UBC Wiki - User contributions [en]

Documentation:Open Case Studies/FRST522/2024/REDD+ in Indigenous Amazonia: What works and what doesn’t?

2025-02-18T01:53:17Z

ConnorHaynes: /* National climate targets, policies and legislation */

__TOC__

==Positionality==
First and foremost I am not Indigenous, and whilst there are a myriad of cultures, ontologies and epistemologies that are not sufficiently represented by simply stating ‘Indigenous’, it is commonly accepted that these worldviews are vastly different to those of the ‘Western’ world, which is the world in which I grew up and matured. I am therefore only understanding of Indigenous cultures, beliefs and customary laws based upon available online literature and those which I have learnt through life, in addition to those introduced to me in my Master’s degree. As such, I will never be able to fully relate to an Indigenous person; the best I can do is try to understand and learn. Only throughout this process am I able to work towards reconciliation and attempt to address the inequities experienced by Indigenous folk globally.

Additionally, I am yet to act as a carbon project proponent and so do not understand the nuances or stresses of undertaking such a task. Whilst an individual proponent may have the best intention of procuring a carbon project for its social and environmental benefits, there are a number of stakeholders involved throughout the entire process which influence its eventual outcome. Without experience acting as a project proponent I am naïve in understanding the process and its difficulties.

==Acronyms / Terminology==
'''Acronyms:'''

AFOLU: Agriculture, Forestry and Other Land-Use

CCBS: Climate, Community and Biodiversity Standard

ICVCM: Integrity Council for the Voluntary Carbon Market

IPLC: Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities

KMGBF: Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework

LAC: Latin American Countries

MRV: Monitoring, Reporting and Verification

PD: Project Description

REDD+: Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation

UNCBD: United Nations Convention on Biological Biodiversity

UNFCCC: United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

VCM: Voluntary Carbon Market

VCMI: Voluntary Carbon Markets Integrity Initiative

VCS: Verified Carbon Standard

'''Terminology:'''

''Additionality:'' Additionality is the determination of whether the project will lead to the expected outcomes when compared to the baseline or ‘business as usual’ emissions.

''Leakage'': Refers to the shifting of emissions to outside the project boundary as a result of the project’s activities.

''Permanence:'' Permanence refers to the degree to which a carbon credit is equivalent to a permanent removal or reduction in emissions.
==Abstract==
This case study illustrates two examples of Indigenous-led REDD+ projects on Indigenous territory in Colombia and Brazil. Both countries have a relatively long history of engaging with REDD+ but have slightly different legal structures pertaining to the rights of Indigenous peoples on their traditional territories, and specifically their ‘carbon’ rights. As such, the intention is to evaluate how these differing ''de jure'' rights translate on the ground. With respect to REDD+, do certain rights result in legitimately positive benefits to IPLCs, as well as the environment that these projects were originally intended to protect? The intention is such that the reader can evaluate the effectiveness and true benefit of REDD+ projects to IPLC’s, based upon the legal frameworks of the host country. A secondary intention is such that the reader is better equipped to conduct a prefeasibility assessment based upon available online literature, to evaluate the likelihood that REDD+ can be implemented in any chosen country, with the genuine intent of benefiting IPLC’s that are directly affected as a result of REDD+ project implementation.

==REDD+ and the VCM in Brazil and Colombia==
REDD+, originally introduced by the UNFCCC, is a market-based mechanism sitting within the VCM that aims to reverse the loss of forests and carbon stocks, specifically in developing countries. Simply put, an entity or an individual can voluntarily pay another that has engaged with REDD+ and subsequently sequestered carbon, to offset their own emissions using ‘credits’, sold as units of greenhouse gas equivalent to one ton of carbon dioxide (CO2e). Forestry and Land-Use remains the largest category of carbon credits traded by transaction volume on the VCM, with REDD+ being the most popular project type in this category, accounting for 78% of credits traded.<ref name=":0">Procton, A., (2024). ''State of the voluntary carbon market 2024: On the path to maturity.'' Forest Trends Ecosystem Marketplace.</ref> Furthermore, over one-third of the credits sold within this category were sourced from projects that had been implemented in LAC and the Caribbean in 2024.<ref name=":0" /> Of the four largest standards issuing carbon credits, Verra accounts for roughly 80% of issuances in Latin America,<ref>Pullins, T. (2022). Growth of carbon markets in Latin America. White & Case. https://www.whitecase.com/publications/insight/latin-america-focus-fall-2022-growth-carbon-markets </ref> and even in the face of recent scrutiny,<ref>West, T. A. P., Bofim, B., Haya, B. K. (2024). Methodological issues with deforestation baselines compromise the integrity of carbon offsets from REDD+. ''Global Environmental Change, 87'' https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2024.102863</ref><ref>Wyburd I., & Dufrasne, G. (2023). Error Log: Exposing the methodological failures of REDD+ forestry projects. Carbon Market Watch. https://carbonmarketwatch.org/publications/error-log-exposing-the-methodological-failures-of-redd-forestry-projects/</ref><ref name=":15">Haya, B. K., Alford-Jones, K., Anderegg, W. R. L., Beymer-Farris, B., Blanchard, L., Bomfim, B., Chin, D., Evans, S., Hogan, M., Holm, J. A., McAfee, K., So, I. S., West, T. A. P., & Withey, L. (2023). ''Quality assessment of REDD+ carbon credit projects''. Berkeley Carbon Trading Project. https://gspp.berkeley.edu/research-and-impact/centers/cepp/projects/berkeley-carbontrading-project/REDD+</ref> REDD+ projects account for a significant proportion of the VCM with their continued application likely to persist.<ref>Gordon, O. (2022). ''The interwoven fortunes of carbon markets and indigenous communities.'' Energy Monitor. https://www.energymonitor.ai/tech/carbon-removal/the-interwoven-fortunes-of-carbon-markets-and-indigenous-communities/</ref><ref>Müller, M., Coustar, C., Bietta, F., Mathres, M. (2022). ''UNFCCC REDD+ and the power of sovereign carbon.'' Deutsche Banke Chief Investment Office. https://www.rainforestcoalition.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/CIO-Special-UNFCCC-REDD-power-of-sovereign-carbon.pdf</ref><ref>Pullins, T. (2022). ''Growth of carbon markets in Latin America.'' White & Case. https://www.whitecase.com/publications/insight/latin-america-focus-fall-2022-growth-carbon-markets </ref> With the introduction of updated methodologies aimed at addressing these concerns,<ref>Verra (2023a). ''Setting the Standard: Verra’s Revolutionary New REDD Methodology.'' https://verra.org/program-notice/setting-the-standard-verras-revolutionary-new-redd-methodology/</ref><ref>Verra (2023b). ''VM0048 Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation, v1.0.'' https://verra.org/methodologies/vm0048-reducing-emissions-from-deforestation-and-forest-degradation-v1-0/</ref> there is hope for renewed buyer confidence in the integrity of this market,<ref>MSCI (2023). ''Verra’s New Methodology for Unplanned Deforestation Aims to Silence the Critics''. https://www.msci.com/www/blog-posts/verra-s-new-methodology-for/04577808942</ref> though more work still needs to be done.

Both Colombia and Brazil have a relatively long history of implementing REDD+ projects, using both fund-based and market-based mechanisms. For example, both countries were participants in the ‘Amazon Indigenous REDD+ (RIA in Spanish) initiative, with the first pilot implementation project being initiated in Colombia’s Puiawai Natural Reserve.<ref>Garzón, E., (2017). ''Amazon Indigenous REDD+: An innovative approach to conserve Colombian forests?'' Mongabay. https://news.mongabay.com/2017/01/amazon-indigenous-redd-an-innovative-approach-to-conserve-colombian-forests/</ref> The relevance of these two countries with respect to REDD+ is simple. Much of the Amazon’s primary tropical rainforest falls within these countries' jurisdiction and this rainforest has been consistently under threat from external pressures and encroachment, whether that be in the form of land-clearing for commercial ranching, subsistence purposes, illicit drug production or illegal mining practices,<ref name=":8">Sánchez García, P. A. & Wong, G. Y., (2024) “The political economy of deforestation in the Colombian Amazon”, ''Journal of Political Ecology'' ''31''(1), 178–199. https://doi.org/10.2458/jpe.5230</ref><ref>Radwin, M. (2023). ''Drug trafficking fuels other deforestation drivers in the Amazon: report.'' Mongabay. https://news.mongabay.com/2023/07/drug-trafficking-fuels-other-deforestation-drivers-in-the-amazon-report/</ref><ref>Haddad, E.A., Araújo, I.F., Feltran-Barbieri, R., Perobelli, F. S., Rocha, A., Sass, K. S., Nobre, C. A. (2024). Economic drivers of deforestation in the Brazilian Legal Amazon. ''Nat Sustain'' ''7'', 1141–1148. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41893-024-01387-7 </ref><ref>Hänggli, A., Levy, S. A., Armenteras, D., Bovolo, C. I., Brandão, J., Rueda, X., & Garrett, R. D. (2023). A systematic comparison of deforestation drivers and policy effectiveness across the amazon biome. ''Environmental Research Letters, 18''(7), 073001. https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/acd408</ref> to name a few.

In theory, REDD+ can be used to provide the economic incentive to promote sustained environmental protection of Indigenous lands, with a focus on the rights and livelihoods of IPLCs. Currently the overall funding to IPLCs tenure rights and forest management in tropical countries is low, receiving just $270 million per year between 2011-2020 from bilateral and multilateral donors and private philanthropies.<ref>Hatcher, J., Owen, M., Yin, D., (2021). ''Falling short: Donor funding for Indigenous peoples and local communities to secure tenure rights and manage forests in tropical countries (2011 -2020).'' Rainforest Foundation Norway. https://dv719tqmsuwvb.cloudfront.net/documents/Publikasjoner/Andre-rapporter/RFN_Falling_short_2021.pdf</ref> REDD+ has the potential to channel funding as to promote Indigenous rights and autonomy, provided there is transparent and equitable benefit-sharing for those involved. Fundamentally, only with the inclusion of IPLC’s, or preferably with IPLC’s acting as project proponents, is REDD+ able to promote Indigenous agency and improve IPLC rights and governance. And only when the rights of those inhabiting the land are formally recognized can the land be effectively conserved.<ref name=":16">Reytar, K., Veit, P., von Braun, J. (2024). ''Protecting Biodiversity Hinges on Securing Indigenous and Community Land Rights.'' WRI. https://www.wri.org/insights/indigenous-and-local-community-land-rights-protect-biodiversity</ref> The inclusion of IPLCs in REDD+ project development is therefore considered to be essential for project success, and this is in theory embodied in the very nature of REDD+.<ref name=":1">Alvarez, G., Elfving, M. and Andrade, C. (2016) ‘REDD+ governance and indigenous peoples in Latin America: the case of Suruí Carbon Project in the Brazilian Amazon Forest’, ''Latin American J. Management for Sustainable Development 3''(2) pp.133–146. https://doi.org/10.1504/LAJMSD.2016.083705</ref> Partially owing to a long history of dealing with REDD+, Colombia and Brazil are amongst just a few of the countries hosting tropical rainforests that explicitly recognise community rights to carbon and tie these rights to the legal ownership of lands and forests. In Colombia, carbon rights are tied to land rights, whereas in Brazil carbon rights are tied to forest rights.<ref name=":2">RRI and McGill University (2021). Technical report: ''Status of legal recognition of Indigenous Peoples’, Local Communities’ and Afro-descendant Peoples’ rights to carbon stored in tropical lands and forests''. Rights and Resources Initiative. https://doi.org/10.53892/MLQQ5744</ref>

==Brazil: The Suruí Forest Carbon Project==
[[File:The Amazon Basin, Brazil.jpg|thumb|376x376px|Brazil's Amazon rainforest]]

=== Project description and location ===
The Surui Forest Carbon project (SFCP) was implemented in 2009 on the territory of the Surui people, which is situated in the southern part of Brazil’s Amazon between the states of Rondônia and Mato Grosso. Surui Indigenous territory covers an area of 2,481 km2, though the intention of the SFCP was to protect a portion of this total area. According to the PD, the stated objective was to “prevent 13,575.3 hectares of tropical forest from being cleared by 2038, to avoid the emission of 7,258,352.3 tCO2e to the atmosphere, and to contribute to the preservation of the Paiter Surui lifestyle and traditions.”<ref>IDESAM (2011). ''Project description: Surui forest carbon project''. Institute for Conservation and Sustainable Development of Amazonas. Link: "PROJ_DESC_1118_02FEB2012.PDF" found at https://registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/1118 </ref> This region sits within one of the Brazilian Amazon’s main ‘arcs of deforestation’ and pressure from loggers and ranchers is a matter of concern.

Notably, the SFCP was the first REDD+ project to be proposed by Indigenous peoples in the Brazilian Amazon on their own territory and was the first to receive certification by both the VCS and CCBS.<ref name=":1" />. Metareilá, the Surui’s own Indigenous association, acted as project proponent and the Institute for Conservation and Sustainable Development of Amazonas (IDESAM) assisted with project development, alongside multiple other stakeholder groups. As an endogenous initiative procured and conducted by the Surui community, the SFCP had a ‘non-centralized model of governance’, which reflected the characteristics and traditions of the Surui people. <ref name=":1" />

Only after two years of consultations between the 24 communities involved and the relevant governmental agencies (primarily FUNAI and the Ministry of Environment) was a Memorandum of Understanding signed, showing community consent to develop the project.<ref name=":3">Garcia, B., Rimmer, L., Canal Vieira, L., Mackey, B., (2021). REDD+ and forest protection on indigenous lands in the Amazon. ''RECIEL 30'', 207–219. https://doi.org/10.1111/reel.12389</ref> In 2012 after verification from an independent third-party body, the Surui were able to sell carbon credits on the international market. Between 2009 and 2014 the project drastically helped limit the deforestation occurring within the project’s site, causing many to deem it a success.<ref name=":4">Howard, F. E., (2023). ''An Analysis of the Suruí Forest Carbon Project in Context of Settler Colonialism''. Masters thesis. Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University. https://vtechworks.lib.vt.edu/server/api/core/bitstreams/b0cde6de-794c-453f-856b-ee72bde3db06/content</ref>

=== National climate targets, policies and legislation ===
Rates of deforestation in Brazil’s legal Amazon are significantly impacted by the government in charge. This is evidenced in the decade between 2012 and 2021 whilst under the conservative Bolsonaro administration, deforestation in the Amazon increased 185% — from a loss of 4,571 km2 in 2012 to 13,038 km2 in 2021.<ref>INPE (2022). ''Observação da Terra. http://www.obt.inpe.br/OBT/assuntos/programas/amazonia/prodes''</ref> However, since Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s appointment in 2022 there has been a steady decline in the rate of deforestation, which is now roughly half what it was in 2021.<ref>Terra Brasilis (2024). ''PRODES (deforestation): Deforestation rates – Legal Amazon – States''. https://terrabrasilis.dpi.inpe.br/app/dashboard/deforestation/biomes/legal_amazon/rates</ref> A significant proportion of emissions result from the clearing of rainforest and its subsequent conversion to ranching.<ref>MCTI (2022). ''Estimativas Anuais De Emissões De Gases De Efeito Estufa No Brasil.'' 6ª Edição. Ministério da Estado da Ciência, Tecnologia e Inovações. https://www.gov.br/mcti/pt-br/acompanhe-o-mcti/sirene/publicacoes/estimativas-anuais-de-emissoes-gee/arquivos/6a-ed-estimativas-anuais.pdf</ref> To address these emissions Brazil has implemented various adaptation policies, legislation and targets which are summarized below:
{| class="wikitable"
|'''Document name'''
|'''Type'''
|'''Publication year'''
|'''Key takeaways'''
|-
|National Policy on Climate Change (NPCC)
|Legislation
|2009
|Framework for addressing climate change
|-
|National Plan on Climate Change Adaptation
|Policy
|2016
|Framework for addressing impacts of climate change
|-
|Nationally Determined Contribution
|Target
|2024
|Reduce net greenhouse gas emissions by 59 to 67 percent below 2005 levels by 2035
|-
|Federal Constitution, Article 225
|Legislation
|2006
|The Amazon rainforest is considered as a ‘national heritage’.All levels of government have a shared responsibility to protect it and the environment
|-
| colspan="4" |'''Relating to REDD+'''
|-
|Plan of Action for the Prevention and Control of Deforestation in the Legal Amazon (PPCDAM)
|Policy
|2004
|Aims to reduce deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon
|-
|Forest code
|Legislation
|2012
|Aimed at reducing deforestation, but no specific mention of REDD+
|-
|Amazon Indigenous REDD+ Initiative
|Policy
|2012
|Incorporate Indigenous with REDD+ initiatives
|-
|National REDD+ Strategy (ENREDD+)
|Policy
|2016
|REDD+ as a fund-based mechanism
|}

=== Indigenous rights - Constitutional, tenure and bundle rights ===
In Brazil, Indigenous rights are robust and clearly defined according to the Brazilian Constitution. As a result, the Indigenous communities of the Brazilian Amazon have legal title to 13.8% of the national territory totalling 1.175 million km2, with a total of 631 territories.<ref>Federal government of Brazil (2024). ''Brazil’s NDC: National determination to contribute and transform''. https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/2024-11/Brazil_Second%20Nationally%20Determined%20Contribution%20%28NDC%29_November2024.pdf</ref>
{| class="wikitable"
| colspan="2" |'''Laws'''
|-
|Article 231 of the 1988 Constitution
|Indigenous peoples to have their exclusive right to use their territories to derive economic benefits. Grants indigenous peoples the right to land, prohibits eviction, and restricts mining without authorization from the federal government.
|-
|Indigenous Peoples statute (1973).

|No acts restricting the full exercise of indigenous peoples’ permanent tenure over the land should be permitted.
|-
| colspan="2" | '''Treaties'''
|-
|United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2007)
|Requires States to obtain free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) for the approval of any projects affecting indigenous territories.
|-
|International Labour Organization Convention 169 (2019)
|Ratified and incorporated under domestic law in 2002 through Decree 10.088/2019, endorsing UNDRIP
|-
|American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2016)
|Supports and builds upon UNDRIP
|}
Whilst Indigenous communities in Brazil have legal title to land, it is the State that owns it. Indigenous people simply exercise permanent tenure over lands that they traditionally occupy and have ‘original rights’ to these traditional lands, which no other rights can prevail over.<ref name=":3" /> Indigenous lands, though not classified as protected areas, “have the highest level of protection by law because they are regulated by the Constitution” and cannot be leased or restricted without violating their original rights. The Suruí's right to develop the SFCP is grounded in the Brazilian Constitution, which grants Indigenous peoples exclusive rights to use the ‘riches of the soil, rivers and lakes’ of their land, and these rights cannot be overridden. Thus, Indigenous people and only Indigenous people are legally allowed to engage in productive activities on their land, provided these activities are conducted according to their own customs and traditions and are necessary for the wellbeing and cultural expression of their own people. In Brazil, it is the armed forces and federal police that are responsible for enforcing these laws, and FUNAI is responsible for representing Indigenous communities in judicial disputes.<ref name=":3" /> As such, provided a REDD+ project does not violate the rights to territorial integrity, permanent land tenure and original rights, it is legally allowed.
[[File:Two Pataxo indians (Brasília, 04 April 2006).jpeg|thumb|414x414px|Two Indigenous in Brazil]]
'''CARBON RIGHTS:''' In Brazil, carbon rights are tied to forest rights.<ref name=":2" /> Carbon credits from REDD+ projects are seen as part of the economic benefits derived from indigenous lands, and as such, Indigenous communities are entitled to own, control and distribute these revenues themselves. The carbon credits generated from the SFCP were wholly owned by the Suruí people through Metareilá, with the Suruí Fund (managed by the Brazilian Biodiversity Fund - FUNBIO) acting as recipient. This legality reinforces Indigenous control over both land and carbon rights, as whoever has rights to the forest land is usually recognized as the owner of carbon rights.<ref name=":3" /> Collectively these national and international laws provide an important safeguard to Indigenous peoples, making their consent a prerequisite for the establishment of REDD+ projects and recognizing their rights as the main beneficiaries of REDD+ revenues.<ref name=":3" /> However, as carbon rights are tied to forest rights in Brazil and not land rights, and carbon is considered to be an ‘environmental service’ (Article 41(I)(A) Brazilian Forestry Code), states as well as the federal government have the jurisdiction to exercise full legislative authority over carbon. <ref name=":2" /> As such, certain states have interpreted the law to imply that the title to carbon credits is attributable to the state.<ref>Loft, L., Ravikumar, A., Gebara, M. F., Pham, T. T., Resosudarmo, I. A. P., Assembe, S., Tovar, J. G., Mwangi, E., & Andersson, K. (2015). Taking Stock of Carbon Rights in REDD+ Candidate Countries: Concept Meets Reality. ''Forests'', ''6''(4), 1031-1060. https://doi.org/10.3390/f6041031</ref> Hence, even when carbon rights are clearly defined and tied to forest title it is insufficient in itself, and only by legally recognizing the customary rights of IPLCs can a fair and equitable outcome be realised.

'''FPIC OBLIGATION:''' Brazilian law requires Free, Prior, and Informed Consent (FPIC) for REDD+ projects affecting indigenous lands, ensuring that international standards such as the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) and ILO Convention No. 169 are adhered to; Indigenous consent is, ''de jure,'' a necessity. Projects that violate these rights and fail to consult communities are therefore considered illegal. Notably there are no specific rules or procedures that have been written into the Brazilian constitution that provide guidance on how to achieve FPIC. However, this freedom reinforces Indigenous autonomy as it allows an Indigenous community to define the rules of consultation according to their customs and traditions.

=== Affected and interested stakeholders ===
{| class="wikitable"
| colspan="5" |'''Affected stakeholders'''
|-
|Stakeholders
|Primary objective(s)
|Secondary objective(s)
|Relative power
|Scope of influence
|-
|Metareilá Association of the Suruí Indigenous People
|Project proponent

Works to defend and preserve the cultural and territorial heritage of the Suruí people.

Responsible for the Suruí Fund (FUNBIO). Ensure equitable distribution of funds
|Ensure project longevity.
Stick to the mandate; attempt not to be influenced by external actors
|Powerful, though lacking technical knowhow. Have carbon rights and thus have ultimate control of project revenue; can decide how this revenue is distributed.
|Local
|-
|Other Indigenous groups and associations
|Support various aspects of proejct development
|Aim to benefit from the project
|Have the same rights as the Metareila with respect to land though are less involved with project development and have less say, nor derive economic benefits like the Metareila
|Local
|-
|''Campesinos'' (peasants)
|Survive via subsistence.
|Procure more land.
|Have far fewer rights than Indigenous groups and no involvement with the project
|Local
|-
| colspan="5" |'''Interested stakeholders'''
|-
|IDESAM - Institute for Conservation and Sustainable Development of Amazonas
|Maximise revenue from project.
Ensure project longevity
|Achieve completion of various technical aspects of project
|Powerful: Required to complete various technical aspects of development.
|National
|-
|Forest Trends
|Supported formulation and implementation of the project.
Uphold image of organization
|Maximise environmental benefits of project
|Powerful: Tasked with raising funds and fostering an international network; an integral part of project development
|International
|-
|Amazon Conservation Team - ACT Brazil
|Supports various aspect of project development as well as offering legal advice.
Other technical assistance
|Maximise environmental benefits of project
|Powerful: An integral part of project development
|International
|-
|Kanindé Association for Ethno-Environmental Defense – non-profit
|Promote Metareilá views and beliefs
|Involved with various aspects of project development
|Mid-power. Has a say in project direction, though less weight than the Metareila.
|National - International
|-
|Ministry of Environment (MMA)
|Responsible for protection and conservation of natural environment
|Ensure project adheres to national law
|Powerful. Must be notified about project activities although cannot strictly alter decisions made by the Surui
|National
|-
|National Indian Foundation (FUNAI)
|Promote Indigenous rights

|Represents Indignous organizations with judicial matters.
|Powerful. Knowleadgeable of judicial system. Must be notified about project activities though is not involved with project governance.
|National
|-
|Government of the State of Mato Grosso
|Encourage development, and reduce poverty and crime in Mato Grosso
|Ensure project adheres to regional law.
|Powerful. Legilative control over regional police and municipalities
|Regional
|}

=== Discussion ===
Although originally successful in achieving its goal of reducing deforestation and degradation, in 2016 diamonds were discovered in Surui territory, leading to an increase in illegal logging and mining.<ref name=":1" /> By 2018 the project site had been completely overrun by ''garimpeiros'' (small-scale gold miners), ultimately leading to the project's suspension that year. <ref name=":4" />

While the project had initially garnered support, divisions emerged within the community post-project implementation. Disputes arose over the unequal distribution of project revenues, leading to internal conflicts between different Suruí clans. These criticisms escalated in 2014 when the Catholic Indigenous Missionary Council supported calls for an end to the project due to mismanagement of revenues from carbon credit sales. <ref name=":3" /> Some Suruí members also argued that the REDD+ initiative harmed their way of life.<ref>Lang, C. (2014). ''“What are projects for that destroy life?” Interview with Henrique Suruí about the Paiter-Suruí REDD project, Brazil.'' REDD-Monitor. https://redd-monitor.org/2014/12/17/what-are-projects-for-that-destroy-life-interview-with-henrique-surui-about-the-paiter-surui-redd-project-brazil/</ref>

Further complicating the situation was the controversial role of Henrique Suruí, one of the Suruí tribal leaders. In 2011, it was revealed that Henrique had violated the tribe's logging moratorium, collaborating with loggers in illegal activities. While Henrique later denied responsibility for the project’s failure, his actions, combined with internal disagreements, illustrated the lack of consensus within the Suruí leadership on the project’s goals and outcomes. Both of the tribe’s leaders possessed dramatically different perspectives on how they believed they could ensure agency, autonomy, and economic benefits for the Suruí people.<ref name=":4" /> This fragmentation within the community, in combination with the discovery of diamonds and the state's failure to protect indigenous land rights led to the indefinite suspension of the REDD+ project.

The project's collapse highlights broader structural issues, particularly the state's inconsistent support for indigenous land rights, influenced by settler colonialism, which undermined the project’s long-term viability.<ref name=":4" /> Additionally, the project’s creation was shaped by external actors, including the collaboration between Almir Suruí and Borges from Forest Trends, a Washington-based NGO. This partnership introduced a Western perspective on viewing the Suruí peoples forest, in contrast with their own perspectives on land use and governance. Furthermore, despite Borges’ Brazilian background, the power dynamics between a global North organization and a developing, Indigenous community were apparent.

=== Summary ===
The Suruí Forest Carbon Project provides an interesting example of how, even when the rights of IPLC’s are relatively robust, challenges persist in ensuring REDD+ project longevity. As such, in its current state, REDD+ in the Brazilian Amazon may not be a suitable market-based option for Indigenous communities in the Amazon.<ref name=":3" /> Although initially successful in promoting Indigenous autonomy and reducing deforestation, the project resulted in failure due to of a myriad of factors. Divisions among Surui communities were exacerbated by a perceived unequal benefit-sharing, and the impact of imposing REDD+ seems to have complicated the traditional social structure that the Surui were dependent on. These issues were influenced by Brazil's settler state dynamics, where Indigenous land rights, although legally recognized, are often not upheld in practice due to insufficient enforcement.<ref name=":4" /> Ultimately, the Surui project reveals how settler colonialism's structural flaws make long-term project success difficult, despite initial progress in promoting Indigenous autonomy.

At the national and state level, complex institutional and legal land governance structures convolute and impede REDD+ in Brazil. Multiple institutions share responsibilities and there is no comprehensive, authoritative database of land ownership, which hampers efforts to protect Indigenous territories.<ref name=":5">Costa, R. (2016)''. Insecure land rights in Brazil: Consequences for rural areas and challenges for improvement.'' Climate Policy Initiative. https://www.climatepolicyinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/Insecure_Land_Rights_in_Brazil_CPI.pdf</ref> As a result, land tenure disputes remain common and can be witnessed occurring between the public as well between public and state actors. For example, Brazil’s 1964 Land Statute (Law No. 4504) allows the government to take over unproductive farms and transfer those lands to landless peasants. This often results in the clearing of forest, as only when the land is cleared is it evidenced to be ‘productive’.<ref name=":5" /> Hence, not only does this law cause insecurity for Indigenous populations in Brazil, it also forces them to go against customary traditions of stewarding the land in an effort to maintain its control.

Whilst the aforementioned points to the futility of REDD+ in Brazil, there is reason to maintain optimism. In a recent landmark ruling Brazil’s supreme court voted in favour of the Xoleng peoples, and the decision will serve as a precedent for all cases involving Indigenous peoples.<ref name=":6">Amos-Flom, K., (2023). ''Triumph and Turmoil: The Xokleng Case and the Future of Indigenous Land Rights in Brazil.'' Columbia Journal of Transnational Law. https://www.jtl.columbia.edu/bulletin-blog/triumph-and-turmoil-the-xokleng-case-and-the-future-of-indigenous-land-rights-in-brazil</ref> The Xokleng’s land dispute, settled in 2023, “rejected Santa Catarina state’s marco temporal (“time limit”) argument, which would have required Indigenous people to prove they occupied or legally contested the territory they claimed before the Brazilian Constitution came into force in 1988. If successful, this argument would have led to disastrous repercussions, as many Indigenous peoples had been forcibly removed or are traditionally nomadic.”<ref name=":6" /> Evidently, whilst slow, progress has been made in Brazil in recent years with respect to Indigenous rights as well as the voluntary carbon market itself.

There are currently 159 AFOLU projects listed on the Verra database in Brazil, with only two specifically focused on REDD+ initiatives in collaboration with Indigenous groups. These are the Ka’a Pyahu project, <ref>Verra (n.d.) ''Project 5087: KA'A PYAHU.'' https://registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/5087</ref> initiated by the Guajajara Indigenous people in collaboration with external organizations and validated in 2021, and the ‘Together for the forest Awaete REDD+ project’<ref>Verra (n.d.) ''Project 5200: TOGETHER FOR THE FOREST AWAETÉ REDD+ PROJECT.'' https://registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/5200</ref> which is still under development. Both projects involve Indigenous groups working with Brazilian organizations to build technical capacity and expertise. This could signal a growing trend of Indigenous-led REDD+ projects in the future. To ensure a positive future for REDD+ in Brazil, the customary rights of IPLC’s must be formally recognized. IPLC should have legal ownership of their traditional lands, and in doing so the carbon rights of these communities would be less convoluted, leading to more equitable benefit-sharing and increased cohesion amongst these groups post-project implementation.

==Colombia: ''REDD+ project Resguardo Indigena Unificado - Selva de Mataven (RUI-SM)''==

=== '''Project description and location''' ===
[[File:RS6524 MG 3944.jpg|thumb|407x407px|A view of the Mataven]]
According to the PD,<ref name=":7">ACATISEMA & Mediamos (2017). ''Joint project description and monitoring report: REDD+ project: Resguardo Indigena Unificado – Selva de Mataven (RIU – SM).'' Link: “10 06 2017_VCS Final Report_ Matavin Project.pdf” found at https://registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/1566</ref> the Resguardo Indígena Unificado – Selva de Matavén (RIU-SM) project is located east of the Colombian Orinoco high plain, in the eastern part of the Department of Vichada, municipality of Cumaribo. It resides on the formalized resguardo of the Sikuani, Piaroa, Puinave, Curripaco, Cubeo and Piapoco ethnic groups, spanning 1,856,836 hectares, with 1,477,115 hectares (79.6%) being forested. The PD states that it will reduce greenhouse gas emissions, with a total estimated net reduction of 108,670,562 tons of CO2 equivalent over thirty years, from years 2013 – 2042. By this metric, it is the 14th largest project on the Verra registry, out of over 1700 projects.<ref name=":9">Dufrasne, D., (2021). ''Two Shades of Green: How hot air forest credits are being used to avoid carbon taxes in Colombia''. Carbon Market Watch. https://carbonmarketwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Two-shades-of-green_EN_WEB.pdf</ref> There are 12,312 Indigenous people living in the RIU-SM, belonging to 2,517 families and 250 communities as of 2017.

The project was initiated by the Asociación de Cabildos y Autoridades Indígenas de la Selva de Matavén (ACETISMA), an Indigenous association, and developed by MEDIAMOS F&M, a Colombian consultancy firm. ACETISMA is comprised of Indigenous leaders that represent the 17 communities of the reservation in charge of governing the territory, and it has administrative autonomy, as well as “the capacity to acquire, to own and to dispose of property, to accept donations, to hold national and international conventions, scientific and cultural exchanges and generally, to celebrate all kinds of negotiations and agreements with which the Association can achieve its objectives.”<ref name=":7" />

There is a stated focus on various means of improving the living conditions of the Indigenous peoples living within the project area. To summarise, the main objectives of the REDD+ project RIU-SM include:

· Community development, in the form of improved education.

· Community engagement with respect to the project; developing information channels to reveal project progress.

· Support local initiatives for environmental education and waste management.

· Developing an effective response system that addresses community proposals and concerns relating to the project.

· Strengthening the governance of ACATISEMA.
=== National climate targets, policies and legislation ===
The Colombian Amazon makes up over one-third of Colombia’s national territory, and up until 2005 only 7.3% of the Colombian Amazon had been deforested, largely due to the country's 60-year armed conflict between the government, multiple left-wing guerillas such as FARC, and several far-right paramilitary groups.<ref name=":8" /> However, following the signing of the Peace Treaty in 2016 and demobilization of the FARC, limits to deforestation were weakened in the Colombian Amazon. Poor but opportunistic peasants began to encroach into previously unchartered territory and capitalize from the rainforest. Due to the poor economic integration of the Amazon, many were forced to engage with the traditional economies of cocoa and cattle ranching, as these markets were already well connected to regional and global markets.<ref name=":8" /> To address the drivers of deforestation and its associated emissions, the federal government has implemented various initiatives, which are summarized below:

{| class="wikitable"
|'''Document name'''
|'''Type'''
|'''Publication year'''
|'''Key takeaways'''
|-
|Nationally Determined Contribution(s)
|Target
|2020
|Reduce GHG emissions by 51% by 2030 and net-zero by 2050
|-
|National Climate Change Policy (PNCC)
|Policy
|2018
|Address climate change and foster sustainable development
|-
|National Forest Conservation Program
|Policy
|2011
|Address deforestation
|-
|Law 1931 of 2018 – Climate Change Law

|Legislation
|2018
|Establishes the framework for addressing climate change
|-
| colspan="4" |'''Relating to REDD+:'''
|-
|National Strategy for Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (ENREDD+)
|Initiative
|2009
|Particular focus on the Amazon and Choco rainforests
|-
|Amazon Indigenous REDD+ Initiative
|Initiative
|2016
|Respect Indigenous rights. FPIC focus.
|-
|BIOREDD+ program
|Initiative
|2012
|Portfolio of 8 REDD+ projects in four geographic nodes covering over 700,000 hectares in the Colombian Pacific.

|-
|Vision Amazonia
|Initiative
|2015
|Part of the REDD+ strategy, financed by three foreign countries: Germany, Norway and United Kingdom
|}
As a result of the many fund and market-based initiatives that Colombia has engaged with, it hosts the second most REDD+ projects in the world. REDD+ projects now cover at least 56% of the area of legally recognized Indigenous territories in the Colombian Amazon, with an overwhelming majority of carbon projects located on Indigenous territories.<ref name=":10">Schmid, D., & Castro. C., (2023). ''REDD+ projects in the Colombian Amazon: Social challenges and lack of transparency''. Rainforest Foundation Norway. https://dv719tqmsuwvb.cloudfront.net/documents/REDD_rapport_2024_ENG.pdf</ref> Evidently REDD+ plays an integral part in the country’s efforts of environmental conservation, and incentives have been introduced to promote the development of such projects. For example, in 2016 the government adopted a higher tax that covered fossil fuels, but companies are able to avoid paying the tax by investing in carbon offsets that have been generated domestically.<ref name=":9" /> This led to a boost in the domestic REDD+ market in 2017, as Colombian companies invested to escape higher taxes. Notably, 23 of the 36 REDD+ projects currently under development in the Amazon region were initiated in or after 2018.<ref name=":10" /> Currently Colombia’s REDD+ program sits at over 45 pilot and voluntary carbon projects, as well as one large-scale jurisdictional approach in the Amazon.<ref name=":11">Zambrano-Cortés, D. G. (2024). ''The politics, spaces and subjects of forest conservation in Colombia''. [internal PhD, WU, Wageningen University]. Wageningen University. https://doi.org/10.18174/675328</ref>

=== Indigenous rights - Constitutional, tenure and bundle rights ===
''De jure'', the Indigenous peoples of Colombia have comprehensive tenure and bundle of rights that have been articulated in the national constitution. Collective land titles are granted to Indigenous communities by the Colombian government and as a result about 34 percent of Colombian land (almost 38 million hectares) is legally recognized as Indigenous territory or collective lands of Afro-descendent communities.<ref name=":10" /> These collective land tenure rights have been in effect since the implementation of the 1991 constitution, granting them the authority to exercise legal control over their territories in accordance with their own customs and procedures.<ref>Max Planck Institute (n.d.) ''Colombia 1991 (rev. 2015).'' Institute. https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Colombia_2015</ref> Furthermore, the carbon rights of Indigenous peoples are explicitly defined in the constitution and tied specifically to the ownership of land of the communities.<ref name=":2" /> This in theory provides a solid legal basis for upholding the rights of Indigenous communities in Colombia, specifically relating to REDD+ activities, as it allows communities to define and negotiate the terms of said projects. A summary of the various laws relating to Indigenous rights have been summarized below:
{| class="wikitable"
| colspan="2" |'''Law (1991 constitution)'''
|-
|Article 63

|Indigenous territories are considered collective property. Land is not owned by individuals but is shared by the community. The state must respect these collective rights and cannot alter land ownership without the consent of the Indigenous peoples.
|-
|Article 76 - ''Consulta previa''.
|Pertains to the right of Indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities; prior consultation must be undertaken before any entity undertakes activities that may affect their territories, culture, or way of life.
|-
|Article 330
|Indigenous communities have the right to govern their territories.
|-
|Article 329
|The Reservation is a collective, inalienable, and indefeasible property.
|-
|Decree 1386 of 1994, Article 10; Decree 2164 of 1995, Article 22) 39.
|"The administration and management of these lands are subjected to uses and customs of the beneficiaries."
|}
Whilst land and tenure rights are enshrined into the constitution, the precariousness of these rights persists due to a lack of resources to ensure enforcement, as well as the deeper issue of corruption. As previously stated, the rate of deforestation increased significantly in Colombia’s post-conflict era, evidencing the nation's inability to maintain control over unlawful acts of land-grabbing and disposition. Whilst this began with new peasants converting the Amazon for subsistence purposes, it ultimately led to new areas for the growth of cocoa, much to the benefit of narco-traffickers who could monopolize on this illegal surplus in ‘accumulation by dispossession’.<ref name=":8" />

With respect to the legalities of consultation, Colombia has enshrined ''consulta previa'' into the constitution. Translating to ‘prior consultation’, this legal text provides the formal grounds for Indigenous engagement when any legislative or administrative measures are implemented on Indigenous territory. Importantly, consultation should be achieved in accordance with the customs of the ethnic group with which the project is being imposed upon. However, there have been recent cases of contestation specifically relating to how ''consulta previa'' applies to REDD+ on Indigenous lands, and the RIU – SM project was one that was involved with such a case.

=== Affected and interested stakeholders ===
{| class="wikitable"
| colspan="5" |'''Affected stakeholders'''
|-
|Stakeholders
|Primary objective(s)
|Secondary objective(s)
|Relative power
|Scope of influence
|-
|ACATISEMA - Asociación de Cabildos y Autoridades Indígenas de la Selva de Matavén
|Primary and direct beneficiaries of project
Foster the integral development, social and cultural preservation of the indigenous communities in the Mataven Jungle

Consolidate the territory, and promote conservation and preservation of the environment and biodiversity of the Mataven Jungle

|Maintain control over ''resguardos''
|Powerful, locally.
Has the highest authority in the ''reguardo''.

Rights to the land and revenue generated from project
|Local
|-
|Indigenous communities of the RIU-SM
|Seek to maintain land rights

Promote traditional and cultural beliefs
|Increase benefits from the project
|Mid-power, though little input into project activities in reality.
|Local
|-
|Landless peasants
|Survive via subsistence
|Gain more access to land. Improve rights.
|Low to none
|Local
|-
| colspan="5" |'''Interested stakeholders'''
|-
|MEDIAMOS F&M
|Project developer
Maximise project revenues
|Develop the project in a way that is supporting of ACETISMA beliefs, for their benefit.
|Powerful: involved with various technical aspects of project development
|National
|-
|Ministerio de Ambiente y Desarrollo Sostenible (Minisitry of Environment and Sustainable Development)
|Environmental planning; sustainable development
Form strategic alliances with social and institutional participants in different sectoral and territorial scenarios.
|Ensure project activities are in agreement with ministry mandate
|Powerful, though supporting of project
|National
|-
|Dirección de Asuntos Indígenas, ROM y Minorías - Ministerio del Interior
|Prepares policy in favour of Indigenous groups
Supports ethnic and cultural rights of Indigenous
|
|Not ''per se'' involved with project, though the policy the organization has introduced affects project outcomes
|National
|-
|Corporinoquía
|Environmental authority to ensure the proper use of natural resources in their area of jurisdiction.
Ensure project abides by relevant regulations
|
|Powerful, though supporting of project
|Regional
|-
|Other government institutions: Governor ofice of Vichada, Mayor ofice Cumaribo
|The Reservation for being part of the Cumaribo, Vichada, has territorial jurisdiction relations with the Governor’s office and the Mayor’s office.
|Benefit from the project, if possible
|Powerful, regionally
|Regional - National
|-
|Fundación NATURA
''Civil organization''
|Conservation, use and management of biodiversity
Maximise social and environmental benefits of project
|Ensure suffienct IPLC inclusion
|Mid-power. Can influence decisions regarding project activities though does not hold absolute power to define terms
|International
|-
|Mining companies
|Mine to generate revenue.
|Compete with the project for the territory's resources.
|Relatively powerful, though legally obstructed to achieve primary objective
|International
|-
|Other indigenous communities neighboring RIU-SM
|Ensure autonomy with respect to their own jurisdiction
|Not involved with the project though potentially affected by it
|Low, with respect to the project
|Local
|-
|FONDO ACCIÓN
|Facilitate private investment into project activities
|Conservation and sustainable development; Protection/development of children.
|Mid-power. Important as they raise funds for the project and benefit from it, though not primary beneficiaries.
|National
|-
|Asocarbono – An industry association, including Verra, ProClima, Biofix, and ACATISEMA.

|Promote the agenda of high-level actors of the VCM
Promote integrity of market
|Hide/argue cases of scandal
|Powerful
|International
|-
|OPIAC: National Oganization of the Indigenous Peoples of the Colombian Amazon

|Promotes Indigenous rights in Colombia
Exercises a political representation of the Indigenous peoples of the Colombian Amazon
|
|Powerful. Legally knowledgeable.
|National
|}

=== Discussion ===
According to the official REDD+ Mataven website<ref>RIU – SM (n.d.). ''REDD+ Mataven''. https://reddmataven.com/</ref> the project has resulted in a myriad of benefits to the Indigenous communities of the region. For example, as a result of the funds generated from the project's activities, there have been improvements in infrastructure, transportation and education, ultimately leading to the empowerment and improved governance of ACETISMA. However, the project has come under fire for multiple reasons.

For one, in 2015 some of the Indigenous communities filed a lawsuit referring to the violation of their right to ''consulta previa''. However, the court ruled that their Indigenous rights had not been violated as it was ACETISMA that initially sought MEDIAMOS to develop the project, and that ACETISMA were the best representatives of those Indigenous communities. Furthermore, the project's main focus was the conservation of the rainforest and therefore did not threaten the cultural integrity of those communities.<ref name=":10" /> However, regardless of the outcome of this case, its occurrence points to internal disagreement amongst Indigenous participants of the RIU-SM project. In a study involving interviews with Indigenous members of the project, there was a significant proportion of interviewees that had little knowledge regarding various aspects of the project, such as responsibilities of participation, or the benefit-sharing mechanism in place.<ref name=":2" /> This further reinforces the point that, in the case of the RIU-SM project it may not be ‘bottom-up’ and points to the power imbalance experienced between MEDIAMOS, the project developer, and Indigenous community members. In the PD there is a breakdown of the distribution of income between ACETISMA and MEDIAMOS, which shows a significant proportion of revenue flowing to the former organisation throughout the project’s operations.<ref name=":7" /> However, there is currently no publicly available documentation supporting this initial claim<ref name=":9" /> as there is no obligation to provide this information, leading to a general lack of transparency in the market and between all of the relevant actors. Subsequent meetings with Indigenous leaders have however shown a marked support of the Mataven project, with one Indigenous leader explicitly stating “...the REDD+ project has brought resources that they never had before, which allowed them to open new school classrooms, 21 rural aqueducts, cocoa crops and even headquarters in Cumaribo and Inírida.”<ref>Lievano, A. B. (2021) Colombia's biggest carbon credit project could be selling hot air. Latin American Center for Investigative Journalism. https://www.elclip.org/el-mayor-proyecto-de-bonos-de-carbono-de-colombia-podria-estar-vendiendo-aire-caliente/ </ref> Clearly there have been benefits for IPLC’s involved with this project, though the details of this benefit-sharing remain a mystery.

Secondly, the Mataven project has caused controversy due to its apparently inflated carbon credit issuance. One report states that this has been achieved by using a reference area that is not representative of the project area, as well as assuming an uncharacteristically high assumed rate of deforestation.<ref name=":12">Global Atlas of Environmental Justice (2023). ''Resguardo Indigena Unificado-Selva de Matavén (RIU SM) REDD+ Project, Colombia.'' https://ejatlas.org/conflict/redd-project-resguardo-indigena-unificado-selva-de-mataven-riu-sm</ref> The project used a baseline deforestation rate of 0.86% per year, which is significantly more than the Colombian government's national rate of 0.18%. Additionally, according to the report the reference area chosen is more easily accessed and therefore more prone to deforestation, making it an inaccurate comparison to the relatively remote project area.<ref name=":2" /> This has led to the creation of excess carbon credits, or “hot air” credits, which have been criticized for not reflecting real environmental benefits.<ref name=":9" /> To add further insult to injury these credits have been used by a Colombian fossil fuel distributor company to avoid paying taxes, as described earlier by Colombia’s change in policy in 2017. In doing so, the company avoided paying approximately $18.9 million in taxes.<ref name=":2" /> There has been subsequent back and forth between Verra and Carbon Market Watch, with Verra refuting the claims.<ref>Verra (2021). ''Carbon Market Watch Report on Colombian REDD+ Projects Contains Flawed Allegations.'' https://verra.org/carbon-market-watch-report-on-colombian-redd-projects-contains-flawed-allegations/ </ref> Regardless of the science, Colombia recently introduced a resolution in 2018 (Resolution 1447 – 2018) that requires projects to use baselines that comply with national reference levels.<ref name=":13">Dufrasne, D. (2021b). Companies use ”hot air” forestry offsets to avoid taxes in Colombia: Carbon Market Watch’s fact-check of Verra’s response. Carbon Market Watch. https://carbonmarketwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/CMWs-fact-check-of-Verras-response-on-Colombia.pdf</ref><ref>IEA (2022). ''Resolution 1447 – 2018. Monitoring, Reporting, and Verification System for mitigation actions at the national level.'' International Energy Agency. https://www.iea.org/policies/14772-resolution-1447-2018-monitoring-reporting-and-verification-system-for-mitigation-actions-at-the-national-level</ref> Going forward, REDD+ projects that are being implemented in Colombia will have to abide by Colombia’s national legislation.

=== Summary ===
Colombia has a long history of engaging in REDD+ as it has been used to limit environmental degradation in the post-conflict era, in alignment with the country’s national peacebuilding agenda.<ref name=":11" /> Owing to the country’s comprehensive tenure and bundle of rights, IPLC’s have robust ''de jure'' rights to land as they collectively own it, and rights to carbon are tied to this ownership. This puts Colombia as one of the world leaders in legal terms relating to REDD+ project implementation, but due to a lack of resources to ensure enforcement, as well as corruption, historically these laws have not been adhered to.<ref name=":10" /><ref name=":2" /> There are many documented cases showing the displacement on IPLC’s from traditional lands, poor efforts to adhere to ''consulta previa'', and inequitable benefit sharing.<ref>Greenfield, P. (2023''). The ‘carbon pirates’ preying on Amazon’s Indigenous communities.'' The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2023/jan/21/amazon-indigenous-communities-carbon-offsetting-pirates-aoe</ref><ref name=":14">Lang, C., (2024). ''Colombia’s Constitutional Court rules in favour of Indigenous Peoples. Identifies serious flaws in the REDD+ Baka Rokarire project.'' REDD_Monitor. https://reddmonitor.substack.com/p/colombias-constitutional-court-rules</ref>

The case of the Mataven project provides an interesting example of how it is the market itself that is failing to address concerns regarding transparency, whether that be relating to benefit-sharing amongst relevant stakeholders, or Indigenous representation and engagement throughout the implementation of REDD+ projects. Some ACATISEMA members have explicitly stated their support for the Mataven project,<ref name=":12" /> and its benefits can be seen first-hand in the form of improved infrastructure in local communities involved with the project.<ref>Myers, J. E., Parra, M. A., Bedford, C. (2021). ''How Carbon Offsetting Can Build a Forest.'' Stanford Social Innovation Review. https://ssir.org/articles/entry/how_carbon_offsetting_can_build_a_forest</ref> However, an exact breakdown of how and where revenue is being distributed to IPLC’s remains elusive.<ref name=":13" /> Furthermore, the level of IPLC engagement has come into question, specifically with reference to ''consulta previa'' and the overall understanding that IPLC’s have regarding the project’s intended outcomes and activities.<ref name=":10" /> This is not a rare case in Colombia and has been witnessed occurring with other projects that have been implemented on Indigenous territories in the Colombian Amazon.<ref name=":17">Lang, C., (2023''). “It destroys everything,” says Indigenous leader about the REDD+ Baka Rokarire project in Colombia''. REDD Monitor. https://reddmonitor.substack.com/p/it-destroys-everything-says-indigenous</ref> However, a recent ruling by the Colombian Constitutional court voted in favour of Indigenous groups in Colombia, upholding “the rights to self-determination, autonomy, self-government, territory, identity, physical and cultural integrity, and free, prior and informed consent of the indigenous communities”.<ref name=":14" /> This review ultimately sets a legal precedent safeguarding the fundamental rights of IPLCs with REDD+ project implementation and shows that progress is being made to improve the likelihood that REDD+ will result in genuine benefits to those affected by project implementation.

To ensure a more authentic engagement with IPLC’s so as to result in legitimate and equitable benefit-sharing, improvements must be made by the Colombian government, as well as within the VCM itself. For the former, Colombia’s national registry for GHG mitigation activities must be updated; it has been offline since 2022.<ref name=":10" /> As a result, transparency is lacking. International finance could be utilized so as to alleviate this issue, and only with an accurate and reliable database may the market be regulated. In the broader sense, VCM registries must create stricter guidelines promoting transparency. Often PD’s refer to annexed documents that contain relevant information regarding benefit-sharing, though these are often not publicly available.<ref name=":9" /> This limits transparency and increases the likelihood of inequitable agreements being made between project proponents and developers, further exacerbating existing power asymmetries between the two groups and limiting the likelihood that ''consulta previa'' is honestly adhered to.<ref name=":10" /> This has led to conflict within Indigenous communities, rather than a strengthening of their social fabric.

Furthermore, the Mataven project calls into question the actual emissions reduction that REDD+ projects achieve. Whilst Colombia has since updated its regulations such that REDD+ must use baselines that comply with national reference levels, it is up in the air as to how representative these guidelines are. Reference areas must represent project areas and without the appropriate regulations in place project developers lack the incentive to create realistic baselines; ultimately they are aiming to produce the maximum number of credits so as to generate the greatest possible revenues.

==Conclusion==
As a market-based mechanism, REDD+ is shackled by the construct in which it operates; fundamentally it is a capitalist means of fixing a capitalist problem, which comes with limitations. Both Brazil and Colombia have relatively robust laws that have been written into their constitutions, ultimately promoting more equitable results of REDD+ project implementation. However, as in Colombia IPLC’s collectively own the land, whereas in Brazil these groups only own rights to use the land,<ref name=":2" /> Colombia can be considered better equipped for the establishment of REDD+ projects on traditional Indigenous territory. However, even with these laws in place enforcement remain a matter of concern. Furthermore, given the wide variety of ontological and epistemological perspectives of Indigenous communities, and how these views conflict with the Western worldview from which market-based REDD+ came to fruition, there is an inherent difficulty in implementing a system of governance in REDD+ on Indigenous lands.<ref name=":1" />. Putting a price on nature conflicts with Indigenous perspectives and there have been instances where this has weakened the social and cultural fabric of IPLC’s.<ref name=":17" /> To avoid this REDD+ developers must have the genuine intent of understanding the perspective of the Indigenous group they are working with and aim to implement REDD+ with a bottom-up approach.

In both countries, transparency must be improved to ensure that FPIC is adhered to and subsequently ensure fair IPLC representation and engagement. This issue predominantly arises due to the poor requirements of standards in the VCM. As such, proponents are guided by developers which have little incentive to truly act in the interests of Indigenous groups; ultimately the organizations in charge of project development are interested in increasing project revenues. This has led to instances of over-crediting, as without a transparent framework in which to operate it is difficult to evaluate the legitimacy of the claims being made by project proponents and developers. However, with recent advances that address concerns of additionality<ref name=":15" /> there is hope for improved market integrity. Standards of the VCM must continue to be scrutinized to ensure that progress continues to be made.

Going forward, progress should be made to formalize the customary laws and traditional lands of IPLCs, and finance should be directed towards the enforcement of these laws. The environmental,<ref name=":16" /> economic,<ref name=":5" /><ref>Ding, H., Veit, P. G., Blackman, A., Gray, E., Reytar, K., Altamirano, J. C., Hodgdon, B., (2016). ''Climate benefits, tenure costs: The economic case for securing Indigenous land rights in the Amazon''. WRI. https://files.wri.org/d8/s3fs-public/Climate_Benefits_Tenure_Costs_Executive_Summary.pdf</ref> and social<ref>Sarmiento Barletti, J. P., Heise Vigil, N., & Larson, A. M. (2023). ''Safeguards at a glance: Are voluntary standards supporting community land, resource and carbon rights?'' CIFOR-ICRAF. https://www.cifor-icraf.org/publications/pdf_files/Flyer/REDD-Safeguards-7.pdf </ref> benefits of this have been researched and are well understood. By developing culturally appropriate frameworks for rights-based conservation regimes, that work with IPLCs in accordance with their worldviews, REDD+ could be used to promote Indigenous autonomy. However, progress still must be made to achieve this goal.

{{CFRC FRST522|names=Connor Haynes
https://wiki.ubc.ca/User:ConnorHaynes|share=yes|theme=REDD+|country=Latin America|province=|theme2=Carbon|Additional theme (3rd)=Restoration}}

==References==

Documentation:Open Case Studies/FRST522/2024/REDD+ in Indigenous Amazonia: What works and what doesn’t?

2025-02-18T01:45:41Z

ConnorHaynes: /* REDD+ and the VCM in Brazil and Colombia */

__TOC__

==Positionality==
First and foremost I am not Indigenous, and whilst there are a myriad of cultures, ontologies and epistemologies that are not sufficiently represented by simply stating ‘Indigenous’, it is commonly accepted that these worldviews are vastly different to those of the ‘Western’ world, which is the world in which I grew up and matured. I am therefore only understanding of Indigenous cultures, beliefs and customary laws based upon available online literature and those which I have learnt through life, in addition to those introduced to me in my Master’s degree. As such, I will never be able to fully relate to an Indigenous person; the best I can do is try to understand and learn. Only throughout this process am I able to work towards reconciliation and attempt to address the inequities experienced by Indigenous folk globally.

Additionally, I am yet to act as a carbon project proponent and so do not understand the nuances or stresses of undertaking such a task. Whilst an individual proponent may have the best intention of procuring a carbon project for its social and environmental benefits, there are a number of stakeholders involved throughout the entire process which influence its eventual outcome. Without experience acting as a project proponent I am naïve in understanding the process and its difficulties.

==Acronyms / Terminology==
'''Acronyms:'''

AFOLU: Agriculture, Forestry and Other Land-Use

CCBS: Climate, Community and Biodiversity Standard

ICVCM: Integrity Council for the Voluntary Carbon Market

IPLC: Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities

KMGBF: Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework

LAC: Latin American Countries

MRV: Monitoring, Reporting and Verification

PD: Project Description

REDD+: Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation

UNCBD: United Nations Convention on Biological Biodiversity

UNFCCC: United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

VCM: Voluntary Carbon Market

VCMI: Voluntary Carbon Markets Integrity Initiative

VCS: Verified Carbon Standard

'''Terminology:'''

''Additionality:'' Additionality is the determination of whether the project will lead to the expected outcomes when compared to the baseline or ‘business as usual’ emissions.

''Leakage'': Refers to the shifting of emissions to outside the project boundary as a result of the project’s activities.

''Permanence:'' Permanence refers to the degree to which a carbon credit is equivalent to a permanent removal or reduction in emissions.
==Abstract==
This case study illustrates two examples of Indigenous-led REDD+ projects on Indigenous territory in Colombia and Brazil. Both countries have a relatively long history of engaging with REDD+ but have slightly different legal structures pertaining to the rights of Indigenous peoples on their traditional territories, and specifically their ‘carbon’ rights. As such, the intention is to evaluate how these differing ''de jure'' rights translate on the ground. With respect to REDD+, do certain rights result in legitimately positive benefits to IPLCs, as well as the environment that these projects were originally intended to protect? The intention is such that the reader can evaluate the effectiveness and true benefit of REDD+ projects to IPLC’s, based upon the legal frameworks of the host country. A secondary intention is such that the reader is better equipped to conduct a prefeasibility assessment based upon available online literature, to evaluate the likelihood that REDD+ can be implemented in any chosen country, with the genuine intent of benefiting IPLC’s that are directly affected as a result of REDD+ project implementation.

==REDD+ and the VCM in Brazil and Colombia==
REDD+, originally introduced by the UNFCCC, is a market-based mechanism sitting within the VCM that aims to reverse the loss of forests and carbon stocks, specifically in developing countries. Simply put, an entity or an individual can voluntarily pay another that has engaged with REDD+ and subsequently sequestered carbon, to offset their own emissions using ‘credits’, sold as units of greenhouse gas equivalent to one ton of carbon dioxide (CO2e). Forestry and Land-Use remains the largest category of carbon credits traded by transaction volume on the VCM, with REDD+ being the most popular project type in this category, accounting for 78% of credits traded.<ref name=":0">Procton, A., (2024). ''State of the voluntary carbon market 2024: On the path to maturity.'' Forest Trends Ecosystem Marketplace.</ref> Furthermore, over one-third of the credits sold within this category were sourced from projects that had been implemented in LAC and the Caribbean in 2024.<ref name=":0" /> Of the four largest standards issuing carbon credits, Verra accounts for roughly 80% of issuances in Latin America,<ref>Pullins, T. (2022). Growth of carbon markets in Latin America. White & Case. https://www.whitecase.com/publications/insight/latin-america-focus-fall-2022-growth-carbon-markets </ref> and even in the face of recent scrutiny,<ref>West, T. A. P., Bofim, B., Haya, B. K. (2024). Methodological issues with deforestation baselines compromise the integrity of carbon offsets from REDD+. ''Global Environmental Change, 87'' https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2024.102863</ref><ref>Wyburd I., & Dufrasne, G. (2023). Error Log: Exposing the methodological failures of REDD+ forestry projects. Carbon Market Watch. https://carbonmarketwatch.org/publications/error-log-exposing-the-methodological-failures-of-redd-forestry-projects/</ref><ref name=":15">Haya, B. K., Alford-Jones, K., Anderegg, W. R. L., Beymer-Farris, B., Blanchard, L., Bomfim, B., Chin, D., Evans, S., Hogan, M., Holm, J. A., McAfee, K., So, I. S., West, T. A. P., & Withey, L. (2023). ''Quality assessment of REDD+ carbon credit projects''. Berkeley Carbon Trading Project. https://gspp.berkeley.edu/research-and-impact/centers/cepp/projects/berkeley-carbontrading-project/REDD+</ref> REDD+ projects account for a significant proportion of the VCM with their continued application likely to persist.<ref>Gordon, O. (2022). ''The interwoven fortunes of carbon markets and indigenous communities.'' Energy Monitor. https://www.energymonitor.ai/tech/carbon-removal/the-interwoven-fortunes-of-carbon-markets-and-indigenous-communities/</ref><ref>Müller, M., Coustar, C., Bietta, F., Mathres, M. (2022). ''UNFCCC REDD+ and the power of sovereign carbon.'' Deutsche Banke Chief Investment Office. https://www.rainforestcoalition.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/CIO-Special-UNFCCC-REDD-power-of-sovereign-carbon.pdf</ref><ref>Pullins, T. (2022). ''Growth of carbon markets in Latin America.'' White & Case. https://www.whitecase.com/publications/insight/latin-america-focus-fall-2022-growth-carbon-markets </ref> With the introduction of updated methodologies aimed at addressing these concerns,<ref>Verra (2023a). ''Setting the Standard: Verra’s Revolutionary New REDD Methodology.'' https://verra.org/program-notice/setting-the-standard-verras-revolutionary-new-redd-methodology/</ref><ref>Verra (2023b). ''VM0048 Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation, v1.0.'' https://verra.org/methodologies/vm0048-reducing-emissions-from-deforestation-and-forest-degradation-v1-0/</ref> there is hope for renewed buyer confidence in the integrity of this market,<ref>MSCI (2023). ''Verra’s New Methodology for Unplanned Deforestation Aims to Silence the Critics''. https://www.msci.com/www/blog-posts/verra-s-new-methodology-for/04577808942</ref> though more work still needs to be done.

Both Colombia and Brazil have a relatively long history of implementing REDD+ projects, using both fund-based and market-based mechanisms. For example, both countries were participants in the ‘Amazon Indigenous REDD+ (RIA in Spanish) initiative, with the first pilot implementation project being initiated in Colombia’s Puiawai Natural Reserve.<ref>Garzón, E., (2017). ''Amazon Indigenous REDD+: An innovative approach to conserve Colombian forests?'' Mongabay. https://news.mongabay.com/2017/01/amazon-indigenous-redd-an-innovative-approach-to-conserve-colombian-forests/</ref> The relevance of these two countries with respect to REDD+ is simple. Much of the Amazon’s primary tropical rainforest falls within these countries' jurisdiction and this rainforest has been consistently under threat from external pressures and encroachment, whether that be in the form of land-clearing for commercial ranching, subsistence purposes, illicit drug production or illegal mining practices,<ref name=":8">Sánchez García, P. A. & Wong, G. Y., (2024) “The political economy of deforestation in the Colombian Amazon”, ''Journal of Political Ecology'' ''31''(1), 178–199. https://doi.org/10.2458/jpe.5230</ref><ref>Radwin, M. (2023). ''Drug trafficking fuels other deforestation drivers in the Amazon: report.'' Mongabay. https://news.mongabay.com/2023/07/drug-trafficking-fuels-other-deforestation-drivers-in-the-amazon-report/</ref><ref>Haddad, E.A., Araújo, I.F., Feltran-Barbieri, R., Perobelli, F. S., Rocha, A., Sass, K. S., Nobre, C. A. (2024). Economic drivers of deforestation in the Brazilian Legal Amazon. ''Nat Sustain'' ''7'', 1141–1148. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41893-024-01387-7 </ref><ref>Hänggli, A., Levy, S. A., Armenteras, D., Bovolo, C. I., Brandão, J., Rueda, X., & Garrett, R. D. (2023). A systematic comparison of deforestation drivers and policy effectiveness across the amazon biome. ''Environmental Research Letters, 18''(7), 073001. https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/acd408</ref> to name a few.

In theory, REDD+ can be used to provide the economic incentive to promote sustained environmental protection of Indigenous lands, with a focus on the rights and livelihoods of IPLCs. Currently the overall funding to IPLCs tenure rights and forest management in tropical countries is low, receiving just $270 million per year between 2011-2020 from bilateral and multilateral donors and private philanthropies.<ref>Hatcher, J., Owen, M., Yin, D., (2021). ''Falling short: Donor funding for Indigenous peoples and local communities to secure tenure rights and manage forests in tropical countries (2011 -2020).'' Rainforest Foundation Norway. https://dv719tqmsuwvb.cloudfront.net/documents/Publikasjoner/Andre-rapporter/RFN_Falling_short_2021.pdf</ref> REDD+ has the potential to channel funding as to promote Indigenous rights and autonomy, provided there is transparent and equitable benefit-sharing for those involved. Fundamentally, only with the inclusion of IPLC’s, or preferably with IPLC’s acting as project proponents, is REDD+ able to promote Indigenous agency and improve IPLC rights and governance. And only when the rights of those inhabiting the land are formally recognized can the land be effectively conserved.<ref name=":16">Reytar, K., Veit, P., von Braun, J. (2024). ''Protecting Biodiversity Hinges on Securing Indigenous and Community Land Rights.'' WRI. https://www.wri.org/insights/indigenous-and-local-community-land-rights-protect-biodiversity</ref> The inclusion of IPLCs in REDD+ project development is therefore considered to be essential for project success, and this is in theory embodied in the very nature of REDD+.<ref name=":1">Alvarez, G., Elfving, M. and Andrade, C. (2016) ‘REDD+ governance and indigenous peoples in Latin America: the case of Suruí Carbon Project in the Brazilian Amazon Forest’, ''Latin American J. Management for Sustainable Development 3''(2) pp.133–146. https://doi.org/10.1504/LAJMSD.2016.083705</ref> Partially owing to a long history of dealing with REDD+, Colombia and Brazil are amongst just a few of the countries hosting tropical rainforests that explicitly recognise community rights to carbon and tie these rights to the legal ownership of lands and forests. In Colombia, carbon rights are tied to land rights, whereas in Brazil carbon rights are tied to forest rights.<ref name=":2">RRI and McGill University (2021). Technical report: ''Status of legal recognition of Indigenous Peoples’, Local Communities’ and Afro-descendant Peoples’ rights to carbon stored in tropical lands and forests''. Rights and Resources Initiative. https://doi.org/10.53892/MLQQ5744</ref>

==Brazil: The Suruí Forest Carbon Project==
[[File:The Amazon Basin, Brazil.jpg|thumb|376x376px|Brazil's Amazon rainforest]]

=== Project description and location ===
The Surui Forest Carbon project (SFCP) was implemented in 2009 on the territory of the Surui people, which is situated in the southern part of Brazil’s Amazon between the states of Rondônia and Mato Grosso. Surui Indigenous territory covers an area of 2,481 km2, though the intention of the SFCP was to protect a portion of this total area. According to the PD, the stated objective was to “prevent 13,575.3 hectares of tropical forest from being cleared by 2038, to avoid the emission of 7,258,352.3 tCO2e to the atmosphere, and to contribute to the preservation of the Paiter Surui lifestyle and traditions.”<ref>IDESAM (2011). ''Project description: Surui forest carbon project''. Institute for Conservation and Sustainable Development of Amazonas. Link: "PROJ_DESC_1118_02FEB2012.PDF" found at https://registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/1118 </ref> This region sits within one of the Brazilian Amazon’s main ‘arcs of deforestation’ and pressure from loggers and ranchers is a matter of concern.

Notably, the SFCP was the first REDD+ project to be proposed by Indigenous peoples in the Brazilian Amazon on their own territory and was the first to receive certification by both the VCS and CCBS.<ref name=":1" />. Metareilá, the Surui’s own Indigenous association, acted as project proponent and the Institute for Conservation and Sustainable Development of Amazonas (IDESAM) assisted with project development, alongside multiple other stakeholder groups. As an endogenous initiative procured and conducted by the Surui community, the SFCP had a ‘non-centralized model of governance’, which reflected the characteristics and traditions of the Surui people. <ref name=":1" />

Only after two years of consultations between the 24 communities involved and the relevant governmental agencies (primarily FUNAI and the Ministry of Environment) was a Memorandum of Understanding signed, showing community consent to develop the project.<ref name=":3">Garcia, B., Rimmer, L., Canal Vieira, L., Mackey, B., (2021). REDD+ and forest protection on indigenous lands in the Amazon. ''RECIEL 30'', 207–219. https://doi.org/10.1111/reel.12389</ref> In 2012 after verification from an independent third-party body, the Surui were able to sell carbon credits on the international market. Between 2009 and 2014 the project drastically helped limit the deforestation occurring within the project’s site, causing many to deem it a success.<ref name=":4">Howard, F. E., (2023). ''An Analysis of the Suruí Forest Carbon Project in Context of Settler Colonialism''. Masters thesis. Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University. https://vtechworks.lib.vt.edu/server/api/core/bitstreams/b0cde6de-794c-453f-856b-ee72bde3db06/content</ref>

=== National climate targets, policies and legislation ===
Rates of deforestation in Brazil’s legal Amazon are significantly impacted by the government in charge. This is evidenced in the decade between 2012 and 2021 whilst under the conservative Bolsonaro administration, deforestation in the Amazon increased 185% — from a loss of 4,571 km2 in 2012 to 13,038 km2 in 2021.<ref>INPE (2022). ''Observação da Terra. http://www.obt.inpe.br/OBT/assuntos/programas/amazonia/prodes''</ref> However, since Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s appointment in 2022 there has been a steady decline in the rate of deforestation, which is now roughly half what it was in 2021.<ref>Terra Brasilis (2024). ''PRODES (deforestation): Deforestation rates – Legal Amazon – States''. https://terrabrasilis.dpi.inpe.br/app/dashboard/deforestation/biomes/legal_amazon/rates</ref> A significant proportion of emissions result from the clearing of rainforest and its subsequent conversion to ranching.<ref>MCTI (2022). ''Estimativas Anuais De Emissões De Gases De Efeito Estufa No Brasil.'' 6ª Edição. Ministério da Estado da Ciência, Tecnologia e Inovações. https://www.gov.br/mcti/pt-br/acompanhe-o-mcti/sirene/publicacoes/estimativas-anuais-de-emissoes-gee/arquivos/6a-ed-estimativas-anuais.pdf</ref> To address these emissions Brazil has implemented various adaptation policies, legislation and targets which are summarized below:
{| class="wikitable"
|'''Document name'''
|'''Type'''
|'''Publication year'''
|'''Key takeaways'''
|-
|National Policy on Climate Change (NPCC)
|Legislation
|2009
|Framework for addressing climate change
|-
|National Plan on Climate Change Adaptation
|Policy
|2016
|Framework for addressing impacts of climate change
|-
|Nationally Determined Contribution
|Target
|2024
|Reduce net greenhouse gas emissions by 59 to 67 percent below 2005 levels by 2035
|-
|Federal Constitution, Article 225
|Legislation
|2006
|The Amazon rainforest is considered as a ‘national heritage’.All levels of government have a shared responsibility to protect it and the environment
|-
| colspan="4" |'''Relating to REDD+'''
|-
|Plan of Action for the Prevention and Control of Deforestation in the Legal Amazon (PPCDAM)
|Policy
|2004
|Aims to reduce deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon
|-
|Forest code
|Legislation
|2012
|Aimed at reducing deforestation, but no specific mention of REDD+
|-
|Amazon Indigenous REDD+ Initiative
|Policy
|2012
|Incorporate Indigenous with REDD+ initiatives
|-
|National REDD+ Strategy (ENREDD+)
|Policy
|2016
|REDD+ as a fund-based mechanism
|}

=== Indigenous rights - Constitutional, tenure and bundle rights ===
In Brazil, Indigenous rights are robust and clearly defined according to the Brazilian Constitution. As a result, the Indigenous communities of the Brazilian Amazon have legal title to 13.8% of the national territory totalling 1.175 million km2, with a total of 631 territories.<ref>Federal government of Brazil (2024). ''Brazil’s NDC: National determination to contribute and transform''. https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/2024-11/Brazil_Second%20Nationally%20Determined%20Contribution%20%28NDC%29_November2024.pdf</ref>
{| class="wikitable"
| colspan="2" |'''Laws'''
|-
|Article 231 of the 1988 Constitution
|Indigenous peoples to have their exclusive right to use their territories to derive economic benefits. Grants indigenous peoples the right to land, prohibits eviction, and restricts mining without authorization from the federal government.
|-
|Indigenous Peoples statute (1973).

|No acts restricting the full exercise of indigenous peoples’ permanent tenure over the land should be permitted.
|-
| colspan="2" | '''Treaties'''
|-
|United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2007)
|Requires States to obtain free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) for the approval of any projects affecting indigenous territories.
|-
|International Labour Organization Convention 169 (2019)
|Ratified and incorporated under domestic law in 2002 through Decree 10.088/2019, endorsing UNDRIP
|-
|American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2016)
|Supports and builds upon UNDRIP
|}
Whilst Indigenous communities in Brazil have legal title to land, it is the State that owns it. Indigenous people simply exercise permanent tenure over lands that they traditionally occupy and have ‘original rights’ to these traditional lands, which no other rights can prevail over.<ref name=":3" /> Indigenous lands, though not classified as protected areas, “have the highest level of protection by law because they are regulated by the Constitution” and cannot be leased or restricted without violating their original rights. The Suruí's right to develop the SFCP is grounded in the Brazilian Constitution, which grants Indigenous peoples exclusive rights to use the ‘riches of the soil, rivers and lakes’ of their land, and these rights cannot be overridden. Thus, Indigenous people and only Indigenous people are legally allowed to engage in productive activities on their land, provided these activities are conducted according to their own customs and traditions and are necessary for the wellbeing and cultural expression of their own people. In Brazil, it is the armed forces and federal police that are responsible for enforcing these laws, and FUNAI is responsible for representing Indigenous communities in judicial disputes.<ref name=":3" /> As such, provided a REDD+ project does not violate the rights to territorial integrity, permanent land tenure and original rights, it is legally allowed.
[[File:Two Pataxo indians (Brasília, 04 April 2006).jpeg|thumb|414x414px|Two Indigenous in Brazil]]
'''CARBON RIGHTS:''' In Brazil, carbon rights are tied to forest rights.<ref name=":2" /> Carbon credits from REDD+ projects are seen as part of the economic benefits derived from indigenous lands, and as such, Indigenous communities are entitled to own, control and distribute these revenues themselves. The carbon credits generated from the SFCP were wholly owned by the Suruí people through Metareilá, with the Suruí Fund (managed by the Brazilian Biodiversity Fund - FUNBIO) acting as recipient. This legality reinforces Indigenous control over both land and carbon rights, as whoever has rights to the forest land is usually recognized as the owner of carbon rights.<ref name=":3" /> Collectively these national and international laws provide an important safeguard to Indigenous peoples, making their consent a prerequisite for the establishment of REDD+ projects and recognizing their rights as the main beneficiaries of REDD+ revenues.<ref name=":3" /> However, as carbon rights are tied to forest rights in Brazil and not land rights, and carbon is considered to be an ‘environmental service’ (Article 41(I)(A) Brazilian Forestry Code), states as well as the federal government have the jurisdiction to exercise full legislative authority over carbon. <ref name=":2" /> As such, certain states have interpreted the law to imply that the title to carbon credits is attributable to the state.<ref>Loft, L., Ravikumar, A., Gebara, M. F., Pham, T. T., Resosudarmo, I. A. P., Assembe, S., Tovar, J. G., Mwangi, E., & Andersson, K. (2015). Taking Stock of Carbon Rights in REDD+ Candidate Countries: Concept Meets Reality. ''Forests'', ''6''(4), 1031-1060. https://doi.org/10.3390/f6041031</ref> Hence, even when carbon rights are clearly defined and tied to forest title it is insufficient in itself, and only by legally recognizing the customary rights of IPLCs can a fair and equitable outcome be realised.

'''FPIC OBLIGATION:''' Brazilian law requires Free, Prior, and Informed Consent (FPIC) for REDD+ projects affecting indigenous lands, ensuring that international standards such as the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) and ILO Convention No. 169 are adhered to; Indigenous consent is, ''de jure,'' a necessity. Projects that violate these rights and fail to consult communities are therefore considered illegal. Notably there are no specific rules or procedures that have been written into the Brazilian constitution that provide guidance on how to achieve FPIC. However, this freedom reinforces Indigenous autonomy as it allows an Indigenous community to define the rules of consultation according to their customs and traditions.

=== Affected and interested stakeholders ===
{| class="wikitable"
| colspan="5" |'''Affected stakeholders'''
|-
|Stakeholders
|Primary objective(s)
|Secondary objective(s)
|Relative power
|Scope of influence
|-
|Metareilá Association of the Suruí Indigenous People
|Project proponent

Works to defend and preserve the cultural and territorial heritage of the Suruí people.

Responsible for the Suruí Fund (FUNBIO). Ensure equitable distribution of funds
|Ensure project longevity.
Stick to the mandate; attempt not to be influenced by external actors
|Powerful, though lacking technical knowhow. Have carbon rights and thus have ultimate control of project revenue; can decide how this revenue is distributed.
|Local
|-
|Other Indigenous groups and associations
|Support various aspects of proejct development
|Aim to benefit from the project
|Have the same rights as the Metareila with respect to land though are less involved with project development and have less say, nor derive economic benefits like the Metareila
|Local
|-
|''Campesinos'' (peasants)
|Survive via subsistence.
|Procure more land.
|Have far fewer rights than Indigenous groups and no involvement with the project
|Local
|-
| colspan="5" |'''Interested stakeholders'''
|-
|IDESAM - Institute for Conservation and Sustainable Development of Amazonas
|Maximise revenue from project.
Ensure project longevity
|Achieve completion of various technical aspects of project
|Powerful: Required to complete various technical aspects of development.
|National
|-
|Forest Trends
|Supported formulation and implementation of the project.
Uphold image of organization
|Maximise environmental benefits of project
|Powerful: Tasked with raising funds and fostering an international network; an integral part of project development
|International
|-
|Amazon Conservation Team - ACT Brazil
|Supports various aspect of project development as well as offering legal advice.
Other technical assistance
|Maximise environmental benefits of project
|Powerful: An integral part of project development
|International
|-
|Kanindé Association for Ethno-Environmental Defense – non-profit
|Promote Metareilá views and beliefs
|Involved with various aspects of project development
|Mid-power. Has a say in project direction, though less weight than the Metareila.
|National - International
|-
|Ministry of Environment (MMA)
|Responsible for protection and conservation of natural environment
|Ensure project adheres to national law
|Powerful. Must be notified about project activities although cannot strictly alter decisions made by the Surui
|National
|-
|National Indian Foundation (FUNAI)
|Promote Indigenous rights

|Represents Indignous organizations with judicial matters.
|Powerful. Knowleadgeable of judicial system. Must be notified about project activities though is not involved with project governance.
|National
|-
|Government of the State of Mato Grosso
|Encourage development, and reduce poverty and crime in Mato Grosso
|Ensure project adheres to regional law.
|Powerful. Legilative control over regional police and municipalities
|Regional
|}

=== Discussion ===
Although originally successful in achieving its goal of reducing deforestation and degradation, in 2016 diamonds were discovered in Surui territory, leading to an increase in illegal logging and mining.<ref name=":1" /> By 2018 the project site had been completely overrun by ''garimpeiros'' (small-scale gold miners), ultimately leading to the project's suspension that year. <ref name=":4" />

While the project had initially garnered support, divisions emerged within the community post-project implementation. Disputes arose over the unequal distribution of project revenues, leading to internal conflicts between different Suruí clans. These criticisms escalated in 2014 when the Catholic Indigenous Missionary Council supported calls for an end to the project due to mismanagement of revenues from carbon credit sales. <ref name=":3" /> Some Suruí members also argued that the REDD+ initiative harmed their way of life.<ref>Lang, C. (2014). ''“What are projects for that destroy life?” Interview with Henrique Suruí about the Paiter-Suruí REDD project, Brazil.'' REDD-Monitor. https://redd-monitor.org/2014/12/17/what-are-projects-for-that-destroy-life-interview-with-henrique-surui-about-the-paiter-surui-redd-project-brazil/</ref>

Further complicating the situation was the controversial role of Henrique Suruí, one of the Suruí tribal leaders. In 2011, it was revealed that Henrique had violated the tribe's logging moratorium, collaborating with loggers in illegal activities. While Henrique later denied responsibility for the project’s failure, his actions, combined with internal disagreements, illustrated the lack of consensus within the Suruí leadership on the project’s goals and outcomes. Both of the tribe’s leaders possessed dramatically different perspectives on how they believed they could ensure agency, autonomy, and economic benefits for the Suruí people.<ref name=":4" /> This fragmentation within the community, in combination with the discovery of diamonds and the state's failure to protect indigenous land rights led to the indefinite suspension of the REDD+ project.

The project's collapse highlights broader structural issues, particularly the state's inconsistent support for indigenous land rights, influenced by settler colonialism, which undermined the project’s long-term viability.<ref name=":4" /> Additionally, the project’s creation was shaped by external actors, including the collaboration between Almir Suruí and Borges from Forest Trends, a Washington-based NGO. This partnership introduced a Western perspective on viewing the Suruí peoples forest, in contrast with their own perspectives on land use and governance. Furthermore, despite Borges’ Brazilian background, the power dynamics between a global North organization and a developing, Indigenous community were apparent.

=== Summary ===
The Suruí Forest Carbon Project provides an interesting example of how, even when the rights of IPLC’s are relatively robust, challenges persist in ensuring REDD+ project longevity. As such, in its current state, REDD+ in the Brazilian Amazon may not be a suitable market-based option for Indigenous communities in the Amazon.<ref name=":3" /> Although initially successful in promoting Indigenous autonomy and reducing deforestation, the project resulted in failure due to of a myriad of factors. Divisions among Surui communities were exacerbated by a perceived unequal benefit-sharing, and the impact of imposing REDD+ seems to have complicated the traditional social structure that the Surui were dependent on. These issues were influenced by Brazil's settler state dynamics, where Indigenous land rights, although legally recognized, are often not upheld in practice due to insufficient enforcement.<ref name=":4" /> Ultimately, the Surui project reveals how settler colonialism's structural flaws make long-term project success difficult, despite initial progress in promoting Indigenous autonomy.

At the national and state level, complex institutional and legal land governance structures convolute and impede REDD+ in Brazil. Multiple institutions share responsibilities and there is no comprehensive, authoritative database of land ownership, which hampers efforts to protect Indigenous territories.<ref name=":5">Costa, R. (2016)''. Insecure land rights in Brazil: Consequences for rural areas and challenges for improvement.'' Climate Policy Initiative. https://www.climatepolicyinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/Insecure_Land_Rights_in_Brazil_CPI.pdf</ref> As a result, land tenure disputes remain common and can be witnessed occurring between the public as well between public and state actors. For example, Brazil’s 1964 Land Statute (Law No. 4504) allows the government to take over unproductive farms and transfer those lands to landless peasants. This often results in the clearing of forest, as only when the land is cleared is it evidenced to be ‘productive’.<ref name=":5" /> Hence, not only does this law cause insecurity for Indigenous populations in Brazil, it also forces them to go against customary traditions of stewarding the land in an effort to maintain its control.

Whilst the aforementioned points to the futility of REDD+ in Brazil, there is reason to maintain optimism. In a recent landmark ruling Brazil’s supreme court voted in favour of the Xoleng peoples, and the decision will serve as a precedent for all cases involving Indigenous peoples.<ref name=":6">Amos-Flom, K., (2023). ''Triumph and Turmoil: The Xokleng Case and the Future of Indigenous Land Rights in Brazil.'' Columbia Journal of Transnational Law. https://www.jtl.columbia.edu/bulletin-blog/triumph-and-turmoil-the-xokleng-case-and-the-future-of-indigenous-land-rights-in-brazil</ref> The Xokleng’s land dispute, settled in 2023, “rejected Santa Catarina state’s marco temporal (“time limit”) argument, which would have required Indigenous people to prove they occupied or legally contested the territory they claimed before the Brazilian Constitution came into force in 1988. If successful, this argument would have led to disastrous repercussions, as many Indigenous peoples had been forcibly removed or are traditionally nomadic.”<ref name=":6" /> Evidently, whilst slow, progress has been made in Brazil in recent years with respect to Indigenous rights as well as the voluntary carbon market itself.

There are currently 159 AFOLU projects listed on the Verra database in Brazil, with only two specifically focused on REDD+ initiatives in collaboration with Indigenous groups. These are the Ka’a Pyahu project, <ref>Verra (n.d.) ''Project 5087: KA'A PYAHU.'' https://registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/5087</ref> initiated by the Guajajara Indigenous people in collaboration with external organizations and validated in 2021, and the ‘Together for the forest Awaete REDD+ project’<ref>Verra (n.d.) ''Project 5200: TOGETHER FOR THE FOREST AWAETÉ REDD+ PROJECT.'' https://registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/5200</ref> which is still under development. Both projects involve Indigenous groups working with Brazilian organizations to build technical capacity and expertise. This could signal a growing trend of Indigenous-led REDD+ projects in the future. To ensure a positive future for REDD+ in Brazil, the customary rights of IPLC’s must be formally recognized. IPLC should have legal ownership of their traditional lands, and in doing so the carbon rights of these communities would be less convoluted, leading to more equitable benefit-sharing and increased cohesion amongst these groups post-project implementation.

==Colombia: ''REDD+ project Resguardo Indigena Unificado - Selva de Mataven (RUI-SM)''==

=== '''Project description and location''' ===
[[File:RS6524 MG 3944.jpg|thumb|407x407px|A view of the Mataven]]
According to the PD,<ref name=":7">ACATISEMA & Mediamos (2017). ''Joint project description and monitoring report: REDD+ project: Resguardo Indigena Unificado – Selva de Mataven (RIU – SM).'' Link: “10 06 2017_VCS Final Report_ Matavin Project.pdf” found at https://registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/1566</ref> the Resguardo Indígena Unificado – Selva de Matavén (RIU-SM) project is located east of the Colombian Orinoco high plain, in the eastern part of the Department of Vichada, municipality of Cumaribo. It resides on the formalized resguardo of the Sikuani, Piaroa, Puinave, Curripaco, Cubeo and Piapoco ethnic groups, spanning 1,856,836 hectares, with 1,477,115 hectares (79.6%) being forested. The PD states that it will reduce greenhouse gas emissions, with a total estimated net reduction of 108,670,562 tons of CO2 equivalent over thirty years, from years 2013 – 2042. By this metric, it is the 14th largest project on the Verra registry, out of over 1700 projects.<ref name=":9">Dufrasne, D., (2021). ''Two Shades of Green: How hot air forest credits are being used to avoid carbon taxes in Colombia''. Carbon Market Watch. https://carbonmarketwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Two-shades-of-green_EN_WEB.pdf</ref> There are 12,312 Indigenous people living in the RIU-SM, belonging to 2,517 families and 250 communities as of 2017.

The project was initiated by the Asociación de Cabildos y Autoridades Indígenas de la Selva de Matavén (ACETISMA), an Indigenous association, and developed by MEDIAMOS F&M, a Colombian consultancy firm. ACETISMA is comprised of Indigenous leaders that represent the 17 communities of the reservation in charge of governing the territory, and it has administrative autonomy, as well as “the capacity to acquire, to own and to dispose of property, to accept donations, to hold national and international conventions, scientific and cultural exchanges and generally, to celebrate all kinds of negotiations and agreements with which the Association can achieve its objectives.”<ref name=":7" />

There is a stated focus on various means of improving the living conditions of the Indigenous peoples living within the project area. To summarise, the main objectives of the REDD+ project RIU-SM include:

· Community development, in the form of improved education.

· Community engagement with respect to the project; developing information channels to reveal project progress.

· Support local initiatives for environmental education and waste management.

· Developing an effective response system that addresses community proposals and concerns relating to the project.

· Strengthening the governance of ACATISEMA.
=== National climate targets, policies and legislation ===
The Colombian Amazon makes up over one-third of Colombia’s national territory, and up until 2005 only 7.3% of the Colombian Amazon had been deforested, largely due to the country's 60-year armed conflict between the government, multiple left-wing guerillas such as FARC, and several far-right paramilitary groups.<ref name=":8" /> However, following the signing of the Peace Treaty in 2016 and demobilization of the FARC, limits to deforestation were weakened in the Colombian Amazon. Poor but opportunistic peasants began to encroach into previously unchartered territory and capitalize from the rainforest. Due to the poor economic integration of the Amazon, many were forced to engage with the traditional economies of cocoa and cattle ranching, as these markets were already well connected to regional and global markets.<ref name=":8" /> To address the drivers of deforestation and its associated emissions, the federal government has implemented various initiatives, which are summarized below:

{| class="wikitable"
|'''Document name'''
|'''Type'''
|'''Publication year'''
|'''Key takeaways'''
|-
|Nationally Determined Contribution(s)
|Target
|2020
|Reduce GHG emissions by 51% by 2030 and net-zero by 2050
|-
|National Climate Change Policy (PNCC)
|Policy
|2018
|Address climate change and foster sustainable development
|-
|National Forest Conservation Program
|Policy
|2011
|Address deforestation
|-
|Law 1931 of 2018 – Climate Change Law

|Legislation
|2018
|Establishes the framework for addressing climate change
|-
| colspan="4" |'''Relating to REDD+:'''
|-
|National Strategy for Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (ENREDD+)
|Initiative
|2009
|Particular focus on the Amazon and Choco rainforests
|-
|Amazon Indigenous REDD+ Initiative
|Initiative
|2016
|Respect Indigenous rights. FPIC focus.
|-
|BIOREDD+ program
|Initiative
|2012
|Portfolio of 8 REDD+ projects in four geographic nodes covering over 700,000 hectares in the Colombian Pacific.

|-
|Vision Amazonia
|Initiative
|2015
|Part of the REDD+ strategy, financed by three foreign countries: Germany, Norway and United Kingdom
|}
As a result of the many fund and market-based initiatives that Colombia has engaged with, it hosts the second most REDD+ projects in the world. REDD+ projects now cover at least 56% of the area of legally recognized Indigenous territories in the Colombian Amazon, with an overwhelming majority of carbon projects located on Indigenous territories.<ref name=":10">Schmid, D., & Castro. C., (2023). ''REDD+ projects in the Colombian Amazon: Social challenges and lack of transparency''. Rainforest Foundation Norway. https://dv719tqmsuwvb.cloudfront.net/documents/REDD_rapport_2024_ENG.pdf</ref> Evidently REDD+ plays an integral part in the country’s efforts of environmental conservation, and incentives have been introduced to promote the development of such projects. For example, in 2016 the government adopted a higher tax that covered fossil fuels, but companies are able to avoid paying the tax by investing in carbon offsets that have been generated domestically.<ref name=":9" /> This led to a boost in the domestic REDD+ market in 2017, as Colombian companies invested so as to escape higher taxes. Notably, 23 of the 36 REDD+ projects currently under development in the Amazon region were initiated in or after 2018.<ref name=":10" /> Currently Colombia’s REDD+ program sits at over 45 pilot and voluntary carbon projects, as well as one large-scale jurisdictional approach in the Amazon.<ref name=":11">Zambrano-Cortés, D. G. (2024). ''The politics, spaces and subjects of forest conservation in Colombia''. [internal PhD, WU, Wageningen University]. Wageningen University. https://doi.org/10.18174/675328</ref>

=== Indigenous rights - Constitutional, tenure and bundle rights ===
''De jure'', the Indigenous peoples of Colombia have comprehensive tenure and bundle of rights that have been articulated in the national constitution. Collective land titles are granted to Indigenous communities by the Colombian government and as a result about 34 percent of Colombian land (almost 38 million hectares) is legally recognized as Indigenous territory or collective lands of Afro-descendent communities.<ref name=":10" /> These collective land tenure rights have been in effect since the implementation of the 1991 constitution, granting them the authority to exercise legal control over their territories in accordance with their own customs and procedures.<ref>Max Planck Institute (n.d.) ''Colombia 1991 (rev. 2015).'' Institute. https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Colombia_2015</ref> Furthermore, the carbon rights of Indigenous peoples are explicitly defined in the constitution and tied specifically to the ownership of land of the communities.<ref name=":2" /> This in theory provides a solid legal basis for upholding the rights of Indigenous communities in Colombia, specifically relating to REDD+ activities, as it allows communities to define and negotiate the terms of said projects. A summary of the various laws relating to Indigenous rights have been summarized below:
{| class="wikitable"
| colspan="2" |'''Law (1991 constitution)'''
|-
|Article 63

|Indigenous territories are considered collective property. Land is not owned by individuals but is shared by the community. The state must respect these collective rights and cannot alter land ownership without the consent of the Indigenous peoples.
|-
|Article 76 - ''Consulta previa''.
|Pertains to the right of Indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities; prior consultation must be undertaken before any entity undertakes activities that may affect their territories, culture, or way of life.
|-
|Article 330
|Indigenous communities have the right to govern their territories.
|-
|Article 329
|The Reservation is a collective, inalienable, and indefeasible property.
|-
|Decree 1386 of 1994, Article 10; Decree 2164 of 1995, Article 22) 39.
|"The administration and management of these lands are subjected to uses and customs of the beneficiaries."
|}
Whilst land and tenure rights are enshrined into the constitution, the precariousness of these rights persists due to a lack of resources to ensure enforcement, as well as the deeper issue of corruption. As previously stated, the rate of deforestation increased significantly in Colombia’s post-conflict era, evidencing the nation's inability to maintain control over unlawful acts of land-grabbing and disposition. Whilst this began with new peasants converting the Amazon for subsistence purposes, it ultimately led to new areas for the growth of cocoa, much to the benefit of narco-traffickers who could monopolize on this illegal surplus in ‘accumulation by dispossession’.<ref name=":8" />

With respect to the legalities of consultation, Colombia has enshrined ''consulta previa'' into the constitution. Translating to ‘prior consultation’, this legal text provides the formal grounds for Indigenous engagement when any legislative or administrative measures are implemented on Indigenous territory. Importantly, consultation should be achieved in accordance with the customs of the ethnic group with which the project is being imposed upon. However, there have been recent cases of contestation specifically relating to how ''consulta previa'' applies to REDD+ on Indigenous lands, and the RIU – SM project was one that was involved with such a case.

=== Affected and interested stakeholders ===
{| class="wikitable"
| colspan="5" |'''Affected stakeholders'''
|-
|Stakeholders
|Primary objective(s)
|Secondary objective(s)
|Relative power
|Scope of influence
|-
|ACATISEMA - Asociación de Cabildos y Autoridades Indígenas de la Selva de Matavén
|Primary and direct beneficiaries of project
Foster the integral development, social and cultural preservation of the indigenous communities in the Mataven Jungle

Consolidate the territory, and promote conservation and preservation of the environment and biodiversity of the Mataven Jungle

|Maintain control over ''resguardos''
|Powerful, locally.
Has the highest authority in the ''reguardo''.

Rights to the land and revenue generated from project
|Local
|-
|Indigenous communities of the RIU-SM
|Seek to maintain land rights

Promote traditional and cultural beliefs
|Increase benefits from the project
|Mid-power, though little input into project activities in reality.
|Local
|-
|Landless peasants
|Survive via subsistence
|Gain more access to land. Improve rights.
|Low to none
|Local
|-
| colspan="5" |'''Interested stakeholders'''
|-
|MEDIAMOS F&M
|Project developer
Maximise project revenues
|Develop the project in a way that is supporting of ACETISMA beliefs, for their benefit.
|Powerful: involved with various technical aspects of project development
|National
|-
|Ministerio de Ambiente y Desarrollo Sostenible (Minisitry of Environment and Sustainable Development)
|Environmental planning; sustainable development
Form strategic alliances with social and institutional participants in different sectoral and territorial scenarios.
|Ensure project activities are in agreement with ministry mandate
|Powerful, though supporting of project
|National
|-
|Dirección de Asuntos Indígenas, ROM y Minorías - Ministerio del Interior
|Prepares policy in favour of Indigenous groups
Supports ethnic and cultural rights of Indigenous
|
|Not ''per se'' involved with project, though the policy the organization has introduced affects project outcomes
|National
|-
|Corporinoquía
|Environmental authority to ensure the proper use of natural resources in their area of jurisdiction.
Ensure project abides by relevant regulations
|
|Powerful, though supporting of project
|Regional
|-
|Other government institutions: Governor ofice of Vichada, Mayor ofice Cumaribo
|The Reservation for being part of the Cumaribo, Vichada, has territorial jurisdiction relations with the Governor’s office and the Mayor’s office.
|Benefit from the project, if possible
|Powerful, regionally
|Regional - National
|-
|Fundación NATURA
''Civil organization''
|Conservation, use and management of biodiversity
Maximise social and environmental benefits of project
|Ensure suffienct IPLC inclusion
|Mid-power. Can influence decisions regarding project activities though does not hold absolute power to define terms
|International
|-
|Mining companies
|Mine to generate revenue.
|Compete with the project for the territory's resources.
|Relatively powerful, though legally obstructed to achieve primary objective
|International
|-
|Other indigenous communities neighboring RIU-SM
|Ensure autonomy with respect to their own jurisdiction
|Not involved with the project though potentially affected by it
|Low, with respect to the project
|Local
|-
|FONDO ACCIÓN
|Facilitate private investment into project activities
|Conservation and sustainable development; Protection/development of children.
|Mid-power. Important as they raise funds for the project and benefit from it, though not primary beneficiaries.
|National
|-
|Asocarbono – An industry association, including Verra, ProClima, Biofix, and ACATISEMA.

|Promote the agenda of high-level actors of the VCM
Promote integrity of market
|Hide/argue cases of scandal
|Powerful
|International
|-
|OPIAC: National Oganization of the Indigenous Peoples of the Colombian Amazon

|Promotes Indigenous rights in Colombia
Exercises a political representation of the Indigenous peoples of the Colombian Amazon
|
|Powerful. Legally knowledgeable.
|National
|}

=== Discussion ===
According to the official REDD+ Mataven website<ref>RIU – SM (n.d.). ''REDD+ Mataven''. https://reddmataven.com/</ref> the project has resulted in a myriad of benefits to the Indigenous communities of the region. For example, as a result of the funds generated from the project's activities, there have been improvements in infrastructure, transportation and education, ultimately leading to the empowerment and improved governance of ACETISMA. However, the project has come under fire for multiple reasons.

For one, in 2015 some of the Indigenous communities filed a lawsuit referring to the violation of their right to ''consulta previa''. However, the court ruled that their Indigenous rights had not been violated as it was ACETISMA that initially sought MEDIAMOS to develop the project, and that ACETISMA were the best representatives of those Indigenous communities. Furthermore, the project's main focus was the conservation of the rainforest and therefore did not threaten the cultural integrity of those communities.<ref name=":10" /> However, regardless of the outcome of this case, its occurrence points to internal disagreement amongst Indigenous participants of the RIU-SM project. In a study involving interviews with Indigenous members of the project, there was a significant proportion of interviewees that had little knowledge regarding various aspects of the project, such as responsibilities of participation, or the benefit-sharing mechanism in place.<ref name=":2" /> This further reinforces the point that, in the case of the RIU-SM project it may not be ‘bottom-up’ and points to the power imbalance experienced between MEDIAMOS, the project developer, and Indigenous community members. In the PD there is a breakdown of the distribution of income between ACETISMA and MEDIAMOS, which shows a significant proportion of revenue flowing to the former organisation throughout the project’s operations.<ref name=":7" /> However, there is currently no publicly available documentation supporting this initial claim<ref name=":9" /> as there is no obligation to provide this information, leading to a general lack of transparency in the market and between all of the relevant actors. Subsequent meetings with Indigenous leaders have however shown a marked support of the Mataven project, with one Indigenous leader explicitly stating “...the REDD+ project has brought resources that they never had before, which allowed them to open new school classrooms, 21 rural aqueducts, cocoa crops and even headquarters in Cumaribo and Inírida.”<ref>Lievano, A. B. (2021) Colombia's biggest carbon credit project could be selling hot air. Latin American Center for Investigative Journalism. https://www.elclip.org/el-mayor-proyecto-de-bonos-de-carbono-de-colombia-podria-estar-vendiendo-aire-caliente/ </ref> Clearly there have been benefits for IPLC’s involved with this project, though the details of this benefit-sharing remain a mystery.

Secondly, the Mataven project has caused controversy due to its apparently inflated carbon credit issuance. One report states that this has been achieved by using a reference area that is not representative of the project area, as well as assuming an uncharacteristically high assumed rate of deforestation.<ref name=":12">Global Atlas of Environmental Justice (2023). ''Resguardo Indigena Unificado-Selva de Matavén (RIU SM) REDD+ Project, Colombia.'' https://ejatlas.org/conflict/redd-project-resguardo-indigena-unificado-selva-de-mataven-riu-sm</ref> The project used a baseline deforestation rate of 0.86% per year, which is significantly more than the Colombian government's national rate of 0.18%. Additionally, according to the report the reference area chosen is more easily accessed and therefore more prone to deforestation, making it an inaccurate comparison to the relatively remote project area.<ref name=":2" /> This has led to the creation of excess carbon credits, or “hot air” credits, which have been criticized for not reflecting real environmental benefits.<ref name=":9" /> To add further insult to injury these credits have been used by a Colombian fossil fuel distributor company to avoid paying taxes, as described earlier by Colombia’s change in policy in 2017. In doing so, the company avoided paying approximately $18.9 million in taxes.<ref name=":2" /> There has been subsequent back and forth between Verra and Carbon Market Watch, with Verra refuting the claims.<ref>Verra (2021). ''Carbon Market Watch Report on Colombian REDD+ Projects Contains Flawed Allegations.'' https://verra.org/carbon-market-watch-report-on-colombian-redd-projects-contains-flawed-allegations/ </ref> Regardless of the science, Colombia recently introduced a resolution in 2018 (Resolution 1447 – 2018) that requires projects to use baselines that comply with national reference levels.<ref name=":13">Dufrasne, D. (2021b). Companies use ”hot air” forestry offsets to avoid taxes in Colombia: Carbon Market Watch’s fact-check of Verra’s response. Carbon Market Watch. https://carbonmarketwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/CMWs-fact-check-of-Verras-response-on-Colombia.pdf</ref><ref>IEA (2022). ''Resolution 1447 – 2018. Monitoring, Reporting, and Verification System for mitigation actions at the national level.'' International Energy Agency. https://www.iea.org/policies/14772-resolution-1447-2018-monitoring-reporting-and-verification-system-for-mitigation-actions-at-the-national-level</ref> Going forward, REDD+ projects that are being implemented in Colombia will have to abide by Colombia’s national legislation.

=== Summary ===
Colombia has a long history of engaging in REDD+ as it has been used to limit environmental degradation in the post-conflict era, in alignment with the country’s national peacebuilding agenda.<ref name=":11" /> Owing to the country’s comprehensive tenure and bundle of rights, IPLC’s have robust ''de jure'' rights to land as they collectively own it, and rights to carbon are tied to this ownership. This puts Colombia as one of the world leaders in legal terms relating to REDD+ project implementation, but due to a lack of resources to ensure enforcement, as well as corruption, historically these laws have not been adhered to.<ref name=":10" /><ref name=":2" /> There are many documented cases showing the displacement on IPLC’s from traditional lands, poor efforts to adhere to ''consulta previa'', and inequitable benefit sharing.<ref>Greenfield, P. (2023''). The ‘carbon pirates’ preying on Amazon’s Indigenous communities.'' The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2023/jan/21/amazon-indigenous-communities-carbon-offsetting-pirates-aoe</ref><ref name=":14">Lang, C., (2024). ''Colombia’s Constitutional Court rules in favour of Indigenous Peoples. Identifies serious flaws in the REDD+ Baka Rokarire project.'' REDD_Monitor. https://reddmonitor.substack.com/p/colombias-constitutional-court-rules</ref>

The case of the Mataven project provides an interesting example of how it is the market itself that is failing to address concerns regarding transparency, whether that be relating to benefit-sharing amongst relevant stakeholders, or Indigenous representation and engagement throughout the implementation of REDD+ projects. Some ACATISEMA members have explicitly stated their support for the Mataven project,<ref name=":12" /> and its benefits can be seen first-hand in the form of improved infrastructure in local communities involved with the project.<ref>Myers, J. E., Parra, M. A., Bedford, C. (2021). ''How Carbon Offsetting Can Build a Forest.'' Stanford Social Innovation Review. https://ssir.org/articles/entry/how_carbon_offsetting_can_build_a_forest</ref> However, an exact breakdown of how and where revenue is being distributed to IPLC’s remains elusive.<ref name=":13" /> Furthermore, the level of IPLC engagement has come into question, specifically with reference to ''consulta previa'' and the overall understanding that IPLC’s have regarding the project’s intended outcomes and activities.<ref name=":10" /> This is not a rare case in Colombia and has been witnessed occurring with other projects that have been implemented on Indigenous territories in the Colombian Amazon.<ref name=":17">Lang, C., (2023''). “It destroys everything,” says Indigenous leader about the REDD+ Baka Rokarire project in Colombia''. REDD Monitor. https://reddmonitor.substack.com/p/it-destroys-everything-says-indigenous</ref> However, a recent ruling by the Colombian Constitutional court voted in favour of Indigenous groups in Colombia, upholding “the rights to self-determination, autonomy, self-government, territory, identity, physical and cultural integrity, and free, prior and informed consent of the indigenous communities”.<ref name=":14" /> This review ultimately sets a legal precedent safeguarding the fundamental rights of IPLCs with REDD+ project implementation and shows that progress is being made to improve the likelihood that REDD+ will result in genuine benefits to those affected by project implementation.

To ensure a more authentic engagement with IPLC’s so as to result in legitimate and equitable benefit-sharing, improvements must be made by the Colombian government, as well as within the VCM itself. For the former, Colombia’s national registry for GHG mitigation activities must be updated; it has been offline since 2022.<ref name=":10" /> As a result, transparency is lacking. International finance could be utilized so as to alleviate this issue, and only with an accurate and reliable database may the market be regulated. In the broader sense, VCM registries must create stricter guidelines promoting transparency. Often PD’s refer to annexed documents that contain relevant information regarding benefit-sharing, though these are often not publicly available.<ref name=":9" /> This limits transparency and increases the likelihood of inequitable agreements being made between project proponents and developers, further exacerbating existing power asymmetries between the two groups and limiting the likelihood that ''consulta previa'' is honestly adhered to.<ref name=":10" /> This has led to conflict within Indigenous communities, rather than a strengthening of their social fabric.

Furthermore, the Mataven project calls into question the actual emissions reduction that REDD+ projects achieve. Whilst Colombia has since updated its regulations such that REDD+ must use baselines that comply with national reference levels, it is up in the air as to how representative these guidelines are. Reference areas must represent project areas and without the appropriate regulations in place project developers lack the incentive to create realistic baselines; ultimately they are aiming to produce the maximum number of credits so as to generate the greatest possible revenues.

==Conclusion==
As a market-based mechanism, REDD+ is shackled by the construct in which it operates; fundamentally it is a capitalist means of fixing a capitalist problem, which comes with limitations. Both Brazil and Colombia have relatively robust laws that have been written into their constitutions, ultimately promoting more equitable results of REDD+ project implementation. However, as in Colombia IPLC’s collectively own the land, whereas in Brazil these groups only own rights to use the land,<ref name=":2" /> Colombia can be considered better equipped for the establishment of REDD+ projects on traditional Indigenous territory. However, even with these laws in place enforcement remain a matter of concern. Furthermore, given the wide variety of ontological and epistemological perspectives of Indigenous communities, and how these views conflict with the Western worldview from which market-based REDD+ came to fruition, there is an inherent difficulty in implementing a system of governance in REDD+ on Indigenous lands.<ref name=":1" />. Putting a price on nature conflicts with Indigenous perspectives and there have been instances where this has weakened the social and cultural fabric of IPLC’s.<ref name=":17" /> To avoid this REDD+ developers must have the genuine intent of understanding the perspective of the Indigenous group they are working with and aim to implement REDD+ with a bottom-up approach.

In both countries, transparency must be improved to ensure that FPIC is adhered to and subsequently ensure fair IPLC representation and engagement. This issue predominantly arises due to the poor requirements of standards in the VCM. As such, proponents are guided by developers which have little incentive to truly act in the interests of Indigenous groups; ultimately the organizations in charge of project development are interested in increasing project revenues. This has led to instances of over-crediting, as without a transparent framework in which to operate it is difficult to evaluate the legitimacy of the claims being made by project proponents and developers. However, with recent advances that address concerns of additionality<ref name=":15" /> there is hope for improved market integrity. Standards of the VCM must continue to be scrutinized to ensure that progress continues to be made.

Going forward, progress should be made to formalize the customary laws and traditional lands of IPLCs, and finance should be directed towards the enforcement of these laws. The environmental,<ref name=":16" /> economic,<ref name=":5" /><ref>Ding, H., Veit, P. G., Blackman, A., Gray, E., Reytar, K., Altamirano, J. C., Hodgdon, B., (2016). ''Climate benefits, tenure costs: The economic case for securing Indigenous land rights in the Amazon''. WRI. https://files.wri.org/d8/s3fs-public/Climate_Benefits_Tenure_Costs_Executive_Summary.pdf</ref> and social<ref>Sarmiento Barletti, J. P., Heise Vigil, N., & Larson, A. M. (2023). ''Safeguards at a glance: Are voluntary standards supporting community land, resource and carbon rights?'' CIFOR-ICRAF. https://www.cifor-icraf.org/publications/pdf_files/Flyer/REDD-Safeguards-7.pdf </ref> benefits of this have been researched and are well understood. By developing culturally appropriate frameworks for rights-based conservation regimes, that work with IPLCs in accordance with their worldviews, REDD+ could be used to promote Indigenous autonomy. However, progress still must be made to achieve this goal.

{{CFRC FRST522|names=Connor Haynes
https://wiki.ubc.ca/User:ConnorHaynes|share=yes|theme=REDD+|country=Latin America|province=|theme2=Carbon|Additional theme (3rd)=Restoration}}

==References==

Documentation:Open Case Studies/FRST522/2024/REDD+ in Indigenous Amazonia: What works and what doesn’t?

2024-12-31T20:14:49Z

ConnorHaynes: /* Discussion */

__TOC__

==Positionality==
First and foremost I am not Indigenous, and whilst there are a myriad of cultures, ontologies and epistemologies that are not sufficiently represented by simply stating ‘Indigenous’, it is commonly accepted that these worldviews are vastly different to those of the ‘Western’ world, which is the world in which I grew up and matured. I am therefore only understanding of Indigenous cultures, beliefs and customary laws based upon available online literature and those which I have learnt through life, in addition to those introduced to me in my Master’s degree. As such, I will never be able to fully relate to an Indigenous person; the best I can do is try to understand and learn. Only throughout this process am I able to work towards reconciliation and attempt to address the inequities experienced by Indigenous folk globally.

Additionally, I am yet to act as a carbon project proponent and so do not understand the nuances or stresses of undertaking such a task. Whilst an individual proponent may have the best intention of procuring a carbon project for its social and environmental benefits, there are a number of stakeholders involved throughout the entire process which influence its eventual outcome. Without experience acting as a project proponent I am naïve in understanding the process and its difficulties.

==Acronyms / Terminology==
'''Acronyms:'''

AFOLU: Agriculture, Forestry and Other Land-Use

CCBS: Climate, Community and Biodiversity Standard

ICVCM: Integrity Council for the Voluntary Carbon Market

IPLC: Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities

KMGBF: Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework

LAC: Latin American Countries

MRV: Monitoring, Reporting and Verification

PD: Project Description

REDD+: Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation

UNCBD: United Nations Convention on Biological Biodiversity

UNFCCC: United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

VCM: Voluntary Carbon Market

VCMI: Voluntary Carbon Markets Integrity Initiative

VCS: Verified Carbon Standard

'''Terminology:'''

''Additionality:'' Additionality is the determination of whether the project will lead to the expected outcomes when compared to the baseline or ‘business as usual’ emissions.

''Leakage'': Refers to the shifting of emissions to outside the project boundary as a result of the project’s activities.

''Permanence:'' Permanence refers to the degree to which a carbon credit is equivalent to a permanent removal or reduction in emissions.
==Abstract==
This case study illustrates two examples of Indigenous-led REDD+ projects on Indigenous territory in Colombia and Brazil. Both countries have a relatively long history of engaging with REDD+ but have slightly different legal structures pertaining to the rights of Indigenous peoples on their traditional territories, and specifically their ‘carbon’ rights. As such, the intention is to evaluate how these differing ''de jure'' rights translate on the ground. With respect to REDD+, do certain rights result in legitimately positive benefits to IPLCs, as well as the environment that these projects were originally intended to protect? The intention is such that the reader can evaluate the effectiveness and true benefit of REDD+ projects to IPLC’s, based upon the legal frameworks of the host country. A secondary intention is such that the reader is better equipped to conduct a prefeasibility assessment based upon available online literature, to evaluate the likelihood that REDD+ can be implemented in any chosen country, with the genuine intent of benefiting IPLC’s that are directly affected as a result of REDD+ project implementation.

==REDD+ and the VCM in Brazil and Colombia==
REDD+, originally introduced by the UNFCCC, is a market-based mechanism sitting within the VCM that aims to reverse the loss of forests and carbon stocks, specifically in developing countries. Simply put, an entity or an individual can voluntarily pay another that has engaged with REDD+ and subsequently sequestered carbon, to offset their own emissions using ‘credits’, sold as units of greenhouse gas equivalent to one ton of carbon dioxide (CO2e). Forestry and Land-Use remains the largest category of carbon credits traded by transaction volume on the VCM, with REDD+ being the most popular project type in this category, accounting for 78% of credits traded.<ref name=":0">Procton, A., (2024). ''State of the voluntary carbon market 2024: On the path to maturity.'' Forest Trends Ecosystem Marketplace.</ref> Furthermore, over one-third of the credits sold within this category were sourced from projects that had been implemented in LAC and the Caribbean in 2024.<ref name=":0" /> Of the four largest standards issuing carbon credits, Verra accounts for roughly 80% of issuances in Latin America,<ref>Pullins, T. (2022). Growth of carbon markets in Latin America. White & Case. https://www.whitecase.com/publications/insight/latin-america-focus-fall-2022-growth-carbon-markets </ref> and even in the face of recent scrutiny,<ref>West, T. A. P., Bofim, B., Haya, B. K. (2024). Methodological issues with deforestation baselines compromise the integrity of carbon offsets from REDD+. ''Global Environmental Change, 87'' https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2024.102863</ref><ref>Wyburd I., & Dufrasne, G. (2023). Error Log: Exposing the methodological failures of REDD+ forestry projects. Carbon Market Watch. https://carbonmarketwatch.org/publications/error-log-exposing-the-methodological-failures-of-redd-forestry-projects/</ref><ref name=":15">Haya, B. K., Alford-Jones, K., Anderegg, W. R. L., Beymer-Farris, B., Blanchard, L., Bomfim, B., Chin, D., Evans, S., Hogan, M., Holm, J. A., McAfee, K., So, I. S., West, T. A. P., & Withey, L. (2023). ''Quality assessment of REDD+ carbon credit projects''. Berkeley Carbon Trading Project. https://gspp.berkeley.edu/research-and-impact/centers/cepp/projects/berkeley-carbontrading-project/REDD+</ref> REDD+ projects account for a significant proportion of the VCM with their continued application likely to persist.<ref>Gordon, O. (2022). ''The interwoven fortunes of carbon markets and indigenous communities.'' Energy Monitor. https://www.energymonitor.ai/tech/carbon-removal/the-interwoven-fortunes-of-carbon-markets-and-indigenous-communities/</ref><ref>Müller, M., Coustar, C., Bietta, F., Mathres, M. (2022). ''UNFCCC REDD+ and the power of sovereign carbon.'' Deutsche Banke Chief Investment Office. https://www.rainforestcoalition.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/CIO-Special-UNFCCC-REDD-power-of-sovereign-carbon.pdf</ref><ref>Pullins, T. (2022). ''Growth of carbon markets in Latin America.'' White & Case. https://www.whitecase.com/publications/insight/latin-america-focus-fall-2022-growth-carbon-markets </ref> With the introduction of updated methodologies aimed at addressing these concerns,<ref>Verra (2023a). ''Setting the Standard: Verra’s Revolutionary New REDD Methodology.'' https://verra.org/program-notice/setting-the-standard-verras-revolutionary-new-redd-methodology/</ref><ref>Verra (2023b). ''VM0048 Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation, v1.0.'' https://verra.org/methodologies/vm0048-reducing-emissions-from-deforestation-and-forest-degradation-v1-0/</ref> there is hope for renewed buyer confidence in the integrity of this market,<ref>MSCI (2023). ''Verra’s New Methodology for Unplanned Deforestation Aims to Silence the Critics''. https://www.msci.com/www/blog-posts/verra-s-new-methodology-for/04577808942</ref> though more work still needs to be done.

Both Colombia and Brazil have a relatively long history of implementing REDD+ projects, using both fund-based and market-based mechanisms. For example, both countries were participants in the ‘Amazon Indigenous REDD+ (RIA in Spanish) initiative, with the first pilot implementation project being initiated in Colombia’s Puiawai Natural Reserve.<ref>Garzón, E., (2017). ''Amazon Indigenous REDD+: An innovative approach to conserve Colombian forests?'' Mongabay. https://news.mongabay.com/2017/01/amazon-indigenous-redd-an-innovative-approach-to-conserve-colombian-forests/</ref> The relevance of these two countries with respect to REDD+ is simple. Much of the Amazon’s primary tropical rainforest falls within these countries' jurisdiction and this rainforest has been consistently under threat from external pressures and encroachment, whether that be in the form of land-clearing for commercial ranching, subsistence purposes, illicit drug production or illegal mining practices,<ref name=":8">Sánchez García, P. A. & Wong, G. Y., (2024) “The political economy of deforestation in the Colombian Amazon”, ''Journal of Political Ecology'' ''31''(1), 178–199. https://doi.org/10.2458/jpe.5230</ref><ref>Radwin, M. (2023). ''Drug trafficking fuels other deforestation drivers in the Amazon: report.'' Mongabay. https://news.mongabay.com/2023/07/drug-trafficking-fuels-other-deforestation-drivers-in-the-amazon-report/</ref><ref>Haddad, E.A., Araújo, I.F., Feltran-Barbieri, R., Perobelli, F. S., Rocha, A., Sass, K. S., Nobre, C. A. (2024). Economic drivers of deforestation in the Brazilian Legal Amazon. ''Nat Sustain'' ''7'', 1141–1148. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41893-024-01387-7 </ref><ref>Hänggli, A., Levy, S. A., Armenteras, D., Bovolo, C. I., Brandão, J., Rueda, X., & Garrett, R. D. (2023). A systematic comparison of deforestation drivers and policy effectiveness across the amazon biome. ''Environmental Research Letters, 18''(7), 073001. https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/acd408</ref> to name a few.

In theory, REDD+ can be used to provide the economic incentive to promote sustained environmental protection of Indigenous lands, with a focus on the rights and livelihoods of IPLCs. Currently the overall funding to IPLCs tenure rights and forest management in tropical countries is low, receiving just $270 million per year between 2011-2020 from bilateral and multilateral donors and private philanthropies.<ref>Hatcher, J., Owen, M., Yin, D., (2021). ''Falling short: Donor funding for Indigenous peoples and local communities to secure tenure rights and manage forests in tropical countries (2011 -2020).'' Rainforest Foundation Norway. https://dv719tqmsuwvb.cloudfront.net/documents/Publikasjoner/Andre-rapporter/RFN_Falling_short_2021.pdf</ref> REDD+ has the potential to channel funding so as to promote Indigenous rights and autonomy, provided there is transparent and equitable benefit-sharing for those involved. Fundamentally, only with the inclusion of IPLC’s, or preferably with IPLC’s acting as project proponents, is REDD+ able to promote Indigenous agency and improve IPLC rights and governance. And only when the rights of those inhabiting the land are formally recognized can the land be effectively conserved.<ref name=":16">Reytar, K., Veit, P., von Braun, J. (2024). ''Protecting Biodiversity Hinges on Securing Indigenous and Community Land Rights.'' WRI. https://www.wri.org/insights/indigenous-and-local-community-land-rights-protect-biodiversity</ref> The inclusion of IPLCs in REDD+ project development is therefore considered to be essential for project success, and this is in theory embodied in the very nature of REDD+.<ref name=":1">Alvarez, G., Elfving, M. and Andrade, C. (2016) ‘REDD+ governance and indigenous peoples in Latin America: the case of Suruí Carbon Project in the Brazilian Amazon Forest’, ''Latin American J. Management for Sustainable Development 3''(2) pp.133–146. https://doi.org/10.1504/LAJMSD.2016.083705</ref> Partially owing to a long history of dealing with REDD+, Colombia and Brazil are amongst just a few of the countries hosting tropical rainforests that explicitly recognise community rights to carbon and tie these rights to the legal ownership of lands and forests. In Colombia, carbon rights are tied to land rights, whereas in Brazil carbon rights are tied to forest rights.<ref name=":2">RRI and McGill University (2021). Technical report: ''Status of legal recognition of Indigenous Peoples’, Local Communities’ and Afro-descendant Peoples’ rights to carbon stored in tropical lands and forests''. Rights and Resources Initiative. https://doi.org/10.53892/MLQQ5744</ref>

==Brazil: The Suruí Forest Carbon Project==
[[File:The Amazon Basin, Brazil.jpg|thumb|376x376px|Brazil's Amazon rainforest]]

=== Project description and location ===
The Surui Forest Carbon project (SFCP) was implemented in 2009 on the territory of the Surui people, which is situated in the southern part of Brazil’s Amazon between the states of Rondônia and Mato Grosso. Surui Indigenous territory covers an area of 2,481 km2, though the intention of the SFCP was to protect a portion of this total area. According to the PD, the stated objective was to “prevent 13,575.3 hectares of tropical forest from being cleared by 2038, to avoid the emission of 7,258,352.3 tCO2e to the atmosphere, and to contribute to the preservation of the Paiter Surui lifestyle and traditions.”<ref>IDESAM (2011). ''Project description: Surui forest carbon project''. Institute for Conservation and Sustainable Development of Amazonas. Link: "PROJ_DESC_1118_02FEB2012.PDF" found at https://registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/1118 </ref> This region sits within one of the Brazilian Amazon’s main ‘arcs of deforestation’ and pressure from loggers and ranchers is a matter of concern.

