces Nouvelles (FN) group. Instead of implementing a DDR policy with rebel groups and militia, as stated in their mandate, the government is just training them to become the official security force. Many FN forces are still controlled by warlords, not to mention the fact they are reported to be disorganized and undisciplined. This explicitly contradicts UNOCI’s DDR mandate, as armed groups under multiple leaderships are still roaming around freely. The analysis further describes a large arsenal of weapons throughout Cote d’Ivoire, and the need for better disarmament procedures and trade-in programs, so that people will give up their weapons. Finally, in regards to law and order, many of the supporters of Gbagbo (the head of the losing side of the previous 2010-2011 civil war) are being given a trial in a legitimate court of law, which is a positive step towards a fair legal system. However, very little charges have been laid against supporters of the new government, under president Ouattra. This is very problematic because if the area is already unstable and at risk for further conflict, the perception of unfair trials may be enough to upset those who oppose the government, as well as a perception of legal bias, leading to more violence. Overall, the mission is hard to label as a failure or a success, because it is still in progress. However, as one can see, there are a great deal of challenges UNOCI faces. The UNOCI mandate has been renewed constantly, and the forces are still very much apart of the restructuring of the area. There are many areas that need to be addressed to stabilize the area and begin building a peace, as mentioned above. However, progress in the area has been made, and it seems as if the Cote d’Ivoire government is undergoing the necessary steps to stabilize the country, including reforming the security sector and strengthening its legal system. More steps are needed, but peacekeeping is not an instant process, and if Cote d’Ivoire can implement proper DDR programs while strengthening its judicial system, many of the other aspects of the peacekeeping mission can proceed smoothly.
Hey guys, here's my part of the draft. I haven't put in proper citations yet, just notes to myself telling me where I got the information from. I know it's too long but I'll edit it once we go over everybody's section. Sorry it's a bit late.
Rajit Mittal
Among the many goals set out by the Security Council for the United Nations mission in Cote d’Ivoire, one of the primary objectives of the mission is the protection of civilians, institutions, and all United Nations personnel. As with any peacekeeping mission, it is the foremost responsibility of the mission to ensure the protection of the civilian population while still protecting its own personnel. In the case of Cote d’Ivoire, though UN peacekeeping forces, in conjunction with French armed forces, have been making a valiant effort to keep a politically, geographically, and ethnically divided country peaceful, there have been some major setbacks. Forces loyal to ousted President Laurent Gbagbo have continued to clash with supporters of current President Alassane Ouattara. The height of violence came following the results of the UN monitored November 2011 election, the results of which were a majority win for Ouattara. However, Gbagbo’s refusal to step down led to large scale violence between both sides in which an estimated 173 people were killed (UN 2010 Yir). Unfortunately, even after the forcible removal of Gbagbo from power, violence along political and ethnic lines persists. For example, a report from Human Rights Watch found that just between the period of April 2011 and July 2011 at least 369 people had been killed between the two sides, 220 of them pro-Ouattara and 149 of them pro-Gbagbo (SC Report). Furthermore, human rights abuses also continue to be commonplace among both sides, further damaging the possibility of reconciling Gbagbo and Ouattara supporters. Not immune from this violence are UNOCI peacekeepers as they have also been subject to violent attacks and anger from both sides of the conflict (UN 2010 Yir). Peacekeepers have seen their vehicles stopped by blockades and set ablaze (UN 2010 Yir). In one particular example, a peacekeeper was slashed with a machete after his vehicle was stopped by a mob (UN 2010 Yir). In total, from the start of the UNOCI mission, 57 peacekeepers, 9 police officers, and 1 military observer have been killed thus far (UNOCI Facts). This demonstrates that though the mission has accomplished much in the country, it has not fared so well in its most important obligation, which is to ensure the protection of civilians and its own personnel. One way to enhance the security of those in the country is to reform the security sector of the country. By rebuilding and restructuring the institutions and structures of the security sector, UNOCI will be better able to offer protection to civilians. However, re-establishing the rule of law and the and the means by which to enforce it in a country facing post-electoral turmoil and a revolving door of power holders is not a simple task. Additionally, as long as the armed forces in Cote d’Ivoire remained divided, it is not possible to reform the security sector. Also hindering the security sector reform is the ballooning of the security sector that has occurred since the outbreak of violence in the country (IPI). From 2002 to 2009, the police force in the country doubled to 18 000, the armed forces grew from an estimated 20 000 to 62 500, and militias and foreign mercenaries were being used to carry out orders from the Gbagbo government. Such a large increase in the security sector in such a small amount of time creates greater insecurity and violence in a divided country. That being said, UNOCI has made some headway in this process, as the United Nations Police (UNPOL) has worked with both the North and South in training and monitoring the police forces (ISSAT DCAF). Furthermore, it has been increasingly accepted by local populations in the north as being a helpful organization as opposed to an enemy (ISSAT DCAF). Nonetheless, until there is a stable democratically elected government in place, both armed forces of the warring sides are reconciled, and the size of the security sector is decreased back to pre-conflict size, it remains difficult to reform the security sector (IPI). Accordingly, until the security sector is reformed, it remains difficult for peacekeepers to protect civilians as well as members of the mission and restore law and order in the country.