Notably, the SFCP was the first REDD+ project to be proposed by Indigenous peoples in the Brazilian Amazon on their own territory and was the first to receive certification by both the VCS and CCBS.<ref name=":1" />. Metareilá, the Surui’s own Indigenous association, acted as project proponent and the Institute for Conservation and Sustainable Development of Amazonas (IDESAM) assisted with project development, alongside multiple other stakeholder groups. As an endogenous initiative procured and conducted by the Surui community, the SFCP had a ‘non-centralized model of governance’, which reflected the characteristics and traditions of the Surui people. <ref name=":1" />

Only after two years of consultations between the 24 communities involved and the relevant governmental agencies (primarily FUNAI and the Ministry of Environment) was a Memorandum of Understanding signed, showing community consent to develop the project.<ref name=":3">Garcia, B., Rimmer, L., Canal Vieira, L., Mackey, B., (2021). REDD+ and forest protection on indigenous lands in the Amazon. ''RECIEL 30'', 207–219. https://doi.org/10.1111/reel.12389</ref> In 2012 after verification from an independent third-party body, the Surui were able to sell carbon credits on the international market. Between 2009 and 2014 the project drastically helped limit the deforestation occurring within the project’s site, causing many to deem it a success.<ref name=":4">Howard, F. E., (2023). ''An Analysis of the Suruí Forest Carbon Project in Context of Settler Colonialism''. Masters thesis. Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University. https://vtechworks.lib.vt.edu/server/api/core/bitstreams/b0cde6de-794c-453f-856b-ee72bde3db06/content</ref>

=== National climate targets, policies and legislation ===
Rates of deforestation in Brazil’s legal Amazon are significantly impacted by the government in charge. This is evidenced in the decade between 2012 and 2021 whilst under the conservative Bolsonaro administration, deforestation in the Amazon increased 185% — from a loss of 4,571 km2 in 2012 to 13,038 km2 in 2021.<ref>INPE (2022). ''Observação da Terra. http://www.obt.inpe.br/OBT/assuntos/programas/amazonia/prodes''</ref> However, since Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s appointment in 2022 there has been a steady decline in the rate of deforestation, which is now roughly half what it was in 2021.<ref>Terra Brasilis (2024). ''PRODES (deforestation): Deforestation rates – Legal Amazon – States''. https://terrabrasilis.dpi.inpe.br/app/dashboard/deforestation/biomes/legal_amazon/rates</ref> A significant proportion of emissions result from the clearing of rainforest and its subsequent conversion to ranching.<ref>MCTI (2022). ''Estimativas Anuais De Emissões De Gases De Efeito Estufa No Brasil.'' 6ª Edição. Ministério da Estado da Ciência, Tecnologia e Inovações. https://www.gov.br/mcti/pt-br/acompanhe-o-mcti/sirene/publicacoes/estimativas-anuais-de-emissoes-gee/arquivos/6a-ed-estimativas-anuais.pdf</ref> To address these emissions Brazil has implemented various adaptation policies, legislation and targets which are summarized below:
{| class="wikitable"
|'''Document name'''
|'''Type'''
|'''Publication year'''
|'''Key takeaways'''
|-
|National Policy on Climate Change (NPCC)
|Legislation
|2009
|Framework for addressing climate change
|-
|National Plan on Climate Change Adaptation
|Policy
|2016
|Framework for addressing impacts of climate change
|-
|Nationally Determined Contribution
|Target
|2024
|Reduce net greenhouse gas emissions by 59 to 67 percent below 2005 levels by 2035
|-
|Federal Constitution, Article 225
|Legislation
|2006
|The Amazon rainforest is considered as a ‘national heritage’.All levels of government have a shared responsibility to protect it and the environment
|-
| colspan="4" |'''Relating to REDD+'''
|-
|Plan of Action for the Prevention and Control of Deforestation in the Legal Amazon (PPCDAM)
|Policy
|2004
|Aims to reduce deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon
|-
|Forest code
|Legislation
|2012
|Aimed at reducing deforestation, but no specific mention of REDD+
|-
|Amazon Indigenous REDD+ Initiative
|Policy
|2012
|Incorporate Indigenous with REDD+ initiatives
|-
|National REDD+ Strategy (ENREDD+)
|Policy
|2016
|REDD+ as a fund-based mechanism
|}

=== Indigenous rights - Constitutional, tenure and bundle rights ===
In Brazil, Indigenous rights are robust and clearly defined according to the Brazilian Constitution. As a result, the Indigenous communities of the Brazilian Amazon have legal title to 13.8% of the national territory totalling 1.175 million km2, with a total of 631 territories.<ref>Federal government of Brazil (2024). ''Brazil’s NDC: National determination to contribute and transform''. https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/2024-11/Brazil_Second%20Nationally%20Determined%20Contribution%20%28NDC%29_November2024.pdf</ref>
{| class="wikitable"
| colspan="2" |'''Laws'''
|-
|Article 231 of the 1988 Constitution
|Indigenous peoples to have their exclusive right to use their territories to derive economic benefits. Grants indigenous peoples the right to land, prohibits eviction, and restricts mining without authorization from the federal government.
|-
|Indigenous Peoples statute (1973).

|No acts restricting the full exercise of indigenous peoples’ permanent tenure over the land should be permitted.
|-
| colspan="2" | '''Treaties'''
|-
|United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2007)
|Requires States to obtain free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) for the approval of any projects affecting indigenous territories.
|-
|International Labour Organization Convention 169 (2019)
|Ratified and incorporated under domestic law in 2002 through Decree 10.088/2019, endorsing UNDRIP
|-
|American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2016)
|Supports and builds upon UNDRIP
|}
Whilst Indigenous communities in Brazil have legal title to land, it is the State that owns it. Indigenous people simply exercise permanent tenure over lands that they traditionally occupy and have ‘original rights’ to these traditional lands, which no other rights can prevail over.<ref name=":3" /> Indigenous lands, though not classified as protected areas, “have the highest level of protection by law because they are regulated by the Constitution” and cannot be leased or restricted without violating their original rights. The Suruí's right to develop the SFCP is grounded in the Brazilian Constitution, which grants Indigenous peoples exclusive rights to use the ‘riches of the soil, rivers and lakes’ of their land, and these rights cannot be overridden. Thus, Indigenous people and only Indigenous people are legally allowed to engage in productive activities on their land, provided these activities are conducted according to their own customs and traditions and are necessary for the wellbeing and cultural expression of their own people. In Brazil, it is the armed forces and federal police that are responsible for enforcing these laws, and FUNAI is responsible for representing Indigenous communities in judicial disputes.<ref name=":3" /> As such, provided a REDD+ project does not violate the rights to territorial integrity, permanent land tenure and original rights, it is legally allowed.
[[File:Two Pataxo indians (Brasília, 04 April 2006).jpeg|thumb|414x414px|Two Indigenous in Brazil]]
'''CARBON RIGHTS:''' In Brazil, carbon rights are tied to forest rights.<ref name=":2" /> Carbon credits from REDD+ projects are seen as part of the economic benefits derived from indigenous lands, and as such, Indigenous communities are entitled to own, control and distribute these revenues themselves. The carbon credits generated from the SFCP were wholly owned by the Suruí people through Metareilá, with the Suruí Fund (managed by the Brazilian Biodiversity Fund - FUNBIO) acting as recipient. This legality reinforces Indigenous control over both land and carbon rights, as whoever has rights to the forest land is usually recognized as the owner of carbon rights.<ref name=":3" /> Collectively these national and international laws provide an important safeguard to Indigenous peoples, making their consent a prerequisite for the establishment of REDD+ projects and recognizing their rights as the main beneficiaries of REDD+ revenues.<ref name=":3" /> However, as carbon rights are tied to forest rights in Brazil and not land rights, and carbon is considered to be an ‘environmental service’ (Article 41(I)(A) Brazilian Forestry Code), states as well as the federal government have the jurisdiction to exercise full legislative authority over carbon. <ref name=":2" /> As such, certain states have interpreted the law to imply that the title to carbon credits is attributable to the state.<ref>Loft, L., Ravikumar, A., Gebara, M. F., Pham, T. T., Resosudarmo, I. A. P., Assembe, S., Tovar, J. G., Mwangi, E., & Andersson, K. (2015). Taking Stock of Carbon Rights in REDD+ Candidate Countries: Concept Meets Reality. ''Forests'', ''6''(4), 1031-1060. https://doi.org/10.3390/f6041031</ref> Hence, even when carbon rights are clearly defined and tied to forest title it is insufficient in itself, and only by legally recognizing the customary rights of IPLCs can a fair and equitable outcome be realised.

'''FPIC OBLIGATION:''' Brazilian law requires Free, Prior, and Informed Consent (FPIC) for REDD+ projects affecting indigenous lands, ensuring that international standards such as the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) and ILO Convention No. 169 are adhered to; Indigenous consent is, ''de jure,'' a necessity. Projects that violate these rights and fail to consult communities are therefore considered illegal. Notably there are no specific rules or procedures that have been written into the Brazilian constitution that provide guidance on how to achieve FPIC. However, this freedom reinforces Indigenous autonomy as it allows an Indigenous community to define the rules of consultation according to their customs and traditions.

=== Affected and interested stakeholders ===
{| class="wikitable"
| colspan="5" |'''Affected stakeholders'''
|-
|Stakeholders
|Primary objective(s)
|Secondary objective(s)
|Relative power
|Scope of influence
|-
|Metareilá Association of the Suruí Indigenous People
|Project proponent

Works to defend and preserve the cultural and territorial heritage of the Suruí people.

Responsible for the Suruí Fund (FUNBIO). Ensure equitable distribution of funds
|Ensure project longevity.
Stick to the mandate; attempt not to be influenced by external actors
|Powerful, though lacking technical knowhow. Have carbon rights and thus have ultimate control of project revenue; can decide how this revenue is distributed.
|Local
|-
|Other Indigenous groups and associations
|Support various aspects of proejct development
|Aim to benefit from the project
|Have the same rights as the Metareila with respect to land though are less involved with project development and have less say, nor derive economic benefits like the Metareila
|Local
|-
|''Campesinos'' (peasants)
|Survive via subsistence.
|Procure more land.
|Have far fewer rights than Indigenous groups and no involvement with the project
|Local
|-
| colspan="5" |'''Interested stakeholders'''
|-
|IDESAM - Institute for Conservation and Sustainable Development of Amazonas
|Maximise revenue from project.
Ensure project longevity
|Achieve completion of various technical aspects of project
|Powerful: Required to complete various technical aspects of development.
|National
|-
|Forest Trends
|Supported formulation and implementation of the project.
Uphold image of organization
|Maximise environmental benefits of project
|Powerful: Tasked with raising funds and fostering an international network; an integral part of project development
|International
|-
|Amazon Conservation Team - ACT Brazil
|Supports various aspect of project development as well as offering legal advice.
Other technical assistance
|Maximise environmental benefits of project
|Powerful: An integral part of project development
|International
|-
|Kanindé Association for Ethno-Environmental Defense – non-profit
|Promote Metareilá views and beliefs
|Involved with various aspects of project development
|Mid-power. Has a say in project direction, though less weight than the Metareila.
|National - International
|-
|Ministry of Environment (MMA)
|Responsible for protection and conservation of natural environment
|Ensure project adheres to national law
|Powerful. Must be notified about project activities although cannot strictly alter decisions made by the Surui
|National
|-
|National Indian Foundation (FUNAI)
|Promote Indigenous rights

|Represents Indignous organizations with judicial matters.
|Powerful. Knowleadgeable of judicial system. Must be notified about project activities though is not involved with project governance.
|National
|-
|Government of the State of Mato Grosso
|Encourage development, and reduce poverty and crime in Mato Grosso
|Ensure project adheres to regional law.
|Powerful. Legilative control over regional police and municipalities
|Regional
|}

=== Discussion ===
Although originally successful in achieving its goal of reducing deforestation and degradation, in 2016 diamonds were discovered in Surui territory, leading to an increase in illegal logging and mining.<ref name=":1" /> By 2018 the project site had been completely overrun by ''garimpeiros'' (small-scale gold miners), ultimately leading to the project's suspension that year. <ref name=":4" />

While the project had initially garnered support, divisions emerged within the community post-project implementation. Disputes arose over the unequal distribution of project revenues, leading to internal conflicts between different Suruí clans. These criticisms escalated in 2014 when the Catholic Indigenous Missionary Council supported calls for an end to the project due to mismanagement of revenues from carbon credit sales. <ref name=":3" /> Some Suruí members also argued that the REDD+ initiative harmed their way of life.<ref>Lang, C. (2014). ''“What are projects for that destroy life?” Interview with Henrique Suruí about the Paiter-Suruí REDD project, Brazil.'' REDD-Monitor. https://redd-monitor.org/2014/12/17/what-are-projects-for-that-destroy-life-interview-with-henrique-surui-about-the-paiter-surui-redd-project-brazil/</ref>

Further complicating the situation was the controversial role of Henrique Suruí, one of the Suruí tribal leaders. In 2011, it was revealed that Henrique had violated the tribe's logging moratorium, collaborating with loggers in illegal activities. While Henrique later denied responsibility for the project’s failure, his actions, combined with internal disagreements, illustrated the lack of consensus within the Suruí leadership on the project’s goals and outcomes. Both of the tribe’s leaders possessed dramatically different perspectives on how they believed they could ensure agency, autonomy, and economic benefits for the Suruí people.<ref name=":4" /> This fragmentation within the community, in combination with the discovery of diamonds and the state's failure to protect indigenous land rights led to the indefinite suspension of the REDD+ project.

The project's collapse highlights broader structural issues, particularly the state's inconsistent support for indigenous land rights, influenced by settler colonialism, which undermined the project’s long-term viability.<ref name=":4" /> Additionally, the project’s creation was shaped by external actors, including the collaboration between Almir Suruí and Borges from Forest Trends, a Washington-based NGO. This partnership introduced a Western perspective on viewing the Suruí peoples forest, in contrast with their own perspectives on land use and governance. Furthermore, despite Borges’ Brazilian background, the power dynamics between a global North organization and a developing, Indigenous community were apparent.

=== Summary ===
The Suruí Forest Carbon Project provides an interesting example of how, even when the rights of IPLC’s are relatively robust, challenges persist in ensuring REDD+ project longevity. As such, in its current state, REDD+ in the Brazilian Amazon may not be a suitable market-based option for Indigenous communities in the Amazon.<ref name=":3" /> Although initially successful in promoting Indigenous autonomy and reducing deforestation, the project resulted in failure due to of a myriad of factors. Divisions among Surui communities were exacerbated by a perceived unequal benefit-sharing, and the impact of imposing REDD+ seems to have complicated the traditional social structure that the Surui were dependent on. These issues were influenced by Brazil's settler state dynamics, where Indigenous land rights, although legally recognized, are often not upheld in practice due to insufficient enforcement.<ref name=":4" /> Ultimately, the Surui project reveals how settler colonialism's structural flaws make long-term project success difficult, despite initial progress in promoting Indigenous autonomy.

At the national and state level, complex institutional and legal land governance structures convolute and impede REDD+ in Brazil. Multiple institutions share responsibilities and there is no comprehensive, authoritative database of land ownership, which hampers efforts to protect Indigenous territories.<ref name=":5">Costa, R. (2016)''. Insecure land rights in Brazil: Consequences for rural areas and challenges for improvement.'' Climate Policy Initiative. https://www.climatepolicyinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/Insecure_Land_Rights_in_Brazil_CPI.pdf</ref> As a result, land tenure disputes remain common and can be witnessed occurring between the public as well between public and state actors. For example, Brazil’s 1964 Land Statute (Law No. 4504) allows the government to take over unproductive farms and transfer those lands to landless peasants. This often results in the clearing of forest, as only when the land is cleared is it evidenced to be ‘productive’.<ref name=":5" /> Hence, not only does this law cause insecurity for Indigenous populations in Brazil, it also forces them to go against customary traditions of stewarding the land in an effort to maintain its control.

Whilst the aforementioned points to the futility of REDD+ in Brazil, there is reason to maintain optimism. In a recent landmark ruling Brazil’s supreme court voted in favour of the Xoleng peoples, and the decision will serve as a precedent for all cases involving Indigenous peoples.<ref name=":6">Amos-Flom, K., (2023). ''Triumph and Turmoil: The Xokleng Case and the Future of Indigenous Land Rights in Brazil.'' Columbia Journal of Transnational Law. https://www.jtl.columbia.edu/bulletin-blog/triumph-and-turmoil-the-xokleng-case-and-the-future-of-indigenous-land-rights-in-brazil</ref> The Xokleng’s land dispute, settled in 2023, “rejected Santa Catarina state’s marco temporal (“time limit”) argument, which would have required Indigenous people to prove they occupied or legally contested the territory they claimed before the Brazilian Constitution came into force in 1988. If successful, this argument would have led to disastrous repercussions, as many Indigenous peoples had been forcibly removed or are traditionally nomadic.”<ref name=":6" /> Evidently, whilst slow, progress has been made in Brazil in recent years with respect to Indigenous rights as well as the voluntary carbon market itself.

There are currently 159 AFOLU projects listed on the Verra database in Brazil, with only two specifically focused on REDD+ initiatives in collaboration with Indigenous groups. These are the Ka’a Pyahu project, <ref>Verra (n.d.) ''Project 5087: KA'A PYAHU.'' https://registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/5087</ref> initiated by the Guajajara Indigenous people in collaboration with external organizations and validated in 2021, and the ‘Together for the forest Awaete REDD+ project’<ref>Verra (n.d.) ''Project 5200: TOGETHER FOR THE FOREST AWAETÉ REDD+ PROJECT.'' https://registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/5200</ref> which is still under development. Both projects involve Indigenous groups working with Brazilian organizations to build technical capacity and expertise. This could signal a growing trend of Indigenous-led REDD+ projects in the future. To ensure a positive future for REDD+ in Brazil, the customary rights of IPLC’s must be formally recognized. IPLC should have legal ownership of their traditional lands, and in doing so the carbon rights of these communities would be less convoluted, leading to more equitable benefit-sharing and increased cohesion amongst these groups post-project implementation.

==Colombia: ''REDD+ project Resguardo Indigena Unificado - Selva de Mataven (RUI-SM)''==

=== '''Project description and location''' ===
[[File:RS6524 MG 3944.jpg|thumb|407x407px|A view of the Mataven]]
According to the PD,<ref name=":7">ACATISEMA & Mediamos (2017). ''Joint project description and monitoring report: REDD+ project: Resguardo Indigena Unificado – Selva de Mataven (RIU – SM).'' Link: “10 06 2017_VCS Final Report_ Matavin Project.pdf” found at https://registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/1566</ref> the Resguardo Indígena Unificado – Selva de Matavén (RIU-SM) project is located east of the Colombian Orinoco high plain, in the eastern part of the Department of Vichada, municipality of Cumaribo. It resides on the formalized resguardo of the Sikuani, Piaroa, Puinave, Curripaco, Cubeo and Piapoco ethnic groups, spanning 1,856,836 hectares, with 1,477,115 hectares (79.6%) being forested. The PD states that it will reduce greenhouse gas emissions, with a total estimated net reduction of 108,670,562 tons of CO2 equivalent over thirty years, from years 2013 – 2042. By this metric, it is the 14th largest project on the Verra registry, out of over 1700 projects.<ref name=":9">Dufrasne, D., (2021). ''Two Shades of Green: How hot air forest credits are being used to avoid carbon taxes in Colombia''. Carbon Market Watch. https://carbonmarketwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Two-shades-of-green_EN_WEB.pdf</ref> There are 12,312 Indigenous people living in the RIU-SM, belonging to 2,517 families and 250 communities as of 2017.

The project was initiated by the Asociación de Cabildos y Autoridades Indígenas de la Selva de Matavén (ACETISMA), an Indigenous association, and developed by MEDIAMOS F&M, a Colombian consultancy firm. ACETISMA is comprised of Indigenous leaders that represent the 17 communities of the reservation in charge of governing the territory, and it has administrative autonomy, as well as “the capacity to acquire, to own and to dispose of property, to accept donations, to hold national and international conventions, scientific and cultural exchanges and generally, to celebrate all kinds of negotiations and agreements with which the Association can achieve its objectives.”<ref name=":7" />

There is a stated focus on various means of improving the living conditions of the Indigenous peoples living within the project area. To summarise, the main objectives of the REDD+ project RIU-SM include:

· Community development, in the form of improved education.

· Community engagement with respect to the project; developing information channels to reveal project progress.

· Support local initiatives for environmental education and waste management.

· Developing an effective response system that addresses community proposals and concerns relating to the project.

· Strengthening the governance of ACATISEMA.
=== National climate targets, policies and legislation ===
The Colombian Amazon makes up over one-third of Colombia’s national territory, and up until 2005 only 7.3% of the Colombian Amazon had been deforested, largely due to the country's 60-year armed conflict between the government, multiple left-wing guerillas such as FARC, and several far-right paramilitary groups.<ref name=":8" /> However, following the signing of the Peace Treaty in 2016 and demobilization of the FARC, limits to deforestation were weakened in the Colombian Amazon. Poor but opportunistic peasants began to encroach into previously unchartered territory and capitalize from the rainforest. Due to the poor economic integration of the Amazon, many were forced to engage with the traditional economies of cocoa and cattle ranching, as these markets were already well connected to regional and global markets.<ref name=":8" /> To address the drivers of deforestation and its associated emissions, the federal government has implemented various initiatives, which are summarized below:

{| class="wikitable"
|'''Document name'''
|'''Type'''
|'''Publication year'''
|'''Key takeaways'''
|-
|Nationally Determined Contribution(s)
|Target
|2020
|Reduce GHG emissions by 51% by 2030 and net-zero by 2050
|-
|National Climate Change Policy (PNCC)
|Policy
|2018
|Address climate change and foster sustainable development
|-
|National Forest Conservation Program
|Policy
|2011
|Address deforestation
|-
|Law 1931 of 2018 – Climate Change Law

|Legislation
|2018
|Establishes the framework for addressing climate change
|-
| colspan="4" |'''Relating to REDD+:'''
|-
|National Strategy for Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (ENREDD+)
|Initiative
|2009
|Particular focus on the Amazon and Choco rainforests
|-
|Amazon Indigenous REDD+ Initiative
|Initiative
|2016
|Respect Indigenous rights. FPIC focus.
|-
|BIOREDD+ program
|Initiative
|2012
|Portfolio of 8 REDD+ projects in four geographic nodes covering over 700,000 hectares in the Colombian Pacific.

|-
|Vision Amazonia
|Initiative
|2015
|Part of the REDD+ strategy, financed by three foreign countries: Germany, Norway and United Kingdom
|}
As a result of the many fund and market-based initiatives that Colombia has engaged with, it hosts the second most REDD+ projects in the world. REDD+ projects now cover at least 56% of the area of legally recognized Indigenous territories in the Colombian Amazon, with an overwhelming majority of carbon projects located on Indigenous territories.<ref name=":10">Schmid, D., & Castro. C., (2023). ''REDD+ projects in the Colombian Amazon: Social challenges and lack of transparency''. Rainforest Foundation Norway. https://dv719tqmsuwvb.cloudfront.net/documents/REDD_rapport_2024_ENG.pdf</ref> Evidently REDD+ plays an integral part in the country’s efforts of environmental conservation, and incentives have been introduced to promote the development of such projects. For example, in 2016 the government adopted a higher tax that covered fossil fuels, but companies are able to avoid paying the tax by investing in carbon offsets that have been generated domestically.<ref name=":9" /> This led to a boost in the domestic REDD+ market in 2017, as Colombian companies invested so as to escape higher taxes. Notably, 23 of the 36 REDD+ projects currently under development in the Amazon region were initiated in or after 2018.<ref name=":10" /> Currently Colombia’s REDD+ program sits at over 45 pilot and voluntary carbon projects, as well as one large-scale jurisdictional approach in the Amazon.<ref name=":11">Zambrano-Cortés, D. G. (2024). ''The politics, spaces and subjects of forest conservation in Colombia''. [internal PhD, WU, Wageningen University]. Wageningen University. https://doi.org/10.18174/675328</ref>

=== Indigenous rights - Constitutional, tenure and bundle rights ===
''De jure'', the Indigenous peoples of Colombia have comprehensive tenure and bundle of rights that have been articulated in the national constitution. Collective land titles are granted to Indigenous communities by the Colombian government and as a result about 34 percent of Colombian land (almost 38 million hectares) is legally recognized as Indigenous territory or collective lands of Afro-descendent communities.<ref name=":10" /> These collective land tenure rights have been in effect since the implementation of the 1991 constitution, granting them the authority to exercise legal control over their territories in accordance with their own customs and procedures.<ref>Max Planck Institute (n.d.) ''Colombia 1991 (rev. 2015).'' Institute. https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Colombia_2015</ref> Furthermore, the carbon rights of Indigenous peoples are explicitly defined in the constitution and tied specifically to the ownership of land of the communities.<ref name=":2" /> This in theory provides a solid legal basis for upholding the rights of Indigenous communities in Colombia, specifically relating to REDD+ activities, as it allows communities to define and negotiate the terms of said projects. A summary of the various laws relating to Indigenous rights have been summarized below:
{| class="wikitable"
| colspan="2" |'''Law (1991 constitution)'''
|-
|Article 63

|Indigenous territories are considered collective property. Land is not owned by individuals but is shared by the community. The state must respect these collective rights and cannot alter land ownership without the consent of the Indigenous peoples.
|-
|Article 76 - ''Consulta previa''.
|Pertains to the right of Indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities; prior consultation must be undertaken before any entity undertakes activities that may affect their territories, culture, or way of life.
|-
|Article 330
|Indigenous communities have the right to govern their territories.
|-
|Article 329
|The Reservation is a collective, inalienable, and indefeasible property.
|-
|Decree 1386 of 1994, Article 10; Decree 2164 of 1995, Article 22) 39.
|"The administration and management of these lands are subjected to uses and customs of the beneficiaries."
|}
Whilst land and tenure rights are enshrined into the constitution, the precariousness of these rights persists due to a lack of resources to ensure enforcement, as well as the deeper issue of corruption. As previously stated, the rate of deforestation increased significantly in Colombia’s post-conflict era, evidencing the nation's inability to maintain control over unlawful acts of land-grabbing and disposition. Whilst this began with new peasants converting the Amazon for subsistence purposes, it ultimately led to new areas for the growth of cocoa, much to the benefit of narco-traffickers who could monopolize on this illegal surplus in ‘accumulation by dispossession’.<ref name=":8" />

With respect to the legalities of consultation, Colombia has enshrined ''consulta previa'' into the constitution. Translating to ‘prior consultation’, this legal text provides the formal grounds for Indigenous engagement when any legislative or administrative measures are implemented on Indigenous territory. Importantly, consultation should be achieved in accordance with the customs of the ethnic group with which the project is being imposed upon. However, there have been recent cases of contestation specifically relating to how ''consulta previa'' applies to REDD+ on Indigenous lands, and the RIU – SM project was one that was involved with such a case.

=== Affected and interested stakeholders ===
{| class="wikitable"
| colspan="5" |'''Affected stakeholders'''
|-
|Stakeholders
|Primary objective(s)
|Secondary objective(s)
|Relative power
|Scope of influence
|-
|ACATISEMA - Asociación de Cabildos y Autoridades Indígenas de la Selva de Matavén
|Primary and direct beneficiaries of project
Foster the integral development, social and cultural preservation of the indigenous communities in the Mataven Jungle

Consolidate the territory, and promote conservation and preservation of the environment and biodiversity of the Mataven Jungle

|Maintain control over ''resguardos''
|Powerful, locally.
Has the highest authority in the ''reguardo''.

Rights to the land and revenue generated from project
|Local
|-
|Indigenous communities of the RIU-SM
|Seek to maintain land rights

Promote traditional and cultural beliefs
|Increase benefits from the project
|Mid-power, though little input into project activities in reality.
|Local
|-
|Landless peasants
|Survive via subsistence
|Gain more access to land. Improve rights.
|Low to none
|Local
|-
| colspan="5" |'''Interested stakeholders'''
|-
|MEDIAMOS F&M
|Project developer
Maximise project revenues
|Develop the project in a way that is supporting of ACETISMA beliefs, for their benefit.
|Powerful: involved with various technical aspects of project development
|National
|-
|Ministerio de Ambiente y Desarrollo Sostenible (Minisitry of Environment and Sustainable Development)
|Environmental planning; sustainable development
Form strategic alliances with social and institutional participants in different sectoral and territorial scenarios.
|Ensure project activities are in agreement with ministry mandate
|Powerful, though supporting of project
|National
|-
|Dirección de Asuntos Indígenas, ROM y Minorías - Ministerio del Interior
|Prepares policy in favour of Indigenous groups
Supports ethnic and cultural rights of Indigenous
|
|Not ''per se'' involved with project, though the policy the organization has introduced affects project outcomes
|National
|-
|Corporinoquía
|Environmental authority to ensure the proper use of natural resources in their area of jurisdiction.
Ensure project abides by relevant regulations
|
|Powerful, though supporting of project
|Regional
|-
|Other government institutions: Governor ofice of Vichada, Mayor ofice Cumaribo
|The Reservation for being part of the Cumaribo, Vichada, has territorial jurisdiction relations with the Governor’s office and the Mayor’s office.
|Benefit from the project, if possible
|Powerful, regionally
|Regional - National
|-
|Fundación NATURA
''Civil organization''
|Conservation, use and management of biodiversity
Maximise social and environmental benefits of project
|Ensure suffienct IPLC inclusion
|Mid-power. Can influence decisions regarding project activities though does not hold absolute power to define terms
|International
|-
|Mining companies
|Mine to generate revenue.
|Compete with the project for the territory's resources.
|Relatively powerful, though legally obstructed to achieve primary objective
|International
|-
|Other indigenous communities neighboring RIU-SM
|Ensure autonomy with respect to their own jurisdiction
|Not involved with the project though potentially affected by it
|Low, with respect to the project
|Local
|-
|FONDO ACCIÓN
|Facilitate private investment into project activities
|Conservation and sustainable development; Protection/development of children.
|Mid-power. Important as they raise funds for the project and benefit from it, though not primary beneficiaries.
|National
|-
|Asocarbono – An industry association, including Verra, ProClima, Biofix, and ACATISEMA.

|Promote the agenda of high-level actors of the VCM
Promote integrity of market
|Hide/argue cases of scandal
|Powerful
|International
|-
|OPIAC: National Oganization of the Indigenous Peoples of the Colombian Amazon

|Promotes Indigenous rights in Colombia
Exercises a political representation of the Indigenous peoples of the Colombian Amazon
|
|Powerful. Legally knowledgeable.
|National
|}

=== Discussion ===
According to the official REDD+ Mataven website<ref>RIU – SM (n.d.). ''REDD+ Mataven''. https://reddmataven.com/</ref> the project has resulted in a myriad of benefits to the Indigenous communities of the region. For example, as a result of the funds generated from the project's activities, there have been improvements in infrastructure, transportation and education, ultimately leading to the empowerment and improved governance of ACETISMA. However, the project has come under fire for multiple reasons.

For one, in 2015 some of the Indigenous communities filed a lawsuit referring to the violation of their right to ''consulta previa''. However, the court ruled that their Indigenous rights had not been violated as it was ACETISMA that initially sought MEDIAMOS to develop the project, and that ACETISMA were the best representatives of those Indigenous communities. Furthermore, the project's main focus was the conservation of the rainforest and therefore did not threaten the cultural integrity of those communities.<ref name=":10" /> However, regardless of the outcome of this case, its occurrence points to internal disagreement amongst Indigenous participants of the RIU-SM project. In a study involving interviews with Indigenous members of the project, there was a significant proportion of interviewees that had little knowledge regarding various aspects of the project, such as responsibilities of participation, or the benefit-sharing mechanism in place.<ref name=":2" /> This further reinforces the point that, in the case of the RIU-SM project it may not be ‘bottom-up’ and points to the power imbalance experienced between MEDIAMOS, the project developer, and Indigenous community members. In the PD there is a breakdown of the distribution of income between ACETISMA and MEDIAMOS, which shows a significant proportion of revenue flowing to the former organisation throughout the project’s operations.<ref name=":7" /> However, there is currently no publicly available documentation supporting this initial claim<ref name=":9" /> as there is no obligation to provide this information, leading to a general lack of transparency in the market and between all of the relevant actors. Subsequent meetings with Indigenous leaders have however shown a marked support of the Mataven project, with one Indigenous leader explicitly stating “...the REDD+ project has brought resources that they never had before, which allowed them to open new school classrooms, 21 rural aqueducts, cocoa crops and even headquarters in Cumaribo and Inírida.”<ref>Lievano, A. B. (2021) Colombia's biggest carbon credit project could be selling hot air. Latin American Center for Investigative Journalism. https://www.elclip.org/el-mayor-proyecto-de-bonos-de-carbono-de-colombia-podria-estar-vendiendo-aire-caliente/ </ref> Clearly there have been benefits for IPLC’s involved with this project, though the details of this benefit-sharing remain a mystery.

Secondly, the Mataven project has caused controversy due to its apparently inflated carbon credit issuance. One report states that this has been achieved by using a reference area that is not representative of the project area, as well as assuming an uncharacteristically high assumed rate of deforestation.<ref name=":12">Global Atlas of Environmental Justice (2023). ''Resguardo Indigena Unificado-Selva de Matavén (RIU SM) REDD+ Project, Colombia.'' https://ejatlas.org/conflict/redd-project-resguardo-indigena-unificado-selva-de-mataven-riu-sm</ref> The project used a baseline deforestation rate of 0.86% per year, which is significantly more than the Colombian government's national rate of 0.18%. Additionally, according to the report the reference area chosen is more easily accessed and therefore more prone to deforestation, making it an inaccurate comparison to the relatively remote project area.<ref name=":2" /> This has led to the creation of excess carbon credits, or “hot air” credits, which have been criticized for not reflecting real environmental benefits.<ref name=":9" /> To add further insult to injury these credits have been used by a Colombian fossil fuel distributor company to avoid paying taxes, as described earlier by Colombia’s change in policy in 2017. In doing so, the company avoided paying approximately $18.9 million in taxes.<ref name=":2" /> There has been subsequent back and forth between Verra and Carbon Market Watch, with Verra refuting the claims.<ref>Verra (2021). ''Carbon Market Watch Report on Colombian REDD+ Projects Contains Flawed Allegations.'' https://verra.org/carbon-market-watch-report-on-colombian-redd-projects-contains-flawed-allegations/ </ref> Regardless of the science, Colombia recently introduced a resolution in 2018 (Resolution 1447 – 2018) that requires projects to use baselines that comply with national reference levels.<ref name=":13">Dufrasne, D. (2021b). Companies use ”hot air” forestry offsets to avoid taxes in Colombia: Carbon Market Watch’s fact-check of Verra’s response. Carbon Market Watch. https://carbonmarketwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/CMWs-fact-check-of-Verras-response-on-Colombia.pdf</ref><ref>IEA (2022). ''Resolution 1447 – 2018. Monitoring, Reporting, and Verification System for mitigation actions at the national level.'' International Energy Agency. https://www.iea.org/policies/14772-resolution-1447-2018-monitoring-reporting-and-verification-system-for-mitigation-actions-at-the-national-level</ref> Going forward, REDD+ projects that are being implemented in Colombia will have to abide by Colombia’s national legislation.

=== Summary ===
Colombia has a long history of engaging in REDD+ as it has been used to limit environmental degradation in the post-conflict era, in alignment with the country’s national peacebuilding agenda.<ref name=":11" /> Owing to the country’s comprehensive tenure and bundle of rights, IPLC’s have robust ''de jure'' rights to land as they collectively own it, and rights to carbon are tied to this ownership. This puts Colombia as one of the world leaders in legal terms relating to REDD+ project implementation, but due to a lack of resources to ensure enforcement, as well as corruption, historically these laws have not been adhered to.<ref name=":10" /><ref name=":2" /> There are many documented cases showing the displacement on IPLC’s from traditional lands, poor efforts to adhere to ''consulta previa'', and inequitable benefit sharing.<ref>Greenfield, P. (2023''). The ‘carbon pirates’ preying on Amazon’s Indigenous communities.'' The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2023/jan/21/amazon-indigenous-communities-carbon-offsetting-pirates-aoe</ref><ref name=":14">Lang, C., (2024). ''Colombia’s Constitutional Court rules in favour of Indigenous Peoples. Identifies serious flaws in the REDD+ Baka Rokarire project.'' REDD_Monitor. https://reddmonitor.substack.com/p/colombias-constitutional-court-rules</ref>

The case of the Mataven project provides an interesting example of how it is the market itself that is failing to address concerns regarding transparency, whether that be relating to benefit-sharing amongst relevant stakeholders, or Indigenous representation and engagement throughout the implementation of REDD+ projects. Some ACATISEMA members have explicitly stated their support for the Mataven project,<ref name=":12" /> and its benefits can be seen first-hand in the form of improved infrastructure in local communities involved with the project.<ref>Myers, J. E., Parra, M. A., Bedford, C. (2021). ''How Carbon Offsetting Can Build a Forest.'' Stanford Social Innovation Review. https://ssir.org/articles/entry/how_carbon_offsetting_can_build_a_forest</ref> However, an exact breakdown of how and where revenue is being distributed to IPLC’s remains elusive.<ref name=":13" /> Furthermore, the level of IPLC engagement has come into question, specifically with reference to ''consulta previa'' and the overall understanding that IPLC’s have regarding the project’s intended outcomes and activities.<ref name=":10" /> This is not a rare case in Colombia and has been witnessed occurring with other projects that have been implemented on Indigenous territories in the Colombian Amazon.<ref name=":17">Lang, C., (2023''). “It destroys everything,” says Indigenous leader about the REDD+ Baka Rokarire project in Colombia''. REDD Monitor. https://reddmonitor.substack.com/p/it-destroys-everything-says-indigenous</ref> However, a recent ruling by the Colombian Constitutional court voted in favour of Indigenous groups in Colombia, upholding “the rights to self-determination, autonomy, self-government, territory, identity, physical and cultural integrity, and free, prior and informed consent of the indigenous communities”.<ref name=":14" /> This review ultimately sets a legal precedent safeguarding the fundamental rights of IPLCs with REDD+ project implementation and shows that progress is being made to improve the likelihood that REDD+ will result in genuine benefits to those affected by project implementation.

To ensure a more authentic engagement with IPLC’s so as to result in legitimate and equitable benefit-sharing, improvements must be made by the Colombian government, as well as within the VCM itself. For the former, Colombia’s national registry for GHG mitigation activities must be updated; it has been offline since 2022.<ref name=":10" /> As a result, transparency is lacking. International finance could be utilized so as to alleviate this issue, and only with an accurate and reliable database may the market be regulated. In the broader sense, VCM registries must create stricter guidelines promoting transparency. Often PD’s refer to annexed documents that contain relevant information regarding benefit-sharing, though these are often not publicly available.<ref name=":9" /> This limits transparency and increases the likelihood of inequitable agreements being made between project proponents and developers, further exacerbating existing power asymmetries between the two groups and limiting the likelihood that ''consulta previa'' is honestly adhered to.<ref name=":10" /> This has led to conflict within Indigenous communities, rather than a strengthening of their social fabric.

Furthermore, the Mataven project calls into question the actual emissions reduction that REDD+ projects achieve. Whilst Colombia has since updated its regulations such that REDD+ must use baselines that comply with national reference levels, it is up in the air as to how representative these guidelines are. Reference areas must represent project areas and without the appropriate regulations in place project developers lack the incentive to create realistic baselines; ultimately they are aiming to produce the maximum number of credits so as to generate the greatest possible revenues.

==Conclusion==
As a market-based mechanism, REDD+ is shackled by the construct in which it operates; fundamentally it is a capitalist means of fixing a capitalist problem, which comes with limitations. Both Brazil and Colombia have relatively robust laws that have been written into their constitutions, ultimately promoting more equitable results of REDD+ project implementation. However, as in Colombia IPLC’s collectively own the land, whereas in Brazil these groups only own rights to use the land,<ref name=":2" /> Colombia can be considered better equipped for the establishment of REDD+ projects on traditional Indigenous territory. However, even with these laws in place enforcement remain a matter of concern. Furthermore, given the wide variety of ontological and epistemological perspectives of Indigenous communities, and how these views conflict with the Western worldview from which market-based REDD+ came to fruition, there is an inherent difficulty in implementing a system of governance in REDD+ on Indigenous lands.<ref name=":1" />. Putting a price on nature conflicts with Indigenous perspectives and there have been instances where this has weakened the social and cultural fabric of IPLC’s.<ref name=":17" /> To avoid this REDD+ developers must have the genuine intent of understanding the perspective of the Indigenous group they are working with and aim to implement REDD+ with a bottom-up approach.

In both countries, transparency must be improved to ensure that FPIC is adhered to and subsequently ensure fair IPLC representation and engagement. This issue predominantly arises due to the poor requirements of standards in the VCM. As such, proponents are guided by developers which have little incentive to truly act in the interests of Indigenous groups; ultimately the organizations in charge of project development are interested in increasing project revenues. This has led to instances of over-crediting, as without a transparent framework in which to operate it is difficult to evaluate the legitimacy of the claims being made by project proponents and developers. However, with recent advances that address concerns of additionality<ref name=":15" /> there is hope for improved market integrity. Standards of the VCM must continue to be scrutinized to ensure that progress continues to be made.

Going forward, progress should be made to formalize the customary laws and traditional lands of IPLCs, and finance should be directed towards the enforcement of these laws. The environmental,<ref name=":16" /> economic,<ref name=":5" /><ref>Ding, H., Veit, P. G., Blackman, A., Gray, E., Reytar, K., Altamirano, J. C., Hodgdon, B., (2016). ''Climate benefits, tenure costs: The economic case for securing Indigenous land rights in the Amazon''. WRI. https://files.wri.org/d8/s3fs-public/Climate_Benefits_Tenure_Costs_Executive_Summary.pdf</ref> and social<ref>Sarmiento Barletti, J. P., Heise Vigil, N., & Larson, A. M. (2023). ''Safeguards at a glance: Are voluntary standards supporting community land, resource and carbon rights?'' CIFOR-ICRAF. https://www.cifor-icraf.org/publications/pdf_files/Flyer/REDD-Safeguards-7.pdf </ref> benefits of this have been researched and are well understood. By developing culturally appropriate frameworks for rights-based conservation regimes, that work with IPLCs in accordance with their worldviews, REDD+ could be used to promote Indigenous autonomy. However, progress still must be made to achieve this goal.

{{CFRC FRST522|names=Connor Haynes
https://wiki.ubc.ca/User:ConnorHaynes|share=yes|theme=REDD+|country=Latin America|province=|theme2=Carbon|Additional theme (3rd)=Restoration}}

==References==

User:ConnorHaynes

2024-12-29T07:09:29Z

ConnorHaynes:

== Background ==
Originally from the UK but now also a citizen of Canada, I have spent much of my life focusing my time, money and energy on educating myself and working as to facilitate ecosystem restoration. Since living in Canada I have become particularly aware of the linkage between societal inequity and environmental degradation and have the utmost intent on alleviating the unfair pressures that many eperience worldwide. Having visited during my undergraduate degree I hope to focus my efforts in Colombia, as a country faced with immense difficulties and many incredibly important ecosystems that require attention.

== Education ==
''(Ongoing)''

'''''University of British Columbia:''''' Master’s in International Forestry.

'''''GHG Management Institute:''''' Diploma in GHG Measurement, Reporting and Verification; - Emphasis on Forests and other Land Use projects (AFOLU).

''(2023)''

'''''University of British Columbia:''''' Micro-certificate in Forest Carbon Accounting.

''(2014 – 2017)''

'''Durham University, St. Cuthberts College. Chemistry (F100)'''

§ 2:1 BSc Hons. (GPA 3.3)

§ Key Modules: Chemistry in Society. Dissertation - “Cobalt Catalysed Water Splitting”.

'''''Environmental Related Experience'''''

§ (2015 – 2017) Member of ''St. Cuthberts Society environmental committee'': Organised themed weeks and promoted sustainable lifestyles, with the sole intention of raising awareness for environmental issues. I was the only contributor to the bulletin for this society.

§ (2016 – 2017) Member of ''Durham University Conservation Society'': Rewilded, planted trees and restored walkways to improve the local environment.

'''''Extracurricular activities / Positions of responsibility'''''

§ (2014 – 2017) Active member of the college rugby and football teams.

§ (2016 – 2017) College football captain and social secretary.

§ (2016 – 2017) College rugby social secretary.

'''''A level results''''' – A*, A, A in Chemistry, Mathematics and Physics respectively.

== Experience ==

=== Internships: ===
''Association Community Carbon Trees''. Dominical, Costa Rica''. Ecological Restoration intern.''

Dedicated to restoring and rewilding degraded farmland, working with local farmers and fostering biodiverse ecosystems. Emphasising community-based solutions to sequester carbon, amongst the other myriad of co-benefits associated with planting a diverse range of tree species, in collaboration with local stakeholders.

''Osa Conservation''. Osa Peninsula, Costa Rica''. Field Station Operations intern.''

Responsible for ensuring smooth operation at Osa’s research station. My main project focused on landscape design to benefit the myriad of fauna habiting Osa’s spaces. This involved in-depth research and subsequent identification of flora, various methods of germination, mapping and planning areas to be rewilded, all with the intention of utilizing the ecological benefits and aesthetic appeal of each species. My Spanish improved significantly whilst living here.

=== Volunteering: ===
''(06/23) Salmon Coast Research Station''. Echo Bay, BC, Canada.

Conducted ongoing field work studying the effects of open-net salmon farms on migrating juvenile salmon, in addition to studying the spatial arrangement of salmon in bull kelp beds in the Broughton Archipelago. Responsible for subsequent data entry and analysis. Also assisted with station renovations and other trail maintenance.

''(11/21 – 03/22) Neighbours United (formerly West Kootenay Ecosociety).'' Nelson, BC, Canada.

Primarily assisted with donor and community engagement and relations, with elements of fundraising and canvassing. Gained experience in social media design and using CiviCRM.

== Interests ==
I am interested in exploring the Voluntary Carbon Market, and how it can be used as a means to finance legitimate restoration projects. Connecting the dots between farmer and funder is an area of focus of mine; I intend to use this market to promote ecosystem restoration and combat social inequality. Whilst some may see the irony in using this market to combat social inequity in-particluar, I am confident that I personally will utilise this market with genuine and authentic intent.

Documentation:Open Case Studies/FRST522/2024/REDD+ in Indigenous Amazonia: What works and what doesn’t?

2024-12-29T07:08:57Z

ConnorHaynes:

__TOC__

==Positionality==
First and foremost I am not Indigenous, and whilst there are a myriad of cultures, ontologies and epistemologies that are not sufficiently represented by simply stating ‘Indigenous’, it is commonly accepted that these worldviews are vastly different to those of the ‘Western’ world, which is the world in which I grew up and matured. I am therefore only understanding of Indigenous cultures, beliefs and customary laws based upon available online literature and those which I have learnt through life, in addition to those introduced to me in my Master’s degree. As such, I will never be able to fully relate to an Indigenous person; the best I can do is try to understand and learn. Only throughout this process am I able to work towards reconciliation and attempt to address the inequities experienced by Indigenous folk globally.

Additionally, I am yet to act as a carbon project proponent and so do not understand the nuances or stresses of undertaking such a task. Whilst an individual proponent may have the best intention of procuring a carbon project for its social and environmental benefits, there are a number of stakeholders involved throughout the entire process which influence its eventual outcome. Without experience acting as a project proponent I am naïve in understanding the process and its difficulties.

==Acronyms / Terminology==
'''Acronyms:'''

AFOLU: Agriculture, Forestry and Other Land-Use

CCBS: Climate, Community and Biodiversity Standard

ICVCM: Integrity Council for the Voluntary Carbon Market

IPLC: Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities

KMGBF: Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework

LAC: Latin American Countries

MRV: Monitoring, Reporting and Verification

PD: Project Description

REDD+: Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation

UNCBD: United Nations Convention on Biological Biodiversity

UNFCCC: United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

VCM: Voluntary Carbon Market

VCMI: Voluntary Carbon Markets Integrity Initiative

VCS: Verified Carbon Standard

'''Terminology:'''

''Additionality:'' Additionality is the determination of whether the project will lead to the expected outcomes when compared to the baseline or ‘business as usual’ emissions.

''Leakage'': Refers to the shifting of emissions to outside the project boundary as a result of the project’s activities.

''Permanence:'' Permanence refers to the degree to which a carbon credit is equivalent to a permanent removal or reduction in emissions.
==Abstract==
This case study illustrates two examples of Indigenous-led REDD+ projects on Indigenous territory in Colombia and Brazil. Both countries have a relatively long history of engaging with REDD+ but have slightly different legal structures pertaining to the rights of Indigenous peoples on their traditional territories, and specifically their ‘carbon’ rights. As such, the intention is to evaluate how these differing ''de jure'' rights translate on the ground. With respect to REDD+, do certain rights result in legitimately positive benefits to IPLCs, as well as the environment that these projects were originally intended to protect? The intention is such that the reader can evaluate the effectiveness and true benefit of REDD+ projects to IPLC’s, based upon the legal frameworks of the host country. A secondary intention is such that the reader is better equipped to conduct a prefeasibility assessment based upon available online literature, to evaluate the likelihood that REDD+ can be implemented in any chosen country, with the genuine intent of benefiting IPLC’s that are directly affected as a result of REDD+ project implementation.

==REDD+ and the VCM in Brazil and Colombia==
REDD+, originally introduced by the UNFCCC, is a market-based mechanism sitting within the VCM that aims to reverse the loss of forests and carbon stocks, specifically in developing countries. Simply put, an entity or an individual can voluntarily pay another that has engaged with REDD+ and subsequently sequestered carbon, to offset their own emissions using ‘credits’, sold as units of greenhouse gas equivalent to one ton of carbon dioxide (CO2e). Forestry and Land-Use remains the largest category of carbon credits traded by transaction volume on the VCM, with REDD+ being the most popular project type in this category, accounting for 78% of credits traded.<ref name=":0">Procton, A., (2024). ''State of the voluntary carbon market 2024: On the path to maturity.'' Forest Trends Ecosystem Marketplace.</ref> Furthermore, over one-third of the credits sold within this category were sourced from projects that had been implemented in LAC and the Caribbean in 2024.<ref name=":0" /> Of the four largest standards issuing carbon credits, Verra accounts for roughly 80% of issuances in Latin America,<ref>Pullins, T. (2022). Growth of carbon markets in Latin America. White & Case. https://www.whitecase.com/publications/insight/latin-america-focus-fall-2022-growth-carbon-markets </ref> and even in the face of recent scrutiny,<ref>West, T. A. P., Bofim, B., Haya, B. K. (2024). Methodological issues with deforestation baselines compromise the integrity of carbon offsets from REDD+. ''Global Environmental Change, 87'' https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2024.102863</ref><ref>Wyburd I., & Dufrasne, G. (2023). Error Log: Exposing the methodological failures of REDD+ forestry projects. Carbon Market Watch. https://carbonmarketwatch.org/publications/error-log-exposing-the-methodological-failures-of-redd-forestry-projects/</ref><ref name=":15">Haya, B. K., Alford-Jones, K., Anderegg, W. R. L., Beymer-Farris, B., Blanchard, L., Bomfim, B., Chin, D., Evans, S., Hogan, M., Holm, J. A., McAfee, K., So, I. S., West, T. A. P., & Withey, L. (2023). ''Quality assessment of REDD+ carbon credit projects''. Berkeley Carbon Trading Project. https://gspp.berkeley.edu/research-and-impact/centers/cepp/projects/berkeley-carbontrading-project/REDD+</ref> REDD+ projects account for a significant proportion of the VCM with their continued application likely to persist.<ref>Gordon, O. (2022). ''The interwoven fortunes of carbon markets and indigenous communities.'' Energy Monitor. https://www.energymonitor.ai/tech/carbon-removal/the-interwoven-fortunes-of-carbon-markets-and-indigenous-communities/</ref><ref>Müller, M., Coustar, C., Bietta, F., Mathres, M. (2022). ''UNFCCC REDD+ and the power of sovereign carbon.'' Deutsche Banke Chief Investment Office. https://www.rainforestcoalition.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/CIO-Special-UNFCCC-REDD-power-of-sovereign-carbon.pdf</ref><ref>Pullins, T. (2022). ''Growth of carbon markets in Latin America.'' White & Case. https://www.whitecase.com/publications/insight/latin-america-focus-fall-2022-growth-carbon-markets </ref> With the introduction of updated methodologies aimed at addressing these concerns,<ref>Verra (2023a). ''Setting the Standard: Verra’s Revolutionary New REDD Methodology.'' https://verra.org/program-notice/setting-the-standard-verras-revolutionary-new-redd-methodology/</ref><ref>Verra (2023b). ''VM0048 Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation, v1.0.'' https://verra.org/methodologies/vm0048-reducing-emissions-from-deforestation-and-forest-degradation-v1-0/</ref> there is hope for renewed buyer confidence in the integrity of this market,<ref>MSCI (2023). ''Verra’s New Methodology for Unplanned Deforestation Aims to Silence the Critics''. https://www.msci.com/www/blog-posts/verra-s-new-methodology-for/04577808942</ref> though more work still needs to be done.

Both Colombia and Brazil have a relatively long history of implementing REDD+ projects, using both fund-based and market-based mechanisms. For example, both countries were participants in the ‘Amazon Indigenous REDD+ (RIA in Spanish) initiative, with the first pilot implementation project being initiated in Colombia’s Puiawai Natural Reserve.<ref>Garzón, E., (2017). ''Amazon Indigenous REDD+: An innovative approach to conserve Colombian forests?'' Mongabay. https://news.mongabay.com/2017/01/amazon-indigenous-redd-an-innovative-approach-to-conserve-colombian-forests/</ref> The relevance of these two countries with respect to REDD+ is simple. Much of the Amazon’s primary tropical rainforest falls within these countries' jurisdiction and this rainforest has been consistently under threat from external pressures and encroachment, whether that be in the form of land-clearing for commercial ranching, subsistence purposes, illicit drug production or illegal mining practices,<ref name=":8">Sánchez García, P. A. & Wong, G. Y., (2024) “The political economy of deforestation in the Colombian Amazon”, ''Journal of Political Ecology'' ''31''(1), 178–199. https://doi.org/10.2458/jpe.5230</ref><ref>Radwin, M. (2023). ''Drug trafficking fuels other deforestation drivers in the Amazon: report.'' Mongabay. https://news.mongabay.com/2023/07/drug-trafficking-fuels-other-deforestation-drivers-in-the-amazon-report/</ref><ref>Haddad, E.A., Araújo, I.F., Feltran-Barbieri, R., Perobelli, F. S., Rocha, A., Sass, K. S., Nobre, C. A. (2024). Economic drivers of deforestation in the Brazilian Legal Amazon. ''Nat Sustain'' ''7'', 1141–1148. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41893-024-01387-7 </ref><ref>Hänggli, A., Levy, S. A., Armenteras, D., Bovolo, C. I., Brandão, J., Rueda, X., & Garrett, R. D. (2023). A systematic comparison of deforestation drivers and policy effectiveness across the amazon biome. ''Environmental Research Letters, 18''(7), 073001. https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/acd408</ref> to name a few.

In theory, REDD+ can be used to provide the economic incentive to promote sustained environmental protection of Indigenous lands, with a focus on the rights and livelihoods of IPLCs. Currently the overall funding to IPLCs tenure rights and forest management in tropical countries is low, receiving just $270 million per year between 2011-2020 from bilateral and multilateral donors and private philanthropies.<ref>Hatcher, J., Owen, M., Yin, D., (2021). ''Falling short: Donor funding for Indigenous peoples and local communities to secure tenure rights and manage forests in tropical countries (2011 -2020).'' Rainforest Foundation Norway. https://dv719tqmsuwvb.cloudfront.net/documents/Publikasjoner/Andre-rapporter/RFN_Falling_short_2021.pdf</ref> REDD+ has the potential to channel funding so as to promote Indigenous rights and autonomy, provided there is transparent and equitable benefit-sharing for those involved. Fundamentally, only with the inclusion of IPLC’s, or preferably with IPLC’s acting as project proponents, is REDD+ able to promote Indigenous agency and improve IPLC rights and governance. And only when the rights of those inhabiting the land are formally recognized can the land be effectively conserved.<ref name=":16">Reytar, K., Veit, P., von Braun, J. (2024). ''Protecting Biodiversity Hinges on Securing Indigenous and Community Land Rights.'' WRI. https://www.wri.org/insights/indigenous-and-local-community-land-rights-protect-biodiversity</ref> The inclusion of IPLCs in REDD+ project development is therefore considered to be essential for project success, and this is in theory embodied in the very nature of REDD+.<ref name=":1">Alvarez, G., Elfving, M. and Andrade, C. (2016) ‘REDD+ governance and indigenous peoples in Latin America: the case of Suruí Carbon Project in the Brazilian Amazon Forest’, ''Latin American J. Management for Sustainable Development 3''(2) pp.133–146. https://doi.org/10.1504/LAJMSD.2016.083705</ref> Partially owing to a long history of dealing with REDD+, Colombia and Brazil are amongst just a few of the countries hosting tropical rainforests that explicitly recognise community rights to carbon and tie these rights to the legal ownership of lands and forests. In Colombia, carbon rights are tied to land rights, whereas in Brazil carbon rights are tied to forest rights.<ref name=":2">RRI and McGill University (2021). Technical report: ''Status of legal recognition of Indigenous Peoples’, Local Communities’ and Afro-descendant Peoples’ rights to carbon stored in tropical lands and forests''. Rights and Resources Initiative. https://doi.org/10.53892/MLQQ5744</ref>

==Brazil: The Suruí Forest Carbon Project==
[[File:The Amazon Basin, Brazil.jpg|thumb|376x376px|Brazil's Amazon rainforest]]

=== Project description and location ===
The Surui Forest Carbon project (SFCP) was implemented in 2009 on the territory of the Surui people, which is situated in the southern part of Brazil’s Amazon between the states of Rondônia and Mato Grosso. Surui Indigenous territory covers an area of 2,481 km2, though the intention of the SFCP was to protect a portion of this total area. According to the PD, the stated objective was to “prevent 13,575.3 hectares of tropical forest from being cleared by 2038, to avoid the emission of 7,258,352.3 tCO2e to the atmosphere, and to contribute to the preservation of the Paiter Surui lifestyle and traditions.”<ref>IDESAM (2011). ''Project description: Surui forest carbon project''. Institute for Conservation and Sustainable Development of Amazonas. Link: "PROJ_DESC_1118_02FEB2012.PDF" found at https://registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/1118 </ref> This region sits within one of the Brazilian Amazon’s main ‘arcs of deforestation’ and pressure from loggers and ranchers is a matter of concern.

Notably, the SFCP was the first REDD+ project to be proposed by Indigenous peoples in the Brazilian Amazon on their own territory and was the first to receive certification by both the VCS and CCBS.<ref name=":1" />. Metareilá, the Surui’s own Indigenous association, acted as project proponent and the Institute for Conservation and Sustainable Development of Amazonas (IDESAM) assisted with project development, alongside multiple other stakeholder groups. As an endogenous initiative procured and conducted by the Surui community, the SFCP had a ‘non-centralized model of governance’, which reflected the characteristics and traditions of the Surui people. <ref name=":1" />

Only after two years of consultations between the 24 communities involved and the relevant governmental agencies (primarily FUNAI and the Ministry of Environment) was a Memorandum of Understanding signed, showing community consent to develop the project.<ref name=":3">Garcia, B., Rimmer, L., Canal Vieira, L., Mackey, B., (2021). REDD+ and forest protection on indigenous lands in the Amazon. ''RECIEL 30'', 207–219. https://doi.org/10.1111/reel.12389</ref> In 2012 after verification from an independent third-party body, the Surui were able to sell carbon credits on the international market. Between 2009 and 2014 the project drastically helped limit the deforestation occurring within the project’s site, causing many to deem it a success.<ref name=":4">Howard, F. E., (2023). ''An Analysis of the Suruí Forest Carbon Project in Context of Settler Colonialism''. Masters thesis. Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University. https://vtechworks.lib.vt.edu/server/api/core/bitstreams/b0cde6de-794c-453f-856b-ee72bde3db06/content</ref>

=== National climate targets, policies and legislation ===
Rates of deforestation in Brazil’s legal Amazon are significantly impacted by the government in charge. This is evidenced in the decade between 2012 and 2021 whilst under the conservative Bolsonaro administration, deforestation in the Amazon increased 185% — from a loss of 4,571 km2 in 2012 to 13,038 km2 in 2021.<ref>INPE (2022). ''Observação da Terra. http://www.obt.inpe.br/OBT/assuntos/programas/amazonia/prodes''</ref> However, since Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s appointment in 2022 there has been a steady decline in the rate of deforestation, which is now roughly half what it was in 2021.<ref>Terra Brasilis (2024). ''PRODES (deforestation): Deforestation rates – Legal Amazon – States''. https://terrabrasilis.dpi.inpe.br/app/dashboard/deforestation/biomes/legal_amazon/rates</ref> A significant proportion of emissions result from the clearing of rainforest and its subsequent conversion to ranching.<ref>MCTI (2022). ''Estimativas Anuais De Emissões De Gases De Efeito Estufa No Brasil.'' 6ª Edição. Ministério da Estado da Ciência, Tecnologia e Inovações. https://www.gov.br/mcti/pt-br/acompanhe-o-mcti/sirene/publicacoes/estimativas-anuais-de-emissoes-gee/arquivos/6a-ed-estimativas-anuais.pdf</ref> To address these emissions Brazil has implemented various adaptation policies, legislation and targets which are summarized below:
{| class="wikitable"
|'''Document name'''
|'''Type'''
|'''Publication year'''
|'''Key takeaways'''
|-
|National Policy on Climate Change (NPCC)
|Legislation
|2009
|Framework for addressing climate change
|-
|National Plan on Climate Change Adaptation
|Policy
|2016
|Framework for addressing impacts of climate change
|-
|Nationally Determined Contribution
|Target
|2024
|Reduce net greenhouse gas emissions by 59 to 67 percent below 2005 levels by 2035
|-
|Federal Constitution, Article 225
|Legislation
|2006
|The Amazon rainforest is considered as a ‘national heritage’.All levels of government have a shared responsibility to protect it and the environment
|-
| colspan="4" |'''Relating to REDD+'''
|-
|Plan of Action for the Prevention and Control of Deforestation in the Legal Amazon (PPCDAM)
|Policy
|2004
|Aims to reduce deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon
|-
|Forest code
|Legislation
|2012
|Aimed at reducing deforestation, but no specific mention of REDD+
|-
|Amazon Indigenous REDD+ Initiative
|Policy
|2012
|Incorporate Indigenous with REDD+ initiatives
|-
|National REDD+ Strategy (ENREDD+)
|Policy
|2016
|REDD+ as a fund-based mechanism
|}

=== Indigenous rights - Constitutional, tenure and bundle rights ===
In Brazil, Indigenous rights are robust and clearly defined according to the Brazilian Constitution. As a result, the Indigenous communities of the Brazilian Amazon have legal title to 13.8% of the national territory totalling 1.175 million km2, with a total of 631 territories.<ref>Federal government of Brazil (2024). ''Brazil’s NDC: National determination to contribute and transform''. https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/2024-11/Brazil_Second%20Nationally%20Determined%20Contribution%20%28NDC%29_November2024.pdf</ref>
{| class="wikitable"
| colspan="2" |'''Laws'''
|-
|Article 231 of the 1988 Constitution
|Indigenous peoples to have their exclusive right to use their territories to derive economic benefits. Grants indigenous peoples the right to land, prohibits eviction, and restricts mining without authorization from the federal government.
|-
|Indigenous Peoples statute (1973).

|No acts restricting the full exercise of indigenous peoples’ permanent tenure over the land should be permitted.
|-
| colspan="2" | '''Treaties'''
|-
|United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2007)
|Requires States to obtain free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) for the approval of any projects affecting indigenous territories.
|-
|International Labour Organization Convention 169 (2019)
|Ratified and incorporated under domestic law in 2002 through Decree 10.088/2019, endorsing UNDRIP
|-
|American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2016)
|Supports and builds upon UNDRIP
|}
Whilst Indigenous communities in Brazil have legal title to land, it is the State that owns it. Indigenous people simply exercise permanent tenure over lands that they traditionally occupy and have ‘original rights’ to these traditional lands, which no other rights can prevail over.<ref name=":3" /> Indigenous lands, though not classified as protected areas, “have the highest level of protection by law because they are regulated by the Constitution” and cannot be leased or restricted without violating their original rights. The Suruí's right to develop the SFCP is grounded in the Brazilian Constitution, which grants Indigenous peoples exclusive rights to use the ‘riches of the soil, rivers and lakes’ of their land, and these rights cannot be overridden. Thus, Indigenous people and only Indigenous people are legally allowed to engage in productive activities on their land, provided these activities are conducted according to their own customs and traditions and are necessary for the wellbeing and cultural expression of their own people. In Brazil, it is the armed forces and federal police that are responsible for enforcing these laws, and FUNAI is responsible for representing Indigenous communities in judicial disputes.<ref name=":3" /> As such, provided a REDD+ project does not violate the rights to territorial integrity, permanent land tenure and original rights, it is legally allowed.
[[File:Two Pataxo indians (Brasília, 04 April 2006).jpeg|thumb|414x414px|Two Indigenous in Brazil]]
'''CARBON RIGHTS:''' In Brazil, carbon rights are tied to forest rights.<ref name=":2" /> Carbon credits from REDD+ projects are seen as part of the economic benefits derived from indigenous lands, and as such, Indigenous communities are entitled to own, control and distribute these revenues themselves. The carbon credits generated from the SFCP were wholly owned by the Suruí people through Metareilá, with the Suruí Fund (managed by the Brazilian Biodiversity Fund - FUNBIO) acting as recipient. This legality reinforces Indigenous control over both land and carbon rights, as whoever has rights to the forest land is usually recognized as the owner of carbon rights.<ref name=":3" /> Collectively these national and international laws provide an important safeguard to Indigenous peoples, making their consent a prerequisite for the establishment of REDD+ projects and recognizing their rights as the main beneficiaries of REDD+ revenues.<ref name=":3" /> However, as carbon rights are tied to forest rights in Brazil and not land rights, and carbon is considered to be an ‘environmental service’ (Article 41(I)(A) Brazilian Forestry Code), states as well as the federal government have the jurisdiction to exercise full legislative authority over carbon. <ref name=":2" /> As such, certain states have interpreted the law to imply that the title to carbon credits is attributable to the state.<ref>Loft, L., Ravikumar, A., Gebara, M. F., Pham, T. T., Resosudarmo, I. A. P., Assembe, S., Tovar, J. G., Mwangi, E., & Andersson, K. (2015). Taking Stock of Carbon Rights in REDD+ Candidate Countries: Concept Meets Reality. ''Forests'', ''6''(4), 1031-1060. https://doi.org/10.3390/f6041031</ref> Hence, even when carbon rights are clearly defined and tied to forest title it is insufficient in itself, and only by legally recognizing the customary rights of IPLCs can a fair and equitable outcome be realised.

'''FPIC OBLIGATION:''' Brazilian law requires Free, Prior, and Informed Consent (FPIC) for REDD+ projects affecting indigenous lands, ensuring that international standards such as the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) and ILO Convention No. 169 are adhered to; Indigenous consent is, ''de jure,'' a necessity. Projects that violate these rights and fail to consult communities are therefore considered illegal. Notably there are no specific rules or procedures that have been written into the Brazilian constitution that provide guidance on how to achieve FPIC. However, this freedom reinforces Indigenous autonomy as it allows an Indigenous community to define the rules of consultation according to their customs and traditions.

=== Affected and interested stakeholders ===
{| class="wikitable"
| colspan="5" |'''Affected stakeholders'''
|-
|Stakeholders
|Primary objective(s)
|Secondary objective(s)
|Relative power
|Scope of influence
|-
|Metareilá Association of the Suruí Indigenous People
|Project proponent

Works to defend and preserve the cultural and territorial heritage of the Suruí people.

Responsible for the Suruí Fund (FUNBIO). Ensure equitable distribution of funds
|Ensure project longevity.
Stick to the mandate; attempt not to be influenced by external actors
|Powerful, though lacking technical knowhow. Have carbon rights and thus have ultimate control of project revenue; can decide how this revenue is distributed.
|Local
|-
|Other Indigenous groups and associations
|Support various aspects of proejct development
|Aim to benefit from the project
|Have the same rights as the Metareila with respect to land though are less involved with project development and have less say, nor derive economic benefits like the Metareila
|Local
|-
|''Campesinos'' (peasants)
|Survive via subsistence.
|Procure more land.
|Have far fewer rights than Indigenous groups and no involvement with the project
|Local
|-
| colspan="5" |'''Interested stakeholders'''
|-
|IDESAM - Institute for Conservation and Sustainable Development of Amazonas
|Maximise revenue from project.
Ensure project longevity
|Achieve completion of various technical aspects of project
|Powerful: Required to complete various technical aspects of development.
|National
|-
|Forest Trends
|Supported formulation and implementation of the project.
Uphold image of organization
|Maximise environmental benefits of project
|Powerful: Tasked with raising funds and fostering an international network; an integral part of project development
|International
|-
|Amazon Conservation Team - ACT Brazil
|Supports various aspect of project development as well as offering legal advice.
Other technical assistance
|Maximise environmental benefits of project
|Powerful: An integral part of project development
|International
|-
|Kanindé Association for Ethno-Environmental Defense – non-profit
|Promote Metareilá views and beliefs
|Involved with various aspects of project development
|Mid-power. Has a say in project direction, though less weight than the Metareila.
|National - International
|-
|Ministry of Environment (MMA)
|Responsible for protection and conservation of natural environment
|Ensure project adheres to national law
|Powerful. Must be notified about project activities although cannot strictly alter decisions made by the Surui
|National
|-
|National Indian Foundation (FUNAI)
|Promote Indigenous rights

|Represents Indignous organizations with judicial matters.
|Powerful. Knowleadgeable of judicial system. Must be notified about project activities though is not involved with project governance.
|National
|-
|Government of the State of Mato Grosso
|Encourage development, and reduce poverty and crime in Mato Grosso
|Ensure project adheres to regional law.
|Powerful. Legilative control over regional police and municipalities
|Regional
|}

=== Discussion ===
Although originally successful in achieving its goal of reducing deforestation and degradation, in 2016 diamonds were discovered in Surui territory, leading to an increase in illegal logging and mining.<ref name=":1" /> By 2018 the project site had been completely overrun by ''garimpeiros'' (small-scale gold miners), ultimately leading to the project's suspension that year. <ref name=":4" />

While the project had initially garnered support, divisions emerged within the community post-project implementation. Disputes arose over the unequal distribution of project revenues, leading to internal conflicts between different Suruí clans. These criticisms escalated in 2014 when the Catholic Indigenous Missionary Council supported calls for an end to the project due to mismanagement of revenues from carbon credit sales. <ref name=":3" /> Some Suruí members also argued that the REDD+ initiative harmed their way of life.<ref>Lang, C. (2014). ''“What are projects for that destroy life?” Interview with Henrique Suruí about the Paiter-Suruí REDD project, Brazil.'' REDD-Monitor. https://redd-monitor.org/2014/12/17/what-are-projects-for-that-destroy-life-interview-with-henrique-surui-about-the-paiter-surui-redd-project-brazil/</ref>

Further complicating the situation was the controversial role of Henrique Suruí, one of the Suruí tribal leaders. In 2011, it was revealed that Henrique had violated the tribe's logging moratorium, collaborating with loggers in illegal activities. While Henrique later denied responsibility for the project’s failure, his actions, combined with internal disagreements, illustrated the lack of consensus within the Suruí leadership on the project’s goals and outcomes. Both of the tribe’s leaders possessed dramatically different perspectives on how they believed they could ensure agency, autonomy, and economic benefits for the Suruí people.<ref name=":4" /> This fragmentation within the community, in combination with the discovery of diamonds and the state's failure to protect indigenous land rights led to the indefinite suspension of the REDD+ project.

The project's collapse highlights broader structural issues, particularly the state's inconsistent support for indigenous land rights, influenced by settler colonialism, which undermined the project’s long-term viability.<ref name=":4" /> Additionally, the project’s creation was shaped by external actors, including the collaboration between Almir Suruí and Borges from Forest Trends, a Washington-based NGO. This partnership introduced a Western perspective on viewing the Suruí peoples forest, in contrast with their own perspectives on land use and governance. Furthermore, despite Borges’ Brazilian background, the power dynamics between a global North organization and a developing, Indigenous community were apparent.

=== Summary ===
The Suruí Forest Carbon Project provides an interesting example of how, even when the rights of IPLC’s are relatively robust, challenges persist in ensuring REDD+ project longevity. As such, in its current state, REDD+ in the Brazilian Amazon may not be a suitable market-based option for Indigenous communities in the Amazon.<ref name=":3" /> Although initially successful in promoting Indigenous autonomy and reducing deforestation, the project resulted in failure due to of a myriad of factors. Divisions among Surui communities were exacerbated by a perceived unequal benefit-sharing, and the impact of imposing REDD+ seems to have complicated the traditional social structure that the Surui were dependent on. These issues were influenced by Brazil's settler state dynamics, where Indigenous land rights, although legally recognized, are often not upheld in practice due to insufficient enforcement.<ref name=":4" /> Ultimately, the Surui project reveals how settler colonialism's structural flaws make long-term project success difficult, despite initial progress in promoting Indigenous autonomy.

At the national and state level, complex institutional and legal land governance structures convolute and impede REDD+ in Brazil. Multiple institutions share responsibilities and there is no comprehensive, authoritative database of land ownership, which hampers efforts to protect Indigenous territories.<ref name=":5">Costa, R. (2016)''. Insecure land rights in Brazil: Consequences for rural areas and challenges for improvement.'' Climate Policy Initiative. https://www.climatepolicyinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/Insecure_Land_Rights_in_Brazil_CPI.pdf</ref> As a result, land tenure disputes remain common and can be witnessed occurring between the public as well between public and state actors. For example, Brazil’s 1964 Land Statute (Law No. 4504) allows the government to take over unproductive farms and transfer those lands to landless peasants. This often results in the clearing of forest, as only when the land is cleared is it evidenced to be ‘productive’.<ref name=":5" /> Hence, not only does this law cause insecurity for Indigenous populations in Brazil, it also forces them to go against customary traditions of stewarding the land in an effort to maintain its control.

Whilst the aforementioned points to the futility of REDD+ in Brazil, there is reason to maintain optimism. In a recent landmark ruling Brazil’s supreme court voted in favour of the Xoleng peoples, and the decision will serve as a precedent for all cases involving Indigenous peoples.<ref name=":6">Amos-Flom, K., (2023). ''Triumph and Turmoil: The Xokleng Case and the Future of Indigenous Land Rights in Brazil.'' Columbia Journal of Transnational Law. https://www.jtl.columbia.edu/bulletin-blog/triumph-and-turmoil-the-xokleng-case-and-the-future-of-indigenous-land-rights-in-brazil</ref> The Xokleng’s land dispute, settled in 2023, “rejected Santa Catarina state’s marco temporal (“time limit”) argument, which would have required Indigenous people to prove they occupied or legally contested the territory they claimed before the Brazilian Constitution came into force in 1988. If successful, this argument would have led to disastrous repercussions, as many Indigenous peoples had been forcibly removed or are traditionally nomadic.”<ref name=":6" /> Evidently, whilst slow, progress has been made in Brazil in recent years with respect to Indigenous rights as well as the voluntary carbon market itself.

There are currently 159 AFOLU projects listed on the Verra database in Brazil, with only two specifically focused on REDD+ initiatives in collaboration with Indigenous groups. These are the Ka’a Pyahu project, <ref>Verra (n.d.) ''Project 5087: KA'A PYAHU.'' https://registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/5087</ref> initiated by the Guajajara Indigenous people in collaboration with external organizations and validated in 2021, and the ‘Together for the forest Awaete REDD+ project’<ref>Verra (n.d.) ''Project 5200: TOGETHER FOR THE FOREST AWAETÉ REDD+ PROJECT.'' https://registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/5200</ref> which is still under development. Both projects involve Indigenous groups working with Brazilian organizations to build technical capacity and expertise. This could signal a growing trend of Indigenous-led REDD+ projects in the future. To ensure a positive future for REDD+ in Brazil, the customary rights of IPLC’s must be formally recognized. IPLC should have legal ownership of their traditional lands, and in doing so the carbon rights of these communities would be less convoluted, leading to more equitable benefit-sharing and increased cohesion amongst these groups post-project implementation.

==Colombia: ''REDD+ project Resguardo Indigena Unificado - Selva de Mataven (RUI-SM)''==

=== '''Project description and location''' ===
[[File:RS6524 MG 3944.jpg|thumb|407x407px|A view of the Mataven]]
According to the PD,<ref name=":7">ACATISEMA & Mediamos (2017). ''Joint project description and monitoring report: REDD+ project: Resguardo Indigena Unificado – Selva de Mataven (RIU – SM).'' Link: “10 06 2017_VCS Final Report_ Matavin Project.pdf” found at https://registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/1566</ref> the Resguardo Indígena Unificado – Selva de Matavén (RIU-SM) project is located east of the Colombian Orinoco high plain, in the eastern part of the Department of Vichada, municipality of Cumaribo. It resides on the formalized resguardo of the Sikuani, Piaroa, Puinave, Curripaco, Cubeo and Piapoco ethnic groups, spanning 1,856,836 hectares, with 1,477,115 hectares (79.6%) being forested. The PD states that it will reduce greenhouse gas emissions, with a total estimated net reduction of 108,670,562 tons of CO2 equivalent over thirty years, from years 2013 – 2042. By this metric, it is the 14th largest project on the Verra registry, out of over 1700 projects.<ref name=":9">Dufrasne, D., (2021). ''Two Shades of Green: How hot air forest credits are being used to avoid carbon taxes in Colombia''. Carbon Market Watch. https://carbonmarketwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Two-shades-of-green_EN_WEB.pdf</ref> There are 12,312 Indigenous people living in the RIU-SM, belonging to 2,517 families and 250 communities as of 2017.

The project was initiated by the Asociación de Cabildos y Autoridades Indígenas de la Selva de Matavén (ACETISMA), an Indigenous association, and developed by MEDIAMOS F&M, a Colombian consultancy firm. ACETISMA is comprised of Indigenous leaders that represent the 17 communities of the reservation in charge of governing the territory, and it has administrative autonomy, as well as “the capacity to acquire, to own and to dispose of property, to accept donations, to hold national and international conventions, scientific and cultural exchanges and generally, to celebrate all kinds of negotiations and agreements with which the Association can achieve its objectives.”<ref name=":7" />

There is a stated focus on various means of improving the living conditions of the Indigenous peoples living within the project area. To summarise, the main objectives of the REDD+ project RIU-SM include:

· Community development, in the form of improved education.

· Community engagement with respect to the project; developing information channels to reveal project progress.

· Support local initiatives for environmental education and waste management.

· Developing an effective response system that addresses community proposals and concerns relating to the project.

· Strengthening the governance of ACATISEMA.
=== National climate targets, policies and legislation ===
The Colombian Amazon makes up over one-third of Colombia’s national territory, and up until 2005 only 7.3% of the Colombian Amazon had been deforested, largely due to the country's 60-year armed conflict between the government, multiple left-wing guerillas such as FARC, and several far-right paramilitary groups.<ref name=":8" /> However, following the signing of the Peace Treaty in 2016 and demobilization of the FARC, limits to deforestation were weakened in the Colombian Amazon. Poor but opportunistic peasants began to encroach into previously unchartered territory and capitalize from the rainforest. Due to the poor economic integration of the Amazon, many were forced to engage with the traditional economies of cocoa and cattle ranching, as these markets were already well connected to regional and global markets.<ref name=":8" /> To address the drivers of deforestation and its associated emissions, the federal government has implemented various initiatives, which are summarized below:

{| class="wikitable"
|'''Document name'''
|'''Type'''
|'''Publication year'''
|'''Key takeaways'''
|-
|Nationally Determined Contribution(s)
|Target
|2020
|Reduce GHG emissions by 51% by 2030 and net-zero by 2050
|-
|National Climate Change Policy (PNCC)
|Policy
|2018
|Address climate change and foster sustainable development
|-
|National Forest Conservation Program
|Policy
|2011
|Address deforestation
|-
|Law 1931 of 2018 – Climate Change Law

|Legislation
|2018
|Establishes the framework for addressing climate change
|-
| colspan="4" |'''Relating to REDD+:'''
|-
|National Strategy for Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (ENREDD+)
|Initiative
|2009
|Particular focus on the Amazon and Choco rainforests
|-
|Amazon Indigenous REDD+ Initiative
|Initiative
|2016
|Respect Indigenous rights. FPIC focus.
|-
|BIOREDD+ program
|Initiative
|2012
|Portfolio of 8 REDD+ projects in four geographic nodes covering over 700,000 hectares in the Colombian Pacific.

|-
|Vision Amazonia
|Initiative
|2015
|Part of the REDD+ strategy, financed by three foreign countries: Germany, Norway and United Kingdom
|}
As a result of the many fund and market-based initiatives that Colombia has engaged with, it hosts the second most REDD+ projects in the world. REDD+ projects now cover at least 56% of the area of legally recognized Indigenous territories in the Colombian Amazon, with an overwhelming majority of carbon projects located on Indigenous territories.<ref name=":10">Schmid, D., & Castro. C., (2023). ''REDD+ projects in the Colombian Amazon: Social challenges and lack of transparency''. Rainforest Foundation Norway. https://dv719tqmsuwvb.cloudfront.net/documents/REDD_rapport_2024_ENG.pdf</ref> Evidently REDD+ plays an integral part in the country’s efforts of environmental conservation, and incentives have been introduced to promote the development of such projects. For example, in 2016 the government adopted a higher tax that covered fossil fuels, but companies are able to avoid paying the tax by investing in carbon offsets that have been generated domestically.<ref name=":9" /> This led to a boost in the domestic REDD+ market in 2017, as Colombian companies invested so as to escape higher taxes. Notably, 23 of the 36 REDD+ projects currently under development in the Amazon region were initiated in or after 2018.<ref name=":10" /> Currently Colombia’s REDD+ program sits at over 45 pilot and voluntary carbon projects, as well as one large-scale jurisdictional approach in the Amazon.<ref name=":11">Zambrano-Cortés, D. G. (2024). ''The politics, spaces and subjects of forest conservation in Colombia''. [internal PhD, WU, Wageningen University]. Wageningen University. https://doi.org/10.18174/675328</ref>

=== Indigenous rights - Constitutional, tenure and bundle rights ===
''De jure'', the Indigenous peoples of Colombia have comprehensive tenure and bundle of rights that have been articulated in the national constitution. Collective land titles are granted to Indigenous communities by the Colombian government and as a result about 34 percent of Colombian land (almost 38 million hectares) is legally recognized as Indigenous territory or collective lands of Afro-descendent communities.<ref name=":10" /> These collective land tenure rights have been in effect since the implementation of the 1991 constitution, granting them the authority to exercise legal control over their territories in accordance with their own customs and procedures.<ref>Max Planck Institute (n.d.) ''Colombia 1991 (rev. 2015).'' Institute. https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Colombia_2015</ref> Furthermore, the carbon rights of Indigenous peoples are explicitly defined in the constitution and tied specifically to the ownership of land of the communities.<ref name=":2" /> This in theory provides a solid legal basis for upholding the rights of Indigenous communities in Colombia, specifically relating to REDD+ activities, as it allows communities to define and negotiate the terms of said projects. A summary of the various laws relating to Indigenous rights have been summarized below:
{| class="wikitable"
| colspan="2" |'''Law (1991 constitution)'''
|-
|Article 63

|Indigenous territories are considered collective property. Land is not owned by individuals but is shared by the community. The state must respect these collective rights and cannot alter land ownership without the consent of the Indigenous peoples.
|-
|Article 76 - ''Consulta previa''.
|Pertains to the right of Indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities; prior consultation must be undertaken before any entity undertakes activities that may affect their territories, culture, or way of life.
|-
|Article 330
|Indigenous communities have the right to govern their territories.
|-
|Article 329
|The Reservation is a collective, inalienable, and indefeasible property.
|-
|Decree 1386 of 1994, Article 10; Decree 2164 of 1995, Article 22) 39.
|"The administration and management of these lands are subjected to uses and customs of the beneficiaries."
|}
Whilst land and tenure rights are enshrined into the constitution, the precariousness of these rights persists due to a lack of resources to ensure enforcement, as well as the deeper issue of corruption. As previously stated, the rate of deforestation increased significantly in Colombia’s post-conflict era, evidencing the nation's inability to maintain control over unlawful acts of land-grabbing and disposition. Whilst this began with new peasants converting the Amazon for subsistence purposes, it ultimately led to new areas for the growth of cocoa, much to the benefit of narco-traffickers who could monopolize on this illegal surplus in ‘accumulation by dispossession’.<ref name=":8" />

With respect to the legalities of consultation, Colombia has enshrined ''consulta previa'' into the constitution. Translating to ‘prior consultation’, this legal text provides the formal grounds for Indigenous engagement when any legislative or administrative measures are implemented on Indigenous territory. Importantly, consultation should be achieved in accordance with the customs of the ethnic group with which the project is being imposed upon. However, there have been recent cases of contestation specifically relating to how ''consulta previa'' applies to REDD+ on Indigenous lands, and the RIU – SM project was one that was involved with such a case.

=== Affected and interested stakeholders ===
{| class="wikitable"
| colspan="5" |'''Affected stakeholders'''
|-
|Stakeholders
|Primary objective(s)
|Secondary objective(s)
|Relative power
|Scope of influence
|-
|ACATISEMA - Asociación de Cabildos y Autoridades Indígenas de la Selva de Matavén
|Primary and direct beneficiaries of project
Foster the integral development, social and cultural preservation of the indigenous communities in the Mataven Jungle

Consolidate the territory, and promote conservation and preservation of the environment and biodiversity of the Mataven Jungle

|Maintain control over ''resguardos''
|Powerful, locally.
Has the highest authority in the ''reguardo''.

Rights to the land and revenue generated from project
|Local
|-
|Indigenous communities of the RIU-SM
|Seek to maintain land rights

Promote traditional and cultural beliefs
|Increase benefits from the project
|Mid-power, though little input into project activities in reality.
|Local
|-
|Landless peasants
|Survive via subsistence
|Gain more access to land. Improve rights.
|Low to none
|Local
|-
| colspan="5" |'''Interested stakeholders'''
|-
|MEDIAMOS F&M
|Project developer
Maximise project revenues
|Develop the project in a way that is supporting of ACETISMA beliefs, for their benefit.
|Powerful: involved with various technical aspects of project development
|National
|-
|Ministerio de Ambiente y Desarrollo Sostenible (Minisitry of Environment and Sustainable Development)
|Environmental planning; sustainable development
Form strategic alliances with social and institutional participants in different sectoral and territorial scenarios.
|Ensure project activities are in agreement with ministry mandate
|Powerful, though supporting of project
|National
|-
|Dirección de Asuntos Indígenas, ROM y Minorías - Ministerio del Interior
|Prepares policy in favour of Indigenous groups
Supports ethnic and cultural rights of Indigenous
|
|Not ''per se'' involved with project, though the policy the organization has introduced affects project outcomes
|National
|-
|Corporinoquía
|Environmental authority to ensure the proper use of natural resources in their area of jurisdiction.
Ensure project abides by relevant regulations
|
|Powerful, though supporting of project
|Regional
|-
|Other government institutions: Governor ofice of Vichada, Mayor ofice Cumaribo
|The Reservation for being part of the Cumaribo, Vichada, has territorial jurisdiction relations with the Governor’s office and the Mayor’s office.
|Benefit from the project, if possible
|Powerful, regionally
|Regional - National
|-
|Fundación NATURA
''Civil organization''
|Conservation, use and management of biodiversity
Maximise social and environmental benefits of project
|Ensure suffienct IPLC inclusion
|Mid-power. Can influence decisions regarding project activities though does not hold absolute power to define terms
|International
|-
|Mining companies
|Mine to generate revenue.
|Compete with the project for the territory's resources.
|Relatively powerful, though legally obstructed to achieve primary objective
|International
|-
|Other indigenous communities neighboring RIU-SM
|Ensure autonomy with respect to their own jurisdiction
|Not involved with the project though potentially affected by it
|Low, with respect to the project
|Local
|-
|FONDO ACCIÓN
|Facilitate private investment into project activities
|Conservation and sustainable development; Protection/development of children.
|Mid-power. Important as they raise funds for the project and benefit from it, though not primary beneficiaries.
|National
|-
|Asocarbono – An industry association, including Verra, ProClima, Biofix, and ACATISEMA.

|Promote the agenda of high-level actors of the VCM
Promote integrity of market
|Hide/argue cases of scandal
|Powerful
|International
|-
|OPIAC: National Oganization of the Indigenous Peoples of the Colombian Amazon

|Promotes Indigenous rights in Colombia
Exercises a political representation of the Indigenous peoples of the Colombian Amazon
|
|Powerful. Legally knowledgeable.
|National
|}

=== Discussion ===
According to the official REDD+ Mataven website<ref>RIU – SM (n.d.). ''REDD+ Mataven''. https://reddmataven.com/</ref> the project has resulted in a myriad of benefits to the Indigenous communities of the region. For example, as a result of the funds generated from the project's activities, there have been improvements in infrastructure, transportation and education, ultimately leading to the empowerment and improved governance of ACETISMA. However, the project has come under fire for multiple reasons.

For one, in 2015 some of the Indigenous communities filed a lawsuit referring to the violation of their right to ''consulta previa''. However, the court ruled that their Indigenous rights had not been violated as it was ACETISMA that initially sought MEDIAMOS to develop the project, and that ACETISMA were the best representatives of those Indigenous communities. Furthermore, the project's main focus was the conservation of the rainforest and therefore did not threaten the cultural integrity of those communities.<ref name=":10" /> However, regardless of the outcome of this case, its occurrence points to internal disagreement amongst Indigenous participants of the RIU-SM project. In a study involving interviews with Indigenous members of the project, there was a significant proportion of interviewees that had little knowledge regarding various aspects of the project, such as responsibilities of participation, or the benefit-sharing mechanism in place.<ref name=":2" /> This further reinforces the point that, in the case of the RIU-SM project it may not be ‘bottom-up’ and points to the power imbalance experienced between MEDIAMOS, the project developer, and Indigenous community members. In the PD there is a breakdown of the distribution of income between ACETISMA and MEDIAMOS, which shows a significant proportion of revenue flowing to the former organisation throughout the project’s operations.<ref name=":7" /> However, there is currently no publicly available documentation supporting this initial claim<ref name=":9" /> as there is no obligation to provide this information, leading to a general lack of transparency in the market and between all of the relevant actors. Subsequent meetings with Indigenous leaders have however shown a marked support of the Mataven project, with one Indigenous leader explicitly stating “...the Redd+ project has brought resources that they never had before, which allowed them to open new school classrooms, 21 rural aqueducts, cocoa crops and even headquarters in Cumaribo and Inírida.”<ref>Lievano, A. B. (2021) Colombia's biggest carbon credit project could be selling hot air. Latin American Center for Investigative Journalism. https://www.elclip.org/el-mayor-proyecto-de-bonos-de-carbono-de-colombia-podria-estar-vendiendo-aire-caliente/ </ref> Clearly there have been benefits for IPLC’s involved with this project, though the details of this benefit-sharing remain a mystery.

Secondly, the Mataven project has caused controversy due to its apparently inflated carbon credit issuance. One report states that this has been achieved by using a reference area that is not representative of the project area, as well as assuming an uncharacteristically high assumed rate of deforestation.<ref name=":12">Global Atlas of Environmental Justice (2023). ''Resguardo Indigena Unificado-Selva de Matavén (RIU SM) REDD+ Project, Colombia.'' https://ejatlas.org/conflict/redd-project-resguardo-indigena-unificado-selva-de-mataven-riu-sm</ref> The project used a baseline deforestation rate of 0.86% per year, which is significantly more than the Colombian government's national rate of 0.18%. Additionally, according to the report the reference area chosen is more easily accessed and therefore more prone to deforestation, making it an inaccurate comparison to the relatively remote project area.<ref name=":2" /> This has led to the creation of excess carbon credits, or “hot air” credits, which have been criticized for not reflecting real environmental benefits.<ref name=":9" /> To add further insult to injury these credits have been used by a Colombian fossil fuel distributor company to avoid paying taxes, as described earlier by Colombia’s change in policy in 2017. In doing so, the company avoided paying approximately $18.9 million in taxes.<ref name=":2" /> There has been subsequent back and forth between Verra and Carbon Market Watch, with Verra refuting the claims<ref>Verra (2021). ''Carbon Market Watch Report on Colombian REDD+ Projects Contains Flawed Allegations.'' https://verra.org/carbon-market-watch-report-on-colombian-redd-projects-contains-flawed-allegations/ </ref> Regardless of the science, Colombia recently introduced a resolution in 2018 (Resolution 1447 – 2018) that requires projects to use baselines that comply with national reference levels.<ref name=":13">Dufrasne, D. (2021b). Companies use ”hot air” forestry offsets to avoid taxes in Colombia: Carbon Market Watch’s fact-check of Verra’s response. Carbon Market Watch. https://carbonmarketwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/CMWs-fact-check-of-Verras-response-on-Colombia.pdf</ref><ref>IEA (2022). ''Resolution 1447 – 2018. Monitoring, Reporting, and Verification System for mitigation actions at the national level.'' International Energy Agency. https://www.iea.org/policies/14772-resolution-1447-2018-monitoring-reporting-and-verification-system-for-mitigation-actions-at-the-national-level</ref> Going forward, REDD+ projects that are being implemented in Colombia will have to abide by Colombia’s national legislation.

=== Summary ===
Colombia has a long history of engaging in REDD+ as it has been used to limit environmental degradation in the post-conflict era, in alignment with the country’s national peacebuilding agenda.<ref name=":11" /> Owing to the country’s comprehensive tenure and bundle of rights, IPLC’s have robust ''de jure'' rights to land as they collectively own it, and rights to carbon are tied to this ownership. This puts Colombia as one of the world leaders in legal terms relating to REDD+ project implementation, but due to a lack of resources to ensure enforcement, as well as corruption, historically these laws have not been adhered to.<ref name=":10" /><ref name=":2" /> There are many documented cases showing the displacement on IPLC’s from traditional lands, poor efforts to adhere to ''consulta previa'', and inequitable benefit sharing.<ref>Greenfield, P. (2023''). The ‘carbon pirates’ preying on Amazon’s Indigenous communities.'' The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2023/jan/21/amazon-indigenous-communities-carbon-offsetting-pirates-aoe</ref><ref name=":14">Lang, C., (2024). ''Colombia’s Constitutional Court rules in favour of Indigenous Peoples. Identifies serious flaws in the REDD+ Baka Rokarire project.'' REDD_Monitor. https://reddmonitor.substack.com/p/colombias-constitutional-court-rules</ref>

The case of the Mataven project provides an interesting example of how it is the market itself that is failing to address concerns regarding transparency, whether that be relating to benefit-sharing amongst relevant stakeholders, or Indigenous representation and engagement throughout the implementation of REDD+ projects. Some ACATISEMA members have explicitly stated their support for the Mataven project,<ref name=":12" /> and its benefits can be seen first-hand in the form of improved infrastructure in local communities involved with the project.<ref>Myers, J. E., Parra, M. A., Bedford, C. (2021). ''How Carbon Offsetting Can Build a Forest.'' Stanford Social Innovation Review. https://ssir.org/articles/entry/how_carbon_offsetting_can_build_a_forest</ref> However, an exact breakdown of how and where revenue is being distributed to IPLC’s remains elusive.<ref name=":13" /> Furthermore, the level of IPLC engagement has come into question, specifically with reference to ''consulta previa'' and the overall understanding that IPLC’s have regarding the project’s intended outcomes and activities.<ref name=":10" /> This is not a rare case in Colombia and has been witnessed occurring with other projects that have been implemented on Indigenous territories in the Colombian Amazon.<ref name=":17">Lang, C., (2023''). “It destroys everything,” says Indigenous leader about the REDD+ Baka Rokarire project in Colombia''. REDD Monitor. https://reddmonitor.substack.com/p/it-destroys-everything-says-indigenous</ref> However, a recent ruling by the Colombian Constitutional court voted in favour of Indigenous groups in Colombia, upholding “the rights to self-determination, autonomy, self-government, territory, identity, physical and cultural integrity, and free, prior and informed consent of the indigenous communities”.<ref name=":14" /> This review ultimately sets a legal precedent safeguarding the fundamental rights of IPLCs with REDD+ project implementation and shows that progress is being made to improve the likelihood that REDD+ will result in genuine benefits to those affected by project implementation.

To ensure a more authentic engagement with IPLC’s so as to result in legitimate and equitable benefit-sharing, improvements must be made by the Colombian government, as well as within the VCM itself. For the former, Colombia’s national registry for GHG mitigation activities must be updated; it has been offline since 2022.<ref name=":10" /> As a result, transparency is lacking. International finance could be utilized so as to alleviate this issue, and only with an accurate and reliable database may the market be regulated. In the broader sense, VCM registries must create stricter guidelines promoting transparency. Often PD’s refer to annexed documents that contain relevant information regarding benefit-sharing, though these are often not publicly available.<ref name=":9" /> This limits transparency and increases the likelihood of inequitable agreements being made between project proponents and developers, further exacerbating existing power asymmetries between the two groups and limiting the likelihood that ''consulta previa'' is honestly adhered to.<ref name=":10" /> This has led to conflict within Indigenous communities, rather than a strengthening of their social fabric.

Furthermore, the Mataven project calls into question the actual emissions reduction that REDD+ projects achieve. Whilst Colombia has since updated its regulations such that REDD+ must use baselines that comply with national reference levels, it is up in the air as to how representative these guidelines are. Reference areas must represent project areas and without the appropriate regulations in place project developers lack the incentive to create realistic baselines; ultimately they are aiming to produce the maximum number of credits so as to generate the greatest possible revenues.

==Conclusion==
As a market-based mechanism, REDD+ is shackled by the construct in which it operates; fundamentally it is a capitalist means of fixing a capitalist problem, which comes with limitations. Both Brazil and Colombia have relatively robust laws that have been written into their constitutions, ultimately promoting more equitable results of REDD+ project implementation. However, as in Colombia IPLC’s collectively own the land, whereas in Brazil these groups only own rights to use the land,<ref name=":2" /> Colombia can be considered better equipped for the establishment of REDD+ projects on traditional Indigenous territory. However, even with these laws in place enforcement remain a matter of concern. Furthermore, given the wide variety of ontological and epistemological perspectives of Indigenous communities, and how these views conflict with the Western worldview from which market-based REDD+ came to fruition, there is an inherent difficulty in implementing a system of governance in REDD+ on Indigenous lands.<ref name=":1" />. Putting a price on nature conflicts with Indigenous perspectives and there have been instances where this has weakened the social and cultural fabric of IPLC’s.<ref name=":17" /> To avoid this REDD+ developers must have the genuine intent of understanding the perspective of the Indigenous group they are working with and aim to implement REDD+ with a bottom-up approach.

In both countries, transparency must be improved to ensure that FPIC is adhered to and subsequently ensure fair IPLC representation and engagement. This issue predominantly arises due to the poor requirements of standards in the VCM. As such, proponents are guided by developers which have little incentive to truly act in the interests of Indigenous groups; ultimately the organizations in charge of project development are interested in increasing project revenues. This has led to instances of over-crediting, as without a transparent framework in which to operate it is difficult to evaluate the legitimacy of the claims being made by project proponents and developers. However, with recent advances that address concerns of additionality<ref name=":15" /> there is hope for improved market integrity. Standards of the VCM must continue to be scrutinized to ensure that progress continues to be made.

Going forward, progress should be made to formalize the customary laws and traditional lands of IPLCs, and finance should be directed towards the enforcement of these laws. The environmental,<ref name=":16" /> economic,<ref name=":5" /><ref>Ding, H., Veit, P. G., Blackman, A., Gray, E., Reytar, K., Altamirano, J. C., Hodgdon, B., (2016). ''Climate benefits, tenure costs: The economic case for securing Indigenous land rights in the Amazon''. WRI. https://files.wri.org/d8/s3fs-public/Climate_Benefits_Tenure_Costs_Executive_Summary.pdf</ref> and social<ref>Sarmiento Barletti, J. P., Heise Vigil, N., & Larson, A. M. (2023). ''Safeguards at a glance: Are voluntary standards supporting community land, resource and carbon rights?'' CIFOR-ICRAF. https://www.cifor-icraf.org/publications/pdf_files/Flyer/REDD-Safeguards-7.pdf </ref> benefits of this have been researched and are well understood. By developing culturally appropriate frameworks for rights-based conservation regimes, that work with IPLCs in accordance with their worldviews, REDD+ could be used to promote Indigenous autonomy. However, progress still must be made to achieve this goal.

{{CFRC FRST522|names=Connor Haynes
https://wiki.ubc.ca/User:ConnorHaynes|share=yes|theme=REDD+|country=Latin America|province=|theme2=Carbon|Additional theme (3rd)=Restoration}}

==References==

User:ConnorHaynes

2024-12-29T07:07:15Z

ConnorHaynes:

== Background ==
Originally from the UK but now a citizen of Canada, I have spent much of my life focusing my time, money and energy on educating myself and working as to facilitate ecosystem restoration. Since living in Canada I have become particularly aware of the linkage between societal inequity and environmental degradation and have the utmost intent on alleviating the unfair pressures that many eperience worldwide. Having visited during my undergraduate degree I hope to focus my efforts in Colombia, as a country faced with immense difficulties and many incredibly important ecosystems that require attention.

== Education ==
''(Ongoing)''

'''''University of British Columbia:''''' Master’s in International Forestry.

'''''GHG Management Institute:''''' Diploma in GHG Measurement, Reporting and Verification; - Emphasis on Forests and other Land Use projects (AFOLU).

''(2023)''

'''''University of British Columbia:''''' Micro-certificate in Forest Carbon Accounting.

''(2014 – 2017)''

'''Durham University, St. Cuthberts College. Chemistry (F100)'''

§ 2:1 BSc Hons. (GPA 3.3)

§ Key Modules: Chemistry in Society. Dissertation - “Cobalt Catalysed Water Splitting”.

'''''Environmental Related Experience'''''

§ (2015 – 2017) Member of ''St. Cuthberts Society environmental committee'': Organised themed weeks and promoted sustainable lifestyles, with the sole intention of raising awareness for environmental issues. I was the only contributor to the bulletin for this society.

§ (2016 – 2017) Member of ''Durham University Conservation Society'': Rewilded, planted trees and restored walkways to improve the local environment.

'''''Extracurricular activities / Positions of responsibility'''''

§ (2014 – 2017) Active member of the college rugby and football teams.

§ (2016 – 2017) College football captain and social secretary.

§ (2016 – 2017) College rugby social secretary.

'''''A level results''''' – A*, A, A in Chemistry, Mathematics and Physics respectively.

== Experience ==

=== Internships: ===
''Association Community Carbon Trees''. Dominical, Costa Rica''. Ecological Restoration intern.''

Dedicated to restoring and rewilding degraded farmland, working with local farmers and fostering biodiverse ecosystems. Emphasising community-based solutions to sequester carbon, amongst the other myriad of co-benefits associated with planting a diverse range of tree species, in collaboration with local stakeholders.

''Osa Conservation''. Osa Peninsula, Costa Rica''. Field Station Operations intern.''

Responsible for ensuring smooth operation at Osa’s research station. My main project focused on landscape design to benefit the myriad of fauna habiting Osa’s spaces. This involved in-depth research and subsequent identification of flora, various methods of germination, mapping and planning areas to be rewilded, all with the intention of utilizing the ecological benefits and aesthetic appeal of each species. My Spanish improved significantly whilst living here.

=== Volunteering: ===
''(06/23) Salmon Coast Research Station''. Echo Bay, BC, Canada.

Conducted ongoing field work studying the effects of open-net salmon farms on migrating juvenile salmon, in addition to studying the spatial arrangement of salmon in bull kelp beds in the Broughton Archipelago. Responsible for subsequent data entry and analysis. Also assisted with station renovations and other trail maintenance.

''(11/21 – 03/22) Neighbours United (formerly West Kootenay Ecosociety).'' Nelson, BC, Canada.

Primarily assisted with donor and community engagement and relations, with elements of fundraising and canvassing. Gained experience in social media design and using CiviCRM.

== Interests ==
I am interested in exploring the Voluntary Carbon Market, and how it can be used as a means to finance legitimate restoration projects. Connecting the dots between farmer and funder is an area of focus of mine; I intend to use this market to promote ecosystem restoration and combat social inequality. Whilst some may see the irony in using this market to combat social inequity in-particluar, I am confident that I personally will utilise this market with genuine and authentic intent.

Documentation:Open Case Studies/FRST522/2024/REDD+ in Indigenous Amazonia: What works and what doesn’t?

2024-12-29T06:33:38Z

ConnorHaynes:

__TOC__

==Positionality==
First and foremost I am not Indigenous, and whilst there are a myriad of cultures, ontologies and epistemologies that are not sufficiently represented by simply stating ‘Indigenous’, it is commonly accepted that these worldviews are vastly different to those of the ‘Western’ world, which is the world in which I grew up and matured. I am therefore only understanding of Indigenous cultures, beliefs and customary laws based upon available online literature and those which I have learnt through life, in addition to those introduced to me in my Master’s degree. As such, I will never be able to fully relate to an Indigenous person; the best I can do is try to understand and learn. Only throughout this process am I able to work towards reconciliation and attempt to address the inequities experienced by Indigenous folk globally.

Additionally, I am yet to act as a carbon project proponent and so do not understand the nuances or stresses of undertaking such a task. Whilst an individual proponent may have the best intention of procuring a carbon project for its social and environmental benefits, there are a number of stakeholders involved throughout the entire process which influence its eventual outcome. Without experience acting as a project proponent I am naïve in understanding the process and its difficulties.

==Acronyms / Terminology==
'''Acronyms:'''

AFOLU: Agriculture, Forestry and Other Land-Use

CCBS: Climate, Community and Biodiversity Standard

ICVCM: Integrity Council for the Voluntary Carbon Market

IPLC: Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities

KMGBF: Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework

LAC: Latin American Countries

MRV: Monitoring, Reporting and Verification

PD: Project Description

REDD+: Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation

UNCBD: United Nations Convention on Biological Biodiversity

UNFCCC: United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

VCM: Voluntary Carbon Market

VCMI: Voluntary Carbon Markets Integrity Initiative

VCS: Verified Carbon Standard

'''Terminology:'''

''Additionality:'' Additionality is the determination of whether the project will lead to the expected outcomes when compared to the baseline or ‘business as usual’ emissions.

''Leakage'': Refers to the shifting of emissions to outside the project boundary as a result of the project’s activities.

''Permanence:'' Permanence refers to the degree to which a carbon credit is equivalent to a permanent removal or reduction in emissions.
==Abstract==
This case study illustrates two examples of Indigenous-led REDD+ projects on Indigenous territory in Colombia and Brazil. Both countries have a relatively long history of engaging with REDD+ but have slightly different legal structures pertaining to the rights of Indigenous peoples on their traditional territories, and specifically their ‘carbon’ rights. As such, the intention is to evaluate how these differing ''de jure'' rights translate on the ground. With respect to REDD+, do certain rights result in legitimately positive benefits to IPLCs, as well as the environment that these projects were originally intended to protect? The intention is such that the reader can evaluate the effectiveness and true benefit of REDD+ projects to IPLC’s, based upon the legal frameworks of the host country. A secondary intention is such that the reader is better equipped to conduct a prefeasibility assessment based upon available online literature, to evaluate the likelihood that REDD+ can be implemented in any chosen country, with the genuine intent of benefiting IPLC’s that are directly affected as a result of REDD+ project implementation.

==REDD+ and the VCM in Brazil and Colombia==
REDD+, originally introduced by the UNFCCC, is a market-based mechanism sitting within the VCM that aims to reverse the loss of forests and carbon stocks, specifically in developing countries. Simply put, an entity or an individual can voluntarily pay another that has engaged with REDD+ and subsequently sequestered carbon, to offset their own emissions using ‘credits’, sold as units of greenhouse gas equivalent to one ton of carbon dioxide (CO2e). Forestry and Land-Use remains the largest category of carbon credits traded by transaction volume on the VCM, with REDD+ being the most popular project type in this category, accounting for 78% of credits traded.<ref name=":0">Procton, A., (2024). ''State of the voluntary carbon market 2024: On the path to maturity.'' Forest Trends Ecosystem Marketplace.</ref> Furthermore, over one-third of the credits sold within this category were sourced from projects that had been implemented in LAC and the Caribbean in 2024.<ref name=":0" /> Of the four largest standards issuing carbon credits, Verra accounts for roughly 80% of issuances in Latin America,<ref>Pullins, T. (2022). Growth of carbon markets in Latin America. White & Case. https://www.whitecase.com/publications/insight/latin-america-focus-fall-2022-growth-carbon-markets </ref> and even in the face of recent scrutiny,<ref>West, T. A. P., Bofim, B., Haya, B. K. (2024). Methodological issues with deforestation baselines compromise the integrity of carbon offsets from REDD+. ''Global Environmental Change, 87'' https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2024.102863</ref><ref>Wyburd I., & Dufrasne, G. (2023). Error Log: Exposing the methodological failures of REDD+ forestry projects. Carbon Market Watch. https://carbonmarketwatch.org/publications/error-log-exposing-the-methodological-failures-of-redd-forestry-projects/</ref><ref name=":15">Haya, B. K., Alford-Jones, K., Anderegg, W. R. L., Beymer-Farris, B., Blanchard, L., Bomfim, B., Chin, D., Evans, S., Hogan, M., Holm, J. A., McAfee, K., So, I. S., West, T. A. P., & Withey, L. (2023). ''Quality assessment of REDD+ carbon credit projects''. Berkeley Carbon Trading Project. https://gspp.berkeley.edu/research-and-impact/centers/cepp/projects/berkeley-carbontrading-project/REDD+</ref> REDD+ projects account for a significant proportion of the VCM with their continued application likely to persist.<ref>Gordon, O. (2022). ''The interwoven fortunes of carbon markets and indigenous communities.'' Energy Monitor. https://www.energymonitor.ai/tech/carbon-removal/the-interwoven-fortunes-of-carbon-markets-and-indigenous-communities/</ref><ref>Müller, M., Coustar, C., Bietta, F., Mathres, M. (2022). ''UNFCCC REDD+ and the power of sovereign carbon.'' Deutsche Banke Chief Investment Office. https://www.rainforestcoalition.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/CIO-Special-UNFCCC-REDD-power-of-sovereign-carbon.pdf</ref><ref>Pullins, T. (2022). ''Growth of carbon markets in Latin America.'' White & Case. https://www.whitecase.com/publications/insight/latin-america-focus-fall-2022-growth-carbon-markets </ref> With the introduction of updated methodologies aimed at addressing these concerns,<ref>Verra (2023a). ''Setting the Standard: Verra’s Revolutionary New REDD Methodology.'' https://verra.org/program-notice/setting-the-standard-verras-revolutionary-new-redd-methodology/</ref><ref>Verra (2023b). ''VM0048 Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation, v1.0.'' https://verra.org/methodologies/vm0048-reducing-emissions-from-deforestation-and-forest-degradation-v1-0/</ref> there is hope for renewed buyer confidence in the integrity of this market,<ref>MSCI (2023). ''Verra’s New Methodology for Unplanned Deforestation Aims to Silence the Critics''. https://www.msci.com/www/blog-posts/verra-s-new-methodology-for/04577808942</ref> though more work still needs to be done.

Both Colombia and Brazil have a relatively long history of implementing REDD+ projects, using both fund-based and market-based mechanisms. For example, both countries were participants in the ‘Amazon Indigenous REDD+ (RIA in Spanish) initiative, with the first pilot implementation project being initiated in Colombia’s Puiawai Natural Reserve.<ref>Garzón, E., (2017). ''Amazon Indigenous REDD+: An innovative approach to conserve Colombian forests?'' Mongabay. https://news.mongabay.com/2017/01/amazon-indigenous-redd-an-innovative-approach-to-conserve-colombian-forests/</ref> The relevance of these two countries with respect to REDD+ is simple. Much of the Amazon’s primary tropical rainforest falls within these countries' jurisdiction and this rainforest has been consistently under threat from external pressures and encroachment, whether that be in the form of land-clearing for commercial ranching, subsistence purposes, illicit drug production or illegal mining practices,<ref name=":8">Sánchez García, P. A. & Wong, G. Y., (2024) “The political economy of deforestation in the Colombian Amazon”, ''Journal of Political Ecology'' ''31''(1), 178–199. https://doi.org/10.2458/jpe.5230</ref><ref>Radwin, M. (2023). ''Drug trafficking fuels other deforestation drivers in the Amazon: report.'' Mongabay. https://news.mongabay.com/2023/07/drug-trafficking-fuels-other-deforestation-drivers-in-the-amazon-report/</ref><ref>Haddad, E.A., Araújo, I.F., Feltran-Barbieri, R., Perobelli, F. S., Rocha, A., Sass, K. S., Nobre, C. A. (2024). Economic drivers of deforestation in the Brazilian Legal Amazon. ''Nat Sustain'' ''7'', 1141–1148. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41893-024-01387-7 </ref><ref>Hänggli, A., Levy, S. A., Armenteras, D., Bovolo, C. I., Brandão, J., Rueda, X., & Garrett, R. D. (2023). A systematic comparison of deforestation drivers and policy effectiveness across the amazon biome. ''Environmental Research Letters, 18''(7), 073001. https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/acd408</ref> to name a few.

In theory, REDD+ can be used to provide the economic incentive to promote sustained environmental protection of Indigenous lands, with a focus on the rights and livelihoods of IPLCs. Currently the overall funding to IPLCs tenure rights and forest management in tropical countries is low, receiving just $270 million per year between 2011-2020 from bilateral and multilateral donors and private philanthropies.<ref>Hatcher, J., Owen, M., Yin, D., (2021). ''Falling short: Donor funding for Indigenous peoples and local communities to secure tenure rights and manage forests in tropical countries (2011 -2020).'' Rainforest Foundation Norway. https://dv719tqmsuwvb.cloudfront.net/documents/Publikasjoner/Andre-rapporter/RFN_Falling_short_2021.pdf</ref> REDD+ has the potential to channel funding so as to promote Indigenous rights and autonomy, provided there is transparent and equitable benefit-sharing for those involved. Fundamentally, only with the inclusion of IPLC’s, or preferably with IPLC’s acting as project proponents, is REDD+ able to promote Indigenous agency and improve IPLC rights and governance. And only when the rights of those inhabiting the land are formally recognized can the land be effectively conserved.<ref name=":16">Reytar, K., Veit, P., von Braun, J. (2024). ''Protecting Biodiversity Hinges on Securing Indigenous and Community Land Rights.'' WRI. https://www.wri.org/insights/indigenous-and-local-community-land-rights-protect-biodiversity</ref> The inclusion of IPLCs in REDD+ project development is therefore considered to be essential for project success, and this is in theory embodied in the very nature of REDD+.<ref name=":1">Alvarez, G., Elfving, M. and Andrade, C. (2016) ‘REDD+ governance and indigenous peoples in Latin America: the case of Suruí Carbon Project in the Brazilian Amazon Forest’, ''Latin American J. Management for Sustainable Development 3''(2) pp.133–146. https://doi.org/10.1504/LAJMSD.2016.083705</ref> Partially owing to a long history of dealing with REDD+, Colombia and Brazil are amongst just a few of the countries hosting tropical rainforests that explicitly recognise community rights to carbon and tie these rights to the legal ownership of lands and forests. In Colombia, carbon rights are tied to land rights, whereas in Brazil carbon rights are tied to forest rights.<ref name=":2">RRI and McGill University (2021). Technical report: ''Status of legal recognition of Indigenous Peoples’, Local Communities’ and Afro-descendant Peoples’ rights to carbon stored in tropical lands and forests''. Rights and Resources Initiative. https://doi.org/10.53892/MLQQ5744</ref>

==Brazil: The Suruí Forest Carbon Project==
[[File:The Amazon Basin, Brazil.jpg|thumb|376x376px|Brazil's Amazon rainforest]]

=== Project description and location ===
The Surui Forest Carbon project (SFCP) was implemented in 2009 on the territory of the Surui people, which is situated in the southern part of Brazil’s Amazon between the states of Rondônia and Mato Grosso. Surui Indigenous territory covers an area of 2,481 km2, though the intention of the SFCP was to protect a portion of this total area. According to the PD, the stated objective was to “prevent 13,575.3 hectares of tropical forest from being cleared by 2038, to avoid the emission of 7,258,352.3 tCO2e to the atmosphere, and to contribute to the preservation of the Paiter Surui lifestyle and traditions.”<ref>IDESAM (2011). ''Project description: Surui forest carbon project''. Institute for Conservation and Sustainable Development of Amazonas. Link: "PROJ_DESC_1118_02FEB2012.PDF" found at https://registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/1118 </ref> This region sits within one of the Brazilian Amazon’s main ‘arcs of deforestation’ and pressure from loggers and ranchers is a matter of concern.

Notably, the SFCP was the first REDD+ project to be proposed by Indigenous peoples in the Brazilian Amazon on their own territory and was the first to receive certification by both the VCS and CCBS.<ref name=":1" />. Metareilá, the Surui’s own Indigenous association, acted as project proponent and the Institute for Conservation and Sustainable Development of Amazonas (IDESAM) assisted with project development, alongside multiple other stakeholder groups. As an endogenous initiative procured and conducted by the Surui community, the SFCP had a ‘non-centralized model of governance’, which reflected the characteristics and traditions of the Surui people. <ref name=":1" />

Only after two years of consultations between the 24 communities involved and the relevant governmental agencies (primarily FUNAI and the Ministry of Environment) was a Memorandum of Understanding signed, showing community consent to develop the project.<ref name=":3">Garcia, B., Rimmer, L., Canal Vieira, L., Mackey, B., (2021). REDD+ and forest protection on indigenous lands in the Amazon. ''RECIEL 30'', 207–219. https://doi.org/10.1111/reel.12389</ref> In 2012 after verification from an independent third-party body, the Surui were able to sell carbon credits on the international market. Between 2009 and 2014 the project drastically helped limit the deforestation occurring within the project’s site, causing many to deem it a success.<ref name=":4">Howard, F. E., (2023). ''An Analysis of the Suruí Forest Carbon Project in Context of Settler Colonialism''. Masters thesis. Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University. https://vtechworks.lib.vt.edu/server/api/core/bitstreams/b0cde6de-794c-453f-856b-ee72bde3db06/content</ref>

=== National climate targets, policies and legislation ===
Rates of deforestation in Brazil’s legal Amazon are significantly impacted by the government in charge. This is evidenced in the decade between 2012 and 2021 whilst under the conservative Bolsonaro administration, deforestation in the Amazon increased 185% — from a loss of 4,571 km2 in 2012 to 13,038 km2 in 2021.<ref>INPE (2022). ''Observação da Terra. http://www.obt.inpe.br/OBT/assuntos/programas/amazonia/prodes''</ref> However, since Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s appointment in 2022 there has been a steady decline in the rate of deforestation, which is now roughly half what it was in 2021.<ref>Terra Brasilis (2024). ''PRODES (deforestation): Deforestation rates – Legal Amazon – States''. https://terrabrasilis.dpi.inpe.br/app/dashboard/deforestation/biomes/legal_amazon/rates</ref> A significant proportion of emissions result from the clearing of rainforest and its subsequent conversion to ranching.<ref>MCTI (2022). ''Estimativas Anuais De Emissões De Gases De Efeito Estufa No Brasil.'' 6ª Edição. Ministério da Estado da Ciência, Tecnologia e Inovações. https://www.gov.br/mcti/pt-br/acompanhe-o-mcti/sirene/publicacoes/estimativas-anuais-de-emissoes-gee/arquivos/6a-ed-estimativas-anuais.pdf</ref> To address these emissions Brazil has implemented various adaptation policies, legislation and targets which are summarized below:
{| class="wikitable"
|'''Document name'''
|'''Type'''
|'''Publication year'''
|'''Key takeaways'''
|-
|National Policy on Climate Change (NPCC)
|Legislation
|2009
|Framework for addressing climate change
|-
|National Plan on Climate Change Adaptation
|Policy
|2016
|Framework for addressing impacts of climate change
|-
|Nationally Determined Contribution
|Target
|2024
|Reduce net greenhouse gas emissions by 59 to 67 percent below 2005 levels by 2035
|-
|Federal Constitution, Article 225
|Legislation
|2006
|The Amazon rainforest is considered as a ‘national heritage’.All levels of government have a shared responsibility to protect it and the environment
|-
| colspan="4" |'''Relating to REDD+'''
|-
|Plan of Action for the Prevention and Control of Deforestation in the Legal Amazon (PPCDAM)
|Policy
|2004
|Aims to reduce deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon
|-
|Forest code
|Legislation
|2012
|Aimed at reducing deforestation, but no specific mention of REDD+
|-
|Amazon Indigenous REDD+ Initiative
|Policy
|2012
|Incorporate Indigenous with REDD+ initiatives
|-
|National REDD+ Strategy (ENREDD+)
|Policy
|2016
|REDD+ as a fund-based mechanism
|}

=== Indigenous rights - Constitutional, tenure and bundle rights ===
In Brazil, Indigenous rights are robust and clearly defined according to the Brazilian Constitution. As a result, the Indigenous communities of the Brazilian Amazon have legal title to 13.8% of the national territory totalling 1.175 million km2, with a total of 631 territories.<ref>Federal government of Brazil (2024). ''Brazil’s NDC: National determination to contribute and transform''. https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/2024-11/Brazil_Second%20Nationally%20Determined%20Contribution%20%28NDC%29_November2024.pdf</ref>
{| class="wikitable"
| colspan="2" |'''Laws'''
|-
|Article 231 of the 1988 Constitution
|Indigenous peoples to have their exclusive right to use their territories to derive economic benefits. Grants indigenous peoples the right to land, prohibits eviction, and restricts mining without authorization from the federal government.
|-
|Indigenous Peoples statute (1973).

|No acts restricting the full exercise of indigenous peoples’ permanent tenure over the land should be permitted.
|-
| colspan="2" | '''Treaties'''
|-
|United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2007)
|Requires States to obtain free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) for the approval of any projects affecting indigenous territories.
|-
|International Labour Organization Convention 169 (2019)
|Ratified and incorporated under domestic law in 2002 through Decree 10.088/2019, endorsing UNDRIP
|-
|American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2016)
|Supports and builds upon UNDRIP
|}
Whilst Indigenous communities in Brazil have legal title to land, it is the State that owns it. Indigenous people simply exercise permanent tenure over lands that they traditionally occupy and have ‘original rights’ to these traditional lands, which no other rights can prevail over.<ref name=":3" /> Indigenous lands, though not classified as protected areas, “have the highest level of protection by law because they are regulated by the Constitution” and cannot be leased or restricted without violating their original rights. The Suruí's right to develop the SFCP is grounded in the Brazilian Constitution, which grants Indigenous peoples exclusive rights to use the ‘riches of the soil, rivers and lakes’ of their land, and these rights cannot be overridden. Thus, Indigenous people and only Indigenous people are legally allowed to engage in productive activities on their land, provided these activities are conducted according to their own customs and traditions and are necessary for the wellbeing and cultural expression of their own people. In Brazil, it is the armed forces and federal police that are responsible for enforcing these laws, and FUNAI is responsible for representing Indigenous communities in judicial disputes.<ref name=":3" /> As such, provided a REDD+ project does not violate the rights to territorial integrity, permanent land tenure and original rights, it is legally allowed.
[[File:Two Pataxo indians (Brasília, 04 April 2006).jpeg|thumb|414x414px|Two Indigenous in Brazil]]
'''CARBON RIGHTS:''' In Brazil, carbon rights are tied to forest rights.<ref name=":2" /> Carbon credits from REDD+ projects are seen as part of the economic benefits derived from indigenous lands, and as such, Indigenous communities are entitled to own, control and distribute these revenues themselves. The carbon credits generated from the SFCP were wholly owned by the Suruí people through Metareilá, with the Suruí Fund (managed by the Brazilian Biodiversity Fund - FUNBIO) acting as recipient. This legality reinforces Indigenous control over both land and carbon rights, as whoever has rights to the forest land is usually recognized as the owner of carbon rights.<ref name=":3" /> Collectively these national and international laws provide an important safeguard to Indigenous peoples, making their consent a prerequisite for the establishment of REDD+ projects and recognizing their rights as the main beneficiaries of REDD+ revenues.<ref name=":3" /> However, as carbon rights are tied to forest rights in Brazil and not land rights, and carbon is considered to be an ‘environmental service’ (Article 41(I)(A) Brazilian Forestry Code), states as well as the federal government have the jurisdiction to exercise full legislative authority over carbon. <ref name=":2" /> As such, certain states have interpreted the law to imply that the title to carbon credits is attributable to the state.<ref>Loft, L., Ravikumar, A., Gebara, M. F., Pham, T. T., Resosudarmo, I. A. P., Assembe, S., Tovar, J. G., Mwangi, E., & Andersson, K. (2015). Taking Stock of Carbon Rights in REDD+ Candidate Countries: Concept Meets Reality. ''Forests'', ''6''(4), 1031-1060. https://doi.org/10.3390/f6041031</ref> Hence, even when carbon rights are clearly defined and tied to forest title it is insufficient in itself, and only by legally recognizing the customary rights of IPLCs can a fair and equitable outcome be realised.

'''FPIC OBLIGATION:''' Brazilian law requires Free, Prior, and Informed Consent (FPIC) for REDD+ projects affecting indigenous lands, ensuring that international standards such as the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) and ILO Convention No. 169 are adhered to; Indigenous consent is, ''de jure,'' a necessity. Projects that violate these rights and fail to consult communities are therefore considered illegal. Notably there are no specific rules or procedures that have been written into the Brazilian constitution that provide guidance on how to achieve FPIC. However, this freedom reinforces Indigenous autonomy as it allows an Indigenous community to define the rules of consultation according to their customs and traditions.

=== Affected and interested stakeholders ===
{| class="wikitable"
| colspan="5" |'''Affected stakeholders'''
|-
|Stakeholders
|Primary objective(s)
|Secondary objective(s)
|Relative power
|Scope of influence
|-
|Metareilá Association of the Suruí Indigenous People
|Project proponent

Works to defend and preserve the cultural and territorial heritage of the Suruí people.

Responsible for the Suruí Fund (FUNBIO). Ensure equitable distribution of funds
|Ensure project longevity.
Stick to the mandate; attempt not to be influenced by external actors
|Powerful, though lacking technical knowhow. Have carbon rights and thus have ultimate control of project revenue; can decide how this revenue is distributed.
|Local
|-
|Other Indigenous groups and associations
|Support various aspects of proejct development
|Aim to benefit from the project
|Have the same rights as the Metareila with respect to land though are less involved with project development and have less say, nor derive economic benefits like the Metareila
|Local
|-
|''Campesinos'' (peasants)
|Survive via subsistence.
|Procure more land.
|Have far fewer rights than Indigenous groups and no involvement with the project
|Local
|-
| colspan="5" |'''Interested stakeholders'''
|-
|IDESAM - Institute for Conservation and Sustainable Development of Amazonas
|Maximise revenue from project.
Ensure project longevity
|Achieve completion of various technical aspects of project
|Powerful: Required to complete various technical aspects of development.
|National
|-
|Forest Trends
|Supported formulation and implementation of the project.
Uphold image of organization
|Maximise environmental benefits of project
|Powerful: Tasked with raising funds and fostering an international network; an integral part of project development
|International
|-
|Amazon Conservation Team - ACT Brazil
|Supports various aspect of project development as well as offering legal advice.
Other technical assistance
|Maximise environmental benefits of project
|Powerful: An integral part of project development
|International
|-
|Kanindé Association for Ethno-Environmental Defense – non-profit
|Promote Metareilá views and beliefs
|Involved with various aspects of project development
|Mid-power. Has a say in project direction, though less weight than the Metareila.
|National - International
|-
|Ministry of Environment (MMA)
|Responsible for protection and conservation of natural environment
|Ensure project adheres to national law
|Powerful. Must be notified about project activities although cannot strictly alter decisions made by the Surui
|National
|-
|National Indian Foundation (FUNAI)
|Promote Indigenous rights

|Represents Indignous organizations with judicial matters.
|Powerful. Knowleadgeable of judicial system. Must be notified about project activities though is not involved with project governance.
|National
|-
|Government of the State of Mato Grosso
|Encourage development, and reduce poverty and crime in Mato Grosso
|Ensure project adheres to regional law.
|Powerful. Legilative control over regional police and municipalities
|Regional
|}

=== Discussion ===
Although originally successful in achieving its goal of reducing deforestation and degradation, in 2016 diamonds were discovered in Surui territory, leading to an increase in illegal logging and mining.<ref name=":1" /> By 2018 the project site had been completely overrun by ''garimpeiros'' (small-scale gold miners), ultimately leading to the project's suspension that year. <ref name=":4" />

While the project had initially garnered support, divisions emerged within the community post-project implementation. Disputes arose over the unequal distribution of project revenues, leading to internal conflicts between different Suruí clans. These criticisms escalated in 2014 when the Catholic Indigenous Missionary Council supported calls for an end to the project due to mismanagement of revenues from carbon credit sales. <ref name=":3" /> Some Suruí members also argued that the REDD+ initiative harmed their way of life.<ref>Lang, C. (2014). ''“What are projects for that destroy life?” Interview with Henrique Suruí about the Paiter-Suruí REDD project, Brazil.'' REDD-Monitor. https://redd-monitor.org/2014/12/17/what-are-projects-for-that-destroy-life-interview-with-henrique-surui-about-the-paiter-surui-redd-project-brazil/</ref>

Further complicating the situation was the controversial role of Henrique Suruí, one of the Suruí tribal leaders. In 2011, it was revealed that Henrique had violated the tribe's logging moratorium, collaborating with loggers in illegal activities. While Henrique later denied responsibility for the project’s failure, his actions, combined with internal disagreements, illustrated the lack of consensus within the Suruí leadership on the project’s goals and outcomes. Both of the tribe’s leaders possessed dramatically different perspectives on how they believed they could ensure agency, autonomy, and economic benefits for the Suruí people.<ref name=":4" /> This fragmentation within the community, in combination with the discovery of diamonds and the state's failure to protect indigenous land rights led to the indefinite suspension of the REDD+ project.

The project's collapse highlights broader structural issues, particularly the state's inconsistent support for indigenous land rights, influenced by settler colonialism, which undermined the project’s long-term viability.<ref name=":4" /> Additionally, the project’s creation was shaped by external actors, including the collaboration between Almir Suruí and Borges from Forest Trends, a Washington-based NGO. This partnership introduced a Western perspective on viewing the Suruí peoples forest, in contrast with their own perspectives on land use and governance. Furthermore, despite Borges’ Brazilian background, the power dynamics between a global North organization and a developing, Indigenous community were apparent.

=== Summary ===
The Suruí Forest Carbon Project provides an interesting example of how, even when the rights of IPLC’s are relatively robust, challenges persist in ensuring REDD+ project longevity. As such, in its current state, REDD+ in the Brazilian Amazon may not be a suitable market-based option for Indigenous communities in the Amazon.<ref name=":3" /> Although initially successful in promoting Indigenous autonomy and reducing deforestation, the project resulted in failure due to of a myriad of factors. Divisions among Surui communities were exacerbated by a perceived unequal benefit-sharing, and the impact of imposing REDD+ seems to have complicated the traditional social structure that the Surui were dependent on. These issues were influenced by Brazil's settler state dynamics, where Indigenous land rights, although legally recognized, are often not upheld in practice due to insufficient enforcement.<ref name=":4" /> Ultimately, the Surui project reveals how settler colonialism's structural flaws make long-term project success difficult, despite initial progress in promoting Indigenous autonomy.

At the national and state level, complex institutional and legal land governance structures convolute and impede REDD+ in Brazil. Multiple institutions share responsibilities and there is no comprehensive, authoritative database of land ownership, which hampers efforts to protect Indigenous territories.<ref name=":5">Costa, R. (2016)''. Insecure land rights in Brazil: Consequences for rural areas and challenges for improvement.'' Climate Policy Initiative. https://www.climatepolicyinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/Insecure_Land_Rights_in_Brazil_CPI.pdf</ref> As a result, land tenure disputes remain common and can be witnessed occurring between the public as well between public and state actors. For example, Brazil’s 1964 Land Statute (Law No. 4504) allows the government to take over unproductive farms and transfer those lands to landless peasants. This often results in the clearing of forest, as only when the land is cleared is it evidenced to be ‘productive’.<ref name=":5" /> Hence, not only does this law cause insecurity for Indigenous populations in Brazil, it also forces them to go against customary traditions of stewarding the land in an effort to maintain its control.

Whilst the aforementioned points to the futility of REDD+ in Brazil, there is reason to maintain optimism. In a recent landmark ruling Brazil’s supreme court voted in favour of the Xoleng peoples, and the decision will serve as a precedent for all cases involving Indigenous peoples.<ref name=":6">Amos-Flom, K., (2023). ''Triumph and Turmoil: The Xokleng Case and the Future of Indigenous Land Rights in Brazil.'' Columbia Journal of Transnational Law. https://www.jtl.columbia.edu/bulletin-blog/triumph-and-turmoil-the-xokleng-case-and-the-future-of-indigenous-land-rights-in-brazil</ref> The Xokleng’s land dispute, settled in 2023, “rejected Santa Catarina state’s marco temporal (“time limit”) argument, which would have required Indigenous people to prove they occupied or legally contested the territory they claimed before the Brazilian Constitution came into force in 1988. If successful, this argument would have led to disastrous repercussions, as many Indigenous peoples had been forcibly removed or are traditionally nomadic.”<ref name=":6" /> Evidently, whilst slow, progress has been made in Brazil in recent years with respect to Indigenous rights as well as the voluntary carbon market itself.

There are currently 159 AFOLU projects listed on the Verra database in Brazil, with only two specifically focused on REDD+ initiatives in collaboration with Indigenous groups. These are the Ka’a Pyahu project, <ref>Verra (n.d.) ''Project 5087: KA'A PYAHU.'' https://registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/5087</ref> initiated by the Guajajara Indigenous people in collaboration with external organizations and validated in 2021, and the ‘Together for the forest Awaete REDD+ project’<ref>Verra (n.d.) ''Project 5200: TOGETHER FOR THE FOREST AWAETÉ REDD+ PROJECT.'' https://registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/5200</ref> which is still under development. Both projects involve Indigenous groups working with Brazilian organizations to build technical capacity and expertise. This could signal a growing trend of Indigenous-led REDD+ projects in the future. To ensure a positive future for REDD+ in Brazil, the customary rights of IPLC’s must be formally recognized. IPLC should have legal ownership of their traditional lands, and in doing so the carbon rights of these communities would be less convoluted, leading to more equitable benefit-sharing and increased cohesion amongst these groups post-project implementation.

==Colombia: ''REDD+ project Resguardo Indigena Unificado - Selva de Mataven (RUI-SM)''==

=== '''Project description and location''' ===
[[File:RS6524 MG 3944.jpg|thumb|407x407px|A view of the Mataven]]
According to the PD,<ref name=":7">ACATISEMA & Mediamos (2017). ''Joint project description and monitoring report: REDD+ project: Resguardo Indigena Unificado – Selva de Mataven (RIU – SM).'' Link: “10 06 2017_VCS Final Report_ Matavin Project.pdf” found at https://registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/1566</ref> the Resguardo Indígena Unificado – Selva de Matavén (RIU-SM) project is located east of the Colombian Orinoco high plain, in the eastern part of the Department of Vichada, municipality of Cumaribo. It resides on the formalized resguardo of the Sikuani, Piaroa, Puinave, Curripaco, Cubeo and Piapoco ethnic groups, spanning 1,856,836 hectares, with 1,477,115 hectares (79.6%) being forested. The PD states that it will reduce greenhouse gas emissions, with a total estimated net reduction of 108,670,562 tons of CO2 equivalent over thirty years, from years 2013 – 2042. By this metric, it is the 14th largest project on the Verra registry, out of over 1700 projects.<ref name=":9">Dufrasne, D., (2021). ''Two Shades of Green: How hot air forest credits are being used to avoid carbon taxes in Colombia''. Carbon Market Watch. https://carbonmarketwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Two-shades-of-green_EN_WEB.pdf</ref> There are 12,312 Indigenous people living in the RIU-SM, belonging to 2,517 families and 250 communities as of 2017.

The project was initiated by the Asociación de Cabildos y Autoridades Indígenas de la Selva de Matavén (ACETISMA), an Indigenous association, and developed by MEDIAMOS F&M, a Colombian consultancy firm. ACETISMA is comprised of Indigenous leaders that represent the 17 communities of the reservation in charge of governing the territory, and it has administrative autonomy, as well as “the capacity to acquire, to own and to dispose of property, to accept donations, to hold national and international conventions, scientific and cultural exchanges and generally, to celebrate all kinds of negotiations and agreements with which the Association can achieve its objectives.”<ref name=":7" />

There is a stated focus on various means of improving the living conditions of the Indigenous peoples living within the project area. To summarise, the main objectives of the REDD+ project RIU-SM include:

· Community development, in the form of improved education.

· Community engagement with respect to the project; developing information channels to reveal project progress.

· Support local initiatives for environmental education and waste management.

· Developing an effective response system that addresses community proposals and concerns relating to the project.

· Strengthening the governance of ACATISEMA.
=== National climate targets, policies and legislation ===
The Colombian Amazon makes up over one-third of Colombia’s national territory, and up until 2005 only 7.3% of the Colombian Amazon had been deforested, largely due to the country's 60-year armed conflict between the government, multiple left-wing guerillas such as FARC, and several far-right paramilitary groups.<ref name=":8" /> However, following the signing of the Peace Treaty in 2016 and demobilization of the FARC, limits to deforestation were weakened in the Colombian Amazon. Poor but opportunistic peasants began to encroach into previously unchartered territory and capitalize from the rainforest. Due to the poor economic integration of the Amazon, many were forced to engage with the traditional economies of cocoa and cattle ranching, as these markets were already well connected to regional and global markets.<ref name=":8" /> To address the drivers of deforestation and its associated emissions, the federal government has implemented various initiatives, which are summarized below:

{| class="wikitable"
|'''Document name'''
|'''Type'''
|'''Publication year'''
|'''Key takeaways'''
|-
|Nationally Determined Contribution(s)
|Target
|2020
|Reduce GHG emissions by 51% by 2030 and net-zero by 2050
|-
|National Climate Change Policy (PNCC)
|Policy
|2018
|Address climate change and foster sustainable development
|-
|National Forest Conservation Program
|Policy
|2011
|Address deforestation
|-
|Law 1931 of 2018 – Climate Change Law

|Legislation
|2018
|Establishes the framework for addressing climate change
|-
| colspan="4" |'''Relating to REDD+:'''
|-
|National Strategy for Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (ENREDD+)
|Initiative
|2009
|Particular focus on the Amazon and Choco rainforests
|-
|Amazon Indigenous REDD+ Initiative
|Initiative
|2016
|Respect Indigenous rights. FPIC focus.
|-
|BIOREDD+ program
|Initiative
|2012
|Portfolio of 8 REDD+ projects in four geographic nodes covering over 700,000 hectares in the Colombian Pacific.

|-
|Vision Amazonia
|Initiative
|2015
|Part of the REDD+ strategy, financed by three foreign countries: Germany, Norway and United Kingdom
|}
As a result of the many fund and market-based initiatives that Colombia has engaged with, it hosts the second most REDD+ projects in the world. REDD+ projects now cover at least 56% of the area of legally recognized Indigenous territories in the Colombian Amazon, with an overwhelming majority of carbon projects located on Indigenous territories.<ref name=":10">Schmid, D., & Castro. C., (2023). ''REDD+ projects in the Colombian Amazon: Social challenges and lack of transparency''. Rainforest Foundation Norway. https://dv719tqmsuwvb.cloudfront.net/documents/REDD_rapport_2024_ENG.pdf</ref> Evidently REDD+ plays an integral part in the country’s efforts of environmental conservation, and incentives have been introduced to promote the development of such projects. For example, in 2016 the government adopted a higher tax that covered fossil fuels, but companies are able to avoid paying the tax by investing in carbon offsets that have been generated domestically.<ref name=":9" /> This led to a boost in the domestic REDD+ market in 2017, as Colombian companies invested so as to escape higher taxes. Notably, 23 of the 36 REDD+ projects currently under development in the Amazon region were initiated in or after 2018.<ref name=":10" /> Currently Colombia’s REDD+ program sits at over 45 pilot and voluntary carbon projects, as well as one large-scale jurisdictional approach in the Amazon.<ref name=":11">Zambrano-Cortés, D. G. (2024). ''The politics, spaces and subjects of forest conservation in Colombia''. [internal PhD, WU, Wageningen University]. Wageningen University. https://doi.org/10.18174/675328</ref>

=== Indigenous rights - Constitutional, tenure and bundle rights ===
''De jure'', the Indigenous peoples of Colombia have comprehensive tenure and bundle of rights that have been articulated in the national constitution. Collective land titles are granted to Indigenous communities by the Colombian government and as a result about 34 percent of Colombian land (almost 38 million hectares) is legally recognized as Indigenous territory or collective lands of Afro-descendent communities.<ref name=":10" /> These collective land tenure rights have been in effect since the implementation of the 1991 constitution, granting them the authority to exercise legal control over their territories in accordance with their own customs and procedures.<ref>Max Planck Institute (n.d.) ''Colombia 1991 (rev. 2015).'' Institute. https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Colombia_2015</ref> Furthermore, the carbon rights of Indigenous peoples are explicitly defined in the constitution and tied specifically to the ownership of land of the communities.<ref name=":2" /> This in theory provides a solid legal basis for upholding the rights of Indigenous communities in Colombia, specifically relating to REDD+ activities, as it allows communities to define and negotiate the terms of said projects. A summary of the various laws relating to Indigenous rights have been summarized below:
{| class="wikitable"
| colspan="2" |'''Law (1991 constitution)'''
|-
|Article 63

|Indigenous territories are considered collective property. Land is not owned by individuals but is shared by the community. The state must respect these collective rights and cannot alter land ownership without the consent of the Indigenous peoples.
|-
|Article 76 - ''Consulta previa''.
|Pertains to the right of Indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities; prior consultation must be undertaken before any entity undertakes activities that may affect their territories, culture, or way of life.
|-
|Article 330
|Indigenous communities have the right to govern their territories.
|-
|Article 329
|The Reservation is a collective, inalienable, and indefeasible property.
|-
|Decree 1386 of 1994, Article 10; Decree 2164 of 1995, Article 22) 39.
|"The administration and management of these lands are subjected to uses and customs of the beneficiaries."
|}
Whilst land and tenure rights are enshrined into the constitution, the precariousness of these rights persists due to a lack of resources to ensure enforcement, as well as the deeper issue of corruption. As previously stated, the rate of deforestation increased significantly in Colombia’s post-conflict era, evidencing the nation's inability to maintain control over unlawful acts of land-grabbing and disposition. Whilst this began with new peasants converting the Amazon for subsistence purposes, it ultimately led to new areas for the growth of cocoa, much to the benefit of narco-traffickers who could monopolize on this illegal surplus in ‘accumulation by dispossession’.<ref name=":8" />

With respect to the legalities of consultation, Colombia has enshrined ''consulta previa'' into the constitution. Translating to ‘prior consultation’, this legal text provides the formal grounds for Indigenous engagement when any legislative or administrative measures are implemented on Indigenous territory. Importantly, consultation should be achieved in accordance with the customs of the ethnic group with which the project is being imposed upon. However, there have been recent cases of contestation specifically relating to how ''consulta previa'' applies to REDD+ on Indigenous lands, and the RIU – SM project was one that was involved with such a case.

=== Affected and interested stakeholders ===
{| class="wikitable"
| colspan="5" |'''Affected stakeholders'''
|-
|Stakeholders
|Primary objective(s)
|Secondary objective(s)
|Relative power
|Scope of influence
|-
|ACATISEMA - Asociación de Cabildos y Autoridades Indígenas de la Selva de Matavén
|Primary and direct beneficiaries of project
Foster the integral development, social and cultural preservation of the indigenous communities in the Mataven Jungle

Consolidate the territory, and promote conservation and preservation of the environment and biodiversity of the Mataven Jungle

|Maintain control over ''resguardos''
|Powerful, locally.
Has the highest authority in the ''reguardo''.

Rights to the land and revenue generated from project
|Local
|-
|Indigenous communities of the RIU-SM
|Seek to maintain land rights

Promote traditional and cultural beliefs
|Increase benefits from the project
|Mid-power, though little input into project activities in reality.
|Local
|-
|Landless peasants
|Survive via subsistence
|Gain more access to land. Improve rights.
|Low to none
|Local
|-
| colspan="5" |'''Interested stakeholders'''
|-
|MEDIAMOS F&M
|Project developer
Maximise project revenues
|Develop the project in a way that is supporting of ACETISMA beliefs, for their benefit.
|Powerful: involved with various technical aspects of project development
|National
|-
|Ministerio de Ambiente y Desarrollo Sostenible (Minisitry of Environment and Sustainable Development)
|Environmental planning; sustainable development
Form strategic alliances with social and institutional participants in different sectoral and territorial scenarios.
|Ensure project activities are in agreement with ministry mandate
|Powerful, though supporting of project
|National
|-
|Dirección de Asuntos Indígenas, ROM y Minorías - Ministerio del Interior
|Prepares policy in favour of Indigenous groups
Supports ethnic and cultural rights of Indigenous
|
|Not ''per se'' involved with project, though the policy the organization has introduced affects project outcomes
|National
|-
|Corporinoquía
|Environmental authority to ensure the proper use of natural resources in their area of jurisdiction.
Ensure project abides by relevant regulations
|
|Powerful, though supporting of project
|Regional
|-
|Other government institutions: Governor ofice of Vichada, Mayor ofice Cumaribo
|The Reservation for being part of the Cumaribo, Vichada, has territorial jurisdiction relations with the Governor’s office and the Mayor’s office.
|Benefit from the project, if possible
|Powerful, regionally
|Regional - National
|-
|Fundación NATURA
''Civil organization''
|Conservation, use and management of biodiversity
Maximise social and environmental benefits of project
|Ensure suffienct IPLC inclusion
|Mid-power. Can influence decisions regarding project activities though does not hold absolute power to define terms
|International
|-
|Mining companies
|Mine to generate revenue.
|Compete with the project for the territory's resources.
|Relatively powerful, though legally obstructed to achieve primary objective
|International
|-
|Other indigenous communities neighboring RIU-SM
|Ensure autonomy with respect to their own jurisdiction
|Not involved with the project though potentially affected by it
|Low, with respect to the project
|Local
|-
|FONDO ACCIÓN
|Facilitate private investment into project activities
|Conservation and sustainable development; Protection/development of children.
|Mid-power. Important as they raise funds for the project and benefit from it, though not primary beneficiaries.
|National
|-
|Asocarbono – An industry association, including Verra, ProClima, Biofix, and ACATISEMA.

|Promote the agenda of high-level actors of the VCM
Promote integrity of market
|Hide/argue cases of scandal
|Powerful
|International
|-
|OPIAC: National Oganization of the Indigenous Peoples of the Colombian Amazon

|Promotes Indigenous rights in Colombia
Exercises a political representation of the Indigenous peoples of the Colombian Amazon
|
|Powerful. Legally knowledgeable.
|National
|}

=== Discussion ===
According to the official REDD+ Mataven website<ref>RIU – SM (n.d.). ''REDD+ Mataven''. https://reddmataven.com/</ref> the project has resulted in a myriad of benefits to the Indigenous communities of the region. For example, as a result of the funds generated from the project's activities, there have been improvements in infrastructure, transportation and education, ultimately leading to the empowerment and improved governance of ACETISMA. However, the project has come under fire for multiple reasons.

For one, in 2015 some of the Indigenous communities filed a lawsuit referring to the violation of their right to ''consulta previa''. However, the court ruled that their Indigenous rights had not been violated as it was ACETISMA that initially sought MEDIAMOS to develop the project, and that ACETISMA were the best representatives of those Indigenous communities. Furthermore, the project's main focus was the conservation of the rainforest and therefore did not threaten the cultural integrity of those communities.<ref name=":10" /> However, regardless of the outcome of this case, its occurrence points to internal disagreement amongst Indigenous participants of the RIU-SM project. In a study involving interviews with Indigenous members of the project, there was a significant proportion of interviewees that had little knowledge regarding various aspects of the project, such as responsibilities of participation, or the benefit-sharing mechanism in place.<ref name=":2" /> This further reinforces the point that, in the case of the RIU-SM project it may not be ‘bottom-up’ and points to the power imbalance experienced between MEDIAMOS, the project developer, and Indigenous community members. In the PD there is a breakdown of the distribution of income between ACETISMA and MEDIAMOS, which shows a significant proportion of revenue flowing to the former organisation throughout the project’s operations.<ref name=":7" /> However, there is currently no publicly available documentation supporting this initial claim<ref name=":9" /> as there is no obligation to provide this information, leading to a general lack of transparency in the market and between all of the relevant actors. Subsequent meetings with Indigenous leaders have however shown a marked support of the Mataven project, with one Indigenous leader explicitly stating “...the Redd+ project has brought resources that they never had before, which allowed them to open new school classrooms, 21 rural aqueducts, cocoa crops and even headquarters in Cumaribo and Inírida.”<ref>Lievano, A. B. (2021) Colombia's biggest carbon credit project could be selling hot air. Latin American Center for Investigative Journalism. https://www.elclip.org/el-mayor-proyecto-de-bonos-de-carbono-de-colombia-podria-estar-vendiendo-aire-caliente/ </ref> Clearly there have been benefits for IPLC’s involved with this project, though the details of this benefit-sharing remain a mystery.

Secondly, the Mataven project has caused controversy due to its apparently inflated carbon credit issuance. One report states that this has been achieved by using a reference area that is not representative of the project area, as well as assuming an uncharacteristically high assumed rate of deforestation.<ref name=":12">Global Atlas of Environmental Justice (2023). ''Resguardo Indigena Unificado-Selva de Matavén (RIU SM) REDD+ Project, Colombia.'' https://ejatlas.org/conflict/redd-project-resguardo-indigena-unificado-selva-de-mataven-riu-sm</ref> The project used a baseline deforestation rate of 0.86% per year, which is significantly more than the Colombian government's national rate of 0.18%. Additionally, according to the report the reference area chosen is more easily accessed and therefore more prone to deforestation, making it an inaccurate comparison to the relatively remote project area.<ref name=":2" /> This has led to the creation of excess carbon credits, or “hot air” credits, which have been criticized for not reflecting real environmental benefits.<ref name=":9" /> To add further insult to injury these credits have been used by a Colombian fossil fuel distributor company to avoid paying taxes, as described earlier by Colombia’s change in policy in 2017. In doing so, the company avoided paying approximately $18.9 million in taxes.<ref name=":2" /> There has been subsequent back and forth between Verra and Carbon Market Watch, with Verra refuting the claims<ref>Verra (2021). ''Carbon Market Watch Report on Colombian REDD+ Projects Contains Flawed Allegations.'' https://verra.org/carbon-market-watch-report-on-colombian-redd-projects-contains-flawed-allegations/ </ref> Regardless of the science, Colombia recently introduced a resolution in 2018 (Resolution 1447 – 2018) that requires projects to use baselines that comply with national reference levels.<ref name=":13">Dufrasne, D. (2021b). Companies use ”hot air” forestry offsets to avoid taxes in Colombia: Carbon Market Watch’s fact-check of Verra’s response. Carbon Market Watch. https://carbonmarketwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/CMWs-fact-check-of-Verras-response-on-Colombia.pdf</ref><ref>IEA (2022). ''Resolution 1447 – 2018. Monitoring, Reporting, and Verification System for mitigation actions at the national level.'' International Energy Agency. https://www.iea.org/policies/14772-resolution-1447-2018-monitoring-reporting-and-verification-system-for-mitigation-actions-at-the-national-level</ref> Going forward, REDD+ projects that are being implemented in Colombia will have to abide by Colombia’s national legislation.

=== Summary ===
Colombia has a long history of engaging in REDD+ as it has been used to limit environmental degradation in the post-conflict era, in alignment with the country’s national peacebuilding agenda.<ref name=":11" /> Owing to the country’s comprehensive tenure and bundle of rights, IPLC’s have robust ''de jure'' rights to land as they collectively own it, and rights to carbon are tied to this ownership. This puts Colombia as one of the world leaders in legal terms relating to REDD+ project implementation, but due to a lack of resources to ensure enforcement, as well as corruption, historically these laws have not been adhered to.<ref name=":10" /><ref name=":2" /> There are many documented cases showing the displacement on IPLC’s from traditional lands, poor efforts to adhere to ''consulta previa'', and inequitable benefit sharing.<ref>Greenfield, P. (2023''). The ‘carbon pirates’ preying on Amazon’s Indigenous communities.'' The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2023/jan/21/amazon-indigenous-communities-carbon-offsetting-pirates-aoe</ref><ref name=":14">Lang, C., (2024). ''Colombia’s Constitutional Court rules in favour of Indigenous Peoples. Identifies serious flaws in the REDD+ Baka Rokarire project.'' REDD_Monitor. https://reddmonitor.substack.com/p/colombias-constitutional-court-rules</ref>

The case of the Mataven project provides an interesting example of how it is the market itself that is failing to address concerns regarding transparency, whether that be relating to benefit-sharing amongst relevant stakeholders, or Indigenous representation and engagement throughout the implementation of REDD+ projects. Some ACATISEMA members have explicitly stated their support for the Mataven project,<ref name=":12" /> and its benefits can be seen first-hand in the form of improved infrastructure in local communities involved with the project.<ref>Myers, J. E., Parra, M. A., Bedford, C. (2021). ''How Carbon Offsetting Can Build a Forest.'' Stanford Social Innovation Review. https://ssir.org/articles/entry/how_carbon_offsetting_can_build_a_forest</ref> However, an exact breakdown of how and where revenue is being distributed to IPLC’s remains elusive.<ref name=":13" /> Furthermore, the level of IPLC engagement has come into question, specifically with reference to ''consulta previa'' and the overall understanding that IPLC’s have regarding the project’s intended outcomes and activities.<ref name=":10" /> This is not a rare case in Colombia and has been witnessed occurring with other projects that have been implemented on Indigenous territories in the Colombian Amazon.<ref name=":17">Lang, C., (2023''). “It destroys everything,” says Indigenous leader about the REDD+ Baka Rokarire project in Colombia''. REDD Monitor. https://reddmonitor.substack.com/p/it-destroys-everything-says-indigenous</ref> However, a recent ruling by the Colombian Constitutional court voted in favour of Indigenous groups in Colombia, upholding “the rights to self-determination, autonomy, self-government, territory, identity, physical and cultural integrity, and free, prior and informed consent of the indigenous communities”.<ref name=":14" /> This review ultimately sets a legal precedent safeguarding the fundamental rights of IPLCs with REDD+ project implementation and shows that progress is being made to improve the likelihood that REDD+ will result in genuine benefits to those affected by project implementation.

To ensure a more authentic engagement with IPLC’s so as to result in legitimate and equitable benefit-sharing, improvements must be made by the Colombian government, as well as within the VCM itself. For the former, Colombia’s national registry for GHG mitigation activities must be updated; it has been offline since 2022.<ref name=":10" /> As a result, transparency is lacking. International finance could be utilized so as to alleviate this issue, and only with an accurate and reliable database may the market be regulated. In the broader sense, VCM registries must create stricter guidelines promoting transparency. Often PD’s refer to annexed documents that contain relevant information regarding benefit-sharing, though these are often not publicly available.<ref name=":9" /> This limits transparency and increases the likelihood of inequitable agreements being made between project proponents and developers, further exacerbating existing power asymmetries between the two groups and limiting the likelihood that ''consulta previa'' is honestly adhered to.<ref name=":10" /> This has led to conflict within Indigenous communities, rather than a strengthening of their social fabric.

Furthermore, the Mataven project calls into question the actual emissions reduction that REDD+ projects achieve. Whilst Colombia has since updated its regulations such that REDD+ must use baselines that comply with national reference levels, it is up in the air as to how representative these guidelines are. Reference areas must represent project areas and without the appropriate regulations in place project developers lack the incentive to create realistic baselines; ultimately they are aiming to produce the maximum number of credits so as to generate the greatest possible revenues.

==Conclusion==
As a market-based mechanism, REDD+ is shackled by the construct in which it operates; fundamentally it is a capitalist means of fixing a capitalist problem, which comes with limitations. Both Brazil and Colombia have relatively robust laws that have been written into their constitutions, ultimately promoting more equitable results of REDD+ project implementation. However, as in Colombia IPLC’s collectively own the land, whereas in Brazil these groups only own rights to use the land,<ref name=":2" /> Colombia can be considered better equipped for the establishment of REDD+ projects on traditional Indigenous territory. However, even with these laws in place enforcement remain a matter of concern. Furthermore, given the wide variety of ontological and epistemological perspectives of Indigenous communities, and how these views conflict with the Western worldview from which market-based REDD+ came to fruition, there is an inherent difficulty in implementing a system of governance in REDD+ on Indigenous lands.<ref name=":1" />. Putting a price on nature conflicts with Indigenous perspectives and there have been instances where this has weakened the social and cultural fabric of IPLC’s.<ref name=":17" /> To avoid this REDD+ developers must have the genuine intent of understanding the perspective of the Indigenous group they are working with and aim to implement REDD+ with a bottom-up approach.

In both countries, transparency must be improved to ensure that FPIC is adhered to and subsequently ensure fair IPLC representation and engagement. This issue predominantly arises due to the poor requirements of standards in the VCM. As such, proponents are guided by developers which have little incentive to truly act in the interests of Indigenous groups; ultimately the organizations in charge of project development are interested in increasing project revenues. This has led to instances of over-crediting, as without a transparent framework in which to operate it is difficult to evaluate the legitimacy of the claims being made by project proponents and developers. However, with recent advances that address concerns of additionality<ref name=":15" /> there is hope for improved market integrity. Standards of the VCM must continue to be scrutinized to ensure that progress continues to be made.

Going forward, progress should be made to formalize the customary laws and traditional lands of IPLCs, and finance should be directed towards the enforcement of these laws. The environmental,<ref name=":16" /> economic,<ref name=":5" /><ref>Ding, H., Veit, P. G., Blackman, A., Gray, E., Reytar, K., Altamirano, J. C., Hodgdon, B., (2016). ''Climate benefits, tenure costs: The economic case for securing Indigenous land rights in the Amazon''. WRI. https://files.wri.org/d8/s3fs-public/Climate_Benefits_Tenure_Costs_Executive_Summary.pdf</ref> and social<ref>Sarmiento Barletti, J. P., Heise Vigil, N., & Larson, A. M. (2023). ''Safeguards at a glance: Are voluntary standards supporting community land, resource and carbon rights?'' CIFOR-ICRAF. https://www.cifor-icraf.org/publications/pdf_files/Flyer/REDD-Safeguards-7.pdf </ref> benefits of this have been researched and are well understood. By developing culturally appropriate frameworks for rights-based conservation regimes, that work with IPLCs in accordance with their worldviews, REDD+ could be used to promote Indigenous autonomy. However, progress still must be made to achieve this goal.

{{CFRC FRST522|names=Connor Haynes|share=yes|theme=REDD+|country=Latin America|province=|theme2=Carbon|Additional theme (3rd)=Restoration}}

==References==

Documentation:Open Case Studies/FRST522/2024/REDD+ in Indigenous Amazonia: What works and what doesn’t?

2024-12-16T22:19:37Z

ConnorHaynes: /* Interested and affected stakeholders */

__TOC__

==Positionality==
First and foremost I am not Indigenous, and whilst there are a myriad of cultures, ontologies and epistemologies that are not sufficiently represented by simply stating ‘Indigenous’, it is commonly accepted that these worldviews are vastly different to those of the ‘Western’ world, which is the world in which I grew up and matured. I am therefore only understanding of Indigenous cultures, beliefs and customary laws based upon available online literature and those which I have learnt through life, in addition to those introduced to me in my Master’s degree. As such, I will never be able to fully relate to an Indigenous person; the best I can do is try to understand and learn. Only throughout this process am I able to work towards reconciliation and attempt to address the inequities experienced by Indigenous folk globally.

Additionally, I am yet to act as a carbon project proponent and so do not understand the nuances or stresses of undertaking such a task. Whilst an individual proponent may have the best intention of procuring a carbon project for its social and environmental benefits, there are a number of stakeholders involved throughout the entire process which influence its eventual outcome. Without experience acting as a project proponent I am naïve in understanding the process and it's difficulties.

==Acronyms / Terminology==
'''Acronyms:'''

AFOLU: Agriculture, Forestry and Other Land-Use

ICVCM: Integrity Council for the Voluntary Carbon Market

IPLC: Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities

KMGBF: Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework

LAC: Latin American Countries

MRV: Monitoring, Reporting and Verification

REDD+: Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation

UNCBD: United Nations Convention on Biological Biodiversity

VCMI: Voluntary Carbon Markets Integrity Initiative

'''Terminology:'''

''Additionality:'' Additionality is the determination of whether the project will lead to the expected outcomes when compared to the baseline or ‘business as usual’ emissions.

''Leakage'': Refers to the shifting of emissions to outside the project boundary as a result of the project’s activities.

''Permanence:'' Permanence refers to the degree to which a carbon credit is equivalent to a permanent removal or reduction in emissions.
==Abstract==
This case study illustrates two examples of Indigenous-led REDD+ projects on Indigenous territory in Colombia and Brazil. Both countries have a relatively long history of engaging with REDD+ but have slightly different legal structures pertaining to the rights of Indigenous peoples on their traditional territories, and specifically their ‘carbon’ rights. As such, the intention is to evaluate how these differing ''de jure'' rights translate on the ground. With respect to REDD+, do certain rights result in legitimately positive benefits to IPLCs, as well as the environment that these projects were originally intended to protect? The intention is such that the reader can evaluate the effectiveness and true benefit of REDD+ projects to IPLC’s, based upon the legal frameworks of the host country. A secondary intention is such that the reader is better equipped to conduct a prefeasibility assessment based upon available online literature, to evaluate the likelihood that REDD+ can be implemented in any chosen country, with the genuine intent of benefiting IPLC’s that are directly affected as a result of REDD+ project implementation.

==REDD+ and the VCM in Brazil and Colombia==
REDD+, originally introduced by the UNFCCC, is a market-based mechanism sitting within the VCM that aims to reverse the loss of forests and carbon stocks, specifically in developing countries. Simply put, an entity or an individual can voluntarily pay another that has engaged with REDD+ and subsequently sequestered carbon, to offset their own emissions using ‘credits’, sold as units of greenhouse gas equivalent to one ton of carbon dioxide (CO2e). Forestry and Land-Use remains to be the largest category of carbon credits traded by transaction volume on the VCM, with REDD+ being the most popular project type in this category, accounting for 78% of credits traded.<ref name=":0">Procton, A., (2024). ''State of the voluntary carbon market 2024: On the path to maturity.'' Forest Trends Ecosystem Marketplace.</ref> Furthermore, over one-third of the credits sold within this category were sourced from projects that had been implemented in LAC and the Caribbean in 2024.<ref name=":0" /> Of the four largest standards issuing carbon credits, Verra accounts for roughly 80% of issuances in Latin America,<ref>Pullins, T. (2022). Growth of carbon markets in Latin America. White & Case. https://www.whitecase.com/publications/insight/latin-america-focus-fall-2022-growth-carbon-markets </ref> and even in the face of recent scrutiny,<ref>West, T. A. P., Bofim, B., Haya, B. K. (2024). Methodological issues with deforestation baselines compromise the integrity of carbon offsets from REDD+. ''Global Environmental Change, 87'' https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2024.102863</ref><ref>Wyburd I., & Dufrasne, G. (2023). Error Log: Exposing the methodological failures of REDD+ forestry projects. Carbon Market Watch. https://carbonmarketwatch.org/publications/error-log-exposing-the-methodological-failures-of-redd-forestry-projects/</ref><ref name=":15">Haya, B. K., Alford-Jones, K., Anderegg, W. R. L., Beymer-Farris, B., Blanchard, L., Bomfim, B., Chin, D., Evans, S., Hogan, M., Holm, J. A., McAfee, K., So, I. S., West, T. A. P., & Withey, L. (2023). ''Quality assessment of REDD+ carbon credit projects''. Berkeley Carbon Trading Project. https://gspp.berkeley.edu/research-and-impact/centers/cepp/projects/berkeley-carbontrading-project/REDD+</ref> REDD+ projects account for a significant proportion of the VCM with their continued application likely to persist.<ref>Gordon, O. (2022). ''The interwoven fortunes of carbon markets and indigenous communities.'' Energy Monitor. https://www.energymonitor.ai/tech/carbon-removal/the-interwoven-fortunes-of-carbon-markets-and-indigenous-communities/</ref><ref>Müller, M., Coustar, C., Bietta, F., Mathres, M. (2022). ''UNFCCC REDD+ and the power of sovereign carbon.'' Deutsche Banke Chief Investment Office. https://www.rainforestcoalition.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/CIO-Special-UNFCCC-REDD-power-of-sovereign-carbon.pdf</ref><ref>Pullins, T. (2022). ''Growth of carbon markets in Latin America.'' White & Case. https://www.whitecase.com/publications/insight/latin-america-focus-fall-2022-growth-carbon-markets </ref> With the introduction of updated methodologies aimed at addressing these concerns,<ref>Verra (2023a). ''Setting the Standard: Verra’s Revolutionary New REDD Methodology.'' https://verra.org/program-notice/setting-the-standard-verras-revolutionary-new-redd-methodology/</ref><ref>Verra (2023b). ''VM0048 Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation, v1.0.'' https://verra.org/methodologies/vm0048-reducing-emissions-from-deforestation-and-forest-degradation-v1-0/</ref> there is hope for renewed buyer confidence in the integrity of this market,<ref>MSCI (2023). ''Verra’s New Methodology for Unplanned Deforestation Aims to Silence the Critics''. https://www.msci.com/www/blog-posts/verra-s-new-methodology-for/04577808942</ref> though more work still needs to be done.

Both Colombia and Brazil have a relatively long history of implementing REDD+ projects, using both fund-based and market-based mechanisms. For example, both countries were participants in the ‘Amazon Indigenous REDD+ (RIA in Spanish) initiative, with the first pilot implementation project being initiated in Colombia’s Puiawai Natural Reserve.<ref>Garzón, E., (2017). ''Amazon Indigenous REDD+: An innovative approach to conserve Colombian forests?'' Mongabay. https://news.mongabay.com/2017/01/amazon-indigenous-redd-an-innovative-approach-to-conserve-colombian-forests/</ref> The relevance of these two countries with respect to REDD+ is simple. Much of the Amazon’s primary tropical rainforest falls within these countries jurisdiction and this rainforest has been consistently under threat from external pressures and encroachment, whether that be in the form of land-clearing for commercial ranching, subsistence purposes, illicit drug production or illegal mining practices,<ref name=":8">Sánchez García, P. A. & Wong, G. Y., (2024) “The political economy of deforestation in the Colombian Amazon”, ''Journal of Political Ecology'' ''31''(1), 178–199. https://doi.org/10.2458/jpe.5230</ref><ref>Radwin, M. (2023). ''Drug trafficking fuels other deforestation drivers in the Amazon: report.'' Mongabay. https://news.mongabay.com/2023/07/drug-trafficking-fuels-other-deforestation-drivers-in-the-amazon-report/</ref><ref>Haddad, E.A., Araújo, I.F., Feltran-Barbieri, R., Perobelli, F. S., Rocha, A., Sass, K. S., Nobre, C. A. (2024). Economic drivers of deforestation in the Brazilian Legal Amazon. ''Nat Sustain'' ''7'', 1141–1148. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41893-024-01387-7 </ref><ref>Hänggli, A., Levy, S. A., Armenteras, D., Bovolo, C. I., Brandão, J., Rueda, X., & Garrett, R. D. (2023). A systematic comparison of deforestation drivers and policy effectiveness across the amazon biome. ''Environmental Research Letters, 18''(7), 073001. https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/acd408</ref> to name a few.

In theory, REDD+ can be used to provide the economic incentive to promote sustained environmental protection of Indigenous lands, with a focus on the rights and livelihoods of IPLCs. Currently the overall funding to IPLCs tenure rights and forest management in tropical countries is low, receiving just $270 million per year between 2011-2020 from bilateral and multilateral donors and private philanthropies.<ref>Hatcher, J., Owen, M., Yin, D., (2021). ''Falling short: Donor funding for Indigenous peoples and local communities to secure tenure rights and manage forests in tropical countries (2011 -2020).'' Rainforest Foundation Norway. https://dv719tqmsuwvb.cloudfront.net/documents/Publikasjoner/Andre-rapporter/RFN_Falling_short_2021.pdf</ref> REDD+ has the potential to channel funding as to promote Indigenous rights and autonomy, provided there is transparent and equitable benefit-sharing for those involved. Fundamentally, only with the inclusion of IPLC’s, or preferably with IPLC’s acting as project proponents, is REDD+ able to promote Indigenous agency and improve IPLC rights and governance. And only when the rights of those inhabiting the land are formally recognized can the land be effectively conserved.<ref name=":16">Reytar, K., Veit, P., von Braun, J. (2024). ''Protecting Biodiversity Hinges on Securing Indigenous and Community Land Rights.'' WRI. https://www.wri.org/insights/indigenous-and-local-community-land-rights-protect-biodiversity</ref> The inclusion of IPLCs in REDD+ project development is therefore considered to be essential for project success, and this is in theory embodied in the very nature of REDD+.<ref name=":1">Alvarez, G., Elfving, M. and Andrade, C. (2016) ‘REDD+ governance and indigenous peoples in Latin America: the case of Suruí Carbon Project in the Brazilian Amazon Forest’, ''Latin American J. Management for Sustainable Development 3''(2) pp.133–146. https://doi.org/10.1504/LAJMSD.2016.083705</ref> Partially owing to a long history of dealing with REDD+, Colombia and Brazil are amongst just a few of the countries hosting tropical rainforests that explicitly recognise community rights to carbon and tie these rights to the legal ownership of lands and forests. In Colombia, carbon rights are tied to land rights, whereas in Brazil carbon rights are tied to forest rights.<ref name=":2">RRI and McGill University (2021). Technical report: ''Status of legal recognition of Indigenous Peoples’, Local Communities’ and Afro-descendant Peoples’ rights to carbon stored in tropical lands and forests''. Rights and Resources Initiative. https://doi.org/10.53892/MLQQ5744</ref>

==Brazil: The Suruí Forest Carbon Project==
[[File:The Amazon Basin, Brazil.jpg|thumb|376x376px|Brazil's Amazon rainforest]]

=== Project description and location ===
The Surui Forest Carbon project was implemented in 2009 on the territory of the Surui people, which is situated in the southern part of Brazil’s Amazon between the states of Rondônia and Mato Grosso. Surui Indigenous territory covers an area of 2,481 km2, though the intention of the PCFS was to protect a portion of this total area. According to the PD, the stated objective was to “prevent 13,575.3 hectares of tropical forest from being cleared by 2038, to avoid the emission of 7,258,352.3 tCO2e to the atmosphere, and to contribute to the preservation of the Paiter Surui lifestyle and traditions.”<ref>IDESAM (2011). ''Project description: Surui forest carbon project''. Institute for Conservation and Sustainable Development of Amazonas. Link: "PROJ_DESC_1118_02FEB2012.PDF" found at https://registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/1118 </ref> This region sits within one of the Brazilian Amazon’s main ‘arcs of deforestation’ and pressure from loggers and ranchers is a matter of concern.

Notably, the PCFS was the first REDD+ project to be proposed by Indigenous peoples in the Brazilian Amazon on their own territory and was the first to receive certification by both the VCS and CCBS.<ref name=":1" />. Metareilá, the Surui’s own Indigenous association, acted as project proponent and the Institute for Conservation and Sustainable Development of Amazonas (IDESAM) assisted with project development, alongside multiple other stakeholder groups. As an endogenous initiative procured and conducted by the Surui community, the SFCP had a ‘non-centralized model of governance’, which reflected the characteristics and traditions of the Surui people. <ref name=":1" />

Only after two years of consultations between the 24 communities involved and the relevant governmental agencies (primarily FUNAI and the Ministry of Environment) was a Memorandum of Understanding signed, showing community consent to develop the project.<ref name=":3">Garcia, B., Rimmer, L., Canal Vieira, L., Mackey, B., (2021). REDD+ and forest protection on indigenous lands in the Amazon. ''RECIEL 30'', 207–219. https://doi.org/10.1111/reel.12389</ref> In 2012 after verification from an independent third-party body, the Surui were able to sell carbon credits on the international market. Between 2009 and 2014 the project drastically helped limit the deforestation occurring within the project’s site, causing many to deem it a success.<ref name=":4">Howard, F. E., (2023). ''An Analysis of the Suruí Forest Carbon Project in Context of Settler Colonialism''. Masters thesis. Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University. https://vtechworks.lib.vt.edu/server/api/core/bitstreams/b0cde6de-794c-453f-856b-ee72bde3db06/content</ref>

=== National climate targets, policies and legislation ===
Rates of deforestation in Brazil’s legal Amazon are significantly impacted by the government in charge. This is evidenced in the decade between 2012 and 2021 whilst under the conservative Bolsonaro administration, when deforestation in the Amazon increased 185% — from a loss of 4,571 km2 in 2012 to 13,038 km2 in 2021.<ref>INPE (2022). ''Observação da Terra. http://www.obt.inpe.br/OBT/assuntos/programas/amazonia/prodes''</ref> However, since Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s appointment in 2022 there has been a steady decline in the rate of deforestation, which is now roughly half what it was in 2021.<ref>Terra Brasilis (2024). ''PRODES (deforestation): Deforestation rates – Legal Amazon – States''. https://terrabrasilis.dpi.inpe.br/app/dashboard/deforestation/biomes/legal_amazon/rates</ref> A significant proportion of emissions result from the clearing of rainforest and its subsequent conversion to ranching.<ref>MCTI (2022). ''Estimativas Anuais De Emissões De Gases De Efeito Estufa No Brasil.'' 6ª Edição. Ministério da Estado da Ciência, Tecnologia e Inovações. https://www.gov.br/mcti/pt-br/acompanhe-o-mcti/sirene/publicacoes/estimativas-anuais-de-emissoes-gee/arquivos/6a-ed-estimativas-anuais.pdf</ref> To address these emissions Brazil has implemented various adaptation policies, legislation and targets which are summarized below:
{| class="wikitable"
|'''Document name'''
|'''Type'''
|'''Publication year'''
|'''Key takeaways'''
|-
|National Policy on Climate Change (NPCC)
|Legislation
|2009
|Framework for addressing climate change
|-
|National Plan on Climate Change Adaptation
|Policy
|2016
|Framework for addressing impacts of climate change
|-
|Nationally Determined Contribution
|Target
|2024
|Reduce net greenhouse gas emissions by 59 to 67 percent below 2005 levels by 2035
|-
|Federal Constitution, Article 225
|Legislation
|2006
|The Amazon rainforest is considered as a ‘national heritage’.All levels of government have a shared responsibility to protect it and the environment
|-
| colspan="4" |'''Relating to REDD+'''
|-
|Plan of Action for the Prevention and Control of Deforestation in the Legal Amazon (PPCDAM)
|Policy
|2004
|Aims to reduce deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon
|-
|Forest code
|Legislation
|2012
|Aimed at reducing deforestation, but no specific mention of REDD+
|-
|Amazon Indigenous REDD+ Initiative
|Policy
|2012
|Incorporate Indigenous with REDD+ initiatives
|-
|National REDD+ Strategy (ENREDD+)
|Policy
|2016
|REDD+ as a fund-based mechanism
|}

=== Indigenous rights - Constitutional, tenure and bundle rights ===
In Brazil, Indigenous rights are robust and clearly defined according to the Brazilian Constitution. As a result, the Indigenous communities of the Brazilian Amazon have legal title to 13.8% of the national territory totalling 1.175 million km2, with a total of 631 territories.<ref>Federal government of Brazil (2024). ''Brazil’s NDC: National determination to contribute and transform''. https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/2024-11/Brazil_Second%20Nationally%20Determined%20Contribution%20%28NDC%29_November2024.pdf</ref>
{| class="wikitable"
| colspan="2" |'''Laws'''
|-
|Article 231 of the 1988 Constitution
|Indigenous peoples to have their exclusive right to use their territories to derive economic benefits. Grants indigenous peoples the right to land, prohibits eviction, and restricts mining without authorization from the federal government.
|-
|Indigenous Peoples statute (1973).

|No acts restricting the full exercise of indigenous peoples’ permanent tenure over the land should be permitted.
|-
| colspan="2" | '''Treaties'''
|-
|United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2007)
|Requires States to obtain free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) for the approval of any projects affecting indigenous territories.
|-
|International Labour Organization Convention 169 (2019)
|Ratified and incorporated under domestic law in 2002 through Decree 10.088/2019, endorsing UNDRIP
|-
|American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2016)
|Supports and builds upon UNDRIP
|}
Whilst Indigenous communities in Brazil have legal title to land, it is the State that owns it. Indigenous people simply exercise permanent tenure over lands that they traditionally occupy and have ‘original rights’ to these traditional lands, which no other rights can prevail over.<ref name=":3" /> Indigenous lands, though not classified as protected areas, “have the highest level of protection by law because they are regulated by the Constitution” and cannot be leased or restricted without violating their original rights. The Suruí's right to develop the PCFS is grounded in the Brazilian Constitution, which grants Indigenous peoples exclusive rights to use the ‘riches of the soil, rivers and lakes’ of their land, and these rights cannot be overridden. Thus, Indigenous people and only Indigenous people are legally allowed to engage in productive activities on their land, provided these activities are conducted according to their own customs and traditions and are necessary for the wellbeing and cultural expression of their own people. In Brazil, it is the armed forces and federal police that are responsible for enforcing these laws, and FUNAI is responsible for representing Indigenous communities in judicial disputes.<ref name=":3" /> As such, provided a REDD+ project does not violate the rights to territorial integrity, permanent land tenure and original rights, it is legally allowed.
[[File:Two Pataxo indians (Brasília, 04 April 2006).jpeg|thumb|414x414px|Two Indigenous in Brazil]]
'''CARBON RIGHTS:''' In Brazil, carbon rights are tied to forest rights.<ref name=":2" /> Carbon credits from REDD+ projects are seen as part of the economic benefits derived from indigenous lands, and as such, Indigenous communities are entitled to own, control and distribute these revenues themselves. The carbon credits generated from the (SFCP) were wholly owned by the Suruí people through Metareilá, with the Suruí Fund (managed by the Brazilian Biodiversity Fund - FUNBIO) acting as recipient. This legality reinforces Indigenous control over both land and carbon rights, as whoever has rights to the forest land is usually recognized as the owner of carbon rights.<ref name=":3" /> Collectively these national and international laws provide an important safeguard to Indigenous peoples, making their consent a prerequisite for the establishment of REDD+ projects and recognizing their rights as the main beneficiaries of REDD+ revenues.<ref name=":3" /> However, as carbon rights are tied to forest rights in Brazil and not land rights, and carbon is considered to be an ‘environmental service’ (Article 41(I)(A) Brazilian Forestry Code), states as well as the federal government have the jurisdiction to exercise full legislative authority over carbon. <ref name=":2" /> As such, certain states have interpreted the law to imply that the title to carbon credits is attributable to the state.<ref>Loft, L., Ravikumar, A., Gebara, M. F., Pham, T. T., Resosudarmo, I. A. P., Assembe, S., Tovar, J. G., Mwangi, E., & Andersson, K. (2015). Taking Stock of Carbon Rights in REDD+ Candidate Countries: Concept Meets Reality. ''Forests'', ''6''(4), 1031-1060. https://doi.org/10.3390/f6041031</ref> Hence, even when carbon rights are clearly defined and tied to forest title it is insufficient in itself, and only by legally recognizing the customary rights of IPLCs can a fair and equitable outcome be realised.

'''FPIC OBLIGATION:''' Brazilian law requires Free, Prior, and Informed Consent (FPIC) for REDD+ projects affecting indigenous lands, ensuring that international standards such as the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) and ILO Convention No. 169 are adhered to; Indigenous consent is, ''de jure,'' a necessity. Projects that violate these rights and fail to consult communities are therefore considered illegal. Notably there are no specific rules or procedures that have been written into the Brazilian constitution that provide guidance on how to achieve FPIC. However, this freedom reinforces Indigenous autonomy as it allows an Indigenous community to define the rules of consultation according to their customs and traditions.

=== Affected and interested stakeholders ===
{| class="wikitable"
| colspan="5" |'''Affected stakeholders'''
|-
|Stakeholders
|Primary objective(s)
|Secondary objective(s)
|Relative power
|Scope of influence
|-
|Metareilá Association of the Suruí Indigenous People
|Project proponent

Works to defend and preserve the cultural and territorial heritage of the Suruí people.

Responsible for the Suruí Fund (FUNBIO). Ensure equitable distribution of funds
|Ensure project longevity.
Stick to the mandate; attempt not to be influenced by external actors
|Powerful, though lacking technical knowhow. Have carbon rights and thus have ultimate control of project revenue; can decide how this revenue is distributed.
|Local
|-
|Other Indigenous groups and associations
|Support various aspects of proejct development
|Aim to benefit from the project
|Have the same rights as the Metareila with respect to land though are less involved with project development and have less say, nor derive economic benefits like the Metareila
|Local
|-
|''Campesinos'' (peasants)
|Survive via subsistence.
|Procure more land.
|Have far fewer rights than Indigenous groups and no involvement with the project
|Local
|-
| colspan="5" |'''Interested stakeholders'''
|-
|IDESAM - Institute for Conservation and Sustainable Development of Amazonas
|Maximise revenue from project.
Ensure project longevity
|Achieve completion of various technical aspects of project
|Powerful: Required to complete various technical aspects of development.
|National
|-
|Forest Trends
|Supported formulation and implementation of the project.
Uphold image of organization
|Maximise environmental benefits of project
|Powerful: Tasked with raising funds and fostering an international network; an integral part of project development
|International
|-
|Amazon Conservation Team - ACT Brazil
|Supports various aspect of project development as well as offering legal advice.
Other technical assistance
|Maximise environmental benefits of project
|Powerful: An integral part of project development
|International
|-
|Kanindé Association for Ethno-Environmental Defense – non-profit
|Promote Metareilá views and beliefs
|Involved with various aspects of project development
|Mid-power. Has a say in project direction, though less weight than the Metareila.
|National - International
|-
|Ministry of Environment (MMA)
|Responsible for protection and conservation of natural environment
|Ensure project adheres to national law
|Powerful. Must be notified about project activities although cannot strictly alter decisions made by the Surui
|National
|-
|National Indian Foundation (FUNAI)
|Promote Indigenous rights

|Represents Indignous organizations with judicial matters.
|Powerful. Knowleadgeable of judicial system. Must be notified about project activities though is not involved with project governance.
|National
|-
|Government of the State of Mato Grosso
|Encourage development, and reduce poverty and crime in Mato Grosso
|Ensure project adheres to regional law.
|Powerful. Legilative control over regional police and municipalities
|Regional
|}

=== Discussion ===
Although originally successful in achieving its goal of reducing deforestation and degradation, in 2016 diamonds were discovered in Surui territory, leading to an increase in illegal logging and mining.<ref name=":1" /> By 2018 the project site had been completely overrun by ''garimpeiros'' (small-scale gold miners), ultimately leading to the projects suspension that year. <ref name=":4" />

While the project had initially garnered support, divisions emerged within the community post-project implementation. Disputes arose over the unequal distribution of project revenues, leading to internal conflicts between different Suruí clans. These criticisms escalated in 2014 when the Catholic Indigenous Missionary Council supported calls for an end to the project due to mismanagement of revenues from carbon credit sales. <ref name=":3" /> Some Suruí members also argued that the REDD+ initiative harmed their way of life.<ref>Lang, C. (2014). ''“What are projects for that destroy life?” Interview with Henrique Suruí about the Paiter-Suruí REDD project, Brazil.'' REDD-Monitor. https://redd-monitor.org/2014/12/17/what-are-projects-for-that-destroy-life-interview-with-henrique-surui-about-the-paiter-surui-redd-project-brazil/</ref>

Further complicating the situation was the controversial role of Henrique Suruí, one of the Suruí tribal leaders. In 2011, it was revealed that Henrique had violated the tribe's logging moratorium, collaborating with loggers in illegal activities. While Henrique later denied responsibility for the project’s failure, his actions, combined with internal disagreements, illustrated the lack of consensus within the Suruí leadership on the project’s goals and outcomes. Both of the tribe’s leaders possessed dramatically different perspectives on how they believed they could ensure agency, autonomy, and economic benefits for the Suruí people.<ref name=":4" /> This fragmentation within the community, in combination with the discovery of diamonds and the state's failure to protect indigenous land rights led to the indefinite suspension of the REDD+ project.

The project's collapse highlights broader structural issues, particularly the state's inconsistent support for indigenous land rights, influenced by settler colonialism, which undermined the project’s long-term viability.<ref name=":4" /> Additionally, the project’s creation was shaped by external actors, including the collaboration between Almir Suruí and Borges from Forest Trends, a Washington-based NGO. This partnership introduced a Western perspective on viewing the Suruí peoples forest, in contrast with their own perspectives on land use and governance. Furthermore, despite Borges’ Brazilian background, the power dynamics between a global North organization and a developing, Indigenous community were apparent.

=== Summary ===
The Suruí Forest Carbon Project provides an interesting example of how, even when the rights of IPLC’s are relatively robust, challenges persist in ensuring REDD+ project longevity. As such, in its current state, REDD+ in the Brazilian Amazon may not be a suitable market-based option for Indigenous communities in the Amazon.<ref name=":3" /> Although initially successful in promoting Indigenous autonomy and reducing deforestation, the project resulted in failure due to of a myriad of factors. Division between Surui communities was exacerbated by a perceived unequal benefit-sharing, and the impact of imposing REDD+ seems to have complicated the traditional social structure that the Surui were dependent on. These issues were influenced by Brazil's settler state dynamics, where Indigenous land rights, although legally recognized, are often not upheld in practice due to insufficient enforcement.<ref name=":4" /> Ultimately, the Surui project reveals how settler colonialism's structural flaws make long-term project success difficult, despite initial progress in promoting Indigenous autonomy.

At the national and state level, complex institutional and legal land governance structures convolute and impede REDD+ in Brazil. Multiple institutions share responsibilities and there is no comprehensive, authoritative database of land ownership, which hampers efforts to protect Indigenous territories.<ref name=":5">Costa, R. (2016)''. Insecure land rights in Brazil: Consequences for rural areas and challenges for improvement.'' Climate Policy Initiative. https://www.climatepolicyinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/Insecure_Land_Rights_in_Brazil_CPI.pdf</ref> As a result, land tenure disputes remain common and can be witnessed occurring between the public as well between public and state actors. For example, Brazil’s 1964 Land Statute (Law No. 4504) allows the government to takeover unproductive farms and transfer those lands to landless peasants. This often results in the clearing of forest, as only when the land is cleared is it evidenced to be ‘productive’.<ref name=":5" /> Hence, not only does this law cause insecurity for Indigenous populations in Brazil, it also forces them to go against customary traditions of stewarding the land in an effort to maintain its control.

Whilst the aforementioned points to the futility of REDD+ in Brazil, there is reason to maintain optimism. In a recent landmark ruling Brazil’s supreme court voted in favour of the Xoleng peoples, and the decision will serve as a precedent for all cases involving Indigenous peoples.<ref name=":6">Amos-Flom, K., (2023). ''Triumph and Turmoil: The Xokleng Case and the Future of Indigenous Land Rights in Brazil.'' Columbia Journal of Transnational Law. https://www.jtl.columbia.edu/bulletin-blog/triumph-and-turmoil-the-xokleng-case-and-the-future-of-indigenous-land-rights-in-brazil</ref> The Xokleng’s land dispute, settled in 2023, “rejected Santa Catarina state’s marco temporal (“time limit”) argument, which would have required Indigenous people to prove they occupied or legally contested the territory they claimed before the Brazilian Constitution came into force in 1988. If successful, this argument would have led to disastrous repercussions, as many Indigenous peoples had been forcibly removed or are traditionally nomadic.”<ref name=":6" /> Evidently, whilst slow, progress has been made in Brazil in recent years with respect to Indigenous rights as well as the voluntary carbon market itself.

There are currently 159 AFOLU projects listed on the Verra database in Brazil, with only two specifically focused on REDD+ initiatives in collaboration with Indigenous groups. These are the Ka’a Pyahu project, <ref>Verra (n.d.) ''Project 5087: KA'A PYAHU.'' https://registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/5087</ref> initiated by the Guajajara Indigenous people in collaboration with external organizations and validated in 2021, and the ‘Together for the forest Awaete REDD+ project’<ref>Verra (n.d.) ''Project 5200: TOGETHER FOR THE FOREST AWAETÉ REDD+ PROJECT.'' https://registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/5200</ref> which is still under development. Both projects involve Indigenous groups working with Brazilian organizations to build technical capacity and expertise. This could signal a growing trend of Indigenous-led REDD+ projects in the future. To ensure a positive future for REDD+ in Brazil, the customary rights of IPLC’s must be formally recognized. IPLC should have legal ownership of their traditional lands, and in doing so the carbon rights of these communities would be less convoluted, leading to more equitable benefit-sharing and increased cohesion amongst these groups post-project implementation.

==Colombia: ''REDD+ project Resguardo Indigena Unificado - Selva de Mataven (RUI-SM)''==

=== '''Project description and location''' ===
[[File:RS6524 MG 3944.jpg|thumb|407x407px|A view of the Mataven]]
According to the PD,<ref name=":7">ACATISEMA & Mediamos (2017). ''Joint project description and monitoring report: REDD+ project: Resguardo Indigena Unificado – Selva de Mataven (RIU – SM).'' Link: “10 06 2017_VCS Final Report_ Matavin Project.pdf” found at https://registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/1566</ref> the Resguardo Indígena Unificado – Selva de Matavén (RIU-SM) project is located east of the Colombian Orinoco high plain, in the eastern part of the Department of Vichada, municipality of Cumaribo. It resides on the formalized resguardo of the Sikuani, Piaroa, Puinave, Curripaco, Cubeo and Piapoco ethnic groups, spanning 1,856,836 hectares, with 1,477,115 hectares (79.6%) being forested. The PD states that it will reduce greenhouse gas emissions, with a total estimated net reduction of 108,670,562 tons of CO2 equivalent over thirty years, from years 2013 – 2042. By this metric, it is the 14th largest project on the Verra registry, out of over 1700 projects.<ref name=":9">Dufrasne, D., (2021). ''Two Shades of Green: How hot air forest credits are being used to avoid carbon taxes in Colombia''. Carbon Market Watch. https://carbonmarketwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Two-shades-of-green_EN_WEB.pdf</ref> There are 12,312 Indigenous people living in the RIU-SM, belonging to 2,517 families and 250 communities as of 2017.

The project was initiated by the Asociación de Cabildos y Autoridades Indígenas de la Selva de Matavén (ACETISMA), an Indigenous association, and developed by MEDIAMOS F&M, a Colombian consultancy firm. ACETISMA is comprised of Indigenous leaders that represent the 17 communities of the reservation in charge of governing the territory, and it has administrative autonomy, as well as “the capacity to acquire, to own and to dispose of property, to accept donations, to hold national and international conventions, scientific and cultural exchanges and generally, to celebrate all kinds of negotiations and agreements with which the Association can achieve its objectives.”<ref name=":7" />

There is a stated focus on various means of improving the living conditions of the Indigenous peoples living within the project area. To summarise, the main objectives of the REDD+ project RIU-SM include:

· Community development, in the form of improved education.

· Community engagement with respect to the project; developing information channels to reveal project progress.

· Support local initiatives for environmental education and waste management.

· Developing an effective response system that addresses community proposals and concerns relating to the project.

· Strengthening the governance of ACATISEMA.
=== National climate targets, policies and legislation ===
The Colombian Amazon makes up over one-third of Colombia’s national territory, and up until 2005 only 7.3% of the Colombian Amazon had been deforested, largely due to the country's 60-year armed conflict between the government, multiple left-wing guerillas such as FARC, and several far-right paramilitary groups.<ref name=":8" /> However, following the signing of the Peace Treaty in 2016 and demobilization of the FARC, limits to deforestation were weakened in the Colombian Amazon. Poor but opportunistic peasants began to encroach into previously unchartered territory and capitalize from the rainforest. Due to the poor economic integration of the Amazon, many were forced to engage with the traditional economies of cocoa and cattle ranching, as these markets were already well connected to regional and global markets.<ref name=":8" /> To address the drivers of deforestation and its associated emissions, the federal government has implemented various initiatives, which are summarized below:

{| class="wikitable"
|'''Document name'''
|'''Type'''
|'''Publication year'''
|'''Key takeaways'''
|-
|Nationally Determined Contribution(s)
|Target
|2020
|Reduce GHG emissions by 51% by 2030 and net-zero by 2050
|-
|National Climate Change Policy (PNCC)
|Policy
|2018
|Address climate change and foster sustainable development
|-
|National Forest Conservation Program
|Policy
|2011
|Address deforestation
|-
|Law 1931 of 2018 – Climate Change Law

|Legislation
|2018
|Establishes the framework for addressing climate change
|-
| colspan="4" |'''Relating to REDD+:'''
|-
|National Strategy for Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (ENREDD+)
|Initiative
|2009
|Particular focus on the Amazon and Choco rainforests
|-
|Amazon Indigenous REDD+ Initiative
|Initiative
|2016
|Respect Indigenous rights. FPIC focus.
|-
|BIOREDD+ program
|Initiative
|2012
|Portfolio of 8 REDD+ projects in four geographic nodes covering over 700,000 hectares in the Colombian Pacific.

|-
|Vision Amazonia
|Initiative
|2015
|Part of the REDD+ strategy, financed by three foreign countries: Germany, Norway and United Kingdom
|}
As a result of the many fund and market-based initiatives that Colombia has engaged with, it hosts the second most REDD+ projects in the world. REDD+ projects now cover at least 56% of the area of legally recognized Indigenous territories in the Colombian Amazon, with an overwhelming majority of carbon projects located on Indigenous territories.<ref name=":10">Schmid, D., & Castro. C., (2023). ''REDD+ projects in the Colombian Amazon: Social challenges and lack of transparency''. Rainforest Foundation Norway. https://dv719tqmsuwvb.cloudfront.net/documents/REDD_rapport_2024_ENG.pdf</ref> Evidently REDD+ plays an integral part in the country’s efforts of environmental conservation, and incentives have been introduced to promote the development of such projects. For example, in 2016 the government adopted a higher tax that covered fossil fuels, but companies are able to avoid paying the tax by investing in carbon offsets that have been generated domestically.<ref name=":9" /> This led to a boost in the domestic REDD+ market in 2017, as Colombian companies invested as to escape higher taxes. Notably, 23 of the 36 REDD+ projects currently under development in the Amazon region were initiated in or after 2018.<ref name=":10" /> Currently Colombia’s REDD+ program sits at over 45 pilot and voluntary carbon projects, as well as one large-scale jurisdictional approach in the Amazon.<ref name=":11">Zambrano-Cortés, D. G. (2024). ''The politics, spaces and subjects of forest conservation in Colombia''. [internal PhD, WU, Wageningen University]. Wageningen University. https://doi.org/10.18174/675328</ref>

=== Indigenous rights - Constitutional, tenure and bundle rights ===
''De jure'', the Indigenous peoples of Colombia have comprehensive tenure and bundle rights that have been articulated in the national constitution. Collective land titles are granted to Indigenous communities by the Colombian government and as a result about 34 percent of Colombian land (almost 38 million hectares) is legally recognized as Indigenous territory or collective lands of Afro-descendent communities.<ref name=":10" /> These collective land tenure rights have been in effect since the implementation of the 1991 constitution, granting them the authority to exercise legal control over their territories in accordance with their own customs and procedures.<ref>Max Planck Institute (n.d.) ''Colombia 1991 (rev. 2015).'' Institute. https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Colombia_2015</ref> Furthermore, the carbon rights of Indigenous peoples are explicitly defined in the constitution and tied specifically to the ownership of land of the communities.<ref name=":2" /> This in theory provides a solid legal basis for upholding the rights of Indigenous communities in Colombia, specifically relating to REDD+ activities, as it allows communities to define and negotiate the terms of said projects. A summary of the various laws relating to Indigenous rights have been summarized below:
{| class="wikitable"
| colspan="2" |'''Law (1991 constitution)'''
|-
|Article 63

|Indigenous territories are considered collective property. Land is not owned by individuals but is shared by the community. The state must respect these collective rights and cannot alter land ownership without the consent of the Indigenous peoples.
|-
|Article 76 - ''Consulta previa''.
|Pertains to the right of Indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities; prior consultation must be undertaken before any entity undertakes activities that may affect their territories, culture, or way of life.
|-
|Article 330
|Indigenous communities have the right to govern their territories.
|-
|Article 329
|The Reservation is a collective, inalienable, and indefeasible property.
|-
|Decree 1386 of 1994, Article 10; Decree 2164 of 1995, Article 22) 39.
|"The administration and management of these lands are subjected to uses and customs of the beneficiaries."
|}
Whilst land and tenure rights are enshrined into the constitution, the precariousness of these rights persists due to a lack of resources to ensure enforcement, as well as the deeper issue of corruption. As previously stated, the rate of deforestation increased significantly in Colombia’s post-conflict era, evidencing the nations inability to maintain control over unlawful acts of land-grabbing and disposition. Whilst this began with new peasants converting the Amazon for subsistence purposes, it ultimately led to new areas for the growth of cocoa, much to the benefit of narco-traffickers who could monopolize on this illegal surplus in ‘accumulation by dispossession’.<ref name=":8" />

With respect to the legalities of consultation, Colombia has enshrined ''consulta previa'' into the constitution. Translating to ‘prior consultation’, this legal text provides the formal grounds for Indigenous engagement when any legislative or administrative measures are implemented on Indigenous territory. Importantly, consultation should be achieved in accordance with the customs of the ethnic group with which the project is being imposed upon. However, there have been recent cases of contestation specifically relating to how ''consulta previa'' applies to REDD+ on Indigenous lands, and the RIU – SM project was one that was involved with such a case.

=== Affected and interested stakeholders ===
{| class="wikitable"
| colspan="5" |'''Affected stakeholders'''
|-
|Stakeholders
|Primary objective(s)
|Secondary objective(s)
|Relative power
|Scope of influence
|-
|ACATISEMA - Asociación de Cabildos y Autoridades Indígenas de la Selva de Matavén
|Primary and direct beneficiaries of project
Foster the integral development, social and cultural preservation of the indigenous communities in the Mataven Jungle

Consolidate the territory, and promote conservation and preservation of the environment and biodiversity of the Mataven Jungle

|Maintain control over ''resguardos''
|Powerful, locally.
Has the highest authority in the ''reguardo''.

Rights to the land and revenue generated from project
|Local
|-
|Indigenous communities of the RIU-SM
|Seek to maintain land rights

Promote traditional and cultural beliefs
|Increase benefits from the project
|Mid-power, though little input into project activities in reality.
|Local
|-
|Landless peasants
|Survive via subsistence
|Gain more access to land. Improve rights.
|Low to none
|Local
|-
| colspan="5" |'''Interested stakeholders'''
|-
|MEDIAMOS F&M
|Project developer
Maximise project revenues
|Develop the project in a way that is supporting of ACETISMA beliefs, for their benefit.
|Powerful: involved with various technical aspects of project development
|National
|-
|Ministerio de Ambiente y Desarrollo Sostenible (Minisitry of Environment and Sustainable Development)
|Environmental planning; sustainable development
Form strategic alliances with social and institutional participants in different sectoral and territorial scenarios.
|Ensure project activities are in agreement with ministry mandate
|Powerful, though supporting of project
|National
|-
|Dirección de Asuntos Indígenas, ROM y Minorías - Ministerio del Interior
|Prepares policy in favour of Indigenous groups
Supports ethnic and cultural rights of Indigenous
|
|Not ''per se'' involved with project, though the policy the organization has introduced affects project outcomes
|National
|-
|Corporinoquía
|Environmental authority to ensure the proper use of natural resources in their area of jurisdiction.
Ensure project abides by relevant regulations
|
|Powerful, though supporting of project
|Regional
|-
|Other government institutions: Governor ofice of Vichada, Mayor ofice Cumaribo
|The Reservation for being part of the Cumaribo, Vichada, has territorial jurisdiction relations with the Governor’s office and the Mayor’s office.
|Benefit from the project, if possible
|Powerful, regionally
|Regional - National
|-
|Fundación NATURA
''Civil organization''
|Conservation, use and management of biodiversity
Maximise social and environmental benefits of project
|Ensure suffienct IPLC inclusion
|Mid-power. Can influence decisions regarding project activities though does not hold absolute power to define terms
|International
|-
|Mining companies
|Mine to generate revenue.
|Compete with the project for the territory's resources.
|Relatively powerful, though legally obstructed to achieve primary objective
|International
|-
|Other indigenous communities neighboring RIU-SM
|Ensure autonomy with respect to their own jurisdiction
|Not involved with the project though potentially affected by it
|Low, with respect to the project
|Local
|-
|FONDO ACCIÓN
|Facilitate private investment into project activities
|Conservation and sustainable development; Protection/development of children.
|Mid-power. Important as they raise funds for the project and benefit from it, though not primary beneficiaries.
|National
|-
|Asocarbono – An industry association, including Verra, ProClima, Biofix, and ACATISEMA.

|Promote the agenda of high-level actors of the VCM
Promote integrity of market
|Hide/argue cases of scandal
|Powerful
|International
|-
|OPIAC: National Oganization of the Indigenous Peoples of the Colombian Amazon

|Promotes Indigenous rights in Colombia
Exercises a political representation of the Indigenous peoples of the Colombian Amazon
|
|Powerful. Legally knowledgeable.
|National
|}

=== Discussion ===
According to the official REDD+ Mataven website<ref>RIU – SM (n.d.). ''REDD+ Mataven''. https://reddmataven.com/</ref> the project has resulted in a myriad of benefits to the Indigenous communities of the region. For example, as a result of the funds generated from the projects activities, there have been improvements in infrastructure, transportation and education, ultimately leading to the empowerment and improved governance of ACETISMA. However, the project has come under fire for multiple reasons.

For one, in 2015 some of the Indigenous communities filed a lawsuit referring to the violation of their right to ''consulta previa''. However, the court ruled that their Indigenous rights had not been violated as it was ACETISMA that initially sought MEDIAMOS to develop the project, and that ACETISMA were the best representatives of those Indigenous communities. Furthermore, the projects main focus was the conservation of the rainforest and therefore did not threaten the cultural integrity of those communities.<ref name=":10" /> However, regardless of the outcome of this case, its occurrence points to internal disagreement amongst Indigenous participants of the RIU-SM project. In a study involving interviews with Indigenous members of the project, there was a significant proportion of interviewees that had little knowledge regarding various aspects of the project, such as responsibilities of participation, or the benefit-sharing mechanism in place.<ref name=":2" /> This further reinforces the point that, in the case of the RIU-SM project it may not be ‘bottom-up’ and eludes to the power imbalance experienced between MEDIAMOS, the project developer, and Indigenous community members. In the PD there is a breakdown of the distribution of income between ACETISMA and MEDIAMOS, which shows a significant proportion of revenue flowing to the former organisation throughout the project’s operations.<ref name=":7" /> However, there is currently no publicly available documentation supporting this initial claim<ref name=":9" /> as there is no obligation to provide this information, leading to a general lack of transparency in the market and between all of the relevant actors. Subsequent meetings with Indigenous leaders have however shown a marked support of the Mataven project, with one Indigenous leader explicitly stating “...the Redd+ project has brought resources that they never had before, which allowed them to open new school classrooms, 21 rural aqueducts, cocoa crops and even headquarters in Cumaribo and Inírida.”<ref>Lievano, A. B. (2021) Colombia's biggest carbon credit project could be selling hot air. Latin American Center for Investigative Journalism. https://www.elclip.org/el-mayor-proyecto-de-bonos-de-carbono-de-colombia-podria-estar-vendiendo-aire-caliente/ </ref> Clearly there have been benefits for IPLC’s involved with this project, though the details of this benefit-sharing remain a mystery.

Secondly, the Mataven project has caused controversy due to its apparently inflated carbon credit issuance. One report states that this has been achieved by using a reference area that is not representative of the project area, as well as assuming an uncharacteristically heigh assumed rate of deforestation.<ref name=":12">Global Atlas of Environmental Justice (2023). ''Resguardo Indigena Unificado-Selva de Matavén (RIU SM) REDD+ Project, Colombia.'' https://ejatlas.org/conflict/redd-project-resguardo-indigena-unificado-selva-de-mataven-riu-sm</ref> The project used a baseline deforestation rate of 0.86% per year, which is significantly more than the Colombian government's national rate of 0.18%. Additionally, according to the report the reference area chosen is more easily accessed and therefore more prone to deforestation, making it an inaccurate comparison to the relatively remote project area.<ref name=":2" /> This has led to the creation of excess carbon credits, or “hot air” credits, which have been criticized for not reflecting real environmental benefits.<ref name=":9" /> To add further insult to injury these credits have been used by a Colombian fossil fuel distributor company to avoid paying taxes, as described earlier by Colombia’s change in policy in 2017. In doing so, the company avoided paying approximately $18.9 million in taxes.<ref name=":2" /> There has been subsequent back and forth between Verra and Carbon Market Watch, with Verra refuting the claims<ref>Verra (2021). ''Carbon Market Watch Report on Colombian REDD+ Projects Contains Flawed Allegations.'' https://verra.org/carbon-market-watch-report-on-colombian-redd-projects-contains-flawed-allegations/ </ref> Regardless of the science, Colombia recently introduced a resolution in 2018 (Resolution 1447 – 2018) that requires projects to use baselines that comply with national reference levels.<ref name=":13">Dufrasne, D. (2021b). Companies use ”hot air” forestry offsets to avoid taxes in Colombia: Carbon Market Watch’s fact-check of Verra’s response. Carbon Market Watch. https://carbonmarketwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/CMWs-fact-check-of-Verras-response-on-Colombia.pdf</ref><ref>IEA (2022). ''Resolution 1447 – 2018. Monitoring, Reporting, and Verification System for mitigation actions at the national level.'' International Energy Agency. https://www.iea.org/policies/14772-resolution-1447-2018-monitoring-reporting-and-verification-system-for-mitigation-actions-at-the-national-level</ref> Going forward, REDD+ projects that are being implemented in Colombia will have to abide by Colombia’s national legislation.

=== Summary ===
Colombia has a long history of engaging in REDD+ as it has been used to limit environmental degradation in the post-conflict era, in alignment with the country’s national peacebuilding agenda.<ref name=":11" /> Owing to the country’s comprehensive tenure and bundle rights, IPLC’s have robust ''de jure'' rights to land as they collectively own it, and rights to carbon are tied to this ownership. This puts Colombia as one of the world leaders in legal terms relating to REDD+ project implementation, but due to a lack of resources to ensure enforcement, as well as corruption, historically these laws have not been adhered to.<ref name=":10" /><ref name=":2" /> There are many documented cases showing the displacement on IPLC’s from traditional lands, poor efforts to adhere to ''consulta previa'', and inequitable benefit sharing.<ref>Greenfield, P. (2023''). The ‘carbon pirates’ preying on Amazon’s Indigenous communities.'' The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2023/jan/21/amazon-indigenous-communities-carbon-offsetting-pirates-aoe</ref><ref name=":14">Lang, C., (2024). ''Colombia’s Constitutional Court rules in favour of Indigenous Peoples. Identifies serious flaws in the REDD+ Baka Rokarire project.'' REDD_Monitor. https://reddmonitor.substack.com/p/colombias-constitutional-court-rules</ref>

The case of the Mataven project provides an interesting example of how it is the market itself that is failing to address concerns regarding transparency, whether that be relating to benefit-sharing amongst relevant stakeholders, or Indigenous representation and engagement throughout the implementation of REDD+ projects. Some ACATISEMA members have explicitly stated their support for the Mataven project,<ref name=":12" /> and its benefits can be seen first-hand in the form of improved infrastructure in local communities involved with the project.<ref>Myers, J. E., Parra, M. A., Bedford, C. (2021). ''How Carbon Offsetting Can Build a Forest.'' Stanford Social Innovation Review. https://ssir.org/articles/entry/how_carbon_offsetting_can_build_a_forest</ref> However, an exact breakdown of how and where revenue is being distributed to IPLC’s remains elusive.<ref name=":13" /> Furthermore, the level of IPLC engagement has come into question, specifically with reference to ''consulta previa'' and the overall understanding that IPLC’s have regarding the project’s intended outcomes and activities.<ref name=":10" /> This is not a rare case in Colombia and has been witnessed occurring with other projects that have been implemented on Indigenous territories in the Colombian Amazon.<ref name=":17">Lang, C., (2023''). “It destroys everything,” says Indigenous leader about the REDD+ Baka Rokarire project in Colombia''. REDD Monitor. https://reddmonitor.substack.com/p/it-destroys-everything-says-indigenous</ref> However, a recent ruling by the Colombian Constitutional court voted in favour of Indigenous groups in Colombia, upholding “the rights to self-determination, autonomy, self-government, territory, identity, physical and cultural integrity, and free, prior and informed consent of the indigenous communities”.<ref name=":14" /> This review ultimately sets a legal precedent safeguarding the fundamental rights of IPLCs with REDD+ project implementation and shows that progress is being made to improve the likelihood that REDD+ will result in genuine benefits to those affected by project implementation.

To ensure a more authentic engagement with IPLC’s as to result in legitimate and equitable benefit-sharing, improvements must be made by the Colombian government, as well as within the VCM itself. For the former, Colombia’s national registry for GHG mitigation activities must be updated; it has been offline since 2022.<ref name=":10" /> As a result, transparency is lacking. International finance could be utilized as to alleviate this issue, and only with an accurate and reliable database may the market be regulated. In the broader sense, VCM registries must create stricter guidelines promoting transparency. Often PD’s refer to annexed documents that contain relevant information regarding benefit-sharing, though these are often not publicly available.<ref name=":9" /> This limits transparency and increases the likelihood of inequitable agreements being made between project proponents and developers, further exacerbating existing power asymmetries between the two groups and limiting the likelihood that ''consulta previa'' is honestly adhered to.<ref name=":10" /> This has led to conflict within Indigenous communities, rather than a strengthening of their social fabric.

Furthermore, the Mataven project calls into question the actual emissions reduction that REDD+ projects achieve. Whilst Colombia has since updated its regulations such that REDD+ must use baselines that comply with national reference levels, it is up in the air as to how representative these guidelines are. Reference areas must represent project areas and without the appropriate regulations in place project developers lack the incentive to create realistic baselines; ultimately they are aiming to produce the maximum number of credits as to generate the greatest possible revenues.

==Conclusion==
As a market-based mechanism, REDD+ is shackled by the construct in which it operates; fundamentally it is a capitalist means of fixing a capitalist problem, which comes with limitations. Both Brazil and Colombia have relatively robust laws that have been written into the constitution, ultimately promoting more equitable results of REDD+ project implementation. However, as in Colombia IPLC’s collectively own the land, whereas in Brazil these groups only own rights to use the land,<ref name=":2" /> Colombia can be considered better equipped for the establishment of REDD+ projects on traditional Indigenous territory. However, even with these laws in place enforcement remain a matter of concern. Furthermore, given the wide variety of ontological and epistemological perspectives of Indigenous communities, and how these views conflict with the Western worldview from which market-based REDD+ came to fruition, there is an inherent difficulty in implementing a system of governance in REDD+ on Indigenous lands.<ref name=":1" />. Putting a price on nature conflicts with Indigenous perspectives and there have been instances where this has attacked the social and cultural fabric of IPLC’s.<ref name=":17" /> To avoid this REDD+ developers must have the genuine intent of understanding the perspective of the Indigenous group they are working with and aim to implement REDD+ with a bottom-up approach.

In both countries, transparency must be improved to ensure that FPIC is adhered to and subsequently ensure fair IPLC representation and engagement. This issue predominantly arises due to the poor requirements of standards in the VCM. As such, proponents are guided by developers which have little incentive to truly act in the interests of Indigenous groups; ultimately the organizations in charge of project development are interested in increasing project revenues. This has led to instances of over-crediting, as without a transparent framework in which to operate it is difficult to evaluate the legitimacy of the claims being made by project proponents and developers. However, with recent advances that address concerns of additionality<ref name=":15" /> there is hope for improved market integrity. Standards of the VCM must continue to be scrutinized to ensure that progress continues to be made.

Going forward, progress should be made to formalize the customary laws and traditional lands of IPLCs, and finance should be directed towards the enforcement of these laws. The environmental,<ref name=":16" /> economic,<ref name=":5" /><ref>Ding, H., Veit, P. G., Blackman, A., Gray, E., Reytar, K., Altamirano, J. C., Hodgdon, B., (2016). ''Climate benefits, tenure costs: The economic case for securing Indigenous land rights in the Amazon''. WRI. https://files.wri.org/d8/s3fs-public/Climate_Benefits_Tenure_Costs_Executive_Summary.pdf</ref> and social<ref>Sarmiento Barletti, J. P., Heise Vigil, N., & Larson, A. M. (2023). ''Safeguards at a glance: Are voluntary standards supporting community land, resource and carbon rights?'' CIFOR-ICRAF. https://www.cifor-icraf.org/publications/pdf_files/Flyer/REDD-Safeguards-7.pdf </ref> benefits of this have been researched and are well understood. By developing culturally appropriate frameworks for rights-based conservation regimes, that work with IPLCs in accordance with their worldviews, REDD+ could be used to promote Indigenous autonomy. However, progress still must be made to achieve this goal.

==References==

Documentation:Open Case Studies/FRST522/2024/REDD+ in Indigenous Amazonia: What works and what doesn’t?

2024-12-16T22:16:23Z

ConnorHaynes: /* Indigenous rights - Constitutional, tenure and bundle rights */

__TOC__

==Positionality==
First and foremost I am not Indigenous, and whilst there are a myriad of cultures, ontologies and epistemologies that are not sufficiently represented by simply stating ‘Indigenous’, it is commonly accepted that these worldviews are vastly different to those of the ‘Western’ world, which is the world in which I grew up and matured. I am therefore only understanding of Indigenous cultures, beliefs and customary laws based upon available online literature and those which I have learnt through life, in addition to those introduced to me in my Master’s degree. As such, I will never be able to fully relate to an Indigenous person; the best I can do is try to understand and learn. Only throughout this process am I able to work towards reconciliation and attempt to address the inequities experienced by Indigenous folk globally.

Additionally, I am yet to act as a carbon project proponent and so do not understand the nuances or stresses of undertaking such a task. Whilst an individual proponent may have the best intention of procuring a carbon project for its social and environmental benefits, there are a number of stakeholders involved throughout the entire process which influence its eventual outcome. Without experience acting as a project proponent I am naïve in understanding the process and it's difficulties.

==Acronyms / Terminology==
'''Acronyms:'''

AFOLU: Agriculture, Forestry and Other Land-Use

ICVCM: Integrity Council for the Voluntary Carbon Market

IPLC: Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities

KMGBF: Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework

LAC: Latin American Countries

MRV: Monitoring, Reporting and Verification

REDD+: Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation

UNCBD: United Nations Convention on Biological Biodiversity

VCMI: Voluntary Carbon Markets Integrity Initiative

'''Terminology:'''

''Additionality:'' Additionality is the determination of whether the project will lead to the expected outcomes when compared to the baseline or ‘business as usual’ emissions.

''Leakage'': Refers to the shifting of emissions to outside the project boundary as a result of the project’s activities.

''Permanence:'' Permanence refers to the degree to which a carbon credit is equivalent to a permanent removal or reduction in emissions.
==Abstract==
This case study illustrates two examples of Indigenous-led REDD+ projects on Indigenous territory in Colombia and Brazil. Both countries have a relatively long history of engaging with REDD+ but have slightly different legal structures pertaining to the rights of Indigenous peoples on their traditional territories, and specifically their ‘carbon’ rights. As such, the intention is to evaluate how these differing ''de jure'' rights translate on the ground. With respect to REDD+, do certain rights result in legitimately positive benefits to IPLCs, as well as the environment that these projects were originally intended to protect? The intention is such that the reader can evaluate the effectiveness and true benefit of REDD+ projects to IPLC’s, based upon the legal frameworks of the host country. A secondary intention is such that the reader is better equipped to conduct a prefeasibility assessment based upon available online literature, to evaluate the likelihood that REDD+ can be implemented in any chosen country, with the genuine intent of benefiting IPLC’s that are directly affected as a result of REDD+ project implementation.

==REDD+ and the VCM in Brazil and Colombia==
REDD+, originally introduced by the UNFCCC, is a market-based mechanism sitting within the VCM that aims to reverse the loss of forests and carbon stocks, specifically in developing countries. Simply put, an entity or an individual can voluntarily pay another that has engaged with REDD+ and subsequently sequestered carbon, to offset their own emissions using ‘credits’, sold as units of greenhouse gas equivalent to one ton of carbon dioxide (CO2e). Forestry and Land-Use remains to be the largest category of carbon credits traded by transaction volume on the VCM, with REDD+ being the most popular project type in this category, accounting for 78% of credits traded.<ref name=":0">Procton, A., (2024). ''State of the voluntary carbon market 2024: On the path to maturity.'' Forest Trends Ecosystem Marketplace.</ref> Furthermore, over one-third of the credits sold within this category were sourced from projects that had been implemented in LAC and the Caribbean in 2024.<ref name=":0" /> Of the four largest standards issuing carbon credits, Verra accounts for roughly 80% of issuances in Latin America,<ref>Pullins, T. (2022). Growth of carbon markets in Latin America. White & Case. https://www.whitecase.com/publications/insight/latin-america-focus-fall-2022-growth-carbon-markets </ref> and even in the face of recent scrutiny,<ref>West, T. A. P., Bofim, B., Haya, B. K. (2024). Methodological issues with deforestation baselines compromise the integrity of carbon offsets from REDD+. ''Global Environmental Change, 87'' https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2024.102863</ref><ref>Wyburd I., & Dufrasne, G. (2023). Error Log: Exposing the methodological failures of REDD+ forestry projects. Carbon Market Watch. https://carbonmarketwatch.org/publications/error-log-exposing-the-methodological-failures-of-redd-forestry-projects/</ref><ref name=":15">Haya, B. K., Alford-Jones, K., Anderegg, W. R. L., Beymer-Farris, B., Blanchard, L., Bomfim, B., Chin, D., Evans, S., Hogan, M., Holm, J. A., McAfee, K., So, I. S., West, T. A. P., & Withey, L. (2023). ''Quality assessment of REDD+ carbon credit projects''. Berkeley Carbon Trading Project. https://gspp.berkeley.edu/research-and-impact/centers/cepp/projects/berkeley-carbontrading-project/REDD+</ref> REDD+ projects account for a significant proportion of the VCM with their continued application likely to persist.<ref>Gordon, O. (2022). ''The interwoven fortunes of carbon markets and indigenous communities.'' Energy Monitor. https://www.energymonitor.ai/tech/carbon-removal/the-interwoven-fortunes-of-carbon-markets-and-indigenous-communities/</ref><ref>Müller, M., Coustar, C., Bietta, F., Mathres, M. (2022). ''UNFCCC REDD+ and the power of sovereign carbon.'' Deutsche Banke Chief Investment Office. https://www.rainforestcoalition.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/CIO-Special-UNFCCC-REDD-power-of-sovereign-carbon.pdf</ref><ref>Pullins, T. (2022). ''Growth of carbon markets in Latin America.'' White & Case. https://www.whitecase.com/publications/insight/latin-america-focus-fall-2022-growth-carbon-markets </ref> With the introduction of updated methodologies aimed at addressing these concerns,<ref>Verra (2023a). ''Setting the Standard: Verra’s Revolutionary New REDD Methodology.'' https://verra.org/program-notice/setting-the-standard-verras-revolutionary-new-redd-methodology/</ref><ref>Verra (2023b). ''VM0048 Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation, v1.0.'' https://verra.org/methodologies/vm0048-reducing-emissions-from-deforestation-and-forest-degradation-v1-0/</ref> there is hope for renewed buyer confidence in the integrity of this market,<ref>MSCI (2023). ''Verra’s New Methodology for Unplanned Deforestation Aims to Silence the Critics''. https://www.msci.com/www/blog-posts/verra-s-new-methodology-for/04577808942</ref> though more work still needs to be done.

Both Colombia and Brazil have a relatively long history of implementing REDD+ projects, using both fund-based and market-based mechanisms. For example, both countries were participants in the ‘Amazon Indigenous REDD+ (RIA in Spanish) initiative, with the first pilot implementation project being initiated in Colombia’s Puiawai Natural Reserve.<ref>Garzón, E., (2017). ''Amazon Indigenous REDD+: An innovative approach to conserve Colombian forests?'' Mongabay. https://news.mongabay.com/2017/01/amazon-indigenous-redd-an-innovative-approach-to-conserve-colombian-forests/</ref> The relevance of these two countries with respect to REDD+ is simple. Much of the Amazon’s primary tropical rainforest falls within these countries jurisdiction and this rainforest has been consistently under threat from external pressures and encroachment, whether that be in the form of land-clearing for commercial ranching, subsistence purposes, illicit drug production or illegal mining practices,<ref name=":8">Sánchez García, P. A. & Wong, G. Y., (2024) “The political economy of deforestation in the Colombian Amazon”, ''Journal of Political Ecology'' ''31''(1), 178–199. https://doi.org/10.2458/jpe.5230</ref><ref>Radwin, M. (2023). ''Drug trafficking fuels other deforestation drivers in the Amazon: report.'' Mongabay. https://news.mongabay.com/2023/07/drug-trafficking-fuels-other-deforestation-drivers-in-the-amazon-report/</ref><ref>Haddad, E.A., Araújo, I.F., Feltran-Barbieri, R., Perobelli, F. S., Rocha, A., Sass, K. S., Nobre, C. A. (2024). Economic drivers of deforestation in the Brazilian Legal Amazon. ''Nat Sustain'' ''7'', 1141–1148. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41893-024-01387-7 </ref><ref>Hänggli, A., Levy, S. A., Armenteras, D., Bovolo, C. I., Brandão, J., Rueda, X., & Garrett, R. D. (2023). A systematic comparison of deforestation drivers and policy effectiveness across the amazon biome. ''Environmental Research Letters, 18''(7), 073001. https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/acd408</ref> to name a few.

In theory, REDD+ can be used to provide the economic incentive to promote sustained environmental protection of Indigenous lands, with a focus on the rights and livelihoods of IPLCs. Currently the overall funding to IPLCs tenure rights and forest management in tropical countries is low, receiving just $270 million per year between 2011-2020 from bilateral and multilateral donors and private philanthropies.<ref>Hatcher, J., Owen, M., Yin, D., (2021). ''Falling short: Donor funding for Indigenous peoples and local communities to secure tenure rights and manage forests in tropical countries (2011 -2020).'' Rainforest Foundation Norway. https://dv719tqmsuwvb.cloudfront.net/documents/Publikasjoner/Andre-rapporter/RFN_Falling_short_2021.pdf</ref> REDD+ has the potential to channel funding as to promote Indigenous rights and autonomy, provided there is transparent and equitable benefit-sharing for those involved. Fundamentally, only with the inclusion of IPLC’s, or preferably with IPLC’s acting as project proponents, is REDD+ able to promote Indigenous agency and improve IPLC rights and governance. And only when the rights of those inhabiting the land are formally recognized can the land be effectively conserved.<ref name=":16">Reytar, K., Veit, P., von Braun, J. (2024). ''Protecting Biodiversity Hinges on Securing Indigenous and Community Land Rights.'' WRI. https://www.wri.org/insights/indigenous-and-local-community-land-rights-protect-biodiversity</ref> The inclusion of IPLCs in REDD+ project development is therefore considered to be essential for project success, and this is in theory embodied in the very nature of REDD+.<ref name=":1">Alvarez, G., Elfving, M. and Andrade, C. (2016) ‘REDD+ governance and indigenous peoples in Latin America: the case of Suruí Carbon Project in the Brazilian Amazon Forest’, ''Latin American J. Management for Sustainable Development 3''(2) pp.133–146. https://doi.org/10.1504/LAJMSD.2016.083705</ref> Partially owing to a long history of dealing with REDD+, Colombia and Brazil are amongst just a few of the countries hosting tropical rainforests that explicitly recognise community rights to carbon and tie these rights to the legal ownership of lands and forests. In Colombia, carbon rights are tied to land rights, whereas in Brazil carbon rights are tied to forest rights.<ref name=":2">RRI and McGill University (2021). Technical report: ''Status of legal recognition of Indigenous Peoples’, Local Communities’ and Afro-descendant Peoples’ rights to carbon stored in tropical lands and forests''. Rights and Resources Initiative. https://doi.org/10.53892/MLQQ5744</ref>

==Brazil: The Suruí Forest Carbon Project==
[[File:The Amazon Basin, Brazil.jpg|thumb|376x376px|Brazil's Amazon rainforest]]

=== Project description and location ===
The Surui Forest Carbon project was implemented in 2009 on the territory of the Surui people, which is situated in the southern part of Brazil’s Amazon between the states of Rondônia and Mato Grosso. Surui Indigenous territory covers an area of 2,481 km2, though the intention of the PCFS was to protect a portion of this total area. According to the PD, the stated objective was to “prevent 13,575.3 hectares of tropical forest from being cleared by 2038, to avoid the emission of 7,258,352.3 tCO2e to the atmosphere, and to contribute to the preservation of the Paiter Surui lifestyle and traditions.”<ref>IDESAM (2011). ''Project description: Surui forest carbon project''. Institute for Conservation and Sustainable Development of Amazonas. Link: "PROJ_DESC_1118_02FEB2012.PDF" found at https://registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/1118 </ref> This region sits within one of the Brazilian Amazon’s main ‘arcs of deforestation’ and pressure from loggers and ranchers is a matter of concern.

Notably, the PCFS was the first REDD+ project to be proposed by Indigenous peoples in the Brazilian Amazon on their own territory and was the first to receive certification by both the VCS and CCBS.<ref name=":1" />. Metareilá, the Surui’s own Indigenous association, acted as project proponent and the Institute for Conservation and Sustainable Development of Amazonas (IDESAM) assisted with project development, alongside multiple other stakeholder groups. As an endogenous initiative procured and conducted by the Surui community, the SFCP had a ‘non-centralized model of governance’, which reflected the characteristics and traditions of the Surui people. <ref name=":1" />

Only after two years of consultations between the 24 communities involved and the relevant governmental agencies (primarily FUNAI and the Ministry of Environment) was a Memorandum of Understanding signed, showing community consent to develop the project.<ref name=":3">Garcia, B., Rimmer, L., Canal Vieira, L., Mackey, B., (2021). REDD+ and forest protection on indigenous lands in the Amazon. ''RECIEL 30'', 207–219. https://doi.org/10.1111/reel.12389</ref> In 2012 after verification from an independent third-party body, the Surui were able to sell carbon credits on the international market. Between 2009 and 2014 the project drastically helped limit the deforestation occurring within the project’s site, causing many to deem it a success.<ref name=":4">Howard, F. E., (2023). ''An Analysis of the Suruí Forest Carbon Project in Context of Settler Colonialism''. Masters thesis. Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University. https://vtechworks.lib.vt.edu/server/api/core/bitstreams/b0cde6de-794c-453f-856b-ee72bde3db06/content</ref>

=== National climate targets, policies and legislation ===
Rates of deforestation in Brazil’s legal Amazon are significantly impacted by the government in charge. This is evidenced in the decade between 2012 and 2021 whilst under the conservative Bolsonaro administration, when deforestation in the Amazon increased 185% — from a loss of 4,571 km2 in 2012 to 13,038 km2 in 2021.<ref>INPE (2022). ''Observação da Terra. http://www.obt.inpe.br/OBT/assuntos/programas/amazonia/prodes''</ref> However, since Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s appointment in 2022 there has been a steady decline in the rate of deforestation, which is now roughly half what it was in 2021.<ref>Terra Brasilis (2024). ''PRODES (deforestation): Deforestation rates – Legal Amazon – States''. https://terrabrasilis.dpi.inpe.br/app/dashboard/deforestation/biomes/legal_amazon/rates</ref> A significant proportion of emissions result from the clearing of rainforest and its subsequent conversion to ranching.<ref>MCTI (2022). ''Estimativas Anuais De Emissões De Gases De Efeito Estufa No Brasil.'' 6ª Edição. Ministério da Estado da Ciência, Tecnologia e Inovações. https://www.gov.br/mcti/pt-br/acompanhe-o-mcti/sirene/publicacoes/estimativas-anuais-de-emissoes-gee/arquivos/6a-ed-estimativas-anuais.pdf</ref> To address these emissions Brazil has implemented various adaptation policies, legislation and targets which are summarized below:
{| class="wikitable"
|'''Document name'''
|'''Type'''
|'''Publication year'''
|'''Key takeaways'''
|-
|National Policy on Climate Change (NPCC)
|Legislation
|2009
|Framework for addressing climate change
|-
|National Plan on Climate Change Adaptation
|Policy
|2016
|Framework for addressing impacts of climate change
|-
|Nationally Determined Contribution
|Target
|2024
|Reduce net greenhouse gas emissions by 59 to 67 percent below 2005 levels by 2035
|-
|Federal Constitution, Article 225
|Legislation
|2006
|The Amazon rainforest is considered as a ‘national heritage’.All levels of government have a shared responsibility to protect it and the environment
|-
| colspan="4" |'''Relating to REDD+'''
|-
|Plan of Action for the Prevention and Control of Deforestation in the Legal Amazon (PPCDAM)
|Policy
|2004
|Aims to reduce deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon
|-
|Forest code
|Legislation
|2012
|Aimed at reducing deforestation, but no specific mention of REDD+
|-
|Amazon Indigenous REDD+ Initiative
|Policy
|2012
|Incorporate Indigenous with REDD+ initiatives
|-
|National REDD+ Strategy (ENREDD+)
|Policy
|2016
|REDD+ as a fund-based mechanism
|}

=== Indigenous rights - Constitutional, tenure and bundle rights ===
In Brazil, Indigenous rights are robust and clearly defined according to the Brazilian Constitution. As a result, the Indigenous communities of the Brazilian Amazon have legal title to 13.8% of the national territory totalling 1.175 million km2, with a total of 631 territories.<ref>Federal government of Brazil (2024). ''Brazil’s NDC: National determination to contribute and transform''. https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/2024-11/Brazil_Second%20Nationally%20Determined%20Contribution%20%28NDC%29_November2024.pdf</ref>
{| class="wikitable"
| colspan="2" |'''Laws'''
|-
|Article 231 of the 1988 Constitution
|Indigenous peoples to have their exclusive right to use their territories to derive economic benefits. Grants indigenous peoples the right to land, prohibits eviction, and restricts mining without authorization from the federal government.
|-
|Indigenous Peoples statute (1973).

|No acts restricting the full exercise of indigenous peoples’ permanent tenure over the land should be permitted.
|-
| colspan="2" | '''Treaties'''
|-
|United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2007)
|Requires States to obtain free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) for the approval of any projects affecting indigenous territories.
|-
|International Labour Organization Convention 169 (2019)
|Ratified and incorporated under domestic law in 2002 through Decree 10.088/2019, endorsing UNDRIP
|-
|American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2016)
|Supports and builds upon UNDRIP
|}
Whilst Indigenous communities in Brazil have legal title to land, it is the State that owns it. Indigenous people simply exercise permanent tenure over lands that they traditionally occupy and have ‘original rights’ to these traditional lands, which no other rights can prevail over.<ref name=":3" /> Indigenous lands, though not classified as protected areas, “have the highest level of protection by law because they are regulated by the Constitution” and cannot be leased or restricted without violating their original rights. The Suruí's right to develop the PCFS is grounded in the Brazilian Constitution, which grants Indigenous peoples exclusive rights to use the ‘riches of the soil, rivers and lakes’ of their land, and these rights cannot be overridden. Thus, Indigenous people and only Indigenous people are legally allowed to engage in productive activities on their land, provided these activities are conducted according to their own customs and traditions and are necessary for the wellbeing and cultural expression of their own people. In Brazil, it is the armed forces and federal police that are responsible for enforcing these laws, and FUNAI is responsible for representing Indigenous communities in judicial disputes.<ref name=":3" /> As such, provided a REDD+ project does not violate the rights to territorial integrity, permanent land tenure and original rights, it is legally allowed.
[[File:Two Pataxo indians (Brasília, 04 April 2006).jpeg|thumb|414x414px|Two Indigenous in Brazil]]
'''CARBON RIGHTS:''' In Brazil, carbon rights are tied to forest rights.<ref name=":2" /> Carbon credits from REDD+ projects are seen as part of the economic benefits derived from indigenous lands, and as such, Indigenous communities are entitled to own, control and distribute these revenues themselves. The carbon credits generated from the (SFCP) were wholly owned by the Suruí people through Metareilá, with the Suruí Fund (managed by the Brazilian Biodiversity Fund - FUNBIO) acting as recipient. This legality reinforces Indigenous control over both land and carbon rights, as whoever has rights to the forest land is usually recognized as the owner of carbon rights.<ref name=":3" /> Collectively these national and international laws provide an important safeguard to Indigenous peoples, making their consent a prerequisite for the establishment of REDD+ projects and recognizing their rights as the main beneficiaries of REDD+ revenues.<ref name=":3" /> However, as carbon rights are tied to forest rights in Brazil and not land rights, and carbon is considered to be an ‘environmental service’ (Article 41(I)(A) Brazilian Forestry Code), states as well as the federal government have the jurisdiction to exercise full legislative authority over carbon. <ref name=":2" /> As such, certain states have interpreted the law to imply that the title to carbon credits is attributable to the state.<ref>Loft, L., Ravikumar, A., Gebara, M. F., Pham, T. T., Resosudarmo, I. A. P., Assembe, S., Tovar, J. G., Mwangi, E., & Andersson, K. (2015). Taking Stock of Carbon Rights in REDD+ Candidate Countries: Concept Meets Reality. ''Forests'', ''6''(4), 1031-1060. https://doi.org/10.3390/f6041031</ref> Hence, even when carbon rights are clearly defined and tied to forest title it is insufficient in itself, and only by legally recognizing the customary rights of IPLCs can a fair and equitable outcome be realised.

'''FPIC OBLIGATION:''' Brazilian law requires Free, Prior, and Informed Consent (FPIC) for REDD+ projects affecting indigenous lands, ensuring that international standards such as the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) and ILO Convention No. 169 are adhered to; Indigenous consent is, ''de jure,'' a necessity. Projects that violate these rights and fail to consult communities are therefore considered illegal. Notably there are no specific rules or procedures that have been written into the Brazilian constitution that provide guidance on how to achieve FPIC. However, this freedom reinforces Indigenous autonomy as it allows an Indigenous community to define the rules of consultation according to their customs and traditions.

=== Interested and affected stakeholders ===
{| class="wikitable"
| colspan="5" |'''Affected stakeholders'''
|-
|Stakeholders
|Primary objective(s)
|Secondary objective(s)
|Relative power
|Scope of influence
|-
|Metareilá Association of the Suruí Indigenous People
|Project proponent

Works to defend and preserve the cultural and territorial heritage of the Suruí people.

Responsible for the Suruí Fund (FUNBIO). Ensure equitable distribution of funds
|Ensure project longevity.
Stick to the mandate; attempt not to be influenced by external actors
|Powerful, though lacking technical knowhow. Have carbon rights and thus have ultimate control of project revenue; can decide how this revenue is distributed.
|Local
|-
|Other Indigenous groups and associations
|Support various aspects of proejct development
|Aim to benefit from the project
|Have the same rights as the Metareila with respect to land though are less involved with project development and have less say, nor derive economic benefits like the Metareila
|Local
|-
|''Campesinos'' (peasants)
|Survive via subsistence.
|Procure more land.
|Have far fewer rights than Indigenous groups and no involvement with the project
|Local
|-
| colspan="5" |'''Interested stakeholders'''
|-
|IDESAM - Institute for Conservation and Sustainable Development of Amazonas
|Maximise revenue from project.
Ensure project longevity
|Achieve completion of various technical aspects of project
|Powerful: Required to complete various technical aspects of development.
|National
|-
|Forest Trends
|Supported formulation and implementation of the project.
Uphold image of organization
|Maximise environmental benefits of project
|Powerful: Tasked with raising funds and fostering an international network; an integral part of project development
|International
|-
|Amazon Conservation Team - ACT Brazil
|Supports various aspect of project development as well as offering legal advice.
Other technical assistance
|Maximise environmental benefits of project
|Powerful: An integral part of project development
|International
|-
|Kanindé Association for Ethno-Environmental Defense – non-profit
|Promote Metareilá views and beliefs
|Involved with various aspects of project development
|Mid-power. Has a say in project direction, though less weight than the Metareila.
|National - International
|-
|Ministry of Environment (MMA)
|Responsible for protection and conservation of natural environment
|Ensure project adheres to national law
|Powerful. Must be notified about project activities although cannot strictly alter decisions made by the Surui
|National
|-
|National Indian Foundation (FUNAI)
|Promote Indigenous rights

|Represents Indignous organizations with judicial matters.
|Powerful. Knowleadgeable of judicial system. Must be notified about project activities though is not involved with project governance.
|National
|-
|Government of the State of Mato Grosso
|Encourage development, and reduce poverty and crime in Mato Grosso
|Ensure project adheres to regional law.
|Powerful. Legilative control over regional police and municipalities
|Regional
|}

=== Discussion ===
Although originally successful in achieving its goal of reducing deforestation and degradation, in 2016 diamonds were discovered in Surui territory, leading to an increase in illegal logging and mining.<ref name=":1" /> By 2018 the project site had been completely overrun by ''garimpeiros'' (small-scale gold miners), ultimately leading to the projects suspension that year. <ref name=":4" />

While the project had initially garnered support, divisions emerged within the community post-project implementation. Disputes arose over the unequal distribution of project revenues, leading to internal conflicts between different Suruí clans. These criticisms escalated in 2014 when the Catholic Indigenous Missionary Council supported calls for an end to the project due to mismanagement of revenues from carbon credit sales. <ref name=":3" /> Some Suruí members also argued that the REDD+ initiative harmed their way of life.<ref>Lang, C. (2014). ''“What are projects for that destroy life?” Interview with Henrique Suruí about the Paiter-Suruí REDD project, Brazil.'' REDD-Monitor. https://redd-monitor.org/2014/12/17/what-are-projects-for-that-destroy-life-interview-with-henrique-surui-about-the-paiter-surui-redd-project-brazil/</ref>

Further complicating the situation was the controversial role of Henrique Suruí, one of the Suruí tribal leaders. In 2011, it was revealed that Henrique had violated the tribe's logging moratorium, collaborating with loggers in illegal activities. While Henrique later denied responsibility for the project’s failure, his actions, combined with internal disagreements, illustrated the lack of consensus within the Suruí leadership on the project’s goals and outcomes. Both of the tribe’s leaders possessed dramatically different perspectives on how they believed they could ensure agency, autonomy, and economic benefits for the Suruí people.<ref name=":4" /> This fragmentation within the community, in combination with the discovery of diamonds and the state's failure to protect indigenous land rights led to the indefinite suspension of the REDD+ project.

The project's collapse highlights broader structural issues, particularly the state's inconsistent support for indigenous land rights, influenced by settler colonialism, which undermined the project’s long-term viability.<ref name=":4" /> Additionally, the project’s creation was shaped by external actors, including the collaboration between Almir Suruí and Borges from Forest Trends, a Washington-based NGO. This partnership introduced a Western perspective on viewing the Suruí peoples forest, in contrast with their own perspectives on land use and governance. Furthermore, despite Borges’ Brazilian background, the power dynamics between a global North organization and a developing, Indigenous community were apparent.

=== Summary ===
The Suruí Forest Carbon Project provides an interesting example of how, even when the rights of IPLC’s are relatively robust, challenges persist in ensuring REDD+ project longevity. As such, in its current state, REDD+ in the Brazilian Amazon may not be a suitable market-based option for Indigenous communities in the Amazon.<ref name=":3" /> Although initially successful in promoting Indigenous autonomy and reducing deforestation, the project resulted in failure due to of a myriad of factors. Division between Surui communities was exacerbated by a perceived unequal benefit-sharing, and the impact of imposing REDD+ seems to have complicated the traditional social structure that the Surui were dependent on. These issues were influenced by Brazil's settler state dynamics, where Indigenous land rights, although legally recognized, are often not upheld in practice due to insufficient enforcement.<ref name=":4" /> Ultimately, the Surui project reveals how settler colonialism's structural flaws make long-term project success difficult, despite initial progress in promoting Indigenous autonomy.

At the national and state level, complex institutional and legal land governance structures convolute and impede REDD+ in Brazil. Multiple institutions share responsibilities and there is no comprehensive, authoritative database of land ownership, which hampers efforts to protect Indigenous territories.<ref name=":5">Costa, R. (2016)''. Insecure land rights in Brazil: Consequences for rural areas and challenges for improvement.'' Climate Policy Initiative. https://www.climatepolicyinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/Insecure_Land_Rights_in_Brazil_CPI.pdf</ref> As a result, land tenure disputes remain common and can be witnessed occurring between the public as well between public and state actors. For example, Brazil’s 1964 Land Statute (Law No. 4504) allows the government to takeover unproductive farms and transfer those lands to landless peasants. This often results in the clearing of forest, as only when the land is cleared is it evidenced to be ‘productive’.<ref name=":5" /> Hence, not only does this law cause insecurity for Indigenous populations in Brazil, it also forces them to go against customary traditions of stewarding the land in an effort to maintain its control.

Whilst the aforementioned points to the futility of REDD+ in Brazil, there is reason to maintain optimism. In a recent landmark ruling Brazil’s supreme court voted in favour of the Xoleng peoples, and the decision will serve as a precedent for all cases involving Indigenous peoples.<ref name=":6">Amos-Flom, K., (2023). ''Triumph and Turmoil: The Xokleng Case and the Future of Indigenous Land Rights in Brazil.'' Columbia Journal of Transnational Law. https://www.jtl.columbia.edu/bulletin-blog/triumph-and-turmoil-the-xokleng-case-and-the-future-of-indigenous-land-rights-in-brazil</ref> The Xokleng’s land dispute, settled in 2023, “rejected Santa Catarina state’s marco temporal (“time limit”) argument, which would have required Indigenous people to prove they occupied or legally contested the territory they claimed before the Brazilian Constitution came into force in 1988. If successful, this argument would have led to disastrous repercussions, as many Indigenous peoples had been forcibly removed or are traditionally nomadic.”<ref name=":6" /> Evidently, whilst slow, progress has been made in Brazil in recent years with respect to Indigenous rights as well as the voluntary carbon market itself.