-Rajit
Hey...Here's my section of this draft. Like b4, I didn't use the citations but I have kept notes for myself. I kept mine pretty short and compact b/c we only have 4 pages total. I have much more information and I can include it if we need to. We can discuss all that tom. It was hard to come up with an overall success/failure b/c we only looked at certain mandates. But I think we can come up with all that tom along with some challenges and problems with the mission.
The United Nations has been involved in the mission in Ivory Coast for many years now but it seems like the country has not progressed in those years. The mission has achieved some success in certain areas, however, the number of failures outweigh the successes. The mandate to monitor all arms embargo has been relatively successfully since it’s initiation in 2004. There was one situation in 2005 where 22 military vehicles were seized at the port in Abidjan. Evidence suggested that these military vehicles had come from Russia, or other former Soviet countries. There was another shipment of infantry fighting vehicles, rocket launchers, fighter jets and other weapons in 2004, allegedly from Belarus. Belarus and Ivory Coast have experienced a very friendly trading relationship, which includes trading weapons. There was also a recent report which stated that Belarus had sent attack helicopters to Gbagbo’s supporters in 2011. However, this allegation was quickly rejected by the UN. An area in which the United Nations mission is failing in is their mandate to protect human rights and provide humanitarian assistance. According to many sources, the humanitarian situation in Ivory Coast has been deteriorating. People are being arrested or abducted by armed unidentified individuals. There have been many cases of violence against protestors. Innocent members of society are being killed or disappearing suspiciously. Bodies are being found on the side of streets and large burial sites are also being located. The problem the human rights aspect faces is that Gbagbo’s loyalists are going around and committing these crimes, but no one is there to stop them. Even though the peacekeeping soldiers have the mandate to protect civilians with all means necessary, this is not being implemented to the fullest because the soldiers lack the equipment and numbers necessary to go through with it. Overall, UNOCI is besieged with what is in front of them. Too much is required to be done and the opposition against the UN is very strong and intimidating. As of now, the mission has not been a success, but the rights steps are being taken in the right direction with certain aspects of the mandates.