There are currently 159 AFOLU projects listed on the Verra database in Brazil, with only two specifically focused on REDD+ initiatives in collaboration with Indigenous groups. These are the Ka’a Pyahu project, <ref>Verra (n.d.) ''Project 5087: KA'A PYAHU.'' https://registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/5087</ref> initiated by the Guajajara Indigenous people in collaboration with external organizations and validated in 2021, and the ‘Together for the forest Awaete REDD+ project’<ref>Verra (n.d.) ''Project 5200: TOGETHER FOR THE FOREST AWAETÉ REDD+ PROJECT.'' https://registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/5200</ref> which is still under development. Both projects involve Indigenous groups working with Brazilian organizations to build technical capacity and expertise. This could signal a growing trend of Indigenous-led REDD+ projects in the future. To ensure a positive future for REDD+ in Brazil, the customary rights of IPLC’s must be formally recognized. IPLC should have legal ownership of their traditional lands, and in doing so the carbon rights of these communities would be less convoluted, leading to more equitable benefit-sharing and increased cohesion amongst these groups post-project implementation.

==Colombia: ''REDD+ project Resguardo Indigena Unificado - Selva de Mataven (RUI-SM)''==

=== '''Project description and location''' ===
[[File:RS6524 MG 3944.jpg|thumb|407x407px|A view of the Mataven]]
According to the PD,<ref name=":7">ACATISEMA & Mediamos (2017). ''Joint project description and monitoring report: REDD+ project: Resguardo Indigena Unificado – Selva de Mataven (RIU – SM).'' Link: “10 06 2017_VCS Final Report_ Matavin Project.pdf” found at https://registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/1566</ref> the Resguardo Indígena Unificado – Selva de Matavén (RIU-SM) project is located east of the Colombian Orinoco high plain, in the eastern part of the Department of Vichada, municipality of Cumaribo. It resides on the formalized resguardo of the Sikuani, Piaroa, Puinave, Curripaco, Cubeo and Piapoco ethnic groups, spanning 1,856,836 hectares, with 1,477,115 hectares (79.6%) being forested. The PD states that it will reduce greenhouse gas emissions, with a total estimated net reduction of 108,670,562 tons of CO2 equivalent over thirty years, from years 2013 – 2042. By this metric, it is the 14th largest project on the Verra registry, out of over 1700 projects.<ref name=":9">Dufrasne, D., (2021). ''Two Shades of Green: How hot air forest credits are being used to avoid carbon taxes in Colombia''. Carbon Market Watch. https://carbonmarketwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Two-shades-of-green_EN_WEB.pdf</ref> There are 12,312 Indigenous people living in the RIU-SM, belonging to 2,517 families and 250 communities as of 2017.

The project was initiated by the Asociación de Cabildos y Autoridades Indígenas de la Selva de Matavén (ACETISMA), an Indigenous association, and developed by MEDIAMOS F&M, a Colombian consultancy firm. ACETISMA is comprised of Indigenous leaders that represent the 17 communities of the reservation in charge of governing the territory, and it has administrative autonomy, as well as “the capacity to acquire, to own and to dispose of property, to accept donations, to hold national and international conventions, scientific and cultural exchanges and generally, to celebrate all kinds of negotiations and agreements with which the Association can achieve its objectives.”<ref name=":7" />

There is a stated focus on various means of improving the living conditions of the Indigenous peoples living within the project area. To summarise, the main objectives of the REDD+ project RIU-SM include:

· Community development, in the form of improved education.

· Community engagement with respect to the project; developing information channels to reveal project progress.

· Support local initiatives for environmental education and waste management.

· Developing an effective response system that addresses community proposals and concerns relating to the project.

· Strengthening the governance of ACATISEMA.
=== National climate targets, policies and legislation ===
The Colombian Amazon makes up over one-third of Colombia’s national territory, and up until 2005 only 7.3% of the Colombian Amazon had been deforested, largely due to the country's 60-year armed conflict between the government, multiple left-wing guerillas such as FARC, and several far-right paramilitary groups.<ref name=":8" /> However, following the signing of the Peace Treaty in 2016 and demobilization of the FARC, limits to deforestation were weakened in the Colombian Amazon. Poor but opportunistic peasants began to encroach into previously unchartered territory and capitalize from the rainforest. Due to the poor economic integration of the Amazon, many were forced to engage with the traditional economies of cocoa and cattle ranching, as these markets were already well connected to regional and global markets.<ref name=":8" /> To address the drivers of deforestation and its associated emissions, the federal government has implemented various initiatives, which are summarized below:

{| class="wikitable"
|'''Document name'''
|'''Type'''
|'''Publication year'''
|'''Key takeaways'''
|-
|Nationally Determined Contribution(s)
|Target
|2020
|Reduce GHG emissions by 51% by 2030 and net-zero by 2050
|-
|National Climate Change Policy (PNCC)
|Policy
|2018
|Address climate change and foster sustainable development
|-
|National Forest Conservation Program
|Policy
|2011
|Address deforestation
|-
|Law 1931 of 2018 – Climate Change Law

|Legislation
|2018
|Establishes the framework for addressing climate change
|-
| colspan="4" |'''Relating to REDD+:'''
|-
|National Strategy for Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (ENREDD+)
|Initiative
|2009
|Particular focus on the Amazon and Choco rainforests
|-
|Amazon Indigenous REDD+ Initiative
|Initiative
|2016
|Respect Indigenous rights. FPIC focus.
|-
|BIOREDD+ program
|Initiative
|2012
|Portfolio of 8 REDD+ projects in four geographic nodes covering over 700,000 hectares in the Colombian Pacific.

|-
|Vision Amazonia
|Initiative
|2015
|Part of the REDD+ strategy, financed by three foreign countries: Germany, Norway and United Kingdom
|}
As a result of the many fund and market-based initiatives that Colombia has engaged with, it hosts the second most REDD+ projects in the world. REDD+ projects now cover at least 56% of the area of legally recognized Indigenous territories in the Colombian Amazon, with an overwhelming majority of carbon projects located on Indigenous territories.<ref name=":10">Schmid, D., & Castro. C., (2023). ''REDD+ projects in the Colombian Amazon: Social challenges and lack of transparency''. Rainforest Foundation Norway. https://dv719tqmsuwvb.cloudfront.net/documents/REDD_rapport_2024_ENG.pdf</ref> Evidently REDD+ plays an integral part in the country’s efforts of environmental conservation, and incentives have been introduced to promote the development of such projects. For example, in 2016 the government adopted a higher tax that covered fossil fuels, but companies are able to avoid paying the tax by investing in carbon offsets that have been generated domestically.<ref name=":9" /> This led to a boost in the domestic REDD+ market in 2017, as Colombian companies invested as to escape higher taxes. Notably, 23 of the 36 REDD+ projects currently under development in the Amazon region were initiated in or after 2018.<ref name=":10" /> Currently Colombia’s REDD+ program sits at over 45 pilot and voluntary carbon projects, as well as one large-scale jurisdictional approach in the Amazon.<ref name=":11">Zambrano-Cortés, D. G. (2024). ''The politics, spaces and subjects of forest conservation in Colombia''. [internal PhD, WU, Wageningen University]. Wageningen University. https://doi.org/10.18174/675328</ref>

=== Indigenous rights - Constitutional, tenure and bundle rights ===
''De jure'', the Indigenous peoples of Colombia have comprehensive tenure and bundle rights that have been articulated in the national constitution. Collective land titles are granted to Indigenous communities by the Colombian government and as a result about 34 percent of Colombian land (almost 38 million hectares) is legally recognized as Indigenous territory or collective lands of Afro-descendent communities.<ref name=":10" /> These collective land tenure rights have been in effect since the implementation of the 1991 constitution, granting them the authority to exercise legal control over their territories in accordance with their own customs and procedures.<ref>Max Planck Institute (n.d.) ''Colombia 1991 (rev. 2015).'' Institute. https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Colombia_2015</ref> Furthermore, the carbon rights of Indigenous peoples are explicitly defined in the constitution and tied specifically to the ownership of land of the communities.<ref name=":2" /> This in theory provides a solid legal basis for upholding the rights of Indigenous communities in Colombia, specifically relating to REDD+ activities, as it allows communities to define and negotiate the terms of said projects. A summary of the various laws relating to Indigenous rights have been summarized below:
{| class="wikitable"
| colspan="2" |'''Law (1991 constitution)'''
|-
|Article 63

|Indigenous territories are considered collective property. Land is not owned by individuals but is shared by the community. The state must respect these collective rights and cannot alter land ownership without the consent of the Indigenous peoples.
|-
|Article 76 - ''Consulta previa''.
|Pertains to the right of Indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities; prior consultation must be undertaken before any entity undertakes activities that may affect their territories, culture, or way of life.
|-
|Article 330
|Indigenous communities have the right to govern their territories.
|-
|Article 329
|The Reservation is a collective, inalienable, and indefeasible property.
|-
|Decree 1386 of 1994, Article 10; Decree 2164 of 1995, Article 22) 39.
|"The administration and management of these lands are subjected to uses and customs of the beneficiaries."
|}
Whilst land and tenure rights are enshrined into the constitution, the precariousness of these rights persists due to a lack of resources to ensure enforcement, as well as the deeper issue of corruption. As previously stated, the rate of deforestation increased significantly in Colombia’s post-conflict era, evidencing the nations inability to maintain control over unlawful acts of land-grabbing and disposition. Whilst this began with new peasants converting the Amazon for subsistence purposes, it ultimately led to new areas for the growth of cocoa, much to the benefit of narco-traffickers who could monopolize on this illegal surplus in ‘accumulation by dispossession’.<ref name=":8" />

With respect to the legalities of consultation, Colombia has enshrined ''consulta previa'' into the constitution. Translating to ‘prior consultation’, this legal text provides the formal grounds for Indigenous engagement when any legislative or administrative measures are implemented on Indigenous territory. Importantly, consultation should be achieved in accordance with the customs of the ethnic group with which the project is being imposed upon. However, there have been recent cases of contestation specifically relating to how ''consulta previa'' applies to REDD+ on Indigenous lands, and the RIU – SM project was one that was involved with such a case.

=== Affected and interested stakeholders ===
{| class="wikitable"
| colspan="5" |'''Affected stakeholders'''
|-
|Stakeholders
|Primary objective(s)
|Secondary objective(s)
|Relative power
|Scope of influence
|-
|ACATISEMA - Asociación de Cabildos y Autoridades Indígenas de la Selva de Matavén
|Primary and direct beneficiaries of project
Foster the integral development, social and cultural preservation of the indigenous communities in the Mataven Jungle

Consolidate the territory, and promote conservation and preservation of the environment and biodiversity of the Mataven Jungle

|Maintain control over ''resguardos''
|Powerful, locally.
Has the highest authority in the ''reguardo''.

Rights to the land and revenue generated from project
|Local
|-
|Indigenous communities of the RIU-SM
|Seek to maintain land rights

Promote traditional and cultural beliefs
|Increase benefits from the project
|Mid-power, though little input into project activities in reality.
|Local
|-
|Landless peasants
|Survive via subsistence
|Gain more access to land. Improve rights.
|Low to none
|Local
|-
| colspan="5" |'''Interested stakeholders'''
|-
|MEDIAMOS F&M
|Project developer
Maximise project revenues
|Develop the project in a way that is supporting of ACETISMA beliefs, for their benefit.
|Powerful: involved with various technical aspects of project development
|National
|-
|Ministerio de Ambiente y Desarrollo Sostenible (Minisitry of Environment and Sustainable Development)
|Environmental planning; sustainable development
Form strategic alliances with social and institutional participants in different sectoral and territorial scenarios.
|Ensure project activities are in agreement with ministry mandate
|Powerful, though supporting of project
|National
|-
|Dirección de Asuntos Indígenas, ROM y Minorías - Ministerio del Interior
|Prepares policy in favour of Indigenous groups
Supports ethnic and cultural rights of Indigenous
|
|Not ''per se'' involved with project, though the policy the organization has introduced affects project outcomes
|National
|-
|Corporinoquía
|Environmental authority to ensure the proper use of natural resources in their area of jurisdiction.
Ensure project abides by relevant regulations
|
|Powerful, though supporting of project
|Regional
|-
|Other government institutions: Governor ofice of Vichada, Mayor ofice Cumaribo
|The Reservation for being part of the Cumaribo, Vichada, has territorial jurisdiction relations with the Governor’s office and the Mayor’s office.
|Benefit from the project, if possible
|Powerful, regionally
|Regional - National
|-
|Fundación NATURA
''Civil organization''
|Conservation, use and management of biodiversity
Maximise social and environmental benefits of project
|Ensure suffienct IPLC inclusion
|Mid-power. Can influence decisions regarding project activities though does not hold absolute power to define terms
|International
|-
|Mining companies
|Mine to generate revenue.
|Compete with the project for the territory's resources.
|Relatively powerful, though legally obstructed to achieve primary objective
|International
|-
|Other indigenous communities neighboring RIU-SM
|Ensure autonomy with respect to their own jurisdiction
|Not involved with the project though potentially affected by it
|Low, with respect to the project
|Local
|-
|FONDO ACCIÓN
|Facilitate private investment into project activities
|Conservation and sustainable development; Protection/development of children.
|Mid-power. Important as they raise funds for the project and benefit from it, though not primary beneficiaries.
|National
|-
|Asocarbono – An industry association, including Verra, ProClima, Biofix, and ACATISEMA.

|Promote the agenda of high-level actors of the VCM
Promote integrity of market
|Hide/argue cases of scandal
|Powerful
|International
|-
|OPIAC: National Oganization of the Indigenous Peoples of the Colombian Amazon

|Promotes Indigenous rights in Colombia
Exercises a political representation of the Indigenous peoples of the Colombian Amazon
|
|Powerful. Legally knowledgeable.
|National
|}

=== Discussion ===
According to the official REDD+ Mataven website<ref>RIU – SM (n.d.). ''REDD+ Mataven''. https://reddmataven.com/</ref> the project has resulted in a myriad of benefits to the Indigenous communities of the region. For example, as a result of the funds generated from the projects activities, there have been improvements in infrastructure, transportation and education, ultimately leading to the empowerment and improved governance of ACETISMA. However, the project has come under fire for multiple reasons.

For one, in 2015 some of the Indigenous communities filed a lawsuit referring to the violation of their right to ''consulta previa''. However, the court ruled that their Indigenous rights had not been violated as it was ACETISMA that initially sought MEDIAMOS to develop the project, and that ACETISMA were the best representatives of those Indigenous communities. Furthermore, the projects main focus was the conservation of the rainforest and therefore did not threaten the cultural integrity of those communities.<ref name=":10" /> However, regardless of the outcome of this case, its occurrence points to internal disagreement amongst Indigenous participants of the RIU-SM project. In a study involving interviews with Indigenous members of the project, there was a significant proportion of interviewees that had little knowledge regarding various aspects of the project, such as responsibilities of participation, or the benefit-sharing mechanism in place.<ref name=":2" /> This further reinforces the point that, in the case of the RIU-SM project it may not be ‘bottom-up’ and eludes to the power imbalance experienced between MEDIAMOS, the project developer, and Indigenous community members. In the PD there is a breakdown of the distribution of income between ACETISMA and MEDIAMOS, which shows a significant proportion of revenue flowing to the former organisation throughout the project’s operations.<ref name=":7" /> However, there is currently no publicly available documentation supporting this initial claim<ref name=":9" /> as there is no obligation to provide this information, leading to a general lack of transparency in the market and between all of the relevant actors. Subsequent meetings with Indigenous leaders have however shown a marked support of the Mataven project, with one Indigenous leader explicitly stating “...the Redd+ project has brought resources that they never had before, which allowed them to open new school classrooms, 21 rural aqueducts, cocoa crops and even headquarters in Cumaribo and Inírida.”<ref>Lievano, A. B. (2021) Colombia's biggest carbon credit project could be selling hot air. Latin American Center for Investigative Journalism. https://www.elclip.org/el-mayor-proyecto-de-bonos-de-carbono-de-colombia-podria-estar-vendiendo-aire-caliente/ </ref> Clearly there have been benefits for IPLC’s involved with this project, though the details of this benefit-sharing remain a mystery.

Secondly, the Mataven project has caused controversy due to its apparently inflated carbon credit issuance. One report states that this has been achieved by using a reference area that is not representative of the project area, as well as assuming an uncharacteristically heigh assumed rate of deforestation.<ref name=":12">Global Atlas of Environmental Justice (2023). ''Resguardo Indigena Unificado-Selva de Matavén (RIU SM) REDD+ Project, Colombia.'' https://ejatlas.org/conflict/redd-project-resguardo-indigena-unificado-selva-de-mataven-riu-sm</ref> The project used a baseline deforestation rate of 0.86% per year, which is significantly more than the Colombian government's national rate of 0.18%. Additionally, according to the report the reference area chosen is more easily accessed and therefore more prone to deforestation, making it an inaccurate comparison to the relatively remote project area.<ref name=":2" /> This has led to the creation of excess carbon credits, or “hot air” credits, which have been criticized for not reflecting real environmental benefits.<ref name=":9" /> To add further insult to injury these credits have been used by a Colombian fossil fuel distributor company to avoid paying taxes, as described earlier by Colombia’s change in policy in 2017. In doing so, the company avoided paying approximately $18.9 million in taxes.<ref name=":2" /> There has been subsequent back and forth between Verra and Carbon Market Watch, with Verra refuting the claims<ref>Verra (2021). ''Carbon Market Watch Report on Colombian REDD+ Projects Contains Flawed Allegations.'' https://verra.org/carbon-market-watch-report-on-colombian-redd-projects-contains-flawed-allegations/ </ref> Regardless of the science, Colombia recently introduced a resolution in 2018 (Resolution 1447 – 2018) that requires projects to use baselines that comply with national reference levels.<ref name=":13">Dufrasne, D. (2021b). Companies use ”hot air” forestry offsets to avoid taxes in Colombia: Carbon Market Watch’s fact-check of Verra’s response. Carbon Market Watch. https://carbonmarketwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/CMWs-fact-check-of-Verras-response-on-Colombia.pdf</ref><ref>IEA (2022). ''Resolution 1447 – 2018. Monitoring, Reporting, and Verification System for mitigation actions at the national level.'' International Energy Agency. https://www.iea.org/policies/14772-resolution-1447-2018-monitoring-reporting-and-verification-system-for-mitigation-actions-at-the-national-level</ref> Going forward, REDD+ projects that are being implemented in Colombia will have to abide by Colombia’s national legislation.

=== Summary ===
Colombia has a long history of engaging in REDD+ as it has been used to limit environmental degradation in the post-conflict era, in alignment with the country’s national peacebuilding agenda.<ref name=":11" /> Owing to the country’s comprehensive tenure and bundle rights, IPLC’s have robust ''de jure'' rights to land as they collectively own it, and rights to carbon are tied to this ownership. This puts Colombia as one of the world leaders in legal terms relating to REDD+ project implementation, but due to a lack of resources to ensure enforcement, as well as corruption, historically these laws have not been adhered to.<ref name=":10" /><ref name=":2" /> There are many documented cases showing the displacement on IPLC’s from traditional lands, poor efforts to adhere to ''consulta previa'', and inequitable benefit sharing.<ref>Greenfield, P. (2023''). The ‘carbon pirates’ preying on Amazon’s Indigenous communities.'' The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2023/jan/21/amazon-indigenous-communities-carbon-offsetting-pirates-aoe</ref><ref name=":14">Lang, C., (2024). ''Colombia’s Constitutional Court rules in favour of Indigenous Peoples. Identifies serious flaws in the REDD+ Baka Rokarire project.'' REDD_Monitor. https://reddmonitor.substack.com/p/colombias-constitutional-court-rules</ref>

The case of the Mataven project provides an interesting example of how it is the market itself that is failing to address concerns regarding transparency, whether that be relating to benefit-sharing amongst relevant stakeholders, or Indigenous representation and engagement throughout the implementation of REDD+ projects. Some ACATISEMA members have explicitly stated their support for the Mataven project,<ref name=":12" /> and its benefits can be seen first-hand in the form of improved infrastructure in local communities involved with the project.<ref>Myers, J. E., Parra, M. A., Bedford, C. (2021). ''How Carbon Offsetting Can Build a Forest.'' Stanford Social Innovation Review. https://ssir.org/articles/entry/how_carbon_offsetting_can_build_a_forest</ref> However, an exact breakdown of how and where revenue is being distributed to IPLC’s remains elusive.<ref name=":13" /> Furthermore, the level of IPLC engagement has come into question, specifically with reference to ''consulta previa'' and the overall understanding that IPLC’s have regarding the project’s intended outcomes and activities.<ref name=":10" /> This is not a rare case in Colombia and has been witnessed occurring with other projects that have been implemented on Indigenous territories in the Colombian Amazon.<ref name=":17">Lang, C., (2023''). “It destroys everything,” says Indigenous leader about the REDD+ Baka Rokarire project in Colombia''. REDD Monitor. https://reddmonitor.substack.com/p/it-destroys-everything-says-indigenous</ref> However, a recent ruling by the Colombian Constitutional court voted in favour of Indigenous groups in Colombia, upholding “the rights to self-determination, autonomy, self-government, territory, identity, physical and cultural integrity, and free, prior and informed consent of the indigenous communities”.<ref name=":14" /> This review ultimately sets a legal precedent safeguarding the fundamental rights of IPLCs with REDD+ project implementation and shows that progress is being made to improve the likelihood that REDD+ will result in genuine benefits to those affected by project implementation.

To ensure a more authentic engagement with IPLC’s as to result in legitimate and equitable benefit-sharing, improvements must be made by the Colombian government, as well as within the VCM itself. For the former, Colombia’s national registry for GHG mitigation activities must be updated; it has been offline since 2022.<ref name=":10" /> As a result, transparency is lacking. International finance could be utilized as to alleviate this issue, and only with an accurate and reliable database may the market be regulated. In the broader sense, VCM registries must create stricter guidelines promoting transparency. Often PD’s refer to annexed documents that contain relevant information regarding benefit-sharing, though these are often not publicly available.<ref name=":9" /> This limits transparency and increases the likelihood of inequitable agreements being made between project proponents and developers, further exacerbating existing power asymmetries between the two groups and limiting the likelihood that ''consulta previa'' is honestly adhered to.<ref name=":10" /> This has led to conflict within Indigenous communities, rather than a strengthening of their social fabric.

Furthermore, the Mataven project calls into question the actual emissions reduction that REDD+ projects achieve. Whilst Colombia has since updated its regulations such that REDD+ must use baselines that comply with national reference levels, it is up in the air as to how representative these guidelines are. Reference areas must represent project areas and without the appropriate regulations in place project developers lack the incentive to create realistic baselines; ultimately they are aiming to produce the maximum number of credits as to generate the greatest possible revenues.

==Conclusion==
As a market-based mechanism, REDD+ is shackled by the construct in which it operates; fundamentally it is a capitalist means of fixing a capitalist problem, which comes with limitations. Both Brazil and Colombia have relatively robust laws that have been written into the constitution, ultimately promoting more equitable results of REDD+ project implementation. However, as in Colombia IPLC’s collectively own the land, whereas in Brazil these groups only own rights to use the land,<ref name=":2" /> Colombia can be considered better equipped for the establishment of REDD+ projects on traditional Indigenous territory. However, even with these laws in place enforcement remain a matter of concern. Furthermore, given the wide variety of ontological and epistemological perspectives of Indigenous communities, and how these views conflict with the Western worldview from which market-based REDD+ came to fruition, there is an inherent difficulty in implementing a system of governance in REDD+ on Indigenous lands.<ref name=":1" />. Putting a price on nature conflicts with Indigenous perspectives and there have been instances where this has attacked the social and cultural fabric of IPLC’s.<ref name=":17" /> To avoid this REDD+ developers must have the genuine intent of understanding the perspective of the Indigenous group they are working with and aim to implement REDD+ with a bottom-up approach.

In both countries, transparency must be improved to ensure that FPIC is adhered to and subsequently ensure fair IPLC representation and engagement. This issue predominantly arises due to the poor requirements of standards in the VCM. As such, proponents are guided by developers which have little incentive to truly act in the interests of Indigenous groups; ultimately the organizations in charge of project development are interested in increasing project revenues. This has led to instances of over-crediting, as without a transparent framework in which to operate it is difficult to evaluate the legitimacy of the claims being made by project proponents and developers. However, with recent advances that address concerns of additionality<ref name=":15" /> there is hope for improved market integrity. Standards of the VCM must continue to be scrutinized to ensure that progress continues to be made.

Going forward, progress should be made to formalize the customary laws and traditional lands of IPLCs, and finance should be directed towards the enforcement of these laws. The environmental,<ref name=":16" /> economic,<ref name=":5" /><ref>Ding, H., Veit, P. G., Blackman, A., Gray, E., Reytar, K., Altamirano, J. C., Hodgdon, B., (2016). ''Climate benefits, tenure costs: The economic case for securing Indigenous land rights in the Amazon''. WRI. https://files.wri.org/d8/s3fs-public/Climate_Benefits_Tenure_Costs_Executive_Summary.pdf</ref> and social<ref>Sarmiento Barletti, J. P., Heise Vigil, N., & Larson, A. M. (2023). ''Safeguards at a glance: Are voluntary standards supporting community land, resource and carbon rights?'' CIFOR-ICRAF. https://www.cifor-icraf.org/publications/pdf_files/Flyer/REDD-Safeguards-7.pdf </ref> benefits of this have been researched and are well understood. By developing culturally appropriate frameworks for rights-based conservation regimes, that work with IPLCs in accordance with their worldviews, REDD+ could be used to promote Indigenous autonomy. However, progress still must be made to achieve this goal.

==References==

Documentation:Open Case Studies/FRST522/2024/REDD+ in Indigenous Amazonia: What works and what doesn’t?

2024-12-16T22:15:11Z

ConnorHaynes:

__TOC__

==Positionality==
First and foremost I am not Indigenous, and whilst there are a myriad of cultures, ontologies and epistemologies that are not sufficiently represented by simply stating ‘Indigenous’, it is commonly accepted that these worldviews are vastly different to those of the ‘Western’ world, which is the world in which I grew up and matured. I am therefore only understanding of Indigenous cultures, beliefs and customary laws based upon available online literature and those which I have learnt through life, in addition to those introduced to me in my Master’s degree. As such, I will never be able to fully relate to an Indigenous person; the best I can do is try to understand and learn. Only throughout this process am I able to work towards reconciliation and attempt to address the inequities experienced by Indigenous folk globally.

Additionally, I am yet to act as a carbon project proponent and so do not understand the nuances or stresses of undertaking such a task. Whilst an individual proponent may have the best intention of procuring a carbon project for its social and environmental benefits, there are a number of stakeholders involved throughout the entire process which influence its eventual outcome. Without experience acting as a project proponent I am naïve in understanding the process and it's difficulties.

==Acronyms / Terminology==
'''Acronyms:'''

AFOLU: Agriculture, Forestry and Other Land-Use

ICVCM: Integrity Council for the Voluntary Carbon Market

IPLC: Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities

KMGBF: Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework

LAC: Latin American Countries

MRV: Monitoring, Reporting and Verification

REDD+: Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation

UNCBD: United Nations Convention on Biological Biodiversity

VCMI: Voluntary Carbon Markets Integrity Initiative

'''Terminology:'''

''Additionality:'' Additionality is the determination of whether the project will lead to the expected outcomes when compared to the baseline or ‘business as usual’ emissions.

''Leakage'': Refers to the shifting of emissions to outside the project boundary as a result of the project’s activities.

''Permanence:'' Permanence refers to the degree to which a carbon credit is equivalent to a permanent removal or reduction in emissions.
==Abstract==
This case study illustrates two examples of Indigenous-led REDD+ projects on Indigenous territory in Colombia and Brazil. Both countries have a relatively long history of engaging with REDD+ but have slightly different legal structures pertaining to the rights of Indigenous peoples on their traditional territories, and specifically their ‘carbon’ rights. As such, the intention is to evaluate how these differing ''de jure'' rights translate on the ground. With respect to REDD+, do certain rights result in legitimately positive benefits to IPLCs, as well as the environment that these projects were originally intended to protect? The intention is such that the reader can evaluate the effectiveness and true benefit of REDD+ projects to IPLC’s, based upon the legal frameworks of the host country. A secondary intention is such that the reader is better equipped to conduct a prefeasibility assessment based upon available online literature, to evaluate the likelihood that REDD+ can be implemented in any chosen country, with the genuine intent of benefiting IPLC’s that are directly affected as a result of REDD+ project implementation.

==REDD+ and the VCM in Brazil and Colombia==
REDD+, originally introduced by the UNFCCC, is a market-based mechanism sitting within the VCM that aims to reverse the loss of forests and carbon stocks, specifically in developing countries. Simply put, an entity or an individual can voluntarily pay another that has engaged with REDD+ and subsequently sequestered carbon, to offset their own emissions using ‘credits’, sold as units of greenhouse gas equivalent to one ton of carbon dioxide (CO2e). Forestry and Land-Use remains to be the largest category of carbon credits traded by transaction volume on the VCM, with REDD+ being the most popular project type in this category, accounting for 78% of credits traded.<ref name=":0">Procton, A., (2024). ''State of the voluntary carbon market 2024: On the path to maturity.'' Forest Trends Ecosystem Marketplace.</ref> Furthermore, over one-third of the credits sold within this category were sourced from projects that had been implemented in LAC and the Caribbean in 2024.<ref name=":0" /> Of the four largest standards issuing carbon credits, Verra accounts for roughly 80% of issuances in Latin America,<ref>Pullins, T. (2022). Growth of carbon markets in Latin America. White & Case. https://www.whitecase.com/publications/insight/latin-america-focus-fall-2022-growth-carbon-markets </ref> and even in the face of recent scrutiny,<ref>West, T. A. P., Bofim, B., Haya, B. K. (2024). Methodological issues with deforestation baselines compromise the integrity of carbon offsets from REDD+. ''Global Environmental Change, 87'' https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2024.102863</ref><ref>Wyburd I., & Dufrasne, G. (2023). Error Log: Exposing the methodological failures of REDD+ forestry projects. Carbon Market Watch. https://carbonmarketwatch.org/publications/error-log-exposing-the-methodological-failures-of-redd-forestry-projects/</ref><ref name=":15">Haya, B. K., Alford-Jones, K., Anderegg, W. R. L., Beymer-Farris, B., Blanchard, L., Bomfim, B., Chin, D., Evans, S., Hogan, M., Holm, J. A., McAfee, K., So, I. S., West, T. A. P., & Withey, L. (2023). ''Quality assessment of REDD+ carbon credit projects''. Berkeley Carbon Trading Project. https://gspp.berkeley.edu/research-and-impact/centers/cepp/projects/berkeley-carbontrading-project/REDD+</ref> REDD+ projects account for a significant proportion of the VCM with their continued application likely to persist.<ref>Gordon, O. (2022). ''The interwoven fortunes of carbon markets and indigenous communities.'' Energy Monitor. https://www.energymonitor.ai/tech/carbon-removal/the-interwoven-fortunes-of-carbon-markets-and-indigenous-communities/</ref><ref>Müller, M., Coustar, C., Bietta, F., Mathres, M. (2022). ''UNFCCC REDD+ and the power of sovereign carbon.'' Deutsche Banke Chief Investment Office. https://www.rainforestcoalition.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/CIO-Special-UNFCCC-REDD-power-of-sovereign-carbon.pdf</ref><ref>Pullins, T. (2022). ''Growth of carbon markets in Latin America.'' White & Case. https://www.whitecase.com/publications/insight/latin-america-focus-fall-2022-growth-carbon-markets </ref> With the introduction of updated methodologies aimed at addressing these concerns,<ref>Verra (2023a). ''Setting the Standard: Verra’s Revolutionary New REDD Methodology.'' https://verra.org/program-notice/setting-the-standard-verras-revolutionary-new-redd-methodology/</ref><ref>Verra (2023b). ''VM0048 Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation, v1.0.'' https://verra.org/methodologies/vm0048-reducing-emissions-from-deforestation-and-forest-degradation-v1-0/</ref> there is hope for renewed buyer confidence in the integrity of this market,<ref>MSCI (2023). ''Verra’s New Methodology for Unplanned Deforestation Aims to Silence the Critics''. https://www.msci.com/www/blog-posts/verra-s-new-methodology-for/04577808942</ref> though more work still needs to be done.

Both Colombia and Brazil have a relatively long history of implementing REDD+ projects, using both fund-based and market-based mechanisms. For example, both countries were participants in the ‘Amazon Indigenous REDD+ (RIA in Spanish) initiative, with the first pilot implementation project being initiated in Colombia’s Puiawai Natural Reserve.<ref>Garzón, E., (2017). ''Amazon Indigenous REDD+: An innovative approach to conserve Colombian forests?'' Mongabay. https://news.mongabay.com/2017/01/amazon-indigenous-redd-an-innovative-approach-to-conserve-colombian-forests/</ref> The relevance of these two countries with respect to REDD+ is simple. Much of the Amazon’s primary tropical rainforest falls within these countries jurisdiction and this rainforest has been consistently under threat from external pressures and encroachment, whether that be in the form of land-clearing for commercial ranching, subsistence purposes, illicit drug production or illegal mining practices,<ref name=":8">Sánchez García, P. A. & Wong, G. Y., (2024) “The political economy of deforestation in the Colombian Amazon”, ''Journal of Political Ecology'' ''31''(1), 178–199. https://doi.org/10.2458/jpe.5230</ref><ref>Radwin, M. (2023). ''Drug trafficking fuels other deforestation drivers in the Amazon: report.'' Mongabay. https://news.mongabay.com/2023/07/drug-trafficking-fuels-other-deforestation-drivers-in-the-amazon-report/</ref><ref>Haddad, E.A., Araújo, I.F., Feltran-Barbieri, R., Perobelli, F. S., Rocha, A., Sass, K. S., Nobre, C. A. (2024). Economic drivers of deforestation in the Brazilian Legal Amazon. ''Nat Sustain'' ''7'', 1141–1148. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41893-024-01387-7 </ref><ref>Hänggli, A., Levy, S. A., Armenteras, D., Bovolo, C. I., Brandão, J., Rueda, X., & Garrett, R. D. (2023). A systematic comparison of deforestation drivers and policy effectiveness across the amazon biome. ''Environmental Research Letters, 18''(7), 073001. https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/acd408</ref> to name a few.

In theory, REDD+ can be used to provide the economic incentive to promote sustained environmental protection of Indigenous lands, with a focus on the rights and livelihoods of IPLCs. Currently the overall funding to IPLCs tenure rights and forest management in tropical countries is low, receiving just $270 million per year between 2011-2020 from bilateral and multilateral donors and private philanthropies.<ref>Hatcher, J., Owen, M., Yin, D., (2021). ''Falling short: Donor funding for Indigenous peoples and local communities to secure tenure rights and manage forests in tropical countries (2011 -2020).'' Rainforest Foundation Norway. https://dv719tqmsuwvb.cloudfront.net/documents/Publikasjoner/Andre-rapporter/RFN_Falling_short_2021.pdf</ref> REDD+ has the potential to channel funding as to promote Indigenous rights and autonomy, provided there is transparent and equitable benefit-sharing for those involved. Fundamentally, only with the inclusion of IPLC’s, or preferably with IPLC’s acting as project proponents, is REDD+ able to promote Indigenous agency and improve IPLC rights and governance. And only when the rights of those inhabiting the land are formally recognized can the land be effectively conserved.<ref name=":16">Reytar, K., Veit, P., von Braun, J. (2024). ''Protecting Biodiversity Hinges on Securing Indigenous and Community Land Rights.'' WRI. https://www.wri.org/insights/indigenous-and-local-community-land-rights-protect-biodiversity</ref> The inclusion of IPLCs in REDD+ project development is therefore considered to be essential for project success, and this is in theory embodied in the very nature of REDD+.<ref name=":1">Alvarez, G., Elfving, M. and Andrade, C. (2016) ‘REDD+ governance and indigenous peoples in Latin America: the case of Suruí Carbon Project in the Brazilian Amazon Forest’, ''Latin American J. Management for Sustainable Development 3''(2) pp.133–146. https://doi.org/10.1504/LAJMSD.2016.083705</ref> Partially owing to a long history of dealing with REDD+, Colombia and Brazil are amongst just a few of the countries hosting tropical rainforests that explicitly recognise community rights to carbon and tie these rights to the legal ownership of lands and forests. In Colombia, carbon rights are tied to land rights, whereas in Brazil carbon rights are tied to forest rights.<ref name=":2">RRI and McGill University (2021). Technical report: ''Status of legal recognition of Indigenous Peoples’, Local Communities’ and Afro-descendant Peoples’ rights to carbon stored in tropical lands and forests''. Rights and Resources Initiative. https://doi.org/10.53892/MLQQ5744</ref>

==Brazil: The Suruí Forest Carbon Project==
[[File:The Amazon Basin, Brazil.jpg|thumb|376x376px|Brazil's Amazon rainforest]]

=== Project description and location ===
The Surui Forest Carbon project was implemented in 2009 on the territory of the Surui people, which is situated in the southern part of Brazil’s Amazon between the states of Rondônia and Mato Grosso. Surui Indigenous territory covers an area of 2,481 km2, though the intention of the PCFS was to protect a portion of this total area. According to the PD, the stated objective was to “prevent 13,575.3 hectares of tropical forest from being cleared by 2038, to avoid the emission of 7,258,352.3 tCO2e to the atmosphere, and to contribute to the preservation of the Paiter Surui lifestyle and traditions.”<ref>IDESAM (2011). ''Project description: Surui forest carbon project''. Institute for Conservation and Sustainable Development of Amazonas. Link: "PROJ_DESC_1118_02FEB2012.PDF" found at https://registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/1118 </ref> This region sits within one of the Brazilian Amazon’s main ‘arcs of deforestation’ and pressure from loggers and ranchers is a matter of concern.

Notably, the PCFS was the first REDD+ project to be proposed by Indigenous peoples in the Brazilian Amazon on their own territory and was the first to receive certification by both the VCS and CCBS.<ref name=":1" />. Metareilá, the Surui’s own Indigenous association, acted as project proponent and the Institute for Conservation and Sustainable Development of Amazonas (IDESAM) assisted with project development, alongside multiple other stakeholder groups. As an endogenous initiative procured and conducted by the Surui community, the SFCP had a ‘non-centralized model of governance’, which reflected the characteristics and traditions of the Surui people. <ref name=":1" />

Only after two years of consultations between the 24 communities involved and the relevant governmental agencies (primarily FUNAI and the Ministry of Environment) was a Memorandum of Understanding signed, showing community consent to develop the project.<ref name=":3">Garcia, B., Rimmer, L., Canal Vieira, L., Mackey, B., (2021). REDD+ and forest protection on indigenous lands in the Amazon. ''RECIEL 30'', 207–219. https://doi.org/10.1111/reel.12389</ref> In 2012 after verification from an independent third-party body, the Surui were able to sell carbon credits on the international market. Between 2009 and 2014 the project drastically helped limit the deforestation occurring within the project’s site, causing many to deem it a success.<ref name=":4">Howard, F. E., (2023). ''An Analysis of the Suruí Forest Carbon Project in Context of Settler Colonialism''. Masters thesis. Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University. https://vtechworks.lib.vt.edu/server/api/core/bitstreams/b0cde6de-794c-453f-856b-ee72bde3db06/content</ref>

=== National climate targets, policies and legislation ===
Rates of deforestation in Brazil’s legal Amazon are significantly impacted by the government in charge. This is evidenced in the decade between 2012 and 2021 whilst under the conservative Bolsonaro administration, when deforestation in the Amazon increased 185% — from a loss of 4,571 km2 in 2012 to 13,038 km2 in 2021.<ref>INPE (2022). ''Observação da Terra. http://www.obt.inpe.br/OBT/assuntos/programas/amazonia/prodes''</ref> However, since Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s appointment in 2022 there has been a steady decline in the rate of deforestation, which is now roughly half what it was in 2021.<ref>Terra Brasilis (2024). ''PRODES (deforestation): Deforestation rates – Legal Amazon – States''. https://terrabrasilis.dpi.inpe.br/app/dashboard/deforestation/biomes/legal_amazon/rates</ref> A significant proportion of emissions result from the clearing of rainforest and its subsequent conversion to ranching.<ref>MCTI (2022). ''Estimativas Anuais De Emissões De Gases De Efeito Estufa No Brasil.'' 6ª Edição. Ministério da Estado da Ciência, Tecnologia e Inovações. https://www.gov.br/mcti/pt-br/acompanhe-o-mcti/sirene/publicacoes/estimativas-anuais-de-emissoes-gee/arquivos/6a-ed-estimativas-anuais.pdf</ref> To address these emissions Brazil has implemented various adaptation policies, legislation and targets which are summarized below:
{| class="wikitable"
|'''Document name'''
|'''Type'''
|'''Publication year'''
|'''Key takeaways'''
|-
|National Policy on Climate Change (NPCC)
|Legislation
|2009
|Framework for addressing climate change
|-
|National Plan on Climate Change Adaptation
|Policy
|2016
|Framework for addressing impacts of climate change
|-
|Nationally Determined Contribution
|Target
|2024
|Reduce net greenhouse gas emissions by 59 to 67 percent below 2005 levels by 2035
|-
|Federal Constitution, Article 225
|Legislation
|2006
|The Amazon rainforest is considered as a ‘national heritage’.All levels of government have a shared responsibility to protect it and the environment
|-
| colspan="4" |'''Relating to REDD+'''
|-
|Plan of Action for the Prevention and Control of Deforestation in the Legal Amazon (PPCDAM)
|Policy
|2004
|Aims to reduce deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon
|-
|Forest code
|Legislation
|2012
|Aimed at reducing deforestation, but no specific mention of REDD+
|-
|Amazon Indigenous REDD+ Initiative
|Policy
|2012
|Incorporate Indigenous with REDD+ initiatives
|-
|National REDD+ Strategy (ENREDD+)
|Policy
|2016
|REDD+ as a fund-based mechanism
|}

=== Indigenous rights - Constitutional, tenure and bundle rights ===
In Brazil, Indigenous rights are robust and clearly defined according to the Brazilian Constitution. As a result, the Indigenous communities of the Brazilian Amazon have legal title to 13.8% of the national territory totalling 1.175 million km2, with a total of 631 territories.<ref>Federal government of Brazil (2024). ''Brazil’s NDC: National determination to contribute and transform''. https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/2024-11/Brazil_Second%20Nationally%20Determined%20Contribution%20%28NDC%29_November2024.pdf</ref>
{| class="wikitable"
| colspan="2" |'''Laws'''
|-
|Article 231 of the 1988 Constitution
|Indigenous peoples to have their exclusive right to use their territories to derive economic benefits. Grants indigenous peoples the right to land, prohibits eviction, and restricts mining without authorization from the federal government.
|-
|Indigenous Peoples statute (1973).

|No acts restricting the full exercise of indigenous peoples’ permanent tenure over the land should be permitted.
|-
| colspan="2" | '''Treaties'''
|-
|United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2007)
|Requires States to obtain free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) for the approval of any projects affecting indigenous territories.
|-
|International Labour Organization Convention 169 (2019)
|Ratified and incorporated under domestic law in 2002 through Decree 10.088/2019, endorsing UNDRIP
|-
|American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2016)
|Supports and builds upon UNDRIP
|}
Whilst Indigenous communities in Brazil have legal title to land, it is the State that owns it. Indigenous people simply exercise permanent tenure over lands that they traditionally occupy and have ‘original rights’ to these traditional lands, which no other rights can prevail over.<ref name=":3" /> Indigenous lands, though not classified as protected areas, “have the highest level of protection by law because they are regulated by the Constitution” and cannot be leased or restricted without violating their original rights. The Suruí's right to develop the PCFS is grounded in the Brazilian Constitution, which grants Indigenous peoples exclusive rights to use the ‘riches of the soil, rivers and lakes’ of their land, and these rights cannot be overridden. Thus, Indigenous people and only Indigenous people are legally allowed to engage in productive activities on their land, provided these activities are conducted according to their own customs and traditions and are necessary for the wellbeing and cultural expression of their own people. In Brazil, it is the armed forces and federal police that are responsible for enforcing these laws, and FUNAI is responsible for representing Indigenous communities in judicial disputes.<ref name=":3" /> As such, provided a REDD+ project does not violate the rights to territorial integrity, permanent land tenure and original rights, it is legally allowed.
[[File:Two Pataxo indians (Brasília, 04 April 2006).jpeg|thumb|414x414px|Two Indigenous in Brazil]]
'''CARBON RIGHTS:''' In Brazil, carbon rights are tied to forest rights.<ref name=":2" /> Carbon credits from REDD+ projects are seen as part of the economic benefits derived from indigenous lands, and as such, Indigenous communities are entitled to own, control and distribute these revenues themselves. The carbon credits generated from the (SFCP) were wholly owned by the Suruí people through Metareilá, with the Suruí Fund (managed by the Brazilian Biodiversity Fund - FUNBIO) acting as recipient. This legality reinforces Indigenous control over both land and carbon rights, as whoever has rights to the forest land is usually recognized as the owner of carbon rights.<ref name=":3" /> Collectively these national and international laws provide an important safeguard to Indigenous peoples, making their consent a prerequisite for the establishment of REDD+ projects and recognizing their rights as the main beneficiaries of REDD+ revenues.<ref name=":3" /> However, as carbon rights are tied to forest rights in Brazil and not land rights, and carbon is considered to be an ‘environmental service’ (Article 41(I)(A) Brazilian Forestry Code), states as well as the federal government have the jurisdiction to exercise full legislative authority over carbon. <ref name=":2" /> As such, certain states have interpreted the law to imply that the title to carbon credits is attributable to the state.<ref>Loft, L., Ravikumar, A., Gebara, M. F., Pham, T. T., Resosudarmo, I. A. P., Assembe, S., Tovar, J. G., Mwangi, E., & Andersson, K. (2015). Taking Stock of Carbon Rights in REDD+ Candidate Countries: Concept Meets Reality. ''Forests'', ''6''(4), 1031-1060. https://doi.org/10.3390/f6041031</ref> Hence, even when carbon rights are clearly defined and tied to forest title it is insufficient in itself, and only by legally recognizing the customary rights of IPLCs can a fair and equitable outcome be realised.

'''FPIC OBLIGATION:''' Brazilian law requires Free, Prior, and Informed Consent (FPIC) for REDD+ projects affecting indigenous lands, ensuring that international standards such as the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) and ILO Convention No. 169 are adhered to; Indigenous consent is, ''de jure,'' a necessity. Projects that violate these rights and fail to consult communities are therefore considered illegal. Notably there are no specific rules or procedures that have been written into the Brazilian constitution that provide guidance on how to achieve FPIC. However, this freedom reinforces Indigenous autonomy as it allows an Indigenous community to define the rules of consultation according to their customs and traditions.

=== Interested and affected stakeholders ===
{| class="wikitable"
| colspan="5" |'''Affected stakeholders'''
|-
|Stakeholders
|Primary objective(s)
|Secondary objective(s)
|Relative power
|Scope of influence
|-
|Metareilá Association of the Suruí Indigenous People
|Project proponent

Works to defend and preserve the cultural and territorial heritage of the Suruí people.

Responsible for the Suruí Fund (FUNBIO). Ensure equitable distribution of funds
|Ensure project longevity.
Stick to the mandate; attempt not to be influenced by external actors
|Powerful, though lacking technical knowhow. Have carbon rights and thus have ultimate control of project revenue; can decide how this revenue is distributed.
|Local
|-
|Other Indigenous groups and associations
|Support various aspects of proejct development
|Aim to benefit from the project
|Have the same rights as the Metareila with respect to land though are less involved with project development and have less say, nor derive economic benefits like the Metareila
|Local
|-
|''Campesinos'' (peasants)
|Survive via subsistence.
|Procure more land.
|Have far fewer rights than Indigenous groups and no involvement with the project
|Local
|-
| colspan="5" |'''Interested stakeholders'''
|-
|IDESAM - Institute for Conservation and Sustainable Development of Amazonas
|Maximise revenue from project.
Ensure project longevity
|Achieve completion of various technical aspects of project
|Powerful: Required to complete various technical aspects of development.
|National
|-
|Forest Trends
|Supported formulation and implementation of the project.
Uphold image of organization
|Maximise environmental benefits of project
|Powerful: Tasked with raising funds and fostering an international network; an integral part of project development
|International
|-
|Amazon Conservation Team - ACT Brazil
|Supports various aspect of project development as well as offering legal advice.
Other technical assistance
|Maximise environmental benefits of project
|Powerful: An integral part of project development
|International
|-
|Kanindé Association for Ethno-Environmental Defense – non-profit
|Promote Metareilá views and beliefs
|Involved with various aspects of project development
|Mid-power. Has a say in project direction, though less weight than the Metareila.
|National - International
|-
|Ministry of Environment (MMA)
|Responsible for protection and conservation of natural environment
|Ensure project adheres to national law
|Powerful. Must be notified about project activities although cannot strictly alter decisions made by the Surui
|National
|-
|National Indian Foundation (FUNAI)
|Promote Indigenous rights

|Represents Indignous organizations with judicial matters.
|Powerful. Knowleadgeable of judicial system. Must be notified about project activities though is not involved with project governance.
|National
|-
|Government of the State of Mato Grosso
|Encourage development, and reduce poverty and crime in Mato Grosso
|Ensure project adheres to regional law.
|Powerful. Legilative control over regional police and municipalities
|Regional
|}

=== Discussion ===
Although originally successful in achieving its goal of reducing deforestation and degradation, in 2016 diamonds were discovered in Surui territory, leading to an increase in illegal logging and mining.<ref name=":1" /> By 2018 the project site had been completely overrun by ''garimpeiros'' (small-scale gold miners), ultimately leading to the projects suspension that year. <ref name=":4" />

While the project had initially garnered support, divisions emerged within the community post-project implementation. Disputes arose over the unequal distribution of project revenues, leading to internal conflicts between different Suruí clans. These criticisms escalated in 2014 when the Catholic Indigenous Missionary Council supported calls for an end to the project due to mismanagement of revenues from carbon credit sales. <ref name=":3" /> Some Suruí members also argued that the REDD+ initiative harmed their way of life.<ref>Lang, C. (2014). ''“What are projects for that destroy life?” Interview with Henrique Suruí about the Paiter-Suruí REDD project, Brazil.'' REDD-Monitor. https://redd-monitor.org/2014/12/17/what-are-projects-for-that-destroy-life-interview-with-henrique-surui-about-the-paiter-surui-redd-project-brazil/</ref>

Further complicating the situation was the controversial role of Henrique Suruí, one of the Suruí tribal leaders. In 2011, it was revealed that Henrique had violated the tribe's logging moratorium, collaborating with loggers in illegal activities. While Henrique later denied responsibility for the project’s failure, his actions, combined with internal disagreements, illustrated the lack of consensus within the Suruí leadership on the project’s goals and outcomes. Both of the tribe’s leaders possessed dramatically different perspectives on how they believed they could ensure agency, autonomy, and economic benefits for the Suruí people.<ref name=":4" /> This fragmentation within the community, in combination with the discovery of diamonds and the state's failure to protect indigenous land rights led to the indefinite suspension of the REDD+ project.

The project's collapse highlights broader structural issues, particularly the state's inconsistent support for indigenous land rights, influenced by settler colonialism, which undermined the project’s long-term viability.<ref name=":4" /> Additionally, the project’s creation was shaped by external actors, including the collaboration between Almir Suruí and Borges from Forest Trends, a Washington-based NGO. This partnership introduced a Western perspective on viewing the Suruí peoples forest, in contrast with their own perspectives on land use and governance. Furthermore, despite Borges’ Brazilian background, the power dynamics between a global North organization and a developing, Indigenous community were apparent.

=== Summary ===
The Suruí Forest Carbon Project provides an interesting example of how, even when the rights of IPLC’s are relatively robust, challenges persist in ensuring REDD+ project longevity. As such, in its current state, REDD+ in the Brazilian Amazon may not be a suitable market-based option for Indigenous communities in the Amazon.<ref name=":3" /> Although initially successful in promoting Indigenous autonomy and reducing deforestation, the project resulted in failure due to of a myriad of factors. Division between Surui communities was exacerbated by a perceived unequal benefit-sharing, and the impact of imposing REDD+ seems to have complicated the traditional social structure that the Surui were dependent on. These issues were influenced by Brazil's settler state dynamics, where Indigenous land rights, although legally recognized, are often not upheld in practice due to insufficient enforcement.<ref name=":4" /> Ultimately, the Surui project reveals how settler colonialism's structural flaws make long-term project success difficult, despite initial progress in promoting Indigenous autonomy.

At the national and state level, complex institutional and legal land governance structures convolute and impede REDD+ in Brazil. Multiple institutions share responsibilities and there is no comprehensive, authoritative database of land ownership, which hampers efforts to protect Indigenous territories.<ref name=":5">Costa, R. (2016)''. Insecure land rights in Brazil: Consequences for rural areas and challenges for improvement.'' Climate Policy Initiative. https://www.climatepolicyinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/Insecure_Land_Rights_in_Brazil_CPI.pdf</ref> As a result, land tenure disputes remain common and can be witnessed occurring between the public as well between public and state actors. For example, Brazil’s 1964 Land Statute (Law No. 4504) allows the government to takeover unproductive farms and transfer those lands to landless peasants. This often results in the clearing of forest, as only when the land is cleared is it evidenced to be ‘productive’.<ref name=":5" /> Hence, not only does this law cause insecurity for Indigenous populations in Brazil, it also forces them to go against customary traditions of stewarding the land in an effort to maintain its control.

Whilst the aforementioned points to the futility of REDD+ in Brazil, there is reason to maintain optimism. In a recent landmark ruling Brazil’s supreme court voted in favour of the Xoleng peoples, and the decision will serve as a precedent for all cases involving Indigenous peoples.<ref name=":6">Amos-Flom, K., (2023). ''Triumph and Turmoil: The Xokleng Case and the Future of Indigenous Land Rights in Brazil.'' Columbia Journal of Transnational Law. https://www.jtl.columbia.edu/bulletin-blog/triumph-and-turmoil-the-xokleng-case-and-the-future-of-indigenous-land-rights-in-brazil</ref> The Xokleng’s land dispute, settled in 2023, “rejected Santa Catarina state’s marco temporal (“time limit”) argument, which would have required Indigenous people to prove they occupied or legally contested the territory they claimed before the Brazilian Constitution came into force in 1988. If successful, this argument would have led to disastrous repercussions, as many Indigenous peoples had been forcibly removed or are traditionally nomadic.”<ref name=":6" /> Evidently, whilst slow, progress has been made in Brazil in recent years with respect to Indigenous rights as well as the voluntary carbon market itself.

There are currently 159 AFOLU projects listed on the Verra database in Brazil, with only two specifically focused on REDD+ initiatives in collaboration with Indigenous groups. These are the Ka’a Pyahu project, <ref>Verra (n.d.) ''Project 5087: KA'A PYAHU.'' https://registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/5087</ref> initiated by the Guajajara Indigenous people in collaboration with external organizations and validated in 2021, and the ‘Together for the forest Awaete REDD+ project’<ref>Verra (n.d.) ''Project 5200: TOGETHER FOR THE FOREST AWAETÉ REDD+ PROJECT.'' https://registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/5200</ref> which is still under development. Both projects involve Indigenous groups working with Brazilian organizations to build technical capacity and expertise. This could signal a growing trend of Indigenous-led REDD+ projects in the future. To ensure a positive future for REDD+ in Brazil, the customary rights of IPLC’s must be formally recognized. IPLC should have legal ownership of their traditional lands, and in doing so the carbon rights of these communities would be less convoluted, leading to more equitable benefit-sharing and increased cohesion amongst these groups post-project implementation.

==Colombia: ''REDD+ project Resguardo Indigena Unificado - Selva de Mataven (RUI-SM)''==

=== '''Project description and location''' ===
[[File:RS6524 MG 3944.jpg|thumb|407x407px|A view of the Mataven]]
According to the PD,<ref name=":7">ACATISEMA & Mediamos (2017). ''Joint project description and monitoring report: REDD+ project: Resguardo Indigena Unificado – Selva de Mataven (RIU – SM).'' Link: “10 06 2017_VCS Final Report_ Matavin Project.pdf” found at https://registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/1566</ref> the Resguardo Indígena Unificado – Selva de Matavén (RIU-SM) project is located east of the Colombian Orinoco high plain, in the eastern part of the Department of Vichada, municipality of Cumaribo. It resides on the formalized resguardo of the Sikuani, Piaroa, Puinave, Curripaco, Cubeo and Piapoco ethnic groups, spanning 1,856,836 hectares, with 1,477,115 hectares (79.6%) being forested. The PD states that it will reduce greenhouse gas emissions, with a total estimated net reduction of 108,670,562 tons of CO2 equivalent over thirty years, from years 2013 – 2042. By this metric, it is the 14th largest project on the Verra registry, out of over 1700 projects.<ref name=":9">Dufrasne, D., (2021). ''Two Shades of Green: How hot air forest credits are being used to avoid carbon taxes in Colombia''. Carbon Market Watch. https://carbonmarketwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Two-shades-of-green_EN_WEB.pdf</ref> There are 12,312 Indigenous people living in the RIU-SM, belonging to 2,517 families and 250 communities as of 2017.

The project was initiated by the Asociación de Cabildos y Autoridades Indígenas de la Selva de Matavén (ACETISMA), an Indigenous association, and developed by MEDIAMOS F&M, a Colombian consultancy firm. ACETISMA is comprised of Indigenous leaders that represent the 17 communities of the reservation in charge of governing the territory, and it has administrative autonomy, as well as “the capacity to acquire, to own and to dispose of property, to accept donations, to hold national and international conventions, scientific and cultural exchanges and generally, to celebrate all kinds of negotiations and agreements with which the Association can achieve its objectives.”<ref name=":7" />

There is a stated focus on various means of improving the living conditions of the Indigenous peoples living within the project area. To summarise, the main objectives of the REDD+ project RIU-SM include:

· Community development, in the form of improved education.

· Community engagement with respect to the project; developing information channels to reveal project progress.

· Support local initiatives for environmental education and waste management.

· Developing an effective response system that addresses community proposals and concerns relating to the project.

· Strengthening the governance of ACATISEMA.
=== National climate targets, policies and legislation ===
The Colombian Amazon makes up over one-third of Colombia’s national territory, and up until 2005 only 7.3% of the Colombian Amazon had been deforested, largely due to the country's 60-year armed conflict between the government, multiple left-wing guerillas such as FARC, and several far-right paramilitary groups.<ref name=":8" /> However, following the signing of the Peace Treaty in 2016 and demobilization of the FARC, limits to deforestation were weakened in the Colombian Amazon. Poor but opportunistic peasants began to encroach into previously unchartered territory and capitalize from the rainforest. Due to the poor economic integration of the Amazon, many were forced to engage with the traditional economies of cocoa and cattle ranching, as these markets were already well connected to regional and global markets.<ref name=":8" /> To address the drivers of deforestation and its associated emissions, the federal government has implemented various initiatives, which are summarized below:

{| class="wikitable"
|'''Document name'''
|'''Type'''
|'''Publication year'''
|'''Key takeaways'''
|-
|Nationally Determined Contribution(s)
|Target
|2020
|Reduce GHG emissions by 51% by 2030 and net-zero by 2050
|-
|National Climate Change Policy (PNCC)
|Policy
|2018
|Address climate change and foster sustainable development
|-
|National Forest Conservation Program
|Policy
|2011
|Address deforestation
|-
|Law 1931 of 2018 – Climate Change Law

|Legislation
|2018
|Establishes the framework for addressing climate change
|-
| colspan="4" |'''Relating to REDD+:'''
|-
|National Strategy for Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (ENREDD+)
|Initiative
|2009
|Particular focus on the Amazon and Choco rainforests
|-
|Amazon Indigenous REDD+ Initiative
|Initiative
|2016
|Respect Indigenous rights. FPIC focus.
|-
|BIOREDD+ program
|Initiative
|2012
|Portfolio of 8 REDD+ projects in four geographic nodes covering over 700,000 hectares in the Colombian Pacific.

|-
|Vision Amazonia
|Initiative
|2015
|Part of the REDD+ strategy, financed by three foreign countries: Germany, Norway and United Kingdom
|}
As a result of the many fund and market-based initiatives that Colombia has engaged with, it hosts the second most REDD+ projects in the world. REDD+ projects now cover at least 56% of the area of legally recognized Indigenous territories in the Colombian Amazon, with an overwhelming majority of carbon projects located on Indigenous territories.<ref name=":10">Schmid, D., & Castro. C., (2023). ''REDD+ projects in the Colombian Amazon: Social challenges and lack of transparency''. Rainforest Foundation Norway. https://dv719tqmsuwvb.cloudfront.net/documents/REDD_rapport_2024_ENG.pdf</ref> Evidently REDD+ plays an integral part in the country’s efforts of environmental conservation, and incentives have been introduced to promote the development of such projects. For example, in 2016 the government adopted a higher tax that covered fossil fuels, but companies are able to avoid paying the tax by investing in carbon offsets that have been generated domestically.<ref name=":9" /> This led to a boost in the domestic REDD+ market in 2017, as Colombian companies invested as to escape higher taxes. Notably, 23 of the 36 REDD+ projects currently under development in the Amazon region were initiated in or after 2018.<ref name=":10" /> Currently Colombia’s REDD+ program sits at over 45 pilot and voluntary carbon projects, as well as one large-scale jurisdictional approach in the Amazon.<ref name=":11">Zambrano-Cortés, D. G. (2024). ''The politics, spaces and subjects of forest conservation in Colombia''. [internal PhD, WU, Wageningen University]. Wageningen University. [[/doi.org/10.18174/675328|https://doi.org/10.18174/675328]]</ref>

=== Indigenous rights - Constitutional, tenure and bundle rights ===
''De jure'', the Indigenous peoples of Colombia have comprehensive tenure and bundle rights that have been articulated in the national constitution. Collective land titles are granted to Indigenous communities by the Colombian government and as a result about 34 percent of Colombian land (almost 38 million hectares) is legally recognized as Indigenous territory or collective lands of Afro-descendent communities.<ref name=":10" /> These collective land tenure rights have been in effect since the implementation of the 1991 constitution, granting them the authority to exercise legal control over their territories in accordance with their own customs and procedures.<ref>Max Planck Institute (n.d.) ''Colombia 1991 (rev. 2015).'' Institute. https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Colombia_2015</ref> Furthermore, the carbon rights of Indigenous peoples are explicitly defined in the constitution and tied specifically to the ownership of land of the communities.<ref name=":2" /> This in theory provides a solid legal basis for upholding the rights of Indigenous communities in Colombia, specifically relating to REDD+ activities, as it allows communities to define and negotiate the terms of said projects. A summary of the various laws relating to Indigenous rights have been summarized below:
{| class="wikitable"
| colspan="2" |'''Law (1991 constitution)'''
|-
|Article 63

|Indigenous territories are considered collective property. Land is not owned by individuals but is shared by the community. The state must respect these collective rights and cannot alter land ownership without the consent of the Indigenous peoples.
|-
|Article 76 - ''Consulta previa''.
|Pertains to the right of Indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities; prior consultation must be undertaken before any entity undertakes activities that may affect their territories, culture, or way of life.
|-
|Article 330
|Indigenous communities have the right to govern their territories.
|-
|Article 329
|The Reservation is a collective, inalienable, and indefeasible property.
|-
|Decree 1386 of 1994, Article 10; Decree 2164 of 1995, Article 22) 39.
|"The administration and management of these lands are subjected to uses and customs of the beneficiaries."
|}
Whilst land and tenure rights are enshrined into the constitution, the precariousness of these rights persists due to a lack of resources to ensure enforcement, as well as the deeper issue of corruption. As previously stated, the rate of deforestation increased significantly in Colombia’s post-conflict era, evidencing the nations inability to maintain control over unlawful acts of land-grabbing and disposition. Whilst this began with new peasants converting the Amazon for subsistence purposes, it ultimately led to new areas for the growth of cocoa, much to the benefit of narco-traffickers who could monopolize on this illegal surplus in ‘accumulation by dispossession’.<ref name=":8" />

With respect to the legalities of consultation, Colombia has enshrined ''consulta previa'' into the constitution. Translating to ‘prior consultation’, this legal text provides the formal grounds for Indigenous engagement when any legislative or administrative measures are implemented on Indigenous territory. Importantly, consultation should be achieved in accordance with the customs of the ethnic group with which the project is being imposed upon. However, there have been recent cases of contestation specifically relating to how ''consulta previa'' applies to REDD+ on Indigenous lands, and the RIU – SM project was one that was involved with such a case.

=== Affected and interested stakeholders ===
{| class="wikitable"
| colspan="5" |'''Affected stakeholders'''
|-
|Stakeholders
|Primary objective(s)
|Secondary objective(s)
|Relative power
|Scope of influence
|-
|ACATISEMA - Asociación de Cabildos y Autoridades Indígenas de la Selva de Matavén
|Primary and direct beneficiaries of project
Foster the integral development, social and cultural preservation of the indigenous communities in the Mataven Jungle

Consolidate the territory, and promote conservation and preservation of the environment and biodiversity of the Mataven Jungle

|Maintain control over ''resguardos''
|Powerful, locally.
Has the highest authority in the ''reguardo''.

Rights to the land and revenue generated from project
|Local
|-
|Indigenous communities of the RIU-SM
|Seek to maintain land rights

Promote traditional and cultural beliefs
|Increase benefits from the project
|Mid-power, though little input into project activities in reality.
|Local
|-
|Landless peasants
|Survive via subsistence
|Gain more access to land. Improve rights.
|Low to none
|Local
|-
| colspan="5" |'''Interested stakeholders'''
|-
|MEDIAMOS F&M
|Project developer
Maximise project revenues
|Develop the project in a way that is supporting of ACETISMA beliefs, for their benefit.
|Powerful: involved with various technical aspects of project development
|National
|-
|Ministerio de Ambiente y Desarrollo Sostenible (Minisitry of Environment and Sustainable Development)
|Environmental planning; sustainable development
Form strategic alliances with social and institutional participants in different sectoral and territorial scenarios.
|Ensure project activities are in agreement with ministry mandate
|Powerful, though supporting of project
|National
|-
|Dirección de Asuntos Indígenas, ROM y Minorías - Ministerio del Interior
|Prepares policy in favour of Indigenous groups
Supports ethnic and cultural rights of Indigenous
|
|Not ''per se'' involved with project, though the policy the organization has introduced affects project outcomes
|National
|-
|Corporinoquía
|Environmental authority to ensure the proper use of natural resources in their area of jurisdiction.
Ensure project abides by relevant regulations
|
|Powerful, though supporting of project
|Regional
|-
|Other government institutions: Governor ofice of Vichada, Mayor ofice Cumaribo
|The Reservation for being part of the Cumaribo, Vichada, has territorial jurisdiction relations with the Governor’s office and the Mayor’s office.
|Benefit from the project, if possible
|Powerful, regionally
|Regional - National
|-
|Fundación NATURA
''Civil organization''
|Conservation, use and management of biodiversity
Maximise social and environmental benefits of project
|Ensure suffienct IPLC inclusion
|Mid-power. Can influence decisions regarding project activities though does not hold absolute power to define terms
|International
|-
|Mining companies
|Mine to generate revenue.
|Compete with the project for the territory's resources.
|Relatively powerful, though legally obstructed to achieve primary objective
|International
|-
|Other indigenous communities neighboring RIU-SM
|Ensure autonomy with respect to their own jurisdiction
|Not involved with the project though potentially affected by it
|Low, with respect to the project
|Local
|-
|FONDO ACCIÓN
|Facilitate private investment into project activities
|Conservation and sustainable development; Protection/development of children.
|Mid-power. Important as they raise funds for the project and benefit from it, though not primary beneficiaries.
|National
|-
|Asocarbono – An industry association, including Verra, ProClima, Biofix, and ACATISEMA.

|Promote the agenda of high-level actors of the VCM
Promote integrity of market
|Hide/argue cases of scandal
|Powerful
|International
|-
|OPIAC: National Oganization of the Indigenous Peoples of the Colombian Amazon

|Promotes Indigenous rights in Colombia
Exercises a political representation of the Indigenous peoples of the Colombian Amazon
|
|Powerful. Legally knowledgeable.
|National
|}

=== Discussion ===
According to the official REDD+ Mataven website<ref>RIU – SM (n.d.). ''REDD+ Mataven''. https://reddmataven.com/</ref> the project has resulted in a myriad of benefits to the Indigenous communities of the region. For example, as a result of the funds generated from the projects activities, there have been improvements in infrastructure, transportation and education, ultimately leading to the empowerment and improved governance of ACETISMA. However, the project has come under fire for multiple reasons.

For one, in 2015 some of the Indigenous communities filed a lawsuit referring to the violation of their right to ''consulta previa''. However, the court ruled that their Indigenous rights had not been violated as it was ACETISMA that initially sought MEDIAMOS to develop the project, and that ACETISMA were the best representatives of those Indigenous communities. Furthermore, the projects main focus was the conservation of the rainforest and therefore did not threaten the cultural integrity of those communities.<ref name=":10" /> However, regardless of the outcome of this case, its occurrence points to internal disagreement amongst Indigenous participants of the RIU-SM project. In a study involving interviews with Indigenous members of the project, there was a significant proportion of interviewees that had little knowledge regarding various aspects of the project, such as responsibilities of participation, or the benefit-sharing mechanism in place.<ref name=":2" /> This further reinforces the point that, in the case of the RIU-SM project it may not be ‘bottom-up’ and eludes to the power imbalance experienced between MEDIAMOS, the project developer, and Indigenous community members. In the PD there is a breakdown of the distribution of income between ACETISMA and MEDIAMOS, which shows a significant proportion of revenue flowing to the former organisation throughout the project’s operations.<ref name=":7" /> However, there is currently no publicly available documentation supporting this initial claim<ref name=":9" /> as there is no obligation to provide this information, leading to a general lack of transparency in the market and between all of the relevant actors. Subsequent meetings with Indigenous leaders have however shown a marked support of the Mataven project, with one Indigenous leader explicitly stating “...the Redd+ project has brought resources that they never had before, which allowed them to open new school classrooms, 21 rural aqueducts, cocoa crops and even headquarters in Cumaribo and Inírida.”<ref>Lievano, A. B. (2021) Colombia's biggest carbon credit project could be selling hot air. Latin American Center for Investigative Journalism. https://www.elclip.org/el-mayor-proyecto-de-bonos-de-carbono-de-colombia-podria-estar-vendiendo-aire-caliente/ </ref> Clearly there have been benefits for IPLC’s involved with this project, though the details of this benefit-sharing remain a mystery.

Secondly, the Mataven project has caused controversy due to its apparently inflated carbon credit issuance. One report states that this has been achieved by using a reference area that is not representative of the project area, as well as assuming an uncharacteristically heigh assumed rate of deforestation.<ref name=":12">Global Atlas of Environmental Justice (2023). ''Resguardo Indigena Unificado-Selva de Matavén (RIU SM) REDD+ Project, Colombia.'' https://ejatlas.org/conflict/redd-project-resguardo-indigena-unificado-selva-de-mataven-riu-sm</ref> The project used a baseline deforestation rate of 0.86% per year, which is significantly more than the Colombian government's national rate of 0.18%. Additionally, according to the report the reference area chosen is more easily accessed and therefore more prone to deforestation, making it an inaccurate comparison to the relatively remote project area.<ref name=":2" /> This has led to the creation of excess carbon credits, or “hot air” credits, which have been criticized for not reflecting real environmental benefits.<ref name=":9" /> To add further insult to injury these credits have been used by a Colombian fossil fuel distributor company to avoid paying taxes, as described earlier by Colombia’s change in policy in 2017. In doing so, the company avoided paying approximately $18.9 million in taxes.<ref name=":2" /> There has been subsequent back and forth between Verra and Carbon Market Watch, with Verra refuting the claims<ref>Verra (2021). ''Carbon Market Watch Report on Colombian REDD+ Projects Contains Flawed Allegations.'' https://verra.org/carbon-market-watch-report-on-colombian-redd-projects-contains-flawed-allegations/ </ref> Regardless of the science, Colombia recently introduced a resolution in 2018 (Resolution 1447 – 2018) that requires projects to use baselines that comply with national reference levels.<ref name=":13">Dufrasne, D. (2021b). Companies use ”hot air” forestry offsets to avoid taxes in Colombia: Carbon Market Watch’s fact-check of Verra’s response. Carbon Market Watch. https://carbonmarketwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/CMWs-fact-check-of-Verras-response-on-Colombia.pdf</ref><ref>IEA (2022). ''Resolution 1447 – 2018. Monitoring, Reporting, and Verification System for mitigation actions at the national level.'' International Energy Agency. https://www.iea.org/policies/14772-resolution-1447-2018-monitoring-reporting-and-verification-system-for-mitigation-actions-at-the-national-level</ref> Going forward, REDD+ projects that are being implemented in Colombia will have to abide by Colombia’s national legislation.

=== Summary ===
Colombia has a long history of engaging in REDD+ as it has been used to limit environmental degradation in the post-conflict era, in alignment with the country’s national peacebuilding agenda.<ref name=":11" /> Owing to the country’s comprehensive tenure and bundle rights, IPLC’s have robust ''de jure'' rights to land as they collectively own it, and rights to carbon are tied to this ownership. This puts Colombia as one of the world leaders in legal terms relating to REDD+ project implementation, but due to a lack of resources to ensure enforcement, as well as corruption, historically these laws have not been adhered to.<ref name=":10" /><ref name=":2" /> There are many documented cases showing the displacement on IPLC’s from traditional lands, poor efforts to adhere to ''consulta previa'', and inequitable benefit sharing.<ref>Greenfield, P. (2023''). The ‘carbon pirates’ preying on Amazon’s Indigenous communities.'' The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2023/jan/21/amazon-indigenous-communities-carbon-offsetting-pirates-aoe</ref><ref name=":14">Lang, C., (2024). ''Colombia’s Constitutional Court rules in favour of Indigenous Peoples. Identifies serious flaws in the REDD+ Baka Rokarire project.'' REDD_Monitor. https://reddmonitor.substack.com/p/colombias-constitutional-court-rules</ref>

The case of the Mataven project provides an interesting example of how it is the market itself that is failing to address concerns regarding transparency, whether that be relating to benefit-sharing amongst relevant stakeholders, or Indigenous representation and engagement throughout the implementation of REDD+ projects. Some ACATISEMA members have explicitly stated their support for the Mataven project,<ref name=":12" /> and its benefits can be seen first-hand in the form of improved infrastructure in local communities involved with the project.<ref>Myers, J. E., Parra, M. A., Bedford, C. (2021). ''How Carbon Offsetting Can Build a Forest.'' Stanford Social Innovation Review. https://ssir.org/articles/entry/how_carbon_offsetting_can_build_a_forest</ref> However, an exact breakdown of how and where revenue is being distributed to IPLC’s remains elusive.<ref name=":13" /> Furthermore, the level of IPLC engagement has come into question, specifically with reference to ''consulta previa'' and the overall understanding that IPLC’s have regarding the project’s intended outcomes and activities.<ref name=":10" /> This is not a rare case in Colombia and has been witnessed occurring with other projects that have been implemented on Indigenous territories in the Colombian Amazon.<ref name=":17">Lang, C., (2023''). “It destroys everything,” says Indigenous leader about the REDD+ Baka Rokarire project in Colombia''. REDD Monitor. https://reddmonitor.substack.com/p/it-destroys-everything-says-indigenous</ref> However, a recent ruling by the Colombian Constitutional court voted in favour of Indigenous groups in Colombia, upholding “the rights to self-determination, autonomy, self-government, territory, identity, physical and cultural integrity, and free, prior and informed consent of the indigenous communities”.<ref name=":14" /> This review ultimately sets a legal precedent safeguarding the fundamental rights of IPLCs with REDD+ project implementation and shows that progress is being made to improve the likelihood that REDD+ will result in genuine benefits to those affected by project implementation.

To ensure a more authentic engagement with IPLC’s as to result in legitimate and equitable benefit-sharing, improvements must be made by the Colombian government, as well as within the VCM itself. For the former, Colombia’s national registry for GHG mitigation activities must be updated; it has been offline since 2022.<ref name=":10" /> As a result, transparency is lacking. International finance could be utilized as to alleviate this issue, and only with an accurate and reliable database may the market be regulated. In the broader sense, VCM registries must create stricter guidelines promoting transparency. Often PD’s refer to annexed documents that contain relevant information regarding benefit-sharing, though these are often not publicly available.<ref name=":9" /> This limits transparency and increases the likelihood of inequitable agreements being made between project proponents and developers, further exacerbating existing power asymmetries between the two groups and limiting the likelihood that ''consulta previa'' is honestly adhered to.<ref name=":10" /> This has led to conflict within Indigenous communities, rather than a strengthening of their social fabric.

Furthermore, the Mataven project calls into question the actual emissions reduction that REDD+ projects achieve. Whilst Colombia has since updated its regulations such that REDD+ must use baselines that comply with national reference levels, it is up in the air as to how representative these guidelines are. Reference areas must represent project areas and without the appropriate regulations in place project developers lack the incentive to create realistic baselines; ultimately they are aiming to produce the maximum number of credits as to generate the greatest possible revenues.

==Conclusion==
As a market-based mechanism, REDD+ is shackled by the construct in which it operates; fundamentally it is a capitalist means of fixing a capitalist problem, which comes with limitations. Both Brazil and Colombia have relatively robust laws that have been written into the constitution, ultimately promoting more equitable results of REDD+ project implementation. However, as in Colombia IPLC’s collectively own the land, whereas in Brazil these groups only own rights to use the land,<ref name=":2" /> Colombia can be considered better equipped for the establishment of REDD+ projects on traditional Indigenous territory. However, even with these laws in place enforcement remain a matter of concern. Furthermore, given the wide variety of ontological and epistemological perspectives of Indigenous communities, and how these views conflict with the Western worldview from which market-based REDD+ came to fruition, there is an inherent difficulty in implementing a system of governance in REDD+ on Indigenous lands.<ref name=":1" />. Putting a price on nature conflicts with Indigenous perspectives and there have been instances where this has attacked the social and cultural fabric of IPLC’s.<ref name=":17" /> To avoid this REDD+ developers must have the genuine intent of understanding the perspective of the Indigenous group they are working with and aim to implement REDD+ with a bottom-up approach.

In both countries, transparency must be improved to ensure that FPIC is adhered to and subsequently ensure fair IPLC representation and engagement. This issue predominantly arises due to the poor requirements of standards in the VCM. As such, proponents are guided by developers which have little incentive to truly act in the interests of Indigenous groups; ultimately the organizations in charge of project development are interested in increasing project revenues. This has led to instances of over-crediting, as without a transparent framework in which to operate it is difficult to evaluate the legitimacy of the claims being made by project proponents and developers. However, with recent advances that address concerns of additionality<ref name=":15" /> there is hope for improved market integrity. Standards of the VCM must continue to be scrutinized to ensure that progress continues to be made.

Going forward, progress should be made to formalize the customary laws and traditional lands of IPLCs, and finance should be directed towards the enforcement of these laws. The environmental,<ref name=":16" /> economic,<ref name=":5" /><ref>Ding, H., Veit, P. G., Blackman, A., Gray, E., Reytar, K., Altamirano, J. C., Hodgdon, B., (2016). ''Climate benefits, tenure costs: The economic case for securing Indigenous land rights in the Amazon''. WRI. https://files.wri.org/d8/s3fs-public/Climate_Benefits_Tenure_Costs_Executive_Summary.pdf</ref> and social<ref>Sarmiento Barletti, J. P., Heise Vigil, N., & Larson, A. M. (2023). ''Safeguards at a glance: Are voluntary standards supporting community land, resource and carbon rights?'' CIFOR-ICRAF. https://www.cifor-icraf.org/publications/pdf_files/Flyer/REDD-Safeguards-7.pdf </ref> benefits of this have been researched and are well understood. By developing culturally appropriate frameworks for rights-based conservation regimes, that work with IPLCs in accordance with their worldviews, REDD+ could be used to promote Indigenous autonomy. However, progress still must be made to achieve this goal.

==References==

Documentation:Open Case Studies/FRST522/2024/REDD+ in Indigenous Amazonia: What works and what doesn’t?

2024-12-16T22:02:52Z

ConnorHaynes:

__TOC__

==Positionality==
First and foremost I am not Indigenous, and whilst there are a myriad of cultures, ontologies and epistemologies that are not sufficiently represented by simply stating ‘Indigenous’, it is commonly accepted that these worldviews are vastly different to those of the ‘Western’ world, which is the world in which I grew up and matured. I am therefore only understanding of Indigenous cultures, beliefs and customary laws based upon available online literature and those which I have learnt through life, in addition to those introduced to me in my Master’s degree. As such, I will never be able to fully relate to an Indigenous person; the best I can do is try to understand and learn. Only throughout this process am I able to work towards reconciliation and attempt to address the inequities experienced by Indigenous folk globally.

Additionally, I am yet to act as a carbon project proponent and so do not understand the nuances or stresses of undertaking such a task. Whilst an individual proponent may have the best intention of procuring a carbon project for its social and environmental benefits, there are a number of stakeholders involved throughout the entire process which influence its eventual outcome. Without experience acting as a project proponent I am naïve in understanding the process and it's difficulties.

==Acronyms / Terminology==
'''Acronyms:'''

AFOLU: Agriculture, Forestry and Other Land-Use

ICVCM: Integrity Council for the Voluntary Carbon Market

IPLC: Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities

KMGBF: Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework

LAC: Latin American Countries

MRV: Monitoring, Reporting and Verification

REDD+: Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation

UNCBD: United Nations Convention on Biological Biodiversity

VCMI: Voluntary Carbon Markets Integrity Initiative

'''Terminology:'''

''Additionality:'' Additionality is the determination of whether the project will lead to the expected outcomes when compared to the baseline or ‘business as usual’ emissions.

''Leakage'': Refers to the shifting of emissions to outside the project boundary as a result of the project’s activities.

''Permanence:'' Permanence refers to the degree to which a carbon credit is equivalent to a permanent removal or reduction in emissions.
==Abstract==
This case study illustrates two examples of Indigenous-led REDD+ projects on Indigenous territory in Colombia and Brazil. Both countries have a relatively long history of engaging with REDD+ but have slightly different legal structures pertaining to the rights of Indigenous peoples on their traditional territories, and specifically their ‘carbon’ rights. As such, the intention is to evaluate how these differing ''de jure'' rights translate on the ground. With respect to REDD+, do certain rights result in legitimately positive benefits to IPLCs, as well as the environment that these projects were originally intended to protect? The intention is such that the reader can evaluate the effectiveness and true benefit of REDD+ projects to IPLC’s, based upon the legal frameworks of the host country. A secondary intention is such that the reader is better equipped to conduct a prefeasibility assessment based upon available online literature, to evaluate the likelihood that REDD+ can be implemented in any chosen country, with the genuine intent of benefiting IPLC’s that are directly affected as a result of REDD+ project implementation.

==REDD+ and the VCM in Brazil and Colombia==
REDD+, originally introduced by the UNFCCC, is a market-based mechanism sitting within the VCM that aims to reverse the loss of forests and carbon stocks, specifically in developing countries. Simply put, an entity or an individual can voluntarily pay another that has engaged with REDD+ and subsequently sequestered carbon, to offset their own emissions using ‘credits’, sold as units of greenhouse gas equivalent to one ton of carbon dioxide (CO2e). Forestry and Land-Use remains to be the largest category of carbon credits traded by transaction volume on the VCM, with REDD+ being the most popular project type in this category, accounting for 78% of credits traded.<ref name=":0">Procton, A., (2024). ''State of the voluntary carbon market 2024: On the path to maturity.'' Forest Trends Ecosystem Marketplace.</ref> Furthermore, over one-third of the credits sold within this category were sourced from projects that had been implemented in LAC and the Caribbean in 2024.<ref name=":0" /> Of the four largest standards issuing carbon credits, Verra accounts for roughly 80% of issuances in Latin America,<ref>Pullins, T. (2022). Growth of carbon markets in Latin America. White & Case. https://www.whitecase.com/publications/insight/latin-america-focus-fall-2022-growth-carbon-markets </ref> and even in the face of recent scrutiny,<ref>West, T. A. P., Bofim, B., Haya, B. K. (2024). Methodological issues with deforestation baselines compromise the integrity of carbon offsets from REDD+. ''Global Environmental Change, 87'' https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2024.102863</ref><ref>Wyburd I., & Dufrasne, G. (2023). Error Log: Exposing the methodological failures of REDD+ forestry projects. Carbon Market Watch. https://carbonmarketwatch.org/publications/error-log-exposing-the-methodological-failures-of-redd-forestry-projects/</ref><ref name=":15">Haya, B. K., Alford-Jones, K., Anderegg, W. R. L., Beymer-Farris, B., Blanchard, L., Bomfim, B., Chin, D., Evans, S., Hogan, M., Holm, J. A., McAfee, K., So, I. S., West, T. A. P., & Withey, L. (2023). ''Quality assessment of REDD+ carbon credit projects''. Berkeley Carbon Trading Project. https://gspp.berkeley.edu/research-and-impact/centers/cepp/projects/berkeley-carbontrading-project/REDD+</ref> REDD+ projects account for a significant proportion of the VCM with their continued application likely to persist.<ref>Gordon, O. (2022). ''The interwoven fortunes of carbon markets and indigenous communities.'' Energy Monitor. [[/www.energymonitor.ai/tech/carbon-removal/the-interwoven-fortunes-of-carbon-markets-and-indigenous-communities/|https://www.energymonitor.ai/tech/carbon-removal/the-interwoven-fortunes-of-carbon-markets-and-indigenous-communities/]]</ref><ref>Müller, M., Coustar, C., Bietta, F., Mathres, M. (2022). ''UNFCCC REDD+ and the power of sovereign carbon.'' Deutsche Banke Chief Investment Office. [[/www.rainforestcoalition.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/CIO-Special-UNFCCC-REDD-power-of-sovereign-carbon.pdf|https://www.rainforestcoalition.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/CIO-Special-UNFCCC-REDD-power-of-sovereign-carbon.pdf]]</ref><ref>Pullins, T. (2022). ''Growth of carbon markets in Latin America.'' White & Case. [[/www.whitecase.com/publications/insight/latin-america-focus-fall-2022-growth-carbon-markets|https://www.whitecase.com/publications/insight/latin-america-focus-fall-2022-growth-carbon-markets]] </ref> With the introduction of updated methodologies aimed at addressing these concerns,<ref>Verra (2023a). ''Setting the Standard: Verra’s Revolutionary New REDD Methodology.'' [[/verra.org/program-notice/setting-the-standard-verras-revolutionary-new-redd-methodology/|https://verra.org/program-notice/setting-the-standard-verras-revolutionary-new-redd-methodology/]]</ref><ref>Verra (2023b). ''VM0048 Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation, v1.0.'' [[/verra.org/methodologies/vm0048-reducing-emissions-from-deforestation-and-forest-degradation-v1-0/|https://verra.org/methodologies/vm0048-reducing-emissions-from-deforestation-and-forest-degradation-v1-0/]]</ref> there is hope for renewed buyer confidence in the integrity of this market,<ref>MSCI (2023). ''Verra’s New Methodology for Unplanned Deforestation Aims to Silence the Critics''. [[/www.msci.com/www/blog-posts/verra-s-new-methodology-for/04577808942|https://www.msci.com/www/blog-posts/verra-s-new-methodology-for/04577808942]]</ref> though more work still needs to be done.

Both Colombia and Brazil have a relatively long history of implementing REDD+ projects, using both fund-based and market-based mechanisms. For example, both countries were participants in the ‘Amazon Indigenous REDD+ (RIA in Spanish) initiative, with the first pilot implementation project being initiated in Colombia’s Puiawai Natural Reserve.<ref>Garzón, E., (2017). ''Amazon Indigenous REDD+: An innovative approach to conserve Colombian forests?'' Mongabay. [[/news.mongabay.com/2017/01/amazon-indigenous-redd-an-innovative-approach-to-conserve-colombian-forests/|https://news.mongabay.com/2017/01/amazon-indigenous-redd-an-innovative-approach-to-conserve-colombian-forests/]]</ref> The relevance of these two countries with respect to REDD+ is simple. Much of the Amazon’s primary tropical rainforest falls within these countries jurisdiction and this rainforest has been consistently under threat from external pressures and encroachment, whether that be in the form of land-clearing for commercial ranching, subsistence purposes, illicit drug production or illegal mining practices,<ref name=":8">Sánchez García, P. A. & Wong, G. Y., (2024) “The political economy of deforestation in the Colombian Amazon”, ''Journal of Political Ecology'' ''31''(1), 178–199. [[/doi.org/10.2458/jpe.5230|https://doi.org/10.2458/jpe.5230]]</ref><ref>Radwin, M. (2023). ''Drug trafficking fuels other deforestation drivers in the Amazon: report.'' Mongabay. [[/news.mongabay.com/2023/07/drug-trafficking-fuels-other-deforestation-drivers-in-the-amazon-report/|https://news.mongabay.com/2023/07/drug-trafficking-fuels-other-deforestation-drivers-in-the-amazon-report/]]</ref><ref>Haddad, E.A., Araújo, I.F., Feltran-Barbieri, R., Perobelli, F. S., Rocha, A., Sass, K. S., Nobre, C. A. (2024). Economic drivers of deforestation in the Brazilian Legal Amazon. ''Nat Sustain'' ''7'', 1141–1148. [[/doi.org/10.1038/s41893-024-01387-7|https://doi.org/10.1038/s41893-024-01387-7]] </ref><ref>Hänggli, A., Levy, S. A., Armenteras, D., Bovolo, C. I., Brandão, J., Rueda, X., & Garrett, R. D. (2023). A systematic comparison of deforestation drivers and policy effectiveness across the amazon biome. ''Environmental Research Letters, 18''(7), 073001. [[/doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/acd408|https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/acd408]]</ref> to name a few.

In theory, REDD+ can be used to provide the economic incentive to promote sustained environmental protection of Indigenous lands, with a focus on the rights and livelihoods of IPLCs. Currently the overall funding to IPLCs tenure rights and forest management in tropical countries is low, receiving just $270 million per year between 2011-2020 from bilateral and multilateral donors and private philanthropies.<ref>Hatcher, J., Owen, M., Yin, D., (2021). ''Falling short: Donor funding for Indigenous peoples and local communities to secure tenure rights and manage forests in tropical countries (2011 -2020).'' Rainforest Foundation Norway. [[/dv719tqmsuwvb.cloudfront.net/documents/Publikasjoner/Andre-rapporter/RFN Falling short 2021.pdf|https://dv719tqmsuwvb.cloudfront.net/documents/Publikasjoner/Andre-rapporter/RFN_Falling_short_2021.pdf]]</ref> REDD+ has the potential to channel funding as to promote Indigenous rights and autonomy, provided there is transparent and equitable benefit-sharing for those involved. Fundamentally, only with the inclusion of IPLC’s, or preferably with IPLC’s acting as project proponents, is REDD+ able to promote Indigenous agency and improve IPLC rights and governance. And only when the rights of those inhabiting the land are formally recognized can the land be effectively conserved.<ref name=":16">Reytar, K., Veit, P., von Braun, J. (2024). ''Protecting Biodiversity Hinges on Securing Indigenous and Community Land Rights.'' WRI. [[/www.wri.org/insights/indigenous-and-local-community-land-rights-protect-biodiversity|https://www.wri.org/insights/indigenous-and-local-community-land-rights-protect-biodiversity]]</ref> The inclusion of IPLCs in REDD+ project development is therefore considered to be essential for project success, and this is in theory embodied in the very nature of REDD+.<ref name=":1">Alvarez, G., Elfving, M. and Andrade, C. (2016) ‘REDD+ governance and indigenous peoples in Latin America: the case of Suruí Carbon Project in the Brazilian Amazon Forest’, ''Latin American J. Management for Sustainable Development 3''(2) pp.133–146. [[/dx.doi.org/10.1504/LAJMSD.2016.083705|10.1504/LAJMSD.2016.083705]]</ref> Partially owing to a long history of dealing with REDD+, Colombia and Brazil are amongst just a few of the countries hosting tropical rainforests that explicitly recognise community rights to carbon and tie these rights to the legal ownership of lands and forests. In Colombia, carbon rights are tied to land rights, whereas in Brazil carbon rights are tied to forest rights.<ref name=":2">RRI and McGill University (2021). Technical report: ''Status of legal recognition of Indigenous Peoples’, Local Communities’ and Afro-descendant Peoples’ rights to carbon stored in tropical lands and forests''. Rights and Resources Initiative. [[/doi.org/10.53892/MLQQ5744|https://doi.org/10.53892/MLQQ5744]]</ref>

==Brazil: The Suruí Forest Carbon Project==
[[File:The Amazon Basin, Brazil.jpg|thumb|376x376px|Brazil's Amazon rainforest]]

=== Project description and location ===
The Surui Forest Carbon project was implemented in 2009 on the territory of the Surui people, which is situated in the southern part of Brazil’s Amazon between the states of Rondônia and Mato Grosso. Surui Indigenous territory covers an area of 2,481 km2, though the intention of the PCFS was to protect a portion of this total area. According to the PD, the stated objective was to “prevent 13,575.3 hectares of tropical forest from being cleared by 2038, to avoid the emission of 7,258,352.3 tCO2e to the atmosphere, and to contribute to the preservation of the Paiter Surui lifestyle and traditions.”<ref>IDESAM (2011). ''Project description: Surui forest carbon project''. Institute for Conservation and Sustainable Development of Amazonas. Link: "PROJ_DESC_1118_02FEB2012.PDF" found at [[/registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/1118|https://registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/1118]] </ref> This region sits within one of the Brazilian Amazon’s main ‘arcs of deforestation’ and pressure from loggers and ranchers is a matter of concern.

Notably, the PCFS was the first REDD+ project to be proposed by Indigenous peoples in the Brazilian Amazon on their own territory and was the first to receive certification by both the VCS and CCBS.<ref name=":1" />. Metareilá, the Surui’s own Indigenous association, acted as project proponent and the Institute for Conservation and Sustainable Development of Amazonas (IDESAM) assisted with project development, alongside multiple other stakeholder groups. As an endogenous initiative procured and conducted by the Surui community, the SFCP had a ‘non-centralized model of governance’, which reflected the characteristics and traditions of the Surui people. <ref name=":1" />

Only after two years of consultations between the 24 communities involved and the relevant governmental agencies (primarily FUNAI and the Ministry of Environment) was a Memorandum of Understanding signed, showing community consent to develop the project.<ref name=":3">Garcia, B., Rimmer, L., Canal Vieira, L., Mackey, B., (2021). REDD+ and forest protection on indigenous lands in the Amazon. ''RECIEL 30'', 207–219. [[/doi.org/10.1111/reel.12389|https://doi.org/10.1111/reel.12389]]</ref> In 2012 after verification from an independent third-party body, the Surui were able to sell carbon credits on the international market. Between 2009 and 2014 the project drastically helped limit the deforestation occurring within the project’s site, causing many to deem it a success.<ref name=":4">Howard, F. E., (2023). ''An Analysis of the Suruí Forest Carbon Project in Context of Settler Colonialism''. Masters thesis. Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University. [[/vtechworks.lib.vt.edu/server/api/core/bitstreams/b0cde6de-794c-453f-856b-ee72bde3db06/content|https://vtechworks.lib.vt.edu/server/api/core/bitstreams/b0cde6de-794c-453f-856b-ee72bde3db06/content]]</ref>

=== National climate targets, policies and legislation ===
Rates of deforestation in Brazil’s legal Amazon are significantly impacted by the government in charge. This is evidenced in the decade between 2012 and 2021 whilst under the conservative Bolsonaro administration, when deforestation in the Amazon increased 185% — from a loss of 4,571 km2 in 2012 to 13,038 km2 in 2021.<ref>INPE (2022). ''Observação da Terra. [[/www.obt.inpe.br/OBT/assuntos/programas/amazonia/prodes|http://www.obt.inpe.br/OBT/assuntos/programas/amazonia/prodes]]''</ref> However, since Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s appointment in 2022 there has been a steady decline in the rate of deforestation, which is now roughly half what it was in 2021.<ref>Terra Brasilis (2024). ''PRODES (deforestation): Deforestation rates – Legal Amazon – States''. [[/terrabrasilis.dpi.inpe.br/app/dashboard/deforestation/biomes/legal amazon/rates|https://terrabrasilis.dpi.inpe.br/app/dashboard/deforestation/biomes/legal_amazon/rates]]</ref> A significant proportion of emissions result from the clearing of rainforest and its subsequent conversion to ranching.<ref>MCTI (2022). ''Estimativas Anuais De Emissões De Gases De Efeito Estufa No Brasil.'' 6ª Edição. Ministério da Estado da Ciência, Tecnologia e Inovações. [[/www.gov.br/mcti/pt-br/acompanhe-o-mcti/sirene/publicacoes/estimativas-anuais-de-emissoes-gee/arquivos/6a-ed-estimativas-anuais.pdf|https://www.gov.br/mcti/pt-br/acompanhe-o-mcti/sirene/publicacoes/estimativas-anuais-de-emissoes-gee/arquivos/6a-ed-estimativas-anuais.pdf]]</ref> To address these emissions Brazil has implemented various adaptation policies, legislation and targets which are summarized below:
{| class="wikitable"
|'''Document name'''
|'''Type'''
|'''Publication year'''
|'''Key takeaways'''
|-
|National Policy on Climate Change (NPCC)
|Legislation
|2009
|Framework for addressing climate change
|-
|National Plan on Climate Change Adaptation
|Policy
|2016
|Framework for addressing impacts of climate change
|-
|Nationally Determined Contribution
|Target
|2024
|Reduce net greenhouse gas emissions by 59 to 67 percent below 2005 levels by 2035
|-
|Federal Constitution, Article 225
|Legislation
|2006
|The Amazon rainforest is considered as a ‘national heritage’.All levels of government have a shared responsibility to protect it and the environment
|-
| colspan="4" |'''Relating to REDD+'''
|-
|Plan of Action for the Prevention and Control of Deforestation in the Legal Amazon (PPCDAM)
|Policy
|2004
|Aims to reduce deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon
|-
|Forest code
|Legislation
|2012
|Aimed at reducing deforestation, but no specific mention of REDD+
|-
|Amazon Indigenous REDD+ Initiative
|Policy
|2012
|Incorporate Indigenous with REDD+ initiatives
|-
|National REDD+ Strategy (ENREDD+)
|Policy
|2016
|REDD+ as a fund-based mechanism
|}

=== Indigenous rights - Constitutional, tenure and bundle rights ===
In Brazil, Indigenous rights are robust and clearly defined according to the Brazilian Constitution. As a result, the Indigenous communities of the Brazilian Amazon have legal title to 13.8% of the national territory totalling 1.175 million km2, with a total of 631 territories.<ref>Federal government of Brazil (2024). ''Brazil’s NDC: National determination to contribute and transform''. [[/unfccc.int/sites/default/files/2024-11/Brazil Second Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) November2024.pdf|https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/2024-11/Brazil_Second%20Nationally%20Determined%20Contribution%20%28NDC%29_November2024.pdf]]</ref>
{| class="wikitable"
| colspan="2" |'''Laws'''
|-
|Article 231 of the 1988 Constitution
|Indigenous peoples to have their exclusive right to use their territories to derive economic benefits. Grants indigenous peoples the right to land, prohibits eviction, and restricts mining without authorization from the federal government.
|-
|Indigenous Peoples statute (1973).

|No acts restricting the full exercise of indigenous peoples’ permanent tenure over the land should be permitted.
|-
| colspan="2" | '''Treaties'''
|-
|United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2007)
|Requires States to obtain free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) for the approval of any projects affecting indigenous territories.
|-
|International Labour Organization Convention 169 (2019)
|Ratified and incorporated under domestic law in 2002 through Decree 10.088/2019, endorsing UNDRIP
|-
|American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2016)
|Supports and builds upon UNDRIP
|}
Whilst Indigenous communities in Brazil have legal title to land, it is the State that owns it. Indigenous people simply exercise permanent tenure over lands that they traditionally occupy and have ‘original rights’ to these traditional lands, which no other rights can prevail over.<ref name=":3" /> Indigenous lands, though not classified as protected areas, “have the highest level of protection by law because they are regulated by the Constitution” and cannot be leased or restricted without violating their original rights. The Suruí's right to develop the PCFS is grounded in the Brazilian Constitution, which grants Indigenous peoples exclusive rights to use the ‘riches of the soil, rivers and lakes’ of their land, and these rights cannot be overridden. Thus, Indigenous people and only Indigenous people are legally allowed to engage in productive activities on their land, provided these activities are conducted according to their own customs and traditions and are necessary for the wellbeing and cultural expression of their own people. In Brazil, it is the armed forces and federal police that are responsible for enforcing these laws, and FUNAI is responsible for representing Indigenous communities in judicial disputes.<ref name=":3" /> As such, provided a REDD+ project does not violate the rights to territorial integrity, permanent land tenure and original rights, it is legally allowed.
[[File:Two Pataxo indians (Brasília, 04 April 2006).jpeg|thumb|414x414px|Two Indigenous in Brazil]]
'''CARBON RIGHTS:''' In Brazil, carbon rights are tied to forest rights.<ref name=":2" /> Carbon credits from REDD+ projects are seen as part of the economic benefits derived from indigenous lands, and as such, Indigenous communities are entitled to own, control and distribute these revenues themselves. The carbon credits generated from the (SFCP) were wholly owned by the Suruí people through Metareilá, with the Suruí Fund (managed by the Brazilian Biodiversity Fund - FUNBIO) acting as recipient. This legality reinforces Indigenous control over both land and carbon rights, as whoever has rights to the forest land is usually recognized as the owner of carbon rights.<ref name=":3" /> Collectively these national and international laws provide an important safeguard to Indigenous peoples, making their consent a prerequisite for the establishment of REDD+ projects and recognizing their rights as the main beneficiaries of REDD+ revenues.<ref name=":3" /> However, as carbon rights are tied to forest rights in Brazil and not land rights, and carbon is considered to be an ‘environmental service’ (Article 41(I)(A) Brazilian Forestry Code), states as well as the federal government have the jurisdiction to exercise full legislative authority over carbon. <ref name=":2" /> As such, certain states have interpreted the law to imply that the title to carbon credits is attributable to the state.<ref>Loft, L., Ravikumar, A., Gebara, M. F., Pham, T. T., Resosudarmo, I. A. P., Assembe, S., Tovar, J. G., Mwangi, E., & Andersson, K. (2015). Taking Stock of Carbon Rights in REDD+ Candidate Countries: Concept Meets Reality. ''Forests'', ''6''(4), 1031-1060. [[/doi.org/10.3390/f6041031|https://doi.org/10.3390/f6041031]]</ref> Hence, even when carbon rights are clearly defined and tied to forest title it is insufficient in itself, and only by legally recognizing the customary rights of IPLCs can a fair and equitable outcome be realised.

'''FPIC OBLIGATION:''' Brazilian law requires Free, Prior, and Informed Consent (FPIC) for REDD+ projects affecting indigenous lands, ensuring that international standards such as the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) and ILO Convention No. 169 are adhered to; Indigenous consent is, ''de jure,'' a necessity. Projects that violate these rights and fail to consult communities are therefore considered illegal. Notably there are no specific rules or procedures that have been written into the Brazilian constitution that provide guidance on how to achieve FPIC. However, this freedom reinforces Indigenous autonomy as it allows an Indigenous community to define the rules of consultation according to their customs and traditions.

=== Interested and affected stakeholders ===
{| class="wikitable"
| colspan="5" |'''Affected stakeholders'''
|-
|Stakeholders
|Primary objective(s)
|Secondary objective(s)
|Relative power
|Scope of influence
|-
|Metareilá Association of the Suruí Indigenous People
|Project proponent

Works to defend and preserve the cultural and territorial heritage of the Suruí people.

Responsible for the Suruí Fund (FUNBIO). Ensure equitable distribution of funds
|Ensure project longevity.
Stick to the mandate; attempt not to be influenced by external actors
|Powerful, though lacking technical knowhow. Have carbon rights and thus have ultimate control of project revenue; can decide how this revenue is distributed.
|Local
|-
|Other Indigenous groups and associations
|Support various aspects of proejct development
|Aim to benefit from the project
|Have the same rights as the Metareila with respect to land though are less involved with project development and have less say, nor derive economic benefits like the Metareila
|Local
|-
|''Campesinos'' (peasants)
|Survive via subsistence.
|Procure more land.
|Have far fewer rights than Indigenous groups and no involvement with the project
|Local
|-
| colspan="5" |'''Interested stakeholders'''
|-
|IDESAM - Institute for Conservation and Sustainable Development of Amazonas
|Maximise revenue from project.
Ensure project longevity
|Achieve completion of various technical aspects of project
|Powerful: Required to complete various technical aspects of development.
|National
|-
|Forest Trends
|Supported formulation and implementation of the project.
Uphold image of organization
|Maximise environmental benefits of project
|Powerful: Tasked with raising funds and fostering an international network; an integral part of project development
|International
|-
|Amazon Conservation Team - ACT Brazil
|Supports various aspect of project development as well as offering legal advice.
Other technical assistance
|Maximise environmental benefits of project
|Powerful: An integral part of project development
|International
|-
|Kanindé Association for Ethno-Environmental Defense – non-profit
|Promote Metareilá views and beliefs
|Involved with various aspects of project development
|Mid-power. Has a say in project direction, though less weight than the Metareila.
|National - International
|-
|Ministry of Environment (MMA)
|Responsible for protection and conservation of natural environment
|Ensure project adheres to national law
|Powerful. Must be notified about project activities although cannot strictly alter decisions made by the Surui
|National
|-
|National Indian Foundation (FUNAI)
|Promote Indigenous rights

|Represents Indignous organizations with judicial matters.
|Powerful. Knowleadgeable of judicial system. Must be notified about project activities though is not involved with project governance.
|National
|-
|Government of the State of Mato Grosso
|Encourage development, and reduce poverty and crime in Mato Grosso
|Ensure project adheres to regional law.
|Powerful. Legilative control over regional police and municipalities
|Regional
|}

=== Discussion ===
Although originally successful in achieving its goal of reducing deforestation and degradation, in 2016 diamonds were discovered in Surui territory, leading to an increase in illegal logging and mining.<ref name=":1" /> By 2018 the project site had been completely overrun by ''garimpeiros'' (small-scale gold miners), ultimately leading to the projects suspension that year. <ref name=":4" />

While the project had initially garnered support, divisions emerged within the community post-project implementation. Disputes arose over the unequal distribution of project revenues, leading to internal conflicts between different Suruí clans. These criticisms escalated in 2014 when the Catholic Indigenous Missionary Council supported calls for an end to the project due to mismanagement of revenues from carbon credit sales. <ref name=":3" /> Some Suruí members also argued that the REDD+ initiative harmed their way of life.<ref>Lang, C. (2014). ''“What are projects for that destroy life?” Interview with Henrique Suruí about the Paiter-Suruí REDD project, Brazil.'' REDD-Monitor. [[/redd-monitor.org/2014/12/17/what-are-projects-for-that-destroy-life-interview-with-henrique-surui-about-the-paiter-surui-redd-project-brazil/|https://redd-monitor.org/2014/12/17/what-are-projects-for-that-destroy-life-interview-with-henrique-surui-about-the-paiter-surui-redd-project-brazil/]]</ref>

Further complicating the situation was the controversial role of Henrique Suruí, one of the Suruí tribal leaders. In 2011, it was revealed that Henrique had violated the tribe's logging moratorium, collaborating with loggers in illegal activities. While Henrique later denied responsibility for the project’s failure, his actions, combined with internal disagreements, illustrated the lack of consensus within the Suruí leadership on the project’s goals and outcomes. Both of the tribe’s leaders possessed dramatically different perspectives on how they believed they could ensure agency, autonomy, and economic benefits for the Suruí people.<ref name=":4" /> This fragmentation within the community, in combination with the discovery of diamonds and the state's failure to protect indigenous land rights led to the indefinite suspension of the REDD+ project.

The project's collapse highlights broader structural issues, particularly the state's inconsistent support for indigenous land rights, influenced by settler colonialism, which undermined the project’s long-term viability.<ref name=":4" /> Additionally, the project’s creation was shaped by external actors, including the collaboration between Almir Suruí and Borges from Forest Trends, a Washington-based NGO. This partnership introduced a Western perspective on viewing the Suruí peoples forest, in contrast with their own perspectives on land use and governance. Furthermore, despite Borges’ Brazilian background, the power dynamics between a global North organization and a developing, Indigenous community were apparent.

=== Summary ===
The Suruí Forest Carbon Project provides an interesting example of how, even when the rights of IPLC’s are relatively robust, challenges persist in ensuring REDD+ project longevity. As such, in its current state, REDD+ in the Brazilian Amazon may not be a suitable market-based option for Indigenous communities in the Amazon.<ref name=":3" /> Although initially successful in promoting Indigenous autonomy and reducing deforestation, the project resulted in failure due to of a myriad of factors. Division between Surui communities was exacerbated by a perceived unequal benefit-sharing, and the impact of imposing REDD+ seems to have complicated the traditional social structure that the Surui were dependent on. These issues were influenced by Brazil's settler state dynamics, where Indigenous land rights, although legally recognized, are often not upheld in practice due to insufficient enforcement.<ref name=":4" /> Ultimately, the Surui project reveals how settler colonialism's structural flaws make long-term project success difficult, despite initial progress in promoting Indigenous autonomy.

At the national and state level, complex institutional and legal land governance structures convolute and impede REDD+ in Brazil. Multiple institutions share responsibilities and there is no comprehensive, authoritative database of land ownership, which hampers efforts to protect Indigenous territories.<ref name=":5">Costa, R. (2016)''. Insecure land rights in Brazil: Consequences for rural areas and challenges for improvement.'' Climate Policy Initiative. [[/www.climatepolicyinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/Insecure Land Rights in Brazil CPI.pdf|https://www.climatepolicyinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/Insecure_Land_Rights_in_Brazil_CPI.pdf]]</ref> As a result, land tenure disputes remain common and can be witnessed occurring between the public as well between public and state actors. For example, Brazil’s 1964 Land Statute (Law No. 4504) allows the government to takeover unproductive farms and transfer those lands to landless peasants. This often results in the clearing of forest, as only when the land is cleared is it evidenced to be ‘productive’.<ref name=":5" /> Hence, not only does this law cause insecurity for Indigenous populations in Brazil, it also forces them to go against customary traditions of stewarding the land in an effort to maintain its control.

Whilst the aforementioned points to the futility of REDD+ in Brazil, there is reason to maintain optimism. In a recent landmark ruling Brazil’s supreme court voted in favour of the Xoleng peoples, and the decision will serve as a precedent for all cases involving Indigenous peoples.<ref name=":6">Amos-Flom, K., (2023). ''Triumph and Turmoil: The Xokleng Case and the Future of Indigenous Land Rights in Brazil.'' Columbia Journal of Transnational Law. [[/www.jtl.columbia.edu/bulletin-blog/triumph-and-turmoil-the-xokleng-case-and-the-future-of-indigenous-land-rights-in-brazil|https://www.jtl.columbia.edu/bulletin-blog/triumph-and-turmoil-the-xokleng-case-and-the-future-of-indigenous-land-rights-in-brazil]]</ref> The Xokleng’s land dispute, settled in 2023, “rejected Santa Catarina state’s marco temporal (“time limit”) argument, which would have required Indigenous people to prove they occupied or legally contested the territory they claimed before the Brazilian Constitution came into force in 1988. If successful, this argument would have led to disastrous repercussions, as many Indigenous peoples had been forcibly removed or are traditionally nomadic.”<ref name=":6" /> Evidently, whilst slow, progress has been made in Brazil in recent years with respect to Indigenous rights as well as the voluntary carbon market itself.

There are currently 159 AFOLU projects listed on the Verra database in Brazil, with only two specifically focused on REDD+ initiatives in collaboration with Indigenous groups. These are the Ka’a Pyahu project, <ref>Verra (n.d.) ''Project 5087: KA'A PYAHU.'' https://registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/5087</ref> initiated by the Guajajara Indigenous people in collaboration with external organizations and validated in 2021, and the ‘Together for the forest Awaete REDD+ project’<ref>Verra (n.d.) ''Project 5200: TOGETHER FOR THE FOREST AWAETÉ REDD+ PROJECT.'' https://registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/5200</ref> which is still under development. Both projects involve Indigenous groups working with Brazilian organizations to build technical capacity and expertise. This could signal a growing trend of Indigenous-led REDD+ projects in the future. To ensure a positive future for REDD+ in Brazil, the customary rights of IPLC’s must be formally recognized. IPLC should have legal ownership of their traditional lands, and in doing so the carbon rights of these communities would be less convoluted, leading to more equitable benefit-sharing and increased cohesion amongst these groups post-project implementation.

==Colombia: ''REDD+ project Resguardo Indigena Unificado - Selva de Mataven (RUI-SM)''==

=== '''Project description and location''' ===
[[File:RS6524 MG 3944.jpg|thumb|407x407px|A view of the Mataven]]
According to the PD,<ref name=":7">ACATISEMA & Mediamos (2017). ''Joint project description and monitoring report: REDD+ project: Resguardo Indigena Unificado – Selva de Mataven (RIU – SM).'' Link: “10 06 2017_VCS Final Report_ Matavin Project.pdf” found at [[/registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/1566|https://registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/1566]]</ref> the Resguardo Indígena Unificado – Selva de Matavén (RIU-SM) project is located east of the Colombian Orinoco high plain, in the eastern part of the Department of Vichada, municipality of Cumaribo. It resides on the formalized resguardo of the Sikuani, Piaroa, Puinave, Curripaco, Cubeo and Piapoco ethnic groups, spanning 1,856,836 hectares, with 1,477,115 hectares (79.6%) being forested. The PD states that it will reduce greenhouse gas emissions, with a total estimated net reduction of 108,670,562 tons of CO2 equivalent over thirty years, from years 2013 – 2042. By this metric, it is the 14th largest project on the Verra registry, out of over 1700 projects.<ref name=":9">Dufrasne, D., (2021). ''Two Shades of Green: How hot air forest credits are being used to avoid carbon taxes in Colombia''. Carbon Market Watch. [[/carbonmarketwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Two-shades-of-green EN WEB.pdf|https://carbonmarketwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Two-shades-of-green_EN_WEB.pdf]]</ref> There are 12,312 Indigenous people living in the RIU-SM, belonging to 2,517 families and 250 communities as of 2017.

The project was initiated by the Asociación de Cabildos y Autoridades Indígenas de la Selva de Matavén (ACETISMA), an Indigenous association, and developed by MEDIAMOS F&M, a Colombian consultancy firm. ACETISMA is comprised of Indigenous leaders that represent the 17 communities of the reservation in charge of governing the territory, and it has administrative autonomy, as well as “the capacity to acquire, to own and to dispose of property, to accept donations, to hold national and international conventions, scientific and cultural exchanges and generally, to celebrate all kinds of negotiations and agreements with which the Association can achieve its objectives.”<ref name=":7" />

There is a stated focus on various means of improving the living conditions of the Indigenous peoples living within the project area. To summarise, the main objectives of the REDD+ project RIU-SM include:

· Community development, in the form of improved education.

· Community engagement with respect to the project; developing information channels to reveal project progress.

· Support local initiatives for environmental education and waste management.

· Developing an effective response system that addresses community proposals and concerns relating to the project.

· Strengthening the governance of ACATISEMA.
=== National climate targets, policies and legislation ===
The Colombian Amazon makes up over one-third of Colombia’s national territory, and up until 2005 only 7.3% of the Colombian Amazon had been deforested, largely due to the country's 60-year armed conflict between the government, multiple left-wing guerillas such as FARC, and several far-right paramilitary groups.<ref name=":8" /> However, following the signing of the Peace Treaty in 2016 and demobilization of the FARC, limits to deforestation were weakened in the Colombian Amazon. Poor but opportunistic peasants began to encroach into previously unchartered territory and capitalize from the rainforest. Due to the poor economic integration of the Amazon, many were forced to engage with the traditional economies of cocoa and cattle ranching, as these markets were already well connected to regional and global markets.<ref name=":8" /> To address the drivers of deforestation and its associated emissions, the federal government has implemented various initiatives, which are summarized below:

{| class="wikitable"
|'''Document name'''
|'''Type'''
|'''Publication year'''
|'''Key takeaways'''
|-
|Nationally Determined Contribution(s)
|Target
|2020
|Reduce GHG emissions by 51% by 2030 and net-zero by 2050
|-
|National Climate Change Policy (PNCC)
|Policy
|2018
|Address climate change and foster sustainable development
|-
|National Forest Conservation Program
|Policy
|2011
|Address deforestation
|-
|Law 1931 of 2018 – Climate Change Law

|Legislation
|2018
|Establishes the framework for addressing climate change
|-
| colspan="4" |'''Relating to REDD+:'''
|-
|National Strategy for Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (ENREDD+)
|Initiative
|2009
|Particular focus on the Amazon and Choco rainforests
|-
|Amazon Indigenous REDD+ Initiative
|Initiative
|2016
|Respect Indigenous rights. FPIC focus.
|-
|BIOREDD+ program
|Initiative
|2012
|Portfolio of 8 REDD+ projects in four geographic nodes covering over 700,000 hectares in the Colombian Pacific.

|-
|Vision Amazonia
|Initiative
|2015
|Part of the REDD+ strategy, financed by three foreign countries: Germany, Norway and United Kingdom
|}
As a result of the many fund and market-based initiatives that Colombia has engaged with, it hosts the second most REDD+ projects in the world. REDD+ projects now cover at least 56% of the area of legally recognized Indigenous territories in the Colombian Amazon, with an overwhelming majority of carbon projects located on Indigenous territories.<ref name=":10">Schmid, D., & Castro. C., (2023). ''REDD+ projects in the Colombian Amazon: Social challenges and lack of transparency''. Rainforest Foundation Norway. [[/dv719tqmsuwvb.cloudfront.net/documents/REDD rapport 2024 ENG.pdf|https://dv719tqmsuwvb.cloudfront.net/documents/REDD_rapport_2024_ENG.pdf]]</ref> Evidently REDD+ plays an integral part in the country’s efforts of environmental conservation, and incentives have been introduced to promote the development of such projects. For example, in 2016 the government adopted a higher tax that covered fossil fuels, but companies are able to avoid paying the tax by investing in carbon offsets that have been generated domestically.<ref name=":9" /> This led to a boost in the domestic REDD+ market in 2017, as Colombian companies invested as to escape higher taxes. Notably, 23 of the 36 REDD+ projects currently under development in the Amazon region were initiated in or after 2018.<ref name=":10" /> Currently Colombia’s REDD+ program sits at over 45 pilot and voluntary carbon projects, as well as one large-scale jurisdictional approach in the Amazon.<ref name=":11">Zambrano-Cortés, D. G. (2024). ''The politics, spaces and subjects of forest conservation in Colombia''. [internal PhD, WU, Wageningen University]. Wageningen University. [[/doi.org/10.18174/675328|https://doi.org/10.18174/675328]]</ref>

=== Indigenous rights - Constitutional, tenure and bundle rights ===
''De jure'', the Indigenous peoples of Colombia have comprehensive tenure and bundle rights that have been articulated in the national constitution. Collective land titles are granted to Indigenous communities by the Colombian government and as a result about 34 percent of Colombian land (almost 38 million hectares) is legally recognized as Indigenous territory or collective lands of Afro-descendent communities.<ref name=":10" /> These collective land tenure rights have been in effect since the implementation of the 1991 constitution, granting them the authority to exercise legal control over their territories in accordance with their own customs and procedures.<ref>Max Planck Institute (n.d.) ''Colombia 1991 (rev. 2015).'' Institute. [[/www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Colombia 2015|https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Colombia_2015]]</ref> Furthermore, the carbon rights of Indigenous peoples are explicitly defined in the constitution and tied specifically to the ownership of land of the communities.<ref name=":2" /> This in theory provides a solid legal basis for upholding the rights of Indigenous communities in Colombia, specifically relating to REDD+ activities, as it allows communities to define and negotiate the terms of said projects. A summary of the various laws relating to Indigenous rights have been summarized below:
{| class="wikitable"
| colspan="2" |'''Law (1991 constitution)'''
|-
|Article 63

|Indigenous territories are considered collective property. Land is not owned by individuals but is shared by the community. The state must respect these collective rights and cannot alter land ownership without the consent of the Indigenous peoples.
|-
|Article 76 - ''Consulta previa''.
|Pertains to the right of Indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities; prior consultation must be undertaken before any entity undertakes activities that may affect their territories, culture, or way of life.
|-
|Article 330
|Indigenous communities have the right to govern their territories.
|-
|Article 329
|The Reservation is a collective, inalienable, and indefeasible property.
|-
|Decree 1386 of 1994, Article 10; Decree 2164 of 1995, Article 22) 39.
|"The administration and management of these lands are subjected to uses and customs of the beneficiaries."
|}
Whilst land and tenure rights are enshrined into the constitution, the precariousness of these rights persists due to a lack of resources to ensure enforcement, as well as the deeper issue of corruption. As previously stated, the rate of deforestation increased significantly in Colombia’s post-conflict era, evidencing the nations inability to maintain control over unlawful acts of land-grabbing and disposition. Whilst this began with new peasants converting the Amazon for subsistence purposes, it ultimately led to new areas for the growth of cocoa, much to the benefit of narco-traffickers who could monopolize on this illegal surplus in ‘accumulation by dispossession’.<ref name=":8" />

With respect to the legalities of consultation, Colombia has enshrined ''consulta previa'' into the constitution. Translating to ‘prior consultation’, this legal text provides the formal grounds for Indigenous engagement when any legislative or administrative measures are implemented on Indigenous territory. Importantly, consultation should be achieved in accordance with the customs of the ethnic group with which the project is being imposed upon. However, there have been recent cases of contestation specifically relating to how ''consulta previa'' applies to REDD+ on Indigenous lands, and the RIU – SM project was one that was involved with such a case.

=== Affected and interested stakeholders ===
{| class="wikitable"
| colspan="5" |'''Affected stakeholders'''
|-
|Stakeholders
|Primary objective(s)
|Secondary objective(s)
|Relative power
|Scope of influence
|-
|ACATISEMA - Asociación de Cabildos y Autoridades Indígenas de la Selva de Matavén
|Primary and direct beneficiaries of project
Foster the integral development, social and cultural preservation of the indigenous communities in the Mataven Jungle

Consolidate the territory, and promote conservation and preservation of the environment and biodiversity of the Mataven Jungle

|Maintain control over ''resguardos''
|Powerful, locally.
Has the highest authority in the ''reguardo''.

Rights to the land and revenue generated from project
|Local
|-
|Indigenous communities of the RIU-SM
|Seek to maintain land rights

Promote traditional and cultural beliefs
|Increase benefits from the project
|Mid-power, though little input into project activities in reality.
|Local
|-
|Landless peasants
|Survive via subsistence
|Gain more access to land. Improve rights.
|Low to none
|Local
|-
| colspan="5" |'''Interested stakeholders'''
|-
|MEDIAMOS F&M
|Project developer
Maximise project revenues
|Develop the project in a way that is supporting of ACETISMA beliefs, for their benefit.
|Powerful: involved with various technical aspects of project development
|National
|-
|Ministerio de Ambiente y Desarrollo Sostenible (Minisitry of Environment and Sustainable Development)
|Environmental planning; sustainable development
Form strategic alliances with social and institutional participants in different sectoral and territorial scenarios.
|Ensure project activities are in agreement with ministry mandate
|Powerful, though supporting of project
|National
|-
|Dirección de Asuntos Indígenas, ROM y Minorías - Ministerio del Interior
|Prepares policy in favour of Indigenous groups
Supports ethnic and cultural rights of Indigenous
|
|Not ''per se'' involved with project, though the policy the organization has introduced affects project outcomes
|National
|-
|Corporinoquía
|Environmental authority to ensure the proper use of natural resources in their area of jurisdiction.
Ensure project abides by relevant regulations
|
|Powerful, though supporting of project
|Regional
|-
|Other government institutions: Governor ofice of Vichada, Mayor ofice Cumaribo
|The Reservation for being part of the Cumaribo, Vichada, has territorial jurisdiction relations with the Governor’s office and the Mayor’s office.
|Benefit from the project, if possible
|Powerful, regionally
|Regional - National
|-
|Fundación NATURA
''Civil organization''
|Conservation, use and management of biodiversity
Maximise social and environmental benefits of project
|Ensure suffienct IPLC inclusion
|Mid-power. Can influence decisions regarding project activities though does not hold absolute power to define terms
|International
|-
|Mining companies
|Mine to generate revenue.
|Compete with the project for the territory's resources.
|Relatively powerful, though legally obstructed to achieve primary objective
|International
|-
|Other indigenous communities neighboring RIU-SM
|Ensure autonomy with respect to their own jurisdiction
|Not involved with the project though potentially affected by it
|Low, with respect to the project
|Local
|-
|FONDO ACCIÓN
|Facilitate private investment into project activities
|Conservation and sustainable development; Protection/development of children.
|Mid-power. Important as they raise funds for the project and benefit from it, though not primary beneficiaries.
|National
|-
|Asocarbono – An industry association, including Verra, ProClima, Biofix, and ACATISEMA.

|Promote the agenda of high-level actors of the VCM
Promote integrity of market
|Hide/argue cases of scandal
|Powerful
|International
|-
|OPIAC: National Oganization of the Indigenous Peoples of the Colombian Amazon

|Promotes Indigenous rights in Colombia
Exercises a political representation of the Indigenous peoples of the Colombian Amazon
|
|Powerful. Legally knowledgeable.
|National
|}

=== Discussion ===
According to the official REDD+ Mataven website<ref>RIU – SM (n.d.). ''REDD+ Mataven''. [[/reddmataven.com/|https://reddmataven.com/]]</ref> the project has resulted in a myriad of benefits to the Indigenous communities of the region. For example, as a result of the funds generated from the projects activities, there have been improvements in infrastructure, transportation and education, ultimately leading to the empowerment and improved governance of ACETISMA. However, the project has come under fire for multiple reasons.

For one, in 2015 some of the Indigenous communities filed a lawsuit referring to the violation of their right to ''consulta previa''. However, the court ruled that their Indigenous rights had not been violated as it was ACETISMA that initially sought MEDIAMOS to develop the project, and that ACETISMA were the best representatives of those Indigenous communities. Furthermore, the projects main focus was the conservation of the rainforest and therefore did not threaten the cultural integrity of those communities.<ref name=":10" /> However, regardless of the outcome of this case, its occurrence points to internal disagreement amongst Indigenous participants of the RIU-SM project. In a study involving interviews with Indigenous members of the project, there was a significant proportion of interviewees that had little knowledge regarding various aspects of the project, such as responsibilities of participation, or the benefit-sharing mechanism in place.<ref name=":2" /> This further reinforces the point that, in the case of the RIU-SM project it may not be ‘bottom-up’ and eludes to the power imbalance experienced between MEDIAMOS, the project developer, and Indigenous community members. In the PD there is a breakdown of the distribution of income between ACETISMA and MEDIAMOS, which shows a significant proportion of revenue flowing to the former organisation throughout the project’s operations.<ref name=":7" /> However, there is currently no publicly available documentation supporting this initial claim<ref name=":9" /> as there is no obligation to provide this information, leading to a general lack of transparency in the market and between all of the relevant actors. Subsequent meetings with Indigenous leaders have however shown a marked support of the Mataven project, with one Indigenous leader explicitly stating “...the Redd+ project has brought resources that they never had before, which allowed them to open new school classrooms, 21 rural aqueducts, cocoa crops and even headquarters in Cumaribo and Inírida.”<ref>Lievano, A. B. (2021) Colombia's biggest carbon credit project could be selling hot air. Latin American Center for Investigative Journalism. [[/www.elclip.org/el-mayor-proyecto-de-bonos-de-carbono-de-colombia-podria-estar-vendiendo-aire-caliente/|https://www.elclip.org/el-mayor-proyecto-de-bonos-de-carbono-de-colombia-podria-estar-vendiendo-aire-caliente/]] </ref> Clearly there have been benefits for IPLC’s involved with this project, though the details of this benefit-sharing remain a mystery.

Secondly, the Mataven project has caused controversy due to its apparently inflated carbon credit issuance. One report states that this has been achieved by using a reference area that is not representative of the project area, as well as assuming an uncharacteristically heigh assumed rate of deforestation.<ref name=":12">Global Atlas of Environmental Justice (2023). ''Resguardo Indigena Unificado-Selva de Matavén (RIU SM) REDD+ Project, Colombia.'' [[/ejatlas.org/conflict/redd-project-resguardo-indigena-unificado-selva-de-mataven-riu-sm|https://ejatlas.org/conflict/redd-project-resguardo-indigena-unificado-selva-de-mataven-riu-sm]]</ref> The project used a baseline deforestation rate of 0.86% per year, which is significantly more than the Colombian government's national rate of 0.18%. Additionally, according to the report the reference area chosen is more easily accessed and therefore more prone to deforestation, making it an inaccurate comparison to the relatively remote project area.<ref name=":2" /> This has led to the creation of excess carbon credits, or “hot air” credits, which have been criticized for not reflecting real environmental benefits.<ref name=":9" /> To add further insult to injury these credits have been used by a Colombian fossil fuel distributor company to avoid paying taxes, as described earlier by Colombia’s change in policy in 2017. In doing so, the company avoided paying approximately $18.9 million in taxes.<ref name=":2" /> There has been subsequent back and forth between Verra and Carbon Market Watch, with Verra refuting the claims<ref>Verra (2021). ''Carbon Market Watch Report on Colombian REDD+ Projects Contains Flawed Allegations.'' [[/verra.org/carbon-market-watch-report-on-colombian-redd-projects-contains-flawed-allegations/|https://verra.org/carbon-market-watch-report-on-colombian-redd-projects-contains-flawed-allegations/]] </ref> Regardless of the science, Colombia recently introduced a resolution in 2018 (Resolution 1447 – 2018) that requires projects to use baselines that comply with national reference levels.<ref name=":13">Dufrasne, D. (2021b). Companies use ”hot air” forestry offsets to avoid taxes in Colombia: Carbon Market Watch’s fact-check of Verra’s response. Carbon Market Watch. [[/carbonmarketwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/CMWs-fact-check-of-Verras-response-on-Colombia.pdf|https://carbonmarketwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/CMWs-fact-check-of-Verras-response-on-Colombia.pdf]]</ref><ref>IEA (2022). ''Resolution 1447 – 2018. Monitoring, Reporting, and Verification System for mitigation actions at the national level.'' International Energy Agency. [[/www.iea.org/policies/14772-resolution-1447-2018-monitoring-reporting-and-verification-system-for-mitigation-actions-at-the-national-level|https://www.iea.org/policies/14772-resolution-1447-2018-monitoring-reporting-and-verification-system-for-mitigation-actions-at-the-national-level]]</ref> Going forward, REDD+ projects that are being implemented in Colombia will have to abide by Colombia’s national legislation.

=== Summary ===
Colombia has a long history of engaging in REDD+ as it has been used to limit environmental degradation in the post-conflict era, in alignment with the country’s national peacebuilding agenda.<ref name=":11" /> Owing to the country’s comprehensive tenure and bundle rights, IPLC’s have robust ''de jure'' rights to land as they collectively own it, and rights to carbon are tied to this ownership. This puts Colombia as one of the world leaders in legal terms relating to REDD+ project implementation, but due to a lack of resources to ensure enforcement, as well as corruption, historically these laws have not been adhered to.<ref name=":10" /><ref name=":2" /> There are many documented cases showing the displacement on IPLC’s from traditional lands, poor efforts to adhere to ''consulta previa'', and inequitable benefit sharing.<ref>Greenfield, P. (2023''). The ‘carbon pirates’ preying on Amazon’s Indigenous communities.'' The Guardian. [[/www.theguardian.com/environment/2023/jan/21/amazon-indigenous-communities-carbon-offsetting-pirates-aoe|https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2023/jan/21/amazon-indigenous-communities-carbon-offsetting-pirates-aoe]]</ref><ref name=":14">Lang, C., (2024). ''Colombia’s Constitutional Court rules in favour of Indigenous Peoples. Identifies serious flaws in the REDD+ Baka Rokarire project.'' REDD_Monitor. [[/reddmonitor.substack.com/p/colombias-constitutional-court-rules|https://reddmonitor.substack.com/p/colombias-constitutional-court-rules]]</ref>

The case of the Mataven project provides an interesting example of how it is the market itself that is failing to address concerns regarding transparency, whether that be relating to benefit-sharing amongst relevant stakeholders, or Indigenous representation and engagement throughout the implementation of REDD+ projects. Some ACATISEMA members have explicitly stated their support for the Mataven project,<ref name=":12" /> and its benefits can be seen first-hand in the form of improved infrastructure in local communities involved with the project.<ref>Myers, J. E., Parra, M. A., Bedford, C. (2021). ''How Carbon Offsetting Can Build a Forest.'' Stanford Social Innovation Review. [[/ssir.org/articles/entry/how carbon offsetting can build a forest|https://ssir.org/articles/entry/how_carbon_offsetting_can_build_a_forest]]</ref> However, an exact breakdown of how and where revenue is being distributed to IPLC’s remains elusive.<ref name=":13" /> Furthermore, the level of IPLC engagement has come into question, specifically with reference to ''consulta previa'' and the overall understanding that IPLC’s have regarding the project’s intended outcomes and activities.<ref name=":10" /> This is not a rare case in Colombia and has been witnessed occurring with other projects that have been implemented on Indigenous territories in the Colombian Amazon.<ref name=":17">Lang, C., (2023''). “It destroys everything,” says Indigenous leader about the REDD+ Baka Rokarire project in Colombia''. REDD Monitor. [[/reddmonitor.substack.com/p/it-destroys-everything-says-indigenous|https://reddmonitor.substack.com/p/it-destroys-everything-says-indigenous]]</ref> However, a recent ruling by the Colombian Constitutional court voted in favour of Indigenous groups in Colombia, upholding “the rights to self-determination, autonomy, self-government, territory, identity, physical and cultural integrity, and free, prior and informed consent of the indigenous communities”.<ref name=":14" /> This review ultimately sets a legal precedent safeguarding the fundamental rights of IPLCs with REDD+ project implementation and shows that progress is being made to improve the likelihood that REDD+ will result in genuine benefits to those affected by project implementation.

To ensure a more authentic engagement with IPLC’s as to result in legitimate and equitable benefit-sharing, improvements must be made by the Colombian government, as well as within the VCM itself. For the former, Colombia’s national registry for GHG mitigation activities must be updated; it has been offline since 2022.<ref name=":10" /> As a result, transparency is lacking. International finance could be utilized as to alleviate this issue, and only with an accurate and reliable database may the market be regulated. In the broader sense, VCM registries must create stricter guidelines promoting transparency. Often PD’s refer to annexed documents that contain relevant information regarding benefit-sharing, though these are often not publicly available.<ref name=":9" /> This limits transparency and increases the likelihood of inequitable agreements being made between project proponents and developers, further exacerbating existing power asymmetries between the two groups and limiting the likelihood that ''consulta previa'' is honestly adhered to.<ref name=":10" /> This has led to conflict within Indigenous communities, rather than a strengthening of their social fabric.

Furthermore, the Mataven project calls into question the actual emissions reduction that REDD+ projects achieve. Whilst Colombia has since updated its regulations such that REDD+ must use baselines that comply with national reference levels, it is up in the air as to how representative these guidelines are. Reference areas must represent project areas and without the appropriate regulations in place project developers lack the incentive to create realistic baselines; ultimately they are aiming to produce the maximum number of credits as to generate the greatest possible revenues.

==Conclusion==
As a market-based mechanism, REDD+ is shackled by the construct in which it operates; fundamentally it is a capitalist means of fixing a capitalist problem, which comes with limitations. Both Brazil and Colombia have relatively robust laws that have been written into the constitution, ultimately promoting more equitable results of REDD+ project implementation. However, as in Colombia IPLC’s collectively own the land, whereas in Brazil these groups only own rights to use the land,<ref name=":2" /> Colombia can be considered better equipped for the establishment of REDD+ projects on traditional Indigenous territory. However, even with these laws in place enforcement remain a matter of concern. Furthermore, given the wide variety of ontological and epistemological perspectives of Indigenous communities, and how these views conflict with the Western worldview from which market-based REDD+ came to fruition, there is an inherent difficulty in implementing a system of governance in REDD+ on Indigenous lands.<ref name=":1" />. Putting a price on nature conflicts with Indigenous perspectives and there have been instances where this has attacked the social and cultural fabric of IPLC’s.<ref name=":17" /> To avoid this REDD+ developers must have the genuine intent of understanding the perspective of the Indigenous group they are working with and aim to implement REDD+ with a bottom-up approach.

In both countries, transparency must be improved to ensure that FPIC is adhered to and subsequently ensure fair IPLC representation and engagement. This issue predominantly arises due to the poor requirements of standards in the VCM. As such, proponents are guided by developers which have little incentive to truly act in the interests of Indigenous groups; ultimately the organizations in charge of project development are interested in increasing project revenues. This has led to instances of over-crediting, as without a transparent framework in which to operate it is difficult to evaluate the legitimacy of the claims being made by project proponents and developers. However, with recent advances that address concerns of additionality<ref name=":15" /> there is hope for improved market integrity. Standards of the VCM must continue to be scrutinized to ensure that progress continues to be made.

Going forward, progress should be made to formalize the customary laws and traditional lands of IPLCs, and finance should be directed towards the enforcement of these laws. The environmental,<ref name=":16" /> economic,<ref name=":5" /><ref>Ding, H., Veit, P. G., Blackman, A., Gray, E., Reytar, K., Altamirano, J. C., Hodgdon, B., (2016). ''Climate benefits, tenure costs: The economic case for securing Indigenous land rights in the Amazon''. WRI. [[/files.wri.org/d8/s3fs-public/Climate Benefits Tenure Costs Executive Summary.pdf|https://files.wri.org/d8/s3fs-public/Climate_Benefits_Tenure_Costs_Executive_Summary.pdf]]</ref> and social<ref>Sarmiento Barletti, J. P., Heise Vigil, N., & Larson, A. M. (2023). ''Safeguards at a glance: Are voluntary standards supporting community land, resource and carbon rights?'' CIFOR-ICRAF. [[/www.cifor-icraf.org/publications/pdf files/Flyer/REDD-Safeguards-7.pdf|https://www.cifor-icraf.org/publications/pdf_files/Flyer/REDD-Safeguards-7.pdf]] </ref> benefits of this have been researched and are well understood. By developing culturally appropriate frameworks for rights-based conservation regimes, that work with IPLCs in accordance with their worldviews, REDD+ could be used to promote Indigenous autonomy. However, progress still must be made to achieve this goal.

==References==

Documentation:Open Case Studies/FRST522/2024/REDD+ in Indigenous Amazonia: What works and what doesn’t?

2024-12-16T21:58:26Z

ConnorHaynes: /* Interested and affected stakeholders */

__TOC__

==Positionality==
First and foremost I am not Indigenous, and whilst there are a myriad of cultures, ontologies and epistemologies that are not sufficiently represented by simply stating ‘Indigenous’, it is commonly accepted that these worldviews are vastly different to those of the ‘Western’ world, which is the world in which I grew up and matured. I am therefore only understanding of Indigenous cultures, beliefs and customary laws based upon available online literature and those which I have learnt through life, in addition to those introduced to me in my Master’s degree. As such, I will never be able to fully relate to an Indigenous person; the best I can do is try to understand and learn. Only throughout this process am I able to work towards reconciliation and attempt to address the inequities experienced by Indigenous folk globally.

Additionally, I am yet to act as a carbon project proponent and so do not understand the nuances or stresses of undertaking such a task. Whilst an individual proponent may have the best intention of procuring a carbon project for its social and environmental benefits, there are a number of stakeholders involved throughout the entire process which influence its eventual outcome. Without experience acting as a project proponent I am naïve in understanding the process and it's difficulties.

==Acronyms / Terminology==
'''Acronyms:'''

AFOLU: Agriculture, Forestry and Other Land-Use

ICVCM: Integrity Council for the Voluntary Carbon Market

IPLC: Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities

KMGBF: Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework

LAC: Latin American Countries

MRV: Monitoring, Reporting and Verification

REDD+: Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation

UNCBD: United Nations Convention on Biological Biodiversity

VCMI: Voluntary Carbon Markets Integrity Initiative

'''Terminology:'''

''Additionality:'' Additionality is the determination of whether the project will lead to the expected outcomes when compared to the baseline or ‘business as usual’ emissions.

''Leakage'': Refers to the shifting of emissions to outside the project boundary as a result of the project’s activities.

''Permanence:'' Permanence refers to the degree to which a carbon credit is equivalent to a permanent removal or reduction in emissions.
==Abstract==
This case study illustrates two examples of Indigenous-led REDD+ projects on Indigenous territory in Colombia and Brazil. Both countries have a relatively long history of engaging with REDD+ but have slightly different legal structures pertaining to the rights of Indigenous peoples on their traditional territories, and specifically their ‘carbon’ rights. As such, the intention is to evaluate how these differing ''de jure'' rights translate on the ground. With respect to REDD+, do certain rights result in legitimately positive benefits to IPLCs, as well as the environment that these projects were originally intended to protect? The intention is such that the reader can evaluate the effectiveness and true benefit of REDD+ projects to IPLC’s, based upon the legal frameworks of the host country. A secondary intention is such that the reader is better equipped to conduct a prefeasibility assessment based upon available online literature, to evaluate the likelihood that REDD+ can be implemented in any chosen country, with the genuine intent of benefiting IPLC’s that are directly affected as a result of REDD+ project implementation.

==REDD+ and the VCM in Brazil and Colombia==
REDD+, originally introduced by the UNFCCC, is a market-based mechanism sitting within the VCM that aims to reverse the loss of forests and carbon stocks, specifically in developing countries. Simply put, an entity or an individual can voluntarily pay another that has engaged with REDD+ and subsequently sequestered carbon, to offset their own emissions using ‘credits’, sold as units of greenhouse gas equivalent to one ton of carbon dioxide (CO2e). Forestry and Land-Use remains to be the largest category of carbon credits traded by transaction volume on the VCM, with REDD+ being the most popular project type in this category, accounting for 78% of credits traded.<ref name=":0">Procton, A., (2024). ''State of the voluntary carbon market 2024: On the path to maturity.'' Forest Trends Ecosystem Marketplace.</ref> Furthermore, over one-third of the credits sold within this category were sourced from projects that had been implemented in LAC and the Caribbean in 2024.<ref name=":0" /> Of the four largest standards issuing carbon credits, Verra accounts for roughly 80% of issuances in Latin America,<ref>Pullins, T. (2022). Growth of carbon markets in Latin America. White & Case. [[/www.whitecase.com/publications/insight/latin-america-focus-fall-2022-growth-carbon-markets|https://www.whitecase.com/publications/insight/latin-america-focus-fall-2022-growth-carbon-markets]] </ref> and even in the face of recent scrutiny,<ref>West, T. A. P., Bofim, B., Haya, B. K. (2024). Methodological issues with deforestation baselines compromise the integrity of carbon offsets from REDD+. ''Global Environmental Change, 87'' [[/doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2024.102863|https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2024.102863]]</ref><ref>Wyburd I., & Dufrasne, G. (2023). Error Log: Exposing the methodological failures of REDD+ forestry projects. Carbon Market Watch. [[/carbonmarketwatch.org/publications/error-log-exposing-the-methodological-failures-of-redd-forestry-projects/|https://carbonmarketwatch.org/publications/error-log-exposing-the-methodological-failures-of-redd-forestry-projects/]]</ref><ref name=":15">Haya, B. K., Alford-Jones, K., Anderegg, W. R. L., Beymer-Farris, B., Blanchard, L., Bomfim, B., Chin, D., Evans, S., Hogan, M., Holm, J. A., McAfee, K., So, I. S., West, T. A. P., & Withey, L. (2023). ''Quality assessment of REDD+ carbon credit projects''. Berkeley Carbon Trading Project. [[/gspp.berkeley.edu/research-and-impact/centers/cepp/projects/berkeley-carbontrading-project/REDD+|https://gspp.berkeley.edu/research-and-impact/centers/cepp/projects/berkeley-carbontrading-project/REDD+]]</ref> REDD+ projects account for a significant proportion of the VCM with their continued application likely to persist.<ref>Gordon, O. (2022). ''The interwoven fortunes of carbon markets and indigenous communities.'' Energy Monitor. [[/www.energymonitor.ai/tech/carbon-removal/the-interwoven-fortunes-of-carbon-markets-and-indigenous-communities/|https://www.energymonitor.ai/tech/carbon-removal/the-interwoven-fortunes-of-carbon-markets-and-indigenous-communities/]]</ref><ref>Müller, M., Coustar, C., Bietta, F., Mathres, M. (2022). ''UNFCCC REDD+ and the power of sovereign carbon.'' Deutsche Banke Chief Investment Office. [[/www.rainforestcoalition.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/CIO-Special-UNFCCC-REDD-power-of-sovereign-carbon.pdf|https://www.rainforestcoalition.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/CIO-Special-UNFCCC-REDD-power-of-sovereign-carbon.pdf]]</ref><ref>Pullins, T. (2022). ''Growth of carbon markets in Latin America.'' White & Case. [[/www.whitecase.com/publications/insight/latin-america-focus-fall-2022-growth-carbon-markets|https://www.whitecase.com/publications/insight/latin-america-focus-fall-2022-growth-carbon-markets]] </ref> With the introduction of updated methodologies aimed at addressing these concerns,<ref>Verra (2023a). ''Setting the Standard: Verra’s Revolutionary New REDD Methodology.'' [[/verra.org/program-notice/setting-the-standard-verras-revolutionary-new-redd-methodology/|https://verra.org/program-notice/setting-the-standard-verras-revolutionary-new-redd-methodology/]]</ref><ref>Verra (2023b). ''VM0048 Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation, v1.0.'' [[/verra.org/methodologies/vm0048-reducing-emissions-from-deforestation-and-forest-degradation-v1-0/|https://verra.org/methodologies/vm0048-reducing-emissions-from-deforestation-and-forest-degradation-v1-0/]]</ref> there is hope for renewed buyer confidence in the integrity of this market,<ref>MSCI (2023). ''Verra’s New Methodology for Unplanned Deforestation Aims to Silence the Critics''. [[/www.msci.com/www/blog-posts/verra-s-new-methodology-for/04577808942|https://www.msci.com/www/blog-posts/verra-s-new-methodology-for/04577808942]]</ref> though more work still needs to be done.

Both Colombia and Brazil have a relatively long history of implementing REDD+ projects, using both fund-based and market-based mechanisms. For example, both countries were participants in the ‘Amazon Indigenous REDD+ (RIA in Spanish) initiative, with the first pilot implementation project being initiated in Colombia’s Puiawai Natural Reserve.<ref>Garzón, E., (2017). ''Amazon Indigenous REDD+: An innovative approach to conserve Colombian forests?'' Mongabay. [[/news.mongabay.com/2017/01/amazon-indigenous-redd-an-innovative-approach-to-conserve-colombian-forests/|https://news.mongabay.com/2017/01/amazon-indigenous-redd-an-innovative-approach-to-conserve-colombian-forests/]]</ref> The relevance of these two countries with respect to REDD+ is simple. Much of the Amazon’s primary tropical rainforest falls within these countries jurisdiction and this rainforest has been consistently under threat from external pressures and encroachment, whether that be in the form of land-clearing for commercial ranching, subsistence purposes, illicit drug production or illegal mining practices,<ref name=":8">Sánchez García, P. A. & Wong, G. Y., (2024) “The political economy of deforestation in the Colombian Amazon”, ''Journal of Political Ecology'' ''31''(1), 178–199. [[/doi.org/10.2458/jpe.5230|https://doi.org/10.2458/jpe.5230]]</ref><ref>Radwin, M. (2023). ''Drug trafficking fuels other deforestation drivers in the Amazon: report.'' Mongabay. [[/news.mongabay.com/2023/07/drug-trafficking-fuels-other-deforestation-drivers-in-the-amazon-report/|https://news.mongabay.com/2023/07/drug-trafficking-fuels-other-deforestation-drivers-in-the-amazon-report/]]</ref><ref>Haddad, E.A., Araújo, I.F., Feltran-Barbieri, R., Perobelli, F. S., Rocha, A., Sass, K. S., Nobre, C. A. (2024). Economic drivers of deforestation in the Brazilian Legal Amazon. ''Nat Sustain'' ''7'', 1141–1148. [[/doi.org/10.1038/s41893-024-01387-7|https://doi.org/10.1038/s41893-024-01387-7]] </ref><ref>Hänggli, A., Levy, S. A., Armenteras, D., Bovolo, C. I., Brandão, J., Rueda, X., & Garrett, R. D. (2023). A systematic comparison of deforestation drivers and policy effectiveness across the amazon biome. ''Environmental Research Letters, 18''(7), 073001. [[/doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/acd408|https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/acd408]]</ref> to name a few.

In theory, REDD+ can be used to provide the economic incentive to promote sustained environmental protection of Indigenous lands, with a focus on the rights and livelihoods of IPLCs. Currently the overall funding to IPLCs tenure rights and forest management in tropical countries is low, receiving just $270 million per year between 2011-2020 from bilateral and multilateral donors and private philanthropies.<ref>Hatcher, J., Owen, M., Yin, D., (2021). ''Falling short: Donor funding for Indigenous peoples and local communities to secure tenure rights and manage forests in tropical countries (2011 -2020).'' Rainforest Foundation Norway. [[/dv719tqmsuwvb.cloudfront.net/documents/Publikasjoner/Andre-rapporter/RFN Falling short 2021.pdf|https://dv719tqmsuwvb.cloudfront.net/documents/Publikasjoner/Andre-rapporter/RFN_Falling_short_2021.pdf]]</ref> REDD+ has the potential to channel funding as to promote Indigenous rights and autonomy, provided there is transparent and equitable benefit-sharing for those involved. Fundamentally, only with the inclusion of IPLC’s, or preferably with IPLC’s acting as project proponents, is REDD+ able to promote Indigenous agency and improve IPLC rights and governance. And only when the rights of those inhabiting the land are formally recognized can the land be effectively conserved.<ref name=":16">Reytar, K., Veit, P., von Braun, J. (2024). ''Protecting Biodiversity Hinges on Securing Indigenous and Community Land Rights.'' WRI. [[/www.wri.org/insights/indigenous-and-local-community-land-rights-protect-biodiversity|https://www.wri.org/insights/indigenous-and-local-community-land-rights-protect-biodiversity]]</ref> The inclusion of IPLCs in REDD+ project development is therefore considered to be essential for project success, and this is in theory embodied in the very nature of REDD+.<ref name=":1">Alvarez, G., Elfving, M. and Andrade, C. (2016) ‘REDD+ governance and indigenous peoples in Latin America: the case of Suruí Carbon Project in the Brazilian Amazon Forest’, ''Latin American J. Management for Sustainable Development 3''(2) pp.133–146. [[/dx.doi.org/10.1504/LAJMSD.2016.083705|10.1504/LAJMSD.2016.083705]]</ref> Partially owing to a long history of dealing with REDD+, Colombia and Brazil are amongst just a few of the countries hosting tropical rainforests that explicitly recognise community rights to carbon and tie these rights to the legal ownership of lands and forests. In Colombia, carbon rights are tied to land rights, whereas in Brazil carbon rights are tied to forest rights.<ref name=":2">RRI and McGill University (2021). Technical report: ''Status of legal recognition of Indigenous Peoples’, Local Communities’ and Afro-descendant Peoples’ rights to carbon stored in tropical lands and forests''. Rights and Resources Initiative. [[/doi.org/10.53892/MLQQ5744|https://doi.org/10.53892/MLQQ5744]]</ref>

==Brazil: The Suruí Forest Carbon Project==
[[File:The Amazon Basin, Brazil.jpg|thumb|376x376px|Brazil's Amazon rainforest]]

=== Project description and location ===
The Surui Forest Carbon project was implemented in 2009 on the territory of the Surui people, which is situated in the southern part of Brazil’s Amazon between the states of Rondônia and Mato Grosso. Surui Indigenous territory covers an area of 2,481 km2, though the intention of the PCFS was to protect a portion of this total area. According to the PD, the stated objective was to “prevent 13,575.3 hectares of tropical forest from being cleared by 2038, to avoid the emission of 7,258,352.3 tCO2e to the atmosphere, and to contribute to the preservation of the Paiter Surui lifestyle and traditions.”<ref>IDESAM (2011). ''Project description: Surui forest carbon project''. Institute for Conservation and Sustainable Development of Amazonas. Link: "PROJ_DESC_1118_02FEB2012.PDF" found at [[/registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/1118|https://registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/1118]] </ref> This region sits within one of the Brazilian Amazon’s main ‘arcs of deforestation’ and pressure from loggers and ranchers is a matter of concern.

Notably, the PCFS was the first REDD+ project to be proposed by Indigenous peoples in the Brazilian Amazon on their own territory and was the first to receive certification by both the VCS and CCBS.<ref name=":1" />. Metareilá, the Surui’s own Indigenous association, acted as project proponent and the Institute for Conservation and Sustainable Development of Amazonas (IDESAM) assisted with project development, alongside multiple other stakeholder groups. As an endogenous initiative procured and conducted by the Surui community, the SFCP had a ‘non-centralized model of governance’, which reflected the characteristics and traditions of the Surui people. <ref name=":1" />

Only after two years of consultations between the 24 communities involved and the relevant governmental agencies (primarily FUNAI and the Ministry of Environment) was a Memorandum of Understanding signed, showing community consent to develop the project.<ref name=":3">Garcia, B., Rimmer, L., Canal Vieira, L., Mackey, B., (2021). REDD+ and forest protection on indigenous lands in the Amazon. ''RECIEL 30'', 207–219. [[/doi.org/10.1111/reel.12389|https://doi.org/10.1111/reel.12389]]</ref> In 2012 after verification from an independent third-party body, the Surui were able to sell carbon credits on the international market. Between 2009 and 2014 the project drastically helped limit the deforestation occurring within the project’s site, causing many to deem it a success.<ref name=":4">Howard, F. E., (2023). ''An Analysis of the Suruí Forest Carbon Project in Context of Settler Colonialism''. Masters thesis. Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University. [[/vtechworks.lib.vt.edu/server/api/core/bitstreams/b0cde6de-794c-453f-856b-ee72bde3db06/content|https://vtechworks.lib.vt.edu/server/api/core/bitstreams/b0cde6de-794c-453f-856b-ee72bde3db06/content]]</ref>

=== National climate targets, policies and legislation ===
Rates of deforestation in Brazil’s legal Amazon are significantly impacted by the government in charge. This is evidenced in the decade between 2012 and 2021 whilst under the conservative Bolsonaro administration, when deforestation in the Amazon increased 185% — from a loss of 4,571 km2 in 2012 to 13,038 km2 in 2021.<ref>INPE (2022). ''Observação da Terra. [[/www.obt.inpe.br/OBT/assuntos/programas/amazonia/prodes|http://www.obt.inpe.br/OBT/assuntos/programas/amazonia/prodes]]''</ref> However, since Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s appointment in 2022 there has been a steady decline in the rate of deforestation, which is now roughly half what it was in 2021.<ref>Terra Brasilis (2024). ''PRODES (deforestation): Deforestation rates – Legal Amazon – States''. [[/terrabrasilis.dpi.inpe.br/app/dashboard/deforestation/biomes/legal amazon/rates|https://terrabrasilis.dpi.inpe.br/app/dashboard/deforestation/biomes/legal_amazon/rates]]</ref> A significant proportion of emissions result from the clearing of rainforest and its subsequent conversion to ranching.<ref>MCTI (2022). ''Estimativas Anuais De Emissões De Gases De Efeito Estufa No Brasil.'' 6ª Edição. Ministério da Estado da Ciência, Tecnologia e Inovações. [[/www.gov.br/mcti/pt-br/acompanhe-o-mcti/sirene/publicacoes/estimativas-anuais-de-emissoes-gee/arquivos/6a-ed-estimativas-anuais.pdf|https://www.gov.br/mcti/pt-br/acompanhe-o-mcti/sirene/publicacoes/estimativas-anuais-de-emissoes-gee/arquivos/6a-ed-estimativas-anuais.pdf]]</ref> To address these emissions Brazil has implemented various adaptation policies, legislation and targets which are summarized below:
{| class="wikitable"
|'''Document name'''
|'''Type'''
|'''Publication year'''
|'''Key takeaways'''
|-
|National Policy on Climate Change (NPCC)
|Legislation
|2009
|Framework for addressing climate change
|-
|National Plan on Climate Change Adaptation
|Policy
|2016
|Framework for addressing impacts of climate change
|-
|Nationally Determined Contribution
|Target
|2024
|Reduce net greenhouse gas emissions by 59 to 67 percent below 2005 levels by 2035
|-
|Federal Constitution, Article 225
|Legislation
|2006
|The Amazon rainforest is considered as a ‘national heritage’.All levels of government have a shared responsibility to protect it and the environment
|-
| colspan="4" |'''Relating to REDD+'''
|-
|Plan of Action for the Prevention and Control of Deforestation in the Legal Amazon (PPCDAM)
|Policy
|2004
|Aims to reduce deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon
|-
|Forest code
|Legislation
|2012
|Aimed at reducing deforestation, but no specific mention of REDD+
|-
|Amazon Indigenous REDD+ Initiative
|Policy
|2012
|Incorporate Indigenous with REDD+ initiatives
|-
|National REDD+ Strategy (ENREDD+)
|Policy
|2016
|REDD+ as a fund-based mechanism
|}

=== Indigenous rights - Constitutional, tenure and bundle rights ===
In Brazil, Indigenous rights are robust and clearly defined according to the Brazilian Constitution. As a result, the Indigenous communities of the Brazilian Amazon have legal title to 13.8% of the national territory totalling 1.175 million km2, with a total of 631 territories.<ref>Federal government of Brazil (2024). ''Brazil’s NDC: National determination to contribute and transform''. [[/unfccc.int/sites/default/files/2024-11/Brazil Second Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) November2024.pdf|https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/2024-11/Brazil_Second%20Nationally%20Determined%20Contribution%20%28NDC%29_November2024.pdf]]</ref>
{| class="wikitable"
| colspan="2" |'''Laws'''
|-
|Article 231 of the 1988 Constitution
|Indigenous peoples to have their exclusive right to use their territories to derive economic benefits. Grants indigenous peoples the right to land, prohibits eviction, and restricts mining without authorization from the federal government.
|-
|Indigenous Peoples statute (1973).

|No acts restricting the full exercise of indigenous peoples’ permanent tenure over the land should be permitted.
|-
| colspan="2" | '''Treaties'''
|-
|United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2007)
|Requires States to obtain free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) for the approval of any projects affecting indigenous territories.
|-
|International Labour Organization Convention 169 (2019)
|Ratified and incorporated under domestic law in 2002 through Decree 10.088/2019, endorsing UNDRIP
|-
|American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2016)
|Supports and builds upon UNDRIP
|}
Whilst Indigenous communities in Brazil have legal title to land, it is the State that owns it. Indigenous people simply exercise permanent tenure over lands that they traditionally occupy and have ‘original rights’ to these traditional lands, which no other rights can prevail over.<ref name=":3" /> Indigenous lands, though not classified as protected areas, “have the highest level of protection by law because they are regulated by the Constitution” and cannot be leased or restricted without violating their original rights. The Suruí's right to develop the PCFS is grounded in the Brazilian Constitution, which grants Indigenous peoples exclusive rights to use the ‘riches of the soil, rivers and lakes’ of their land, and these rights cannot be overridden. Thus, Indigenous people and only Indigenous people are legally allowed to engage in productive activities on their land, provided these activities are conducted according to their own customs and traditions and are necessary for the wellbeing and cultural expression of their own people. In Brazil, it is the armed forces and federal police that are responsible for enforcing these laws, and FUNAI is responsible for representing Indigenous communities in judicial disputes.<ref name=":3" /> As such, provided a REDD+ project does not violate the rights to territorial integrity, permanent land tenure and original rights, it is legally allowed.
[[File:Two Pataxo indians (Brasília, 04 April 2006).jpeg|thumb|414x414px|Two Indigenous in Brazil]]
'''CARBON RIGHTS:''' In Brazil, carbon rights are tied to forest rights.<ref name=":2" /> Carbon credits from REDD+ projects are seen as part of the economic benefits derived from indigenous lands, and as such, Indigenous communities are entitled to own, control and distribute these revenues themselves. The carbon credits generated from the (SFCP) were wholly owned by the Suruí people through Metareilá, with the Suruí Fund (managed by the Brazilian Biodiversity Fund - FUNBIO) acting as recipient. This legality reinforces Indigenous control over both land and carbon rights, as whoever has rights to the forest land is usually recognized as the owner of carbon rights.<ref name=":3" /> Collectively these national and international laws provide an important safeguard to Indigenous peoples, making their consent a prerequisite for the establishment of REDD+ projects and recognizing their rights as the main beneficiaries of REDD+ revenues.<ref name=":3" /> However, as carbon rights are tied to forest rights in Brazil and not land rights, and carbon is considered to be an ‘environmental service’ (Article 41(I)(A) Brazilian Forestry Code), states as well as the federal government have the jurisdiction to exercise full legislative authority over carbon. <ref name=":2" /> As such, certain states have interpreted the law to imply that the title to carbon credits is attributable to the state.<ref>Loft, L., Ravikumar, A., Gebara, M. F., Pham, T. T., Resosudarmo, I. A. P., Assembe, S., Tovar, J. G., Mwangi, E., & Andersson, K. (2015). Taking Stock of Carbon Rights in REDD+ Candidate Countries: Concept Meets Reality. ''Forests'', ''6''(4), 1031-1060. [[/doi.org/10.3390/f6041031|https://doi.org/10.3390/f6041031]]</ref> Hence, even when carbon rights are clearly defined and tied to forest title it is insufficient in itself, and only by legally recognizing the customary rights of IPLCs can a fair and equitable outcome be realised.

'''FPIC OBLIGATION:''' Brazilian law requires Free, Prior, and Informed Consent (FPIC) for REDD+ projects affecting indigenous lands, ensuring that international standards such as the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) and ILO Convention No. 169 are adhered to; Indigenous consent is, ''de jure,'' a necessity. Projects that violate these rights and fail to consult communities are therefore considered illegal. Notably there are no specific rules or procedures that have been written into the Brazilian constitution that provide guidance on how to achieve FPIC. However, this freedom reinforces Indigenous autonomy as it allows an Indigenous community to define the rules of consultation according to their customs and traditions.

=== Interested and affected stakeholders ===
{| class="wikitable"
| colspan="5" |'''Affected stakeholders'''
|-
|Stakeholders
|Primary objective(s)
|Secondary objective(s)
|Relative power
|Scope of influence
|-
|Metareilá Association of the Suruí Indigenous People
|Project proponent

Works to defend and preserve the cultural and territorial heritage of the Suruí people.

Responsible for the Suruí Fund (FUNBIO). Ensure equitable distribution of funds
|Ensure project longevity.
Stick to the mandate; attempt not to be influenced by external actors
|Powerful, though lacking technical knowhow. Have carbon rights and thus have ultimate control of project revenue; can decide how this revenue is distributed.
|Local
|-
|Other Indigenous groups and associations
|Support various aspects of proejct development
|Aim to benefit from the project
|Have the same rights as the Metareila with respect to land though are less involved with project development and have less say, nor derive economic benefits like the Metareila
|Local
|-
|''Campesinos'' (peasants)
|Survive via subsistence.
|Procure more land.
|Have far fewer rights than Indigenous groups and no involvement with the project
|Local
|-
| colspan="5" |'''Interested stakeholders'''
|-
|IDESAM - Institute for Conservation and Sustainable Development of Amazonas
|Maximise revenue from project.
Ensure project longevity
|Achieve completion of various technical aspects of project
|Powerful: Required to complete various technical aspects of development.
|National
|-
|Forest Trends
|Supported formulation and implementation of the project.
Uphold image of organization
|Maximise environmental benefits of project
|Powerful: Tasked with raising funds and fostering an international network; an integral part of project development
|International
|-
|Amazon Conservation Team - ACT Brazil
|Supports various aspect of project development as well as offering legal advice.
Other technical assistance
|Maximise environmental benefits of project
|Powerful: An integral part of project development
|International
|-
|Kanindé Association for Ethno-Environmental Defense – non-profit
|Promote Metareilá views and beliefs
|Involved with various aspects of project development
|Mid-power. Has a say in project direction, though less weight than the Metareila.
|National - International
|-
|Ministry of Environment (MMA)
|Responsible for protection and conservation of natural environment
|Ensure project adheres to national law
|Powerful. Must be notified about project activities although cannot strictly alter decisions made by the Surui
|National
|-
|National Indian Foundation (FUNAI)
|Promote Indigenous rights

|Represents Indignous organizations with judicial matters.
|Powerful. Knowleadgeable of judicial system. Must be notified about project activities though is not involved with project governance.
|National
|-
|Government of the State of Mato Grosso
|Encourage development, and reduce poverty and crime in Mato Grosso
|Ensure project adheres to regional law.
|Powerful. Legilative control over regional police and municipalities
|Regional
|}

=== Discussion ===
Although originally successful in achieving its goal of reducing deforestation and degradation, in 2016 diamonds were discovered in Surui territory, leading to an increase in illegal logging and mining.<ref name=":1" /> By 2018 the project site had been completely overrun by ''garimpeiros'' (small-scale gold miners), ultimately leading to the projects suspension that year. <ref name=":4" />

While the project had initially garnered support, divisions emerged within the community post-project implementation. Disputes arose over the unequal distribution of project revenues, leading to internal conflicts between different Suruí clans. These criticisms escalated in 2014 when the Catholic Indigenous Missionary Council supported calls for an end to the project due to mismanagement of revenues from carbon credit sales. <ref name=":3" /> Some Suruí members also argued that the REDD+ initiative harmed their way of life.<ref>Lang, C. (2014). ''“What are projects for that destroy life?” Interview with Henrique Suruí about the Paiter-Suruí REDD project, Brazil.'' REDD-Monitor. [[/redd-monitor.org/2014/12/17/what-are-projects-for-that-destroy-life-interview-with-henrique-surui-about-the-paiter-surui-redd-project-brazil/|https://redd-monitor.org/2014/12/17/what-are-projects-for-that-destroy-life-interview-with-henrique-surui-about-the-paiter-surui-redd-project-brazil/]]</ref>

Further complicating the situation was the controversial role of Henrique Suruí, one of the Suruí tribal leaders. In 2011, it was revealed that Henrique had violated the tribe's logging moratorium, collaborating with loggers in illegal activities. While Henrique later denied responsibility for the project’s failure, his actions, combined with internal disagreements, illustrated the lack of consensus within the Suruí leadership on the project’s goals and outcomes. Both of the tribe’s leaders possessed dramatically different perspectives on how they believed they could ensure agency, autonomy, and economic benefits for the Suruí people.<ref name=":4" /> This fragmentation within the community, in combination with the discovery of diamonds and the state's failure to protect indigenous land rights led to the indefinite suspension of the REDD+ project.

The project's collapse highlights broader structural issues, particularly the state's inconsistent support for indigenous land rights, influenced by settler colonialism, which undermined the project’s long-term viability.<ref name=":4" /> Additionally, the project’s creation was shaped by external actors, including the collaboration between Almir Suruí and Borges from Forest Trends, a Washington-based NGO. This partnership introduced a Western perspective on viewing the Suruí peoples forest, in contrast with their own perspectives on land use and governance. Furthermore, despite Borges’ Brazilian background, the power dynamics between a global North organization and a developing, Indigenous community were apparent.

=== Summary ===
The Suruí Forest Carbon Project provides an interesting example of how, even when the rights of IPLC’s are relatively robust, challenges persist in ensuring REDD+ project longevity. As such, in its current state, REDD+ in the Brazilian Amazon may not be a suitable market-based option for Indigenous communities in the Amazon.<ref name=":3" /> Although initially successful in promoting Indigenous autonomy and reducing deforestation, the project resulted in failure due to of a myriad of factors. Division between Surui communities was exacerbated by a perceived unequal benefit-sharing, and the impact of imposing REDD+ seems to have complicated the traditional social structure that the Surui were dependent on. These issues were influenced by Brazil's settler state dynamics, where Indigenous land rights, although legally recognized, are often not upheld in practice due to insufficient enforcement.<ref name=":4" /> Ultimately, the Surui project reveals how settler colonialism's structural flaws make long-term project success difficult, despite initial progress in promoting Indigenous autonomy.

At the national and state level, complex institutional and legal land governance structures convolute and impede REDD+ in Brazil. Multiple institutions share responsibilities and there is no comprehensive, authoritative database of land ownership, which hampers efforts to protect Indigenous territories.<ref name=":5">Costa, R. (2016)''. Insecure land rights in Brazil: Consequences for rural areas and challenges for improvement.'' Climate Policy Initiative. [[/www.climatepolicyinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/Insecure Land Rights in Brazil CPI.pdf|https://www.climatepolicyinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/Insecure_Land_Rights_in_Brazil_CPI.pdf]]</ref> As a result, land tenure disputes remain common and can be witnessed occurring between the public as well between public and state actors. For example, Brazil’s 1964 Land Statute (Law No. 4504) allows the government to takeover unproductive farms and transfer those lands to landless peasants. This often results in the clearing of forest, as only when the land is cleared is it evidenced to be ‘productive’.<ref name=":5" /> Hence, not only does this law cause insecurity for Indigenous populations in Brazil, it also forces them to go against customary traditions of stewarding the land in an effort to maintain its control.

Whilst the aforementioned points to the futility of REDD+ in Brazil, there is reason to maintain optimism. In a recent landmark ruling Brazil’s supreme court voted in favour of the Xoleng peoples, and the decision will serve as a precedent for all cases involving Indigenous peoples.<ref name=":6">Amos-Flom, K., (2023). ''Triumph and Turmoil: The Xokleng Case and the Future of Indigenous Land Rights in Brazil.'' Columbia Journal of Transnational Law. [[/www.jtl.columbia.edu/bulletin-blog/triumph-and-turmoil-the-xokleng-case-and-the-future-of-indigenous-land-rights-in-brazil|https://www.jtl.columbia.edu/bulletin-blog/triumph-and-turmoil-the-xokleng-case-and-the-future-of-indigenous-land-rights-in-brazil]]</ref> The Xokleng’s land dispute, settled in 2023, “rejected Santa Catarina state’s marco temporal (“time limit”) argument, which would have required Indigenous people to prove they occupied or legally contested the territory they claimed before the Brazilian Constitution came into force in 1988. If successful, this argument would have led to disastrous repercussions, as many Indigenous peoples had been forcibly removed or are traditionally nomadic.”<ref name=":6" /> Evidently, whilst slow, progress has been made in Brazil in recent years with respect to Indigenous rights as well as the voluntary carbon market itself.

There are currently 159 AFOLU projects listed on the Verra database in Brazil, with only two specifically focused on REDD+ initiatives in collaboration with Indigenous groups. These are the Ka’a Pyahu project, <ref>Verra (n.d.) ''Project 5087: KA'A PYAHU.'' https://registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/5087</ref> initiated by the Guajajara Indigenous people in collaboration with external organizations and validated in 2021, and the ‘Together for the forest Awaete REDD+ project’<ref>Verra (n.d.) ''Project 5200: TOGETHER FOR THE FOREST AWAETÉ REDD+ PROJECT.'' https://registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/5200</ref> which is still under development. Both projects involve Indigenous groups working with Brazilian organizations to build technical capacity and expertise. This could signal a growing trend of Indigenous-led REDD+ projects in the future. To ensure a positive future for REDD+ in Brazil, the customary rights of IPLC’s must be formally recognized. IPLC should have legal ownership of their traditional lands, and in doing so the carbon rights of these communities would be less convoluted, leading to more equitable benefit-sharing and increased cohesion amongst these groups post-project implementation.

==Colombia: ''REDD+ project Resguardo Indigena Unificado - Selva de Mataven (RUI-SM)''==

=== '''Project description and location''' ===
[[File:RS6524 MG 3944.jpg|thumb|407x407px|A view of the Mataven]]
According to the PD,<ref name=":7">ACATISEMA & Mediamos (2017). ''Joint project description and monitoring report: REDD+ project: Resguardo Indigena Unificado – Selva de Mataven (RIU – SM).'' Link: “10 06 2017_VCS Final Report_ Matavin Project.pdf” found at [[/registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/1566|https://registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/1566]]</ref> the Resguardo Indígena Unificado – Selva de Matavén (RIU-SM) project is located east of the Colombian Orinoco high plain, in the eastern part of the Department of Vichada, municipality of Cumaribo. It resides on the formalized resguardo of the Sikuani, Piaroa, Puinave, Curripaco, Cubeo and Piapoco ethnic groups, spanning 1,856,836 hectares, with 1,477,115 hectares (79.6%) being forested. The PD states that it will reduce greenhouse gas emissions, with a total estimated net reduction of 108,670,562 tons of CO2 equivalent over thirty years, from years 2013 – 2042. By this metric, it is the 14th largest project on the Verra registry, out of over 1700 projects.<ref name=":9">Dufrasne, D., (2021). ''Two Shades of Green: How hot air forest credits are being used to avoid carbon taxes in Colombia''. Carbon Market Watch. [[/carbonmarketwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Two-shades-of-green EN WEB.pdf|https://carbonmarketwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Two-shades-of-green_EN_WEB.pdf]]</ref> There are 12,312 Indigenous people living in the RIU-SM, belonging to 2,517 families and 250 communities as of 2017.

The project was initiated by the Asociación de Cabildos y Autoridades Indígenas de la Selva de Matavén (ACETISMA), an Indigenous association, and developed by MEDIAMOS F&M, a Colombian consultancy firm. ACETISMA is comprised of Indigenous leaders that represent the 17 communities of the reservation in charge of governing the territory, and it has administrative autonomy, as well as “the capacity to acquire, to own and to dispose of property, to accept donations, to hold national and international conventions, scientific and cultural exchanges and generally, to celebrate all kinds of negotiations and agreements with which the Association can achieve its objectives.”<ref name=":7" />

There is a stated focus on various means of improving the living conditions of the Indigenous peoples living within the project area. To summarise, the main objectives of the REDD+ project RIU-SM include:

· Community development, in the form of improved education.

· Community engagement with respect to the project; developing information channels to reveal project progress.

· Support local initiatives for environmental education and waste management.

· Developing an effective response system that addresses community proposals and concerns relating to the project.

· Strengthening the governance of ACATISEMA.
=== National climate targets, policies and legislation ===
The Colombian Amazon makes up over one-third of Colombia’s national territory, and up until 2005 only 7.3% of the Colombian Amazon had been deforested, largely due to the country's 60-year armed conflict between the government, multiple left-wing guerillas such as FARC, and several far-right paramilitary groups.<ref name=":8" /> However, following the signing of the Peace Treaty in 2016 and demobilization of the FARC, limits to deforestation were weakened in the Colombian Amazon. Poor but opportunistic peasants began to encroach into previously unchartered territory and capitalize from the rainforest. Due to the poor economic integration of the Amazon, many were forced to engage with the traditional economies of cocoa and cattle ranching, as these markets were already well connected to regional and global markets.<ref name=":8" /> To address the drivers of deforestation and its associated emissions, the federal government has implemented various initiatives, which are summarized below:

{| class="wikitable"
|'''Document name'''
|'''Type'''
|'''Publication year'''
|'''Key takeaways'''
|-
|Nationally Determined Contribution(s)
|Target
|2020
|Reduce GHG emissions by 51% by 2030 and net-zero by 2050
|-
|National Climate Change Policy (PNCC)
|Policy
|2018
|Address climate change and foster sustainable development
|-
|National Forest Conservation Program
|Policy
|2011
|Address deforestation
|-
|Law 1931 of 2018 – Climate Change Law

|Legislation
|2018
|Establishes the framework for addressing climate change
|-
| colspan="4" |'''Relating to REDD+:'''
|-
|National Strategy for Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (ENREDD+)
|Initiative
|2009
|Particular focus on the Amazon and Choco rainforests
|-
|Amazon Indigenous REDD+ Initiative
|Initiative
|2016
|Respect Indigenous rights. FPIC focus.
|-
|BIOREDD+ program
|Initiative
|2012
|Portfolio of 8 REDD+ projects in four geographic nodes covering over 700,000 hectares in the Colombian Pacific.

|-
|Vision Amazonia
|Initiative
|2015
|Part of the REDD+ strategy, financed by three foreign countries: Germany, Norway and United Kingdom
|}
As a result of the many fund and market-based initiatives that Colombia has engaged with, it hosts the second most REDD+ projects in the world. REDD+ projects now cover at least 56% of the area of legally recognized Indigenous territories in the Colombian Amazon, with an overwhelming majority of carbon projects located on Indigenous territories.<ref name=":10">Schmid, D., & Castro. C., (2023). ''REDD+ projects in the Colombian Amazon: Social challenges and lack of transparency''. Rainforest Foundation Norway. [[/dv719tqmsuwvb.cloudfront.net/documents/REDD rapport 2024 ENG.pdf|https://dv719tqmsuwvb.cloudfront.net/documents/REDD_rapport_2024_ENG.pdf]]</ref> Evidently REDD+ plays an integral part in the country’s efforts of environmental conservation, and incentives have been introduced to promote the development of such projects. For example, in 2016 the government adopted a higher tax that covered fossil fuels, but companies are able to avoid paying the tax by investing in carbon offsets that have been generated domestically.<ref name=":9" /> This led to a boost in the domestic REDD+ market in 2017, as Colombian companies invested as to escape higher taxes. Notably, 23 of the 36 REDD+ projects currently under development in the Amazon region were initiated in or after 2018.<ref name=":10" /> Currently Colombia’s REDD+ program sits at over 45 pilot and voluntary carbon projects, as well as one large-scale jurisdictional approach in the Amazon.<ref name=":11">Zambrano-Cortés, D. G. (2024). ''The politics, spaces and subjects of forest conservation in Colombia''. [internal PhD, WU, Wageningen University]. Wageningen University. [[/doi.org/10.18174/675328|https://doi.org/10.18174/675328]]</ref>

=== Indigenous rights - Constitutional, tenure and bundle rights ===
''De jure'', the Indigenous peoples of Colombia have comprehensive tenure and bundle rights that have been articulated in the national constitution. Collective land titles are granted to Indigenous communities by the Colombian government and as a result about 34 percent of Colombian land (almost 38 million hectares) is legally recognized as Indigenous territory or collective lands of Afro-descendent communities.<ref name=":10" /> These collective land tenure rights have been in effect since the implementation of the 1991 constitution, granting them the authority to exercise legal control over their territories in accordance with their own customs and procedures.<ref>Max Planck Institute (n.d.) ''Colombia 1991 (rev. 2015).'' Institute. [[/www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Colombia 2015|https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Colombia_2015]]</ref> Furthermore, the carbon rights of Indigenous peoples are explicitly defined in the constitution and tied specifically to the ownership of land of the communities.<ref name=":2" /> This in theory provides a solid legal basis for upholding the rights of Indigenous communities in Colombia, specifically relating to REDD+ activities, as it allows communities to define and negotiate the terms of said projects. A summary of the various laws relating to Indigenous rights have been summarized below:
{| class="wikitable"
| colspan="2" |'''Law (1991 constitution)'''
|-
|Article 63

|Indigenous territories are considered collective property. Land is not owned by individuals but is shared by the community. The state must respect these collective rights and cannot alter land ownership without the consent of the Indigenous peoples.
|-
|Article 76 - ''Consulta previa''.
|Pertains to the right of Indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities; prior consultation must be undertaken before any entity undertakes activities that may affect their territories, culture, or way of life.
|-
|Article 330
|Indigenous communities have the right to govern their territories.
|-
|Article 329
|The Reservation is a collective, inalienable, and indefeasible property.
|-
|Decree 1386 of 1994, Article 10; Decree 2164 of 1995, Article 22) 39.
|"The administration and management of these lands are subjected to uses and customs of the beneficiaries."
|}
Whilst land and tenure rights are enshrined into the constitution, the precariousness of these rights persists due to a lack of resources to ensure enforcement, as well as the deeper issue of corruption. As previously stated, the rate of deforestation increased significantly in Colombia’s post-conflict era, evidencing the nations inability to maintain control over unlawful acts of land-grabbing and disposition. Whilst this began with new peasants converting the Amazon for subsistence purposes, it ultimately led to new areas for the growth of cocoa, much to the benefit of narco-traffickers who could monopolize on this illegal surplus in ‘accumulation by dispossession’.<ref name=":8" />

With respect to the legalities of consultation, Colombia has enshrined ''consulta previa'' into the constitution. Translating to ‘prior consultation’, this legal text provides the formal grounds for Indigenous engagement when any legislative or administrative measures are implemented on Indigenous territory. Importantly, consultation should be achieved in accordance with the customs of the ethnic group with which the project is being imposed upon. However, there have been recent cases of contestation specifically relating to how ''consulta previa'' applies to REDD+ on Indigenous lands, and the RIU – SM project was one that was involved with such a case.

=== Affected and interested stakeholders ===
{| class="wikitable"
| colspan="5" |'''Affected stakeholders'''
|-
|Stakeholders
|Primary objective(s)
|Secondary objective(s)
|Relative power
|Scope of influence
|-
|ACATISEMA - Asociación de Cabildos y Autoridades Indígenas de la Selva de Matavén
|Primary and direct beneficiaries of project
Foster the integral development, social and cultural preservation of the indigenous communities in the Mataven Jungle

Consolidate the territory, and promote conservation and preservation of the environment and biodiversity of the Mataven Jungle

|Maintain control over ''resguardos''
|Powerful, locally.
Has the highest authority in the ''reguardo''.

Rights to the land and revenue generated from project
|Local
|-
|Indigenous communities of the RIU-SM
|Seek to maintain land rights

Promote traditional and cultural beliefs
|Increase benefits from the project
|Mid-power, though little input into project activities in reality.
|Local
|-
|Landless peasants
|Survive via subsistence
|Gain more access to land. Improve rights.
|Low to none
|Local
|-
| colspan="5" |'''Interested stakeholders'''
|-
|MEDIAMOS F&M
|Project developer
Maximise project revenues
|Develop the project in a way that is supporting of ACETISMA beliefs, for their benefit.
|Powerful: involved with various technical aspects of project development
|National
|-
|Ministerio de Ambiente y Desarrollo Sostenible (Minisitry of Environment and Sustainable Development)
|Environmental planning; sustainable development
Form strategic alliances with social and institutional participants in different sectoral and territorial scenarios.
|Ensure project activities are in agreement with ministry mandate
|Powerful, though supporting of project
|National
|-
|Dirección de Asuntos Indígenas, ROM y Minorías - Ministerio del Interior
|Prepares policy in favour of Indigenous groups
Supports ethnic and cultural rights of Indigenous
|
|Not ''per se'' involved with project, though the policy the organization has introduced affects project outcomes
|National
|-
|Corporinoquía
|Environmental authority to ensure the proper use of natural resources in their area of jurisdiction.
Ensure project abides by relevant regulations
|
|Powerful, though supporting of project
|Regional
|-
|Other government institutions: Governor ofice of Vichada, Mayor ofice Cumaribo
|The Reservation for being part of the Cumaribo, Vichada, has territorial jurisdiction relations with the Governor’s office and the Mayor’s office.
|Benefit from the project, if possible
|Powerful, regionally
|Regional - National
|-
|Fundación NATURA
''Civil organization''
|Conservation, use and management of biodiversity
Maximise social and environmental benefits of project
|Ensure suffienct IPLC inclusion
|Mid-power. Can influence decisions regarding project activities though does not hold absolute power to define terms
|International
|-
|Mining companies
|Mine to generate revenue.
|Compete with the project for the territory's resources.
|Relatively powerful, though legally obstructed to achieve primary objective
|International
|-
|Other indigenous communities neighboring RIU-SM
|Ensure autonomy with respect to their own jurisdiction
|Not involved with the project though potentially affected by it
|Low, with respect to the project
|Local
|-
|FONDO ACCIÓN
|Facilitate private investment into project activities
|Conservation and sustainable development; Protection/development of children.
|Mid-power. Important as they raise funds for the project and benefit from it, though not primary beneficiaries.
|National
|-
|Asocarbono – An industry association, including Verra, ProClima, Biofix, and ACATISEMA.

|Promote the agenda of high-level actors of the VCM
Promote integrity of market
|Hide/argue cases of scandal
|Powerful
|International
|-
|OPIAC: National Oganization of the Indigenous Peoples of the Colombian Amazon

|Promotes Indigenous rights in Colombia
Exercises a political representation of the Indigenous peoples of the Colombian Amazon
|
|Powerful. Legally knowledgeable.
|National
|}

=== Discussion ===
According to the official REDD+ Mataven website<ref>RIU – SM (n.d.). ''REDD+ Mataven''. [[/reddmataven.com/|https://reddmataven.com/]]</ref> the project has resulted in a myriad of benefits to the Indigenous communities of the region. For example, as a result of the funds generated from the projects activities, there have been improvements in infrastructure, transportation and education, ultimately leading to the empowerment and improved governance of ACETISMA. However, the project has come under fire for multiple reasons.

For one, in 2015 some of the Indigenous communities filed a lawsuit referring to the violation of their right to ''consulta previa''. However, the court ruled that their Indigenous rights had not been violated as it was ACETISMA that initially sought MEDIAMOS to develop the project, and that ACETISMA were the best representatives of those Indigenous communities. Furthermore, the projects main focus was the conservation of the rainforest and therefore did not threaten the cultural integrity of those communities.<ref name=":10" /> However, regardless of the outcome of this case, its occurrence points to internal disagreement amongst Indigenous participants of the RIU-SM project. In a study involving interviews with Indigenous members of the project, there was a significant proportion of interviewees that had little knowledge regarding various aspects of the project, such as responsibilities of participation, or the benefit-sharing mechanism in place.<ref name=":2" /> This further reinforces the point that, in the case of the RIU-SM project it may not be ‘bottom-up’ and eludes to the power imbalance experienced between MEDIAMOS, the project developer, and Indigenous community members. In the PD there is a breakdown of the distribution of income between ACETISMA and MEDIAMOS, which shows a significant proportion of revenue flowing to the former organisation throughout the project’s operations.<ref name=":7" /> However, there is currently no publicly available documentation supporting this initial claim<ref name=":9" /> as there is no obligation to provide this information, leading to a general lack of transparency in the market and between all of the relevant actors. Subsequent meetings with Indigenous leaders have however shown a marked support of the Mataven project, with one Indigenous leader explicitly stating “...the Redd+ project has brought resources that they never had before, which allowed them to open new school classrooms, 21 rural aqueducts, cocoa crops and even headquarters in Cumaribo and Inírida.”<ref>Lievano, A. B. (2021) Colombia's biggest carbon credit project could be selling hot air. Latin American Center for Investigative Journalism. [[/www.elclip.org/el-mayor-proyecto-de-bonos-de-carbono-de-colombia-podria-estar-vendiendo-aire-caliente/|https://www.elclip.org/el-mayor-proyecto-de-bonos-de-carbono-de-colombia-podria-estar-vendiendo-aire-caliente/]] </ref> Clearly there have been benefits for IPLC’s involved with this project, though the details of this benefit-sharing remain a mystery.

Secondly, the Mataven project has caused controversy due to its apparently inflated carbon credit issuance. One report states that this has been achieved by using a reference area that is not representative of the project area, as well as assuming an uncharacteristically heigh assumed rate of deforestation.<ref name=":12">Global Atlas of Environmental Justice (2023). ''Resguardo Indigena Unificado-Selva de Matavén (RIU SM) REDD+ Project, Colombia.'' [[/ejatlas.org/conflict/redd-project-resguardo-indigena-unificado-selva-de-mataven-riu-sm|https://ejatlas.org/conflict/redd-project-resguardo-indigena-unificado-selva-de-mataven-riu-sm]]</ref> The project used a baseline deforestation rate of 0.86% per year, which is significantly more than the Colombian government's national rate of 0.18%. Additionally, according to the report the reference area chosen is more easily accessed and therefore more prone to deforestation, making it an inaccurate comparison to the relatively remote project area.<ref name=":2" /> This has led to the creation of excess carbon credits, or “hot air” credits, which have been criticized for not reflecting real environmental benefits.<ref name=":9" /> To add further insult to injury these credits have been used by a Colombian fossil fuel distributor company to avoid paying taxes, as described earlier by Colombia’s change in policy in 2017. In doing so, the company avoided paying approximately $18.9 million in taxes.<ref name=":2" /> There has been subsequent back and forth between Verra and Carbon Market Watch, with Verra refuting the claims<ref>Verra (2021). ''Carbon Market Watch Report on Colombian REDD+ Projects Contains Flawed Allegations.'' [[/verra.org/carbon-market-watch-report-on-colombian-redd-projects-contains-flawed-allegations/|https://verra.org/carbon-market-watch-report-on-colombian-redd-projects-contains-flawed-allegations/]] </ref> Regardless of the science, Colombia recently introduced a resolution in 2018 (Resolution 1447 – 2018) that requires projects to use baselines that comply with national reference levels.<ref name=":13">Dufrasne, D. (2021b). Companies use ”hot air” forestry offsets to avoid taxes in Colombia: Carbon Market Watch’s fact-check of Verra’s response. Carbon Market Watch. [[/carbonmarketwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/CMWs-fact-check-of-Verras-response-on-Colombia.pdf|https://carbonmarketwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/CMWs-fact-check-of-Verras-response-on-Colombia.pdf]]</ref><ref>IEA (2022). ''Resolution 1447 – 2018. Monitoring, Reporting, and Verification System for mitigation actions at the national level.'' International Energy Agency. [[/www.iea.org/policies/14772-resolution-1447-2018-monitoring-reporting-and-verification-system-for-mitigation-actions-at-the-national-level|https://www.iea.org/policies/14772-resolution-1447-2018-monitoring-reporting-and-verification-system-for-mitigation-actions-at-the-national-level]]</ref> Going forward, REDD+ projects that are being implemented in Colombia will have to abide by Colombia’s national legislation.

=== Summary ===
Colombia has a long history of engaging in REDD+ as it has been used to limit environmental degradation in the post-conflict era, in alignment with the country’s national peacebuilding agenda.<ref name=":11" /> Owing to the country’s comprehensive tenure and bundle rights, IPLC’s have robust ''de jure'' rights to land as they collectively own it, and rights to carbon are tied to this ownership. This puts Colombia as one of the world leaders in legal terms relating to REDD+ project implementation, but due to a lack of resources to ensure enforcement, as well as corruption, historically these laws have not been adhered to.<ref name=":10" /><ref name=":2" /> There are many documented cases showing the displacement on IPLC’s from traditional lands, poor efforts to adhere to ''consulta previa'', and inequitable benefit sharing.<ref>Greenfield, P. (2023''). The ‘carbon pirates’ preying on Amazon’s Indigenous communities.'' The Guardian. [[/www.theguardian.com/environment/2023/jan/21/amazon-indigenous-communities-carbon-offsetting-pirates-aoe|https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2023/jan/21/amazon-indigenous-communities-carbon-offsetting-pirates-aoe]]</ref><ref name=":14">Lang, C., (2024). ''Colombia’s Constitutional Court rules in favour of Indigenous Peoples. Identifies serious flaws in the REDD+ Baka Rokarire project.'' REDD_Monitor. [[/reddmonitor.substack.com/p/colombias-constitutional-court-rules|https://reddmonitor.substack.com/p/colombias-constitutional-court-rules]]</ref>

The case of the Mataven project provides an interesting example of how it is the market itself that is failing to address concerns regarding transparency, whether that be relating to benefit-sharing amongst relevant stakeholders, or Indigenous representation and engagement throughout the implementation of REDD+ projects. Some ACATISEMA members have explicitly stated their support for the Mataven project,<ref name=":12" /> and its benefits can be seen first-hand in the form of improved infrastructure in local communities involved with the project.<ref>Myers, J. E., Parra, M. A., Bedford, C. (2021). ''How Carbon Offsetting Can Build a Forest.'' Stanford Social Innovation Review. [[/ssir.org/articles/entry/how carbon offsetting can build a forest|https://ssir.org/articles/entry/how_carbon_offsetting_can_build_a_forest]]</ref> However, an exact breakdown of how and where revenue is being distributed to IPLC’s remains elusive.<ref name=":13" /> Furthermore, the level of IPLC engagement has come into question, specifically with reference to ''consulta previa'' and the overall understanding that IPLC’s have regarding the project’s intended outcomes and activities.<ref name=":10" /> This is not a rare case in Colombia and has been witnessed occurring with other projects that have been implemented on Indigenous territories in the Colombian Amazon.<ref name=":17">Lang, C., (2023''). “It destroys everything,” says Indigenous leader about the REDD+ Baka Rokarire project in Colombia''. REDD Monitor. [[/reddmonitor.substack.com/p/it-destroys-everything-says-indigenous|https://reddmonitor.substack.com/p/it-destroys-everything-says-indigenous]]</ref> However, a recent ruling by the Colombian Constitutional court voted in favour of Indigenous groups in Colombia, upholding “the rights to self-determination, autonomy, self-government, territory, identity, physical and cultural integrity, and free, prior and informed consent of the indigenous communities”.<ref name=":14" /> This review ultimately sets a legal precedent safeguarding the fundamental rights of IPLCs with REDD+ project implementation and shows that progress is being made to improve the likelihood that REDD+ will result in genuine benefits to those affected by project implementation.

To ensure a more authentic engagement with IPLC’s as to result in legitimate and equitable benefit-sharing, improvements must be made by the Colombian government, as well as within the VCM itself. For the former, Colombia’s national registry for GHG mitigation activities must be updated; it has been offline since 2022.<ref name=":10" /> As a result, transparency is lacking. International finance could be utilized as to alleviate this issue, and only with an accurate and reliable database may the market be regulated. In the broader sense, VCM registries must create stricter guidelines promoting transparency. Often PD’s refer to annexed documents that contain relevant information regarding benefit-sharing, though these are often not publicly available.<ref name=":9" /> This limits transparency and increases the likelihood of inequitable agreements being made between project proponents and developers, further exacerbating existing power asymmetries between the two groups and limiting the likelihood that ''consulta previa'' is honestly adhered to.<ref name=":10" /> This has led to conflict within Indigenous communities, rather than a strengthening of their social fabric.

Furthermore, the Mataven project calls into question the actual emissions reduction that REDD+ projects achieve. Whilst Colombia has since updated its regulations such that REDD+ must use baselines that comply with national reference levels, it is up in the air as to how representative these guidelines are. Reference areas must represent project areas and without the appropriate regulations in place project developers lack the incentive to create realistic baselines; ultimately they are aiming to produce the maximum number of credits as to generate the greatest possible revenues.

==Conclusion==
As a market-based mechanism, REDD+ is shackled by the construct in which it operates; fundamentally it is a capitalist means of fixing a capitalist problem, which comes with limitations. Both Brazil and Colombia have relatively robust laws that have been written into the constitution, ultimately promoting more equitable results of REDD+ project implementation. However, as in Colombia IPLC’s collectively own the land, whereas in Brazil these groups only own rights to use the land,<ref name=":2" /> Colombia can be considered better equipped for the establishment of REDD+ projects on traditional Indigenous territory. However, even with these laws in place enforcement remain a matter of concern. Furthermore, given the wide variety of ontological and epistemological perspectives of Indigenous communities, and how these views conflict with the Western worldview from which market-based REDD+ came to fruition, there is an inherent difficulty in implementing a system of governance in REDD+ on Indigenous lands.<ref name=":1" />. Putting a price on nature conflicts with Indigenous perspectives and there have been instances where this has attacked the social and cultural fabric of IPLC’s.<ref name=":17" /> To avoid this REDD+ developers must have the genuine intent of understanding the perspective of the Indigenous group they are working with and aim to implement REDD+ with a bottom-up approach.

In both countries, transparency must be improved to ensure that FPIC is adhered to and subsequently ensure fair IPLC representation and engagement. This issue predominantly arises due to the poor requirements of standards in the VCM. As such, proponents are guided by developers which have little incentive to truly act in the interests of Indigenous groups; ultimately the organizations in charge of project development are interested in increasing project revenues. This has led to instances of over-crediting, as without a transparent framework in which to operate it is difficult to evaluate the legitimacy of the claims being made by project proponents and developers. However, with recent advances that address concerns of additionality<ref name=":15" /> there is hope for improved market integrity. Standards of the VCM must continue to be scrutinized to ensure that progress continues to be made.

Going forward, progress should be made to formalize the customary laws and traditional lands of IPLCs, and finance should be directed towards the enforcement of these laws. The environmental,<ref name=":16" /> economic,<ref name=":5" /><ref>Ding, H., Veit, P. G., Blackman, A., Gray, E., Reytar, K., Altamirano, J. C., Hodgdon, B., (2016). ''Climate benefits, tenure costs: The economic case for securing Indigenous land rights in the Amazon''. WRI. [[/files.wri.org/d8/s3fs-public/Climate Benefits Tenure Costs Executive Summary.pdf|https://files.wri.org/d8/s3fs-public/Climate_Benefits_Tenure_Costs_Executive_Summary.pdf]]</ref> and social<ref>Sarmiento Barletti, J. P., Heise Vigil, N., & Larson, A. M. (2023). ''Safeguards at a glance: Are voluntary standards supporting community land, resource and carbon rights?'' CIFOR-ICRAF. [[/www.cifor-icraf.org/publications/pdf files/Flyer/REDD-Safeguards-7.pdf|https://www.cifor-icraf.org/publications/pdf_files/Flyer/REDD-Safeguards-7.pdf]] </ref> benefits of this have been researched and are well understood. By developing culturally appropriate frameworks for rights-based conservation regimes, that work with IPLCs in accordance with their worldviews, REDD+ could be used to promote Indigenous autonomy. However, progress still must be made to achieve this goal.

==References==

Documentation:Open Case Studies/FRST522/2024/REDD+ in Indigenous Amazonia: What works and what doesn’t?

2024-12-16T21:54:03Z

ConnorHaynes: /* Affected and interested stakeholders */

__TOC__

==Positionality==
First and foremost I am not Indigenous, and whilst there are a myriad of cultures, ontologies and epistemologies that are not sufficiently represented by simply stating ‘Indigenous’, it is commonly accepted that these worldviews are vastly different to those of the ‘Western’ world, which is the world in which I grew up and matured. I am therefore only understanding of Indigenous cultures, beliefs and customary laws based upon available online literature and those which I have learnt through life, in addition to those introduced to me in my Master’s degree. As such, I will never be able to fully relate to an Indigenous person; the best I can do is try to understand and learn. Only throughout this process am I able to work towards reconciliation and attempt to address the inequities experienced by Indigenous folk globally.

Additionally, I am yet to act as a carbon project proponent and so do not understand the nuances or stresses of undertaking such a task. Whilst an individual proponent may have the best intention of procuring a carbon project for its social and environmental benefits, there are a number of stakeholders involved throughout the entire process which influence its eventual outcome. Without experience acting as a project proponent I am naïve in understanding the process and it's difficulties.

==Acronyms / Terminology==
'''Acronyms:'''

AFOLU: Agriculture, Forestry and Other Land-Use

ICVCM: Integrity Council for the Voluntary Carbon Market

IPLC: Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities

KMGBF: Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework

LAC: Latin American Countries

MRV: Monitoring, Reporting and Verification

REDD+: Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation

UNCBD: United Nations Convention on Biological Biodiversity

VCMI: Voluntary Carbon Markets Integrity Initiative

'''Terminology:'''

''Additionality:'' Additionality is the determination of whether the project will lead to the expected outcomes when compared to the baseline or ‘business as usual’ emissions.

''Leakage'': Refers to the shifting of emissions to outside the project boundary as a result of the project’s activities.

''Permanence:'' Permanence refers to the degree to which a carbon credit is equivalent to a permanent removal or reduction in emissions.
==Abstract==
This case study illustrates two examples of Indigenous-led REDD+ projects on Indigenous territory in Colombia and Brazil. Both countries have a relatively long history of engaging with REDD+ but have slightly different legal structures pertaining to the rights of Indigenous peoples on their traditional territories, and specifically their ‘carbon’ rights. As such, the intention is to evaluate how these differing ''de jure'' rights translate on the ground. With respect to REDD+, do certain rights result in legitimately positive benefits to IPLCs, as well as the environment that these projects were originally intended to protect? The intention is such that the reader can evaluate the effectiveness and true benefit of REDD+ projects to IPLC’s, based upon the legal frameworks of the host country. A secondary intention is such that the reader is better equipped to conduct a prefeasibility assessment based upon available online literature, to evaluate the likelihood that REDD+ can be implemented in any chosen country, with the genuine intent of benefiting IPLC’s that are directly affected as a result of REDD+ project implementation.

==REDD+ and the VCM in Brazil and Colombia==
REDD+, originally introduced by the UNFCCC, is a market-based mechanism sitting within the VCM that aims to reverse the loss of forests and carbon stocks, specifically in developing countries. Simply put, an entity or an individual can voluntarily pay another that has engaged with REDD+ and subsequently sequestered carbon, to offset their own emissions using ‘credits’, sold as units of greenhouse gas equivalent to one ton of carbon dioxide (CO2e). Forestry and Land-Use remains to be the largest category of carbon credits traded by transaction volume on the VCM, with REDD+ being the most popular project type in this category, accounting for 78% of credits traded.<ref name=":0">Procton, A., (2024). ''State of the voluntary carbon market 2024: On the path to maturity.'' Forest Trends Ecosystem Marketplace.</ref> Furthermore, over one-third of the credits sold within this category were sourced from projects that had been implemented in LAC and the Caribbean in 2024.<ref name=":0" /> Of the four largest standards issuing carbon credits, Verra accounts for roughly 80% of issuances in Latin America,<ref>Pullins, T. (2022). Growth of carbon markets in Latin America. White & Case. [[/www.whitecase.com/publications/insight/latin-america-focus-fall-2022-growth-carbon-markets|https://www.whitecase.com/publications/insight/latin-america-focus-fall-2022-growth-carbon-markets]] </ref> and even in the face of recent scrutiny,<ref>West, T. A. P., Bofim, B., Haya, B. K. (2024). Methodological issues with deforestation baselines compromise the integrity of carbon offsets from REDD+. ''Global Environmental Change, 87'' [[/doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2024.102863|https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2024.102863]]</ref><ref>Wyburd I., & Dufrasne, G. (2023). Error Log: Exposing the methodological failures of REDD+ forestry projects. Carbon Market Watch. [[/carbonmarketwatch.org/publications/error-log-exposing-the-methodological-failures-of-redd-forestry-projects/|https://carbonmarketwatch.org/publications/error-log-exposing-the-methodological-failures-of-redd-forestry-projects/]]</ref><ref name=":15">Haya, B. K., Alford-Jones, K., Anderegg, W. R. L., Beymer-Farris, B., Blanchard, L., Bomfim, B., Chin, D., Evans, S., Hogan, M., Holm, J. A., McAfee, K., So, I. S., West, T. A. P., & Withey, L. (2023). ''Quality assessment of REDD+ carbon credit projects''. Berkeley Carbon Trading Project. [[/gspp.berkeley.edu/research-and-impact/centers/cepp/projects/berkeley-carbontrading-project/REDD+|https://gspp.berkeley.edu/research-and-impact/centers/cepp/projects/berkeley-carbontrading-project/REDD+]]</ref> REDD+ projects account for a significant proportion of the VCM with their continued application likely to persist.<ref>Gordon, O. (2022). ''The interwoven fortunes of carbon markets and indigenous communities.'' Energy Monitor. [[/www.energymonitor.ai/tech/carbon-removal/the-interwoven-fortunes-of-carbon-markets-and-indigenous-communities/|https://www.energymonitor.ai/tech/carbon-removal/the-interwoven-fortunes-of-carbon-markets-and-indigenous-communities/]]</ref><ref>Müller, M., Coustar, C., Bietta, F., Mathres, M. (2022). ''UNFCCC REDD+ and the power of sovereign carbon.'' Deutsche Banke Chief Investment Office. [[/www.rainforestcoalition.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/CIO-Special-UNFCCC-REDD-power-of-sovereign-carbon.pdf|https://www.rainforestcoalition.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/CIO-Special-UNFCCC-REDD-power-of-sovereign-carbon.pdf]]</ref><ref>Pullins, T. (2022). ''Growth of carbon markets in Latin America.'' White & Case. [[/www.whitecase.com/publications/insight/latin-america-focus-fall-2022-growth-carbon-markets|https://www.whitecase.com/publications/insight/latin-america-focus-fall-2022-growth-carbon-markets]] </ref> With the introduction of updated methodologies aimed at addressing these concerns,<ref>Verra (2023a). ''Setting the Standard: Verra’s Revolutionary New REDD Methodology.'' [[/verra.org/program-notice/setting-the-standard-verras-revolutionary-new-redd-methodology/|https://verra.org/program-notice/setting-the-standard-verras-revolutionary-new-redd-methodology/]]</ref><ref>Verra (2023b). ''VM0048 Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation, v1.0.'' [[/verra.org/methodologies/vm0048-reducing-emissions-from-deforestation-and-forest-degradation-v1-0/|https://verra.org/methodologies/vm0048-reducing-emissions-from-deforestation-and-forest-degradation-v1-0/]]</ref> there is hope for renewed buyer confidence in the integrity of this market,<ref>MSCI (2023). ''Verra’s New Methodology for Unplanned Deforestation Aims to Silence the Critics''. [[/www.msci.com/www/blog-posts/verra-s-new-methodology-for/04577808942|https://www.msci.com/www/blog-posts/verra-s-new-methodology-for/04577808942]]</ref> though more work still needs to be done.

Both Colombia and Brazil have a relatively long history of implementing REDD+ projects, using both fund-based and market-based mechanisms. For example, both countries were participants in the ‘Amazon Indigenous REDD+ (RIA in Spanish) initiative, with the first pilot implementation project being initiated in Colombia’s Puiawai Natural Reserve.<ref>Garzón, E., (2017). ''Amazon Indigenous REDD+: An innovative approach to conserve Colombian forests?'' Mongabay. [[/news.mongabay.com/2017/01/amazon-indigenous-redd-an-innovative-approach-to-conserve-colombian-forests/|https://news.mongabay.com/2017/01/amazon-indigenous-redd-an-innovative-approach-to-conserve-colombian-forests/]]</ref> The relevance of these two countries with respect to REDD+ is simple. Much of the Amazon’s primary tropical rainforest falls within these countries jurisdiction and this rainforest has been consistently under threat from external pressures and encroachment, whether that be in the form of land-clearing for commercial ranching, subsistence purposes, illicit drug production or illegal mining practices,<ref name=":8">Sánchez García, P. A. & Wong, G. Y., (2024) “The political economy of deforestation in the Colombian Amazon”, ''Journal of Political Ecology'' ''31''(1), 178–199. [[/doi.org/10.2458/jpe.5230|https://doi.org/10.2458/jpe.5230]]</ref><ref>Radwin, M. (2023). ''Drug trafficking fuels other deforestation drivers in the Amazon: report.'' Mongabay. [[/news.mongabay.com/2023/07/drug-trafficking-fuels-other-deforestation-drivers-in-the-amazon-report/|https://news.mongabay.com/2023/07/drug-trafficking-fuels-other-deforestation-drivers-in-the-amazon-report/]]</ref><ref>Haddad, E.A., Araújo, I.F., Feltran-Barbieri, R., Perobelli, F. S., Rocha, A., Sass, K. S., Nobre, C. A. (2024). Economic drivers of deforestation in the Brazilian Legal Amazon. ''Nat Sustain'' ''7'', 1141–1148. [[/doi.org/10.1038/s41893-024-01387-7|https://doi.org/10.1038/s41893-024-01387-7]] </ref><ref>Hänggli, A., Levy, S. A., Armenteras, D., Bovolo, C. I., Brandão, J., Rueda, X., & Garrett, R. D. (2023). A systematic comparison of deforestation drivers and policy effectiveness across the amazon biome. ''Environmental Research Letters, 18''(7), 073001. [[/doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/acd408|https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/acd408]]</ref> to name a few.

In theory, REDD+ can be used to provide the economic incentive to promote sustained environmental protection of Indigenous lands, with a focus on the rights and livelihoods of IPLCs. Currently the overall funding to IPLCs tenure rights and forest management in tropical countries is low, receiving just $270 million per year between 2011-2020 from bilateral and multilateral donors and private philanthropies.<ref>Hatcher, J., Owen, M., Yin, D., (2021). ''Falling short: Donor funding for Indigenous peoples and local communities to secure tenure rights and manage forests in tropical countries (2011 -2020).'' Rainforest Foundation Norway. [[/dv719tqmsuwvb.cloudfront.net/documents/Publikasjoner/Andre-rapporter/RFN Falling short 2021.pdf|https://dv719tqmsuwvb.cloudfront.net/documents/Publikasjoner/Andre-rapporter/RFN_Falling_short_2021.pdf]]</ref> REDD+ has the potential to channel funding as to promote Indigenous rights and autonomy, provided there is transparent and equitable benefit-sharing for those involved. Fundamentally, only with the inclusion of IPLC’s, or preferably with IPLC’s acting as project proponents, is REDD+ able to promote Indigenous agency and improve IPLC rights and governance. And only when the rights of those inhabiting the land are formally recognized can the land be effectively conserved.<ref name=":16">Reytar, K., Veit, P., von Braun, J. (2024). ''Protecting Biodiversity Hinges on Securing Indigenous and Community Land Rights.'' WRI. [[/www.wri.org/insights/indigenous-and-local-community-land-rights-protect-biodiversity|https://www.wri.org/insights/indigenous-and-local-community-land-rights-protect-biodiversity]]</ref> The inclusion of IPLCs in REDD+ project development is therefore considered to be essential for project success, and this is in theory embodied in the very nature of REDD+.<ref name=":1">Alvarez, G., Elfving, M. and Andrade, C. (2016) ‘REDD+ governance and indigenous peoples in Latin America: the case of Suruí Carbon Project in the Brazilian Amazon Forest’, ''Latin American J. Management for Sustainable Development 3''(2) pp.133–146. [[/dx.doi.org/10.1504/LAJMSD.2016.083705|10.1504/LAJMSD.2016.083705]]</ref> Partially owing to a long history of dealing with REDD+, Colombia and Brazil are amongst just a few of the countries hosting tropical rainforests that explicitly recognise community rights to carbon and tie these rights to the legal ownership of lands and forests. In Colombia, carbon rights are tied to land rights, whereas in Brazil carbon rights are tied to forest rights.<ref name=":2">RRI and McGill University (2021). Technical report: ''Status of legal recognition of Indigenous Peoples’, Local Communities’ and Afro-descendant Peoples’ rights to carbon stored in tropical lands and forests''. Rights and Resources Initiative. [[/doi.org/10.53892/MLQQ5744|https://doi.org/10.53892/MLQQ5744]]</ref>

==Brazil: The Suruí Forest Carbon Project==
[[File:The Amazon Basin, Brazil.jpg|thumb|376x376px|Brazil's Amazon rainforest]]

=== Project description and location ===
The Surui Forest Carbon project was implemented in 2009 on the territory of the Surui people, which is situated in the southern part of Brazil’s Amazon between the states of Rondônia and Mato Grosso. Surui Indigenous territory covers an area of 2,481 km2, though the intention of the PCFS was to protect a portion of this total area. According to the PD, the stated objective was to “prevent 13,575.3 hectares of tropical forest from being cleared by 2038, to avoid the emission of 7,258,352.3 tCO2e to the atmosphere, and to contribute to the preservation of the Paiter Surui lifestyle and traditions.”<ref>IDESAM (2011). ''Project description: Surui forest carbon project''. Institute for Conservation and Sustainable Development of Amazonas. Link: "PROJ_DESC_1118_02FEB2012.PDF" found at [[/registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/1118|https://registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/1118]] </ref> This region sits within one of the Brazilian Amazon’s main ‘arcs of deforestation’ and pressure from loggers and ranchers is a matter of concern.

Notably, the PCFS was the first REDD+ project to be proposed by Indigenous peoples in the Brazilian Amazon on their own territory and was the first to receive certification by both the VCS and CCBS.<ref name=":1" />. Metareilá, the Surui’s own Indigenous association, acted as project proponent and the Institute for Conservation and Sustainable Development of Amazonas (IDESAM) assisted with project development, alongside multiple other stakeholder groups. As an endogenous initiative procured and conducted by the Surui community, the SFCP had a ‘non-centralized model of governance’, which reflected the characteristics and traditions of the Surui people. <ref name=":1" />

Only after two years of consultations between the 24 communities involved and the relevant governmental agencies (primarily FUNAI and the Ministry of Environment) was a Memorandum of Understanding signed, showing community consent to develop the project.<ref name=":3">Garcia, B., Rimmer, L., Canal Vieira, L., Mackey, B., (2021). REDD+ and forest protection on indigenous lands in the Amazon. ''RECIEL 30'', 207–219. [[/doi.org/10.1111/reel.12389|https://doi.org/10.1111/reel.12389]]</ref> In 2012 after verification from an independent third-party body, the Surui were able to sell carbon credits on the international market. Between 2009 and 2014 the project drastically helped limit the deforestation occurring within the project’s site, causing many to deem it a success.<ref name=":4">Howard, F. E., (2023). ''An Analysis of the Suruí Forest Carbon Project in Context of Settler Colonialism''. Masters thesis. Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University. [[/vtechworks.lib.vt.edu/server/api/core/bitstreams/b0cde6de-794c-453f-856b-ee72bde3db06/content|https://vtechworks.lib.vt.edu/server/api/core/bitstreams/b0cde6de-794c-453f-856b-ee72bde3db06/content]]</ref>

=== National climate targets, policies and legislation ===
Rates of deforestation in Brazil’s legal Amazon are significantly impacted by the government in charge. This is evidenced in the decade between 2012 and 2021 whilst under the conservative Bolsonaro administration, when deforestation in the Amazon increased 185% — from a loss of 4,571 km2 in 2012 to 13,038 km2 in 2021.<ref>INPE (2022). ''Observação da Terra. [[/www.obt.inpe.br/OBT/assuntos/programas/amazonia/prodes|http://www.obt.inpe.br/OBT/assuntos/programas/amazonia/prodes]]''</ref> However, since Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s appointment in 2022 there has been a steady decline in the rate of deforestation, which is now roughly half what it was in 2021.<ref>Terra Brasilis (2024). ''PRODES (deforestation): Deforestation rates – Legal Amazon – States''. [[/terrabrasilis.dpi.inpe.br/app/dashboard/deforestation/biomes/legal amazon/rates|https://terrabrasilis.dpi.inpe.br/app/dashboard/deforestation/biomes/legal_amazon/rates]]</ref> A significant proportion of emissions result from the clearing of rainforest and its subsequent conversion to ranching.<ref>MCTI (2022). ''Estimativas Anuais De Emissões De Gases De Efeito Estufa No Brasil.'' 6ª Edição. Ministério da Estado da Ciência, Tecnologia e Inovações. [[/www.gov.br/mcti/pt-br/acompanhe-o-mcti/sirene/publicacoes/estimativas-anuais-de-emissoes-gee/arquivos/6a-ed-estimativas-anuais.pdf|https://www.gov.br/mcti/pt-br/acompanhe-o-mcti/sirene/publicacoes/estimativas-anuais-de-emissoes-gee/arquivos/6a-ed-estimativas-anuais.pdf]]</ref> To address these emissions Brazil has implemented various adaptation policies, legislation and targets which are summarized below:
{| class="wikitable"
|'''Document name'''
|'''Type'''
|'''Publication year'''
|'''Key takeaways'''
|-
|National Policy on Climate Change (NPCC)
|Legislation
|2009
|Framework for addressing climate change
|-
|National Plan on Climate Change Adaptation
|Policy
|2016
|Framework for addressing impacts of climate change
|-
|Nationally Determined Contribution
|Target
|2024
|Reduce net greenhouse gas emissions by 59 to 67 percent below 2005 levels by 2035
|-
|Federal Constitution, Article 225
|Legislation
|2006
|The Amazon rainforest is considered as a ‘national heritage’.All levels of government have a shared responsibility to protect it and the environment
|-
| colspan="4" |'''Relating to REDD+'''
|-
|Plan of Action for the Prevention and Control of Deforestation in the Legal Amazon (PPCDAM)
|Policy
|2004
|Aims to reduce deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon
|-
|Forest code
|Legislation
|2012
|Aimed at reducing deforestation, but no specific mention of REDD+
|-
|Amazon Indigenous REDD+ Initiative
|Policy
|2012
|Incorporate Indigenous with REDD+ initiatives
|-
|National REDD+ Strategy (ENREDD+)
|Policy
|2016
|REDD+ as a fund-based mechanism
|}

=== Indigenous rights - Constitutional, tenure and bundle rights ===
In Brazil, Indigenous rights are robust and clearly defined according to the Brazilian Constitution. As a result, the Indigenous communities of the Brazilian Amazon have legal title to 13.8% of the national territory totalling 1.175 million km2, with a total of 631 territories.<ref>Federal government of Brazil (2024). ''Brazil’s NDC: National determination to contribute and transform''. [[/unfccc.int/sites/default/files/2024-11/Brazil Second Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) November2024.pdf|https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/2024-11/Brazil_Second%20Nationally%20Determined%20Contribution%20%28NDC%29_November2024.pdf]]</ref>
{| class="wikitable"
| colspan="2" |'''Laws'''
|-
|Article 231 of the 1988 Constitution
|Indigenous peoples to have their exclusive right to use their territories to derive economic benefits. Grants indigenous peoples the right to land, prohibits eviction, and restricts mining without authorization from the federal government.
|-
|Indigenous Peoples statute (1973).

|No acts restricting the full exercise of indigenous peoples’ permanent tenure over the land should be permitted.
|-
| colspan="2" | '''Treaties'''
|-
|United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2007)
|Requires States to obtain free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) for the approval of any projects affecting indigenous territories.
|-
|International Labour Organization Convention 169 (2019)
|Ratified and incorporated under domestic law in 2002 through Decree 10.088/2019, endorsing UNDRIP
|-
|American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2016)
|Supports and builds upon UNDRIP
|}
Whilst Indigenous communities in Brazil have legal title to land, it is the State that owns it. Indigenous people simply exercise permanent tenure over lands that they traditionally occupy and have ‘original rights’ to these traditional lands, which no other rights can prevail over.<ref name=":3" /> Indigenous lands, though not classified as protected areas, “have the highest level of protection by law because they are regulated by the Constitution” and cannot be leased or restricted without violating their original rights. The Suruí's right to develop the PCFS is grounded in the Brazilian Constitution, which grants Indigenous peoples exclusive rights to use the ‘riches of the soil, rivers and lakes’ of their land, and these rights cannot be overridden. Thus, Indigenous people and only Indigenous people are legally allowed to engage in productive activities on their land, provided these activities are conducted according to their own customs and traditions and are necessary for the wellbeing and cultural expression of their own people. In Brazil, it is the armed forces and federal police that are responsible for enforcing these laws, and FUNAI is responsible for representing Indigenous communities in judicial disputes.<ref name=":3" /> As such, provided a REDD+ project does not violate the rights to territorial integrity, permanent land tenure and original rights, it is legally allowed.
[[File:Two Pataxo indians (Brasília, 04 April 2006).jpeg|thumb|414x414px|Two Indigenous in Brazil]]
'''CARBON RIGHTS:''' In Brazil, carbon rights are tied to forest rights.<ref name=":2" /> Carbon credits from REDD+ projects are seen as part of the economic benefits derived from indigenous lands, and as such, Indigenous communities are entitled to own, control and distribute these revenues themselves. The carbon credits generated from the (SFCP) were wholly owned by the Suruí people through Metareilá, with the Suruí Fund (managed by the Brazilian Biodiversity Fund - FUNBIO) acting as recipient. This legality reinforces Indigenous control over both land and carbon rights, as whoever has rights to the forest land is usually recognized as the owner of carbon rights.<ref name=":3" /> Collectively these national and international laws provide an important safeguard to Indigenous peoples, making their consent a prerequisite for the establishment of REDD+ projects and recognizing their rights as the main beneficiaries of REDD+ revenues.<ref name=":3" /> However, as carbon rights are tied to forest rights in Brazil and not land rights, and carbon is considered to be an ‘environmental service’ (Article 41(I)(A) Brazilian Forestry Code), states as well as the federal government have the jurisdiction to exercise full legislative authority over carbon. <ref name=":2" /> As such, certain states have interpreted the law to imply that the title to carbon credits is attributable to the state.<ref>Loft, L., Ravikumar, A., Gebara, M. F., Pham, T. T., Resosudarmo, I. A. P., Assembe, S., Tovar, J. G., Mwangi, E., & Andersson, K. (2015). Taking Stock of Carbon Rights in REDD+ Candidate Countries: Concept Meets Reality. ''Forests'', ''6''(4), 1031-1060. [[/doi.org/10.3390/f6041031|https://doi.org/10.3390/f6041031]]</ref> Hence, even when carbon rights are clearly defined and tied to forest title it is insufficient in itself, and only by legally recognizing the customary rights of IPLCs can a fair and equitable outcome be realised.

'''FPIC OBLIGATION:''' Brazilian law requires Free, Prior, and Informed Consent (FPIC) for REDD+ projects affecting indigenous lands, ensuring that international standards such as the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) and ILO Convention No. 169 are adhered to; Indigenous consent is, ''de jure,'' a necessity. Projects that violate these rights and fail to consult communities are therefore considered illegal. Notably there are no specific rules or procedures that have been written into the Brazilian constitution that provide guidance on how to achieve FPIC. However, this freedom reinforces Indigenous autonomy as it allows an Indigenous community to define the rules of consultation according to their customs and traditions.

=== Interested and affected stakeholders ===
{| class="wikitable"
| colspan="5" |'''Affected stakeholders'''
|-
|Stakeholders
|Primary objective(s)
|Secondary objective(s)
|Relative power
|Scope of influence
|-
|Metareilá Association of the Suruí Indigenous People
|Project proponent

Works to defend and preserve the cultural and territorial heritage of the Suruí people
|Ensure project longevity
|Powerful, though lacking technical knowhow. Have carbon rights and thus own revenue from the project. Can decide how this revenue is distributed.
|Local
|-
|Other Indigenous groups and associations
|Support various aspects of proejct development
|Aim to benefit from the project
|Have the same rights as the Metareila with respect to land though are less involved with project development and have less say, nor derive economic benefits like the Metareila
|Local
|-
|''Campesinos'' (peasants)
|Survive via subsistence.
|Procure more land.
|Have far fewer rights than Indigenous groups and no involvement with the project
|Local
|-
| colspan="5" |'''Interested stakeholders'''
|-
|IDESAM - Institute for Conservation and Sustainable Development of Amazonas
|Maximise revenue from project.
Ensure project longevity
|Achieve completion of various technical aspects of project
|Powerful: Required to complete various technical aspects of development.
|National
|-
|Forest Trends
|Supported formulation and implementation of the project.
Uphold image of organization
|Maximise environmental benefits of project
|Powerful: Tasked with raising funds and fostering an international network; an integral part of project development
|International
|-
|Brazilian Biodiversity Fund (FUNBIO)

|Responsible for the Suruí Fund. Ensure equitable distribution of funds
|Stick to the mandate; attempt not to be influenced by external actors
|Powerful. Ultimate control of project revenue
|National
|-
|Amazon Conservation Team - ACT Brazil
|Supports various aspect of project development as well as offering legal advice.
Other technical assistance
|Maximise environmental benefits of project
|Powerful: An integral part of project development
|International
|-
|Kanindé Association for Ethno-Environmental Defense – non-profit
|Promote Metareilá views and beliefs
|Involved with various aspects of project development
|Mid-power. Has a say in project direction, though less weight than the Metareila.
|National - International
|-
|Ministry of Environment (MMA)
|Responsible for protection and conservation of natural environment
|Ensure project adheres to national law
|Powerful. Must be notified about project activities although cannot strictly alter decisions made by the Surui
|National
|-
|National Indian Foundation (FUNAI)
|Promote Indigenous rights

|Represents Indignous organizations with judicial matters.
|Powerful. Knowleadgeable of judicial system. Must be notified about project activities though is not involved with project governance.
|National
|-
|Government of the State of Mato Grosso
|Encourage development, and reduce poverty and crime in Mato Grosso
|Ensure project adheres to regional law.
|Powerful. Legilative control over regional police and municipalities
|Regional
|}

=== Discussion ===
Although originally successful in achieving its goal of reducing deforestation and degradation, in 2016 diamonds were discovered in Surui territory, leading to an increase in illegal logging and mining.<ref name=":1" /> By 2018 the project site had been completely overrun by ''garimpeiros'' (small-scale gold miners), ultimately leading to the projects suspension that year. <ref name=":4" />

While the project had initially garnered support, divisions emerged within the community post-project implementation. Disputes arose over the unequal distribution of project revenues, leading to internal conflicts between different Suruí clans. These criticisms escalated in 2014 when the Catholic Indigenous Missionary Council supported calls for an end to the project due to mismanagement of revenues from carbon credit sales. <ref name=":3" /> Some Suruí members also argued that the REDD+ initiative harmed their way of life.<ref>Lang, C. (2014). ''“What are projects for that destroy life?” Interview with Henrique Suruí about the Paiter-Suruí REDD project, Brazil.'' REDD-Monitor. [[/redd-monitor.org/2014/12/17/what-are-projects-for-that-destroy-life-interview-with-henrique-surui-about-the-paiter-surui-redd-project-brazil/|https://redd-monitor.org/2014/12/17/what-are-projects-for-that-destroy-life-interview-with-henrique-surui-about-the-paiter-surui-redd-project-brazil/]]</ref>

Further complicating the situation was the controversial role of Henrique Suruí, one of the Suruí tribal leaders. In 2011, it was revealed that Henrique had violated the tribe's logging moratorium, collaborating with loggers in illegal activities. While Henrique later denied responsibility for the project’s failure, his actions, combined with internal disagreements, illustrated the lack of consensus within the Suruí leadership on the project’s goals and outcomes. Both of the tribe’s leaders possessed dramatically different perspectives on how they believed they could ensure agency, autonomy, and economic benefits for the Suruí people.<ref name=":4" /> This fragmentation within the community, in combination with the discovery of diamonds and the state's failure to protect indigenous land rights led to the indefinite suspension of the REDD+ project.

The project's collapse highlights broader structural issues, particularly the state's inconsistent support for indigenous land rights, influenced by settler colonialism, which undermined the project’s long-term viability.<ref name=":4" /> Additionally, the project’s creation was shaped by external actors, including the collaboration between Almir Suruí and Borges from Forest Trends, a Washington-based NGO. This partnership introduced a Western perspective on viewing the Suruí peoples forest, in contrast with their own perspectives on land use and governance. Furthermore, despite Borges’ Brazilian background, the power dynamics between a global North organization and a developing, Indigenous community were apparent.

=== Summary ===
The Suruí Forest Carbon Project provides an interesting example of how, even when the rights of IPLC’s are relatively robust, challenges persist in ensuring REDD+ project longevity. As such, in its current state, REDD+ in the Brazilian Amazon may not be a suitable market-based option for Indigenous communities in the Amazon.<ref name=":3" /> Although initially successful in promoting Indigenous autonomy and reducing deforestation, the project resulted in failure due to of a myriad of factors. Division between Surui communities was exacerbated by a perceived unequal benefit-sharing, and the impact of imposing REDD+ seems to have complicated the traditional social structure that the Surui were dependent on. These issues were influenced by Brazil's settler state dynamics, where Indigenous land rights, although legally recognized, are often not upheld in practice due to insufficient enforcement.<ref name=":4" /> Ultimately, the Surui project reveals how settler colonialism's structural flaws make long-term project success difficult, despite initial progress in promoting Indigenous autonomy.

At the national and state level, complex institutional and legal land governance structures convolute and impede REDD+ in Brazil. Multiple institutions share responsibilities and there is no comprehensive, authoritative database of land ownership, which hampers efforts to protect Indigenous territories.<ref name=":5">Costa, R. (2016)''. Insecure land rights in Brazil: Consequences for rural areas and challenges for improvement.'' Climate Policy Initiative. [[/www.climatepolicyinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/Insecure Land Rights in Brazil CPI.pdf|https://www.climatepolicyinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/Insecure_Land_Rights_in_Brazil_CPI.pdf]]</ref> As a result, land tenure disputes remain common and can be witnessed occurring between the public as well between public and state actors. For example, Brazil’s 1964 Land Statute (Law No. 4504) allows the government to takeover unproductive farms and transfer those lands to landless peasants. This often results in the clearing of forest, as only when the land is cleared is it evidenced to be ‘productive’.<ref name=":5" /> Hence, not only does this law cause insecurity for Indigenous populations in Brazil, it also forces them to go against customary traditions of stewarding the land in an effort to maintain its control.

Whilst the aforementioned points to the futility of REDD+ in Brazil, there is reason to maintain optimism. In a recent landmark ruling Brazil’s supreme court voted in favour of the Xoleng peoples, and the decision will serve as a precedent for all cases involving Indigenous peoples.<ref name=":6">Amos-Flom, K., (2023). ''Triumph and Turmoil: The Xokleng Case and the Future of Indigenous Land Rights in Brazil.'' Columbia Journal of Transnational Law. [[/www.jtl.columbia.edu/bulletin-blog/triumph-and-turmoil-the-xokleng-case-and-the-future-of-indigenous-land-rights-in-brazil|https://www.jtl.columbia.edu/bulletin-blog/triumph-and-turmoil-the-xokleng-case-and-the-future-of-indigenous-land-rights-in-brazil]]</ref> The Xokleng’s land dispute, settled in 2023, “rejected Santa Catarina state’s marco temporal (“time limit”) argument, which would have required Indigenous people to prove they occupied or legally contested the territory they claimed before the Brazilian Constitution came into force in 1988. If successful, this argument would have led to disastrous repercussions, as many Indigenous peoples had been forcibly removed or are traditionally nomadic.”<ref name=":6" /> Evidently, whilst slow, progress has been made in Brazil in recent years with respect to Indigenous rights as well as the voluntary carbon market itself.

There are currently 159 AFOLU projects listed on the Verra database in Brazil, with only two specifically focused on REDD+ initiatives in collaboration with Indigenous groups. These are the Ka’a Pyahu project, <ref>Verra (n.d.) ''Project 5087: KA'A PYAHU.'' https://registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/5087</ref> initiated by the Guajajara Indigenous people in collaboration with external organizations and validated in 2021, and the ‘Together for the forest Awaete REDD+ project’<ref>Verra (n.d.) ''Project 5200: TOGETHER FOR THE FOREST AWAETÉ REDD+ PROJECT.'' https://registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/5200</ref> which is still under development. Both projects involve Indigenous groups working with Brazilian organizations to build technical capacity and expertise. This could signal a growing trend of Indigenous-led REDD+ projects in the future. To ensure a positive future for REDD+ in Brazil, the customary rights of IPLC’s must be formally recognized. IPLC should have legal ownership of their traditional lands, and in doing so the carbon rights of these communities would be less convoluted, leading to more equitable benefit-sharing and increased cohesion amongst these groups post-project implementation.

==Colombia: ''REDD+ project Resguardo Indigena Unificado - Selva de Mataven (RUI-SM)''==

=== '''Project description and location''' ===
[[File:RS6524 MG 3944.jpg|thumb|407x407px|A view of the Mataven]]
According to the PD,<ref name=":7">ACATISEMA & Mediamos (2017). ''Joint project description and monitoring report: REDD+ project: Resguardo Indigena Unificado – Selva de Mataven (RIU – SM).'' Link: “10 06 2017_VCS Final Report_ Matavin Project.pdf” found at [[/registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/1566|https://registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/1566]]</ref> the Resguardo Indígena Unificado – Selva de Matavén (RIU-SM) project is located east of the Colombian Orinoco high plain, in the eastern part of the Department of Vichada, municipality of Cumaribo. It resides on the formalized resguardo of the Sikuani, Piaroa, Puinave, Curripaco, Cubeo and Piapoco ethnic groups, spanning 1,856,836 hectares, with 1,477,115 hectares (79.6%) being forested. The PD states that it will reduce greenhouse gas emissions, with a total estimated net reduction of 108,670,562 tons of CO2 equivalent over thirty years, from years 2013 – 2042. By this metric, it is the 14th largest project on the Verra registry, out of over 1700 projects.<ref name=":9">Dufrasne, D., (2021). ''Two Shades of Green: How hot air forest credits are being used to avoid carbon taxes in Colombia''. Carbon Market Watch. [[/carbonmarketwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Two-shades-of-green EN WEB.pdf|https://carbonmarketwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Two-shades-of-green_EN_WEB.pdf]]</ref> There are 12,312 Indigenous people living in the RIU-SM, belonging to 2,517 families and 250 communities as of 2017.

The project was initiated by the Asociación de Cabildos y Autoridades Indígenas de la Selva de Matavén (ACETISMA), an Indigenous association, and developed by MEDIAMOS F&M, a Colombian consultancy firm. ACETISMA is comprised of Indigenous leaders that represent the 17 communities of the reservation in charge of governing the territory, and it has administrative autonomy, as well as “the capacity to acquire, to own and to dispose of property, to accept donations, to hold national and international conventions, scientific and cultural exchanges and generally, to celebrate all kinds of negotiations and agreements with which the Association can achieve its objectives.”<ref name=":7" />

There is a stated focus on various means of improving the living conditions of the Indigenous peoples living within the project area. To summarise, the main objectives of the REDD+ project RIU-SM include:

· Community development, in the form of improved education.

· Community engagement with respect to the project; developing information channels to reveal project progress.

· Support local initiatives for environmental education and waste management.

· Developing an effective response system that addresses community proposals and concerns relating to the project.

· Strengthening the governance of ACATISEMA.
=== National climate targets, policies and legislation ===
The Colombian Amazon makes up over one-third of Colombia’s national territory, and up until 2005 only 7.3% of the Colombian Amazon had been deforested, largely due to the country's 60-year armed conflict between the government, multiple left-wing guerillas such as FARC, and several far-right paramilitary groups.<ref name=":8" /> However, following the signing of the Peace Treaty in 2016 and demobilization of the FARC, limits to deforestation were weakened in the Colombian Amazon. Poor but opportunistic peasants began to encroach into previously unchartered territory and capitalize from the rainforest. Due to the poor economic integration of the Amazon, many were forced to engage with the traditional economies of cocoa and cattle ranching, as these markets were already well connected to regional and global markets.<ref name=":8" /> To address the drivers of deforestation and its associated emissions, the federal government has implemented various initiatives, which are summarized below:

{| class="wikitable"
|'''Document name'''
|'''Type'''
|'''Publication year'''
|'''Key takeaways'''
|-
|Nationally Determined Contribution(s)
|Target
|2020
|Reduce GHG emissions by 51% by 2030 and net-zero by 2050
|-
|National Climate Change Policy (PNCC)
|Policy
|2018
|Address climate change and foster sustainable development
|-
|National Forest Conservation Program
|Policy
|2011
|Address deforestation
|-
|Law 1931 of 2018 – Climate Change Law

|Legislation
|2018
|Establishes the framework for addressing climate change
|-
| colspan="4" |'''Relating to REDD+:'''
|-
|National Strategy for Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (ENREDD+)
|Initiative
|2009
|Particular focus on the Amazon and Choco rainforests
|-
|Amazon Indigenous REDD+ Initiative
|Initiative
|2016
|Respect Indigenous rights. FPIC focus.
|-
|BIOREDD+ program
|Initiative
|2012
|Portfolio of 8 REDD+ projects in four geographic nodes covering over 700,000 hectares in the Colombian Pacific.

|-
|Vision Amazonia
|Initiative
|2015
|Part of the REDD+ strategy, financed by three foreign countries: Germany, Norway and United Kingdom
|}
As a result of the many fund and market-based initiatives that Colombia has engaged with, it hosts the second most REDD+ projects in the world. REDD+ projects now cover at least 56% of the area of legally recognized Indigenous territories in the Colombian Amazon, with an overwhelming majority of carbon projects located on Indigenous territories.<ref name=":10">Schmid, D., & Castro. C., (2023). ''REDD+ projects in the Colombian Amazon: Social challenges and lack of transparency''. Rainforest Foundation Norway. [[/dv719tqmsuwvb.cloudfront.net/documents/REDD rapport 2024 ENG.pdf|https://dv719tqmsuwvb.cloudfront.net/documents/REDD_rapport_2024_ENG.pdf]]</ref> Evidently REDD+ plays an integral part in the country’s efforts of environmental conservation, and incentives have been introduced to promote the development of such projects. For example, in 2016 the government adopted a higher tax that covered fossil fuels, but companies are able to avoid paying the tax by investing in carbon offsets that have been generated domestically.<ref name=":9" /> This led to a boost in the domestic REDD+ market in 2017, as Colombian companies invested as to escape higher taxes. Notably, 23 of the 36 REDD+ projects currently under development in the Amazon region were initiated in or after 2018.<ref name=":10" /> Currently Colombia’s REDD+ program sits at over 45 pilot and voluntary carbon projects, as well as one large-scale jurisdictional approach in the Amazon.<ref name=":11">Zambrano-Cortés, D. G. (2024). ''The politics, spaces and subjects of forest conservation in Colombia''. [internal PhD, WU, Wageningen University]. Wageningen University. [[/doi.org/10.18174/675328|https://doi.org/10.18174/675328]]</ref>

=== Indigenous rights - Constitutional, tenure and bundle rights ===
''De jure'', the Indigenous peoples of Colombia have comprehensive tenure and bundle rights that have been articulated in the national constitution. Collective land titles are granted to Indigenous communities by the Colombian government and as a result about 34 percent of Colombian land (almost 38 million hectares) is legally recognized as Indigenous territory or collective lands of Afro-descendent communities.<ref name=":10" /> These collective land tenure rights have been in effect since the implementation of the 1991 constitution, granting them the authority to exercise legal control over their territories in accordance with their own customs and procedures.<ref>Max Planck Institute (n.d.) ''Colombia 1991 (rev. 2015).'' Institute. [[/www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Colombia 2015|https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Colombia_2015]]</ref> Furthermore, the carbon rights of Indigenous peoples are explicitly defined in the constitution and tied specifically to the ownership of land of the communities.<ref name=":2" /> This in theory provides a solid legal basis for upholding the rights of Indigenous communities in Colombia, specifically relating to REDD+ activities, as it allows communities to define and negotiate the terms of said projects. A summary of the various laws relating to Indigenous rights have been summarized below:
{| class="wikitable"
| colspan="2" |'''Law (1991 constitution)'''
|-
|Article 63

|Indigenous territories are considered collective property. Land is not owned by individuals but is shared by the community. The state must respect these collective rights and cannot alter land ownership without the consent of the Indigenous peoples.
|-
|Article 76 - ''Consulta previa''.
|Pertains to the right of Indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities; prior consultation must be undertaken before any entity undertakes activities that may affect their territories, culture, or way of life.
|-
|Article 330
|Indigenous communities have the right to govern their territories.
|-
|Article 329
|The Reservation is a collective, inalienable, and indefeasible property.
|-
|Decree 1386 of 1994, Article 10; Decree 2164 of 1995, Article 22) 39.
|"The administration and management of these lands are subjected to uses and customs of the beneficiaries."
|}
Whilst land and tenure rights are enshrined into the constitution, the precariousness of these rights persists due to a lack of resources to ensure enforcement, as well as the deeper issue of corruption. As previously stated, the rate of deforestation increased significantly in Colombia’s post-conflict era, evidencing the nations inability to maintain control over unlawful acts of land-grabbing and disposition. Whilst this began with new peasants converting the Amazon for subsistence purposes, it ultimately led to new areas for the growth of cocoa, much to the benefit of narco-traffickers who could monopolize on this illegal surplus in ‘accumulation by dispossession’.<ref name=":8" />

With respect to the legalities of consultation, Colombia has enshrined ''consulta previa'' into the constitution. Translating to ‘prior consultation’, this legal text provides the formal grounds for Indigenous engagement when any legislative or administrative measures are implemented on Indigenous territory. Importantly, consultation should be achieved in accordance with the customs of the ethnic group with which the project is being imposed upon. However, there have been recent cases of contestation specifically relating to how ''consulta previa'' applies to REDD+ on Indigenous lands, and the RIU – SM project was one that was involved with such a case.

=== Affected and interested stakeholders ===
{| class="wikitable"
| colspan="5" |'''Affected stakeholders'''
|-
|Stakeholders
|Primary objective(s)
|Secondary objective(s)
|Relative power
|Scope of influence
|-
|ACATISEMA - Asociación de Cabildos y Autoridades Indígenas de la Selva de Matavén
|Primary and direct beneficiaries of project
Foster the integral development, social and cultural preservation of the indigenous communities in the Mataven Jungle

Consolidate the territory, and promote conservation and preservation of the environment and biodiversity of the Mataven Jungle

|Maintain control over ''resguardos''
|Powerful, locally.
Has the highest authority in the ''reguardo''.

Rights to the land and revenue generated from project
|Local
|-
|Indigenous communities of the RIU-SM
|Seek to maintain land rights

Promote traditional and cultural beliefs
|Increase benefits from the project
|Mid-power, though little input into project activities in reality.
|Local
|-
|Landless peasants
|Survive via subsistence
|Gain more access to land. Improve rights.
|Low to none
|Local
|-
| colspan="5" |'''Interested stakeholders'''
|-
|MEDIAMOS F&M
|Project developer
Maximise project revenues
|Develop the project in a way that is supporting of ACETISMA beliefs, for their benefit.
|Powerful: involved with various technical aspects of project development
|National
|-
|Ministerio de Ambiente y Desarrollo Sostenible (Minisitry of Environment and Sustainable Development)
|Environmental planning; sustainable development
Form strategic alliances with social and institutional participants in different sectoral and territorial scenarios.
|Ensure project activities are in agreement with ministry mandate
|Powerful, though supporting of project
|National
|-
|Dirección de Asuntos Indígenas, ROM y Minorías - Ministerio del Interior
|Prepares policy in favour of Indigenous groups
Supports ethnic and cultural rights of Indigenous
|
|Not ''per se'' involved with project, though the policy the organization has introduced affects project outcomes
|National
|-
|Corporinoquía
|Environmental authority to ensure the proper use of natural resources in their area of jurisdiction.
Ensure project abides by relevant regulations
|
|Powerful, though supporting of project
|Regional
|-
|Other government institutions: Governor ofice of Vichada, Mayor ofice Cumaribo
|The Reservation for being part of the Cumaribo, Vichada, has territorial jurisdiction relations with the Governor’s office and the Mayor’s office.
|Benefit from the project, if possible
|Powerful, regionally
|Regional - National
|-
|Fundación NATURA
''Civil organization''
|Conservation, use and management of biodiversity
Maximise social and environmental benefits of project
|Ensure suffienct IPLC inclusion
|Mid-power. Can influence decisions regarding project activities though does not hold absolute power to define terms
|International
|-
|Mining companies
|Mine to generate revenue.
|Compete with the project for the territory's resources.
|Relatively powerful, though legally obstructed to achieve primary objective
|International
|-
|Other indigenous communities neighboring RIU-SM
|Ensure autonomy with respect to their own jurisdiction
|Not involved with the project though potentially affected by it
|Low, with respect to the project
|Local
|-
|FONDO ACCIÓN
|Facilitate private investment into project activities
|Conservation and sustainable development; Protection/development of children.
|Mid-power. Important as they raise funds for the project and benefit from it, though not primary beneficiaries.
|National
|-
|Asocarbono – An industry association, including Verra, ProClima, Biofix, and ACATISEMA.

|Promote the agenda of high-level actors of the VCM
Promote integrity of market
|Hide/argue cases of scandal
|Powerful
|International
|-
|OPIAC: National Oganization of the Indigenous Peoples of the Colombian Amazon

|Promotes Indigenous rights in Colombia
Exercises a political representation of the Indigenous peoples of the Colombian Amazon
|
|Powerful. Legally knowledgeable.
|National
|}

=== Discussion ===
According to the official REDD+ Mataven website<ref>RIU – SM (n.d.). ''REDD+ Mataven''. [[/reddmataven.com/|https://reddmataven.com/]]</ref> the project has resulted in a myriad of benefits to the Indigenous communities of the region. For example, as a result of the funds generated from the projects activities, there have been improvements in infrastructure, transportation and education, ultimately leading to the empowerment and improved governance of ACETISMA. However, the project has come under fire for multiple reasons.