Onkar Sohi
Just as an approximation, I just copied and pasted everything together so far and we have 6 full pages. -Stella
Hey guys, so here is my edited version including citations. I was able to get it down to about 1 page double spaced but I couldn't get it any shorter. Hopefully because some of our information will overlap that will help cut it down. Also please note that though I have included citations, I have not yet done a bibliography because I have another paper due tomorrow. I will have a bibliography completed by tomorrow. Hopefully this doesn't inconvenience anyone too much. Thanks! - Rajit
One of the primary objectives of the United Nations mission in Cote d’Ivoire is the protection of civilians, institutions, and all UN personnel. Though UN forces have been making a valiant effort to keep a politically and ethnically divided country peaceful, there have been major setbacks. Forces loyal to ousted President Laurent Gbagbo have continued to clash with supporters of current President Alassane Ouattara. Gbagbo’s refusal to step down after losing the UN monitored November 2011 election led to large scale violence between both sides in which an estimated 173 people were killed (UNDPI 2010). Even after the forcible removal of Gbagbo from power, violence along political and ethnic lines persists. Just between the period of April 2011 and July 2011 at least 369 people had been killed between the two sides (SCR 2011). Furthermore, human rights abuses also continue to be commonplace among both sides, further damaging the possibility of reconciling Gbagbo and Ouattara supporters. Not immune from this violence are UNOCI peacekeepers as they have also been subject to violent attacks and anger from both sides of the conflict (UNDPI 2010). This demonstrates that the mission has not fared well in its mandate to ensure the protection of civilians and its own personnel. One way to enhance this security is to rebuild the institutions and structures of the security sector. However, re-establishing the rule of law and the means by which to enforce it is difficult given the post-electoral turmoil and the instability of government. Also hindering reform is the ballooning of the security sector that has occurred since the outbreak of violence (Boutellis 2011). From 2002 to 2009, the police force in the country doubled to 18 000, the armed forces tripled to 62 500 (Boutellis 2011). Such a large increase in the security sector in such a small amount of time creates greater insecurity and violence in a divided country. That being said, UNOCI has made some headway in this process, as the UN Police (UNPOL) has worked with both the North and South in training and monitoring the police forces (ISSAT 2006). Nonetheless, until both armed forces of the warring sides are reconciled, and the size of the security sector is decreased back to pre-conflict size, it remains difficult to reform the security sector (Boutellis 2011). Accordingly, until the security sector is reformed, it remains difficult for peacekeepers to protect civilians and restore law and order in the country.
- Rajit
Hey everyone, here's my write up. I've completely rewritten it, it's just over a page double spaced (by a line or 2), and deals almost exclusively with disarmament and demobilization. I've included citations, but I have not come up with a bibliography, but it shouldn't be difficult to do since I've only used two sources. Also, could someone remind me if we were going to meet tomorrow after class? It's completely slipped my mind on whether we agreed to that or not.
The biggest problems when it comes to security sector reform are disarmament and demobilization. In terms of disarmament, there is still a large arsenal of weapons present in the civilian community and among other armed groups (Critical Period for Ensuring Stability [CPFES]). Not only are the civilians moving these weapons between one another, but the borders between Liberia and Cote d’Ivoire have become a notorious for the moving of arms in and out of the country (Africa Research Bulletin [ARB]). When it comes to disarmament, UNOCI barely scratched the surface of the small arms problem in Cote d’Ivoire, and further measures need to be taken to ensure that the levels of arms held by non-legitimate forces are reduced. In terms of demobilization, a new security group named Forces republicaines (“FRCI”, for short) is being formed to establish a legitimate security force, but the project is far from complete and remains largely uncertain if it will be in the near future (CPFES). The FRCI is also largely being formed with members of the former rebel group, Forces Nouvelles (“FN”, for short) (CPFES), which leaves areas for criticism over their legitimacy among pro-Ggagbo groups, a vital player in the Cote d’Ivoire conflict. There are also left over militias loyal to Ouattra that are operating under the control of warlords (CPFES), which further shows not all illegitimate militant groups have been demobilized, and that further action needs to be taken to make sure that there is a centralized security force not running rampant under multiple banners. Finally, there is not enough coordination among the UN community on the ground in Cote d’Ivoire on overall security sector reform (ARB). Whether it is the security forces (both military and police), the judicial system, or even violent human rights abuses (CPFES, ARB), not all these issues are being addressed and the problems related to them continue to this day. Challenges in terms of disarmament and demobilization are largely still present, and need to be addressed in order to stabilize the country for further development.
- Erik
Hey guys, I forgot to write my recommendations even though I sort of mention them at the end of my piece. I'll only give two since the whole group is supposed to come up with them:
1. There needs to be more effort to reconcile Gbagbo supporters and Ouattara supporters 2. The size of the security sector (namely police and army)needs to be scaled down to pre-conflict size.
- Rajit