For one, in 2015 some of the Indigenous communities filed a lawsuit referring to the violation of their right to ''consulta previa''. However, the court ruled that their Indigenous rights had not been violated as it was ACETISMA that initially sought MEDIAMOS to develop the project, and that ACETISMA were the best representatives of those Indigenous communities. Furthermore, the projects main focus was the conservation of the rainforest and therefore did not threaten the cultural integrity of those communities.<ref name=":10" /> However, regardless of the outcome of this case, its occurrence points to internal disagreement amongst Indigenous participants of the RIU-SM project. In a study involving interviews with Indigenous members of the project, there was a significant proportion of interviewees that had little knowledge regarding various aspects of the project, such as responsibilities of participation, or the benefit-sharing mechanism in place.<ref name=":2" /> This further reinforces the point that, in the case of the RIU-SM project it may not be ‘bottom-up’ and eludes to the power imbalance experienced between MEDIAMOS, the project developer, and Indigenous community members. In the PD there is a breakdown of the distribution of income between ACETISMA and MEDIAMOS, which shows a significant proportion of revenue flowing to the former organisation throughout the project’s operations.<ref name=":7" /> However, there is currently no publicly available documentation supporting this initial claim<ref name=":9" /> as there is no obligation to provide this information, leading to a general lack of transparency in the market and between all of the relevant actors. Subsequent meetings with Indigenous leaders have however shown a marked support of the Mataven project, with one Indigenous leader explicitly stating “...the Redd+ project has brought resources that they never had before, which allowed them to open new school classrooms, 21 rural aqueducts, cocoa crops and even headquarters in Cumaribo and Inírida.”<ref>Lievano, A. B. (2021) Colombia's biggest carbon credit project could be selling hot air. Latin American Center for Investigative Journalism. [[/www.elclip.org/el-mayor-proyecto-de-bonos-de-carbono-de-colombia-podria-estar-vendiendo-aire-caliente/|https://www.elclip.org/el-mayor-proyecto-de-bonos-de-carbono-de-colombia-podria-estar-vendiendo-aire-caliente/]] </ref> Clearly there have been benefits for IPLC’s involved with this project, though the details of this benefit-sharing remain a mystery.

Secondly, the Mataven project has caused controversy due to its apparently inflated carbon credit issuance. One report states that this has been achieved by using a reference area that is not representative of the project area, as well as assuming an uncharacteristically heigh assumed rate of deforestation.<ref name=":12">Global Atlas of Environmental Justice (2023). ''Resguardo Indigena Unificado-Selva de Matavén (RIU SM) REDD+ Project, Colombia.'' [[/ejatlas.org/conflict/redd-project-resguardo-indigena-unificado-selva-de-mataven-riu-sm|https://ejatlas.org/conflict/redd-project-resguardo-indigena-unificado-selva-de-mataven-riu-sm]]</ref> The project used a baseline deforestation rate of 0.86% per year, which is significantly more than the Colombian government's national rate of 0.18%. Additionally, according to the report the reference area chosen is more easily accessed and therefore more prone to deforestation, making it an inaccurate comparison to the relatively remote project area.<ref name=":2" /> This has led to the creation of excess carbon credits, or “hot air” credits, which have been criticized for not reflecting real environmental benefits.<ref name=":9" /> To add further insult to injury these credits have been used by a Colombian fossil fuel distributor company to avoid paying taxes, as described earlier by Colombia’s change in policy in 2017. In doing so, the company avoided paying approximately $18.9 million in taxes.<ref name=":2" /> There has been subsequent back and forth between Verra and Carbon Market Watch, with Verra refuting the claims<ref>Verra (2021). ''Carbon Market Watch Report on Colombian REDD+ Projects Contains Flawed Allegations.'' [[/verra.org/carbon-market-watch-report-on-colombian-redd-projects-contains-flawed-allegations/|https://verra.org/carbon-market-watch-report-on-colombian-redd-projects-contains-flawed-allegations/]] </ref> Regardless of the science, Colombia recently introduced a resolution in 2018 (Resolution 1447 – 2018) that requires projects to use baselines that comply with national reference levels.<ref name=":13">Dufrasne, D. (2021b). Companies use ”hot air” forestry offsets to avoid taxes in Colombia: Carbon Market Watch’s fact-check of Verra’s response. Carbon Market Watch. [[/carbonmarketwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/CMWs-fact-check-of-Verras-response-on-Colombia.pdf|https://carbonmarketwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/CMWs-fact-check-of-Verras-response-on-Colombia.pdf]]</ref><ref>IEA (2022). ''Resolution 1447 – 2018. Monitoring, Reporting, and Verification System for mitigation actions at the national level.'' International Energy Agency. [[/www.iea.org/policies/14772-resolution-1447-2018-monitoring-reporting-and-verification-system-for-mitigation-actions-at-the-national-level|https://www.iea.org/policies/14772-resolution-1447-2018-monitoring-reporting-and-verification-system-for-mitigation-actions-at-the-national-level]]</ref> Going forward, REDD+ projects that are being implemented in Colombia will have to abide by Colombia’s national legislation.

=== Summary ===
Colombia has a long history of engaging in REDD+ as it has been used to limit environmental degradation in the post-conflict era, in alignment with the country’s national peacebuilding agenda.<ref name=":11" /> Owing to the country’s comprehensive tenure and bundle rights, IPLC’s have robust ''de jure'' rights to land as they collectively own it, and rights to carbon are tied to this ownership. This puts Colombia as one of the world leaders in legal terms relating to REDD+ project implementation, but due to a lack of resources to ensure enforcement, as well as corruption, historically these laws have not been adhered to.<ref name=":10" /><ref name=":2" /> There are many documented cases showing the displacement on IPLC’s from traditional lands, poor efforts to adhere to ''consulta previa'', and inequitable benefit sharing.<ref>Greenfield, P. (2023''). The ‘carbon pirates’ preying on Amazon’s Indigenous communities.'' The Guardian. [[/www.theguardian.com/environment/2023/jan/21/amazon-indigenous-communities-carbon-offsetting-pirates-aoe|https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2023/jan/21/amazon-indigenous-communities-carbon-offsetting-pirates-aoe]]</ref><ref name=":14">Lang, C., (2024). ''Colombia’s Constitutional Court rules in favour of Indigenous Peoples. Identifies serious flaws in the REDD+ Baka Rokarire project.'' REDD_Monitor. [[/reddmonitor.substack.com/p/colombias-constitutional-court-rules|https://reddmonitor.substack.com/p/colombias-constitutional-court-rules]]</ref>

The case of the Mataven project provides an interesting example of how it is the market itself that is failing to address concerns regarding transparency, whether that be relating to benefit-sharing amongst relevant stakeholders, or Indigenous representation and engagement throughout the implementation of REDD+ projects. Some ACATISEMA members have explicitly stated their support for the Mataven project,<ref name=":12" /> and its benefits can be seen first-hand in the form of improved infrastructure in local communities involved with the project.<ref>Myers, J. E., Parra, M. A., Bedford, C. (2021). ''How Carbon Offsetting Can Build a Forest.'' Stanford Social Innovation Review. [[/ssir.org/articles/entry/how carbon offsetting can build a forest|https://ssir.org/articles/entry/how_carbon_offsetting_can_build_a_forest]]</ref> However, an exact breakdown of how and where revenue is being distributed to IPLC’s remains elusive.<ref name=":13" /> Furthermore, the level of IPLC engagement has come into question, specifically with reference to ''consulta previa'' and the overall understanding that IPLC’s have regarding the project’s intended outcomes and activities.<ref name=":10" /> This is not a rare case in Colombia and has been witnessed occurring with other projects that have been implemented on Indigenous territories in the Colombian Amazon.<ref name=":17">Lang, C., (2023''). “It destroys everything,” says Indigenous leader about the REDD+ Baka Rokarire project in Colombia''. REDD Monitor. [[/reddmonitor.substack.com/p/it-destroys-everything-says-indigenous|https://reddmonitor.substack.com/p/it-destroys-everything-says-indigenous]]</ref> However, a recent ruling by the Colombian Constitutional court voted in favour of Indigenous groups in Colombia, upholding “the rights to self-determination, autonomy, self-government, territory, identity, physical and cultural integrity, and free, prior and informed consent of the indigenous communities”.<ref name=":14" /> This review ultimately sets a legal precedent safeguarding the fundamental rights of IPLCs with REDD+ project implementation and shows that progress is being made to improve the likelihood that REDD+ will result in genuine benefits to those affected by project implementation.

To ensure a more authentic engagement with IPLC’s as to result in legitimate and equitable benefit-sharing, improvements must be made by the Colombian government, as well as within the VCM itself. For the former, Colombia’s national registry for GHG mitigation activities must be updated; it has been offline since 2022.<ref name=":10" /> As a result, transparency is lacking. International finance could be utilized as to alleviate this issue, and only with an accurate and reliable database may the market be regulated. In the broader sense, VCM registries must create stricter guidelines promoting transparency. Often PD’s refer to annexed documents that contain relevant information regarding benefit-sharing, though these are often not publicly available.<ref name=":9" /> This limits transparency and increases the likelihood of inequitable agreements being made between project proponents and developers, further exacerbating existing power asymmetries between the two groups and limiting the likelihood that ''consulta previa'' is honestly adhered to.<ref name=":10" /> This has led to conflict within Indigenous communities, rather than a strengthening of their social fabric.

Furthermore, the Mataven project calls into question the actual emissions reduction that REDD+ projects achieve. Whilst Colombia has since updated its regulations such that REDD+ must use baselines that comply with national reference levels, it is up in the air as to how representative these guidelines are. Reference areas must represent project areas and without the appropriate regulations in place project developers lack the incentive to create realistic baselines; ultimately they are aiming to produce the maximum number of credits as to generate the greatest possible revenues.

==Conclusion==
As a market-based mechanism, REDD+ is shackled by the construct in which it operates; fundamentally it is a capitalist means of fixing a capitalist problem, which comes with limitations. Both Brazil and Colombia have relatively robust laws that have been written into the constitution, ultimately promoting more equitable results of REDD+ project implementation. However, as in Colombia IPLC’s collectively own the land, whereas in Brazil these groups only own rights to use the land,<ref name=":2" /> Colombia can be considered better equipped for the establishment of REDD+ projects on traditional Indigenous territory. However, even with these laws in place enforcement remain a matter of concern. Furthermore, given the wide variety of ontological and epistemological perspectives of Indigenous communities, and how these views conflict with the Western worldview from which market-based REDD+ came to fruition, there is an inherent difficulty in implementing a system of governance in REDD+ on Indigenous lands.<ref name=":1" />. Putting a price on nature conflicts with Indigenous perspectives and there have been instances where this has attacked the social and cultural fabric of IPLC’s.<ref name=":17" /> To avoid this REDD+ developers must have the genuine intent of understanding the perspective of the Indigenous group they are working with and aim to implement REDD+ with a bottom-up approach.

In both countries, transparency must be improved to ensure that FPIC is adhered to and subsequently ensure fair IPLC representation and engagement. This issue predominantly arises due to the poor requirements of standards in the VCM. As such, proponents are guided by developers which have little incentive to truly act in the interests of Indigenous groups; ultimately the organizations in charge of project development are interested in increasing project revenues. This has led to instances of over-crediting, as without a transparent framework in which to operate it is difficult to evaluate the legitimacy of the claims being made by project proponents and developers. However, with recent advances that address concerns of additionality<ref name=":15" /> there is hope for improved market integrity. Standards of the VCM must continue to be scrutinized to ensure that progress continues to be made.

Going forward, progress should be made to formalize the customary laws and traditional lands of IPLCs, and finance should be directed towards the enforcement of these laws. The environmental,<ref name=":16" /> economic,<ref name=":5" /><ref>Ding, H., Veit, P. G., Blackman, A., Gray, E., Reytar, K., Altamirano, J. C., Hodgdon, B., (2016). ''Climate benefits, tenure costs: The economic case for securing Indigenous land rights in the Amazon''. WRI. [[/files.wri.org/d8/s3fs-public/Climate Benefits Tenure Costs Executive Summary.pdf|https://files.wri.org/d8/s3fs-public/Climate_Benefits_Tenure_Costs_Executive_Summary.pdf]]</ref> and social<ref>Sarmiento Barletti, J. P., Heise Vigil, N., & Larson, A. M. (2023). ''Safeguards at a glance: Are voluntary standards supporting community land, resource and carbon rights?'' CIFOR-ICRAF. [[/www.cifor-icraf.org/publications/pdf files/Flyer/REDD-Safeguards-7.pdf|https://www.cifor-icraf.org/publications/pdf_files/Flyer/REDD-Safeguards-7.pdf]] </ref> benefits of this have been researched and are well understood. By developing culturally appropriate frameworks for rights-based conservation regimes, that work with IPLCs in accordance with their worldviews, REDD+ could be used to promote Indigenous autonomy. However, progress still must be made to achieve this goal.

==References==

Documentation:Open Case Studies/FRST522/2024/REDD+ in Indigenous Amazonia: What works and what doesn’t?

2024-12-16T20:48:52Z

ConnorHaynes: /* Abstract */

__TOC__

==Positionality==
First and foremost I am not Indigenous, and whilst there are a myriad of cultures, ontologies and epistemologies that are not sufficiently represented by simply stating ‘Indigenous’, it is commonly accepted that these worldviews are vastly different to those of the ‘Western’ world, which is the world in which I grew up and matured. I am therefore only understanding of Indigenous cultures, beliefs and customary laws based upon available online literature and those which I have learnt through life, in addition to those introduced to me in my Master’s degree. As such, I will never be able to fully relate to an Indigenous person; the best I can do is try to understand and learn. Only throughout this process am I able to work towards reconciliation and attempt to address the inequities experienced by Indigenous folk globally.

Additionally, I am yet to act as a carbon project proponent and so do not understand the nuances or stresses of undertaking such a task. Whilst an individual proponent may have the best intention of procuring a carbon project for its social and environmental benefits, there are a number of stakeholders involved throughout the entire process which influence its eventual outcome. Without experience acting as a project proponent I am naïve in understanding the process and it's difficulties.

==Acronyms / Terminology==
'''Acronyms:'''

AFOLU: Agriculture, Forestry and Other Land-Use

ICVCM: Integrity Council for the Voluntary Carbon Market

IPLC: Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities

KMGBF: Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework

LAC: Latin American Countries

MRV: Monitoring, Reporting and Verification

REDD+: Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation

UNCBD: United Nations Convention on Biological Biodiversity

VCMI: Voluntary Carbon Markets Integrity Initiative

'''Terminology:'''

''Additionality:'' Additionality is the determination of whether the project will lead to the expected outcomes when compared to the baseline or ‘business as usual’ emissions.

''Leakage'': Refers to the shifting of emissions to outside the project boundary as a result of the project’s activities.

''Permanence:'' Permanence refers to the degree to which a carbon credit is equivalent to a permanent removal or reduction in emissions.
==Abstract==
This case study illustrates two examples of Indigenous-led REDD+ projects on Indigenous territory in Colombia and Brazil. Both countries have a relatively long history of engaging with REDD+ but have slightly different legal structures pertaining to the rights of Indigenous peoples on their traditional territories, and specifically their ‘carbon’ rights. As such, the intention is to evaluate how these differing ''de jure'' rights translate on the ground. With respect to REDD+, do certain rights result in legitimately positive benefits to IPLCs, as well as the environment that these projects were originally intended to protect? The intention is such that the reader can evaluate the effectiveness and true benefit of REDD+ projects to IPLC’s, based upon the legal frameworks of the host country. A secondary intention is such that the reader is better equipped to conduct a prefeasibility assessment based upon available online literature, to evaluate the likelihood that REDD+ can be implemented in any chosen country, with the genuine intent of benefiting IPLC’s that are directly affected as a result of REDD+ project implementation.

==REDD+ and the VCM in Brazil and Colombia==
REDD+, originally introduced by the UNFCCC, is a market-based mechanism sitting within the VCM that aims to reverse the loss of forests and carbon stocks, specifically in developing countries. Simply put, an entity or an individual can voluntarily pay another that has engaged with REDD+ and subsequently sequestered carbon, to offset their own emissions using ‘credits’, sold as units of greenhouse gas equivalent to one ton of carbon dioxide (CO2e). Forestry and Land-Use remains to be the largest category of carbon credits traded by transaction volume on the VCM, with REDD+ being the most popular project type in this category, accounting for 78% of credits traded.<ref name=":0">Procton, A., (2024). ''State of the voluntary carbon market 2024: On the path to maturity.'' Forest Trends Ecosystem Marketplace.</ref> Furthermore, over one-third of the credits sold within this category were sourced from projects that had been implemented in LAC and the Caribbean in 2024.<ref name=":0" /> Of the four largest standards issuing carbon credits, Verra accounts for roughly 80% of issuances in Latin America,<ref>Pullins, T. (2022). Growth of carbon markets in Latin America. White & Case. [[/www.whitecase.com/publications/insight/latin-america-focus-fall-2022-growth-carbon-markets|https://www.whitecase.com/publications/insight/latin-america-focus-fall-2022-growth-carbon-markets]] </ref> and even in the face of recent scrutiny,<ref>West, T. A. P., Bofim, B., Haya, B. K. (2024). Methodological issues with deforestation baselines compromise the integrity of carbon offsets from REDD+. ''Global Environmental Change, 87'' [[/doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2024.102863|https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2024.102863]]</ref><ref>Wyburd I., & Dufrasne, G. (2023). Error Log: Exposing the methodological failures of REDD+ forestry projects. Carbon Market Watch. [[/carbonmarketwatch.org/publications/error-log-exposing-the-methodological-failures-of-redd-forestry-projects/|https://carbonmarketwatch.org/publications/error-log-exposing-the-methodological-failures-of-redd-forestry-projects/]]</ref><ref name=":15">Haya, B. K., Alford-Jones, K., Anderegg, W. R. L., Beymer-Farris, B., Blanchard, L., Bomfim, B., Chin, D., Evans, S., Hogan, M., Holm, J. A., McAfee, K., So, I. S., West, T. A. P., & Withey, L. (2023). ''Quality assessment of REDD+ carbon credit projects''. Berkeley Carbon Trading Project. [[/gspp.berkeley.edu/research-and-impact/centers/cepp/projects/berkeley-carbontrading-project/REDD+|https://gspp.berkeley.edu/research-and-impact/centers/cepp/projects/berkeley-carbontrading-project/REDD+]]</ref> REDD+ projects account for a significant proportion of the VCM with their continued application likely to persist.<ref>Gordon, O. (2022). ''The interwoven fortunes of carbon markets and indigenous communities.'' Energy Monitor. [[/www.energymonitor.ai/tech/carbon-removal/the-interwoven-fortunes-of-carbon-markets-and-indigenous-communities/|https://www.energymonitor.ai/tech/carbon-removal/the-interwoven-fortunes-of-carbon-markets-and-indigenous-communities/]]</ref><ref>Müller, M., Coustar, C., Bietta, F., Mathres, M. (2022). ''UNFCCC REDD+ and the power of sovereign carbon.'' Deutsche Banke Chief Investment Office. [[/www.rainforestcoalition.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/CIO-Special-UNFCCC-REDD-power-of-sovereign-carbon.pdf|https://www.rainforestcoalition.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/CIO-Special-UNFCCC-REDD-power-of-sovereign-carbon.pdf]]</ref><ref>Pullins, T. (2022). ''Growth of carbon markets in Latin America.'' White & Case. [[/www.whitecase.com/publications/insight/latin-america-focus-fall-2022-growth-carbon-markets|https://www.whitecase.com/publications/insight/latin-america-focus-fall-2022-growth-carbon-markets]] </ref> With the introduction of updated methodologies aimed at addressing these concerns,<ref>Verra (2023a). ''Setting the Standard: Verra’s Revolutionary New REDD Methodology.'' [[/verra.org/program-notice/setting-the-standard-verras-revolutionary-new-redd-methodology/|https://verra.org/program-notice/setting-the-standard-verras-revolutionary-new-redd-methodology/]]</ref><ref>Verra (2023b). ''VM0048 Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation, v1.0.'' [[/verra.org/methodologies/vm0048-reducing-emissions-from-deforestation-and-forest-degradation-v1-0/|https://verra.org/methodologies/vm0048-reducing-emissions-from-deforestation-and-forest-degradation-v1-0/]]</ref> there is hope for renewed buyer confidence in the integrity of this market,<ref>MSCI (2023). ''Verra’s New Methodology for Unplanned Deforestation Aims to Silence the Critics''. [[/www.msci.com/www/blog-posts/verra-s-new-methodology-for/04577808942|https://www.msci.com/www/blog-posts/verra-s-new-methodology-for/04577808942]]</ref> though more work still needs to be done.

Both Colombia and Brazil have a relatively long history of implementing REDD+ projects, using both fund-based and market-based mechanisms. For example, both countries were participants in the ‘Amazon Indigenous REDD+ (RIA in Spanish) initiative, with the first pilot implementation project being initiated in Colombia’s Puiawai Natural Reserve.<ref>Garzón, E., (2017). ''Amazon Indigenous REDD+: An innovative approach to conserve Colombian forests?'' Mongabay. [[/news.mongabay.com/2017/01/amazon-indigenous-redd-an-innovative-approach-to-conserve-colombian-forests/|https://news.mongabay.com/2017/01/amazon-indigenous-redd-an-innovative-approach-to-conserve-colombian-forests/]]</ref> The relevance of these two countries with respect to REDD+ is simple. Much of the Amazon’s primary tropical rainforest falls within these countries jurisdiction and this rainforest has been consistently under threat from external pressures and encroachment, whether that be in the form of land-clearing for commercial ranching, subsistence purposes, illicit drug production or illegal mining practices,<ref name=":8">Sánchez García, P. A. & Wong, G. Y., (2024) “The political economy of deforestation in the Colombian Amazon”, ''Journal of Political Ecology'' ''31''(1), 178–199. [[/doi.org/10.2458/jpe.5230|https://doi.org/10.2458/jpe.5230]]</ref><ref>Radwin, M. (2023). ''Drug trafficking fuels other deforestation drivers in the Amazon: report.'' Mongabay. [[/news.mongabay.com/2023/07/drug-trafficking-fuels-other-deforestation-drivers-in-the-amazon-report/|https://news.mongabay.com/2023/07/drug-trafficking-fuels-other-deforestation-drivers-in-the-amazon-report/]]</ref><ref>Haddad, E.A., Araújo, I.F., Feltran-Barbieri, R., Perobelli, F. S., Rocha, A., Sass, K. S., Nobre, C. A. (2024). Economic drivers of deforestation in the Brazilian Legal Amazon. ''Nat Sustain'' ''7'', 1141–1148. [[/doi.org/10.1038/s41893-024-01387-7|https://doi.org/10.1038/s41893-024-01387-7]] </ref><ref>Hänggli, A., Levy, S. A., Armenteras, D., Bovolo, C. I., Brandão, J., Rueda, X., & Garrett, R. D. (2023). A systematic comparison of deforestation drivers and policy effectiveness across the amazon biome. ''Environmental Research Letters, 18''(7), 073001. [[/doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/acd408|https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/acd408]]</ref> to name a few.

In theory, REDD+ can be used to provide the economic incentive to promote sustained environmental protection of Indigenous lands, with a focus on the rights and livelihoods of IPLCs. Currently the overall funding to IPLCs tenure rights and forest management in tropical countries is low, receiving just $270 million per year between 2011-2020 from bilateral and multilateral donors and private philanthropies.<ref>Hatcher, J., Owen, M., Yin, D., (2021). ''Falling short: Donor funding for Indigenous peoples and local communities to secure tenure rights and manage forests in tropical countries (2011 -2020).'' Rainforest Foundation Norway. [[/dv719tqmsuwvb.cloudfront.net/documents/Publikasjoner/Andre-rapporter/RFN Falling short 2021.pdf|https://dv719tqmsuwvb.cloudfront.net/documents/Publikasjoner/Andre-rapporter/RFN_Falling_short_2021.pdf]]</ref> REDD+ has the potential to channel funding as to promote Indigenous rights and autonomy, provided there is transparent and equitable benefit-sharing for those involved. Fundamentally, only with the inclusion of IPLC’s, or preferably with IPLC’s acting as project proponents, is REDD+ able to promote Indigenous agency and improve IPLC rights and governance. And only when the rights of those inhabiting the land are formally recognized can the land be effectively conserved.<ref name=":16">Reytar, K., Veit, P., von Braun, J. (2024). ''Protecting Biodiversity Hinges on Securing Indigenous and Community Land Rights.'' WRI. [[/www.wri.org/insights/indigenous-and-local-community-land-rights-protect-biodiversity|https://www.wri.org/insights/indigenous-and-local-community-land-rights-protect-biodiversity]]</ref> The inclusion of IPLCs in REDD+ project development is therefore considered to be essential for project success, and this is in theory embodied in the very nature of REDD+.<ref name=":1">Alvarez, G., Elfving, M. and Andrade, C. (2016) ‘REDD+ governance and indigenous peoples in Latin America: the case of Suruí Carbon Project in the Brazilian Amazon Forest’, ''Latin American J. Management for Sustainable Development 3''(2) pp.133–146. [[/dx.doi.org/10.1504/LAJMSD.2016.083705|10.1504/LAJMSD.2016.083705]]</ref> Partially owing to a long history of dealing with REDD+, Colombia and Brazil are amongst just a few of the countries hosting tropical rainforests that explicitly recognise community rights to carbon and tie these rights to the legal ownership of lands and forests. In Colombia, carbon rights are tied to land rights, whereas in Brazil carbon rights are tied to forest rights.<ref name=":2">RRI and McGill University (2021). Technical report: ''Status of legal recognition of Indigenous Peoples’, Local Communities’ and Afro-descendant Peoples’ rights to carbon stored in tropical lands and forests''. Rights and Resources Initiative. [[/doi.org/10.53892/MLQQ5744|https://doi.org/10.53892/MLQQ5744]]</ref>

==Brazil: The Suruí Forest Carbon Project==
[[File:The Amazon Basin, Brazil.jpg|thumb|376x376px|Brazil's Amazon rainforest]]

=== Project description and location ===
The Surui Forest Carbon project was implemented in 2009 on the territory of the Surui people, which is situated in the southern part of Brazil’s Amazon between the states of Rondônia and Mato Grosso. Surui Indigenous territory covers an area of 2,481 km2, though the intention of the PCFS was to protect a portion of this total area. According to the PD, the stated objective was to “prevent 13,575.3 hectares of tropical forest from being cleared by 2038, to avoid the emission of 7,258,352.3 tCO2e to the atmosphere, and to contribute to the preservation of the Paiter Surui lifestyle and traditions.”<ref>IDESAM (2011). ''Project description: Surui forest carbon project''. Institute for Conservation and Sustainable Development of Amazonas. Link: "PROJ_DESC_1118_02FEB2012.PDF" found at [[/registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/1118|https://registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/1118]] </ref> This region sits within one of the Brazilian Amazon’s main ‘arcs of deforestation’ and pressure from loggers and ranchers is a matter of concern.

Notably, the PCFS was the first REDD+ project to be proposed by Indigenous peoples in the Brazilian Amazon on their own territory and was the first to receive certification by both the VCS and CCBS.<ref name=":1" />. Metareilá, the Surui’s own Indigenous association, acted as project proponent and the Institute for Conservation and Sustainable Development of Amazonas (IDESAM) assisted with project development, alongside multiple other stakeholder groups. As an endogenous initiative procured and conducted by the Surui community, the SFCP had a ‘non-centralized model of governance’, which reflected the characteristics and traditions of the Surui people. <ref name=":1" />

Only after two years of consultations between the 24 communities involved and the relevant governmental agencies (primarily FUNAI and the Ministry of Environment) was a Memorandum of Understanding signed, showing community consent to develop the project.<ref name=":3">Garcia, B., Rimmer, L., Canal Vieira, L., Mackey, B., (2021). REDD+ and forest protection on indigenous lands in the Amazon. ''RECIEL 30'', 207–219. [[/doi.org/10.1111/reel.12389|https://doi.org/10.1111/reel.12389]]</ref> In 2012 after verification from an independent third-party body, the Surui were able to sell carbon credits on the international market. Between 2009 and 2014 the project drastically helped limit the deforestation occurring within the project’s site, causing many to deem it a success.<ref name=":4">Howard, F. E., (2023). ''An Analysis of the Suruí Forest Carbon Project in Context of Settler Colonialism''. Masters thesis. Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University. [[/vtechworks.lib.vt.edu/server/api/core/bitstreams/b0cde6de-794c-453f-856b-ee72bde3db06/content|https://vtechworks.lib.vt.edu/server/api/core/bitstreams/b0cde6de-794c-453f-856b-ee72bde3db06/content]]</ref>

=== National climate targets, policies and legislation ===
Rates of deforestation in Brazil’s legal Amazon are significantly impacted by the government in charge. This is evidenced in the decade between 2012 and 2021 whilst under the conservative Bolsonaro administration, when deforestation in the Amazon increased 185% — from a loss of 4,571 km2 in 2012 to 13,038 km2 in 2021.<ref>INPE (2022). ''Observação da Terra. [[/www.obt.inpe.br/OBT/assuntos/programas/amazonia/prodes|http://www.obt.inpe.br/OBT/assuntos/programas/amazonia/prodes]]''</ref> However, since Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s appointment in 2022 there has been a steady decline in the rate of deforestation, which is now roughly half what it was in 2021.<ref>Terra Brasilis (2024). ''PRODES (deforestation): Deforestation rates – Legal Amazon – States''. [[/terrabrasilis.dpi.inpe.br/app/dashboard/deforestation/biomes/legal amazon/rates|https://terrabrasilis.dpi.inpe.br/app/dashboard/deforestation/biomes/legal_amazon/rates]]</ref> A significant proportion of emissions result from the clearing of rainforest and its subsequent conversion to ranching.<ref>MCTI (2022). ''Estimativas Anuais De Emissões De Gases De Efeito Estufa No Brasil.'' 6ª Edição. Ministério da Estado da Ciência, Tecnologia e Inovações. [[/www.gov.br/mcti/pt-br/acompanhe-o-mcti/sirene/publicacoes/estimativas-anuais-de-emissoes-gee/arquivos/6a-ed-estimativas-anuais.pdf|https://www.gov.br/mcti/pt-br/acompanhe-o-mcti/sirene/publicacoes/estimativas-anuais-de-emissoes-gee/arquivos/6a-ed-estimativas-anuais.pdf]]</ref> To address these emissions Brazil has implemented various adaptation policies, legislation and targets which are summarized below:
{| class="wikitable"
|'''Document name'''
|'''Type'''
|'''Publication year'''
|'''Key takeaways'''
|-
|National Policy on Climate Change (NPCC)
|Legislation
|2009
|Framework for addressing climate change
|-
|National Plan on Climate Change Adaptation
|Policy
|2016
|Framework for addressing impacts of climate change
|-
|Nationally Determined Contribution
|Target
|2024
|Reduce net greenhouse gas emissions by 59 to 67 percent below 2005 levels by 2035
|-
|Federal Constitution, Article 225
|Legislation
|2006
|The Amazon rainforest is considered as a ‘national heritage’.All levels of government have a shared responsibility to protect it and the environment
|-
| colspan="4" |'''Relating to REDD+'''
|-
|Plan of Action for the Prevention and Control of Deforestation in the Legal Amazon (PPCDAM)
|Policy
|2004
|Aims to reduce deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon
|-
|Forest code
|Legislation
|2012
|Aimed at reducing deforestation, but no specific mention of REDD+
|-
|Amazon Indigenous REDD+ Initiative
|Policy
|2012
|Incorporate Indigenous with REDD+ initiatives
|-
|National REDD+ Strategy (ENREDD+)
|Policy
|2016
|REDD+ as a fund-based mechanism
|}

=== Indigenous rights - Constitutional, tenure and bundle rights ===
In Brazil, Indigenous rights are robust and clearly defined according to the Brazilian Constitution. As a result, the Indigenous communities of the Brazilian Amazon have legal title to 13.8% of the national territory totalling 1.175 million km2, with a total of 631 territories.<ref>Federal government of Brazil (2024). ''Brazil’s NDC: National determination to contribute and transform''. [[/unfccc.int/sites/default/files/2024-11/Brazil Second Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) November2024.pdf|https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/2024-11/Brazil_Second%20Nationally%20Determined%20Contribution%20%28NDC%29_November2024.pdf]]</ref>
{| class="wikitable"
| colspan="2" |'''Laws'''
|-
|Article 231 of the 1988 Constitution
|Indigenous peoples to have their exclusive right to use their territories to derive economic benefits. Grants indigenous peoples the right to land, prohibits eviction, and restricts mining without authorization from the federal government.
|-
|Indigenous Peoples statute (1973).

|No acts restricting the full exercise of indigenous peoples’ permanent tenure over the land should be permitted.
|-
| colspan="2" | '''Treaties'''
|-
|United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2007)
|Requires States to obtain free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) for the approval of any projects affecting indigenous territories.
|-
|International Labour Organization Convention 169 (2019)
|Ratified and incorporated under domestic law in 2002 through Decree 10.088/2019, endorsing UNDRIP
|-
|American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2016)
|Supports and builds upon UNDRIP
|}
Whilst Indigenous communities in Brazil have legal title to land, it is the State that owns it. Indigenous people simply exercise permanent tenure over lands that they traditionally occupy and have ‘original rights’ to these traditional lands, which no other rights can prevail over.<ref name=":3" /> Indigenous lands, though not classified as protected areas, “have the highest level of protection by law because they are regulated by the Constitution” and cannot be leased or restricted without violating their original rights. The Suruí's right to develop the PCFS is grounded in the Brazilian Constitution, which grants Indigenous peoples exclusive rights to use the ‘riches of the soil, rivers and lakes’ of their land, and these rights cannot be overridden. Thus, Indigenous people and only Indigenous people are legally allowed to engage in productive activities on their land, provided these activities are conducted according to their own customs and traditions and are necessary for the wellbeing and cultural expression of their own people. In Brazil, it is the armed forces and federal police that are responsible for enforcing these laws, and FUNAI is responsible for representing Indigenous communities in judicial disputes.<ref name=":3" /> As such, provided a REDD+ project does not violate the rights to territorial integrity, permanent land tenure and original rights, it is legally allowed.
[[File:Two Pataxo indians (Brasília, 04 April 2006).jpeg|thumb|414x414px|Two Indigenous in Brazil]]
'''CARBON RIGHTS:''' In Brazil, carbon rights are tied to forest rights.<ref name=":2" /> Carbon credits from REDD+ projects are seen as part of the economic benefits derived from indigenous lands, and as such, Indigenous communities are entitled to own, control and distribute these revenues themselves. The carbon credits generated from the (SFCP) were wholly owned by the Suruí people through Metareilá, with the Suruí Fund (managed by the Brazilian Biodiversity Fund - FUNBIO) acting as recipient. This legality reinforces Indigenous control over both land and carbon rights, as whoever has rights to the forest land is usually recognized as the owner of carbon rights.<ref name=":3" /> Collectively these national and international laws provide an important safeguard to Indigenous peoples, making their consent a prerequisite for the establishment of REDD+ projects and recognizing their rights as the main beneficiaries of REDD+ revenues.<ref name=":3" /> However, as carbon rights are tied to forest rights in Brazil and not land rights, and carbon is considered to be an ‘environmental service’ (Article 41(I)(A) Brazilian Forestry Code), states as well as the federal government have the jurisdiction to exercise full legislative authority over carbon. <ref name=":2" /> As such, certain states have interpreted the law to imply that the title to carbon credits is attributable to the state.<ref>Loft, L., Ravikumar, A., Gebara, M. F., Pham, T. T., Resosudarmo, I. A. P., Assembe, S., Tovar, J. G., Mwangi, E., & Andersson, K. (2015). Taking Stock of Carbon Rights in REDD+ Candidate Countries: Concept Meets Reality. ''Forests'', ''6''(4), 1031-1060. [[/doi.org/10.3390/f6041031|https://doi.org/10.3390/f6041031]]</ref> Hence, even when carbon rights are clearly defined and tied to forest title it is insufficient in itself, and only by legally recognizing the customary rights of IPLCs can a fair and equitable outcome be realised.

'''FPIC OBLIGATION:''' Brazilian law requires Free, Prior, and Informed Consent (FPIC) for REDD+ projects affecting indigenous lands, ensuring that international standards such as the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) and ILO Convention No. 169 are adhered to; Indigenous consent is, ''de jure,'' a necessity. Projects that violate these rights and fail to consult communities are therefore considered illegal. Notably there are no specific rules or procedures that have been written into the Brazilian constitution that provide guidance on how to achieve FPIC. However, this freedom reinforces Indigenous autonomy as it allows an Indigenous community to define the rules of consultation according to their customs and traditions.

=== Interested and affected stakeholders ===
{| class="wikitable"
| colspan="5" |'''Affected stakeholders'''
|-
|Stakeholders
|Primary objective(s)
|Secondary objective(s)
|Relative power
|Scope of influence
|-
|Metareilá Association of the Suruí Indigenous People
|Project proponent

Works to defend and preserve the cultural and territorial heritage of the Suruí people
|Ensure project longevity
|Powerful, though lacking technical knowhow. Have carbon rights and thus own revenue from the project. Can decide how this revenue is distributed.
|Regional - National
|-
|Other Indigenous groups and associations
|Support various aspects of proejct development
|Aim to benefit from the project
|Have the same rights as the Metareila with respect to land though are less involved with project development and have less say, nor derive economic benefits like the Metareila
|Local
|-
|''Campesinos'' (peasants)
|Survive via subsistence.
|Procure more land.
|Have far fewer rights than Indigenous groups and no involvement with the project
|Local
|-
| colspan="5" |'''Interested stakeholders'''
|-
|Kanindé Association for Ethno-Environmental Defense – non-profit
|Involved with various aspects of project development
|
|Has a say in project direction, though less weight than the Metareila
|National - International
|-
|IDESAM - Institute for Conservation and Sustainable Development of Amazonas
|''C''alculation of baseline scenario
Preparation of PD
Validation and verification to VCS and CCB.
Coordination of biomass and carbon inventories. Support policy and technical coordination
|
|Powerful: Involved with technical aspects of development.
|International
|-
|Forest Trends
|Supported formulation and implementation of the project.
|
|Powerful: Tasked with raising funds and fostering an international network; an integral part of project development
|International
|-
|Amazon Conservation Team - ACT Brazil
|Supports various aspect of project development as well as offering legal advice. Also assists with carbon stock monitoring
|
|Powerful: An integral part of project development
|International
|-
|Brazilian Biodiversity Fund (FUNBIO)

|Responsible for the Suruí Fund
|
|Powerful. Controls how revenue is distributed amongst the Metareila.
|National
|-
|Ministry of Environment (MMA)
|Responsible for protection and conservation of natural environment
|
|Mid-power: Must be notified about project activities although cannot strictly alter decisions made by the Surui
|National
|-
|National Indian Foundation (FUNAI)
|Represents Indignous organizations with judicial matters

|
|Must be notified about project activities though is not involved with project governance
|National
|-
|Government of the State of Mato Grosso
|Encourage development, and reduce poverty and crime in Mato Grosso
|
|Legilative control over regional police and municipalities
|National
|}

=== Discussion ===
Although originally successful in achieving its goal of reducing deforestation and degradation, in 2016 diamonds were discovered in Surui territory, leading to an increase in illegal logging and mining.<ref name=":1" /> By 2018 the project site had been completely overrun by ''garimpeiros'' (small-scale gold miners), ultimately leading to the projects suspension that year. <ref name=":4" />

While the project had initially garnered support, divisions emerged within the community post-project implementation. Disputes arose over the unequal distribution of project revenues, leading to internal conflicts between different Suruí clans. These criticisms escalated in 2014 when the Catholic Indigenous Missionary Council supported calls for an end to the project due to mismanagement of revenues from carbon credit sales. <ref name=":3" /> Some Suruí members also argued that the REDD+ initiative harmed their way of life.<ref>Lang, C. (2014). ''“What are projects for that destroy life?” Interview with Henrique Suruí about the Paiter-Suruí REDD project, Brazil.'' REDD-Monitor. [[/redd-monitor.org/2014/12/17/what-are-projects-for-that-destroy-life-interview-with-henrique-surui-about-the-paiter-surui-redd-project-brazil/|https://redd-monitor.org/2014/12/17/what-are-projects-for-that-destroy-life-interview-with-henrique-surui-about-the-paiter-surui-redd-project-brazil/]]</ref>

Further complicating the situation was the controversial role of Henrique Suruí, one of the Suruí tribal leaders. In 2011, it was revealed that Henrique had violated the tribe's logging moratorium, collaborating with loggers in illegal activities. While Henrique later denied responsibility for the project’s failure, his actions, combined with internal disagreements, illustrated the lack of consensus within the Suruí leadership on the project’s goals and outcomes. Both of the tribe’s leaders possessed dramatically different perspectives on how they believed they could ensure agency, autonomy, and economic benefits for the Suruí people.<ref name=":4" /> This fragmentation within the community, in combination with the discovery of diamonds and the state's failure to protect indigenous land rights led to the indefinite suspension of the REDD+ project.

The project's collapse highlights broader structural issues, particularly the state's inconsistent support for indigenous land rights, influenced by settler colonialism, which undermined the project’s long-term viability.<ref name=":4" /> Additionally, the project’s creation was shaped by external actors, including the collaboration between Almir Suruí and Borges from Forest Trends, a Washington-based NGO. This partnership introduced a Western perspective on viewing the Suruí peoples forest, in contrast with their own perspectives on land use and governance. Furthermore, despite Borges’ Brazilian background, the power dynamics between a global North organization and a developing, Indigenous community were apparent.

=== Summary ===
The Suruí Forest Carbon Project provides an interesting example of how, even when the rights of IPLC’s are relatively robust, challenges persist in ensuring REDD+ project longevity. As such, in its current state, REDD+ in the Brazilian Amazon may not be a suitable market-based option for Indigenous communities in the Amazon.<ref name=":3" /> Although initially successful in promoting Indigenous autonomy and reducing deforestation, the project resulted in failure due to of a myriad of factors. Division between Surui communities was exacerbated by a perceived unequal benefit-sharing, and the impact of imposing REDD+ seems to have complicated the traditional social structure that the Surui were dependent on. These issues were influenced by Brazil's settler state dynamics, where Indigenous land rights, although legally recognized, are often not upheld in practice due to insufficient enforcement.<ref name=":4" /> Ultimately, the Surui project reveals how settler colonialism's structural flaws make long-term project success difficult, despite initial progress in promoting Indigenous autonomy.

At the national and state level, complex institutional and legal land governance structures convolute and impede REDD+ in Brazil. Multiple institutions share responsibilities and there is no comprehensive, authoritative database of land ownership, which hampers efforts to protect Indigenous territories.<ref name=":5">Costa, R. (2016)''. Insecure land rights in Brazil: Consequences for rural areas and challenges for improvement.'' Climate Policy Initiative. [[/www.climatepolicyinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/Insecure Land Rights in Brazil CPI.pdf|https://www.climatepolicyinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/Insecure_Land_Rights_in_Brazil_CPI.pdf]]</ref> As a result, land tenure disputes remain common and can be witnessed occurring between the public as well between public and state actors. For example, Brazil’s 1964 Land Statute (Law No. 4504) allows the government to takeover unproductive farms and transfer those lands to landless peasants. This often results in the clearing of forest, as only when the land is cleared is it evidenced to be ‘productive’.<ref name=":5" /> Hence, not only does this law cause insecurity for Indigenous populations in Brazil, it also forces them to go against customary traditions of stewarding the land in an effort to maintain its control.

Whilst the aforementioned points to the futility of REDD+ in Brazil, there is reason to maintain optimism. In a recent landmark ruling Brazil’s supreme court voted in favour of the Xoleng peoples, and the decision will serve as a precedent for all cases involving Indigenous peoples.<ref name=":6">Amos-Flom, K., (2023). ''Triumph and Turmoil: The Xokleng Case and the Future of Indigenous Land Rights in Brazil.'' Columbia Journal of Transnational Law. [[/www.jtl.columbia.edu/bulletin-blog/triumph-and-turmoil-the-xokleng-case-and-the-future-of-indigenous-land-rights-in-brazil|https://www.jtl.columbia.edu/bulletin-blog/triumph-and-turmoil-the-xokleng-case-and-the-future-of-indigenous-land-rights-in-brazil]]</ref> The Xokleng’s land dispute, settled in 2023, “rejected Santa Catarina state’s marco temporal (“time limit”) argument, which would have required Indigenous people to prove they occupied or legally contested the territory they claimed before the Brazilian Constitution came into force in 1988. If successful, this argument would have led to disastrous repercussions, as many Indigenous peoples had been forcibly removed or are traditionally nomadic.”<ref name=":6" /> Evidently, whilst slow, progress has been made in Brazil in recent years with respect to Indigenous rights as well as the voluntary carbon market itself.

There are currently 159 AFOLU projects listed on the Verra database in Brazil, with only two specifically focused on REDD+ initiatives in collaboration with Indigenous groups. These are the Ka’a Pyahu project, <ref>Verra (n.d.) ''Project 5087: KA'A PYAHU.'' https://registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/5087</ref> initiated by the Guajajara Indigenous people in collaboration with external organizations and validated in 2021, and the ‘Together for the forest Awaete REDD+ project’<ref>Verra (n.d.) ''Project 5200: TOGETHER FOR THE FOREST AWAETÉ REDD+ PROJECT.'' https://registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/5200</ref> which is still under development. Both projects involve Indigenous groups working with Brazilian organizations to build technical capacity and expertise. This could signal a growing trend of Indigenous-led REDD+ projects in the future. To ensure a positive future for REDD+ in Brazil, the customary rights of IPLC’s must be formally recognized. IPLC should have legal ownership of their traditional lands, and in doing so the carbon rights of these communities would be less convoluted, leading to more equitable benefit-sharing and increased cohesion amongst these groups post-project implementation.

==Colombia: ''REDD+ project Resguardo Indigena Unificado - Selva de Mataven (RUI-SM)''==

=== '''Project description and location''' ===
[[File:RS6524 MG 3944.jpg|thumb|407x407px|A view of the Mataven]]
According to the PD,<ref name=":7">ACATISEMA & Mediamos (2017). ''Joint project description and monitoring report: REDD+ project: Resguardo Indigena Unificado – Selva de Mataven (RIU – SM).'' Link: “10 06 2017_VCS Final Report_ Matavin Project.pdf” found at [[/registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/1566|https://registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/1566]]</ref> the Resguardo Indígena Unificado – Selva de Matavén (RIU-SM) project is located east of the Colombian Orinoco high plain, in the eastern part of the Department of Vichada, municipality of Cumaribo. It resides on the formalized resguardo of the Sikuani, Piaroa, Puinave, Curripaco, Cubeo and Piapoco ethnic groups, spanning 1,856,836 hectares, with 1,477,115 hectares (79.6%) being forested. The PD states that it will reduce greenhouse gas emissions, with a total estimated net reduction of 108,670,562 tons of CO2 equivalent over thirty years, from years 2013 – 2042. By this metric, it is the 14th largest project on the Verra registry, out of over 1700 projects.<ref name=":9">Dufrasne, D., (2021). ''Two Shades of Green: How hot air forest credits are being used to avoid carbon taxes in Colombia''. Carbon Market Watch. [[/carbonmarketwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Two-shades-of-green EN WEB.pdf|https://carbonmarketwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Two-shades-of-green_EN_WEB.pdf]]</ref> There are 12,312 Indigenous people living in the RIU-SM, belonging to 2,517 families and 250 communities as of 2017.

The project was initiated by the Asociación de Cabildos y Autoridades Indígenas de la Selva de Matavén (ACETISMA), an Indigenous association, and developed by MEDIAMOS F&M, a Colombian consultancy firm. ACETISMA is comprised of Indigenous leaders that represent the 17 communities of the reservation in charge of governing the territory, and it has administrative autonomy, as well as “the capacity to acquire, to own and to dispose of property, to accept donations, to hold national and international conventions, scientific and cultural exchanges and generally, to celebrate all kinds of negotiations and agreements with which the Association can achieve its objectives.”<ref name=":7" />

There is a stated focus on various means of improving the living conditions of the Indigenous peoples living within the project area. To summarise, the main objectives of the REDD+ project RIU-SM include:

· Community development, in the form of improved education.

· Community engagement with respect to the project; developing information channels to reveal project progress.

· Support local initiatives for environmental education and waste management.

· Developing an effective response system that addresses community proposals and concerns relating to the project.

· Strengthening the governance of ACATISEMA.
=== National climate targets, policies and legislation ===
The Colombian Amazon makes up over one-third of Colombia’s national territory, and up until 2005 only 7.3% of the Colombian Amazon had been deforested, largely due to the country's 60-year armed conflict between the government, multiple left-wing guerillas such as FARC, and several far-right paramilitary groups.<ref name=":8" /> However, following the signing of the Peace Treaty in 2016 and demobilization of the FARC, limits to deforestation were weakened in the Colombian Amazon. Poor but opportunistic peasants began to encroach into previously unchartered territory and capitalize from the rainforest. Due to the poor economic integration of the Amazon, many were forced to engage with the traditional economies of cocoa and cattle ranching, as these markets were already well connected to regional and global markets.<ref name=":8" /> To address the drivers of deforestation and its associated emissions, the federal government has implemented various initiatives, which are summarized below:

{| class="wikitable"
|'''Document name'''
|'''Type'''
|'''Publication year'''
|'''Key takeaways'''
|-
|Nationally Determined Contribution(s)
|Target
|2020
|Reduce GHG emissions by 51% by 2030 and net-zero by 2050
|-
|National Climate Change Policy (PNCC)
|Policy
|2018
|Address climate change and foster sustainable development
|-
|National Forest Conservation Program
|Policy
|2011
|Address deforestation
|-
|Law 1931 of 2018 – Climate Change Law

|Legislation
|2018
|Establishes the framework for addressing climate change
|-
| colspan="4" |'''Relating to REDD+:'''
|-
|National Strategy for Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (ENREDD+)
|Initiative
|2009
|Particular focus on the Amazon and Choco rainforests
|-
|Amazon Indigenous REDD+ Initiative
|Initiative
|2016
|Respect Indigenous rights. FPIC focus.
|-
|BIOREDD+ program
|Initiative
|2012
|Portfolio of 8 REDD+ projects in four geographic nodes covering over 700,000 hectares in the Colombian Pacific.

|-
|Vision Amazonia
|Initiative
|2015
|Part of the REDD+ strategy, financed by three foreign countries: Germany, Norway and United Kingdom
|}
As a result of the many fund and market-based initiatives that Colombia has engaged with, it hosts the second most REDD+ projects in the world. REDD+ projects now cover at least 56% of the area of legally recognized Indigenous territories in the Colombian Amazon, with an overwhelming majority of carbon projects located on Indigenous territories.<ref name=":10">Schmid, D., & Castro. C., (2023). ''REDD+ projects in the Colombian Amazon: Social challenges and lack of transparency''. Rainforest Foundation Norway. [[/dv719tqmsuwvb.cloudfront.net/documents/REDD rapport 2024 ENG.pdf|https://dv719tqmsuwvb.cloudfront.net/documents/REDD_rapport_2024_ENG.pdf]]</ref> Evidently REDD+ plays an integral part in the country’s efforts of environmental conservation, and incentives have been introduced to promote the development of such projects. For example, in 2016 the government adopted a higher tax that covered fossil fuels, but companies are able to avoid paying the tax by investing in carbon offsets that have been generated domestically.<ref name=":9" /> This led to a boost in the domestic REDD+ market in 2017, as Colombian companies invested as to escape higher taxes. Notably, 23 of the 36 REDD+ projects currently under development in the Amazon region were initiated in or after 2018.<ref name=":10" /> Currently Colombia’s REDD+ program sits at over 45 pilot and voluntary carbon projects, as well as one large-scale jurisdictional approach in the Amazon.<ref name=":11">Zambrano-Cortés, D. G. (2024). ''The politics, spaces and subjects of forest conservation in Colombia''. [internal PhD, WU, Wageningen University]. Wageningen University. [[/doi.org/10.18174/675328|https://doi.org/10.18174/675328]]</ref>

=== Indigenous rights - Constitutional, tenure and bundle rights ===
''De jure'', the Indigenous peoples of Colombia have comprehensive tenure and bundle rights that have been articulated in the national constitution. Collective land titles are granted to Indigenous communities by the Colombian government and as a result about 34 percent of Colombian land (almost 38 million hectares) is legally recognized as Indigenous territory or collective lands of Afro-descendent communities.<ref name=":10" /> These collective land tenure rights have been in effect since the implementation of the 1991 constitution, granting them the authority to exercise legal control over their territories in accordance with their own customs and procedures.<ref>Max Planck Institute (n.d.) ''Colombia 1991 (rev. 2015).'' Institute. [[/www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Colombia 2015|https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Colombia_2015]]</ref> Furthermore, the carbon rights of Indigenous peoples are explicitly defined in the constitution and tied specifically to the ownership of land of the communities.<ref name=":2" /> This in theory provides a solid legal basis for upholding the rights of Indigenous communities in Colombia, specifically relating to REDD+ activities, as it allows communities to define and negotiate the terms of said projects. A summary of the various laws relating to Indigenous rights have been summarized below:
{| class="wikitable"
| colspan="2" |'''Law (1991 constitution)'''
|-
|Article 63

|Indigenous territories are considered collective property. Land is not owned by individuals but is shared by the community. The state must respect these collective rights and cannot alter land ownership without the consent of the Indigenous peoples.
|-
|Article 76 - ''Consulta previa''.
|Pertains to the right of Indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities; prior consultation must be undertaken before any entity undertakes activities that may affect their territories, culture, or way of life.
|-
|Article 330
|Indigenous communities have the right to govern their territories.
|-
|Article 329
|The Reservation is a collective, inalienable, and indefeasible property.
|-
|Decree 1386 of 1994, Article 10; Decree 2164 of 1995, Article 22) 39.
|"The administration and management of these lands are subjected to uses and customs of the beneficiaries."
|}
Whilst land and tenure rights are enshrined into the constitution, the precariousness of these rights persists due to a lack of resources to ensure enforcement, as well as the deeper issue of corruption. As previously stated, the rate of deforestation increased significantly in Colombia’s post-conflict era, evidencing the nations inability to maintain control over unlawful acts of land-grabbing and disposition. Whilst this began with new peasants converting the Amazon for subsistence purposes, it ultimately led to new areas for the growth of cocoa, much to the benefit of narco-traffickers who could monopolize on this illegal surplus in ‘accumulation by dispossession’.<ref name=":8" />

With respect to the legalities of consultation, Colombia has enshrined ''consulta previa'' into the constitution. Translating to ‘prior consultation’, this legal text provides the formal grounds for Indigenous engagement when any legislative or administrative measures are implemented on Indigenous territory. Importantly, consultation should be achieved in accordance with the customs of the ethnic group with which the project is being imposed upon. However, there have been recent cases of contestation specifically relating to how ''consulta previa'' applies to REDD+ on Indigenous lands, and the RIU – SM project was one that was involved with such a case.

=== Affected and interested stakeholders ===
{| class="wikitable"
| colspan="5" |'''Affected stakeholders'''
|-
|Stakeholders
|Primary objective(s)
|Secondary objective(s)
|Relative power
|Scope of influence
|-
|ACATISEMA - Asociación de Cabildos y Autoridades Indígenas de la Selva de Matavén
|Foster the integral development, social and cultural preservation of the indigenous communities in the Mataven Jungle and to

Consolidate the territory, and conservation and preservation of the environment and biodiversity of the Mataven Jungle

|
|Has the highest authority in the reservation.
Rights to the land and revenue generated from project
|
|-
|Indigenous ''resguardos'' of the RIU-SM
|Primary and direct beneficiaries of project

Seek to maintain land rights

Promote traditional and cultural beliefs
|Uphold rights
|High power, though little input into project activities in reality.
|
|-
|Landless peasants
|Gain more access to land. Improve rights
|
|Low to none
|Local
|-
| colspan="5" |'''Interested stakeholders'''
|-
|MEDIAMOS F&M
|Project developer
|
|Powerful: involved with various technical aspects of project development
|International
|-
|Ministerio de Ambiente y Desarrollo Sostenible
|Environmental planning; sustainable development
Form strategic alliances with social and institutional participants in different sectoral and territorial scenarios.
|
|
|National
|-
|Dirección de Asuntos Indígenas, ROM y Minorías - Ministerio del Interior
|Prepares policy in favour of Indigenous groups
Supports ethnic and cultural rights of Indigenous
|
|Not ''per se'' involved with project, though the policy it has introduced has affected project outcomes
|National
|-
|Corporinoquía
|Environmental authority to ensure the proper use of natural resources in their area of jurisdiction.
|Supporting of project
|As the project is in line with the mandate of Corporinoquía, they are supportive
|Regional
|-
|Other government institutions: Governor ofice of Vichada, Mayor ofice Cumaribo
|The Reservation for being part of the Cumaribo, Vichada, has territorial jurisdiction relations with the Governor’s office and the Mayor’s office.
|
|
|Regional - national
|-
|Fundación NATURA
|Civil organization
Conservation, use and management of biodiversity
Generate social, economic and environmental benefits
|
|
|International
|-
|Mining companies
|Compete with the Project for the territory's resources.
|
|Relatively powerful due to corruption, though legally obstructed to achieve objective
|International
|-
|Other indigenous communities neighboring RIU-SM
|Ensure autonomy with respect to their own jurisdiction
|Not involved with the project though potentially affected by it
|Low, with respect to the project
|Local
|-
|FONDO ACCIÓN
|Encourage the participation of civil society and the private sector in the implementation of the country’s public policies
|Conservation and sustainable development; and protection/development of children.
|
|National
|-
|Asocarbono – An industry association, including Verra, ProClima, Biofix, and ACATISEMA.

|Promote the agenda of high-level actors of the VCM
|
|Powerful
|International
|-
|OPIAC: National Oganization of the Indigenous Peoples of the Colombian Amazon

|Promotes Indigenous rights in Colombia
Exercises a political representation of the indigenous peoples of the Colombian Amazon
|
|
|National
|}

=== Discussion ===
According to the official REDD+ Mataven website<ref>RIU – SM (n.d.). ''REDD+ Mataven''. [[/reddmataven.com/|https://reddmataven.com/]]</ref> the project has resulted in a myriad of benefits to the Indigenous communities of the region. For example, as a result of the funds generated from the projects activities, there have been improvements in infrastructure, transportation and education, ultimately leading to the empowerment and improved governance of ACETISMA. However, the project has come under fire for multiple reasons.

For one, in 2015 some of the Indigenous communities filed a lawsuit referring to the violation of their right to ''consulta previa''. However, the court ruled that their Indigenous rights had not been violated as it was ACETISMA that initially sought MEDIAMOS to develop the project, and that ACETISMA were the best representatives of those Indigenous communities. Furthermore, the projects main focus was the conservation of the rainforest and therefore did not threaten the cultural integrity of those communities.<ref name=":10" /> However, regardless of the outcome of this case, its occurrence points to internal disagreement amongst Indigenous participants of the RIU-SM project. In a study involving interviews with Indigenous members of the project, there was a significant proportion of interviewees that had little knowledge regarding various aspects of the project, such as responsibilities of participation, or the benefit-sharing mechanism in place.<ref name=":2" /> This further reinforces the point that, in the case of the RIU-SM project it may not be ‘bottom-up’ and eludes to the power imbalance experienced between MEDIAMOS, the project developer, and Indigenous community members. In the PD there is a breakdown of the distribution of income between ACETISMA and MEDIAMOS, which shows a significant proportion of revenue flowing to the former organisation throughout the project’s operations.<ref name=":7" /> However, there is currently no publicly available documentation supporting this initial claim<ref name=":9" /> as there is no obligation to provide this information, leading to a general lack of transparency in the market and between all of the relevant actors. Subsequent meetings with Indigenous leaders have however shown a marked support of the Mataven project, with one Indigenous leader explicitly stating “...the Redd+ project has brought resources that they never had before, which allowed them to open new school classrooms, 21 rural aqueducts, cocoa crops and even headquarters in Cumaribo and Inírida.”<ref>Lievano, A. B. (2021) Colombia's biggest carbon credit project could be selling hot air. Latin American Center for Investigative Journalism. [[/www.elclip.org/el-mayor-proyecto-de-bonos-de-carbono-de-colombia-podria-estar-vendiendo-aire-caliente/|https://www.elclip.org/el-mayor-proyecto-de-bonos-de-carbono-de-colombia-podria-estar-vendiendo-aire-caliente/]] </ref> Clearly there have been benefits for IPLC’s involved with this project, though the details of this benefit-sharing remain a mystery.

Secondly, the Mataven project has caused controversy due to its apparently inflated carbon credit issuance. One report states that this has been achieved by using a reference area that is not representative of the project area, as well as assuming an uncharacteristically heigh assumed rate of deforestation.<ref name=":12">Global Atlas of Environmental Justice (2023). ''Resguardo Indigena Unificado-Selva de Matavén (RIU SM) REDD+ Project, Colombia.'' [[/ejatlas.org/conflict/redd-project-resguardo-indigena-unificado-selva-de-mataven-riu-sm|https://ejatlas.org/conflict/redd-project-resguardo-indigena-unificado-selva-de-mataven-riu-sm]]</ref> The project used a baseline deforestation rate of 0.86% per year, which is significantly more than the Colombian government's national rate of 0.18%. Additionally, according to the report the reference area chosen is more easily accessed and therefore more prone to deforestation, making it an inaccurate comparison to the relatively remote project area.<ref name=":2" /> This has led to the creation of excess carbon credits, or “hot air” credits, which have been criticized for not reflecting real environmental benefits.<ref name=":9" /> To add further insult to injury these credits have been used by a Colombian fossil fuel distributor company to avoid paying taxes, as described earlier by Colombia’s change in policy in 2017. In doing so, the company avoided paying approximately $18.9 million in taxes.<ref name=":2" /> There has been subsequent back and forth between Verra and Carbon Market Watch, with Verra refuting the claims<ref>Verra (2021). ''Carbon Market Watch Report on Colombian REDD+ Projects Contains Flawed Allegations.'' [[/verra.org/carbon-market-watch-report-on-colombian-redd-projects-contains-flawed-allegations/|https://verra.org/carbon-market-watch-report-on-colombian-redd-projects-contains-flawed-allegations/]] </ref> Regardless of the science, Colombia recently introduced a resolution in 2018 (Resolution 1447 – 2018) that requires projects to use baselines that comply with national reference levels.<ref name=":13">Dufrasne, D. (2021b). Companies use ”hot air” forestry offsets to avoid taxes in Colombia: Carbon Market Watch’s fact-check of Verra’s response. Carbon Market Watch. [[/carbonmarketwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/CMWs-fact-check-of-Verras-response-on-Colombia.pdf|https://carbonmarketwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/CMWs-fact-check-of-Verras-response-on-Colombia.pdf]]</ref><ref>IEA (2022). ''Resolution 1447 – 2018. Monitoring, Reporting, and Verification System for mitigation actions at the national level.'' International Energy Agency. [[/www.iea.org/policies/14772-resolution-1447-2018-monitoring-reporting-and-verification-system-for-mitigation-actions-at-the-national-level|https://www.iea.org/policies/14772-resolution-1447-2018-monitoring-reporting-and-verification-system-for-mitigation-actions-at-the-national-level]]</ref> Going forward, REDD+ projects that are being implemented in Colombia will have to abide by Colombia’s national legislation.

=== Summary ===
Colombia has a long history of engaging in REDD+ as it has been used to limit environmental degradation in the post-conflict era, in alignment with the country’s national peacebuilding agenda.<ref name=":11" /> Owing to the country’s comprehensive tenure and bundle rights, IPLC’s have robust ''de jure'' rights to land as they collectively own it, and rights to carbon are tied to this ownership. This puts Colombia as one of the world leaders in legal terms relating to REDD+ project implementation, but due to a lack of resources to ensure enforcement, as well as corruption, historically these laws have not been adhered to.<ref name=":10" /><ref name=":2" /> There are many documented cases showing the displacement on IPLC’s from traditional lands, poor efforts to adhere to ''consulta previa'', and inequitable benefit sharing.<ref>Greenfield, P. (2023''). The ‘carbon pirates’ preying on Amazon’s Indigenous communities.'' The Guardian. [[/www.theguardian.com/environment/2023/jan/21/amazon-indigenous-communities-carbon-offsetting-pirates-aoe|https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2023/jan/21/amazon-indigenous-communities-carbon-offsetting-pirates-aoe]]</ref><ref name=":14">Lang, C., (2024). ''Colombia’s Constitutional Court rules in favour of Indigenous Peoples. Identifies serious flaws in the REDD+ Baka Rokarire project.'' REDD_Monitor. [[/reddmonitor.substack.com/p/colombias-constitutional-court-rules|https://reddmonitor.substack.com/p/colombias-constitutional-court-rules]]</ref>

The case of the Mataven project provides an interesting example of how it is the market itself that is failing to address concerns regarding transparency, whether that be relating to benefit-sharing amongst relevant stakeholders, or Indigenous representation and engagement throughout the implementation of REDD+ projects. Some ACATISEMA members have explicitly stated their support for the Mataven project,<ref name=":12" /> and its benefits can be seen first-hand in the form of improved infrastructure in local communities involved with the project.<ref>Myers, J. E., Parra, M. A., Bedford, C. (2021). ''How Carbon Offsetting Can Build a Forest.'' Stanford Social Innovation Review. [[/ssir.org/articles/entry/how carbon offsetting can build a forest|https://ssir.org/articles/entry/how_carbon_offsetting_can_build_a_forest]]</ref> However, an exact breakdown of how and where revenue is being distributed to IPLC’s remains elusive.<ref name=":13" /> Furthermore, the level of IPLC engagement has come into question, specifically with reference to ''consulta previa'' and the overall understanding that IPLC’s have regarding the project’s intended outcomes and activities.<ref name=":10" /> This is not a rare case in Colombia and has been witnessed occurring with other projects that have been implemented on Indigenous territories in the Colombian Amazon.<ref name=":17">Lang, C., (2023''). “It destroys everything,” says Indigenous leader about the REDD+ Baka Rokarire project in Colombia''. REDD Monitor. [[/reddmonitor.substack.com/p/it-destroys-everything-says-indigenous|https://reddmonitor.substack.com/p/it-destroys-everything-says-indigenous]]</ref> However, a recent ruling by the Colombian Constitutional court voted in favour of Indigenous groups in Colombia, upholding “the rights to self-determination, autonomy, self-government, territory, identity, physical and cultural integrity, and free, prior and informed consent of the indigenous communities”.<ref name=":14" /> This review ultimately sets a legal precedent safeguarding the fundamental rights of IPLCs with REDD+ project implementation and shows that progress is being made to improve the likelihood that REDD+ will result in genuine benefits to those affected by project implementation.

To ensure a more authentic engagement with IPLC’s as to result in legitimate and equitable benefit-sharing, improvements must be made by the Colombian government, as well as within the VCM itself. For the former, Colombia’s national registry for GHG mitigation activities must be updated; it has been offline since 2022.<ref name=":10" /> As a result, transparency is lacking. International finance could be utilized as to alleviate this issue, and only with an accurate and reliable database may the market be regulated. In the broader sense, VCM registries must create stricter guidelines promoting transparency. Often PD’s refer to annexed documents that contain relevant information regarding benefit-sharing, though these are often not publicly available.<ref name=":9" /> This limits transparency and increases the likelihood of inequitable agreements being made between project proponents and developers, further exacerbating existing power asymmetries between the two groups and limiting the likelihood that ''consulta previa'' is honestly adhered to.<ref name=":10" /> This has led to conflict within Indigenous communities, rather than a strengthening of their social fabric.

Furthermore, the Mataven project calls into question the actual emissions reduction that REDD+ projects achieve. Whilst Colombia has since updated its regulations such that REDD+ must use baselines that comply with national reference levels, it is up in the air as to how representative these guidelines are. Reference areas must represent project areas and without the appropriate regulations in place project developers lack the incentive to create realistic baselines; ultimately they are aiming to produce the maximum number of credits as to generate the greatest possible revenues.

==Conclusion==
As a market-based mechanism, REDD+ is shackled by the construct in which it operates; fundamentally it is a capitalist means of fixing a capitalist problem, which comes with limitations. Both Brazil and Colombia have relatively robust laws that have been written into the constitution, ultimately promoting more equitable results of REDD+ project implementation. However, as in Colombia IPLC’s collectively own the land, whereas in Brazil these groups only own rights to use the land,<ref name=":2" /> Colombia can be considered better equipped for the establishment of REDD+ projects on traditional Indigenous territory. However, even with these laws in place enforcement remain a matter of concern. Furthermore, given the wide variety of ontological and epistemological perspectives of Indigenous communities, and how these views conflict with the Western worldview from which market-based REDD+ came to fruition, there is an inherent difficulty in implementing a system of governance in REDD+ on Indigenous lands.<ref name=":1" />. Putting a price on nature conflicts with Indigenous perspectives and there have been instances where this has attacked the social and cultural fabric of IPLC’s.<ref name=":17" /> To avoid this REDD+ developers must have the genuine intent of understanding the perspective of the Indigenous group they are working with and aim to implement REDD+ with a bottom-up approach.

In both countries, transparency must be improved to ensure that FPIC is adhered to and subsequently ensure fair IPLC representation and engagement. This issue predominantly arises due to the poor requirements of standards in the VCM. As such, proponents are guided by developers which have little incentive to truly act in the interests of Indigenous groups; ultimately the organizations in charge of project development are interested in increasing project revenues. This has led to instances of over-crediting, as without a transparent framework in which to operate it is difficult to evaluate the legitimacy of the claims being made by project proponents and developers. However, with recent advances that address concerns of additionality<ref name=":15" /> there is hope for improved market integrity. Standards of the VCM must continue to be scrutinized to ensure that progress continues to be made.

Going forward, progress should be made to formalize the customary laws and traditional lands of IPLCs, and finance should be directed towards the enforcement of these laws. The environmental,<ref name=":16" /> economic,<ref name=":5" /><ref>Ding, H., Veit, P. G., Blackman, A., Gray, E., Reytar, K., Altamirano, J. C., Hodgdon, B., (2016). ''Climate benefits, tenure costs: The economic case for securing Indigenous land rights in the Amazon''. WRI. [[/files.wri.org/d8/s3fs-public/Climate Benefits Tenure Costs Executive Summary.pdf|https://files.wri.org/d8/s3fs-public/Climate_Benefits_Tenure_Costs_Executive_Summary.pdf]]</ref> and social<ref>Sarmiento Barletti, J. P., Heise Vigil, N., & Larson, A. M. (2023). ''Safeguards at a glance: Are voluntary standards supporting community land, resource and carbon rights?'' CIFOR-ICRAF. [[/www.cifor-icraf.org/publications/pdf files/Flyer/REDD-Safeguards-7.pdf|https://www.cifor-icraf.org/publications/pdf_files/Flyer/REDD-Safeguards-7.pdf]] </ref> benefits of this have been researched and are well understood. By developing culturally appropriate frameworks for rights-based conservation regimes, that work with IPLCs in accordance with their worldviews, REDD+ could be used to promote Indigenous autonomy. However, progress still must be made to achieve this goal.

==References==

Documentation:Open Case Studies/FRST522/2024/REDD+ in Indigenous Amazonia: What works and what doesn’t?

2024-12-12T23:51:12Z

ConnorHaynes: /* National climate targets, policies and legislation */

__TOC__

==Positionality==
First and foremost I am not Indigenous, and whilst there are a myriad of cultures, ontologies and epistemologies that are not sufficiently represented by simply stating ‘Indigenous’, it is commonly accepted that these worldviews are vastly different to those of the ‘Western’ world, which is the world in which I grew up and matured. I am therefore only understanding of Indigenous cultures, beliefs and customary laws based upon available online literature and those which I have learnt through life, in addition to those introduced to me in my Master’s degree. As such, I will never be able to fully relate to an Indigenous person; the best I can do is try to understand and learn. Only throughout this process am I able to work towards reconciliation and attempt to address the inequities experienced by Indigenous folk globally.

Additionally, I am yet to act as a carbon project proponent and so do not understand the nuances or stresses of undertaking such a task. Whilst an individual proponent may have the best intention of procuring a carbon project for its social and environmental benefits, there are a number of stakeholders involved throughout the entire process which influence its eventual outcome. Without experience acting as a project proponent I am naïve in understanding the process and it's difficulties.

==Acronyms / Terminology==
'''Acronyms:'''

AFOLU: Agriculture, Forestry and Other Land-Use

ICVCM: Integrity Council for the Voluntary Carbon Market

IPLC: Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities

KMGBF: Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework

LAC: Latin American Countries

MRV: Monitoring, Reporting and Verification

REDD+: Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation

UNCBD: United Nations Convention on Biological Biodiversity

VCMI: Voluntary Carbon Markets Integrity Initiative

'''Terminology:'''

''Additionality:'' Additionality is the determination of whether the project will lead to the expected outcomes when compared to the baseline or ‘business as usual’ emissions.

''Leakage'': Refers to the shifting of emissions to outside the project boundary as a result of the project’s activities.

''Permanence:'' Permanence refers to the degree to which a carbon credit is equivalent to a permanent removal or reduction in emissions.
==Abstract==
This case study illustrates two examples of Indigenous-led REDD+ projects on Indigenous territory in Colombia and Brazil. Both countries have a relatively long history of engaging with REDD+ but have slightly different legal structures pertaining to the rights of Indigenous peoples on their traditional territories, and specifically their ‘carbon’ rights. As such, the intention is to evaluate how these differing ''de jure'' rights translate on the ground. With respect to REDD+, do certain rights result in legitimately positive benefits to IPLCs, as well as the environment that these projects were originally intended to protect? To reduce inconsistency, projects were chosen that utilized the same standard, namely Verra’s ‘Verified Carbon Standard’. The intention is such that the reader can evaluate the effectiveness and true benefit of REDD+ projects to IPLC’s, based upon the legal frameworks of the host country. A secondary intention is such that the reader is better equipped to conduct a prefeasibility assessment based upon available online literature, to evaluate the likelihood that REDD+ can be implemented in any chosen country, with the genuine intent of benefiting IPLC’s that are directly affected as a result of REDD+ project implementation.

==REDD+ and the VCM in Brazil and Colombia==
REDD+, originally introduced by the UNFCCC, is a market-based mechanism sitting within the VCM that aims to reverse the loss of forests and carbon stocks, specifically in developing countries. Simply put, an entity or an individual can voluntarily pay another that has engaged with REDD+ and subsequently sequestered carbon, to offset their own emissions using ‘credits’, sold as units of greenhouse gas equivalent to one ton of carbon dioxide (CO2e). Forestry and Land-Use remains to be the largest category of carbon credits traded by transaction volume on the VCM, with REDD+ being the most popular project type in this category, accounting for 78% of credits traded.<ref name=":0">Procton, A., (2024). ''State of the voluntary carbon market 2024: On the path to maturity.'' Forest Trends Ecosystem Marketplace.</ref> Furthermore, over one-third of the credits sold within this category were sourced from projects that had been implemented in LAC and the Caribbean in 2024.<ref name=":0" /> Of the four largest standards issuing carbon credits, Verra accounts for roughly 80% of issuances in Latin America,<ref>Pullins, T. (2022). Growth of carbon markets in Latin America. White & Case. [[/www.whitecase.com/publications/insight/latin-america-focus-fall-2022-growth-carbon-markets|https://www.whitecase.com/publications/insight/latin-america-focus-fall-2022-growth-carbon-markets]] </ref> and even in the face of recent scrutiny,<ref>West, T. A. P., Bofim, B., Haya, B. K. (2024). Methodological issues with deforestation baselines compromise the integrity of carbon offsets from REDD+. ''Global Environmental Change, 87'' [[/doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2024.102863|https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2024.102863]]</ref><ref>Wyburd I., & Dufrasne, G. (2023). Error Log: Exposing the methodological failures of REDD+ forestry projects. Carbon Market Watch. [[/carbonmarketwatch.org/publications/error-log-exposing-the-methodological-failures-of-redd-forestry-projects/|https://carbonmarketwatch.org/publications/error-log-exposing-the-methodological-failures-of-redd-forestry-projects/]]</ref><ref name=":15">Haya, B. K., Alford-Jones, K., Anderegg, W. R. L., Beymer-Farris, B., Blanchard, L., Bomfim, B., Chin, D., Evans, S., Hogan, M., Holm, J. A., McAfee, K., So, I. S., West, T. A. P., & Withey, L. (2023). ''Quality assessment of REDD+ carbon credit projects''. Berkeley Carbon Trading Project. [[/gspp.berkeley.edu/research-and-impact/centers/cepp/projects/berkeley-carbontrading-project/REDD+|https://gspp.berkeley.edu/research-and-impact/centers/cepp/projects/berkeley-carbontrading-project/REDD+]]</ref> REDD+ projects account for a significant proportion of the VCM with their continued application likely to persist.<ref>Gordon, O. (2022). ''The interwoven fortunes of carbon markets and indigenous communities.'' Energy Monitor. [[/www.energymonitor.ai/tech/carbon-removal/the-interwoven-fortunes-of-carbon-markets-and-indigenous-communities/|https://www.energymonitor.ai/tech/carbon-removal/the-interwoven-fortunes-of-carbon-markets-and-indigenous-communities/]]</ref><ref>Müller, M., Coustar, C., Bietta, F., Mathres, M. (2022). ''UNFCCC REDD+ and the power of sovereign carbon.'' Deutsche Banke Chief Investment Office. [[/www.rainforestcoalition.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/CIO-Special-UNFCCC-REDD-power-of-sovereign-carbon.pdf|https://www.rainforestcoalition.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/CIO-Special-UNFCCC-REDD-power-of-sovereign-carbon.pdf]]</ref><ref>Pullins, T. (2022). ''Growth of carbon markets in Latin America.'' White & Case. [[/www.whitecase.com/publications/insight/latin-america-focus-fall-2022-growth-carbon-markets|https://www.whitecase.com/publications/insight/latin-america-focus-fall-2022-growth-carbon-markets]] </ref> With the introduction of updated methodologies aimed at addressing these concerns,<ref>Verra (2023a). ''Setting the Standard: Verra’s Revolutionary New REDD Methodology.'' [[/verra.org/program-notice/setting-the-standard-verras-revolutionary-new-redd-methodology/|https://verra.org/program-notice/setting-the-standard-verras-revolutionary-new-redd-methodology/]]</ref><ref>Verra (2023b). ''VM0048 Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation, v1.0.'' [[/verra.org/methodologies/vm0048-reducing-emissions-from-deforestation-and-forest-degradation-v1-0/|https://verra.org/methodologies/vm0048-reducing-emissions-from-deforestation-and-forest-degradation-v1-0/]]</ref> there is hope for renewed buyer confidence in the integrity of this market,<ref>MSCI (2023). ''Verra’s New Methodology for Unplanned Deforestation Aims to Silence the Critics''. [[/www.msci.com/www/blog-posts/verra-s-new-methodology-for/04577808942|https://www.msci.com/www/blog-posts/verra-s-new-methodology-for/04577808942]]</ref> though more work still needs to be done.

Both Colombia and Brazil have a relatively long history of implementing REDD+ projects, using both fund-based and market-based mechanisms. For example, both countries were participants in the ‘Amazon Indigenous REDD+ (RIA in Spanish) initiative, with the first pilot implementation project being initiated in Colombia’s Puiawai Natural Reserve.<ref>Garzón, E., (2017). ''Amazon Indigenous REDD+: An innovative approach to conserve Colombian forests?'' Mongabay. [[/news.mongabay.com/2017/01/amazon-indigenous-redd-an-innovative-approach-to-conserve-colombian-forests/|https://news.mongabay.com/2017/01/amazon-indigenous-redd-an-innovative-approach-to-conserve-colombian-forests/]]</ref> The relevance of these two countries with respect to REDD+ is simple. Much of the Amazon’s primary tropical rainforest falls within these countries jurisdiction and this rainforest has been consistently under threat from external pressures and encroachment, whether that be in the form of land-clearing for commercial ranching, subsistence purposes, illicit drug production or illegal mining practices,<ref name=":8">Sánchez García, P. A. & Wong, G. Y., (2024) “The political economy of deforestation in the Colombian Amazon”, ''Journal of Political Ecology'' ''31''(1), 178–199. [[/doi.org/10.2458/jpe.5230|https://doi.org/10.2458/jpe.5230]]</ref><ref>Radwin, M. (2023). ''Drug trafficking fuels other deforestation drivers in the Amazon: report.'' Mongabay. [[/news.mongabay.com/2023/07/drug-trafficking-fuels-other-deforestation-drivers-in-the-amazon-report/|https://news.mongabay.com/2023/07/drug-trafficking-fuels-other-deforestation-drivers-in-the-amazon-report/]]</ref><ref>Haddad, E.A., Araújo, I.F., Feltran-Barbieri, R., Perobelli, F. S., Rocha, A., Sass, K. S., Nobre, C. A. (2024). Economic drivers of deforestation in the Brazilian Legal Amazon. ''Nat Sustain'' ''7'', 1141–1148. [[/doi.org/10.1038/s41893-024-01387-7|https://doi.org/10.1038/s41893-024-01387-7]] </ref><ref>Hänggli, A., Levy, S. A., Armenteras, D., Bovolo, C. I., Brandão, J., Rueda, X., & Garrett, R. D. (2023). A systematic comparison of deforestation drivers and policy effectiveness across the amazon biome. ''Environmental Research Letters, 18''(7), 073001. [[/doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/acd408|https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/acd408]]</ref> to name a few.

In theory, REDD+ can be used to provide the economic incentive to promote sustained environmental protection of Indigenous lands, with a focus on the rights and livelihoods of IPLCs. Currently the overall funding to IPLCs tenure rights and forest management in tropical countries is low, receiving just $270 million per year between 2011-2020 from bilateral and multilateral donors and private philanthropies.<ref>Hatcher, J., Owen, M., Yin, D., (2021). ''Falling short: Donor funding for Indigenous peoples and local communities to secure tenure rights and manage forests in tropical countries (2011 -2020).'' Rainforest Foundation Norway. [[/dv719tqmsuwvb.cloudfront.net/documents/Publikasjoner/Andre-rapporter/RFN Falling short 2021.pdf|https://dv719tqmsuwvb.cloudfront.net/documents/Publikasjoner/Andre-rapporter/RFN_Falling_short_2021.pdf]]</ref> REDD+ has the potential to channel funding as to promote Indigenous rights and autonomy, provided there is transparent and equitable benefit-sharing for those involved. Fundamentally, only with the inclusion of IPLC’s, or preferably with IPLC’s acting as project proponents, is REDD+ able to promote Indigenous agency and improve IPLC rights and governance. And only when the rights of those inhabiting the land are formally recognized can the land be effectively conserved.<ref name=":16">Reytar, K., Veit, P., von Braun, J. (2024). ''Protecting Biodiversity Hinges on Securing Indigenous and Community Land Rights.'' WRI. [[/www.wri.org/insights/indigenous-and-local-community-land-rights-protect-biodiversity|https://www.wri.org/insights/indigenous-and-local-community-land-rights-protect-biodiversity]]</ref> The inclusion of IPLCs in REDD+ project development is therefore considered to be essential for project success, and this is in theory embodied in the very nature of REDD+.<ref name=":1">Alvarez, G., Elfving, M. and Andrade, C. (2016) ‘REDD+ governance and indigenous peoples in Latin America: the case of Suruí Carbon Project in the Brazilian Amazon Forest’, ''Latin American J. Management for Sustainable Development 3''(2) pp.133–146. [[/dx.doi.org/10.1504/LAJMSD.2016.083705|10.1504/LAJMSD.2016.083705]]</ref> Partially owing to a long history of dealing with REDD+, Colombia and Brazil are amongst just a few of the countries hosting tropical rainforests that explicitly recognise community rights to carbon and tie these rights to the legal ownership of lands and forests. In Colombia, carbon rights are tied to rights of the land, whereas in Brazil carbon rights are tied to forest rights.<ref name=":2">RRI and McGill University (2021). Technical report: ''Status of legal recognition of Indigenous Peoples’, Local Communities’ and Afro-descendant Peoples’ rights to carbon stored in tropical lands and forests''. Rights and Resources Initiative. [[/doi.org/10.53892/MLQQ5744|https://doi.org/10.53892/MLQQ5744]]</ref>

==Brazil: The Suruí Forest Carbon Project==
[[File:The Amazon Basin, Brazil.jpg|thumb|376x376px|Brazil's Amazon rainforest]]

=== Project description and location ===
The Surui Forest Carbon project was implemented in 2009 on the territory of the Surui people, which is situated in the southern part of Brazil’s Amazon between the states of Rondônia and Mato Grosso. Surui Indigenous territory covers an area of 2,481 km2, though the intention of the PCFS was to protect a portion of this total area. According to the PD, the stated objective was to “prevent 13,575.3 hectares of tropical forest from being cleared by 2038, to avoid the emission of 7,258,352.3 tCO2e to the atmosphere, and to contribute to the preservation of the Paiter Surui lifestyle and traditions.”<ref>IDESAM (2011). ''Project description: Surui forest carbon project''. Institute for Conservation and Sustainable Development of Amazonas. Link: "PROJ_DESC_1118_02FEB2012.PDF" found at [[/registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/1118|https://registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/1118]] </ref> This region sits within one of the Brazilian Amazon’s main ‘arcs of deforestation’ and pressure from loggers and ranchers is a matter of concern.

Notably, the PCFS was the first REDD+ project to be proposed by Indigenous peoples in the Brazilian Amazon on their own territory and was the first to receive certification by both the VCS and CCBS.<ref name=":1" />. Metareilá, the Surui’s own Indigenous association, acted as project proponent and the Institute for Conservation and Sustainable Development of Amazonas (IDESAM) assisted with project development, alongside multiple other stakeholder groups. As an endogenous initiative procured and conducted by the Surui community, the SFCP had a ‘non-centralized model of governance’, which reflected the characteristics and traditions of the Surui people. <ref name=":1" />

Only after two years of consultations between the 24 communities involved and the relevant governmental agencies (primarily FUNAI and the Ministry of Environment) was a Memorandum of Understanding signed, showing community consent to develop the project.<ref name=":3">Garcia, B., Rimmer, L., Canal Vieira, L., Mackey, B., (2021). REDD+ and forest protection on indigenous lands in the Amazon. ''RECIEL 30'', 207–219. [[/doi.org/10.1111/reel.12389|https://doi.org/10.1111/reel.12389]]</ref> In 2012 after verification from an independent third-party body, the Surui were able to sell carbon credits on the international market. Between 2009 and 2014 the project drastically helped limit the deforestation occurring within the project’s site, causing many to deem it a success.<ref name=":4">Howard, F. E., (2023). ''An Analysis of the Suruí Forest Carbon Project in Context of Settler Colonialism''. Masters thesis. Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University. [[/vtechworks.lib.vt.edu/server/api/core/bitstreams/b0cde6de-794c-453f-856b-ee72bde3db06/content|https://vtechworks.lib.vt.edu/server/api/core/bitstreams/b0cde6de-794c-453f-856b-ee72bde3db06/content]]</ref>

=== National climate targets, policies and legislation ===
Rates of deforestation in Brazil’s legal Amazon are significantly impacted by the government in charge. This is evidenced in the decade between 2012 and 2021 whilst under the conservative Bolsonaro administration, when deforestation in the Amazon increased 185% — from a loss of 4,571 km2 in 2012 to 13,038 km2 in 2021.<ref>INPE (2022). ''Observação da Terra. [[/www.obt.inpe.br/OBT/assuntos/programas/amazonia/prodes|http://www.obt.inpe.br/OBT/assuntos/programas/amazonia/prodes]]''</ref> However, since Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s appointment in 2022 there has been a steady decline in the rate of deforestation, which is now roughly half what it was in 2021.<ref>Terra Brasilis (2024). ''PRODES (deforestation): Deforestation rates – Legal Amazon – States''. [[/terrabrasilis.dpi.inpe.br/app/dashboard/deforestation/biomes/legal amazon/rates|https://terrabrasilis.dpi.inpe.br/app/dashboard/deforestation/biomes/legal_amazon/rates]]</ref> A significant proportion of emissions result from the clearing of rainforest and its subsequent conversion to ranching.<ref>MCTI (2022). ''Estimativas Anuais De Emissões De Gases De Efeito Estufa No Brasil.'' 6ª Edição. Ministério da Estado da Ciência, Tecnologia e Inovações. [[/www.gov.br/mcti/pt-br/acompanhe-o-mcti/sirene/publicacoes/estimativas-anuais-de-emissoes-gee/arquivos/6a-ed-estimativas-anuais.pdf|https://www.gov.br/mcti/pt-br/acompanhe-o-mcti/sirene/publicacoes/estimativas-anuais-de-emissoes-gee/arquivos/6a-ed-estimativas-anuais.pdf]]</ref> To address these emissions Brazil has implemented various adaptation policies, legislation and targets which are summarized below:
{| class="wikitable"
|'''Document name'''
|'''Type'''
|'''Publication year'''
|'''Key takeaways'''
|-
|National Policy on Climate Change (NPCC)
|Legislation
|2009
|Framework for addressing climate change
|-
|National Plan on Climate Change Adaptation
|Policy
|2016
|Framework for addressing impacts of climate change
|-
|Nationally Determined Contribution
|Target
|2024
|Reduce net greenhouse gas emissions by 59 to 67 percent below 2005 levels by 2035
|-
|Federal Constitution, Article 225
|Legislation
|2006
|The Amazon rainforest is considered as a ‘national heritage’.All levels of government have a shared responsibility to protect it and the environment
|-
| colspan="4" |'''Relating to REDD+'''
|-
|Plan of Action for the Prevention and Control of Deforestation in the Legal Amazon (PPCDAM)
|Policy
|2004
|Aims to reduce deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon
|-
|Forest code
|Legislation
|2012
|Aimed at reducing deforestation, but no specific mention of REDD+
|-
|Amazon Indigenous REDD+ Initiative
|Policy
|2012
|Incorporate Indigenous with REDD+ initiatives
|-
|National REDD+ Strategy (ENREDD+)
|Policy
|2016
|REDD+ as a fund-based mechanism
|}

=== Indigenous rights - Constitutional, tenure and bundle rights ===
In Brazil, Indigenous rights are robust and clearly defined according to the Brazilian Constitution. As a result, the Indigenous communities of the Brazilian Amazon have legal title to 13.8% of the national territory totalling 1.175 million km2, with a total of 631 territories.<ref>Federal government of Brazil (2024). ''Brazil’s NDC: National determination to contribute and transform''. [[/unfccc.int/sites/default/files/2024-11/Brazil Second Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) November2024.pdf|https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/2024-11/Brazil_Second%20Nationally%20Determined%20Contribution%20%28NDC%29_November2024.pdf]]</ref>
{| class="wikitable"
| colspan="2" |'''Laws'''
|-
|Article 231 of the 1988 Constitution
|Indigenous peoples to have their exclusive right to use their territories to derive economic benefits. Grants indigenous peoples the right to land, prohibits eviction, and restricts mining without authorization from the federal government.
|-
|Indigenous Peoples statute (1973).

|No acts restricting the full exercise of indigenous peoples’ permanent tenure over the land should be permitted.
|-
| colspan="2" | '''Treaties'''
|-
|United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2007)
|Requires States to obtain free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) for the approval of any projects affecting indigenous territories.
|-
|International Labour Organization Convention 169 (2019)
|Ratified and incorporated under domestic law in 2002 through Decree 10.088/2019, endorsing UNDRIP
|-
|American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2016)
|Supports and builds upon UNDRIP
|}
Whilst Indigenous communities in Brazil have legal title to land, it is the State that owns it. Indigenous people simply exercise permanent tenure over lands that they traditionally occupy and have ‘original rights’ to these traditional lands, which no other rights can prevail over.<ref name=":3" /> Indigenous lands, though not classified as protected areas, “have the highest level of protection by law because they are regulated by the Constitution” and cannot be leased or restricted without violating their original rights. The Suruí's right to develop the PCFS is grounded in the Brazilian Constitution, which grants Indigenous peoples exclusive rights to use the ‘riches of the soil, rivers and lakes’ of their land, and these rights cannot be overridden. Thus, Indigenous people and only Indigenous people are legally allowed to engage in productive activities on their land, provided these activities are conducted according to their own customs and traditions and are necessary for the wellbeing and cultural expression of their own people. In Brazil, it is the armed forces and federal police that are responsible for enforcing these laws, and FUNAI is responsible for representing Indigenous communities in judicial disputes.<ref name=":3" /> As such, provided a REDD+ does not violate the rights to territorial integrity, permanent land tenure and original rights, it is legally allowed.
[[File:Two Pataxo indians (Brasília, 04 April 2006).jpeg|thumb|414x414px|Two Indigenous in Brazil]]
'''CARBON RIGHTS:''' In Brazil, carbon rights are tied to forest rights.<ref name=":2" /> Carbon credits from REDD+ projects are seen as part of the economic benefits derived from indigenous lands, and as such, Indigenous communities are entitled to own, control and distribute these revenues themselves. The carbon credits generated from the (SFCP) were wholly owned by the Suruí people through Metareilá, with the Suruí Fund (managed by the Brazilian Biodiversity Fund - FUNBIO) acting as recipient. This legality reinforces Indigenous control over both land and carbon rights, as whoever has rights to the forest land is usually recognized as the owner of carbon rights.<ref name=":3" />

'''FPIC OBLIGATION:''' Furthermore, Brazilian law requires Free, Prior, and Informed Consent (FPIC) for REDD+ projects affecting indigenous lands, ensuring that international standards such as the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) and ILO Convention No. 169 are adhered to; Indigenous consent is, ''de jure,'' a necessity. Projects that violate these rights and fail to consult communities are therefore considered illegal. Notably there are no specific rules or procedures that have been written into the Brazilian constitution that provide guidance on how to achieve FPIC. This freedom reinforces Indigenous autonomy as it allows an Indigenous community to define the rules of consultation according to their customs and traditions.

Collectively these national and international laws provide an important safeguard to Indigenous peoples, making their consent a prerequisite for the establishment of REDD+ projects and recognizing their rights as the main beneficiaries of REDD+ revenues.<ref name=":3" /> However, as carbon rights are tied to forest rights in Brazil and not land rights, carbon is considered to be an ‘environmental service’ (Article 41(I)(A) Brazilian Forestry Code), and states, as well as the federal government, have the jurisdiction to exercise full legislative authority over carbon. <ref name=":2" /> As such, certain states have interpreted the law to imply that the title to carbon credits is attributable to the state.<ref>Loft, L., Ravikumar, A., Gebara, M. F., Pham, T. T., Resosudarmo, I. A. P., Assembe, S., Tovar, J. G., Mwangi, E., & Andersson, K. (2015). Taking Stock of Carbon Rights in REDD+ Candidate Countries: Concept Meets Reality. ''Forests'', ''6''(4), 1031-1060. [[/doi.org/10.3390/f6041031|https://doi.org/10.3390/f6041031]]</ref> Hence, even when carbon rights are clearly defined and tied to forest title it is insufficient in itself, and only by legally recognizing the customary rights of IPLCs can a fair and equitable outcome be realised.

=== Interested and affected stakeholders ===
{| class="wikitable"
| colspan="5" |'''Affected stakeholders'''
|-
|Stakeholders
|Primary objective(s)
|Secondary objective(s)
|Relative power
|Scope of influence
|-
|Metareilá Association of the Suruí Indigenous People
|Project proponent

Works to defend and preserve the cultural and territorial heritage of the Suruí people
|Ensure project longevity
|Powerful, though lackiing technical knowhow. Have carbon rights and thus own revenue from the project. Can decide how this revenue is distributed
|Regional - National
|-
|Other Indigenous groups and associations
|Support various aspects of proejct development
|Aim to benefit from the project
|Have the same rights as the Metareila with respect to land though are less involved with project development and have less say, nor derive as many benefits as the Metareila
|Local
|-
|''Campesinos'' (peasants)
|Procure more land.
|
|Have far fewer rights than Indigenous groups and no involvement with the project
|Local
|-
| colspan="5" |'''Interested stakeholders'''
|-
|Kanindé Association for Ethno-Environmental Defense – non-profit
|Involved with various aspects of project development
|
|Has a say in project direction, though less weight than the Metareila
|National - International
|-
|IDESAM - Institute for Conservation and Sustainable Development of Amazonas
|''C''alculation of baseline scenario
Preparation of PD
Validation and verification to VCS and CCB.
Coordination of biomass and carbon inventories. Support policy and technical coordination
|
|Powerful: Involved with technical aspects of development.
|International
|-
|Forest Trends
|Supported formulation and implementation of the project.
|
|Powerful: Tasked with raising funds and fostering an international network; an integral part of project development
|International
|-
|Amazon Conservation Team - ACT Brazil
|Supports various aspect of project development as well as offering legal advice. Also assists with carbon stock monitoring
|
|Powerful: An integral part of project development
|International
|-
|Brazilian Biodiversity Fund (FUNBIO)

|Responsible for the Suruí Fund
|
|Powerful. Controls how revenue is distributed amongst the Metareila.
|National
|-
|Ministry of Environment (MMA)
|Responsible for protection and conservation of natural environment
|
|Mid-power: Must be notified about project activities although cannot strictly alter decisions made by the Surui
|National
|-
|National Indian Foundation (FUNAI)
|Represents Indignous organizations with judicial matters

|
|Must be notified about project activities though is not involved with project governance
|National
|-
|Government of the State of Mato Grosso
|Encourage development, and reduce poverty and crime in Mato Grosso
|
|Legilative control over regional police and municipalities
|National
|}

=== Discussion ===
Although originally successful in achieving its goal of reducing deforestation and degradation, in 2016 diamonds were discovered in Surui territory, leading to an increase in illegal logging and mining.<ref name=":1" /> By 2018 the project site had been completely overrun by ''garimpeiros'' (small-scale gold miners), ultimately leading to the projects suspension that year. <ref name=":4" />

While the project had initially garnered support, divisions emerged within the community post-project implementation. Disputes arose over the unequal distribution of project revenues, leading to internal conflicts between different Suruí clans. These criticisms escalated in 2014 when the Catholic Indigenous Missionary Council supported calls for an end to the project due to mismanagement of revenues from carbon credit sales. <ref name=":3" /> Some Suruí members also argued that the REDD+ initiative harmed their way of life.<ref>Lang, C. (2014). ''“What are projects for that destroy life?” Interview with Henrique Suruí about the Paiter-Suruí REDD project, Brazil.'' REDD-Monitor. [[/redd-monitor.org/2014/12/17/what-are-projects-for-that-destroy-life-interview-with-henrique-surui-about-the-paiter-surui-redd-project-brazil/|https://redd-monitor.org/2014/12/17/what-are-projects-for-that-destroy-life-interview-with-henrique-surui-about-the-paiter-surui-redd-project-brazil/]]</ref>

Further complicating the situation was the controversial role of Henrique Suruí, one of the Suruí tribal leaders. In 2011, it was revealed that Henrique had violated the tribe's logging moratorium, collaborating with loggers in illegal activities. While Henrique later denied responsibility for the project’s failure, his actions, combined with internal disagreements, illustrated the lack of consensus within the Suruí leadership on the project’s goals and outcomes. Both of the tribe’s leaders possessed dramatically different perspectives on how they believed they could ensure agency, autonomy, and economic benefits for the Suruí people.<ref name=":4" /> This fragmentation within the community, in combination with the discovery of diamonds and the state's failure to protect indigenous land rights led to the indefinite suspension of the REDD+ project.

The project's collapse highlights broader structural issues, particularly the state's inconsistent support for indigenous land rights, influenced by settler colonialism, which undermined the project’s long-term viability.<ref name=":4" /> Additionally, the project’s creation was shaped by external actors, including the collaboration between Almir Suruí and Borges from Forest Trends, a Washington-based NGO. This partnership introduced a Western perspective on viewing the Suruí peoples forest, in contrast with their own perspectives on land use and governance. Furthermore, despite Borges’ Brazilian background, the power dynamics between a global North organization and a developing, Indigenous community were apparent.

=== Summary ===
The Suruí Forest Carbon Project provides an interesting example of how, even when the rights of IPLC’s are relatively robust, challenges persist in ensuring REDD+ project longevity. As such, in its current state, REDD+ in the Brazilian Amazon may not be a suitable market-based option for indigenous communities in the Amazon.<ref name=":3" /> Although initially successful in promoting indigenous autonomy and reducing deforestation, the project resulted in failure due to of a myriad of factors. Division between Surui communities was exacerbated by a perceived unequal benefit-sharing, and the impact of imposing REDD+ seems to have complicated the traditional social structure that the Surui were dependent on. These issues were influenced by Brazil's settler state dynamics, where indigenous land rights, although legally recognized, are often not upheld in practice due to insufficient enforcement.<ref name=":4" /> Ultimately, the Surui project reveals how settler colonialism's structural flaws make long-term project success difficult, despite initial progress in promoting indigenous autonomy.

At the national and state level, complex institutional and legal land governance structures convolute and impede REDD+ in Brazil. Multiple institutions share responsibilities and there is no comprehensive, authoritative database of land ownership, which hampers efforts to protect indigenous territories.<ref name=":5">Costa, R. (2016)''. Insecure land rights in Brazil: Consequences for rural areas and challenges for improvement.'' Climate Policy Initiative. [[/www.climatepolicyinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/Insecure Land Rights in Brazil CPI.pdf|https://www.climatepolicyinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/Insecure_Land_Rights_in_Brazil_CPI.pdf]]</ref> As a result, land tenure disputes remain common and can be witnessed occurring between the public as well between public and state actors. For example, Brazil’s 1964 Land Statute (Law No. 4504) allows the government to takeover unproductive farms and transfer those lands to landless peasants. This often results in the clearing of forest, as only when the land is cleared is it evidenced to be ‘productive’.<ref name=":5" /> Hence, not only does this law cause insecurity for Indigenous populations in Brazil, it also forces them to go against customary traditions of stewarding the land in an effort to maintain its control.

Whilst the aforementioned points to the futility of REDD+ in Brazil, there is reason to maintain optimism. In a recent landmark ruling Brazil’s supreme court voted in favour of the Xoleng peoples, and the decision will serve as a precedent for all cases involving Indigenous peoples.<ref name=":6">Amos-Flom, K., (2023). ''Triumph and Turmoil: The Xokleng Case and the Future of Indigenous Land Rights in Brazil.'' Columbia Journal of Transnational Law. [[/www.jtl.columbia.edu/bulletin-blog/triumph-and-turmoil-the-xokleng-case-and-the-future-of-indigenous-land-rights-in-brazil|https://www.jtl.columbia.edu/bulletin-blog/triumph-and-turmoil-the-xokleng-case-and-the-future-of-indigenous-land-rights-in-brazil]]</ref> The Xokleng’s land dispute, settled in 2023, “rejected Santa Catarina state’s marco temporal (“time limit”) argument, which would have required Indigenous people to prove they occupied or legally contested the territory they claimed before the Brazilian Constitution came into force in 1988. If successful, this argument would have led to disastrous repercussions, as many indigenous peoples had been forcibly removed or are traditionally nomadic.”<ref name=":6" /> Evidently, whilst slow, progress has been made in Brazil in recent years with respect to Indigenous rights as well as the voluntary carbon market itself.

There are currently 159 AFOLU projects listed on the Verra database in Brazil, with only two specifically focused on REDD+ initiatives in collaboration with Indigenous groups. These are the Ka’a Pyahu project, <ref>Verra (n.d.) ''Project 5087: KA'A PYAHU.'' https://registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/5087</ref> initiated by the Guajajara Indigenous people in collaboration with external organizations and validated in 2021, and the ‘Together for the forest Awaete REDD+ project’<ref>Verra (n.d.) ''Project 5200: TOGETHER FOR THE FOREST AWAETÉ REDD+ PROJECT.'' https://registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/5200</ref> which is still under development. Both projects involve Indigenous groups working with Brazilian organizations to build technical capacity and expertise. This could signal a growing trend of Indigenous-led REDD+ projects in the future. To ensure a positive future for REDD+ in Brazil, the customary rights of IPLC’s must be formally recognized. IPLC should have legal ownership of their traditional lands, and in doing so the carbon rights of these communities would be less convoluted, leading to more equitable benefit-sharing and increased cohesion amongst these groups post-project implementation.

==Colombia: ''REDD+ project Resguardo Indigena Unificado - Selva de Mataven (RUI-SM)''==

=== '''Project description and location''' ===
[[File:RS6524 MG 3944.jpg|thumb|407x407px|A view of the Mataven]]
According to the PD,<ref name=":7">ACATISEMA & Mediamos (2017). ''Joint project description and monitoring report: REDD+ project: Resguardo Indigena Unificado – Selva de Mataven (RIU – SM).'' Link: “10 06 2017_VCS Final Report_ Matavin Project.pdf” found at [[/registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/1566|https://registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/1566]]</ref> the Resguardo Indígena Unificado – Selva de Matavén (RIU-SM) project is located east of the Colombian Orinoco high plain, in the eastern part of the Department of Vichada, municipality of Cumaribo. It resides on the formalized resguardo of the Sikuani, Piaroa, Puinave, Curripaco, Cubeo and Piapoco ethnic groups, spanning 1,856,836 hectares, with 1,477,115 hectares (79.6%) being forested. The project states that it will reduce greenhouse gas emissions, with a total estimated net reduction of 108,670,562 tons of CO2 equivalent over thirty years, from years 2013 – 2042. By this metric, it is the 14th largest project on the Verra registry, out of over 1700 projects.<ref name=":9">Dufrasne, D., (2021). ''Two Shades of Green: How hot air forest credits are being used to avoid carbon taxes in Colombia''. Carbon Market Watch. [[/carbonmarketwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Two-shades-of-green EN WEB.pdf|https://carbonmarketwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Two-shades-of-green_EN_WEB.pdf]]</ref> There are 12,312 indigenous people living in the RIU-SM, belonging to 2,517 families and 250 communities as of 2017.

The project was initiated by the Asociación de Cabildos y Autoridades Indígenas de la Selva de Matavén (ACETISMA), an Indigenous association, and developed by MEDIAMOS F&M, a Colombian consultancy firm. ACETISMA is comprised of Indigenous leaders that represent the 17 communities of the reservation in charge of governing the territory, and it has administrative autonomy, as well as “the capacity to acquire, to own and to dispose of property, to accept donations, to hold national and international conventions, scientific and cultural exchanges and generally, to celebrate all kinds of negotiations and agreements with which the Association can achieve its objectives.”<ref name=":7" />

There is a stated focus on various means of improving the living conditions of the Indigenous peoples living within the project area. To summarise, the main objectives of the REDD+ project RIU-SM include:

· Community development, in the form of improved education.

· Community engagement with respect to the project; developing information channels to reveal project progress.

· Support local initiatives for environmental education and waste management.

· Developing an effective response system that addresses community proposals and concerns relating to the project.

· Strengthening the governance of ACATISEMA.
=== National climate targets, policies and legislation ===
The Colombian Amazon makes up over one-third of Colombia’s national territory, and up until 2005 only 7.3% of the Colombian Amazon had been deforested, largely due to the country's 60-year armed conflict between the government, multiple left-wing guerillas such as FARC, and several far-right paramilitary groups.<ref name=":8" /> However, following the signing of the Peace Treaty in 2016 and demobilization of the FARC, limits to deforestation were weakened in the Colombian Amazon. Poor but opportunistic peasants began to encroach into previously unchartered territory and capitalize from the rainforest. Due to the poor economic integration of the Amazon, many were forced to engage with the traditional economies of cocoa and cattle ranching, as these markets were already well connected to regional and global markets.<ref name=":8" /> To address the drivers of deforestation and its associated emissions, the federal government has implemented various initiatives, which are summarized below:

{| class="wikitable"
|'''Document name'''
|'''Type'''
|'''Publication year'''
|'''Key takeaways'''
|-
|Nationally Determined Contribution(s)
|Target
|2020
|Reduce GHG emissions by 51 % by 2030 and net-zero by 2050
|-
|National Climate Change Policy (PNCC)
|Policy
|2018
|Address climate change and foster sustainable development
|-
|National Forest Conservation Program
|Policy
|2011
|Address deforestation
|-
|Law 1931 of 2018 – Climate Change Law

|Legislation
|2018
|Establishes the framework for addressing climate change
|-
| colspan="4" |'''Relating to REDD+:'''
|-
|National Strategy for Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (ENREDD+)
|Initiative
|2009
|Particular focus on the Amazon and Choco rainforests
|-
|Amazon Indigenous REDD+ Initiative
|Initiative
|2016
|Respect Indigenous rights. FPIC focus.
|-
|BIOREDD+ program
|Initiative
|2012
|Portfolio of 8 REDD+ projects in four geographic nodes covering over 700,000 hectares in the Colombian Pacific.

|-
|Vision Amazonia
|Initiative
|2015
|Part of the REDD+ strategy, financed by three foreign countries: Germany, Norway and United Kingdom
|}
As a result of the many fund and market-based initiatives that Colombia has engaged with, it hosts the second most REDD+ projects in the world. REDD+ projects now cover at least 56% of the area of legally recognized Indigenous territories in the Colombian Amazon, with an overwhelming majority of carbon projects located on Indigenous territories.<ref name=":10">Schmid, D., & Castro. C., (2023). ''REDD+ projects in the Colombian Amazon: Social challenges and lack of transparency''. Rainforest Foundation Norway. [[/dv719tqmsuwvb.cloudfront.net/documents/REDD rapport 2024 ENG.pdf|https://dv719tqmsuwvb.cloudfront.net/documents/REDD_rapport_2024_ENG.pdf]]</ref> Evidently REDD+ plays an integral part in the country’s efforts of environmental conservation, and incentives have been introduced to promote the development of such projects. For example, in 2016 the government adopted a higher tax that covered fossil fuels, but companies are able to avoid paying the tax by investing in carbon offsets that have been generated domestically.<ref name=":9" /> This led to a boost in the domestic REDD+ market in 2017, as Colombian companies invested as to escape higher taxes. Notably, 23 of the 36 REDD+ projects currently under development in the Amazon region were initiated in or after 2018.<ref name=":10" /> Currently Colombia’s REDD+ program sits at over 45 pilot and voluntary carbon projects, as well as one large-scale jurisdictional approach in the Amazon.<ref name=":11">Zambrano-Cortés, D. G. (2024). ''The politics, spaces and subjects of forest conservation in Colombia''. [internal PhD, WU, Wageningen University]. Wageningen University. [[/doi.org/10.18174/675328|https://doi.org/10.18174/675328]]</ref>

=== Indigenous rights - Constitutional, tenure and bundle rights ===
''De jure'', the Indigenous peoples of Colombia have comprehensive tenure and bundle rights that have been articulated in the national constitution. Collective land titles are granted to Indigenous communities by the Colombian government, and as a result about 34 percent of Colombian land (almost 38 million hectares) is legally recognized as Indigenous territory or collective lands of Afro-descendent communities.<ref name=":10" /> These collective land tenure rights have been in effect since the implementation of the 1991 constitution, granting them the authority to exercise legal control over their territories in accordance with their own customs and procedures.<ref>Max Planck Institute (n.d.) ''Colombia 1991 (rev. 2015).'' Institute. [[/www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Colombia 2015|https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Colombia_2015]]</ref> Furthermore, the carbon rights of Indigenous peoples are explicitly defined in the constitution and tied specifically to the ownership of land of the communities.<ref name=":2" /> This in theory provides a solid legal basis for upholding the rights of Indigenous communities in Colombia, specifically relating to REDD+ activities, as it allows communities to define and negotiate the terms of said projects. A summary of the various laws relating to Indigenous rights have been summarized below:
{| class="wikitable"
| colspan="2" |'''Law (1991 constitution)'''
|-
|Article 63

|Indigenous territories are considered collective property. Land is not owned by individuals but is shared by the community. The state must respect these collective rights and cannot alter land ownership without the consent of the Indigenous peoples.
|-
|Article 76 - ''Consulta previa''.
|Pertains to the right of Indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities; prior consultation must be undertaken before any entity undertakes activities that may affect their territories, culture, or way of life.
|-
|Article 330
|Indigenous communities have the right to govern their territories.
|-
|Article 329
|The Reservation is a collective, inalienable, and indefeasible property.
|-
|Decree 1386 of 1994, Article 10; Decree 2164 of 1995, Article 22) 39.
|"The administration and management of these lands are subjected to uses and customs of the beneficiaries."
|}
Whilst land and tenure rights are enshrined into the constitution, the precariousness of these rights persists due to a lack of resources to ensure enforcement, as well as the deeper issue of corruption. As previously stated, the rate of deforestation increased significantly in Colombia’s post-conflict era, evidencing the nations inability to maintain control over unlawful acts of land-grabbing and disposition. Whilst this began with new peasants converting the Amazon for subsistence purposes, it ultimately led to new areas for the growth of cocoa, much to the benefit of narco-traffickers who could monopolize on this illegal surplus in ‘accumulation by dispossession’.<ref name=":8" />

With respect to the legalities of consultation, Colombia has enshrined ''consulta previa'' into the constitution. Translating to ‘prior consultation’, this legal text provides the formal grounds for Indigenous engagement when any legislative or administrative measures are implemented on Indigenous territory. Importantly, consultation should be achieved in accordance with the customs of the ethnic group with which the project is being imposed upon. However, there have been recent cases of contestation specifically relating to how ''consulta previa'' applies to REDD+ on Indigenous lands, and the RIU – SM project was one that was involved with such a case.

=== Affected and interested stakeholders ===
{| class="wikitable"
| colspan="5" |'''Affected stakeholders'''
|-
|Stakeholders
|Primary objective(s)
|Secondary objective(s)
|Relative power
|Scope of influence
|-
|ACATISEMA - Asociación de Cabildos y Autoridades Indígenas de la Selva de Matavén
|Foster the integral development, social and cultural preservation of the indigenous communities in the Mataven Jungle and to

Consolidate the territory, and conservation and preservation of the environment and biodiversity of the Mataven Jungle

|
|Has the highest authority in the reservation.
Rights to the land and revenue generated from project
|
|-
|Indigenous ''resguardos'' of the RIU-SM
|Primary and direct beneficiaries of project

Seek to maintain land rights

Promote traditional and cultural beliefs
|Uphold rights
|High power, though little input into project activities in reality.
|
|-
|Landless peasants
|Gain more access to land. Improve rights
|
|Low to none
|Local
|-
| colspan="5" |'''Interested stakeholders'''
|-
|MEDIAMOS F&M
|Project developer
|
|Powerful: involved with various technical aspects of project development
|International
|-
|Ministerio de Ambiente y Desarrollo Sostenible
|Environmental planning; sustainable development
Form strategic alliances with social and institutional participants in different sectoral and territorial scenarios.
|
|
|National
|-
|Dirección de Asuntos Indígenas, ROM y Minorías - Ministerio del Interior
|Prepares policy in favour of Indigenous groups
Supports ethnic and cultural rights of Indigenous
|
|Not ''per se'' involved with project, though the policy it has introduced has affected project outcomes
|National
|-
|Corporinoquía
|Environmental authority to ensure the proper use of natural resources in their area of jurisdiction.
|Supporting of project
|As the project is in line with the mandate of Corporinoquía, they are supportive
|Regional
|-
|Other government institutions: Governor ofice of Vichada, Mayor ofice Cumaribo
|The Reservation for being part of the Cumaribo, Vichada, has territorial jurisdiction relations with the Governor’s office and the Mayor’s office.
|
|
|Regional - national
|-
|Fundación NATURA
|Civil organization
Conservation, use and management of biodiversity
Generate social, economic and environmental benefits
|
|
|International
|-
|Mining companies
|Compete with the Project for the territory's resources.
|
|Relatively powerful due to corruption, though legally obstructed to achieve objective
|International
|-
|Other indigenous communities neighboring RIU-SM
|Ensure autonomy with respect to their own jurisdiction
|Not involved with the project though potentially affected by it
|Low, with respect to the project
|Local
|-
|FONDO ACCIÓN
|Encourage the participation of civil society and the private sector in the implementation of the country’s public policies
|Conservation and sustainable development; and protection/development of children.
|
|National
|-
|Asocarbono – An industry association, including Verra, ProClima, Biofix, and ACATISEMA.

|Promote the agenda of high-level actors of the VCM
|
|Powerful
|International
|-
|OPIAC: National Oganization of the Indigenous Peoples of the Colombian Amazon

|Promotes Indigenous rights in Colombia
Exercises a political representation of the indigenous peoples of the Colombian Amazon
|
|
|National
|}

=== Discussion ===
According to the official REDD+ Mataven website<ref>RIU – SM (n.d.). ''REDD+ Mataven''. [[/reddmataven.com/|https://reddmataven.com/]]</ref> the project has resulted in a myriad of benefits to the Indigenous communities of the region. For example, as a result of the funds generated from the projects activities, there have been improvements in infrastructure, transportation and education, ultimately leading to the empowerment and improved governance of ACETISMA. However, the project has come under fire for multiple reasons.

For one, in 2015 some of the Indigenous communities filed a lawsuit referring to the violation of their right to ''consulta previa''. However, the court ruled that their Indigenous rights had not been violated as it was ACETISMA that initially sought MEDIAMOS to develop the project, and that ACETISMA were the best representatives of those Indigenous communities. Furthermore, the projects main focus was the conservation of the rainforest and therefore did not threaten the cultural integrity of those communities.<ref name=":10" /> However, regardless of the outcome of this case, its occurrence points to internal disagreement amongst Indigenous participants of the RIU-SM project. In a study involving interviews with Indigenous members of the project, there was a significant proportion of interviewees that had little knowledge regarding various aspects of the project, such as responsibilities of participation, or the benefit-sharing mechanism in place.<ref name=":2" /> This further reinforces the point that, in the case of the RIU-SM project it may not be ‘bottom-up’ and eludes to the power imbalance experienced between Mediamos, the project developer, and Indigenous community members. In the PD there is a breakdown of the distribution of income between ACETISMA and Mediamos, which shows a significant proportion of revenue flowing to the former organisation throughout the project’s operations.<ref name=":7" /> However, there is currently no publicly available documentation supporting this initial claim<ref name=":9" /> as there is no obligation to provide this information, leading to a general lack of transparency in the market and between all of the relevant actors. Subsequent meetings with Indigenous leaders have however shown a marked support of the Mataven project, with one Indigenous leader explicitly stating “...the Redd+ project has brought resources that they never had before, which allowed them to open new school classrooms, 21 rural aqueducts, cocoa crops and even headquarters in Cumaribo and Inírida.”<ref>Lievano, A. B. (2021) Colombia's biggest carbon credit project could be selling hot air. Latin American Center for Investigative Journalism. [[/www.elclip.org/el-mayor-proyecto-de-bonos-de-carbono-de-colombia-podria-estar-vendiendo-aire-caliente/|https://www.elclip.org/el-mayor-proyecto-de-bonos-de-carbono-de-colombia-podria-estar-vendiendo-aire-caliente/]] </ref> Clearly there have been benefits for IPLC’s involved with this project, though the details of this benefit-sharing remain a mystery.

Secondly, the Mataven project has caused controversy due to its apparently inflated carbon credit issuance. The report states that this has been achieved by using a reference area that is not representative of the project area, as well as assuming an uncharacteristically heigh assumed rate of deforestation.<ref name=":12">Global Atlas of Environmental Justice (2023). ''Resguardo Indigena Unificado-Selva de Matavén (RIU SM) REDD+ Project, Colombia.'' [[/ejatlas.org/conflict/redd-project-resguardo-indigena-unificado-selva-de-mataven-riu-sm|https://ejatlas.org/conflict/redd-project-resguardo-indigena-unificado-selva-de-mataven-riu-sm]]</ref> The project used a baseline deforestation rate of 0.86% per year, which is significantly more than the Colombian government's national rate of 0.18%. Additionally, according to the report the reference area chosen is more easily accessed and therefore more prone to deforestation, making it an inaccurate comparison to the relatively remote project area.<ref name=":2" /> This has led to the creation of excess carbon credits, or “hot air” credits, which have been criticized for not reflecting real environmental benefits.<ref name=":9" /> To add further insult to injury these credits have been used by a Colombian fossil fuel distributor company to avoid paying taxes, as described earlier by Colombia’s change in policy in 2017. In doing so, the company avoided paying approximately $18.9 million in taxes.<ref name=":2" /> There has been subsequent back and forth between Verra and Carbon Market Watch, with Verra refuting the claims<ref>Verra (2021). ''Carbon Market Watch Report on Colombian REDD+ Projects Contains Flawed Allegations.'' [[/verra.org/carbon-market-watch-report-on-colombian-redd-projects-contains-flawed-allegations/|https://verra.org/carbon-market-watch-report-on-colombian-redd-projects-contains-flawed-allegations/]] </ref> Regardless of the science, Colombia recently introduced a resolution in 2018 (Resolution 1447 – 2018) that requires projects to use baselines that comply with national reference levels.<ref name=":13">Dufrasne, D. (2021b). Companies use ”hot air” forestry offsets to avoid taxes in Colombia: Carbon Market Watch’s fact-check of Verra’s response. Carbon Market Watch. [[/carbonmarketwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/CMWs-fact-check-of-Verras-response-on-Colombia.pdf|https://carbonmarketwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/CMWs-fact-check-of-Verras-response-on-Colombia.pdf]]</ref><ref>IEA (2022). ''Resolution 1447 – 2018. Monitoring, Reporting, and Verification System for mitigation actions at the national level.'' International Energy Agency. [[/www.iea.org/policies/14772-resolution-1447-2018-monitoring-reporting-and-verification-system-for-mitigation-actions-at-the-national-level|https://www.iea.org/policies/14772-resolution-1447-2018-monitoring-reporting-and-verification-system-for-mitigation-actions-at-the-national-level]]</ref> Going forward, REDD+ projects that are being implemented in Colombia will have to abide by Colombia’s national legislation.

=== Summary ===
Colombia has a long history of engaging in REDD+ as it has been used to limit environmental degradation in the post-conflict era, in alignment with the country’s national peacebuilding agenda.<ref name=":11" /> Owing to the country’s comprehensive tenure and bundle rights, IPLC’s have robust ''de jure'' rights to land as they collectively own it, and rights to carbon are tied to this ownership. This puts Colombia as one of the world leaders in legal terms relating to REDD+ project implementation, but due to a lack of resources to ensure enforcement, as well as corruption, historically these laws have not been adhered to.<ref name=":10" /><ref name=":2" /> There are many documented cases showing the displacement on IPLC’s from traditional lands, poor efforts to adhere to ''consulta previa'', and inequitable benefit sharing.<ref>Greenfield, P. (2023''). The ‘carbon pirates’ preying on Amazon’s Indigenous communities.'' The Guardian. [[/www.theguardian.com/environment/2023/jan/21/amazon-indigenous-communities-carbon-offsetting-pirates-aoe|https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2023/jan/21/amazon-indigenous-communities-carbon-offsetting-pirates-aoe]]</ref><ref name=":14">Lang, C., (2024). ''Colombia’s Constitutional Court rules in favour of Indigenous Peoples. Identifies serious flaws in the REDD+ Baka Rokarire project.'' REDD_Monitor. [[/reddmonitor.substack.com/p/colombias-constitutional-court-rules|https://reddmonitor.substack.com/p/colombias-constitutional-court-rules]]</ref>

The case of the Mataven project provides an interesting example of how it is the market itself that is failing to address concerns regarding transparency, whether that be relating to benefit-sharing amongst relevant stakeholders, or Indigenous representation and engagement throughout the implementation of REDD+ projects. Some ACATISEMA members have explicitly stated their support for the Mataven project,<ref name=":12" /> and its benefits can be seen first-hand in the form of improved infrastructure in local communities involved with the project.<ref>Myers, J. E., Parra, M. A., Bedford, C. (2021). ''How Carbon Offsetting Can Build a Forest.'' Stanford Social Innovation Review. [[/ssir.org/articles/entry/how carbon offsetting can build a forest|https://ssir.org/articles/entry/how_carbon_offsetting_can_build_a_forest]]</ref> However, an exact breakdown of how and where revenue is being distributed to IPLC’s remains elusive.<ref name=":13" /> Furthermore, the level of IPLC engagement has come into question, specifically with reference to ''consulta previa'' and the overall understanding that IPLC’s have regarding the project’s intended outcomes and activities.<ref name=":10" /> This is not a rare case in Colombia and has been witnessed occurring with other projects that have been implemented on Indigenous territories in the Colombian Amazon.<ref name=":17">Lang, C., (2023''). “It destroys everything,” says Indigenous leader about the REDD+ Baka Rokarire project in Colombia''. REDD Monitor. [[/reddmonitor.substack.com/p/it-destroys-everything-says-indigenous|https://reddmonitor.substack.com/p/it-destroys-everything-says-indigenous]]</ref> However, a recent ruling by the Colombian Constitutional court voted in favour of Indigenous groups in Colombia, upholding “the rights to self-determination, autonomy, self-government, territory, identity, physical and cultural integrity, and free, prior and informed consent of the indigenous communities”.<ref name=":14" /> This review ultimately sets a legal precedent safeguarding the fundamental rights of IPLCs with REDD+ project implementation and shows that progress is being made to improve the likelihood that REDD+ will result in genuine benefits to those affected by project implementation.

To ensure a more authentic engagement with IPLC’s as to result in legitimate and equitable benefit-sharing, improvements must be made by the Colombian government, as well as within the VCM itself. For the former, Colombia’s national registry for GHG mitigation activities must be updated; it has been offline since 2022.<ref name=":10" /> As a result, transparency is lacking. International finance could be utilized as to alleviate this issue, and only with an accurate and reliable database may the market be regulated. In the broader sense, VCM registries must create stricter guidelines promoting transparency. Often PD’s refer to annexed documents that contain relevant information regarding benefit-sharing, though these are often not publicly available.<ref name=":9" /> This limits transparency and increases the likelihood of inequitable agreements being made between project proponents and developers, further exacerbating existing power asymmetries between the two groups and limiting the likelihood that ''consulta previa'' is honestly adhered to.<ref name=":10" /> This has led to conflict within Indigenous communities, rather than a strengthening of their social fabric.

Furthermore, the Mataven project calls into question the actual emissions reduction that REDD+ projects achieve. Whilst Colombia has since updated its regulations such that REDD+ must use baselines that comply with national reference levels, it is up in the air as to how representative these guidelines are. Reference areas must represent project areas and without the appropriate regulations in place project developers lack the incentive to create realistic baselines; ultimately they are aiming to produce the maximum number of credits as to generate the greatest possible revenues.

==Conclusion==
As a market-based mechanism, REDD+ is shackled by the construct in which it operates; fundamentally it is a capitalist means of fixing a capitalist problem, which comes with limitations. Both Brazil and Colombia have relatively robust laws that have been written into the constitution, ultimately promoting more equitable results of project implementation. However, as in Colombia IPLC’s collectively own the land, whereas in Brazil these groups only own rights to use the land,<ref name=":2" /> Colombia can be considered better equipped for the establishment of REDD+ projects on traditional Indigenous territory. However, even with these laws in place enforcement remain a matter of concern. Furthermore, given the wide variety of ontological and epistemological perspectives of Indigenous communities, and how these views conflict with the Western worldview from which market-based REDD+ came to fruition, there is an inherent difficulty in implementing a system of governance in REDD+ on Indigenous lands.<ref name=":1" />. Putting a price on nature conflicts with Indigenous perspectives and there have been instances where this has attacked the social and cultural fabric of IPLC’s.<ref name=":17" /> To avoid this REDD+ developers must have the genuine intent of understanding the perspective of the Indigenous group they are working with and aim to implement REDD+ with a bottom-up approach.

In both countries, transparency must be improved to ensure that FPIC is adhered to and subsequently ensure fair IPLC representation and engagement. This issue predominantly arises due to the poor requirements of standards in the VCM. As such, proponents are guided by developers which have little incentive to truly act in the interests of Indigenous groups; ultimately the organizations in charge of project development are interested in increasing project revenues. This has led to instances of over-crediting, as without a transparent framework in which to operate it is difficult to evaluate the legitimacy of the claims being made by project proponents and developers. However, with recent advances that address concerns of additionality<ref name=":15" /> there is hope for improved market integrity. Standards of the VCM must continue to be scrutinized to ensure that progress continues to be made.

Going forward, progress should be made to formalize the customary laws and traditional lands of IPLCs, and finance should be directed towards the enforcement of these laws. The environmental,<ref name=":16" /> economic,<ref name=":5" /><ref>Ding, H., Veit, P. G., Blackman, A., Gray, E., Reytar, K., Altamirano, J. C., Hodgdon, B., (2016). ''Climate benefits, tenure costs: The economic case for securing Indigenous land rights in the Amazon''. WRI. [[/files.wri.org/d8/s3fs-public/Climate Benefits Tenure Costs Executive Summary.pdf|https://files.wri.org/d8/s3fs-public/Climate_Benefits_Tenure_Costs_Executive_Summary.pdf]]</ref> and social<ref>Sarmiento Barletti, J. P., Heise Vigil, N., & Larson, A. M. (2023). ''Safeguards at a glance: Are voluntary standards supporting community land, resource and carbon rights?'' CIFOR-ICRAF. [[/www.cifor-icraf.org/publications/pdf files/Flyer/REDD-Safeguards-7.pdf|https://www.cifor-icraf.org/publications/pdf_files/Flyer/REDD-Safeguards-7.pdf]] </ref> benefits of this have been researched and are well understood. By developing culturally appropriate frameworks for rights-based conservation regimes, that work with IPLCs in accordance with their worldviews, REDD+ could be used to promote Indigenous autonomy. However, progress still must be made to achieve this goal.

==References==

Documentation:Open Case Studies/FRST522/2024/REDD+ in Indigenous Amazonia: What works and what doesn’t?

2024-12-12T23:49:28Z

ConnorHaynes:

__TOC__

==Positionality==
First and foremost I am not Indigenous, and whilst there are a myriad of cultures, ontologies and epistemologies that are not sufficiently represented by simply stating ‘Indigenous’, it is commonly accepted that these worldviews are vastly different to those of the ‘Western’ world, which is the world in which I grew up and matured. I am therefore only understanding of Indigenous cultures, beliefs and customary laws based upon available online literature and those which I have learnt through life, in addition to those introduced to me in my Master’s degree. As such, I will never be able to fully relate to an Indigenous person; the best I can do is try to understand and learn. Only throughout this process am I able to work towards reconciliation and attempt to address the inequities experienced by Indigenous folk globally.

Additionally, I am yet to act as a carbon project proponent and so do not understand the nuances or stresses of undertaking such a task. Whilst an individual proponent may have the best intention of procuring a carbon project for its social and environmental benefits, there are a number of stakeholders involved throughout the entire process which influence its eventual outcome. Without experience acting as a project proponent I am naïve in understanding the process and it's difficulties.

==Acronyms / Terminology==
'''Acronyms:'''

AFOLU: Agriculture, Forestry and Other Land-Use

ICVCM: Integrity Council for the Voluntary Carbon Market

IPLC: Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities

KMGBF: Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework

LAC: Latin American Countries

MRV: Monitoring, Reporting and Verification

REDD+: Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation

UNCBD: United Nations Convention on Biological Biodiversity

VCMI: Voluntary Carbon Markets Integrity Initiative

'''Terminology:'''

''Additionality:'' Additionality is the determination of whether the project will lead to the expected outcomes when compared to the baseline or ‘business as usual’ emissions.

''Leakage'': Refers to the shifting of emissions to outside the project boundary as a result of the project’s activities.

''Permanence:'' Permanence refers to the degree to which a carbon credit is equivalent to a permanent removal or reduction in emissions.
==Abstract==
This case study illustrates two examples of Indigenous-led REDD+ projects on Indigenous territory in Colombia and Brazil. Both countries have a relatively long history of engaging with REDD+ but have slightly different legal structures pertaining to the rights of Indigenous peoples on their traditional territories, and specifically their ‘carbon’ rights. As such, the intention is to evaluate how these differing ''de jure'' rights translate on the ground. With respect to REDD+, do certain rights result in legitimately positive benefits to IPLCs, as well as the environment that these projects were originally intended to protect? To reduce inconsistency, projects were chosen that utilized the same standard, namely Verra’s ‘Verified Carbon Standard’. The intention is such that the reader can evaluate the effectiveness and true benefit of REDD+ projects to IPLC’s, based upon the legal frameworks of the host country. A secondary intention is such that the reader is better equipped to conduct a prefeasibility assessment based upon available online literature, to evaluate the likelihood that REDD+ can be implemented in any chosen country, with the genuine intent of benefiting IPLC’s that are directly affected as a result of REDD+ project implementation.

==REDD+ and the VCM in Brazil and Colombia==
REDD+, originally introduced by the UNFCCC, is a market-based mechanism sitting within the VCM that aims to reverse the loss of forests and carbon stocks, specifically in developing countries. Simply put, an entity or an individual can voluntarily pay another that has engaged with REDD+ and subsequently sequestered carbon, to offset their own emissions using ‘credits’, sold as units of greenhouse gas equivalent to one ton of carbon dioxide (CO2e). Forestry and Land-Use remains to be the largest category of carbon credits traded by transaction volume on the VCM, with REDD+ being the most popular project type in this category, accounting for 78% of credits traded.<ref name=":0">Procton, A., (2024). ''State of the voluntary carbon market 2024: On the path to maturity.'' Forest Trends Ecosystem Marketplace.</ref> Furthermore, over one-third of the credits sold within this category were sourced from projects that had been implemented in LAC and the Caribbean in 2024.<ref name=":0" /> Of the four largest standards issuing carbon credits, Verra accounts for roughly 80% of issuances in Latin America,<ref>Pullins, T. (2022). Growth of carbon markets in Latin America. White & Case. [[/www.whitecase.com/publications/insight/latin-america-focus-fall-2022-growth-carbon-markets|https://www.whitecase.com/publications/insight/latin-america-focus-fall-2022-growth-carbon-markets]] </ref> and even in the face of recent scrutiny,<ref>West, T. A. P., Bofim, B., Haya, B. K. (2024). Methodological issues with deforestation baselines compromise the integrity of carbon offsets from REDD+. ''Global Environmental Change, 87'' [[/doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2024.102863|https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2024.102863]]</ref><ref>Wyburd I., & Dufrasne, G. (2023). Error Log: Exposing the methodological failures of REDD+ forestry projects. Carbon Market Watch. [[/carbonmarketwatch.org/publications/error-log-exposing-the-methodological-failures-of-redd-forestry-projects/|https://carbonmarketwatch.org/publications/error-log-exposing-the-methodological-failures-of-redd-forestry-projects/]]</ref><ref name=":15">Haya, B. K., Alford-Jones, K., Anderegg, W. R. L., Beymer-Farris, B., Blanchard, L., Bomfim, B., Chin, D., Evans, S., Hogan, M., Holm, J. A., McAfee, K., So, I. S., West, T. A. P., & Withey, L. (2023). ''Quality assessment of REDD+ carbon credit projects''. Berkeley Carbon Trading Project. [[/gspp.berkeley.edu/research-and-impact/centers/cepp/projects/berkeley-carbontrading-project/REDD+|https://gspp.berkeley.edu/research-and-impact/centers/cepp/projects/berkeley-carbontrading-project/REDD+]]</ref> REDD+ projects account for a significant proportion of the VCM with their continued application likely to persist.<ref>Gordon, O. (2022). ''The interwoven fortunes of carbon markets and indigenous communities.'' Energy Monitor. [[/www.energymonitor.ai/tech/carbon-removal/the-interwoven-fortunes-of-carbon-markets-and-indigenous-communities/|https://www.energymonitor.ai/tech/carbon-removal/the-interwoven-fortunes-of-carbon-markets-and-indigenous-communities/]]</ref><ref>Müller, M., Coustar, C., Bietta, F., Mathres, M. (2022). ''UNFCCC REDD+ and the power of sovereign carbon.'' Deutsche Banke Chief Investment Office. [[/www.rainforestcoalition.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/CIO-Special-UNFCCC-REDD-power-of-sovereign-carbon.pdf|https://www.rainforestcoalition.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/CIO-Special-UNFCCC-REDD-power-of-sovereign-carbon.pdf]]</ref><ref>Pullins, T. (2022). ''Growth of carbon markets in Latin America.'' White & Case. [[/www.whitecase.com/publications/insight/latin-america-focus-fall-2022-growth-carbon-markets|https://www.whitecase.com/publications/insight/latin-america-focus-fall-2022-growth-carbon-markets]] </ref> With the introduction of updated methodologies aimed at addressing these concerns,<ref>Verra (2023a). ''Setting the Standard: Verra’s Revolutionary New REDD Methodology.'' [[/verra.org/program-notice/setting-the-standard-verras-revolutionary-new-redd-methodology/|https://verra.org/program-notice/setting-the-standard-verras-revolutionary-new-redd-methodology/]]</ref><ref>Verra (2023b). ''VM0048 Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation, v1.0.'' [[/verra.org/methodologies/vm0048-reducing-emissions-from-deforestation-and-forest-degradation-v1-0/|https://verra.org/methodologies/vm0048-reducing-emissions-from-deforestation-and-forest-degradation-v1-0/]]</ref> there is hope for renewed buyer confidence in the integrity of this market,<ref>MSCI (2023). ''Verra’s New Methodology for Unplanned Deforestation Aims to Silence the Critics''. [[/www.msci.com/www/blog-posts/verra-s-new-methodology-for/04577808942|https://www.msci.com/www/blog-posts/verra-s-new-methodology-for/04577808942]]</ref> though more work still needs to be done.

Both Colombia and Brazil have a relatively long history of implementing REDD+ projects, using both fund-based and market-based mechanisms. For example, both countries were participants in the ‘Amazon Indigenous REDD+ (RIA in Spanish) initiative, with the first pilot implementation project being initiated in Colombia’s Puiawai Natural Reserve.<ref>Garzón, E., (2017). ''Amazon Indigenous REDD+: An innovative approach to conserve Colombian forests?'' Mongabay. [[/news.mongabay.com/2017/01/amazon-indigenous-redd-an-innovative-approach-to-conserve-colombian-forests/|https://news.mongabay.com/2017/01/amazon-indigenous-redd-an-innovative-approach-to-conserve-colombian-forests/]]</ref> The relevance of these two countries with respect to REDD+ is simple. Much of the Amazon’s primary tropical rainforest falls within these countries jurisdiction and this rainforest has been consistently under threat from external pressures and encroachment, whether that be in the form of land-clearing for commercial ranching, subsistence purposes, illicit drug production or illegal mining practices,<ref name=":8">Sánchez García, P. A. & Wong, G. Y., (2024) “The political economy of deforestation in the Colombian Amazon”, ''Journal of Political Ecology'' ''31''(1), 178–199. [[/doi.org/10.2458/jpe.5230|https://doi.org/10.2458/jpe.5230]]</ref><ref>Radwin, M. (2023). ''Drug trafficking fuels other deforestation drivers in the Amazon: report.'' Mongabay. [[/news.mongabay.com/2023/07/drug-trafficking-fuels-other-deforestation-drivers-in-the-amazon-report/|https://news.mongabay.com/2023/07/drug-trafficking-fuels-other-deforestation-drivers-in-the-amazon-report/]]</ref><ref>Haddad, E.A., Araújo, I.F., Feltran-Barbieri, R., Perobelli, F. S., Rocha, A., Sass, K. S., Nobre, C. A. (2024). Economic drivers of deforestation in the Brazilian Legal Amazon. ''Nat Sustain'' ''7'', 1141–1148. [[/doi.org/10.1038/s41893-024-01387-7|https://doi.org/10.1038/s41893-024-01387-7]] </ref><ref>Hänggli, A., Levy, S. A., Armenteras, D., Bovolo, C. I., Brandão, J., Rueda, X., & Garrett, R. D. (2023). A systematic comparison of deforestation drivers and policy effectiveness across the amazon biome. ''Environmental Research Letters, 18''(7), 073001. [[/doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/acd408|https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/acd408]]</ref> to name a few.

In theory, REDD+ can be used to provide the economic incentive to promote sustained environmental protection of Indigenous lands, with a focus on the rights and livelihoods of IPLCs. Currently the overall funding to IPLCs tenure rights and forest management in tropical countries is low, receiving just $270 million per year between 2011-2020 from bilateral and multilateral donors and private philanthropies.<ref>Hatcher, J., Owen, M., Yin, D., (2021). ''Falling short: Donor funding for Indigenous peoples and local communities to secure tenure rights and manage forests in tropical countries (2011 -2020).'' Rainforest Foundation Norway. [[/dv719tqmsuwvb.cloudfront.net/documents/Publikasjoner/Andre-rapporter/RFN Falling short 2021.pdf|https://dv719tqmsuwvb.cloudfront.net/documents/Publikasjoner/Andre-rapporter/RFN_Falling_short_2021.pdf]]</ref> REDD+ has the potential to channel funding as to promote Indigenous rights and autonomy, provided there is transparent and equitable benefit-sharing for those involved. Fundamentally, only with the inclusion of IPLC’s, or preferably with IPLC’s acting as project proponents, is REDD+ able to promote Indigenous agency and improve IPLC rights and governance. And only when the rights of those inhabiting the land are formally recognized can the land be effectively conserved.<ref name=":16">Reytar, K., Veit, P., von Braun, J. (2024). ''Protecting Biodiversity Hinges on Securing Indigenous and Community Land Rights.'' WRI. [[/www.wri.org/insights/indigenous-and-local-community-land-rights-protect-biodiversity|https://www.wri.org/insights/indigenous-and-local-community-land-rights-protect-biodiversity]]</ref> The inclusion of IPLCs in REDD+ project development is therefore considered to be essential for project success, and this is in theory embodied in the very nature of REDD+.<ref name=":1">Alvarez, G., Elfving, M. and Andrade, C. (2016) ‘REDD+ governance and indigenous peoples in Latin America: the case of Suruí Carbon Project in the Brazilian Amazon Forest’, ''Latin American J. Management for Sustainable Development 3''(2) pp.133–146. [[/dx.doi.org/10.1504/LAJMSD.2016.083705|10.1504/LAJMSD.2016.083705]]</ref> Partially owing to a long history of dealing with REDD+, Colombia and Brazil are amongst just a few of the countries hosting tropical rainforests that explicitly recognise community rights to carbon and tie these rights to the legal ownership of lands and forests. In Colombia, carbon rights are tied to rights of the land, whereas in Brazil carbon rights are tied to forest rights.<ref name=":2">RRI and McGill University (2021). Technical report: ''Status of legal recognition of Indigenous Peoples’, Local Communities’ and Afro-descendant Peoples’ rights to carbon stored in tropical lands and forests''. Rights and Resources Initiative. [[/doi.org/10.53892/MLQQ5744|https://doi.org/10.53892/MLQQ5744]]</ref>

==Brazil: The Suruí Forest Carbon Project==
[[File:The Amazon Basin, Brazil.jpg|thumb|316x316px|Brazil's Amazon rainforest]]

=== Project description and location ===
The Surui Forest Carbon project was implemented in 2009 on the territory of the Surui people, which is situated in the southern part of Brazil’s Amazon between the states of Rondônia and Mato Grosso. Surui Indigenous territory covers an area of 2,481 km2, though the intention of the PCFS was to protect a portion of this total area. According to the PD, the stated objective was to “prevent 13,575.3 hectares of tropical forest from being cleared by 2038, to avoid the emission of 7,258,352.3 tCO2e to the atmosphere, and to contribute to the preservation of the Paiter Surui lifestyle and traditions.”<ref>IDESAM (2011). ''Project description: Surui forest carbon project''. Institute for Conservation and Sustainable Development of Amazonas. Link: "PROJ_DESC_1118_02FEB2012.PDF" found at [[/registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/1118|https://registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/1118]] </ref> This region sits within one of the Brazilian Amazon’s main ‘arcs of deforestation’ and pressure from loggers and ranchers is a matter of concern.

Notably, the PCFS was the first REDD+ project to be proposed by Indigenous peoples in the Brazilian Amazon on their own territory and was the first to receive certification by both the VCS and CCBS.<ref name=":1" />. Metareilá, the Surui’s own Indigenous association, acted as project proponent and the Institute for Conservation and Sustainable Development of Amazonas (IDESAM) assisted with project development, alongside multiple other stakeholder groups. As an endogenous initiative procured and conducted by the Surui community, the SFCP had a ‘non-centralized model of governance’, which reflected the characteristics and traditions of the Surui people. <ref name=":1" />

Only after two years of consultations between the 24 communities involved and the relevant governmental agencies (primarily FUNAI and the Ministry of Environment) was a Memorandum of Understanding signed, showing community consent to develop the project.<ref name=":3">Garcia, B., Rimmer, L., Canal Vieira, L., Mackey, B., (2021). REDD+ and forest protection on indigenous lands in the Amazon. ''RECIEL 30'', 207–219. [[/doi.org/10.1111/reel.12389|https://doi.org/10.1111/reel.12389]]</ref> In 2012 after verification from an independent third-party body, the Surui were able to sell carbon credits on the international market. Between 2009 and 2014 the project drastically helped limit the deforestation occurring within the project’s site, causing many to deem it a success.<ref name=":4">Howard, F. E., (2023). ''An Analysis of the Suruí Forest Carbon Project in Context of Settler Colonialism''. Masters thesis. Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University. [[/vtechworks.lib.vt.edu/server/api/core/bitstreams/b0cde6de-794c-453f-856b-ee72bde3db06/content|https://vtechworks.lib.vt.edu/server/api/core/bitstreams/b0cde6de-794c-453f-856b-ee72bde3db06/content]]</ref>

=== National climate targets, policies and legislation ===
Rates of deforestation in Brazil’s legal Amazon are significantly impacted by the government in charge. This is evidenced in the decade between 2012 and 2021 whilst under the conservative Bolsonaro administration, when deforestation in the Amazon increased 185% — from a loss of 4,571 km2 in 2012 to 13,038 km2 in 2021.<ref>INPE (2022). ''Observação da Terra. [[/www.obt.inpe.br/OBT/assuntos/programas/amazonia/prodes|http://www.obt.inpe.br/OBT/assuntos/programas/amazonia/prodes]]''</ref> However, since Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s appointment in 2022 there has been a steady decline in the rate of deforestation, which is now roughly half what it was in 2021.<ref>Terra Brasilis (2024). ''PRODES (deforestation): Deforestation rates – Legal Amazon – States''. [[/terrabrasilis.dpi.inpe.br/app/dashboard/deforestation/biomes/legal amazon/rates|https://terrabrasilis.dpi.inpe.br/app/dashboard/deforestation/biomes/legal_amazon/rates]]</ref> A significant proportion of emissions result from the clearing of rainforest and its subsequent conversion to ranching.<ref>MCTI (2022). ''Estimativas Anuais De Emissões De Gases De Efeito Estufa No Brasil.'' 6ª Edição. Ministério da Estado da Ciência, Tecnologia e Inovações. [[/www.gov.br/mcti/pt-br/acompanhe-o-mcti/sirene/publicacoes/estimativas-anuais-de-emissoes-gee/arquivos/6a-ed-estimativas-anuais.pdf|https://www.gov.br/mcti/pt-br/acompanhe-o-mcti/sirene/publicacoes/estimativas-anuais-de-emissoes-gee/arquivos/6a-ed-estimativas-anuais.pdf]]</ref> To address these emissions Brazil has implemented various adaptation policies, legislation and targets which are summarized below:
{| class="wikitable"
|'''Document name'''
|'''Type'''
|'''Publication year'''
|'''Key takeaways'''
|-
|National Policy on Climate Change (NPCC)
|Legislation
|2009
|Framework for addressing climate change
|-
|National Plan on Climate Change Adaptation
|Policy
|2016
|Framework for addressing impacts of climate change
|-
|Nationally Determined Contribution
|Target
|2024
|Reduce net greenhouse gas emissions by 59 to 67 percent below 2005 levels by 2035
|-
|Federal Constitution, Article 225
|Legislation
|2006
|The Amazon rainforest is considered as a ‘national heritage’.All levels of government have a shared responsibility to protect it and the environment
|-
| colspan="4" |'''Relating to REDD+'''
|-
|Plan of Action for the Prevention and Control of Deforestation in the Legal Amazon (PPCDAM)
|Policy
|2004
|Aims to reduce deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon
|-
|Forest code
|Legislation
|2012
|Aimed at reducing deforestation, but no specific mention of REDD+
|-
|Amazon Indigenous REDD+ Initiative
|Policy
|2012
|Incorporate Indigenous with REDD+ initiatives
|-
|National REDD+ Strategy (ENREDD+)
|Policy
|2016
|REDD+ as a fund-based mechanism
|}

=== Indigenous rights - Constitutional, tenure and bundle rights ===
In Brazil, Indigenous rights are robust and clearly defined according to the Brazilian Constitution. As a result, the Indigenous communities of the Brazilian Amazon have legal title to 13.8% of the national territory totalling 1.175 million km2, with a total of 631 territories.<ref>Federal government of Brazil (2024). ''Brazil’s NDC: National determination to contribute and transform''. [[/unfccc.int/sites/default/files/2024-11/Brazil Second Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) November2024.pdf|https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/2024-11/Brazil_Second%20Nationally%20Determined%20Contribution%20%28NDC%29_November2024.pdf]]</ref>
{| class="wikitable"
| colspan="2" |'''Laws'''
|-
|Article 231 of the 1988 Constitution
|Indigenous peoples to have their exclusive right to use their territories to derive economic benefits. Grants indigenous peoples the right to land, prohibits eviction, and restricts mining without authorization from the federal government.
|-
|Indigenous Peoples statute (1973).

|No acts restricting the full exercise of indigenous peoples’ permanent tenure over the land should be permitted.
|-
| colspan="2" | '''Treaties'''
|-
|United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2007)
|Requires States to obtain free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) for the approval of any projects affecting indigenous territories.
|-
|International Labour Organization Convention 169 (2019)
|Ratified and incorporated under domestic law in 2002 through Decree 10.088/2019, endorsing UNDRIP
|-
|American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2016)
|Supports and builds upon UNDRIP
|}
Whilst Indigenous communities in Brazil have legal title to land, it is the State that owns it. Indigenous people simply exercise permanent tenure over lands that they traditionally occupy and have ‘original rights’ to these traditional lands, which no other rights can prevail over.<ref name=":3" /> Indigenous lands, though not classified as protected areas, “have the highest level of protection by law because they are regulated by the Constitution” and cannot be leased or restricted without violating their original rights. The Suruí's right to develop the PCFS is grounded in the Brazilian Constitution, which grants Indigenous peoples exclusive rights to use the ‘riches of the soil, rivers and lakes’ of their land, and these rights cannot be overridden. Thus, Indigenous people and only Indigenous people are legally allowed to engage in productive activities on their land, provided these activities are conducted according to their own customs and traditions and are necessary for the wellbeing and cultural expression of their own people. In Brazil, it is the armed forces and federal police that are responsible for enforcing these laws, and FUNAI is responsible for representing Indigenous communities in judicial disputes.<ref name=":3" /> As such, provided a REDD+ does not violate the rights to territorial integrity, permanent land tenure and original rights, it is legally allowed.
[[File:Two Pataxo indians (Brasília, 04 April 2006).jpeg|thumb|414x414px|Two Indigenous in Brazil]]
'''CARBON RIGHTS:''' In Brazil, carbon rights are tied to forest rights.<ref name=":2" /> Carbon credits from REDD+ projects are seen as part of the economic benefits derived from indigenous lands, and as such, Indigenous communities are entitled to own, control and distribute these revenues themselves. The carbon credits generated from the (SFCP) were wholly owned by the Suruí people through Metareilá, with the Suruí Fund (managed by the Brazilian Biodiversity Fund - FUNBIO) acting as recipient. This legality reinforces Indigenous control over both land and carbon rights, as whoever has rights to the forest land is usually recognized as the owner of carbon rights.<ref name=":3" />

'''FPIC OBLIGATION:''' Furthermore, Brazilian law requires Free, Prior, and Informed Consent (FPIC) for REDD+ projects affecting indigenous lands, ensuring that international standards such as the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) and ILO Convention No. 169 are adhered to; Indigenous consent is, ''de jure,'' a necessity. Projects that violate these rights and fail to consult communities are therefore considered illegal. Notably there are no specific rules or procedures that have been written into the Brazilian constitution that provide guidance on how to achieve FPIC. This freedom reinforces Indigenous autonomy as it allows an Indigenous community to define the rules of consultation according to their customs and traditions.

Collectively these national and international laws provide an important safeguard to Indigenous peoples, making their consent a prerequisite for the establishment of REDD+ projects and recognizing their rights as the main beneficiaries of REDD+ revenues.<ref name=":3" /> However, as carbon rights are tied to forest rights in Brazil and not land rights, carbon is considered to be an ‘environmental service’ (Article 41(I)(A) Brazilian Forestry Code), and states, as well as the federal government, have the jurisdiction to exercise full legislative authority over carbon. <ref name=":2" /> As such, certain states have interpreted the law to imply that the title to carbon credits is attributable to the state.<ref>Loft, L., Ravikumar, A., Gebara, M. F., Pham, T. T., Resosudarmo, I. A. P., Assembe, S., Tovar, J. G., Mwangi, E., & Andersson, K. (2015). Taking Stock of Carbon Rights in REDD+ Candidate Countries: Concept Meets Reality. ''Forests'', ''6''(4), 1031-1060. [[/doi.org/10.3390/f6041031|https://doi.org/10.3390/f6041031]]</ref> Hence, even when carbon rights are clearly defined and tied to forest title it is insufficient in itself, and only by legally recognizing the customary rights of IPLCs can a fair and equitable outcome be realised.

=== Interested and affected stakeholders ===
{| class="wikitable"
| colspan="5" |'''Affected stakeholders'''
|-
|Stakeholders
|Primary objective(s)
|Secondary objective(s)
|Relative power
|Scope of influence
|-
|Metareilá Association of the Suruí Indigenous People
|Project proponent

Works to defend and preserve the cultural and territorial heritage of the Suruí people
|Ensure project longevity
|Powerful, though lackiing technical knowhow. Have carbon rights and thus own revenue from the project. Can decide how this revenue is distributed
|Regional - National
|-
|Other Indigenous groups and associations
|Support various aspects of proejct development
|Aim to benefit from the project
|Have the same rights as the Metareila with respect to land though are less involved with project development and have less say, nor derive as many benefits as the Metareila
|Local
|-
|''Campesinos'' (peasants)
|Procure more land.
|
|Have far fewer rights than Indigenous groups and no involvement with the project
|Local
|-
| colspan="5" |'''Interested stakeholders'''
|-
|Kanindé Association for Ethno-Environmental Defense – non-profit
|Involved with various aspects of project development
|
|Has a say in project direction, though less weight than the Metareila
|National - International
|-
|IDESAM - Institute for Conservation and Sustainable Development of Amazonas
|''C''alculation of baseline scenario
Preparation of PD
Validation and verification to VCS and CCB.
Coordination of biomass and carbon inventories. Support policy and technical coordination
|
|Powerful: Involved with technical aspects of development.
|International
|-
|Forest Trends
|Supported formulation and implementation of the project.
|
|Powerful: Tasked with raising funds and fostering an international network; an integral part of project development
|International
|-
|Amazon Conservation Team - ACT Brazil
|Supports various aspect of project development as well as offering legal advice. Also assists with carbon stock monitoring
|
|Powerful: An integral part of project development
|International
|-
|Brazilian Biodiversity Fund (FUNBIO)

|Responsible for the Suruí Fund
|
|Powerful. Controls how revenue is distributed amongst the Metareila.
|National
|-
|Ministry of Environment (MMA)
|Responsible for protection and conservation of natural environment
|
|Mid-power: Must be notified about project activities although cannot strictly alter decisions made by the Surui
|National
|-
|National Indian Foundation (FUNAI)
|Represents Indignous organizations with judicial matters

|
|Must be notified about project activities though is not involved with project governance
|National
|-
|Government of the State of Mato Grosso
|Encourage development, and reduce poverty and crime in Mato Grosso
|
|Legilative control over regional police and municipalities
|National
|}

=== Discussion ===
Although originally successful in achieving its goal of reducing deforestation and degradation, in 2016 diamonds were discovered in Surui territory, leading to an increase in illegal logging and mining.<ref name=":1" /> By 2018 the project site had been completely overrun by ''garimpeiros'' (small-scale gold miners), ultimately leading to the projects suspension that year. <ref name=":4" />

While the project had initially garnered support, divisions emerged within the community post-project implementation. Disputes arose over the unequal distribution of project revenues, leading to internal conflicts between different Suruí clans. These criticisms escalated in 2014 when the Catholic Indigenous Missionary Council supported calls for an end to the project due to mismanagement of revenues from carbon credit sales. <ref name=":3" /> Some Suruí members also argued that the REDD+ initiative harmed their way of life.<ref>Lang, C. (2014). ''“What are projects for that destroy life?” Interview with Henrique Suruí about the Paiter-Suruí REDD project, Brazil.'' REDD-Monitor. [[/redd-monitor.org/2014/12/17/what-are-projects-for-that-destroy-life-interview-with-henrique-surui-about-the-paiter-surui-redd-project-brazil/|https://redd-monitor.org/2014/12/17/what-are-projects-for-that-destroy-life-interview-with-henrique-surui-about-the-paiter-surui-redd-project-brazil/]]</ref>

Further complicating the situation was the controversial role of Henrique Suruí, one of the Suruí tribal leaders. In 2011, it was revealed that Henrique had violated the tribe's logging moratorium, collaborating with loggers in illegal activities. While Henrique later denied responsibility for the project’s failure, his actions, combined with internal disagreements, illustrated the lack of consensus within the Suruí leadership on the project’s goals and outcomes. Both of the tribe’s leaders possessed dramatically different perspectives on how they believed they could ensure agency, autonomy, and economic benefits for the Suruí people.<ref name=":4" /> This fragmentation within the community, in combination with the discovery of diamonds and the state's failure to protect indigenous land rights led to the indefinite suspension of the REDD+ project.

The project's collapse highlights broader structural issues, particularly the state's inconsistent support for indigenous land rights, influenced by settler colonialism, which undermined the project’s long-term viability.<ref name=":4" /> Additionally, the project’s creation was shaped by external actors, including the collaboration between Almir Suruí and Borges from Forest Trends, a Washington-based NGO. This partnership introduced a Western perspective on viewing the Suruí peoples forest, in contrast with their own perspectives on land use and governance. Furthermore, despite Borges’ Brazilian background, the power dynamics between a global North organization and a developing, Indigenous community were apparent.

=== Summary ===
The Suruí Forest Carbon Project provides an interesting example of how, even when the rights of IPLC’s are relatively robust, challenges persist in ensuring REDD+ project longevity. As such, in its current state, REDD+ in the Brazilian Amazon may not be a suitable market-based option for indigenous communities in the Amazon.<ref name=":3" /> Although initially successful in promoting indigenous autonomy and reducing deforestation, the project resulted in failure due to of a myriad of factors. Division between Surui communities was exacerbated by a perceived unequal benefit-sharing, and the impact of imposing REDD+ seems to have complicated the traditional social structure that the Surui were dependent on. These issues were influenced by Brazil's settler state dynamics, where indigenous land rights, although legally recognized, are often not upheld in practice due to insufficient enforcement.<ref name=":4" /> Ultimately, the Surui project reveals how settler colonialism's structural flaws make long-term project success difficult, despite initial progress in promoting indigenous autonomy.

At the national and state level, complex institutional and legal land governance structures convolute and impede REDD+ in Brazil. Multiple institutions share responsibilities and there is no comprehensive, authoritative database of land ownership, which hampers efforts to protect indigenous territories.<ref name=":5">Costa, R. (2016)''. Insecure land rights in Brazil: Consequences for rural areas and challenges for improvement.'' Climate Policy Initiative. [[/www.climatepolicyinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/Insecure Land Rights in Brazil CPI.pdf|https://www.climatepolicyinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/Insecure_Land_Rights_in_Brazil_CPI.pdf]]</ref> As a result, land tenure disputes remain common and can be witnessed occurring between the public as well between public and state actors. For example, Brazil’s 1964 Land Statute (Law No. 4504) allows the government to takeover unproductive farms and transfer those lands to landless peasants. This often results in the clearing of forest, as only when the land is cleared is it evidenced to be ‘productive’.<ref name=":5" /> Hence, not only does this law cause insecurity for Indigenous populations in Brazil, it also forces them to go against customary traditions of stewarding the land in an effort to maintain its control.

Whilst the aforementioned points to the futility of REDD+ in Brazil, there is reason to maintain optimism. In a recent landmark ruling Brazil’s supreme court voted in favour of the Xoleng peoples, and the decision will serve as a precedent for all cases involving Indigenous peoples.<ref name=":6">Amos-Flom, K., (2023). ''Triumph and Turmoil: The Xokleng Case and the Future of Indigenous Land Rights in Brazil.'' Columbia Journal of Transnational Law. [[/www.jtl.columbia.edu/bulletin-blog/triumph-and-turmoil-the-xokleng-case-and-the-future-of-indigenous-land-rights-in-brazil|https://www.jtl.columbia.edu/bulletin-blog/triumph-and-turmoil-the-xokleng-case-and-the-future-of-indigenous-land-rights-in-brazil]]</ref> The Xokleng’s land dispute, settled in 2023, “rejected Santa Catarina state’s marco temporal (“time limit”) argument, which would have required Indigenous people to prove they occupied or legally contested the territory they claimed before the Brazilian Constitution came into force in 1988. If successful, this argument would have led to disastrous repercussions, as many indigenous peoples had been forcibly removed or are traditionally nomadic.”<ref name=":6" /> Evidently, whilst slow, progress has been made in Brazil in recent years with respect to Indigenous rights as well as the voluntary carbon market itself.

There are currently 159 AFOLU projects listed on the Verra database in Brazil, with only two specifically focused on REDD+ initiatives in collaboration with Indigenous groups. These are the Ka’a Pyahu project, <ref>Verra (n.d.) ''Project 5087: KA'A PYAHU.'' https://registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/5087</ref> initiated by the Guajajara Indigenous people in collaboration with external organizations and validated in 2021, and the ‘Together for the forest Awaete REDD+ project’<ref>Verra (n.d.) ''Project 5200: TOGETHER FOR THE FOREST AWAETÉ REDD+ PROJECT.'' https://registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/5200</ref> which is still under development. Both projects involve Indigenous groups working with Brazilian organizations to build technical capacity and expertise. This could signal a growing trend of Indigenous-led REDD+ projects in the future. To ensure a positive future for REDD+ in Brazil, the customary rights of IPLC’s must be formally recognized. IPLC should have legal ownership of their traditional lands, and in doing so the carbon rights of these communities would be less convoluted, leading to more equitable benefit-sharing and increased cohesion amongst these groups post-project implementation.

==Colombia: ''REDD+ project Resguardo Indigena Unificado - Selva de Mataven (RUI-SM)''==

=== '''Project description and location''' ===
[[File:RS6524 MG 3944.jpg|thumb|407x407px|A view of the Mataven]]
According to the PD,<ref name=":7">ACATISEMA & Mediamos (2017). ''Joint project description and monitoring report: REDD+ project: Resguardo Indigena Unificado – Selva de Mataven (RIU – SM).'' Link: “10 06 2017_VCS Final Report_ Matavin Project.pdf” found at [[/registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/1566|https://registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/1566]]</ref> the Resguardo Indígena Unificado – Selva de Matavén (RIU-SM) project is located east of the Colombian Orinoco high plain, in the eastern part of the Department of Vichada, municipality of Cumaribo. It resides on the formalized resguardo of the Sikuani, Piaroa, Puinave, Curripaco, Cubeo and Piapoco ethnic groups, spanning 1,856,836 hectares, with 1,477,115 hectares (79.6%) being forested. The project states that it will reduce greenhouse gas emissions, with a total estimated net reduction of 108,670,562 tons of CO2 equivalent over thirty years, from years 2013 – 2042. By this metric, it is the 14th largest project on the Verra registry, out of over 1700 projects.<ref name=":9">Dufrasne, D., (2021). ''Two Shades of Green: How hot air forest credits are being used to avoid carbon taxes in Colombia''. Carbon Market Watch. [[/carbonmarketwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Two-shades-of-green EN WEB.pdf|https://carbonmarketwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Two-shades-of-green_EN_WEB.pdf]]</ref> There are 12,312 indigenous people living in the RIU-SM, belonging to 2,517 families and 250 communities as of 2017.

The project was initiated by the Asociación de Cabildos y Autoridades Indígenas de la Selva de Matavén (ACETISMA), an Indigenous association, and developed by MEDIAMOS F&M, a Colombian consultancy firm. ACETISMA is comprised of Indigenous leaders that represent the 17 communities of the reservation in charge of governing the territory, and it has administrative autonomy, as well as “the capacity to acquire, to own and to dispose of property, to accept donations, to hold national and international conventions, scientific and cultural exchanges and generally, to celebrate all kinds of negotiations and agreements with which the Association can achieve its objectives.”<ref name=":7" />

There is a stated focus on various means of improving the living conditions of the Indigenous peoples living within the project area. To summarise, the main objectives of the REDD+ project RIU-SM include:

· Community development, in the form of improved education.

· Community engagement with respect to the project; developing information channels to reveal project progress.

· Support local initiatives for environmental education and waste management.

· Developing an effective response system that addresses community proposals and concerns relating to the project.

· Strengthening the governance of ACATISEMA.

[[File:Figure 6 Colombian Manual Eradicators Destroying Coca Fields (31352594937).jpg|thumb|343x343px|The Colombian government fight against cocoa production.]]
=== National climate targets, policies and legislation ===
The Colombian Amazon makes up over one-third of Colombia’s national territory, and up until 2005 only 7.3% of the Colombian Amazon had been deforested, largely due to the country's 60-year armed conflict between the government, multiple left-wing guerillas such as FARC, and several far-right paramilitary groups.<ref name=":8" /> However, following the signing of the Peace Treaty in 2016 and demobilization of the FARC, limits to deforestation were weakened in the Colombian Amazon. Poor but opportunistic peasants began to encroach into previously unchartered territory and capitalize from the rainforest. Due to the poor economic integration of the Amazon, many were forced to engage with the traditional economies of cocoa and cattle ranching, as these markets were already well connected to regional and global markets.<ref name=":8" /> To address the drivers of deforestation and its associated emissions, the federal government has implemented various initiatives, which are summarized below:

{| class="wikitable"
|'''Document name'''
|'''Type'''
|'''Publication year'''
|'''Key takeaways'''
|-
|Nationally Determined Contribution(s)
|Target
|2020
|Reduce GHG emissions by 51 % by 2030 and net-zero by 2050
|-
|National Climate Change Policy (PNCC)
|Policy
|2018
|Address climate change and foster sustainable development
|-
|National Forest Conservation Program
|Policy
|2011
|Address deforestation
|-
|Law 1931 of 2018 – Climate Change Law

|Legislation
|2018
|Establishes the framework for addressing climate change
|-
| colspan="4" |'''Relating to REDD+:'''
|-
|National Strategy for Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (ENREDD+)
|Initiative
|2009
|Particular focus on the Amazon and Choco rainforests
|-
|Amazon Indigenous REDD+ Initiative
|Initiative
|2016
|Respect Indigenous rights. FPIC focus.
|-
|BIOREDD+ program
|Initiative
|2012
|Portfolio of 8 REDD+ projects in four geographic nodes covering over 700,000 hectares in the Colombian Pacific.

|-
|Vision Amazonia
|Initiative
|2015
|Part of the REDD+ strategy, financed by three foreign countries: Germany, Norway and United Kingdom
|}
As a result of the many fund and market-based initiatives that Colombia has engaged with, it hosts the second most REDD+ projects in the world. REDD+ projects now cover at least 56% of the area of legally recognized Indigenous territories in the Colombian Amazon, with an overwhelming majority of carbon projects located on Indigenous territories.<ref name=":10">Schmid, D., & Castro. C., (2023). ''REDD+ projects in the Colombian Amazon: Social challenges and lack of transparency''. Rainforest Foundation Norway. [[/dv719tqmsuwvb.cloudfront.net/documents/REDD rapport 2024 ENG.pdf|https://dv719tqmsuwvb.cloudfront.net/documents/REDD_rapport_2024_ENG.pdf]]</ref> Evidently REDD+ plays an integral part in the country’s efforts of environmental conservation, and incentives have been introduced to promote the development of such projects. For example, in 2016 the government adopted a higher tax that covered fossil fuels, but companies are able to avoid paying the tax by investing in carbon offsets that have been generated domestically.<ref name=":9" /> This led to a boost in the domestic REDD+ market in 2017, as Colombian companies invested as to escape higher taxes. Notably, 23 of the 36 REDD+ projects currently under development in the Amazon region were initiated in or after 2018.<ref name=":10" /> Currently Colombia’s REDD+ program sits at over 45 pilot and voluntary carbon projects, as well as one large-scale jurisdictional approach in the Amazon.<ref name=":11">Zambrano-Cortés, D. G. (2024). ''The politics, spaces and subjects of forest conservation in Colombia''. [internal PhD, WU, Wageningen University]. Wageningen University. [[/doi.org/10.18174/675328|https://doi.org/10.18174/675328]]</ref>

=== Indigenous rights - Constitutional, tenure and bundle rights ===
''De jure'', the Indigenous peoples of Colombia have comprehensive tenure and bundle rights that have been articulated in the national constitution. Collective land titles are granted to Indigenous communities by the Colombian government, and as a result about 34 percent of Colombian land (almost 38 million hectares) is legally recognized as Indigenous territory or collective lands of Afro-descendent communities.<ref name=":10" /> These collective land tenure rights have been in effect since the implementation of the 1991 constitution, granting them the authority to exercise legal control over their territories in accordance with their own customs and procedures.<ref>Max Planck Institute (n.d.) ''Colombia 1991 (rev. 2015).'' Institute. [[/www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Colombia 2015|https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Colombia_2015]]</ref> Furthermore, the carbon rights of Indigenous peoples are explicitly defined in the constitution and tied specifically to the ownership of land of the communities.<ref name=":2" /> This in theory provides a solid legal basis for upholding the rights of Indigenous communities in Colombia, specifically relating to REDD+ activities, as it allows communities to define and negotiate the terms of said projects. A summary of the various laws relating to Indigenous rights have been summarized below:
{| class="wikitable"
| colspan="2" |'''Law (1991 constitution)'''
|-
|Article 63

|Indigenous territories are considered collective property. Land is not owned by individuals but is shared by the community. The state must respect these collective rights and cannot alter land ownership without the consent of the Indigenous peoples.
|-
|Article 76 - ''Consulta previa''.
|Pertains to the right of Indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities; prior consultation must be undertaken before any entity undertakes activities that may affect their territories, culture, or way of life.
|-
|Article 330
|Indigenous communities have the right to govern their territories.
|-
|Article 329
|The Reservation is a collective, inalienable, and indefeasible property.
|-
|Decree 1386 of 1994, Article 10; Decree 2164 of 1995, Article 22) 39.
|"The administration and management of these lands are subjected to uses and customs of the beneficiaries."
|}
Whilst land and tenure rights are enshrined into the constitution, the precariousness of these rights persists due to a lack of resources to ensure enforcement, as well as the deeper issue of corruption. As previously stated, the rate of deforestation increased significantly in Colombia’s post-conflict era, evidencing the nations inability to maintain control over unlawful acts of land-grabbing and disposition. Whilst this began with new peasants converting the Amazon for subsistence purposes, it ultimately led to new areas for the growth of cocoa, much to the benefit of narco-traffickers who could monopolize on this illegal surplus in ‘accumulation by dispossession’.<ref name=":8" />

With respect to the legalities of consultation, Colombia has enshrined ''consulta previa'' into the constitution. Translating to ‘prior consultation’, this legal text provides the formal grounds for Indigenous engagement when any legislative or administrative measures are implemented on Indigenous territory. Importantly, consultation should be achieved in accordance with the customs of the ethnic group with which the project is being imposed upon. However, there have been recent cases of contestation specifically relating to how ''consulta previa'' applies to REDD+ on Indigenous lands, and the RIU – SM project was one that was involved with such a case.

=== Affected and interested stakeholders ===
{| class="wikitable"
| colspan="5" |'''Affected stakeholders'''
|-
|Stakeholders
|Primary objective(s)
|Secondary objective(s)
|Relative power
|Scope of influence
|-
|ACATISEMA - Asociación de Cabildos y Autoridades Indígenas de la Selva de Matavén
|Foster the integral development, social and cultural preservation of the indigenous communities in the Mataven Jungle and to

Consolidate the territory, and conservation and preservation of the environment and biodiversity of the Mataven Jungle

|
|Has the highest authority in the reservation.
Rights to the land and revenue generated from project
|
|-
|Indigenous ''resguardos'' of the RIU-SM
|Primary and direct beneficiaries of project

Seek to maintain land rights

Promote traditional and cultural beliefs
|Uphold rights
|High power, though little input into project activities in reality.
|
|-
|Landless peasants
|Gain more access to land. Improve rights
|
|Low to none
|Local
|-
| colspan="5" |'''Interested stakeholders'''
|-
|MEDIAMOS F&M
|Project developer
|
|Powerful: involved with various technical aspects of project development
|International
|-
|Ministerio de Ambiente y Desarrollo Sostenible
|Environmental planning; sustainable development
Form strategic alliances with social and institutional participants in different sectoral and territorial scenarios.
|
|
|National
|-
|Dirección de Asuntos Indígenas, ROM y Minorías - Ministerio del Interior
|Prepares policy in favour of Indigenous groups
Supports ethnic and cultural rights of Indigenous
|
|Not ''per se'' involved with project, though the policy it has introduced has affected project outcomes
|National
|-
|Corporinoquía
|Environmental authority to ensure the proper use of natural resources in their area of jurisdiction.
|Supporting of project
|As the project is in line with the mandate of Corporinoquía, they are supportive
|Regional
|-
|Other government institutions: Governor ofice of Vichada, Mayor ofice Cumaribo
|The Reservation for being part of the Cumaribo, Vichada, has territorial jurisdiction relations with the Governor’s office and the Mayor’s office.
|
|
|Regional - national
|-
|Fundación NATURA
|Civil organization
Conservation, use and management of biodiversity
Generate social, economic and environmental benefits
|
|
|International
|-
|Mining companies
|Compete with the Project for the territory's resources.
|
|Relatively powerful due to corruption, though legally obstructed to achieve objective
|International
|-
|Other indigenous communities neighboring RIU-SM
|Ensure autonomy with respect to their own jurisdiction
|Not involved with the project though potentially affected by it
|Low, with respect to the project
|Local
|-
|FONDO ACCIÓN
|Encourage the participation of civil society and the private sector in the implementation of the country’s public policies
|Conservation and sustainable development; and protection/development of children.
|
|National
|-
|Asocarbono – An industry association, including Verra, ProClima, Biofix, and ACATISEMA.

|Promote the agenda of high-level actors of the VCM
|
|Powerful
|International
|-
|OPIAC: National Oganization of the Indigenous Peoples of the Colombian Amazon

|Promotes Indigenous rights in Colombia
Exercises a political representation of the indigenous peoples of the Colombian Amazon
|
|
|National
|}

=== Discussion ===
According to the official REDD+ Mataven website<ref>RIU – SM (n.d.). ''REDD+ Mataven''. [[/reddmataven.com/|https://reddmataven.com/]]</ref> the project has resulted in a myriad of benefits to the Indigenous communities of the region. For example, as a result of the funds generated from the projects activities, there have been improvements in infrastructure, transportation and education, ultimately leading to the empowerment and improved governance of ACETISMA. However, the project has come under fire for multiple reasons.

For one, in 2015 some of the Indigenous communities filed a lawsuit referring to the violation of their right to ''consulta previa''. However, the court ruled that their Indigenous rights had not been violated as it was ACETISMA that initially sought MEDIAMOS to develop the project, and that ACETISMA were the best representatives of those Indigenous communities. Furthermore, the projects main focus was the conservation of the rainforest and therefore did not threaten the cultural integrity of those communities.<ref name=":10" /> However, regardless of the outcome of this case, its occurrence points to internal disagreement amongst Indigenous participants of the RIU-SM project. In a study involving interviews with Indigenous members of the project, there was a significant proportion of interviewees that had little knowledge regarding various aspects of the project, such as responsibilities of participation, or the benefit-sharing mechanism in place.<ref name=":2" /> This further reinforces the point that, in the case of the RIU-SM project it may not be ‘bottom-up’ and eludes to the power imbalance experienced between Mediamos, the project developer, and Indigenous community members. In the PD there is a breakdown of the distribution of income between ACETISMA and Mediamos, which shows a significant proportion of revenue flowing to the former organisation throughout the project’s operations.<ref name=":7" /> However, there is currently no publicly available documentation supporting this initial claim<ref name=":9" /> as there is no obligation to provide this information, leading to a general lack of transparency in the market and between all of the relevant actors. Subsequent meetings with Indigenous leaders have however shown a marked support of the Mataven project, with one Indigenous leader explicitly stating “...the Redd+ project has brought resources that they never had before, which allowed them to open new school classrooms, 21 rural aqueducts, cocoa crops and even headquarters in Cumaribo and Inírida.”<ref>Lievano, A. B. (2021) Colombia's biggest carbon credit project could be selling hot air. Latin American Center for Investigative Journalism. [[/www.elclip.org/el-mayor-proyecto-de-bonos-de-carbono-de-colombia-podria-estar-vendiendo-aire-caliente/|https://www.elclip.org/el-mayor-proyecto-de-bonos-de-carbono-de-colombia-podria-estar-vendiendo-aire-caliente/]] </ref> Clearly there have been benefits for IPLC’s involved with this project, though the details of this benefit-sharing remain a mystery.

Secondly, the Mataven project has caused controversy due to its apparently inflated carbon credit issuance. The report states that this has been achieved by using a reference area that is not representative of the project area, as well as assuming an uncharacteristically heigh assumed rate of deforestation.<ref name=":12">Global Atlas of Environmental Justice (2023). ''Resguardo Indigena Unificado-Selva de Matavén (RIU SM) REDD+ Project, Colombia.'' [[/ejatlas.org/conflict/redd-project-resguardo-indigena-unificado-selva-de-mataven-riu-sm|https://ejatlas.org/conflict/redd-project-resguardo-indigena-unificado-selva-de-mataven-riu-sm]]</ref> The project used a baseline deforestation rate of 0.86% per year, which is significantly more than the Colombian government's national rate of 0.18%. Additionally, according to the report the reference area chosen is more easily accessed and therefore more prone to deforestation, making it an inaccurate comparison to the relatively remote project area.<ref name=":2" /> This has led to the creation of excess carbon credits, or “hot air” credits, which have been criticized for not reflecting real environmental benefits.<ref name=":9" /> To add further insult to injury these credits have been used by a Colombian fossil fuel distributor company to avoid paying taxes, as described earlier by Colombia’s change in policy in 2017. In doing so, the company avoided paying approximately $18.9 million in taxes.<ref name=":2" /> There has been subsequent back and forth between Verra and Carbon Market Watch, with Verra refuting the claims<ref>Verra (2021). ''Carbon Market Watch Report on Colombian REDD+ Projects Contains Flawed Allegations.'' [[/verra.org/carbon-market-watch-report-on-colombian-redd-projects-contains-flawed-allegations/|https://verra.org/carbon-market-watch-report-on-colombian-redd-projects-contains-flawed-allegations/]] </ref> Regardless of the science, Colombia recently introduced a resolution in 2018 (Resolution 1447 – 2018) that requires projects to use baselines that comply with national reference levels.<ref name=":13">Dufrasne, D. (2021b). Companies use ”hot air” forestry offsets to avoid taxes in Colombia: Carbon Market Watch’s fact-check of Verra’s response. Carbon Market Watch. [[/carbonmarketwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/CMWs-fact-check-of-Verras-response-on-Colombia.pdf|https://carbonmarketwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/CMWs-fact-check-of-Verras-response-on-Colombia.pdf]]</ref><ref>IEA (2022). ''Resolution 1447 – 2018. Monitoring, Reporting, and Verification System for mitigation actions at the national level.'' International Energy Agency. [[/www.iea.org/policies/14772-resolution-1447-2018-monitoring-reporting-and-verification-system-for-mitigation-actions-at-the-national-level|https://www.iea.org/policies/14772-resolution-1447-2018-monitoring-reporting-and-verification-system-for-mitigation-actions-at-the-national-level]]</ref> Going forward, REDD+ projects that are being implemented in Colombia will have to abide by Colombia’s national legislation.

=== Summary ===
Colombia has a long history of engaging in REDD+ as it has been used to limit environmental degradation in the post-conflict era, in alignment with the country’s national peacebuilding agenda.<ref name=":11" /> Owing to the country’s comprehensive tenure and bundle rights, IPLC’s have robust ''de jure'' rights to land as they collectively own it, and rights to carbon are tied to this ownership. This puts Colombia as one of the world leaders in legal terms relating to REDD+ project implementation, but due to a lack of resources to ensure enforcement, as well as corruption, historically these laws have not been adhered to.<ref name=":10" /><ref name=":2" /> There are many documented cases showing the displacement on IPLC’s from traditional lands, poor efforts to adhere to ''consulta previa'', and inequitable benefit sharing.<ref>Greenfield, P. (2023''). The ‘carbon pirates’ preying on Amazon’s Indigenous communities.'' The Guardian. [[/www.theguardian.com/environment/2023/jan/21/amazon-indigenous-communities-carbon-offsetting-pirates-aoe|https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2023/jan/21/amazon-indigenous-communities-carbon-offsetting-pirates-aoe]]</ref><ref name=":14">Lang, C., (2024). ''Colombia’s Constitutional Court rules in favour of Indigenous Peoples. Identifies serious flaws in the REDD+ Baka Rokarire project.'' REDD_Monitor. [[/reddmonitor.substack.com/p/colombias-constitutional-court-rules|https://reddmonitor.substack.com/p/colombias-constitutional-court-rules]]</ref>

The case of the Mataven project provides an interesting example of how it is the market itself that is failing to address concerns regarding transparency, whether that be relating to benefit-sharing amongst relevant stakeholders, or Indigenous representation and engagement throughout the implementation of REDD+ projects. Some ACATISEMA members have explicitly stated their support for the Mataven project,<ref name=":12" /> and its benefits can be seen first-hand in the form of improved infrastructure in local communities involved with the project.<ref>Myers, J. E., Parra, M. A., Bedford, C. (2021). ''How Carbon Offsetting Can Build a Forest.'' Stanford Social Innovation Review. [[/ssir.org/articles/entry/how carbon offsetting can build a forest|https://ssir.org/articles/entry/how_carbon_offsetting_can_build_a_forest]]</ref> However, an exact breakdown of how and where revenue is being distributed to IPLC’s remains elusive.<ref name=":13" /> Furthermore, the level of IPLC engagement has come into question, specifically with reference to ''consulta previa'' and the overall understanding that IPLC’s have regarding the project’s intended outcomes and activities.<ref name=":10" /> This is not a rare case in Colombia and has been witnessed occurring with other projects that have been implemented on Indigenous territories in the Colombian Amazon.<ref name=":17">Lang, C., (2023''). “It destroys everything,” says Indigenous leader about the REDD+ Baka Rokarire project in Colombia''. REDD Monitor. [[/reddmonitor.substack.com/p/it-destroys-everything-says-indigenous|https://reddmonitor.substack.com/p/it-destroys-everything-says-indigenous]]</ref> However, a recent ruling by the Colombian Constitutional court voted in favour of Indigenous groups in Colombia, upholding “the rights to self-determination, autonomy, self-government, territory, identity, physical and cultural integrity, and free, prior and informed consent of the indigenous communities”.<ref name=":14" /> This review ultimately sets a legal precedent safeguarding the fundamental rights of IPLCs with REDD+ project implementation and shows that progress is being made to improve the likelihood that REDD+ will result in genuine benefits to those affected by project implementation.

To ensure a more authentic engagement with IPLC’s as to result in legitimate and equitable benefit-sharing, improvements must be made by the Colombian government, as well as within the VCM itself. For the former, Colombia’s national registry for GHG mitigation activities must be updated; it has been offline since 2022.<ref name=":10" /> As a result, transparency is lacking. International finance could be utilized as to alleviate this issue, and only with an accurate and reliable database may the market be regulated. In the broader sense, VCM registries must create stricter guidelines promoting transparency. Often PD’s refer to annexed documents that contain relevant information regarding benefit-sharing, though these are often not publicly available.<ref name=":9" /> This limits transparency and increases the likelihood of inequitable agreements being made between project proponents and developers, further exacerbating existing power asymmetries between the two groups and limiting the likelihood that ''consulta previa'' is honestly adhered to.<ref name=":10" /> This has led to conflict within Indigenous communities, rather than a strengthening of their social fabric.

Furthermore, the Mataven project calls into question the actual emissions reduction that REDD+ projects achieve. Whilst Colombia has since updated its regulations such that REDD+ must use baselines that comply with national reference levels, it is up in the air as to how representative these guidelines are. Reference areas must represent project areas and without the appropriate regulations in place project developers lack the incentive to create realistic baselines; ultimately they are aiming to produce the maximum number of credits as to generate the greatest possible revenues.

==Conclusion==
As a market-based mechanism, REDD+ is shackled by the construct in which it operates; fundamentally it is a capitalist means of fixing a capitalist problem, which comes with limitations. Both Brazil and Colombia have relatively robust laws that have been written into the constitution, ultimately promoting more equitable results of project implementation. However, as in Colombia IPLC’s collectively own the land, whereas in Brazil these groups only own rights to use the land,<ref name=":2" /> Colombia can be considered better equipped for the establishment of REDD+ projects on traditional Indigenous territory. However, even with these laws in place enforcement remain a matter of concern. Furthermore, given the wide variety of ontological and epistemological perspectives of Indigenous communities, and how these views conflict with the Western worldview from which market-based REDD+ came to fruition, there is an inherent difficulty in implementing a system of governance in REDD+ on Indigenous lands.<ref name=":1" />. Putting a price on nature conflicts with Indigenous perspectives and there have been instances where this has attacked the social and cultural fabric of IPLC’s.<ref name=":17" /> To avoid this REDD+ developers must have the genuine intent of understanding the perspective of the Indigenous group they are working with and aim to implement REDD+ with a bottom-up approach.

In both countries, transparency must be improved to ensure that FPIC is adhered to and subsequently ensure fair IPLC representation and engagement. This issue predominantly arises due to the poor requirements of standards in the VCM. As such, proponents are guided by developers which have little incentive to truly act in the interests of Indigenous groups; ultimately the organizations in charge of project development are interested in increasing project revenues. This has led to instances of over-crediting, as without a transparent framework in which to operate it is difficult to evaluate the legitimacy of the claims being made by project proponents and developers. However, with recent advances that address concerns of additionality<ref name=":15" /> there is hope for improved market integrity. Standards of the VCM must continue to be scrutinized to ensure that progress continues to be made.

Going forward, progress should be made to formalize the customary laws and traditional lands of IPLCs, and finance should be directed towards the enforcement of these laws. The environmental,<ref name=":16" /> economic,<ref name=":5" /><ref>Ding, H., Veit, P. G., Blackman, A., Gray, E., Reytar, K., Altamirano, J. C., Hodgdon, B., (2016). ''Climate benefits, tenure costs: The economic case for securing Indigenous land rights in the Amazon''. WRI. [[/files.wri.org/d8/s3fs-public/Climate Benefits Tenure Costs Executive Summary.pdf|https://files.wri.org/d8/s3fs-public/Climate_Benefits_Tenure_Costs_Executive_Summary.pdf]]</ref> and social<ref>Sarmiento Barletti, J. P., Heise Vigil, N., & Larson, A. M. (2023). ''Safeguards at a glance: Are voluntary standards supporting community land, resource and carbon rights?'' CIFOR-ICRAF. [[/www.cifor-icraf.org/publications/pdf files/Flyer/REDD-Safeguards-7.pdf|https://www.cifor-icraf.org/publications/pdf_files/Flyer/REDD-Safeguards-7.pdf]] </ref> benefits of this have been researched and are well understood. By developing culturally appropriate frameworks for rights-based conservation regimes, that work with IPLCs in accordance with their worldviews, REDD+ could be used to promote Indigenous autonomy. However, progress still must be made to achieve this goal.

==References==

Documentation:Open Case Studies/FRST522/2024/REDD+ in Indigenous Amazonia: What works and what doesn’t?

2024-12-12T23:48:07Z

ConnorHaynes: /* Interested and affected stakeholders */

__TOC__

==Positionality==
First and foremost I am not Indigenous, and whilst there are a myriad of cultures, ontologies and epistemologies that are not sufficiently represented by simply stating ‘Indigenous’, it is commonly accepted that these worldviews are vastly different to those of the ‘Western’ world, which is the world in which I grew up and matured. I am therefore only understanding of Indigenous cultures, beliefs and customary laws based upon available online literature and those which I have learnt through life, in addition to those introduced to me in my Master’s degree. As such, I will never be able to fully relate to an Indigenous person; the best I can do is try to understand and learn. Only throughout this process am I able to work towards reconciliation and attempt to address the inequities experienced by Indigenous folk globally.

Additionally, I am yet to act as a carbon project proponent and so do not understand the nuances or stresses of undertaking such a task. Whilst an individual proponent may have the best intention of procuring a carbon project for its social and environmental benefits, there are a number of stakeholders involved throughout the entire process which influence its eventual outcome. Without experience acting as a project proponent I am naïve in understanding the process and it's difficulties.

==Acronyms / Terminology==
'''Acronyms:'''

AFOLU: Agriculture, Forestry and Other Land-Use

ICVCM: Integrity Council for the Voluntary Carbon Market

IPLC: Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities

KMGBF: Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework

LAC: Latin American Countries

MRV: Monitoring, Reporting and Verification

REDD+: Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation

UNCBD: United Nations Convention on Biological Biodiversity

VCMI: Voluntary Carbon Markets Integrity Initiative

'''Terminology:'''

''Additionality:'' Additionality is the determination of whether the project will lead to the expected outcomes when compared to the baseline or ‘business as usual’ emissions.

''Leakage'': Refers to the shifting of emissions to outside the project boundary as a result of the project’s activities.

''Permanence:'' Permanence refers to the degree to which a carbon credit is equivalent to a permanent removal or reduction in emissions.
==Abstract==
This case study illustrates two examples of Indigenous-led REDD+ projects on Indigenous territory in Colombia and Brazil. Both countries have a relatively long history of engaging with REDD+ but have slightly different legal structures pertaining to the rights of Indigenous peoples on their traditional territories, and specifically their ‘carbon’ rights. As such, the intention is to evaluate how these differing ''de jure'' rights translate on the ground. With respect to REDD+, do certain rights result in legitimately positive benefits to IPLCs, as well as the environment that these projects were originally intended to protect? To reduce inconsistency, projects were chosen that utilized the same standard, namely Verra’s ‘Verified Carbon Standard’. The intention is such that the reader can evaluate the effectiveness and true benefit of REDD+ projects to IPLC’s, based upon the legal frameworks of the host country. A secondary intention is such that the reader is better equipped to conduct a prefeasibility assessment based upon available online literature, to evaluate the likelihood that REDD+ can be implemented in any chosen country, with the genuine intent of benefiting IPLC’s that are directly affected as a result of REDD+ project implementation.

==REDD+ and the VCM in Brazil and Colombia==
REDD+, originally introduced by the UNFCCC, is a market-based mechanism sitting within the VCM that aims to reverse the loss of forests and carbon stocks, specifically in developing countries. Simply put, an entity or an individual can voluntarily pay another that has engaged with REDD+ and subsequently sequestered carbon, to offset their own emissions using ‘credits’, sold as units of greenhouse gas equivalent to one ton of carbon dioxide (CO2e). Forestry and Land-Use remains to be the largest category of carbon credits traded by transaction volume on the VCM, with REDD+ being the most popular project type in this category, accounting for 78% of credits traded.<ref name=":0">Procton, A., (2024). ''State of the voluntary carbon market 2024: On the path to maturity.'' Forest Trends Ecosystem Marketplace.</ref> Furthermore, over one-third of the credits sold within this category were sourced from projects that had been implemented in LAC and the Caribbean in 2024.<ref name=":0" /> Of the four largest standards issuing carbon credits, Verra accounts for roughly 80% of issuances in Latin America,<ref>Pullins, T. (2022). Growth of carbon markets in Latin America. White & Case. [[/www.whitecase.com/publications/insight/latin-america-focus-fall-2022-growth-carbon-markets|https://www.whitecase.com/publications/insight/latin-america-focus-fall-2022-growth-carbon-markets]] </ref> and even in the face of recent scrutiny,<ref>West, T. A. P., Bofim, B., Haya, B. K. (2024). Methodological issues with deforestation baselines compromise the integrity of carbon offsets from REDD+. ''Global Environmental Change, 87'' [[/doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2024.102863|https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2024.102863]]</ref><ref>Wyburd I., & Dufrasne, G. (2023). Error Log: Exposing the methodological failures of REDD+ forestry projects. Carbon Market Watch. [[/carbonmarketwatch.org/publications/error-log-exposing-the-methodological-failures-of-redd-forestry-projects/|https://carbonmarketwatch.org/publications/error-log-exposing-the-methodological-failures-of-redd-forestry-projects/]]</ref><ref name=":15">Haya, B. K., Alford-Jones, K., Anderegg, W. R. L., Beymer-Farris, B., Blanchard, L., Bomfim, B., Chin, D., Evans, S., Hogan, M., Holm, J. A., McAfee, K., So, I. S., West, T. A. P., & Withey, L. (2023). ''Quality assessment of REDD+ carbon credit projects''. Berkeley Carbon Trading Project. [[/gspp.berkeley.edu/research-and-impact/centers/cepp/projects/berkeley-carbontrading-project/REDD+|https://gspp.berkeley.edu/research-and-impact/centers/cepp/projects/berkeley-carbontrading-project/REDD+]]</ref> REDD+ projects account for a significant proportion of the VCM with their continued application likely to persist.<ref>Gordon, O. (2022). ''The interwoven fortunes of carbon markets and indigenous communities.'' Energy Monitor. [[/www.energymonitor.ai/tech/carbon-removal/the-interwoven-fortunes-of-carbon-markets-and-indigenous-communities/|https://www.energymonitor.ai/tech/carbon-removal/the-interwoven-fortunes-of-carbon-markets-and-indigenous-communities/]]</ref><ref>Müller, M., Coustar, C., Bietta, F., Mathres, M. (2022). ''UNFCCC REDD+ and the power of sovereign carbon.'' Deutsche Banke Chief Investment Office. [[/www.rainforestcoalition.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/CIO-Special-UNFCCC-REDD-power-of-sovereign-carbon.pdf|https://www.rainforestcoalition.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/CIO-Special-UNFCCC-REDD-power-of-sovereign-carbon.pdf]]</ref><ref>Pullins, T. (2022). ''Growth of carbon markets in Latin America.'' White & Case. [[/www.whitecase.com/publications/insight/latin-america-focus-fall-2022-growth-carbon-markets|https://www.whitecase.com/publications/insight/latin-america-focus-fall-2022-growth-carbon-markets]] </ref> With the introduction of updated methodologies aimed at addressing these concerns,<ref>Verra (2023a). ''Setting the Standard: Verra’s Revolutionary New REDD Methodology.'' [[/verra.org/program-notice/setting-the-standard-verras-revolutionary-new-redd-methodology/|https://verra.org/program-notice/setting-the-standard-verras-revolutionary-new-redd-methodology/]]</ref><ref>Verra (2023b). ''VM0048 Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation, v1.0.'' [[/verra.org/methodologies/vm0048-reducing-emissions-from-deforestation-and-forest-degradation-v1-0/|https://verra.org/methodologies/vm0048-reducing-emissions-from-deforestation-and-forest-degradation-v1-0/]]</ref> there is hope for renewed buyer confidence in the integrity of this market,<ref>MSCI (2023). ''Verra’s New Methodology for Unplanned Deforestation Aims to Silence the Critics''. [[/www.msci.com/www/blog-posts/verra-s-new-methodology-for/04577808942|https://www.msci.com/www/blog-posts/verra-s-new-methodology-for/04577808942]]</ref> though more work still needs to be done.

Both Colombia and Brazil have a relatively long history of implementing REDD+ projects, using both fund-based and market-based mechanisms. For example, both countries were participants in the ‘Amazon Indigenous REDD+ (RIA in Spanish) initiative, with the first pilot implementation project being initiated in Colombia’s Puiawai Natural Reserve.<ref>Garzón, E., (2017). ''Amazon Indigenous REDD+: An innovative approach to conserve Colombian forests?'' Mongabay. [[/news.mongabay.com/2017/01/amazon-indigenous-redd-an-innovative-approach-to-conserve-colombian-forests/|https://news.mongabay.com/2017/01/amazon-indigenous-redd-an-innovative-approach-to-conserve-colombian-forests/]]</ref> The relevance of these two countries with respect to REDD+ is simple. Much of the Amazon’s primary tropical rainforest falls within these countries jurisdiction and this rainforest has been consistently under threat from external pressures and encroachment, whether that be in the form of land-clearing for commercial ranching, subsistence purposes, illicit drug production or illegal mining practices,<ref name=":8">Sánchez García, P. A. & Wong, G. Y., (2024) “The political economy of deforestation in the Colombian Amazon”, ''Journal of Political Ecology'' ''31''(1), 178–199. [[/doi.org/10.2458/jpe.5230|https://doi.org/10.2458/jpe.5230]]</ref><ref>Radwin, M. (2023). ''Drug trafficking fuels other deforestation drivers in the Amazon: report.'' Mongabay. [[/news.mongabay.com/2023/07/drug-trafficking-fuels-other-deforestation-drivers-in-the-amazon-report/|https://news.mongabay.com/2023/07/drug-trafficking-fuels-other-deforestation-drivers-in-the-amazon-report/]]</ref><ref>Haddad, E.A., Araújo, I.F., Feltran-Barbieri, R., Perobelli, F. S., Rocha, A., Sass, K. S., Nobre, C. A. (2024). Economic drivers of deforestation in the Brazilian Legal Amazon. ''Nat Sustain'' ''7'', 1141–1148. [[/doi.org/10.1038/s41893-024-01387-7|https://doi.org/10.1038/s41893-024-01387-7]] </ref><ref>Hänggli, A., Levy, S. A., Armenteras, D., Bovolo, C. I., Brandão, J., Rueda, X., & Garrett, R. D. (2023). A systematic comparison of deforestation drivers and policy effectiveness across the amazon biome. ''Environmental Research Letters, 18''(7), 073001. [[/doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/acd408|https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/acd408]]</ref> to name a few.

In theory, REDD+ can be used to provide the economic incentive to promote sustained environmental protection of Indigenous lands, with a focus on the rights and livelihoods of IPLCs. Currently the overall funding to IPLCs tenure rights and forest management in tropical countries is low, receiving just $270 million per year between 2011-2020 from bilateral and multilateral donors and private philanthropies.<ref>Hatcher, J., Owen, M., Yin, D., (2021). ''Falling short: Donor funding for Indigenous peoples and local communities to secure tenure rights and manage forests in tropical countries (2011 -2020).'' Rainforest Foundation Norway. [[/dv719tqmsuwvb.cloudfront.net/documents/Publikasjoner/Andre-rapporter/RFN Falling short 2021.pdf|https://dv719tqmsuwvb.cloudfront.net/documents/Publikasjoner/Andre-rapporter/RFN_Falling_short_2021.pdf]]</ref> REDD+ has the potential to channel funding as to promote Indigenous rights and autonomy, provided there is transparent and equitable benefit-sharing for those involved. Fundamentally, only with the inclusion of IPLC’s, or preferably with IPLC’s acting as project proponents, is REDD+ able to promote Indigenous agency and improve IPLC rights and governance. And only when the rights of those inhabiting the land are formally recognized can the land be effectively conserved.<ref name=":16">Reytar, K., Veit, P., von Braun, J. (2024). ''Protecting Biodiversity Hinges on Securing Indigenous and Community Land Rights.'' WRI. [[/www.wri.org/insights/indigenous-and-local-community-land-rights-protect-biodiversity|https://www.wri.org/insights/indigenous-and-local-community-land-rights-protect-biodiversity]]</ref> The inclusion of IPLCs in REDD+ project development is therefore considered to be essential for project success, and this is in theory embodied in the very nature of REDD+.<ref name=":1">Alvarez, G., Elfving, M. and Andrade, C. (2016) ‘REDD+ governance and indigenous peoples in Latin America: the case of Suruí Carbon Project in the Brazilian Amazon Forest’, ''Latin American J. Management for Sustainable Development 3''(2) pp.133–146. [[/dx.doi.org/10.1504/LAJMSD.2016.083705|10.1504/LAJMSD.2016.083705]]</ref> Partially owing to a long history of dealing with REDD+, Colombia and Brazil are amongst just a few of the countries hosting tropical rainforests that explicitly recognise community rights to carbon and tie these rights to the legal ownership of lands and forests. In Colombia, carbon rights are tied to rights of the land, whereas in Brazil carbon rights are tied to forest rights.<ref name=":2">RRI and McGill University (2021). Technical report: ''Status of legal recognition of Indigenous Peoples’, Local Communities’ and Afro-descendant Peoples’ rights to carbon stored in tropical lands and forests''. Rights and Resources Initiative. [[/doi.org/10.53892/MLQQ5744|https://doi.org/10.53892/MLQQ5744]]</ref>

==Brazil: The Suruí Forest Carbon Project==
[[File:The Amazon Basin, Brazil.jpg|thumb|316x316px|Brazil's Amazon rainforest]]

=== Project description and location ===
The Surui Forest Carbon project was implemented in 2009 on the territory of the Surui people, which is situated in the southern part of Brazil’s Amazon between the states of Rondônia and Mato Grosso. Surui Indigenous territory covers an area of 2,481 km2, though the intention of the PCFS was to protect a portion of this total area. According to the PD, the stated objective was to “prevent 13,575.3 hectares of tropical forest from being cleared by 2038, to avoid the emission of 7,258,352.3 tCO2e to the atmosphere, and to contribute to the preservation of the Paiter Surui lifestyle and traditions.”<ref>IDESAM (2011). ''Project description: Surui forest carbon project''. Institute for Conservation and Sustainable Development of Amazonas. Link: "PROJ_DESC_1118_02FEB2012.PDF" found at [[/registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/1118|https://registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/1118]] </ref> This region sits within one of the Brazilian Amazon’s main ‘arcs of deforestation’ and pressure from loggers and ranchers is a matter of concern.

Notably, the PCFS was the first REDD+ project to be proposed by Indigenous peoples in the Brazilian Amazon on their own territory and was the first to receive certification by both the VCS and CCBS.<ref name=":1" />. Metareilá, the Surui’s own Indigenous association, acted as project proponent and the Institute for Conservation and Sustainable Development of Amazonas (IDESAM) assisted with project development, alongside multiple other stakeholder groups. As an endogenous initiative procured and conducted by the Surui community, the SFCP had a ‘non-centralized model of governance’, which reflected the characteristics and traditions of the Surui people. <ref name=":1" />

Only after two years of consultations between the 24 communities involved and the relevant governmental agencies (primarily FUNAI and the Ministry of Environment) was a Memorandum of Understanding signed, showing community consent to develop the project.<ref name=":3">Garcia, B., Rimmer, L., Canal Vieira, L., Mackey, B., (2021). REDD+ and forest protection on indigenous lands in the Amazon. ''RECIEL 30'', 207–219. [[/doi.org/10.1111/reel.12389|https://doi.org/10.1111/reel.12389]]</ref> In 2012 after verification from an independent third-party body, the Surui were able to sell carbon credits on the international market. Between 2009 and 2014 the project drastically helped limit the deforestation occurring within the project’s site, causing many to deem it a success.<ref name=":4">Howard, F. E., (2023). ''An Analysis of the Suruí Forest Carbon Project in Context of Settler Colonialism''. Masters thesis. Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University. [[/vtechworks.lib.vt.edu/server/api/core/bitstreams/b0cde6de-794c-453f-856b-ee72bde3db06/content|https://vtechworks.lib.vt.edu/server/api/core/bitstreams/b0cde6de-794c-453f-856b-ee72bde3db06/content]]</ref>

=== National climate targets, policies and legislation ===
Rates of deforestation in Brazil’s legal Amazon are significantly impacted by the government in charge. This is evidenced in the decade between 2012 and 2021 whilst under the conservative Bolsonaro administration, when deforestation in the Amazon increased 185% — from a loss of 4,571 km2 in 2012 to 13,038 km2 in 2021.<ref>INPE (2022). ''Observação da Terra. [[/www.obt.inpe.br/OBT/assuntos/programas/amazonia/prodes|http://www.obt.inpe.br/OBT/assuntos/programas/amazonia/prodes]]''</ref> However, since Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s appointment in 2022 there has been a steady decline in the rate of deforestation, which is now roughly half what it was in 2021.<ref>Terra Brasilis (2024). ''PRODES (deforestation): Deforestation rates – Legal Amazon – States''. [[/terrabrasilis.dpi.inpe.br/app/dashboard/deforestation/biomes/legal amazon/rates|https://terrabrasilis.dpi.inpe.br/app/dashboard/deforestation/biomes/legal_amazon/rates]]</ref> A significant proportion of emissions result from the clearing of rainforest and its subsequent conversion to ranching.<ref>MCTI (2022). ''Estimativas Anuais De Emissões De Gases De Efeito Estufa No Brasil.'' 6ª Edição. Ministério da Estado da Ciência, Tecnologia e Inovações. [[/www.gov.br/mcti/pt-br/acompanhe-o-mcti/sirene/publicacoes/estimativas-anuais-de-emissoes-gee/arquivos/6a-ed-estimativas-anuais.pdf|https://www.gov.br/mcti/pt-br/acompanhe-o-mcti/sirene/publicacoes/estimativas-anuais-de-emissoes-gee/arquivos/6a-ed-estimativas-anuais.pdf]]</ref> To address these emissions Brazil has implemented various adaptation policies, legislation and targets which are summarized below:
{| class="wikitable"
|'''Document name'''
|'''Type'''
|'''Publication year'''
|'''Key takeaways'''
|-
|National Policy on Climate Change (NPCC)
|Legislation
|2009
|Framework for addressing climate change
|-
|National Plan on Climate Change Adaptation
|Policy
|2016
|Framework for addressing impacts of climate change
|-
|Nationally Determined Contribution
|Target
|2024
|Reduce net greenhouse gas emissions by 59 to 67 percent below 2005 levels by 2035
|-
|Federal Constitution, Article 225
|Legislation
|2006
|The Amazon rainforest is considered as a ‘national heritage’.All levels of government have a shared responsibility to protect it and the environment
|-
| colspan="4" |'''Relating to REDD+'''
|-
|Plan of Action for the Prevention and Control of Deforestation in the Legal Amazon (PPCDAM)
|Policy
|2004
|Aims to reduce deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon
|-
|Forest code
|Legislation
|2012
|Aimed at reducing deforestation, but no specific mention of REDD+
|-
|Amazon Indigenous REDD+ Initiative
|Policy
|2012
|Incorporate Indigenous with REDD+ initiatives
|-
|National REDD+ Strategy (ENREDD+)
|Policy
|2016
|REDD+ as a fund-based mechanism
|}

=== Indigenous rights - Constitutional, tenure and bundle rights ===
In Brazil, Indigenous rights are robust and clearly defined according to the Brazilian Constitution. As a result, the Indigenous communities of the Brazilian Amazon have legal title to 13.8% of the national territory totalling 1.175 million km2, with a total of 631 territories.<ref>Federal government of Brazil (2024). ''Brazil’s NDC: National determination to contribute and transform''. [[/unfccc.int/sites/default/files/2024-11/Brazil Second Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) November2024.pdf|https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/2024-11/Brazil_Second%20Nationally%20Determined%20Contribution%20%28NDC%29_November2024.pdf]]</ref>
{| class="wikitable"
| colspan="2" |'''Laws'''
|-
|Article 231 of the 1988 Constitution
|Indigenous peoples to have their exclusive right to use their territories to derive economic benefits. Grants indigenous peoples the right to land, prohibits eviction, and restricts mining without authorization from the federal government.
|-
|Indigenous Peoples statute (1973).

|No acts restricting the full exercise of indigenous peoples’ permanent tenure over the land should be permitted.
|-
| colspan="2" | '''Treaties'''
|-
|United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2007)
|Requires States to obtain free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) for the approval of any projects affecting indigenous territories.
|-
|International Labour Organization Convention 169 (2019)
|Ratified and incorporated under domestic law in 2002 through Decree 10.088/2019, endorsing UNDRIP
|-
|American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2016)
|Supports and builds upon UNDRIP
|}
Whilst Indigenous communities in Brazil have legal title to land, it is the State that owns it. Indigenous people simply exercise permanent tenure over lands that they traditionally occupy and have ‘original rights’ to these traditional lands, which no other rights can prevail over.<ref name=":3" /> Indigenous lands, though not classified as protected areas, “have the highest level of protection by law because they are regulated by the Constitution” and cannot be leased or restricted without violating their original rights. The Suruí's right to develop the PCFS is grounded in the Brazilian Constitution, which grants Indigenous peoples exclusive rights to use the ‘riches of the soil, rivers and lakes’ of their land, and these rights cannot be overridden. Thus, Indigenous people and only Indigenous people are legally allowed to engage in productive activities on their land, provided these activities are conducted according to their own customs and traditions and are necessary for the wellbeing and cultural expression of their own people. In Brazil, it is the armed forces and federal police that are responsible for enforcing these laws, and FUNAI is responsible for representing Indigenous communities in judicial disputes.<ref name=":3" /> As such, provided a REDD+ does not violate the rights to territorial integrity, permanent land tenure and original rights, it is legally allowed.
[[File:Two Pataxo indians (Brasília, 04 April 2006).jpeg|thumb|414x414px|Two Indigenous in Brazil]]
'''CARBON RIGHTS:''' In Brazil, carbon rights are tied to forest rights.<ref name=":2" /> Carbon credits from REDD+ projects are seen as part of the economic benefits derived from indigenous lands, and as such, Indigenous communities are entitled to own, control and distribute these revenues themselves. The carbon credits generated from the (SFCP) were wholly owned by the Suruí people through Metareilá, with the Suruí Fund (managed by the Brazilian Biodiversity Fund - FUNBIO) acting as recipient. This legality reinforces Indigenous control over both land and carbon rights, as whoever has rights to the forest land is usually recognized as the owner of carbon rights.<ref name=":3" />

'''FPIC OBLIGATION:''' Furthermore, Brazilian law requires Free, Prior, and Informed Consent (FPIC) for REDD+ projects affecting indigenous lands, ensuring that international standards such as the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) and ILO Convention No. 169 are adhered to; Indigenous consent is, ''de jure,'' a necessity. Projects that violate these rights and fail to consult communities are therefore considered illegal. Notably there are no specific rules or procedures that have been written into the Brazilian constitution that provide guidance on how to achieve FPIC. This freedom reinforces Indigenous autonomy as it allows an Indigenous community to define the rules of consultation according to their customs and traditions.

Collectively these national and international laws provide an important safeguard to Indigenous peoples, making their consent a prerequisite for the establishment of REDD+ projects and recognizing their rights as the main beneficiaries of REDD+ revenues.<ref name=":3" /> However, as carbon rights are tied to forest rights in Brazil and not land rights, carbon is considered to be an ‘environmental service’ (Article 41(I)(A) Brazilian Forestry Code), and states, as well as the federal government, have the jurisdiction to exercise full legislative authority over carbon. <ref name=":2" /> As such, certain states have interpreted the law to imply that the title to carbon credits is attributable to the state.<ref>Loft, L., Ravikumar, A., Gebara, M. F., Pham, T. T., Resosudarmo, I. A. P., Assembe, S., Tovar, J. G., Mwangi, E., & Andersson, K. (2015). Taking Stock of Carbon Rights in REDD+ Candidate Countries: Concept Meets Reality. ''Forests'', ''6''(4), 1031-1060. [[/doi.org/10.3390/f6041031|https://doi.org/10.3390/f6041031]]</ref> Hence, even when carbon rights are clearly defined and tied to forest title it is insufficient in itself, and only by legally recognizing the customary rights of IPLCs can a fair and equitable outcome be realised.

=== Interested and affected stakeholders ===
{| class="wikitable"
| colspan="5" |'''Affected stakeholders'''
|-
|Stakeholders
|Primary objective(s)
|Secondary objective(s)
|Relative power
|Scope of influence
|-
|Metareilá Association of the Suruí Indigenous People
|Project proponent

Works to defend and preserve the cultural and territorial heritage of the Suruí people
|Ensure project longevity
|Powerful, though lackiing technical knowhow. Have carbon rights and thus own revenue from the project. Can decide how this revenue is distributed
|Regional - National
|-
|Other Indigenous groups and associations
|Support various aspects of proejct development
|Aim to benefit from the project
|Have the same rights as the Metareila with respect to land though are less involved with project development and have less say, nor derive as many benefits as the Metareila
|Local
|-
|''Campesinos'' (peasants)
|Procure more land.
|
|Have far fewer rights than Indigenous groups and no involvement with the project
|Local
|-
| colspan="5" |'''Interested stakeholders'''
|-
|Kanindé Association for Ethno-Environmental Defense – non-profit
|Involved with various aspects of project development
|
|Has a say in project direction, though less weight than the Metareila
|National - International
|-
|IDESAM - Institute for Conservation and Sustainable Development of Amazonas
|''C''alculation of baseline scenario
Preparation of PD
Validation and verification to VCS and CCB.
Coordination of biomass and carbon inventories. Support policy and technical coordination
|
|Powerful: Involved with technical aspects of development.
|International
|-
|Forest Trends
|Supported formulation and implementation of the project.
|
|Powerful: Tasked with raising funds and fostering an international network; an integral part of project development
|International
|-
|Amazon Conservation Team - ACT Brazil
|Supports various aspect of project development as well as offering legal advice. Also assists with carbon stock monitoring
|
|Powerful: An integral part of project development
|International
|-
|Brazilian Biodiversity Fund (FUNBIO)

|Responsible for the Suruí Fund
|
|Powerful. Controls how revenue is distributed amongst the Metareila.
|National
|-
|Ministry of Environment (MMA)
|Responsible for protection and conservation of natural environment
|
|Mid-power: Must be notified about project activities although cannot strictly alter decisions made by the Surui
|National
|-
|National Indian Foundation (FUNAI)
|Represents Indignous organizations with judicial matters

|
|Must be notified about project activities though is not involved with project governance
|National
|-
|Government of the State of Mato Grosso
|Encourage development, and reduce poverty and crime in Mato Grosso
|
|Legilative control over regional police and municipalities
|National
|}

=== Discussion ===
Although originally successful in achieving its goal of reducing deforestation and degradation, in 2016 diamonds were discovered in Surui territory, leading to an increase in illegal logging and mining.<ref name=":1" /> By 2018 the project site had been completely overrun by ''garimpeiros'' (small-scale gold miners), ultimately leading to the projects suspension that year. <ref name=":4" />

While the project had initially garnered support, divisions emerged within the community post-project implementation. Disputes arose over the unequal distribution of project revenues, leading to internal conflicts between different Suruí clans. These criticisms escalated in 2014 when the Catholic Indigenous Missionary Council supported calls for an end to the project due to mismanagement of revenues from carbon credit sales. <ref name=":3" /> Some Suruí members also argued that the REDD+ initiative harmed their way of life.<ref>Lang, C. (2014). ''“What are projects for that destroy life?” Interview with Henrique Suruí about the Paiter-Suruí REDD project, Brazil.'' REDD-Monitor. [[/redd-monitor.org/2014/12/17/what-are-projects-for-that-destroy-life-interview-with-henrique-surui-about-the-paiter-surui-redd-project-brazil/|https://redd-monitor.org/2014/12/17/what-are-projects-for-that-destroy-life-interview-with-henrique-surui-about-the-paiter-surui-redd-project-brazil/]]</ref>

Further complicating the situation was the controversial role of Henrique Suruí, one of the Suruí tribal leaders. In 2011, it was revealed that Henrique had violated the tribe's logging moratorium, collaborating with loggers in illegal activities. While Henrique later denied responsibility for the project’s failure, his actions, combined with internal disagreements, illustrated the lack of consensus within the Suruí leadership on the project’s goals and outcomes. Both of the tribe’s leaders possessed dramatically different perspectives on how they believed they could ensure agency, autonomy, and economic benefits for the Suruí people.<ref name=":4" /> This fragmentation within the community, in combination with the discovery of diamonds and the state's failure to protect indigenous land rights led to the indefinite suspension of the REDD+ project.

The project's collapse highlights broader structural issues, particularly the state's inconsistent support for indigenous land rights, influenced by settler colonialism, which undermined the project’s long-term viability.<ref name=":4" /> Additionally, the project’s creation was shaped by external actors, including the collaboration between Almir Suruí and Borges from Forest Trends, a Washington-based NGO. This partnership introduced a Western perspective on viewing the Suruí peoples forest, in contrast with their own perspectives on land use and governance. Furthermore, despite Borges’ Brazilian background, the power dynamics between a global North organization and a developing, Indigenous community were apparent.

=== Summary ===
The Suruí Forest Carbon Project provides an interesting example of how, even when the rights of IPLC’s are relatively robust, challenges persist in ensuring REDD+ project longevity. As such, in its current state, REDD+ in the Brazilian Amazon may not be a suitable market-based option for indigenous communities in the Amazon.<ref name=":3" /> Although initially successful in promoting indigenous autonomy and reducing deforestation, the project resulted in failure due to of a myriad of factors. Division between Surui communities was exacerbated by a perceived unequal benefit-sharing, and the impact of imposing REDD+ seems to have complicated the traditional social structure that the Surui were dependent on. These issues were influenced by Brazil's settler state dynamics, where indigenous land rights, although legally recognized, are often not upheld in practice due to insufficient enforcement.<ref name=":4" /> Ultimately, the Surui project reveals how settler colonialism's structural flaws make long-term project success difficult, despite initial progress in promoting indigenous autonomy.

At the national and state level, complex institutional and legal land governance structures convolute and impede REDD+ in Brazil. Multiple institutions share responsibilities and there is no comprehensive, authoritative database of land ownership, which hampers efforts to protect indigenous territories.<ref name=":5">Costa, R. (2016)''. Insecure land rights in Brazil: Consequences for rural areas and challenges for improvement.'' Climate Policy Initiative. [[/www.climatepolicyinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/Insecure Land Rights in Brazil CPI.pdf|https://www.climatepolicyinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/Insecure_Land_Rights_in_Brazil_CPI.pdf]]</ref> As a result, land tenure disputes remain common and can be witnessed occurring between the public as well between public and state actors. For example, Brazil’s 1964 Land Statute (Law No. 4504) allows the government to takeover unproductive farms and transfer those lands to landless peasants. This often results in the clearing of forest, as only when the land is cleared is it evidenced to be ‘productive’.<ref name=":5" /> Hence, not only does this law cause insecurity for Indigenous populations in Brazil, it also forces them to go against customary traditions of stewarding the land in an effort to maintain its control.

Whilst the aforementioned points to the futility of REDD+ in Brazil, there is reason to maintain optimism. In a recent landmark ruling Brazil’s supreme court voted in favour of the Xoleng peoples, and the decision will serve as a precedent for all cases involving Indigenous peoples.<ref name=":6">Amos-Flom, K., (2023). ''Triumph and Turmoil: The Xokleng Case and the Future of Indigenous Land Rights in Brazil.'' Columbia Journal of Transnational Law. [[/www.jtl.columbia.edu/bulletin-blog/triumph-and-turmoil-the-xokleng-case-and-the-future-of-indigenous-land-rights-in-brazil|https://www.jtl.columbia.edu/bulletin-blog/triumph-and-turmoil-the-xokleng-case-and-the-future-of-indigenous-land-rights-in-brazil]]</ref> The Xokleng’s land dispute, settled in 2023, “rejected Santa Catarina state’s marco temporal (“time limit”) argument, which would have required Indigenous people to prove they occupied or legally contested the territory they claimed before the Brazilian Constitution came into force in 1988. If successful, this argument would have led to disastrous repercussions, as many indigenous peoples had been forcibly removed or are traditionally nomadic.”<ref name=":6" /> Evidently, whilst slow, progress has been made in Brazil in recent years with respect to Indigenous rights as well as the voluntary carbon market itself.

There are currently 159 AFOLU projects listed on the Verra database in Brazil, with only two specifically focused on REDD+ initiatives in collaboration with Indigenous groups. These are the Ka’a Pyahu project, <ref>Verra (n.d.) ''Project 5087: KA'A PYAHU.'' https://registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/5087</ref> initiated by the Guajajara Indigenous people in collaboration with external organizations and validated in 2021, and the ‘Together for the forest Awaete REDD+ project’<ref>Verra (n.d.) ''Project 5200: TOGETHER FOR THE FOREST AWAETÉ REDD+ PROJECT.'' https://registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/5200</ref> which is still under development. Both projects involve Indigenous groups working with Brazilian organizations to build technical capacity and expertise. This could signal a growing trend of Indigenous-led REDD+ projects in the future. To ensure a positive future for REDD+ in Brazil, the customary rights of IPLC’s must be formally recognized. IPLC should have legal ownership of their traditional lands, and in doing so the carbon rights of these communities would be less convoluted, leading to more equitable benefit-sharing and increased cohesion amongst these groups post-project implementation.

==Colombia: ''REDD+ project Resguardo Indigena Unificado - Selva de Mataven (RUI-SM)''==

=== '''Project description and location''' ===
[[File:RS6524 MG 3944.jpg|thumb|407x407px|A view of the Mataven]]
According to the PD,<ref name=":7">ACATISEMA & Mediamos (2017). ''Joint project description and monitoring report: REDD+ project: Resguardo Indigena Unificado – Selva de Mataven (RIU – SM).'' Link: “10 06 2017_VCS Final Report_ Matavin Project.pdf” found at [[/registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/1566|https://registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/1566]]</ref> the Resguardo Indígena Unificado – Selva de Matavén (RIU-SM) project is located east of the Colombian Orinoco high plain, in the eastern part of the Department of Vichada, municipality of Cumaribo. It resides on the formalized resguardo of the Sikuani, Piaroa, Puinave, Curripaco, Cubeo and Piapoco ethnic groups, spanning 1,856,836 hectares, with 1,477,115 hectares (79.6%) being forested. The project states that it will reduce greenhouse gas emissions, with a total estimated net reduction of 108,670,562 tons of CO2 equivalent over thirty years, from years 2013 – 2042. By this metric, it is the 14th largest project on the Verra registry, out of over 1700 projects.<ref name=":9">Dufrasne, D., (2021). ''Two Shades of Green: How hot air forest credits are being used to avoid carbon taxes in Colombia''. Carbon Market Watch. [[/carbonmarketwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Two-shades-of-green EN WEB.pdf|https://carbonmarketwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Two-shades-of-green_EN_WEB.pdf]]</ref> There are 12,312 indigenous people living in the RIU-SM, belonging to 2,517 families and 250 communities as of 2017.

The project was initiated by the Asociación de Cabildos y Autoridades Indígenas de la Selva de Matavén (ACETISMA), an Indigenous association, and developed by MEDIAMOS F&M, a Colombian consultancy firm. ACETISMA is comprised of Indigenous leaders that represent the 17 communities of the reservation in charge of governing the territory, and it has administrative autonomy, as well as “the capacity to acquire, to own and to dispose of property, to accept donations, to hold national and international conventions, scientific and cultural exchanges and generally, to celebrate all kinds of negotiations and agreements with which the Association can achieve its objectives.”<ref name=":7" />

There is a stated focus on various means of improving the living conditions of the Indigenous peoples living within the project area. To summarise, the main objectives of the REDD+ project RIU-SM include:

· Community development, in the form of improved education.

· Community engagement with respect to the project; developing information channels to reveal project progress.

· Support local initiatives for environmental education and waste management.

· Developing an effective response system that addresses community proposals and concerns relating to the project.

· Strengthening the governance of ACATISEMA.[[File:Figure 6 Colombian Manual Eradicators Destroying Coca Fields (31352594937).jpg|thumb|343x343px|The Colombian government fight against cocoa production.]]
=== National climate targets, policies and legislation ===
The Colombian Amazon makes up over one-third of Colombia’s national territory, and up until 2005 only 7.3% of the Colombian Amazon had been deforested, largely due to the country's 60-year armed conflict between the government, multiple left-wing guerillas such as FARC, and several far-right paramilitary groups.<ref name=":8" /> However, following the signing of the Peace Treaty in 2016 and demobilization of the FARC, limits to deforestation were weakened in the Colombian Amazon. Poor but opportunistic peasants began to encroach into previously unchartered territory and capitalize from the rainforest. Due to the poor economic integration of the Amazon, many were forced to engage with the traditional economies of cocoa and cattle ranching, as these markets were already well connected to regional and global markets.<ref name=":8" /> To address the drivers of deforestation and its associated emissions, the federal government has implemented various initiatives, which are summarized below:

{| class="wikitable"
|'''Document name'''
|'''Type'''
|'''Publication year'''
|'''Key takeaways'''
|-
|Nationally Determined Contribution(s)
|Target
|2020
|Reduce GHG emissions by 51 % by 2030 and net-zero by 2050
|-
|National Climate Change Policy (PNCC)
|Policy
|2018
|Address climate change and foster sustainable development
|-
|National Forest Conservation Program
|Policy
|2011
|Address deforestation
|-
|Law 1931 of 2018 – Climate Change Law

|Legislation
|2018
|Establishes the framework for addressing climate change
|-
| colspan="4" |'''Relating to REDD+:'''
|-
|National Strategy for Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (ENREDD+)
|Initiative
|2009
|Particular focus on the Amazon and Choco rainforests
|-
|Amazon Indigenous REDD+ Initiative
|Initiative
|2016
|Respect Indigenous rights. FPIC focus.
|-
|BIOREDD+ program
|Initiative
|2012
|Portfolio of 8 REDD+ projects in four geographic nodes covering over 700,000 hectares in the Colombian Pacific.

|-
|Vision Amazonia
|Initiative
|2015
|Part of the REDD+ strategy, financed by three foreign countries: Germany, Norway and United Kingdom
|}
As a result of the many fund and market-based initiatives that Colombia has engaged with, it hosts the second most REDD+ projects in the world. REDD+ projects now cover at least 56% of the area of legally recognized Indigenous territories in the Colombian Amazon, with an overwhelming majority of carbon projects located on Indigenous territories.<ref name=":10">Schmid, D., & Castro. C., (2023). ''REDD+ projects in the Colombian Amazon: Social challenges and lack of transparency''. Rainforest Foundation Norway. [[/dv719tqmsuwvb.cloudfront.net/documents/REDD rapport 2024 ENG.pdf|https://dv719tqmsuwvb.cloudfront.net/documents/REDD_rapport_2024_ENG.pdf]]</ref> Evidently REDD+ plays an integral part in the country’s efforts of environmental conservation, and incentives have been introduced to promote the development of such projects. For example, in 2016 the government adopted a higher tax that covered fossil fuels, but companies are able to avoid paying the tax by investing in carbon offsets that have been generated domestically.<ref name=":9" /> This led to a boost in the domestic REDD+ market in 2017, as Colombian companies invested as to escape higher taxes. Notably, 23 of the 36 REDD+ projects currently under development in the Amazon region were initiated in or after 2018.<ref name=":10" /> Currently Colombia’s REDD+ program sits at over 45 pilot and voluntary carbon projects, as well as one large-scale jurisdictional approach in the Amazon.<ref name=":11">Zambrano-Cortés, D. G. (2024). ''The politics, spaces and subjects of forest conservation in Colombia''. [internal PhD, WU, Wageningen University]. Wageningen University. [[/doi.org/10.18174/675328|https://doi.org/10.18174/675328]]</ref>

=== Indigenous rights - Constitutional, tenure and bundle rights ===
''De jure'', the Indigenous peoples of Colombia have comprehensive tenure and bundle rights that have been articulated in the national constitution. Collective land titles are granted to Indigenous communities by the Colombian government, and as a result about 34 percent of Colombian land (almost 38 million hectares) is legally recognized as Indigenous territory or collective lands of Afro-descendent communities.<ref name=":10" /> These collective land tenure rights have been in effect since the implementation of the 1991 constitution, granting them the authority to exercise legal control over their territories in accordance with their own customs and procedures.<ref>Max Planck Institute (n.d.) ''Colombia 1991 (rev. 2015).'' Institute. [[/www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Colombia 2015|https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Colombia_2015]]</ref> Furthermore, the carbon rights of Indigenous peoples are explicitly defined in the constitution and tied specifically to the ownership of land of the communities.<ref name=":2" /> This in theory provides a solid legal basis for upholding the rights of Indigenous communities in Colombia, specifically relating to REDD+ activities, as it allows communities to define and negotiate the terms of said projects. A summary of the various laws relating to Indigenous rights have been summarized below:
{| class="wikitable"
| colspan="2" |'''Law (1991 constitution)'''
|-
|Article 63

|Indigenous territories are considered collective property. Land is not owned by individuals but is shared by the community. The state must respect these collective rights and cannot alter land ownership without the consent of the Indigenous peoples.
|-
|Article 76 - ''Consulta previa''.
|Pertains to the right of Indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities; prior consultation must be undertaken before any entity undertakes activities that may affect their territories, culture, or way of life.
|-
|Article 330
|Indigenous communities have the right to govern their territories.
|-
|Article 329
|The Reservation is a collective, inalienable, and indefeasible property.
|-
|Decree 1386 of 1994, Article 10; Decree 2164 of 1995, Article 22) 39.
|"The administration and management of these lands are subjected to uses and customs of the beneficiaries."
|}
Whilst land and tenure rights are enshrined into the constitution, the precariousness of these rights persists due to a lack of resources to ensure enforcement, as well as the deeper issue of corruption. As previously stated, the rate of deforestation increased significantly in Colombia’s post-conflict era, evidencing the nations inability to maintain control over unlawful acts of land-grabbing and disposition. Whilst this began with new peasants converting the Amazon for subsistence purposes, it ultimately led to new areas for the growth of cocoa, much to the benefit of narco-traffickers who could monopolize on this illegal surplus in ‘accumulation by dispossession’.<ref name=":8" />

With respect to the legalities of consultation, Colombia has enshrined ''consulta previa'' into the constitution. Translating to ‘prior consultation’, this legal text provides the formal grounds for Indigenous engagement when any legislative or administrative measures are implemented on Indigenous territory. Importantly, consultation should be achieved in accordance with the customs of the ethnic group with which the project is being imposed upon. However, there have been recent cases of contestation specifically relating to how ''consulta previa'' applies to REDD+ on Indigenous lands, and the RIU – SM project was one that was involved with such a case.

=== Affected and interested stakeholders ===
{| class="wikitable"
| colspan="5" |'''Affected stakeholders'''
|-
|Stakeholders
|Primary objective(s)
|Secondary objective(s)
|Relative power
|Scope of influence
|-
|ACATISEMA - Asociación de Cabildos y Autoridades Indígenas de la Selva de Matavén
|Foster the integral development, social and cultural preservation of the indigenous communities in the Mataven Jungle and to

Consolidate the territory, and conservation and preservation of the environment and biodiversity of the Mataven Jungle

|
|Has the highest authority in the reservation.
Rights to the land and revenue generated from project
|
|-
|Indigenous ''resguardos'' of the RIU-SM
|Primary and direct beneficiaries of project

Seek to maintain land rights

Promote traditional and cultural beliefs
|Uphold rights
|High power, though little input into project activities in reality.
|
|-
|Landless peasants
|Gain more access to land. Improve rights
|
|Low to none
|Local
|-
| colspan="5" |'''Interested stakeholders'''
|-
|MEDIAMOS F&M
|Project developer
|
|Powerful: involved with various technical aspects of project development
|International
|-
|Ministerio de Ambiente y Desarrollo Sostenible
|Environmental planning; sustainable development
Form strategic alliances with social and institutional participants in different sectoral and territorial scenarios.
|
|
|National
|-
|Dirección de Asuntos Indígenas, ROM y Minorías - Ministerio del Interior
|Prepares policy in favour of Indigenous groups
Supports ethnic and cultural rights of Indigenous
|
|Not ''per se'' involved with project, though the policy it has introduced has affected project outcomes
|National
|-
|Corporinoquía
|Environmental authority to ensure the proper use of natural resources in their area of jurisdiction.
|Supporting of project
|As the project is in line with the mandate of Corporinoquía, they are supportive
|Regional
|-
|Other government institutions: Governor ofice of Vichada, Mayor ofice Cumaribo
|The Reservation for being part of the Cumaribo, Vichada, has territorial jurisdiction relations with the Governor’s office and the Mayor’s office.
|
|
|Regional - national
|-
|Fundación NATURA
|Civil organization
Conservation, use and management of biodiversity
Generate social, economic and environmental benefits
|
|
|International
|-
|Mining companies
|Compete with the Project for the territory's resources.
|
|Relatively powerful due to corruption, though legally obstructed to achieve objective
|International
|-
|Other indigenous communities neighboring RIU-SM
|Ensure autonomy with respect to their own jurisdiction
|Not involved with the project though potentially affected by it
|Low, with respect to the project
|Local
|-
|FONDO ACCIÓN
|Encourage the participation of civil society and the private sector in the implementation of the country’s public policies
|Conservation and sustainable development; and protection/development of children.
|
|National
|-
|Asocarbono – An industry association, including Verra, ProClima, Biofix, and ACATISEMA.

|Promote the agenda of high-level actors of the VCM
|
|Powerful
|International
|-
|OPIAC: National Oganization of the Indigenous Peoples of the Colombian Amazon

|Promotes Indigenous rights in Colombia
Exercises a political representation of the indigenous peoples of the Colombian Amazon
|
|
|National
|}

=== Discussion ===
According to the official REDD+ Mataven website<ref>RIU – SM (n.d.). ''REDD+ Mataven''. [[/reddmataven.com/|https://reddmataven.com/]]</ref> the project has resulted in a myriad of benefits to the Indigenous communities of the region. For example, as a result of the funds generated from the projects activities, there have been improvements in infrastructure, transportation and education, ultimately leading to the empowerment and improved governance of ACETISMA. However, the project has come under fire for multiple reasons.

For one, in 2015 some of the Indigenous communities filed a lawsuit referring to the violation of their right to ''consulta previa''. However, the court ruled that their Indigenous rights had not been violated as it was ACETISMA that initially sought MEDIAMOS to develop the project, and that ACETISMA were the best representatives of those Indigenous communities. Furthermore, the projects main focus was the conservation of the rainforest and therefore did not threaten the cultural integrity of those communities.<ref name=":10" /> However, regardless of the outcome of this case, its occurrence points to internal disagreement amongst Indigenous participants of the RIU-SM project. In a study involving interviews with Indigenous members of the project, there was a significant proportion of interviewees that had little knowledge regarding various aspects of the project, such as responsibilities of participation, or the benefit-sharing mechanism in place.<ref name=":2" /> This further reinforces the point that, in the case of the RIU-SM project it may not be ‘bottom-up’ and eludes to the power imbalance experienced between Mediamos, the project developer, and Indigenous community members. In the PD there is a breakdown of the distribution of income between ACETISMA and Mediamos, which shows a significant proportion of revenue flowing to the former organisation throughout the project’s operations.<ref name=":7" /> However, there is currently no publicly available documentation supporting this initial claim<ref name=":9" /> as there is no obligation to provide this information, leading to a general lack of transparency in the market and between all of the relevant actors. Subsequent meetings with Indigenous leaders have however shown a marked support of the Mataven project, with one Indigenous leader explicitly stating “...the Redd+ project has brought resources that they never had before, which allowed them to open new school classrooms, 21 rural aqueducts, cocoa crops and even headquarters in Cumaribo and Inírida.”<ref>Lievano, A. B. (2021) Colombia's biggest carbon credit project could be selling hot air. Latin American Center for Investigative Journalism. [[/www.elclip.org/el-mayor-proyecto-de-bonos-de-carbono-de-colombia-podria-estar-vendiendo-aire-caliente/|https://www.elclip.org/el-mayor-proyecto-de-bonos-de-carbono-de-colombia-podria-estar-vendiendo-aire-caliente/]] </ref> Clearly there have been benefits for IPLC’s involved with this project, though the details of this benefit-sharing remain a mystery.

Secondly, the Mataven project has caused controversy due to its apparently inflated carbon credit issuance. The report states that this has been achieved by using a reference area that is not representative of the project area, as well as assuming an uncharacteristically heigh assumed rate of deforestation.<ref name=":12">Global Atlas of Environmental Justice (2023). ''Resguardo Indigena Unificado-Selva de Matavén (RIU SM) REDD+ Project, Colombia.'' [[/ejatlas.org/conflict/redd-project-resguardo-indigena-unificado-selva-de-mataven-riu-sm|https://ejatlas.org/conflict/redd-project-resguardo-indigena-unificado-selva-de-mataven-riu-sm]]</ref> The project used a baseline deforestation rate of 0.86% per year, which is significantly more than the Colombian government's national rate of 0.18%. Additionally, according to the report the reference area chosen is more easily accessed and therefore more prone to deforestation, making it an inaccurate comparison to the relatively remote project area.<ref name=":2" /> This has led to the creation of excess carbon credits, or “hot air” credits, which have been criticized for not reflecting real environmental benefits.<ref name=":9" /> To add further insult to injury these credits have been used by a Colombian fossil fuel distributor company to avoid paying taxes, as described earlier by Colombia’s change in policy in 2017. In doing so, the company avoided paying approximately $18.9 million in taxes.<ref name=":2" /> There has been subsequent back and forth between Verra and Carbon Market Watch, with Verra refuting the claims<ref>Verra (2021). ''Carbon Market Watch Report on Colombian REDD+ Projects Contains Flawed Allegations.'' [[/verra.org/carbon-market-watch-report-on-colombian-redd-projects-contains-flawed-allegations/|https://verra.org/carbon-market-watch-report-on-colombian-redd-projects-contains-flawed-allegations/]] </ref> Regardless of the science, Colombia recently introduced a resolution in 2018 (Resolution 1447 – 2018) that requires projects to use baselines that comply with national reference levels.<ref name=":13">Dufrasne, D. (2021b). Companies use ”hot air” forestry offsets to avoid taxes in Colombia: Carbon Market Watch’s fact-check of Verra’s response. Carbon Market Watch. [[/carbonmarketwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/CMWs-fact-check-of-Verras-response-on-Colombia.pdf|https://carbonmarketwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/CMWs-fact-check-of-Verras-response-on-Colombia.pdf]]</ref><ref>IEA (2022). ''Resolution 1447 – 2018. Monitoring, Reporting, and Verification System for mitigation actions at the national level.'' International Energy Agency. [[/www.iea.org/policies/14772-resolution-1447-2018-monitoring-reporting-and-verification-system-for-mitigation-actions-at-the-national-level|https://www.iea.org/policies/14772-resolution-1447-2018-monitoring-reporting-and-verification-system-for-mitigation-actions-at-the-national-level]]</ref> Going forward, REDD+ projects that are being implemented in Colombia will have to abide by Colombia’s national legislation.

=== Summary ===
Colombia has a long history of engaging in REDD+ as it has been used to limit environmental degradation in the post-conflict era, in alignment with the country’s national peacebuilding agenda.<ref name=":11" /> Owing to the country’s comprehensive tenure and bundle rights, IPLC’s have robust ''de jure'' rights to land as they collectively own it, and rights to carbon are tied to this ownership. This puts Colombia as one of the world leaders in legal terms relating to REDD+ project implementation, but due to a lack of resources to ensure enforcement, as well as corruption, historically these laws have not been adhered to.<ref name=":10" /><ref name=":2" /> There are many documented cases showing the displacement on IPLC’s from traditional lands, poor efforts to adhere to ''consulta previa'', and inequitable benefit sharing.<ref>Greenfield, P. (2023''). The ‘carbon pirates’ preying on Amazon’s Indigenous communities.'' The Guardian. [[/www.theguardian.com/environment/2023/jan/21/amazon-indigenous-communities-carbon-offsetting-pirates-aoe|https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2023/jan/21/amazon-indigenous-communities-carbon-offsetting-pirates-aoe]]</ref><ref name=":14">Lang, C., (2024). ''Colombia’s Constitutional Court rules in favour of Indigenous Peoples. Identifies serious flaws in the REDD+ Baka Rokarire project.'' REDD_Monitor. [[/reddmonitor.substack.com/p/colombias-constitutional-court-rules|https://reddmonitor.substack.com/p/colombias-constitutional-court-rules]]</ref>

The case of the Mataven project provides an interesting example of how it is the market itself that is failing to address concerns regarding transparency, whether that be relating to benefit-sharing amongst relevant stakeholders, or Indigenous representation and engagement throughout the implementation of REDD+ projects. Some ACATISEMA members have explicitly stated their support for the Mataven project,<ref name=":12" /> and its benefits can be seen first-hand in the form of improved infrastructure in local communities involved with the project.<ref>Myers, J. E., Parra, M. A., Bedford, C. (2021). ''How Carbon Offsetting Can Build a Forest.'' Stanford Social Innovation Review. [[/ssir.org/articles/entry/how carbon offsetting can build a forest|https://ssir.org/articles/entry/how_carbon_offsetting_can_build_a_forest]]</ref> However, an exact breakdown of how and where revenue is being distributed to IPLC’s remains elusive.<ref name=":13" /> Furthermore, the level of IPLC engagement has come into question, specifically with reference to ''consulta previa'' and the overall understanding that IPLC’s have regarding the project’s intended outcomes and activities.<ref name=":10" /> This is not a rare case in Colombia and has been witnessed occurring with other projects that have been implemented on Indigenous territories in the Colombian Amazon.<ref name=":17">Lang, C., (2023''). “It destroys everything,” says Indigenous leader about the REDD+ Baka Rokarire project in Colombia''. REDD Monitor. [[/reddmonitor.substack.com/p/it-destroys-everything-says-indigenous|https://reddmonitor.substack.com/p/it-destroys-everything-says-indigenous]]</ref> However, a recent ruling by the Colombian Constitutional court voted in favour of Indigenous groups in Colombia, upholding “the rights to self-determination, autonomy, self-government, territory, identity, physical and cultural integrity, and free, prior and informed consent of the indigenous communities”.<ref name=":14" /> This review ultimately sets a legal precedent safeguarding the fundamental rights of IPLCs with REDD+ project implementation and shows that progress is being made to improve the likelihood that REDD+ will result in genuine benefits to those affected by project implementation.

To ensure a more authentic engagement with IPLC’s as to result in legitimate and equitable benefit-sharing, improvements must be made by the Colombian government, as well as within the VCM itself. For the former, Colombia’s national registry for GHG mitigation activities must be updated; it has been offline since 2022.<ref name=":10" /> As a result, transparency is lacking. International finance could be utilized as to alleviate this issue, and only with an accurate and reliable database may the market be regulated. In the broader sense, VCM registries must create stricter guidelines promoting transparency. Often PD’s refer to annexed documents that contain relevant information regarding benefit-sharing, though these are often not publicly available.<ref name=":9" /> This limits transparency and increases the likelihood of inequitable agreements being made between project proponents and developers, further exacerbating existing power asymmetries between the two groups and limiting the likelihood that ''consulta previa'' is honestly adhered to.<ref name=":10" /> This has led to conflict within Indigenous communities, rather than a strengthening of their social fabric.

Furthermore, the Mataven project calls into question the actual emissions reduction that REDD+ projects achieve. Whilst Colombia has since updated its regulations such that REDD+ must use baselines that comply with national reference levels, it is up in the air as to how representative these guidelines are. Reference areas must represent project areas and without the appropriate regulations in place project developers lack the incentive to create realistic baselines; ultimately they are aiming to produce the maximum number of credits as to generate the greatest possible revenues.

==Conclusion==
As a market-based mechanism, REDD+ is shackled by the construct in which it operates; fundamentally it is a capitalist means of fixing a capitalist problem, which comes with limitations. Both Brazil and Colombia have relatively robust laws that have been written into the constitution, ultimately promoting more equitable results of project implementation. However, as in Colombia IPLC’s collectively own the land, whereas in Brazil these groups only own rights to use the land,<ref name=":2" /> Colombia can be considered better equipped for the establishment of REDD+ projects on traditional Indigenous territory. However, even with these laws in place enforcement remain a matter of concern. Furthermore, given the wide variety of ontological and epistemological perspectives of Indigenous communities, and how these views conflict with the Western worldview from which market-based REDD+ came to fruition, there is an inherent difficulty in implementing a system of governance in REDD+ on Indigenous lands.<ref name=":1" />. Putting a price on nature conflicts with Indigenous perspectives and there have been instances where this has attacked the social and cultural fabric of IPLC’s.<ref name=":17" /> To avoid this REDD+ developers must have the genuine intent of understanding the perspective of the Indigenous group they are working with and aim to implement REDD+ with a bottom-up approach.

In both countries, transparency must be improved to ensure that FPIC is adhered to and subsequently ensure fair IPLC representation and engagement. This issue predominantly arises due to the poor requirements of standards in the VCM. As such, proponents are guided by developers which have little incentive to truly act in the interests of Indigenous groups; ultimately the organizations in charge of project development are interested in increasing project revenues. This has led to instances of over-crediting, as without a transparent framework in which to operate it is difficult to evaluate the legitimacy of the claims being made by project proponents and developers. However, with recent advances that address concerns of additionality<ref name=":15" /> there is hope for improved market integrity. Standards of the VCM must continue to be scrutinized to ensure that progress continues to be made.

Going forward, progress should be made to formalize the customary laws and traditional lands of IPLCs, and finance should be directed towards the enforcement of these laws. The environmental,<ref name=":16" /> economic,<ref name=":5" /><ref>Ding, H., Veit, P. G., Blackman, A., Gray, E., Reytar, K., Altamirano, J. C., Hodgdon, B., (2016). ''Climate benefits, tenure costs: The economic case for securing Indigenous land rights in the Amazon''. WRI. [[/files.wri.org/d8/s3fs-public/Climate Benefits Tenure Costs Executive Summary.pdf|https://files.wri.org/d8/s3fs-public/Climate_Benefits_Tenure_Costs_Executive_Summary.pdf]]</ref> and social<ref>Sarmiento Barletti, J. P., Heise Vigil, N., & Larson, A. M. (2023). ''Safeguards at a glance: Are voluntary standards supporting community land, resource and carbon rights?'' CIFOR-ICRAF. [[/www.cifor-icraf.org/publications/pdf files/Flyer/REDD-Safeguards-7.pdf|https://www.cifor-icraf.org/publications/pdf_files/Flyer/REDD-Safeguards-7.pdf]] </ref> benefits of this have been researched and are well understood. By developing culturally appropriate frameworks for rights-based conservation regimes, that work with IPLCs in accordance with their worldviews, REDD+ could be used to promote Indigenous autonomy. However, progress still must be made to achieve this goal.

==References==

Documentation:Open Case Studies/FRST522/2024/REDD+ in Indigenous Amazonia: What works and what doesn’t?

2024-12-12T23:06:27Z

ConnorHaynes: /* Interested and affected stakeholders */

__TOC__

==Positionality==
First and foremost I am not Indigenous, and whilst there are a myriad of cultures, ontologies and epistemologies that are not sufficiently represented by simply stating ‘Indigenous’, it is commonly accepted that these worldviews are vastly different to those of the ‘Western’ world, which is the world in which I grew up and matured. I am therefore only understanding of Indigenous cultures, beliefs and customary laws based upon available online literature and those which I have learnt through life, in addition to those introduced to me in my Master’s degree. As such, I will never be able to fully relate to an Indigenous person; the best I can do is try to understand and learn. Only throughout this process am I able to work towards reconciliation and attempt to address the inequities experienced by Indigenous folk globally.

Additionally, I am yet to act as a carbon project proponent and so do not understand the nuances or stresses of undertaking such a task. Whilst an individual proponent may have the best intention of procuring a carbon project for its social and environmental benefits, there are a number of stakeholders involved throughout the entire process which influence its eventual outcome. Without experience acting as a project proponent I am naïve in understanding the process and it's difficulties.

==Acronyms / Terminology==
'''Acronyms:'''

AFOLU: Agriculture, Forestry and Other Land-Use

ICVCM: Integrity Council for the Voluntary Carbon Market

IPLC: Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities

KMGBF: Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework

LAC: Latin American Countries

MRV: Monitoring, Reporting and Verification

REDD+: Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation

UNCBD: United Nations Convention on Biological Biodiversity

VCMI: Voluntary Carbon Markets Integrity Initiative

'''Terminology:'''

''Additionality:'' Additionality is the determination of whether the project will lead to the expected outcomes when compared to the baseline or ‘business as usual’ emissions.

''Leakage'': Refers to the shifting of emissions to outside the project boundary as a result of the project’s activities.

''Permanence:'' Permanence refers to the degree to which a carbon credit is equivalent to a permanent removal or reduction in emissions.
==Abstract==
This case study illustrates two examples of Indigenous-led REDD+ projects on Indigenous territory in Colombia and Brazil. Both countries have a relatively long history of engaging with REDD+ but have slightly different legal structures pertaining to the rights of Indigenous peoples on their traditional territories, and specifically their ‘carbon’ rights. As such, the intention is to evaluate how these differing ''de jure'' rights translate on the ground. With respect to REDD+, do certain rights result in legitimately positive benefits to IPLCs, as well as the environment that these projects were originally intended to protect? To reduce inconsistency, projects were chosen that utilized the same standard, namely Verra’s ‘Verified Carbon Standard’. The intention is such that the reader can evaluate the effectiveness and true benefit of REDD+ projects to IPLC’s, based upon the legal frameworks of the host country. A secondary intention is such that the reader is better equipped to conduct a prefeasibility assessment based upon available online literature, to evaluate the likelihood that REDD+ can be implemented in any chosen country, with the genuine intent of benefiting IPLC’s that are directly affected as a result of REDD+ project implementation.

==REDD+ and the VCM in Brazil and Colombia==
REDD+, originally introduced by the UNFCCC, is a market-based mechanism sitting within the VCM that aims to reverse the loss of forests and carbon stocks, specifically in developing countries. Simply put, an entity or an individual can voluntarily pay another that has engaged with REDD+ and subsequently sequestered carbon, to offset their own emissions using ‘credits’, sold as units of greenhouse gas equivalent to one ton of carbon dioxide (CO2e). Forestry and Land-Use remains to be the largest category of carbon credits traded by transaction volume on the VCM, with REDD+ being the most popular project type in this category, accounting for 78% of credits traded.<ref name=":0">Procton, A., (2024). ''State of the voluntary carbon market 2024: On the path to maturity.'' Forest Trends Ecosystem Marketplace.</ref> Furthermore, over one-third of the credits sold within this category were sourced from projects that had been implemented in LAC and the Caribbean in 2024.<ref name=":0" /> Of the four largest standards issuing carbon credits, Verra accounts for roughly 80% of issuances in Latin America,<ref>Pullins, T. (2022). Growth of carbon markets in Latin America. White & Case. [[/www.whitecase.com/publications/insight/latin-america-focus-fall-2022-growth-carbon-markets|https://www.whitecase.com/publications/insight/latin-america-focus-fall-2022-growth-carbon-markets]] </ref> and even in the face of recent scrutiny,<ref>West, T. A. P., Bofim, B., Haya, B. K. (2024). Methodological issues with deforestation baselines compromise the integrity of carbon offsets from REDD+. ''Global Environmental Change, 87'' [[/doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2024.102863|https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2024.102863]]</ref><ref>Wyburd I., & Dufrasne, G. (2023). Error Log: Exposing the methodological failures of REDD+ forestry projects. Carbon Market Watch. [[/carbonmarketwatch.org/publications/error-log-exposing-the-methodological-failures-of-redd-forestry-projects/|https://carbonmarketwatch.org/publications/error-log-exposing-the-methodological-failures-of-redd-forestry-projects/]]</ref><ref name=":15">Haya, B. K., Alford-Jones, K., Anderegg, W. R. L., Beymer-Farris, B., Blanchard, L., Bomfim, B., Chin, D., Evans, S., Hogan, M., Holm, J. A., McAfee, K., So, I. S., West, T. A. P., & Withey, L. (2023). ''Quality assessment of REDD+ carbon credit projects''. Berkeley Carbon Trading Project. [[/gspp.berkeley.edu/research-and-impact/centers/cepp/projects/berkeley-carbontrading-project/REDD+|https://gspp.berkeley.edu/research-and-impact/centers/cepp/projects/berkeley-carbontrading-project/REDD+]]</ref> REDD+ projects account for a significant proportion of the VCM with their continued application likely to persist.<ref>Gordon, O. (2022). ''The interwoven fortunes of carbon markets and indigenous communities.'' Energy Monitor. [[/www.energymonitor.ai/tech/carbon-removal/the-interwoven-fortunes-of-carbon-markets-and-indigenous-communities/|https://www.energymonitor.ai/tech/carbon-removal/the-interwoven-fortunes-of-carbon-markets-and-indigenous-communities/]]</ref><ref>Müller, M., Coustar, C., Bietta, F., Mathres, M. (2022). ''UNFCCC REDD+ and the power of sovereign carbon.'' Deutsche Banke Chief Investment Office. [[/www.rainforestcoalition.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/CIO-Special-UNFCCC-REDD-power-of-sovereign-carbon.pdf|https://www.rainforestcoalition.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/CIO-Special-UNFCCC-REDD-power-of-sovereign-carbon.pdf]]</ref><ref>Pullins, T. (2022). ''Growth of carbon markets in Latin America.'' White & Case. [[/www.whitecase.com/publications/insight/latin-america-focus-fall-2022-growth-carbon-markets|https://www.whitecase.com/publications/insight/latin-america-focus-fall-2022-growth-carbon-markets]] </ref> With the introduction of updated methodologies aimed at addressing these concerns,<ref>Verra (2023a). ''Setting the Standard: Verra’s Revolutionary New REDD Methodology.'' [[/verra.org/program-notice/setting-the-standard-verras-revolutionary-new-redd-methodology/|https://verra.org/program-notice/setting-the-standard-verras-revolutionary-new-redd-methodology/]]</ref><ref>Verra (2023b). ''VM0048 Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation, v1.0.'' [[/verra.org/methodologies/vm0048-reducing-emissions-from-deforestation-and-forest-degradation-v1-0/|https://verra.org/methodologies/vm0048-reducing-emissions-from-deforestation-and-forest-degradation-v1-0/]]</ref> there is hope for renewed buyer confidence in the integrity of this market,<ref>MSCI (2023). ''Verra’s New Methodology for Unplanned Deforestation Aims to Silence the Critics''. [[/www.msci.com/www/blog-posts/verra-s-new-methodology-for/04577808942|https://www.msci.com/www/blog-posts/verra-s-new-methodology-for/04577808942]]</ref> though more work still needs to be done.

Both Colombia and Brazil have a relatively long history of implementing REDD+ projects, using both fund-based and market-based mechanisms. For example, both countries were participants in the ‘Amazon Indigenous REDD+ (RIA in Spanish) initiative, with the first pilot implementation project being initiated in Colombia’s Puiawai Natural Reserve.<ref>Garzón, E., (2017). ''Amazon Indigenous REDD+: An innovative approach to conserve Colombian forests?'' Mongabay. [[/news.mongabay.com/2017/01/amazon-indigenous-redd-an-innovative-approach-to-conserve-colombian-forests/|https://news.mongabay.com/2017/01/amazon-indigenous-redd-an-innovative-approach-to-conserve-colombian-forests/]]</ref> The relevance of these two countries with respect to REDD+ is simple. Much of the Amazon’s primary tropical rainforest falls within these countries jurisdiction and this rainforest has been consistently under threat from external pressures and encroachment, whether that be in the form of land-clearing for commercial ranching, subsistence purposes, illicit drug production or illegal mining practices,<ref name=":8">Sánchez García, P. A. & Wong, G. Y., (2024) “The political economy of deforestation in the Colombian Amazon”, ''Journal of Political Ecology'' ''31''(1), 178–199. [[/doi.org/10.2458/jpe.5230|https://doi.org/10.2458/jpe.5230]]</ref><ref>Radwin, M. (2023). ''Drug trafficking fuels other deforestation drivers in the Amazon: report.'' Mongabay. [[/news.mongabay.com/2023/07/drug-trafficking-fuels-other-deforestation-drivers-in-the-amazon-report/|https://news.mongabay.com/2023/07/drug-trafficking-fuels-other-deforestation-drivers-in-the-amazon-report/]]</ref><ref>Haddad, E.A., Araújo, I.F., Feltran-Barbieri, R., Perobelli, F. S., Rocha, A., Sass, K. S., Nobre, C. A. (2024). Economic drivers of deforestation in the Brazilian Legal Amazon. ''Nat Sustain'' ''7'', 1141–1148. [[/doi.org/10.1038/s41893-024-01387-7|https://doi.org/10.1038/s41893-024-01387-7]] </ref><ref>Hänggli, A., Levy, S. A., Armenteras, D., Bovolo, C. I., Brandão, J., Rueda, X., & Garrett, R. D. (2023). A systematic comparison of deforestation drivers and policy effectiveness across the amazon biome. ''Environmental Research Letters, 18''(7), 073001. [[/doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/acd408|https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/acd408]]</ref> to name a few.

In theory, REDD+ can be used to provide the economic incentive to promote sustained environmental protection of Indigenous lands, with a focus on the rights and livelihoods of IPLCs. Currently the overall funding to IPLCs tenure rights and forest management in tropical countries is low, receiving just $270 million per year between 2011-2020 from bilateral and multilateral donors and private philanthropies.<ref>Hatcher, J., Owen, M., Yin, D., (2021). ''Falling short: Donor funding for Indigenous peoples and local communities to secure tenure rights and manage forests in tropical countries (2011 -2020).'' Rainforest Foundation Norway. [[/dv719tqmsuwvb.cloudfront.net/documents/Publikasjoner/Andre-rapporter/RFN Falling short 2021.pdf|https://dv719tqmsuwvb.cloudfront.net/documents/Publikasjoner/Andre-rapporter/RFN_Falling_short_2021.pdf]]</ref> REDD+ has the potential to channel funding as to promote Indigenous rights and autonomy, provided there is transparent and equitable benefit-sharing for those involved. Fundamentally, only with the inclusion of IPLC’s, or preferably with IPLC’s acting as project proponents, is REDD+ able to promote Indigenous agency and improve IPLC rights and governance. And only when the rights of those inhabiting the land are formally recognized can the land be effectively conserved.<ref name=":16">Reytar, K., Veit, P., von Braun, J. (2024). ''Protecting Biodiversity Hinges on Securing Indigenous and Community Land Rights.'' WRI. [[/www.wri.org/insights/indigenous-and-local-community-land-rights-protect-biodiversity|https://www.wri.org/insights/indigenous-and-local-community-land-rights-protect-biodiversity]]</ref> The inclusion of IPLCs in REDD+ project development is therefore considered to be essential for project success, and this is in theory embodied in the very nature of REDD+.<ref name=":1">Alvarez, G., Elfving, M. and Andrade, C. (2016) ‘REDD+ governance and indigenous peoples in Latin America: the case of Suruí Carbon Project in the Brazilian Amazon Forest’, ''Latin American J. Management for Sustainable Development 3''(2) pp.133–146. [[/dx.doi.org/10.1504/LAJMSD.2016.083705|10.1504/LAJMSD.2016.083705]]</ref> Partially owing to a long history of dealing with REDD+, Colombia and Brazil are amongst just a few of the countries hosting tropical rainforests that explicitly recognise community rights to carbon and tie these rights to the legal ownership of lands and forests. In Colombia, carbon rights are tied to rights of the land, whereas in Brazil carbon rights are tied to forest rights.<ref name=":2">RRI and McGill University (2021). Technical report: ''Status of legal recognition of Indigenous Peoples’, Local Communities’ and Afro-descendant Peoples’ rights to carbon stored in tropical lands and forests''. Rights and Resources Initiative. [[/doi.org/10.53892/MLQQ5744|https://doi.org/10.53892/MLQQ5744]]</ref>

==Brazil: The Suruí Forest Carbon Project==
[[File:The Amazon Basin, Brazil.jpg|thumb|316x316px|Brazil's Amazon rainforest]]

=== Project description and location ===
The Surui Forest Carbon project was implemented in 2009 on the territory of the Surui people, which is situated in the southern part of Brazil’s Amazon between the states of Rondônia and Mato Grosso. Surui Indigenous territory covers an area of 2,481 km2, though the intention of the PCFS was to protect a portion of this total area. According to the PD, the stated objective was to “prevent 13,575.3 hectares of tropical forest from being cleared by 2038, to avoid the emission of 7,258,352.3 tCO2e to the atmosphere, and to contribute to the preservation of the Paiter Surui lifestyle and traditions.”<ref>IDESAM (2011). ''Project description: Surui forest carbon project''. Institute for Conservation and Sustainable Development of Amazonas. Link: "PROJ_DESC_1118_02FEB2012.PDF" found at [[/registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/1118|https://registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/1118]] </ref> This region sits within one of the Brazilian Amazon’s main ‘arcs of deforestation’ and pressure from loggers and ranchers is a matter of concern.

Notably, the PCFS was the first REDD+ project to be proposed by Indigenous peoples in the Brazilian Amazon on their own territory and was the first to receive certification by both the VCS and CCBS.<ref name=":1" />. Metareilá, the Surui’s own Indigenous association, acted as project proponent and the Institute for Conservation and Sustainable Development of Amazonas (IDESAM) assisted with project development, alongside multiple other stakeholder groups. As an endogenous initiative procured and conducted by the Surui community, the SFCP had a ‘non-centralized model of governance’, which reflected the characteristics and traditions of the Surui people. <ref name=":1" />

Only after two years of consultations between the 24 communities involved and the relevant governmental agencies (primarily FUNAI and the Ministry of Environment) was a Memorandum of Understanding signed, showing community consent to develop the project.<ref name=":3">Garcia, B., Rimmer, L., Canal Vieira, L., Mackey, B., (2021). REDD+ and forest protection on indigenous lands in the Amazon. ''RECIEL 30'', 207–219. [[/doi.org/10.1111/reel.12389|https://doi.org/10.1111/reel.12389]]</ref> In 2012 after verification from an independent third-party body, the Surui were able to sell carbon credits on the international market. Between 2009 and 2014 the project drastically helped limit the deforestation occurring within the project’s site, causing many to deem it a success.<ref name=":4">Howard, F. E., (2023). ''An Analysis of the Suruí Forest Carbon Project in Context of Settler Colonialism''. Masters thesis. Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University. [[/vtechworks.lib.vt.edu/server/api/core/bitstreams/b0cde6de-794c-453f-856b-ee72bde3db06/content|https://vtechworks.lib.vt.edu/server/api/core/bitstreams/b0cde6de-794c-453f-856b-ee72bde3db06/content]]</ref>

=== National climate targets, policies and legislation ===
Rates of deforestation in Brazil’s legal Amazon are significantly impacted by the government in charge. This is evidenced in the decade between 2012 and 2021 whilst under the conservative Bolsonaro administration, when deforestation in the Amazon increased 185% — from a loss of 4,571 km2 in 2012 to 13,038 km2 in 2021.<ref>INPE (2022). ''Observação da Terra. [[/www.obt.inpe.br/OBT/assuntos/programas/amazonia/prodes|http://www.obt.inpe.br/OBT/assuntos/programas/amazonia/prodes]]''</ref> However, since Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s appointment in 2022 there has been a steady decline in the rate of deforestation, which is now roughly half what it was in 2021.<ref>Terra Brasilis (2024). ''PRODES (deforestation): Deforestation rates – Legal Amazon – States''. [[/terrabrasilis.dpi.inpe.br/app/dashboard/deforestation/biomes/legal amazon/rates|https://terrabrasilis.dpi.inpe.br/app/dashboard/deforestation/biomes/legal_amazon/rates]]</ref> A significant proportion of emissions result from the clearing of rainforest and its subsequent conversion to ranching.<ref>MCTI (2022). ''Estimativas Anuais De Emissões De Gases De Efeito Estufa No Brasil.'' 6ª Edição. Ministério da Estado da Ciência, Tecnologia e Inovações. [[/www.gov.br/mcti/pt-br/acompanhe-o-mcti/sirene/publicacoes/estimativas-anuais-de-emissoes-gee/arquivos/6a-ed-estimativas-anuais.pdf|https://www.gov.br/mcti/pt-br/acompanhe-o-mcti/sirene/publicacoes/estimativas-anuais-de-emissoes-gee/arquivos/6a-ed-estimativas-anuais.pdf]]</ref> To address these emissions Brazil has implemented various adaptation policies, legislation and targets which are summarized below:
{| class="wikitable"
|'''Document name'''
|'''Type'''
|'''Publication year'''
|'''Key takeaways'''
|-
|National Policy on Climate Change (NPCC)
|Legislation
|2009
|Framework for addressing climate change
|-
|National Plan on Climate Change Adaptation
|Policy
|2016
|Framework for addressing impacts of climate change
|-
|Nationally Determined Contribution
|Target
|2024
|Reduce net greenhouse gas emissions by 59 to 67 percent below 2005 levels by 2035
|-
|Federal Constitution, Article 225
|Legislation
|2006
|The Amazon rainforest is considered as a ‘national heritage’.All levels of government have a shared responsibility to protect it and the environment
|-
| colspan="4" |'''Relating to REDD+'''
|-
|Plan of Action for the Prevention and Control of Deforestation in the Legal Amazon (PPCDAM)
|Policy
|2004
|Aims to reduce deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon
|-
|Forest code
|Legislation
|2012
|Aimed at reducing deforestation, but no specific mention of REDD+
|-
|Amazon Indigenous REDD+ Initiative
|Policy
|2012
|Incorporate Indigenous with REDD+ initiatives
|-
|National REDD+ Strategy (ENREDD+)
|Policy
|2016
|REDD+ as a fund-based mechanism
|}

=== Indigenous rights - Constitutional, tenure and bundle rights ===
In Brazil, Indigenous rights are robust and clearly defined according to the Brazilian Constitution. As a result, the Indigenous communities of the Brazilian Amazon have legal title to 13.8% of the national territory totalling 1.175 million km2, with a total of 631 territories.<ref>Federal government of Brazil (2024). ''Brazil’s NDC: National determination to contribute and transform''. [[/unfccc.int/sites/default/files/2024-11/Brazil Second Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) November2024.pdf|https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/2024-11/Brazil_Second%20Nationally%20Determined%20Contribution%20%28NDC%29_November2024.pdf]]</ref>
{| class="wikitable"
| colspan="2" |'''Laws'''
|-
|Article 231 of the 1988 Constitution
|Indigenous peoples to have their exclusive right to use their territories to derive economic benefits. Grants indigenous peoples the right to land, prohibits eviction, and restricts mining without authorization from the federal government.
|-
|Indigenous Peoples statute (1973).

|No acts restricting the full exercise of indigenous peoples’ permanent tenure over the land should be permitted.
|-
| colspan="2" | '''Treaties'''
|-
|United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2007)
|Requires States to obtain free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) for the approval of any projects affecting indigenous territories.
|-
|International Labour Organization Convention 169 (2019)
|Ratified and incorporated under domestic law in 2002 through Decree 10.088/2019, endorsing UNDRIP
|-
|American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2016)
|Supports and builds upon UNDRIP
|}
Whilst Indigenous communities in Brazil have legal title to land, it is the State that owns it. Indigenous people simply exercise permanent tenure over lands that they traditionally occupy and have ‘original rights’ to these traditional lands, which no other rights can prevail over.<ref name=":3" /> Indigenous lands, though not classified as protected areas, “have the highest level of protection by law because they are regulated by the Constitution” and cannot be leased or restricted without violating their original rights. The Suruí's right to develop the PCFS is grounded in the Brazilian Constitution, which grants Indigenous peoples exclusive rights to use the ‘riches of the soil, rivers and lakes’ of their land, and these rights cannot be overridden. Thus, Indigenous people and only Indigenous people are legally allowed to engage in productive activities on their land, provided these activities are conducted according to their own customs and traditions and are necessary for the wellbeing and cultural expression of their own people. In Brazil, it is the armed forces and federal police that are responsible for enforcing these laws, and FUNAI is responsible for representing Indigenous communities in judicial disputes.<ref name=":3" /> As such, provided a REDD+ does not violate the rights to territorial integrity, permanent land tenure and original rights, it is legally allowed.
[[File:Two Pataxo indians (Brasília, 04 April 2006).jpeg|thumb|414x414px|Two Indigenous in Brazil]]
'''CARBON RIGHTS:''' In Brazil, carbon rights are tied to forest rights.<ref name=":2" /> Carbon credits from REDD+ projects are seen as part of the economic benefits derived from indigenous lands, and as such, Indigenous communities are entitled to own, control and distribute these revenues themselves. The carbon credits generated from the (SFCP) were wholly owned by the Suruí people through Metareilá, with the Suruí Fund (managed by the Brazilian Biodiversity Fund - FUNBIO) acting as recipient. This legality reinforces Indigenous control over both land and carbon rights, as whoever has rights to the forest land is usually recognized as the owner of carbon rights.<ref name=":3" />

'''FPIC OBLIGATION:''' Furthermore, Brazilian law requires Free, Prior, and Informed Consent (FPIC) for REDD+ projects affecting indigenous lands, ensuring that international standards such as the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) and ILO Convention No. 169 are adhered to; Indigenous consent is, ''de jure,'' a necessity. Projects that violate these rights and fail to consult communities are therefore considered illegal. Notably there are no specific rules or procedures that have been written into the Brazilian constitution that provide guidance on how to achieve FPIC. This freedom reinforces Indigenous autonomy as it allows an Indigenous community to define the rules of consultation according to their customs and traditions.

Collectively these national and international laws provide an important safeguard to Indigenous peoples, making their consent a prerequisite for the establishment of REDD+ projects and recognizing their rights as the main beneficiaries of REDD+ revenues.<ref name=":3" /> However, as carbon rights are tied to forest rights in Brazil and not land rights, carbon is considered to be an ‘environmental service’ (Article 41(I)(A) Brazilian Forestry Code), and states, as well as the federal government, have the jurisdiction to exercise full legislative authority over carbon. <ref name=":2" /> As such, certain states have interpreted the law to imply that the title to carbon credits is attributable to the state.<ref>Loft, L., Ravikumar, A., Gebara, M. F., Pham, T. T., Resosudarmo, I. A. P., Assembe, S., Tovar, J. G., Mwangi, E., & Andersson, K. (2015). Taking Stock of Carbon Rights in REDD+ Candidate Countries: Concept Meets Reality. ''Forests'', ''6''(4), 1031-1060. [[/doi.org/10.3390/f6041031|https://doi.org/10.3390/f6041031]]</ref> Hence, even when carbon rights are clearly defined and tied to forest title it is insufficient in itself, and only by legally recognizing the customary rights of IPLCs can a fair and equitable outcome be realised.

=== Interested and affected stakeholders ===
{| class="wikitable"
| colspan="5" |'''Affected stakeholders'''
|-
|Stakeholders
|Primary objective(s)
|Secondary objective(s)
|Relative power
|Scope of influence
|-
|Metareilá Association of the Suruí Indigenous People
|
* Project proponent

* Works to defend and preserve the cultural and territorial heritage of the Suruí people
|
|
|
|-
|Other Indigenous groups and associations
|
* Encouraging the revitalization, strengthening and enhancement of traditional cultural property

* Provide support to improve the quality and performance of schools
* Supporting the identification of more effective alternatives to address the health problems faced by the Paiter people

* Supports the implementation of economic systems for the sustainable use of natural resources that meet the Paiter Suruí people's needs
|Aim to benefit from the project
|Have the same rights as the Metareila with respect to land though are less involved with project development and have less say, nor derive as many benefits as the Metareila
|Local
|-
|''Campesinos'' (peasants)
|Procure more land.
|
|Have far fewer rights than Indigenous groups
|Local
|-
|Yabner Gãbgir Forestry Institute of the Paiter Suruí people
|Encouraging the revitalization, strengthening and enhancement of traditional cultural property
|
|Low
|Local
|-
| colspan="5" |'''Interested stakeholders'''
|-
|Kanindé Association for Ethno-Environmental Defense – non-profit
|Responsible for the ethno-zoning of TISS. Coordination and organization of activities for Food Security and income generation, monitoring of biodiversity and socio-economic benefits
|
|
|
|-
|IDESAM - Institute for Conservation and Sustainable Development of Amazonas – non-profit NGO
|''Technical coordination''; - calculation of baseline scenario - preparation of Project Design Document (PDD) as well as the validation and verification to VCS and CCB standards. Coordination of biomass and carbon inventories and forest monitoring in support of the PCFS (remote sensing). Also supports policy and technical coordination related to REDD for the PCFS (p.9).
|
|
|
|-
|Forest Trends
|Supported formulation and implementation of the project. Raised funds
|
|
|International
|-
|Amazon Conservation Team - ACT Brazil
|Support to activities for food security and income generation, monitoring of biodiversity and socio-economic benefits, legal advice and communication to the project. Development of the Land Protection Plan, environmental monitoring and carbon stocks.
|
|
|
|-
|Brazilian Biodiversity Fund (FUNBIO)

|Responsible for the financial resources management mechanism generated by the Suruí forest carbon projects - Suruí Fund - and other income activities within the Management Plan.
|
|
|
|-
|Ministry of Environment (MMA)
|
|
|
|
|-
|Government of the State of Mato Grosso
|
|
|
|
|-
|Government of the State of Mato Grosso
|
|
|
|
|-
|National Indian Foundation (FUNAI)
|FUNAI does not necessarily need to take part in the governance of the project (Sales et al., 2010), but it should have formal knowledge of the direction and initiative proposals.

|
|
|National
|}

=== Discussion ===
Although originally successful in achieving its goal of reducing deforestation and degradation, in 2016 diamonds were discovered in Surui territory, leading to an increase in illegal logging and mining.<ref name=":1" /> By 2018 the project site had been completely overrun by ''garimpeiros'' (small-scale gold miners), ultimately leading to the projects suspension that year. <ref name=":4" />

While the project had initially garnered support, divisions emerged within the community post-project implementation. Disputes arose over the unequal distribution of project revenues, leading to internal conflicts between different Suruí clans. These criticisms escalated in 2014 when the Catholic Indigenous Missionary Council supported calls for an end to the project due to mismanagement of revenues from carbon credit sales. <ref name=":3" /> Some Suruí members also argued that the REDD+ initiative harmed their way of life.<ref>Lang, C. (2014). ''“What are projects for that destroy life?” Interview with Henrique Suruí about the Paiter-Suruí REDD project, Brazil.'' REDD-Monitor. [[/redd-monitor.org/2014/12/17/what-are-projects-for-that-destroy-life-interview-with-henrique-surui-about-the-paiter-surui-redd-project-brazil/|https://redd-monitor.org/2014/12/17/what-are-projects-for-that-destroy-life-interview-with-henrique-surui-about-the-paiter-surui-redd-project-brazil/]]</ref>

Further complicating the situation was the controversial role of Henrique Suruí, one of the Suruí tribal leaders. In 2011, it was revealed that Henrique had violated the tribe's logging moratorium, collaborating with loggers in illegal activities. While Henrique later denied responsibility for the project’s failure, his actions, combined with internal disagreements, illustrated the lack of consensus within the Suruí leadership on the project’s goals and outcomes. Both of the tribe’s leaders possessed dramatically different perspectives on how they believed they could ensure agency, autonomy, and economic benefits for the Suruí people.<ref name=":4" /> This fragmentation within the community, in combination with the discovery of diamonds and the state's failure to protect indigenous land rights led to the indefinite suspension of the REDD+ project.

The project's collapse highlights broader structural issues, particularly the state's inconsistent support for indigenous land rights, influenced by settler colonialism, which undermined the project’s long-term viability.<ref name=":4" /> Additionally, the project’s creation was shaped by external actors, including the collaboration between Almir Suruí and Borges from Forest Trends, a Washington-based NGO. This partnership introduced a Western perspective on viewing the Suruí peoples forest, in contrast with their own perspectives on land use and governance. Furthermore, despite Borges’ Brazilian background, the power dynamics between a global North organization and a developing, Indigenous community were apparent.

=== Summary ===
The Suruí Forest Carbon Project provides an interesting example of how, even when the rights of IPLC’s are relatively robust, challenges persist in ensuring REDD+ project longevity. As such, in its current state, REDD+ in the Brazilian Amazon may not be a suitable market-based option for indigenous communities in the Amazon.<ref name=":3" /> Although initially successful in promoting indigenous autonomy and reducing deforestation, the project resulted in failure due to of a myriad of factors. Division between Surui communities was exacerbated by a perceived unequal benefit-sharing, and the impact of imposing REDD+ seems to have complicated the traditional social structure that the Surui were dependent on. These issues were influenced by Brazil's settler state dynamics, where indigenous land rights, although legally recognized, are often not upheld in practice due to insufficient enforcement.<ref name=":4" /> Ultimately, the Surui project reveals how settler colonialism's structural flaws make long-term project success difficult, despite initial progress in promoting indigenous autonomy.

At the national and state level, complex institutional and legal land governance structures convolute and impede REDD+ in Brazil. Multiple institutions share responsibilities and there is no comprehensive, authoritative database of land ownership, which hampers efforts to protect indigenous territories.<ref name=":5">Costa, R. (2016)''. Insecure land rights in Brazil: Consequences for rural areas and challenges for improvement.'' Climate Policy Initiative. [[/www.climatepolicyinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/Insecure Land Rights in Brazil CPI.pdf|https://www.climatepolicyinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/Insecure_Land_Rights_in_Brazil_CPI.pdf]]</ref> As a result, land tenure disputes remain common and can be witnessed occurring between the public as well between public and state actors. For example, Brazil’s 1964 Land Statute (Law No. 4504) allows the government to takeover unproductive farms and transfer those lands to landless peasants. This often results in the clearing of forest, as only when the land is cleared is it evidenced to be ‘productive’.<ref name=":5" /> Hence, not only does this law cause insecurity for Indigenous populations in Brazil, it also forces them to go against customary traditions of stewarding the land in an effort to maintain its control.

Whilst the aforementioned points to the futility of REDD+ in Brazil, there is reason to maintain optimism. In a recent landmark ruling Brazil’s supreme court voted in favour of the Xoleng peoples, and the decision will serve as a precedent for all cases involving Indigenous peoples.<ref name=":6">Amos-Flom, K., (2023). ''Triumph and Turmoil: The Xokleng Case and the Future of Indigenous Land Rights in Brazil.'' Columbia Journal of Transnational Law. [[/www.jtl.columbia.edu/bulletin-blog/triumph-and-turmoil-the-xokleng-case-and-the-future-of-indigenous-land-rights-in-brazil|https://www.jtl.columbia.edu/bulletin-blog/triumph-and-turmoil-the-xokleng-case-and-the-future-of-indigenous-land-rights-in-brazil]]</ref> The Xokleng’s land dispute, settled in 2023, “rejected Santa Catarina state’s marco temporal (“time limit”) argument, which would have required Indigenous people to prove they occupied or legally contested the territory they claimed before the Brazilian Constitution came into force in 1988. If successful, this argument would have led to disastrous repercussions, as many indigenous peoples had been forcibly removed or are traditionally nomadic.”<ref name=":6" /> Evidently, whilst slow, progress has been made in Brazil in recent years with respect to Indigenous rights as well as the voluntary carbon market itself.

There are currently 159 AFOLU projects listed on the Verra database in Brazil, with only two specifically focused on REDD+ initiatives in collaboration with Indigenous groups. These are the Ka’a Pyahu project, <ref>Verra (n.d.) ''Project 5087: KA'A PYAHU.'' https://registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/5087</ref> initiated by the Guajajara Indigenous people in collaboration with external organizations and validated in 2021, and the ‘Together for the forest Awaete REDD+ project’<ref>Verra (n.d.) ''Project 5200: TOGETHER FOR THE FOREST AWAETÉ REDD+ PROJECT.'' https://registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/5200</ref> which is still under development. Both projects involve Indigenous groups working with Brazilian organizations to build technical capacity and expertise. This could signal a growing trend of Indigenous-led REDD+ projects in the future. To ensure a positive future for REDD+ in Brazil, the customary rights of IPLC’s must be formally recognized. IPLC should have legal ownership of their traditional lands, and in doing so the carbon rights of these communities would be less convoluted, leading to more equitable benefit-sharing and increased cohesion amongst these groups post-project implementation.

==Colombia: ''REDD+ project Resguardo Indigena Unificado - Selva de Mataven (RUI-SM)''==

=== '''Project description and location''' ===
[[File:RS6524 MG 3944.jpg|thumb|407x407px|A view of the Mataven]]
According to the PD,<ref name=":7">ACATISEMA & Mediamos (2017). ''Joint project description and monitoring report: REDD+ project: Resguardo Indigena Unificado – Selva de Mataven (RIU – SM).'' Link: “10 06 2017_VCS Final Report_ Matavin Project.pdf” found at [[/registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/1566|https://registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/1566]]</ref> the Resguardo Indígena Unificado – Selva de Matavén (RIU-SM) project is located east of the Colombian Orinoco high plain, in the eastern part of the Department of Vichada, municipality of Cumaribo. It resides on the formalized resguardo of the Sikuani, Piaroa, Puinave, Curripaco, Cubeo and Piapoco ethnic groups, spanning 1,856,836 hectares, with 1,477,115 hectares (79.6%) being forested. The project states that it will reduce greenhouse gas emissions, with a total estimated net reduction of 108,670,562 tons of CO2 equivalent over thirty years, from years 2013 – 2042. By this metric, it is the 14th largest project on the Verra registry, out of over 1700 projects.<ref name=":9">Dufrasne, D., (2021). ''Two Shades of Green: How hot air forest credits are being used to avoid carbon taxes in Colombia''. Carbon Market Watch. [[/carbonmarketwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Two-shades-of-green EN WEB.pdf|https://carbonmarketwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Two-shades-of-green_EN_WEB.pdf]]</ref> There are 12,312 indigenous people living in the RIU-SM, belonging to 2,517 families and 250 communities as of 2017.

The project was initiated by the Asociación de Cabildos y Autoridades Indígenas de la Selva de Matavén (ACETISMA), an Indigenous association, and developed by MEDIAMOS F&M, a Colombian consultancy firm. ACETISMA is comprised of Indigenous leaders that represent the 17 communities of the reservation in charge of governing the territory, and it has administrative autonomy, as well as “the capacity to acquire, to own and to dispose of property, to accept donations, to hold national and international conventions, scientific and cultural exchanges and generally, to celebrate all kinds of negotiations and agreements with which the Association can achieve its objectives.”<ref name=":7" />

There is a stated focus on various means of improving the living conditions of the Indigenous peoples living within the project area. To summarise, the main objectives of the REDD+ project RIU-SM include:

· Community development, in the form of improved education.

· Community engagement with respect to the project; developing information channels to reveal project progress.

· Support local initiatives for environmental education and waste management.

· Developing an effective response system that addresses community proposals and concerns relating to the project.

· Strengthening the governance of ACATISEMA.

=== National climate targets, policies and legislation ===
[[File:Figure 6 Colombian Manual Eradicators Destroying Coca Fields (31352594937).jpg|thumb|292x292px|The Colombian government fight against cocoa production.]]
The Colombian Amazon makes up over one-third of Colombia’s national territory, and up until 2005 only 7.3% of the Colombian Amazon had been deforested, largely due to the country's 60-year armed conflict between the government, multiple left-wing guerillas such as FARC, and several far-right paramilitary groups.<ref name=":8" /> However, following the signing of the Peace Treaty in 2016 and demobilization of the FARC, limits to deforestation were weakened in the Colombian Amazon. Poor but opportunistic peasants began to encroach into previously unchartered territory and capitalize from the rainforest. Due to the poor economic integration of the Amazon, many were forced to engage with the traditional economies of cocoa and cattle ranching, as these markets were already well connected to regional and global markets.<ref name=":8" /> To address the drivers of deforestation and its associated emissions, the federal government has implemented various initiatives, which are summarized below:

{| class="wikitable"
|'''Document name'''
|'''Type'''
|'''Publication year'''
|'''Key takeaways'''
|-
|Nationally Determined Contribution(s)
|Target
|2020
|Reduce GHG emissions by 51 % by 2030 and net-zero by 2050
|-
|National Climate Change Policy (PNCC)
|Policy
|2018
|Address climate change and foster sustainable development
|-
|National Forest Conservation Program
|Policy
|2011
|Address deforestation
|-
|Law 1931 of 2018 – Climate Change Law

|Legislation
|2018
|Establishes the framework for addressing climate change
|-
| colspan="4" |'''Relating to REDD+:'''
|-
|National Strategy for Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (ENREDD+)
|Initiative
|2009
|Particular focus on the Amazon and Choco rainforests
|-
|Amazon Indigenous REDD+ Initiative
|Initiative
|2016
|Respect Indigenous rights. FPIC focus.
|-
|BIOREDD+ program
|Initiative
|2012
|Portfolio of 8 REDD+ projects in four geographic nodes covering over 700,000 hectares in the Colombian Pacific.

|-
|Vision Amazonia
|Initiative
|2015
|Part of the REDD+ strategy, financed by three foreign countries: Germany, Norway and United Kingdom
|}
As a result of the many fund and market-based initiatives that Colombia has engaged with, it hosts the second most REDD+ projects in the world. REDD+ projects now cover at least 56% of the area of legally recognized Indigenous territories in the Colombian Amazon, with an overwhelming majority of carbon projects located on Indigenous territories.<ref name=":10">Schmid, D., & Castro. C., (2023). ''REDD+ projects in the Colombian Amazon: Social challenges and lack of transparency''. Rainforest Foundation Norway. [[/dv719tqmsuwvb.cloudfront.net/documents/REDD rapport 2024 ENG.pdf|https://dv719tqmsuwvb.cloudfront.net/documents/REDD_rapport_2024_ENG.pdf]]</ref> Evidently REDD+ plays an integral part in the country’s efforts of environmental conservation, and incentives have been introduced to promote the development of such projects. For example, in 2016 the government adopted a higher tax that covered fossil fuels, but companies are able to avoid paying the tax by investing in carbon offsets that have been generated domestically.<ref name=":9" /> This led to a boost in the domestic REDD+ market in 2017, as Colombian companies invested as to escape higher taxes. Notably, 23 of the 36 REDD+ projects currently under development in the Amazon region were initiated in or after 2018.<ref name=":10" /> Currently Colombia’s REDD+ program sits at over 45 pilot and voluntary carbon projects, as well as one large-scale jurisdictional approach in the Amazon.<ref name=":11">Zambrano-Cortés, D. G. (2024). ''The politics, spaces and subjects of forest conservation in Colombia''. [internal PhD, WU, Wageningen University]. Wageningen University. [[/doi.org/10.18174/675328|https://doi.org/10.18174/675328]]</ref>

=== Indigenous rights - Constitutional, tenure and bundle rights ===
''De jure'', the Indigenous peoples of Colombia have comprehensive tenure and bundle rights that have been articulated in the national constitution. Collective land titles are granted to Indigenous communities by the Colombian government, and as a result about 34 percent of Colombian land (almost 38 million hectares) is legally recognized as Indigenous territory or collective lands of Afro-descendent communities.<ref name=":10" /> These collective land tenure rights have been in effect since the implementation of the 1991 constitution, granting them the authority to exercise legal control over their territories in accordance with their own customs and procedures.<ref>Max Planck Institute (n.d.) ''Colombia 1991 (rev. 2015).'' Institute. [[/www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Colombia 2015|https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Colombia_2015]]</ref> Furthermore, the carbon rights of Indigenous peoples are explicitly defined in the constitution and tied specifically to the ownership of land of the communities.<ref name=":2" /> This in theory provides a solid legal basis for upholding the rights of Indigenous communities in Colombia, specifically relating to REDD+ activities, as it allows communities to define and negotiate the terms of said projects. A summary of the various laws relating to Indigenous rights have been summarized below:
{| class="wikitable"
| colspan="2" |'''Law (1991 constitution)'''
|-
|Article 63

|Indigenous territories are considered collective property. Land is not owned by individuals but is shared by the community. The state must respect these collective rights and cannot alter land ownership without the consent of the Indigenous peoples.
|-
|Article 76 - ''Consulta previa''.
|Pertains to the right of Indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities; prior consultation must be undertaken before any entity undertakes activities that may affect their territories, culture, or way of life.
|-
|Article 330
|Indigenous communities have the right to govern their territories.
|-
|Article 329
|The Reservation is a collective, inalienable, and indefeasible property.
|-
|Decree 1386 of 1994, Article 10; Decree 2164 of 1995, Article 22) 39.
|"The administration and management of these lands are subjected to uses and customs of the beneficiaries."
|}
Whilst land and tenure rights are enshrined into the constitution, the precariousness of these rights persists due to a lack of resources to ensure enforcement, as well as the deeper issue of corruption. As previously stated, the rate of deforestation increased significantly in Colombia’s post-conflict era, evidencing the nations inability to maintain control over unlawful acts of land-grabbing and disposition. Whilst this began with new peasants converting the Amazon for subsistence purposes, it ultimately led to new areas for the growth of cocoa, much to the benefit of narco-traffickers who could monopolize on this illegal surplus in ‘accumulation by dispossession’.<ref name=":8" />

With respect to the legalities of consultation, Colombia has enshrined ''consulta previa'' into the constitution. Translating to ‘prior consultation’, this legal text provides the formal grounds for Indigenous engagement when any legislative or administrative measures are implemented on Indigenous territory. Importantly, consultation should be achieved in accordance with the customs of the ethnic group with which the project is being imposed upon. However, there have been recent cases of contestation specifically relating to how ''consulta previa'' applies to REDD+ on Indigenous lands, and the RIU – SM project was one that was involved with such a case.

=== Affected and interested stakeholders ===
{| class="wikitable"
| colspan="5" |'''Affected stakeholders'''
|-
|Stakeholders
|Primary objective(s)
|Secondary objective(s)
|Relative power
|Scope of influence
|-
|ACATISEMA - Asociación de Cabildos y Autoridades Indígenas de la Selva de Matavén
|
* Foster the integral development, social and cultural preservation of the indigenous communities in the Mataven Jungle and to
* Consolidate the territory, and conservation and preservation of the environment and biodiversity of the Mataven Jungle

|
|Has the highest authority in the reservation.
Rights to the land.
|
|-
|Indigenous ''resguardos'' of the RIU-SM
|
* Primary and direct beneficiaries of project
* Seek to maintain land rights
* Promote traditional and cultural beliefs
|Uphold
|
|
|-
|Landless peasants
|Gain more access to land. Improve rights
|
|Low
|Local
|-
| colspan="5" |'''Interested stakeholders'''
|-
|MEDIAMOS F&M
|Project developer
|
|
|International
|-
|Mining companies
|Compete with the Project for the territory's resources.
|
|
|
|-
|Ministerio de Ambiente y Desarrollo Sostenible
|Its main interest is to achieve environmental planning, through the consolidation of a policy of sustainable development and strategic alliances with social and institutional participants in different sectoral and territorial scenarios.
|
|
|
|-
|Dirección de Asuntos Indígenas, ROM y Minorías - Ministerio del Interior
|Public agency that advises the national level, prepares and proposes the formulation of public policy in favor of indigenous peoples within the framework of the defense, support, reinforcement and consolidation of ethnic and cultural rights.
|
|
|
|-
|Corporinoquía
|Regional environmental authority to ensure the proper use of natural resources in their area of jurisdiction.
|
|
|Regional
|-
|Other government institutions: Governor ofice of Vichada, Mayor ofice Cumaribo
|The Reservation for being part of the Cumaribo, Vichada, has territorial jurisdiction relations with the Governor’s office and the Mayor’s office.
|
|
|
|-
|Fundación NATURA
|Civil organization whose mission is the conservation, use and management of biodiversity to generate social, economic and environmental benefits in the context of sustainable human development.
|
|
|
|-
|FONDO ACCIÓN
|Colombian non-profit organization in the private scheme. Encourage the participation of civil society and the private sector in the implementation of the country’s public policies in two areas: - Conservation and sustainable development; and protection -development of children.
|
|
|
|-
|SENA, Department of Social Prosperity (DPS), NGOs and private consultants
|Supporting the implementation of rural development activities.
|
|
|Regional
|-
|Other indigenous communities neighboring RIU-SM
|
|
|Low
|Local
|-
|Financial institutions
|They fund local development activities.
|
|
|
|-
|Asocarbono – An industry association, including Verra, ProClima, Biofix, and ACATISEMA.

|
|
|
|
|-
|OPIAC: the National Oganization of the Indigenous Peoples of the Colombian Amazon

|
|
|
|
|}

=== Discussion ===
According to the official REDD+ Mataven website<ref>RIU – SM (n.d.). ''REDD+ Mataven''. [[/reddmataven.com/|https://reddmataven.com/]]</ref> the project has resulted in a myriad of benefits to the Indigenous communities of the region. For example, as a result of the funds generated from the projects activities, there have been improvements in infrastructure, transportation and education, ultimately leading to the empowerment and improved governance of ACETISMA. However, the project has come under fire for multiple reasons.

For one, in 2015 some of the Indigenous communities filed a lawsuit referring to the violation of their right to ''consulta previa''. However, the court ruled that their Indigenous rights had not been violated as it was ACETISMA that initially sought MEDIAMOS to develop the project, and that ACETISMA were the best representatives of those Indigenous communities. Furthermore, the projects main focus was the conservation of the rainforest and therefore did not threaten the cultural integrity of those communities.<ref name=":10" /> However, regardless of the outcome of this case, its occurrence points to internal disagreement amongst Indigenous participants of the RIU-SM project. In a study involving interviews with Indigenous members of the project, there was a significant proportion of interviewees that had little knowledge regarding various aspects of the project, such as responsibilities of participation, or the benefit-sharing mechanism in place.<ref name=":2" /> This further reinforces the point that, in the case of the RIU-SM project it may not be ‘bottom-up’ and eludes to the power imbalance experienced between Mediamos, the project developer, and Indigenous community members. In the PD there is a breakdown of the distribution of income between ACETISMA and Mediamos, which shows a significant proportion of revenue flowing to the former organisation throughout the project’s operations.<ref name=":7" /> However, there is currently no publicly available documentation supporting this initial claim<ref name=":9" /> as there is no obligation to provide this information, leading to a general lack of transparency in the market and between all of the relevant actors. Subsequent meetings with Indigenous leaders have however shown a marked support of the Mataven project, with one Indigenous leader explicitly stating “...the Redd+ project has brought resources that they never had before, which allowed them to open new school classrooms, 21 rural aqueducts, cocoa crops and even headquarters in Cumaribo and Inírida.”<ref>Lievano, A. B. (2021) Colombia's biggest carbon credit project could be selling hot air. Latin American Center for Investigative Journalism. [[/www.elclip.org/el-mayor-proyecto-de-bonos-de-carbono-de-colombia-podria-estar-vendiendo-aire-caliente/|https://www.elclip.org/el-mayor-proyecto-de-bonos-de-carbono-de-colombia-podria-estar-vendiendo-aire-caliente/]] </ref> Clearly there have been benefits for IPLC’s involved with this project, though the details of this benefit-sharing remain a mystery.

Secondly, the Mataven project has caused controversy due to its apparently inflated carbon credit issuance. The report states that this has been achieved by using a reference area that is not representative of the project area, as well as assuming an uncharacteristically heigh assumed rate of deforestation.<ref name=":12">Global Atlas of Environmental Justice (2023). ''Resguardo Indigena Unificado-Selva de Matavén (RIU SM) REDD+ Project, Colombia.'' [[/ejatlas.org/conflict/redd-project-resguardo-indigena-unificado-selva-de-mataven-riu-sm|https://ejatlas.org/conflict/redd-project-resguardo-indigena-unificado-selva-de-mataven-riu-sm]]</ref> The project used a baseline deforestation rate of 0.86% per year, which is significantly more than the Colombian government's national rate of 0.18%. Additionally, according to the report the reference area chosen is more easily accessed and therefore more prone to deforestation, making it an inaccurate comparison to the relatively remote project area.<ref name=":2" /> This has led to the creation of excess carbon credits, or “hot air” credits, which have been criticized for not reflecting real environmental benefits.<ref name=":9" /> To add further insult to injury these credits have been used by a Colombian fossil fuel distributor company to avoid paying taxes, as described earlier by Colombia’s change in policy in 2017. In doing so, the company avoided paying approximately $18.9 million in taxes.<ref name=":2" /> There has been subsequent back and forth between Verra and Carbon Market Watch, with Verra refuting the claims<ref>Verra (2021). ''Carbon Market Watch Report on Colombian REDD+ Projects Contains Flawed Allegations.'' [[/verra.org/carbon-market-watch-report-on-colombian-redd-projects-contains-flawed-allegations/|https://verra.org/carbon-market-watch-report-on-colombian-redd-projects-contains-flawed-allegations/]] </ref> Regardless of the science, Colombia recently introduced a resolution in 2018 (Resolution 1447 – 2018) that requires projects to use baselines that comply with national reference levels.<ref name=":13">Dufrasne, D. (2021b). Companies use ”hot air” forestry offsets to avoid taxes in Colombia: Carbon Market Watch’s fact-check of Verra’s response. Carbon Market Watch. [[/carbonmarketwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/CMWs-fact-check-of-Verras-response-on-Colombia.pdf|https://carbonmarketwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/CMWs-fact-check-of-Verras-response-on-Colombia.pdf]]</ref><ref>IEA (2022). ''Resolution 1447 – 2018. Monitoring, Reporting, and Verification System for mitigation actions at the national level.'' International Energy Agency. [[/www.iea.org/policies/14772-resolution-1447-2018-monitoring-reporting-and-verification-system-for-mitigation-actions-at-the-national-level|https://www.iea.org/policies/14772-resolution-1447-2018-monitoring-reporting-and-verification-system-for-mitigation-actions-at-the-national-level]]</ref> Going forward, REDD+ projects that are being implemented in Colombia will have to abide by Colombia’s national legislation.

=== Summary ===
Colombia has a long history of engaging in REDD+ as it has been used to limit environmental degradation in the post-conflict era, in alignment with the country’s national peacebuilding agenda.<ref name=":11" /> Owing to the country’s comprehensive tenure and bundle rights, IPLC’s have robust ''de jure'' rights to land as they collectively own it, and rights to carbon are tied to this ownership. This puts Colombia as one of the world leaders in legal terms relating to REDD+ project implementation, but due to a lack of resources to ensure enforcement, as well as corruption, historically these laws have not been adhered to.<ref name=":10" /><ref name=":2" /> There are many documented cases showing the displacement on IPLC’s from traditional lands, poor efforts to adhere to ''consulta previa'', and inequitable benefit sharing.<ref>Greenfield, P. (2023''). The ‘carbon pirates’ preying on Amazon’s Indigenous communities.'' The Guardian. [[/www.theguardian.com/environment/2023/jan/21/amazon-indigenous-communities-carbon-offsetting-pirates-aoe|https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2023/jan/21/amazon-indigenous-communities-carbon-offsetting-pirates-aoe]]</ref><ref name=":14">Lang, C., (2024). ''Colombia’s Constitutional Court rules in favour of Indigenous Peoples. Identifies serious flaws in the REDD+ Baka Rokarire project.'' REDD_Monitor. [[/reddmonitor.substack.com/p/colombias-constitutional-court-rules|https://reddmonitor.substack.com/p/colombias-constitutional-court-rules]]</ref>

The case of the Mataven project provides an interesting example of how it is the market itself that is failing to address concerns regarding transparency, whether that be relating to benefit-sharing amongst relevant stakeholders, or Indigenous representation and engagement throughout the implementation of REDD+ projects. Some ACATISEMA members have explicitly stated their support for the Mataven project,<ref name=":12" /> and its benefits can be seen first-hand in the form of improved infrastructure in local communities involved with the project.<ref>Myers, J. E., Parra, M. A., Bedford, C. (2021). ''How Carbon Offsetting Can Build a Forest.'' Stanford Social Innovation Review. [[/ssir.org/articles/entry/how carbon offsetting can build a forest|https://ssir.org/articles/entry/how_carbon_offsetting_can_build_a_forest]]</ref> However, an exact breakdown of how and where revenue is being distributed to IPLC’s remains elusive.<ref name=":13" /> Furthermore, the level of IPLC engagement has come into question, specifically with reference to ''consulta previa'' and the overall understanding that IPLC’s have regarding the project’s intended outcomes and activities.<ref name=":10" /> This is not a rare case in Colombia and has been witnessed occurring with other projects that have been implemented on Indigenous territories in the Colombian Amazon.<ref name=":17">Lang, C., (2023''). “It destroys everything,” says Indigenous leader about the REDD+ Baka Rokarire project in Colombia''. REDD Monitor. [[/reddmonitor.substack.com/p/it-destroys-everything-says-indigenous|https://reddmonitor.substack.com/p/it-destroys-everything-says-indigenous]]</ref> However, a recent ruling by the Colombian Constitutional court voted in favour of Indigenous groups in Colombia, upholding “the rights to self-determination, autonomy, self-government, territory, identity, physical and cultural integrity, and free, prior and informed consent of the indigenous communities”.<ref name=":14" /> This review ultimately sets a legal precedent safeguarding the fundamental rights of IPLCs with REDD+ project implementation and shows that progress is being made to improve the likelihood that REDD+ will result in genuine benefits to those affected by project implementation.

To ensure a more authentic engagement with IPLC’s as to result in legitimate and equitable benefit-sharing, improvements must be made by the Colombian government, as well as within the VCM itself. For the former, Colombia’s national registry for GHG mitigation activities must be updated; it has been offline since 2022.<ref name=":10" /> As a result, transparency is lacking. International finance could be utilized as to alleviate this issue, and only with an accurate and reliable database may the market be regulated. In the broader sense, VCM registries must create stricter guidelines promoting transparency. Often PD’s refer to annexed documents that contain relevant information regarding benefit-sharing, though these are often not publicly available.<ref name=":9" /> This limits transparency and increases the likelihood of inequitable agreements being made between project proponents and developers, further exacerbating existing power asymmetries between the two groups and limiting the likelihood that ''consulta previa'' is honestly adhered to.<ref name=":10" /> This has led to conflict within Indigenous communities, rather than a strengthening of their social fabric.

Furthermore, the Mataven project calls into question the actual emissions reduction that REDD+ projects achieve. Whilst Colombia has since updated its regulations such that REDD+ must use baselines that comply with national reference levels, it is up in the air as to how representative these guidelines are. Reference areas must represent project areas and without the appropriate regulations in place project developers lack the incentive to create realistic baselines; ultimately they are aiming to produce the maximum number of credits as to generate the greatest possible revenues.

==Conclusion==
As a market-based mechanism, REDD+ is shackled by the construct in which it operates; fundamentally it is a capitalist means of fixing a capitalist problem, which comes with limitations. Both Brazil and Colombia have relatively robust laws that have been written into the constitution, ultimately promoting more equitable results of project implementation. However, as in Colombia IPLC’s collectively own the land, whereas in Brazil these groups only own rights to use the land,<ref name=":2" /> Colombia can be considered better equipped for the establishment of REDD+ projects on traditional Indigenous territory. However, even with these laws in place enforcement remain a matter of concern. Furthermore, given the wide variety of ontological and epistemological perspectives of Indigenous communities, and how these views conflict with the Western worldview from which market-based REDD+ came to fruition, there is an inherent difficulty in implementing a system of governance in REDD+ on Indigenous lands.<ref name=":1" />. Putting a price on nature conflicts with Indigenous perspectives and there have been instances where this has attacked the social and cultural fabric of IPLC’s.<ref name=":17" /> To avoid this REDD+ developers must have the genuine intent of understanding the perspective of the Indigenous group they are working with and aim to implement REDD+ with a bottom-up approach.

In both countries, transparency must be improved to ensure that FPIC is adhered to and subsequently ensure fair IPLC representation and engagement. This issue predominantly arises due to the poor requirements of standards in the VCM. As such, proponents are guided by developers which have little incentive to truly act in the interests of Indigenous groups; ultimately the organizations in charge of project development are interested in increasing project revenues. This has led to instances of over-crediting, as without a transparent framework in which to operate it is difficult to evaluate the legitimacy of the claims being made by project proponents and developers. However, with recent advances that address concerns of additionality<ref name=":15" /> there is hope for improved market integrity. Standards of the VCM must continue to be scrutinized to ensure that progress continues to be made.

Going forward, progress should be made to formalize the customary laws and traditional lands of IPLCs, and finance should be directed towards the enforcement of these laws. The environmental,<ref name=":16" /> economic,<ref name=":5" /><ref>Ding, H., Veit, P. G., Blackman, A., Gray, E., Reytar, K., Altamirano, J. C., Hodgdon, B., (2016). ''Climate benefits, tenure costs: The economic case for securing Indigenous land rights in the Amazon''. WRI. [[/files.wri.org/d8/s3fs-public/Climate Benefits Tenure Costs Executive Summary.pdf|https://files.wri.org/d8/s3fs-public/Climate_Benefits_Tenure_Costs_Executive_Summary.pdf]]</ref> and social<ref>Sarmiento Barletti, J. P., Heise Vigil, N., & Larson, A. M. (2023). ''Safeguards at a glance: Are voluntary standards supporting community land, resource and carbon rights?'' CIFOR-ICRAF. [[/www.cifor-icraf.org/publications/pdf files/Flyer/REDD-Safeguards-7.pdf|https://www.cifor-icraf.org/publications/pdf_files/Flyer/REDD-Safeguards-7.pdf]] </ref> benefits of this have been researched and are well understood. By developing culturally appropriate frameworks for rights-based conservation regimes, that work with IPLCs in accordance with their worldviews, REDD+ could be used to promote Indigenous autonomy. However, progress still must be made to achieve this goal.

==References==

Documentation:Open Case Studies/FRST522/2024/REDD+ in Indigenous Amazonia: What works and what doesn’t?

2024-12-12T22:58:36Z

ConnorHaynes: /* Indigenous rights - Constitutional, tenure and bundle rights */

__TOC__

==Positionality==
First and foremost I am not Indigenous, and whilst there are a myriad of cultures, ontologies and epistemologies that are not sufficiently represented by simply stating ‘Indigenous’, it is commonly accepted that these worldviews are vastly different to those of the ‘Western’ world, which is the world in which I grew up and matured. I am therefore only understanding of Indigenous cultures, beliefs and customary laws based upon available online literature and those which I have learnt through life, in addition to those introduced to me in my Master’s degree. As such, I will never be able to fully relate to an Indigenous person; the best I can do is try to understand and learn. Only throughout this process am I able to work towards reconciliation and attempt to address the inequities experienced by Indigenous folk globally.

Additionally, I am yet to act as a carbon project proponent and so do not understand the nuances or stresses of undertaking such a task. Whilst an individual proponent may have the best intention of procuring a carbon project for its social and environmental benefits, there are a number of stakeholders involved throughout the entire process which influence its eventual outcome. Without experience acting as a project proponent I am naïve in understanding the process and it's difficulties.

==Acronyms / Terminology==
'''Acronyms:'''

AFOLU: Agriculture, Forestry and Other Land-Use

ICVCM: Integrity Council for the Voluntary Carbon Market

IPLC: Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities

KMGBF: Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework

LAC: Latin American Countries

MRV: Monitoring, Reporting and Verification

REDD+: Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation

UNCBD: United Nations Convention on Biological Biodiversity

VCMI: Voluntary Carbon Markets Integrity Initiative

'''Terminology:'''

''Additionality:'' Additionality is the determination of whether the project will lead to the expected outcomes when compared to the baseline or ‘business as usual’ emissions.

''Leakage'': Refers to the shifting of emissions to outside the project boundary as a result of the project’s activities.

''Permanence:'' Permanence refers to the degree to which a carbon credit is equivalent to a permanent removal or reduction in emissions.
==Abstract==
This case study illustrates two examples of Indigenous-led REDD+ projects on Indigenous territory in Colombia and Brazil. Both countries have a relatively long history of engaging with REDD+ but have slightly different legal structures pertaining to the rights of Indigenous peoples on their traditional territories, and specifically their ‘carbon’ rights. As such, the intention is to evaluate how these differing ''de jure'' rights translate on the ground. With respect to REDD+, do certain rights result in legitimately positive benefits to IPLCs, as well as the environment that these projects were originally intended to protect? To reduce inconsistency, projects were chosen that utilized the same standard, namely Verra’s ‘Verified Carbon Standard’. The intention is such that the reader can evaluate the effectiveness and true benefit of REDD+ projects to IPLC’s, based upon the legal frameworks of the host country. A secondary intention is such that the reader is better equipped to conduct a prefeasibility assessment based upon available online literature, to evaluate the likelihood that REDD+ can be implemented in any chosen country, with the genuine intent of benefiting IPLC’s that are directly affected as a result of REDD+ project implementation.

==REDD+ and the VCM in Brazil and Colombia==
REDD+, originally introduced by the UNFCCC, is a market-based mechanism sitting within the VCM that aims to reverse the loss of forests and carbon stocks, specifically in developing countries. Simply put, an entity or an individual can voluntarily pay another that has engaged with REDD+ and subsequently sequestered carbon, to offset their own emissions using ‘credits’, sold as units of greenhouse gas equivalent to one ton of carbon dioxide (CO2e). Forestry and Land-Use remains to be the largest category of carbon credits traded by transaction volume on the VCM, with REDD+ being the most popular project type in this category, accounting for 78% of credits traded.<ref name=":0">Procton, A., (2024). ''State of the voluntary carbon market 2024: On the path to maturity.'' Forest Trends Ecosystem Marketplace.</ref> Furthermore, over one-third of the credits sold within this category were sourced from projects that had been implemented in LAC and the Caribbean in 2024.<ref name=":0" /> Of the four largest standards issuing carbon credits, Verra accounts for roughly 80% of issuances in Latin America,<ref>Pullins, T. (2022). Growth of carbon markets in Latin America. White & Case. [[/www.whitecase.com/publications/insight/latin-america-focus-fall-2022-growth-carbon-markets|https://www.whitecase.com/publications/insight/latin-america-focus-fall-2022-growth-carbon-markets]] </ref> and even in the face of recent scrutiny,<ref>West, T. A. P., Bofim, B., Haya, B. K. (2024). Methodological issues with deforestation baselines compromise the integrity of carbon offsets from REDD+. ''Global Environmental Change, 87'' [[/doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2024.102863|https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2024.102863]]</ref><ref>Wyburd I., & Dufrasne, G. (2023). Error Log: Exposing the methodological failures of REDD+ forestry projects. Carbon Market Watch. [[/carbonmarketwatch.org/publications/error-log-exposing-the-methodological-failures-of-redd-forestry-projects/|https://carbonmarketwatch.org/publications/error-log-exposing-the-methodological-failures-of-redd-forestry-projects/]]</ref><ref name=":15">Haya, B. K., Alford-Jones, K., Anderegg, W. R. L., Beymer-Farris, B., Blanchard, L., Bomfim, B., Chin, D., Evans, S., Hogan, M., Holm, J. A., McAfee, K., So, I. S., West, T. A. P., & Withey, L. (2023). ''Quality assessment of REDD+ carbon credit projects''. Berkeley Carbon Trading Project. [[/gspp.berkeley.edu/research-and-impact/centers/cepp/projects/berkeley-carbontrading-project/REDD+|https://gspp.berkeley.edu/research-and-impact/centers/cepp/projects/berkeley-carbontrading-project/REDD+]]</ref> REDD+ projects account for a significant proportion of the VCM with their continued application likely to persist.<ref>Gordon, O. (2022). ''The interwoven fortunes of carbon markets and indigenous communities.'' Energy Monitor. [[/www.energymonitor.ai/tech/carbon-removal/the-interwoven-fortunes-of-carbon-markets-and-indigenous-communities/|https://www.energymonitor.ai/tech/carbon-removal/the-interwoven-fortunes-of-carbon-markets-and-indigenous-communities/]]</ref><ref>Müller, M., Coustar, C., Bietta, F., Mathres, M. (2022). ''UNFCCC REDD+ and the power of sovereign carbon.'' Deutsche Banke Chief Investment Office. [[/www.rainforestcoalition.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/CIO-Special-UNFCCC-REDD-power-of-sovereign-carbon.pdf|https://www.rainforestcoalition.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/CIO-Special-UNFCCC-REDD-power-of-sovereign-carbon.pdf]]</ref><ref>Pullins, T. (2022). ''Growth of carbon markets in Latin America.'' White & Case. [[/www.whitecase.com/publications/insight/latin-america-focus-fall-2022-growth-carbon-markets|https://www.whitecase.com/publications/insight/latin-america-focus-fall-2022-growth-carbon-markets]] </ref> With the introduction of updated methodologies aimed at addressing these concerns,<ref>Verra (2023a). ''Setting the Standard: Verra’s Revolutionary New REDD Methodology.'' [[/verra.org/program-notice/setting-the-standard-verras-revolutionary-new-redd-methodology/|https://verra.org/program-notice/setting-the-standard-verras-revolutionary-new-redd-methodology/]]</ref><ref>Verra (2023b). ''VM0048 Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation, v1.0.'' [[/verra.org/methodologies/vm0048-reducing-emissions-from-deforestation-and-forest-degradation-v1-0/|https://verra.org/methodologies/vm0048-reducing-emissions-from-deforestation-and-forest-degradation-v1-0/]]</ref> there is hope for renewed buyer confidence in the integrity of this market,<ref>MSCI (2023). ''Verra’s New Methodology for Unplanned Deforestation Aims to Silence the Critics''. [[/www.msci.com/www/blog-posts/verra-s-new-methodology-for/04577808942|https://www.msci.com/www/blog-posts/verra-s-new-methodology-for/04577808942]]</ref> though more work still needs to be done.

Both Colombia and Brazil have a relatively long history of implementing REDD+ projects, using both fund-based and market-based mechanisms. For example, both countries were participants in the ‘Amazon Indigenous REDD+ (RIA in Spanish) initiative, with the first pilot implementation project being initiated in Colombia’s Puiawai Natural Reserve.<ref>Garzón, E., (2017). ''Amazon Indigenous REDD+: An innovative approach to conserve Colombian forests?'' Mongabay. [[/news.mongabay.com/2017/01/amazon-indigenous-redd-an-innovative-approach-to-conserve-colombian-forests/|https://news.mongabay.com/2017/01/amazon-indigenous-redd-an-innovative-approach-to-conserve-colombian-forests/]]</ref> The relevance of these two countries with respect to REDD+ is simple. Much of the Amazon’s primary tropical rainforest falls within these countries jurisdiction and this rainforest has been consistently under threat from external pressures and encroachment, whether that be in the form of land-clearing for commercial ranching, subsistence purposes, illicit drug production or illegal mining practices,<ref name=":8">Sánchez García, P. A. & Wong, G. Y., (2024) “The political economy of deforestation in the Colombian Amazon”, ''Journal of Political Ecology'' ''31''(1), 178–199. [[/doi.org/10.2458/jpe.5230|https://doi.org/10.2458/jpe.5230]]</ref><ref>Radwin, M. (2023). ''Drug trafficking fuels other deforestation drivers in the Amazon: report.'' Mongabay. [[/news.mongabay.com/2023/07/drug-trafficking-fuels-other-deforestation-drivers-in-the-amazon-report/|https://news.mongabay.com/2023/07/drug-trafficking-fuels-other-deforestation-drivers-in-the-amazon-report/]]</ref><ref>Haddad, E.A., Araújo, I.F., Feltran-Barbieri, R., Perobelli, F. S., Rocha, A., Sass, K. S., Nobre, C. A. (2024). Economic drivers of deforestation in the Brazilian Legal Amazon. ''Nat Sustain'' ''7'', 1141–1148. [[/doi.org/10.1038/s41893-024-01387-7|https://doi.org/10.1038/s41893-024-01387-7]] </ref><ref>Hänggli, A., Levy, S. A., Armenteras, D., Bovolo, C. I., Brandão, J., Rueda, X., & Garrett, R. D. (2023). A systematic comparison of deforestation drivers and policy effectiveness across the amazon biome. ''Environmental Research Letters, 18''(7), 073001. [[/doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/acd408|https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/acd408]]</ref> to name a few.

In theory, REDD+ can be used to provide the economic incentive to promote sustained environmental protection of Indigenous lands, with a focus on the rights and livelihoods of IPLCs. Currently the overall funding to IPLCs tenure rights and forest management in tropical countries is low, receiving just $270 million per year between 2011-2020 from bilateral and multilateral donors and private philanthropies.<ref>Hatcher, J., Owen, M., Yin, D., (2021). ''Falling short: Donor funding for Indigenous peoples and local communities to secure tenure rights and manage forests in tropical countries (2011 -2020).'' Rainforest Foundation Norway. [[/dv719tqmsuwvb.cloudfront.net/documents/Publikasjoner/Andre-rapporter/RFN Falling short 2021.pdf|https://dv719tqmsuwvb.cloudfront.net/documents/Publikasjoner/Andre-rapporter/RFN_Falling_short_2021.pdf]]</ref> REDD+ has the potential to channel funding as to promote Indigenous rights and autonomy, provided there is transparent and equitable benefit-sharing for those involved. Fundamentally, only with the inclusion of IPLC’s, or preferably with IPLC’s acting as project proponents, is REDD+ able to promote Indigenous agency and improve IPLC rights and governance. And only when the rights of those inhabiting the land are formally recognized can the land be effectively conserved.<ref name=":16">Reytar, K., Veit, P., von Braun, J. (2024). ''Protecting Biodiversity Hinges on Securing Indigenous and Community Land Rights.'' WRI. [[/www.wri.org/insights/indigenous-and-local-community-land-rights-protect-biodiversity|https://www.wri.org/insights/indigenous-and-local-community-land-rights-protect-biodiversity]]</ref> The inclusion of IPLCs in REDD+ project development is therefore considered to be essential for project success, and this is in theory embodied in the very nature of REDD+.<ref name=":1">Alvarez, G., Elfving, M. and Andrade, C. (2016) ‘REDD+ governance and indigenous peoples in Latin America: the case of Suruí Carbon Project in the Brazilian Amazon Forest’, ''Latin American J. Management for Sustainable Development 3''(2) pp.133–146. [[/dx.doi.org/10.1504/LAJMSD.2016.083705|10.1504/LAJMSD.2016.083705]]</ref> Partially owing to a long history of dealing with REDD+, Colombia and Brazil are amongst just a few of the countries hosting tropical rainforests that explicitly recognise community rights to carbon and tie these rights to the legal ownership of lands and forests. In Colombia, carbon rights are tied to rights of the land, whereas in Brazil carbon rights are tied to forest rights.<ref name=":2">RRI and McGill University (2021). Technical report: ''Status of legal recognition of Indigenous Peoples’, Local Communities’ and Afro-descendant Peoples’ rights to carbon stored in tropical lands and forests''. Rights and Resources Initiative. [[/doi.org/10.53892/MLQQ5744|https://doi.org/10.53892/MLQQ5744]]</ref>

==Brazil: The Suruí Forest Carbon Project==
[[File:The Amazon Basin, Brazil.jpg|thumb|316x316px|Brazil's Amazon rainforest]]

=== Project description and location ===
The Surui Forest Carbon project was implemented in 2009 on the territory of the Surui people, which is situated in the southern part of Brazil’s Amazon between the states of Rondônia and Mato Grosso. Surui Indigenous territory covers an area of 2,481 km2, though the intention of the PCFS was to protect a portion of this total area. According to the PD, the stated objective was to “prevent 13,575.3 hectares of tropical forest from being cleared by 2038, to avoid the emission of 7,258,352.3 tCO2e to the atmosphere, and to contribute to the preservation of the Paiter Surui lifestyle and traditions.”<ref>IDESAM (2011). ''Project description: Surui forest carbon project''. Institute for Conservation and Sustainable Development of Amazonas. Link: "PROJ_DESC_1118_02FEB2012.PDF" found at [[/registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/1118|https://registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/1118]] </ref> This region sits within one of the Brazilian Amazon’s main ‘arcs of deforestation’ and pressure from loggers and ranchers is a matter of concern.

Notably, the PCFS was the first REDD+ project to be proposed by Indigenous peoples in the Brazilian Amazon on their own territory and was the first to receive certification by both the VCS and CCBS.<ref name=":1" />. Metareilá, the Surui’s own Indigenous association, acted as project proponent and the Institute for Conservation and Sustainable Development of Amazonas (IDESAM) assisted with project development, alongside multiple other stakeholder groups. As an endogenous initiative procured and conducted by the Surui community, the SFCP had a ‘non-centralized model of governance’, which reflected the characteristics and traditions of the Surui people. <ref name=":1" />

Only after two years of consultations between the 24 communities involved and the relevant governmental agencies (primarily FUNAI and the Ministry of Environment) was a Memorandum of Understanding signed, showing community consent to develop the project.<ref name=":3">Garcia, B., Rimmer, L., Canal Vieira, L., Mackey, B., (2021). REDD+ and forest protection on indigenous lands in the Amazon. ''RECIEL 30'', 207–219. [[/doi.org/10.1111/reel.12389|https://doi.org/10.1111/reel.12389]]</ref> In 2012 after verification from an independent third-party body, the Surui were able to sell carbon credits on the international market. Between 2009 and 2014 the project drastically helped limit the deforestation occurring within the project’s site, causing many to deem it a success.<ref name=":4">Howard, F. E., (2023). ''An Analysis of the Suruí Forest Carbon Project in Context of Settler Colonialism''. Masters thesis. Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University. [[/vtechworks.lib.vt.edu/server/api/core/bitstreams/b0cde6de-794c-453f-856b-ee72bde3db06/content|https://vtechworks.lib.vt.edu/server/api/core/bitstreams/b0cde6de-794c-453f-856b-ee72bde3db06/content]]</ref>

=== National climate targets, policies and legislation ===
Rates of deforestation in Brazil’s legal Amazon are significantly impacted by the government in charge. This is evidenced in the decade between 2012 and 2021 whilst under the conservative Bolsonaro administration, when deforestation in the Amazon increased 185% — from a loss of 4,571 km2 in 2012 to 13,038 km2 in 2021.<ref>INPE (2022). ''Observação da Terra. [[/www.obt.inpe.br/OBT/assuntos/programas/amazonia/prodes|http://www.obt.inpe.br/OBT/assuntos/programas/amazonia/prodes]]''</ref> However, since Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s appointment in 2022 there has been a steady decline in the rate of deforestation, which is now roughly half what it was in 2021.<ref>Terra Brasilis (2024). ''PRODES (deforestation): Deforestation rates – Legal Amazon – States''. [[/terrabrasilis.dpi.inpe.br/app/dashboard/deforestation/biomes/legal amazon/rates|https://terrabrasilis.dpi.inpe.br/app/dashboard/deforestation/biomes/legal_amazon/rates]]</ref> A significant proportion of emissions result from the clearing of rainforest and its subsequent conversion to ranching.<ref>MCTI (2022). ''Estimativas Anuais De Emissões De Gases De Efeito Estufa No Brasil.'' 6ª Edição. Ministério da Estado da Ciência, Tecnologia e Inovações. [[/www.gov.br/mcti/pt-br/acompanhe-o-mcti/sirene/publicacoes/estimativas-anuais-de-emissoes-gee/arquivos/6a-ed-estimativas-anuais.pdf|https://www.gov.br/mcti/pt-br/acompanhe-o-mcti/sirene/publicacoes/estimativas-anuais-de-emissoes-gee/arquivos/6a-ed-estimativas-anuais.pdf]]</ref> To address these emissions Brazil has implemented various adaptation policies, legislation and targets which are summarized below:
{| class="wikitable"
|'''Document name'''
|'''Type'''
|'''Publication year'''
|'''Key takeaways'''
|-
|National Policy on Climate Change (NPCC)
|Legislation
|2009
|Framework for addressing climate change
|-
|National Plan on Climate Change Adaptation
|Policy
|2016
|Framework for addressing impacts of climate change
|-
|Nationally Determined Contribution
|Target
|2024
|Reduce net greenhouse gas emissions by 59 to 67 percent below 2005 levels by 2035
|-
|Federal Constitution, Article 225
|Legislation
|2006
|The Amazon rainforest is considered as a ‘national heritage’.All levels of government have a shared responsibility to protect it and the environment
|-
| colspan="4" |'''Relating to REDD+'''
|-
|Plan of Action for the Prevention and Control of Deforestation in the Legal Amazon (PPCDAM)
|Policy
|2004
|Aims to reduce deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon
|-
|Forest code
|Legislation
|2012
|Aimed at reducing deforestation, but no specific mention of REDD+
|-
|Amazon Indigenous REDD+ Initiative
|Policy
|2012
|Incorporate Indigenous with REDD+ initiatives
|-
|National REDD+ Strategy (ENREDD+)
|Policy
|2016
|REDD+ as a fund-based mechanism
|}

=== Indigenous rights - Constitutional, tenure and bundle rights ===
In Brazil, Indigenous rights are robust and clearly defined according to the Brazilian Constitution. As a result, the Indigenous communities of the Brazilian Amazon have legal title to 13.8% of the national territory totalling 1.175 million km2, with a total of 631 territories.<ref>Federal government of Brazil (2024). ''Brazil’s NDC: National determination to contribute and transform''. [[/unfccc.int/sites/default/files/2024-11/Brazil Second Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) November2024.pdf|https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/2024-11/Brazil_Second%20Nationally%20Determined%20Contribution%20%28NDC%29_November2024.pdf]]</ref>
{| class="wikitable"
| colspan="2" |'''Laws'''
|-
|Article 231 of the 1988 Constitution
|Indigenous peoples to have their exclusive right to use their territories to derive economic benefits. Grants indigenous peoples the right to land, prohibits eviction, and restricts mining without authorization from the federal government.
|-
|Indigenous Peoples statute (1973).

|No acts restricting the full exercise of indigenous peoples’ permanent tenure over the land should be permitted.
|-
| colspan="2" | '''Treaties'''
|-
|United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2007)
|Requires States to obtain free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) for the approval of any projects affecting indigenous territories.
|-
|International Labour Organization Convention 169 (2019)
|Ratified and incorporated under domestic law in 2002 through Decree 10.088/2019, endorsing UNDRIP
|-
|American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2016)
|Supports and builds upon UNDRIP
|}
Whilst Indigenous communities in Brazil have legal title to land, it is the State that owns it. Indigenous people simply exercise permanent tenure over lands that they traditionally occupy and have ‘original rights’ to these traditional lands, which no other rights can prevail over.<ref name=":3" /> Indigenous lands, though not classified as protected areas, “have the highest level of protection by law because they are regulated by the Constitution” and cannot be leased or restricted without violating their original rights. The Suruí's right to develop the PCFS is grounded in the Brazilian Constitution, which grants Indigenous peoples exclusive rights to use the ‘riches of the soil, rivers and lakes’ of their land, and these rights cannot be overridden. Thus, Indigenous people and only Indigenous people are legally allowed to engage in productive activities on their land, provided these activities are conducted according to their own customs and traditions and are necessary for the wellbeing and cultural expression of their own people. In Brazil, it is the armed forces and federal police that are responsible for enforcing these laws, and FUNAI is responsible for representing Indigenous communities in judicial disputes.<ref name=":3" /> As such, provided a REDD+ does not violate the rights to territorial integrity, permanent land tenure and original rights, it is legally allowed.
[[File:Two Pataxo indians (Brasília, 04 April 2006).jpeg|thumb|414x414px|Two Indigenous in Brazil]]
'''CARBON RIGHTS:''' In Brazil, carbon rights are tied to forest rights.<ref name=":2" /> Carbon credits from REDD+ projects are seen as part of the economic benefits derived from indigenous lands, and as such, Indigenous communities are entitled to own, control and distribute these revenues themselves. The carbon credits generated from the (SFCP) were wholly owned by the Suruí people through Metareilá, with the Suruí Fund (managed by the Brazilian Biodiversity Fund - FUNBIO) acting as recipient. This legality reinforces Indigenous control over both land and carbon rights, as whoever has rights to the forest land is usually recognized as the owner of carbon rights.<ref name=":3" />

'''FPIC OBLIGATION:''' Furthermore, Brazilian law requires Free, Prior, and Informed Consent (FPIC) for REDD+ projects affecting indigenous lands, ensuring that international standards such as the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) and ILO Convention No. 169 are adhered to; Indigenous consent is, ''de jure,'' a necessity. Projects that violate these rights and fail to consult communities are therefore considered illegal. Notably there are no specific rules or procedures that have been written into the Brazilian constitution that provide guidance on how to achieve FPIC. This freedom reinforces Indigenous autonomy as it allows an Indigenous community to define the rules of consultation according to their customs and traditions.

Collectively these national and international laws provide an important safeguard to Indigenous peoples, making their consent a prerequisite for the establishment of REDD+ projects and recognizing their rights as the main beneficiaries of REDD+ revenues.<ref name=":3" /> However, as carbon rights are tied to forest rights in Brazil and not land rights, carbon is considered to be an ‘environmental service’ (Article 41(I)(A) Brazilian Forestry Code), and states, as well as the federal government, have the jurisdiction to exercise full legislative authority over carbon. <ref name=":2" /> As such, certain states have interpreted the law to imply that the title to carbon credits is attributable to the state.<ref>Loft, L., Ravikumar, A., Gebara, M. F., Pham, T. T., Resosudarmo, I. A. P., Assembe, S., Tovar, J. G., Mwangi, E., & Andersson, K. (2015). Taking Stock of Carbon Rights in REDD+ Candidate Countries: Concept Meets Reality. ''Forests'', ''6''(4), 1031-1060. [[/doi.org/10.3390/f6041031|https://doi.org/10.3390/f6041031]]</ref> Hence, even when carbon rights are clearly defined and tied to forest title it is insufficient in itself, and only by legally recognizing the customary rights of IPLCs can a fair and equitable outcome be realised.

=== Interested and affected stakeholders ===
{| class="wikitable"
| colspan="5" |'''Affected stakeholders'''
|-
|Stakeholders
|Primary objective(s)
|Secondary objective(s)
|Relative power
|Scope of influence
|-
|Metareilá Association of the Suruí Indigenous People
|<nowiki>- Project proponent</nowiki>

- Works to defend and preserve the cultural and territorial heritage of the Suruí people
|
|
|
|-
|Other Indigenous associations
|
* Encouraging the revitalization, strengthening and enhancement of traditional cultural property

* Provide support to improve the quality and performance of schools
* Supporting the identification of more effective alternatives to address the health problems faced by the Paiter people

* Supports the implementation of economic systems for the sustainable use of natural resources that meet the Paiter Suruí people's needs
|
|Low
|Local
|-
|''Campesinos'' (peasants)
|Procure more land
|
|Low
|Local
|-
|Yabner Gãbgir Forestry Institute of the Paiter Suruí people
|Encouraging the revitalization, strengthening and enhancement of traditional cultural property
|
|Low
|Local
|-
| colspan="5" |'''Interested stakeholders'''
|-
|Kanindé Association for Ethno-Environmental Defense – non-profit
|Responsible for the ethno-zoning of TISS. Coordination and organization of activities for Food Security and income generation, monitoring of biodiversity and socio-economic benefits
|
|
|
|-
|IDESAM - Institute for Conservation and Sustainable Development of Amazonas – non-profit NGO
|''Technical coordination''; - calculation of baseline scenario - preparation of Project Design Document (PDD) as well as the validation and verification to VCS and CCB standards. Coordination of biomass and carbon inventories and forest monitoring in support of the PCFS (remote sensing). Also supports policy and technical coordination related to REDD for the PCFS (p.9).
|
|
|
|-
|Forest Trends
|Supported formulation and implementation of the project. Raised funds
|
|
|International
|-
|Amazon Conservation Team - ACT Brazil
|Support to activities for food security and income generation, monitoring of biodiversity and socio-economic benefits, legal advice and communication to the project. Development of the Land Protection Plan, environmental monitoring and carbon stocks.
|
|
|
|-
|Brazilian Biodiversity Fund (FUNBIO)

|Responsible for the financial resources management mechanism generated by the Suruí forest carbon projects - Suruí Fund - and other income activities within the Management Plan.
|
|
|
|-
|Ministry of Environment (MMA)
|
|
|
|
|-
|Government of the State of Mato Grosso
|
|
|
|
|-
|Government of the State of Mato Grosso
|
|
|
|
|-
|National Indian Foundation (FUNAI)
|FUNAI does not necessarily need to take part in the governance of the project (Sales et al., 2010), but it should have formal knowledge of the direction and initiative proposals.

|
|
|National
|}

=== Discussion ===
Although originally successful in achieving its goal of reducing deforestation and degradation, in 2016 diamonds were discovered in Surui territory, leading to an increase in illegal logging and mining.<ref name=":1" /> By 2018 the project site had been completely overrun by ''garimpeiros'' (small-scale gold miners), ultimately leading to the projects suspension that year. <ref name=":4" />

While the project had initially garnered support, divisions emerged within the community post-project implementation. Disputes arose over the unequal distribution of project revenues, leading to internal conflicts between different Suruí clans. These criticisms escalated in 2014 when the Catholic Indigenous Missionary Council supported calls for an end to the project due to mismanagement of revenues from carbon credit sales. <ref name=":3" /> Some Suruí members also argued that the REDD+ initiative harmed their way of life.<ref>Lang, C. (2014). ''“What are projects for that destroy life?” Interview with Henrique Suruí about the Paiter-Suruí REDD project, Brazil.'' REDD-Monitor. [[/redd-monitor.org/2014/12/17/what-are-projects-for-that-destroy-life-interview-with-henrique-surui-about-the-paiter-surui-redd-project-brazil/|https://redd-monitor.org/2014/12/17/what-are-projects-for-that-destroy-life-interview-with-henrique-surui-about-the-paiter-surui-redd-project-brazil/]]</ref>

Further complicating the situation was the controversial role of Henrique Suruí, one of the Suruí tribal leaders. In 2011, it was revealed that Henrique had violated the tribe's logging moratorium, collaborating with loggers in illegal activities. While Henrique later denied responsibility for the project’s failure, his actions, combined with internal disagreements, illustrated the lack of consensus within the Suruí leadership on the project’s goals and outcomes. Both of the tribe’s leaders possessed dramatically different perspectives on how they believed they could ensure agency, autonomy, and economic benefits for the Suruí people.<ref name=":4" /> This fragmentation within the community, in combination with the discovery of diamonds and the state's failure to protect indigenous land rights led to the indefinite suspension of the REDD+ project.

The project's collapse highlights broader structural issues, particularly the state's inconsistent support for indigenous land rights, influenced by settler colonialism, which undermined the project’s long-term viability.<ref name=":4" /> Additionally, the project’s creation was shaped by external actors, including the collaboration between Almir Suruí and Borges from Forest Trends, a Washington-based NGO. This partnership introduced a Western perspective on viewing the Suruí peoples forest, in contrast with their own perspectives on land use and governance. Furthermore, despite Borges’ Brazilian background, the power dynamics between a global North organization and a developing, Indigenous community were apparent.

=== Summary ===
The Suruí Forest Carbon Project provides an interesting example of how, even when the rights of IPLC’s are relatively robust, challenges persist in ensuring REDD+ project longevity. As such, in its current state, REDD+ in the Brazilian Amazon may not be a suitable market-based option for indigenous communities in the Amazon.<ref name=":3" /> Although initially successful in promoting indigenous autonomy and reducing deforestation, the project resulted in failure due to of a myriad of factors. Division between Surui communities was exacerbated by a perceived unequal benefit-sharing, and the impact of imposing REDD+ seems to have complicated the traditional social structure that the Surui were dependent on. These issues were influenced by Brazil's settler state dynamics, where indigenous land rights, although legally recognized, are often not upheld in practice due to insufficient enforcement.<ref name=":4" /> Ultimately, the Surui project reveals how settler colonialism's structural flaws make long-term project success difficult, despite initial progress in promoting indigenous autonomy.

At the national and state level, complex institutional and legal land governance structures convolute and impede REDD+ in Brazil. Multiple institutions share responsibilities and there is no comprehensive, authoritative database of land ownership, which hampers efforts to protect indigenous territories.<ref name=":5">Costa, R. (2016)''. Insecure land rights in Brazil: Consequences for rural areas and challenges for improvement.'' Climate Policy Initiative. [[/www.climatepolicyinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/Insecure Land Rights in Brazil CPI.pdf|https://www.climatepolicyinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/Insecure_Land_Rights_in_Brazil_CPI.pdf]]</ref> As a result, land tenure disputes remain common and can be witnessed occurring between the public as well between public and state actors. For example, Brazil’s 1964 Land Statute (Law No. 4504) allows the government to takeover unproductive farms and transfer those lands to landless peasants. This often results in the clearing of forest, as only when the land is cleared is it evidenced to be ‘productive’.<ref name=":5" /> Hence, not only does this law cause insecurity for Indigenous populations in Brazil, it also forces them to go against customary traditions of stewarding the land in an effort to maintain its control.

Whilst the aforementioned points to the futility of REDD+ in Brazil, there is reason to maintain optimism. In a recent landmark ruling Brazil’s supreme court voted in favour of the Xoleng peoples, and the decision will serve as a precedent for all cases involving Indigenous peoples.<ref name=":6">Amos-Flom, K., (2023). ''Triumph and Turmoil: The Xokleng Case and the Future of Indigenous Land Rights in Brazil.'' Columbia Journal of Transnational Law. [[/www.jtl.columbia.edu/bulletin-blog/triumph-and-turmoil-the-xokleng-case-and-the-future-of-indigenous-land-rights-in-brazil|https://www.jtl.columbia.edu/bulletin-blog/triumph-and-turmoil-the-xokleng-case-and-the-future-of-indigenous-land-rights-in-brazil]]</ref> The Xokleng’s land dispute, settled in 2023, “rejected Santa Catarina state’s marco temporal (“time limit”) argument, which would have required Indigenous people to prove they occupied or legally contested the territory they claimed before the Brazilian Constitution came into force in 1988. If successful, this argument would have led to disastrous repercussions, as many indigenous peoples had been forcibly removed or are traditionally nomadic.”<ref name=":6" /> Evidently, whilst slow, progress has been made in Brazil in recent years with respect to Indigenous rights as well as the voluntary carbon market itself.

There are currently 159 AFOLU projects listed on the Verra database in Brazil, with only two specifically focused on REDD+ initiatives in collaboration with Indigenous groups. These are the Ka’a Pyahu project, <ref>Verra (n.d.) ''Project 5087: KA'A PYAHU.'' https://registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/5087</ref> initiated by the Guajajara Indigenous people in collaboration with external organizations and validated in 2021, and the ‘Together for the forest Awaete REDD+ project’<ref>Verra (n.d.) ''Project 5200: TOGETHER FOR THE FOREST AWAETÉ REDD+ PROJECT.'' https://registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/5200</ref> which is still under development. Both projects involve Indigenous groups working with Brazilian organizations to build technical capacity and expertise. This could signal a growing trend of Indigenous-led REDD+ projects in the future. To ensure a positive future for REDD+ in Brazil, the customary rights of IPLC’s must be formally recognized. IPLC should have legal ownership of their traditional lands, and in doing so the carbon rights of these communities would be less convoluted, leading to more equitable benefit-sharing and increased cohesion amongst these groups post-project implementation.

==Colombia: ''REDD+ project Resguardo Indigena Unificado - Selva de Mataven (RUI-SM)''==

=== '''Project description and location''' ===
[[File:RS6524 MG 3944.jpg|thumb|407x407px|A view of the Mataven]]
According to the PD,<ref name=":7">ACATISEMA & Mediamos (2017). ''Joint project description and monitoring report: REDD+ project: Resguardo Indigena Unificado – Selva de Mataven (RIU – SM).'' Link: “10 06 2017_VCS Final Report_ Matavin Project.pdf” found at [[/registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/1566|https://registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/1566]]</ref> the Resguardo Indígena Unificado – Selva de Matavén (RIU-SM) project is located east of the Colombian Orinoco high plain, in the eastern part of the Department of Vichada, municipality of Cumaribo. It resides on the formalized resguardo of the Sikuani, Piaroa, Puinave, Curripaco, Cubeo and Piapoco ethnic groups, spanning 1,856,836 hectares, with 1,477,115 hectares (79.6%) being forested. The project states that it will reduce greenhouse gas emissions, with a total estimated net reduction of 108,670,562 tons of CO2 equivalent over thirty years, from years 2013 – 2042. By this metric, it is the 14th largest project on the Verra registry, out of over 1700 projects.<ref name=":9">Dufrasne, D., (2021). ''Two Shades of Green: How hot air forest credits are being used to avoid carbon taxes in Colombia''. Carbon Market Watch. [[/carbonmarketwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Two-shades-of-green EN WEB.pdf|https://carbonmarketwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Two-shades-of-green_EN_WEB.pdf]]</ref> There are 12,312 indigenous people living in the RIU-SM, belonging to 2,517 families and 250 communities as of 2017.

The project was initiated by the Asociación de Cabildos y Autoridades Indígenas de la Selva de Matavén (ACETISMA), an Indigenous association, and developed by MEDIAMOS F&M, a Colombian consultancy firm. ACETISMA is comprised of Indigenous leaders that represent the 17 communities of the reservation in charge of governing the territory, and it has administrative autonomy, as well as “the capacity to acquire, to own and to dispose of property, to accept donations, to hold national and international conventions, scientific and cultural exchanges and generally, to celebrate all kinds of negotiations and agreements with which the Association can achieve its objectives.”<ref name=":7" />

There is a stated focus on various means of improving the living conditions of the Indigenous peoples living within the project area. To summarise, the main objectives of the REDD+ project RIU-SM include:

· Community development, in the form of improved education.

· Community engagement with respect to the project; developing information channels to reveal project progress.

· Support local initiatives for environmental education and waste management.

· Developing an effective response system that addresses community proposals and concerns relating to the project.

· Strengthening the governance of ACATISEMA.

=== National climate targets, policies and legislation ===
[[File:Figure 6 Colombian Manual Eradicators Destroying Coca Fields (31352594937).jpg|thumb|292x292px|The Colombian government fight against cocoa production.]]
The Colombian Amazon makes up over one-third of Colombia’s national territory, and up until 2005 only 7.3% of the Colombian Amazon had been deforested, largely due to the country's 60-year armed conflict between the government, multiple left-wing guerillas such as FARC, and several far-right paramilitary groups.<ref name=":8" /> However, following the signing of the Peace Treaty in 2016 and demobilization of the FARC, limits to deforestation were weakened in the Colombian Amazon. Poor but opportunistic peasants began to encroach into previously unchartered territory and capitalize from the rainforest. Due to the poor economic integration of the Amazon, many were forced to engage with the traditional economies of cocoa and cattle ranching, as these markets were already well connected to regional and global markets.<ref name=":8" /> To address the drivers of deforestation and its associated emissions, the federal government has implemented various initiatives, which are summarized below:

{| class="wikitable"
|'''Document name'''
|'''Type'''
|'''Publication year'''
|'''Key takeaways'''
|-
|Nationally Determined Contribution(s)
|Target
|2020
|Reduce GHG emissions by 51 % by 2030 and net-zero by 2050
|-
|National Climate Change Policy (PNCC)
|Policy
|2018
|Address climate change and foster sustainable development
|-
|National Forest Conservation Program
|Policy
|2011
|Address deforestation
|-
|Law 1931 of 2018 – Climate Change Law

|Legislation
|2018
|Establishes the framework for addressing climate change
|-
| colspan="4" |'''Relating to REDD+:'''
|-
|National Strategy for Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (ENREDD+)
|Initiative
|2009
|Particular focus on the Amazon and Choco rainforests
|-
|Amazon Indigenous REDD+ Initiative
|Initiative
|2016
|Respect Indigenous rights. FPIC focus.
|-
|BIOREDD+ program
|Initiative
|2012
|Portfolio of 8 REDD+ projects in four geographic nodes covering over 700,000 hectares in the Colombian Pacific.

|-
|Vision Amazonia
|Initiative
|2015
|Part of the REDD+ strategy, financed by three foreign countries: Germany, Norway and United Kingdom
|}
As a result of the many fund and market-based initiatives that Colombia has engaged with, it hosts the second most REDD+ projects in the world. REDD+ projects now cover at least 56% of the area of legally recognized Indigenous territories in the Colombian Amazon, with an overwhelming majority of carbon projects located on Indigenous territories.<ref name=":10">Schmid, D., & Castro. C., (2023). ''REDD+ projects in the Colombian Amazon: Social challenges and lack of transparency''. Rainforest Foundation Norway. [[/dv719tqmsuwvb.cloudfront.net/documents/REDD rapport 2024 ENG.pdf|https://dv719tqmsuwvb.cloudfront.net/documents/REDD_rapport_2024_ENG.pdf]]</ref> Evidently REDD+ plays an integral part in the country’s efforts of environmental conservation, and incentives have been introduced to promote the development of such projects. For example, in 2016 the government adopted a higher tax that covered fossil fuels, but companies are able to avoid paying the tax by investing in carbon offsets that have been generated domestically.<ref name=":9" /> This led to a boost in the domestic REDD+ market in 2017, as Colombian companies invested as to escape higher taxes. Notably, 23 of the 36 REDD+ projects currently under development in the Amazon region were initiated in or after 2018.<ref name=":10" /> Currently Colombia’s REDD+ program sits at over 45 pilot and voluntary carbon projects, as well as one large-scale jurisdictional approach in the Amazon.<ref name=":11">Zambrano-Cortés, D. G. (2024). ''The politics, spaces and subjects of forest conservation in Colombia''. [internal PhD, WU, Wageningen University]. Wageningen University. [[/doi.org/10.18174/675328|https://doi.org/10.18174/675328]]</ref>

=== Indigenous rights - Constitutional, tenure and bundle rights ===
''De jure'', the Indigenous peoples of Colombia have comprehensive tenure and bundle rights that have been articulated in the national constitution. Collective land titles are granted to Indigenous communities by the Colombian government, and as a result about 34 percent of Colombian land (almost 38 million hectares) is legally recognized as Indigenous territory or collective lands of Afro-descendent communities.<ref name=":10" /> These collective land tenure rights have been in effect since the implementation of the 1991 constitution, granting them the authority to exercise legal control over their territories in accordance with their own customs and procedures.<ref>Max Planck Institute (n.d.) ''Colombia 1991 (rev. 2015).'' Institute. [[/www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Colombia 2015|https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Colombia_2015]]</ref> Furthermore, the carbon rights of Indigenous peoples are explicitly defined in the constitution and tied specifically to the ownership of land of the communities.<ref name=":2" /> This in theory provides a solid legal basis for upholding the rights of Indigenous communities in Colombia, specifically relating to REDD+ activities, as it allows communities to define and negotiate the terms of said projects. A summary of the various laws relating to Indigenous rights have been summarized below:
{| class="wikitable"
| colspan="2" |'''Law (1991 constitution)'''
|-
|Article 63

|Indigenous territories are considered collective property. Land is not owned by individuals but is shared by the community. The state must respect these collective rights and cannot alter land ownership without the consent of the Indigenous peoples.
|-
|Article 76 - ''Consulta previa''.
|Pertains to the right of Indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities; prior consultation must be undertaken before any entity undertakes activities that may affect their territories, culture, or way of life.
|-
|Article 330
|Indigenous communities have the right to govern their territories.
|-
|Article 329
|The Reservation is a collective, inalienable, and indefeasible property.
|-
|Decree 1386 of 1994, Article 10; Decree 2164 of 1995, Article 22) 39.
|"The administration and management of these lands are subjected to uses and customs of the beneficiaries."
|}
Whilst land and tenure rights are enshrined into the constitution, the precariousness of these rights persists due to a lack of resources to ensure enforcement, as well as the deeper issue of corruption. As previously stated, the rate of deforestation increased significantly in Colombia’s post-conflict era, evidencing the nations inability to maintain control over unlawful acts of land-grabbing and disposition. Whilst this began with new peasants converting the Amazon for subsistence purposes, it ultimately led to new areas for the growth of cocoa, much to the benefit of narco-traffickers who could monopolize on this illegal surplus in ‘accumulation by dispossession’.<ref name=":8" />

With respect to the legalities of consultation, Colombia has enshrined ''consulta previa'' into the constitution. Translating to ‘prior consultation’, this legal text provides the formal grounds for Indigenous engagement when any legislative or administrative measures are implemented on Indigenous territory. Importantly, consultation should be achieved in accordance with the customs of the ethnic group with which the project is being imposed upon. However, there have been recent cases of contestation specifically relating to how ''consulta previa'' applies to REDD+ on Indigenous lands, and the RIU – SM project was one that was involved with such a case.

=== Affected and interested stakeholders ===
{| class="wikitable"
| colspan="5" |'''Affected stakeholders'''
|-
|Stakeholders
|Primary objective(s)
|Secondary objective(s)
|Relative power
|Scope of influence
|-
|ACATISEMA - Asociación de Cabildos y Autoridades Indígenas de la Selva de Matavén
|
* Foster the integral development, social and cultural preservation of the indigenous communities in the Mataven Jungle and to
* Consolidate the territory, selfgovernment by partners, the defense, conservation and preservation of the environment and biodiversity of the Mataven Jungle

|
|It is the highest authority in the reservation.
|
|-
|Indigenous ''resguardos'' of the RIU-SM
|
* Primary and direct beneficiaries
* Seek to maintain land rights
* Promote traditional and cultural beliefs
|
|
|
|-
|Colonists
|
|
|
|
|-
| colspan="5" |'''Interested stakeholders'''
|-
|MEDIAMOS F&M
|Project developer
|
|
|International
|-
|Mining companies
|Compete with the Project for the territory's resources.
|
|
|
|-
|Ministerio de Ambiente y Desarrollo Sostenible
|Its main interest is to achieve environmental planning, through the consolidation of a policy of sustainable development and strategic alliances with social and institutional participants in different sectoral and territorial scenarios.
|
|
|
|-
|Dirección de Asuntos Indígenas, ROM y Minorías - Ministerio del Interior
|Public agency that advises the national level, prepares and proposes the formulation of public policy in favor of indigenous peoples within the framework of the defense, support, reinforcement and consolidation of ethnic and cultural rights.
|
|
|
|-
|Corporinoquía
|Regional environmental authority to ensure the proper use of natural resources in their area of jurisdiction.
|
|
|Regional
|-
|Other government institutions: Governor ofice of Vichada, Mayor ofice Cumaribo
|The Reservation for being part of the Cumaribo, Vichada, has territorial jurisdiction relations with the Governor’s office and the Mayor’s office.
|
|
|
|-
|Fundación NATURA
|Civil organization whose mission is the conservation, use and management of biodiversity to generate social, economic and environmental benefits in the context of sustainable human development.
|
|
|
|-
|FONDO ACCIÓN
|Colombian non-profit organization in the private scheme. Encourage the participation of civil society and the private sector in the implementation of the country’s public policies in two areas: - Conservation and sustainable development; and protection -development of children.
|
|
|
|-
|SENA, Department of Social Prosperity (DPS), NGOs and private consultants
|Supporting the implementation of rural development activities.
|
|
|Regional
|-
|Other indigenous communities neighboring RIU-SM
|
|
|Low
|Local
|-
|Financial institutions
|They fund local development activities.
|
|
|
|-
|Asocarbono – An industry association, including Verra, ProClima, Biofix, and ACATISEMA.

|
|
|
|
|-
|OPIAC: the National Oganization of the Indigenous Peoples of the Colombian Amazon

|
|
|
|
|}

=== Discussion ===
According to the official REDD+ Mataven website<ref>RIU – SM (n.d.). ''REDD+ Mataven''. [[/reddmataven.com/|https://reddmataven.com/]]</ref> the project has resulted in a myriad of benefits to the Indigenous communities of the region. For example, as a result of the funds generated from the projects activities, there have been improvements in infrastructure, transportation and education, ultimately leading to the empowerment and improved governance of ACETISMA. However, the project has come under fire for multiple reasons.

For one, in 2015 some of the Indigenous communities filed a lawsuit referring to the violation of their right to ''consulta previa''. However, the court ruled that their Indigenous rights had not been violated as it was ACETISMA that initially sought MEDIAMOS to develop the project, and that ACETISMA were the best representatives of those Indigenous communities. Furthermore, the projects main focus was the conservation of the rainforest and therefore did not threaten the cultural integrity of those communities.<ref name=":10" /> However, regardless of the outcome of this case, its occurrence points to internal disagreement amongst Indigenous participants of the RIU-SM project. In a study involving interviews with Indigenous members of the project, there was a significant proportion of interviewees that had little knowledge regarding various aspects of the project, such as responsibilities of participation, or the benefit-sharing mechanism in place.<ref name=":2" /> This further reinforces the point that, in the case of the RIU-SM project it may not be ‘bottom-up’ and eludes to the power imbalance experienced between Mediamos, the project developer, and Indigenous community members. In the PD there is a breakdown of the distribution of income between ACETISMA and Mediamos, which shows a significant proportion of revenue flowing to the former organisation throughout the project’s operations.<ref name=":7" /> However, there is currently no publicly available documentation supporting this initial claim<ref name=":9" /> as there is no obligation to provide this information, leading to a general lack of transparency in the market and between all of the relevant actors. Subsequent meetings with Indigenous leaders have however shown a marked support of the Mataven project, with one Indigenous leader explicitly stating “...the Redd+ project has brought resources that they never had before, which allowed them to open new school classrooms, 21 rural aqueducts, cocoa crops and even headquarters in Cumaribo and Inírida.”<ref>Lievano, A. B. (2021) Colombia's biggest carbon credit project could be selling hot air. Latin American Center for Investigative Journalism. [[/www.elclip.org/el-mayor-proyecto-de-bonos-de-carbono-de-colombia-podria-estar-vendiendo-aire-caliente/|https://www.elclip.org/el-mayor-proyecto-de-bonos-de-carbono-de-colombia-podria-estar-vendiendo-aire-caliente/]] </ref> Clearly there have been benefits for IPLC’s involved with this project, though the details of this benefit-sharing remain a mystery.

Secondly, the Mataven project has caused controversy due to its apparently inflated carbon credit issuance. The report states that this has been achieved by using a reference area that is not representative of the project area, as well as assuming an uncharacteristically heigh assumed rate of deforestation.<ref name=":12">Global Atlas of Environmental Justice (2023). ''Resguardo Indigena Unificado-Selva de Matavén (RIU SM) REDD+ Project, Colombia.'' [[/ejatlas.org/conflict/redd-project-resguardo-indigena-unificado-selva-de-mataven-riu-sm|https://ejatlas.org/conflict/redd-project-resguardo-indigena-unificado-selva-de-mataven-riu-sm]]</ref> The project used a baseline deforestation rate of 0.86% per year, which is significantly more than the Colombian government's national rate of 0.18%. Additionally, according to the report the reference area chosen is more easily accessed and therefore more prone to deforestation, making it an inaccurate comparison to the relatively remote project area.<ref name=":2" /> This has led to the creation of excess carbon credits, or “hot air” credits, which have been criticized for not reflecting real environmental benefits.<ref name=":9" /> To add further insult to injury these credits have been used by a Colombian fossil fuel distributor company to avoid paying taxes, as described earlier by Colombia’s change in policy in 2017. In doing so, the company avoided paying approximately $18.9 million in taxes.<ref name=":2" /> There has been subsequent back and forth between Verra and Carbon Market Watch, with Verra refuting the claims<ref>Verra (2021). ''Carbon Market Watch Report on Colombian REDD+ Projects Contains Flawed Allegations.'' [[/verra.org/carbon-market-watch-report-on-colombian-redd-projects-contains-flawed-allegations/|https://verra.org/carbon-market-watch-report-on-colombian-redd-projects-contains-flawed-allegations/]] </ref> Regardless of the science, Colombia recently introduced a resolution in 2018 (Resolution 1447 – 2018) that requires projects to use baselines that comply with national reference levels.<ref name=":13">Dufrasne, D. (2021b). Companies use ”hot air” forestry offsets to avoid taxes in Colombia: Carbon Market Watch’s fact-check of Verra’s response. Carbon Market Watch. [[/carbonmarketwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/CMWs-fact-check-of-Verras-response-on-Colombia.pdf|https://carbonmarketwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/CMWs-fact-check-of-Verras-response-on-Colombia.pdf]]</ref><ref>IEA (2022). ''Resolution 1447 – 2018. Monitoring, Reporting, and Verification System for mitigation actions at the national level.'' International Energy Agency. [[/www.iea.org/policies/14772-resolution-1447-2018-monitoring-reporting-and-verification-system-for-mitigation-actions-at-the-national-level|https://www.iea.org/policies/14772-resolution-1447-2018-monitoring-reporting-and-verification-system-for-mitigation-actions-at-the-national-level]]</ref> Going forward, REDD+ projects that are being implemented in Colombia will have to abide by Colombia’s national legislation.

=== Summary ===
Colombia has a long history of engaging in REDD+ as it has been used to limit environmental degradation in the post-conflict era, in alignment with the country’s national peacebuilding agenda.<ref name=":11" /> Owing to the country’s comprehensive tenure and bundle rights, IPLC’s have robust ''de jure'' rights to land as they collectively own it, and rights to carbon are tied to this ownership. This puts Colombia as one of the world leaders in legal terms relating to REDD+ project implementation, but due to a lack of resources to ensure enforcement, as well as corruption, historically these laws have not been adhered to.<ref name=":10" /><ref name=":2" /> There are many documented cases showing the displacement on IPLC’s from traditional lands, poor efforts to adhere to ''consulta previa'', and inequitable benefit sharing.<ref>Greenfield, P. (2023''). The ‘carbon pirates’ preying on Amazon’s Indigenous communities.'' The Guardian. [[/www.theguardian.com/environment/2023/jan/21/amazon-indigenous-communities-carbon-offsetting-pirates-aoe|https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2023/jan/21/amazon-indigenous-communities-carbon-offsetting-pirates-aoe]]</ref><ref name=":14">Lang, C., (2024). ''Colombia’s Constitutional Court rules in favour of Indigenous Peoples. Identifies serious flaws in the REDD+ Baka Rokarire project.'' REDD_Monitor. [[/reddmonitor.substack.com/p/colombias-constitutional-court-rules|https://reddmonitor.substack.com/p/colombias-constitutional-court-rules]]</ref>

The case of the Mataven project provides an interesting example of how it is the market itself that is failing to address concerns regarding transparency, whether that be relating to benefit-sharing amongst relevant stakeholders, or Indigenous representation and engagement throughout the implementation of REDD+ projects. Some ACATISEMA members have explicitly stated their support for the Mataven project,<ref name=":12" /> and its benefits can be seen first-hand in the form of improved infrastructure in local communities involved with the project.<ref>Myers, J. E., Parra, M. A., Bedford, C. (2021). ''How Carbon Offsetting Can Build a Forest.'' Stanford Social Innovation Review. [[/ssir.org/articles/entry/how carbon offsetting can build a forest|https://ssir.org/articles/entry/how_carbon_offsetting_can_build_a_forest]]</ref> However, an exact breakdown of how and where revenue is being distributed to IPLC’s remains elusive.<ref name=":13" /> Furthermore, the level of IPLC engagement has come into question, specifically with reference to ''consulta previa'' and the overall understanding that IPLC’s have regarding the project’s intended outcomes and activities.<ref name=":10" /> This is not a rare case in Colombia and has been witnessed occurring with other projects that have been implemented on Indigenous territories in the Colombian Amazon.<ref name=":17">Lang, C., (2023''). “It destroys everything,” says Indigenous leader about the REDD+ Baka Rokarire project in Colombia''. REDD Monitor. [[/reddmonitor.substack.com/p/it-destroys-everything-says-indigenous|https://reddmonitor.substack.com/p/it-destroys-everything-says-indigenous]]</ref> However, a recent ruling by the Colombian Constitutional court voted in favour of Indigenous groups in Colombia, upholding “the rights to self-determination, autonomy, self-government, territory, identity, physical and cultural integrity, and free, prior and informed consent of the indigenous communities”.<ref name=":14" /> This review ultimately sets a legal precedent safeguarding the fundamental rights of IPLCs with REDD+ project implementation and shows that progress is being made to improve the likelihood that REDD+ will result in genuine benefits to those affected by project implementation.

To ensure a more authentic engagement with IPLC’s as to result in legitimate and equitable benefit-sharing, improvements must be made by the Colombian government, as well as within the VCM itself. For the former, Colombia’s national registry for GHG mitigation activities must be updated; it has been offline since 2022.<ref name=":10" /> As a result, transparency is lacking. International finance could be utilized as to alleviate this issue, and only with an accurate and reliable database may the market be regulated. In the broader sense, VCM registries must create stricter guidelines promoting transparency. Often PD’s refer to annexed documents that contain relevant information regarding benefit-sharing, though these are often not publicly available.<ref name=":9" /> This limits transparency and increases the likelihood of inequitable agreements being made between project proponents and developers, further exacerbating existing power asymmetries between the two groups and limiting the likelihood that ''consulta previa'' is honestly adhered to.<ref name=":10" /> This has led to conflict within Indigenous communities, rather than a strengthening of their social fabric.

Furthermore, the Mataven project calls into question the actual emissions reduction that REDD+ projects achieve. Whilst Colombia has since updated its regulations such that REDD+ must use baselines that comply with national reference levels, it is up in the air as to how representative these guidelines are. Reference areas must represent project areas and without the appropriate regulations in place project developers lack the incentive to create realistic baselines; ultimately they are aiming to produce the maximum number of credits as to generate the greatest possible revenues.

==Conclusion==
As a market-based mechanism, REDD+ is shackled by the construct in which it operates; fundamentally it is a capitalist means of fixing a capitalist problem, which comes with limitations. Both Brazil and Colombia have relatively robust laws that have been written into the constitution, ultimately promoting more equitable results of project implementation. However, as in Colombia IPLC’s collectively own the land, whereas in Brazil these groups only own rights to use the land,<ref name=":2" /> Colombia can be considered better equipped for the establishment of REDD+ projects on traditional Indigenous territory. However, even with these laws in place enforcement remain a matter of concern. Furthermore, given the wide variety of ontological and epistemological perspectives of Indigenous communities, and how these views conflict with the Western worldview from which market-based REDD+ came to fruition, there is an inherent difficulty in implementing a system of governance in REDD+ on Indigenous lands.<ref name=":1" />. Putting a price on nature conflicts with Indigenous perspectives and there have been instances where this has attacked the social and cultural fabric of IPLC’s.<ref name=":17" /> To avoid this REDD+ developers must have the genuine intent of understanding the perspective of the Indigenous group they are working with and aim to implement REDD+ with a bottom-up approach.

In both countries, transparency must be improved to ensure that FPIC is adhered to and subsequently ensure fair IPLC representation and engagement. This issue predominantly arises due to the poor requirements of standards in the VCM. As such, proponents are guided by developers which have little incentive to truly act in the interests of Indigenous groups; ultimately the organizations in charge of project development are interested in increasing project revenues. This has led to instances of over-crediting, as without a transparent framework in which to operate it is difficult to evaluate the legitimacy of the claims being made by project proponents and developers. However, with recent advances that address concerns of additionality<ref name=":15" /> there is hope for improved market integrity. Standards of the VCM must continue to be scrutinized to ensure that progress continues to be made.

Going forward, progress should be made to formalize the customary laws and traditional lands of IPLCs, and finance should be directed towards the enforcement of these laws. The environmental,<ref name=":16" /> economic,<ref name=":5" /><ref>Ding, H., Veit, P. G., Blackman, A., Gray, E., Reytar, K., Altamirano, J. C., Hodgdon, B., (2016). ''Climate benefits, tenure costs: The economic case for securing Indigenous land rights in the Amazon''. WRI. [[/files.wri.org/d8/s3fs-public/Climate Benefits Tenure Costs Executive Summary.pdf|https://files.wri.org/d8/s3fs-public/Climate_Benefits_Tenure_Costs_Executive_Summary.pdf]]</ref> and social<ref>Sarmiento Barletti, J. P., Heise Vigil, N., & Larson, A. M. (2023). ''Safeguards at a glance: Are voluntary standards supporting community land, resource and carbon rights?'' CIFOR-ICRAF. [[/www.cifor-icraf.org/publications/pdf files/Flyer/REDD-Safeguards-7.pdf|https://www.cifor-icraf.org/publications/pdf_files/Flyer/REDD-Safeguards-7.pdf]] </ref> benefits of this have been researched and are well understood. By developing culturally appropriate frameworks for rights-based conservation regimes, that work with IPLCs in accordance with their worldviews, REDD+ could be used to promote Indigenous autonomy. However, progress still must be made to achieve this goal.

==References==

Documentation:Open Case Studies/FRST522/2024/REDD+ in Indigenous Amazonia: What works and what doesn’t?

2024-12-12T22:31:22Z

ConnorHaynes:

__TOC__

==Positionality==
First and foremost I am not Indigenous, and whilst there are a myriad of cultures, ontologies and epistemologies that are not sufficiently represented by simply stating ‘Indigenous’, it is commonly accepted that these worldviews are vastly different to those of the ‘Western’ world, which is the world in which I grew up and matured. I am therefore only understanding of Indigenous cultures, beliefs and customary laws based upon available online literature and those which I have learnt through life, in addition to those introduced to me in my Master’s degree. As such, I will never be able to fully relate to an Indigenous person; the best I can do is try to understand and learn. Only throughout this process am I able to work towards reconciliation and attempt to address the inequities experienced by Indigenous folk globally.

Additionally, I am yet to act as a carbon project proponent and so do not understand the nuances or stresses of undertaking such a task. Whilst an individual proponent may have the best intention of procuring a carbon project for its social and environmental benefits, there are a number of stakeholders involved throughout the entire process which influence its eventual outcome. Without experience acting as a project proponent I am naïve in understanding the process and it's difficulties.

==Acronyms / Terminology==
'''Acronyms:'''

AFOLU: Agriculture, Forestry and Other Land-Use

ICVCM: Integrity Council for the Voluntary Carbon Market

IPLC: Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities

KMGBF: Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework

LAC: Latin American Countries

MRV: Monitoring, Reporting and Verification

REDD+: Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation

UNCBD: United Nations Convention on Biological Biodiversity

VCMI: Voluntary Carbon Markets Integrity Initiative

'''Terminology:'''

''Additionality:'' Additionality is the determination of whether the project will lead to the expected outcomes when compared to the baseline or ‘business as usual’ emissions.

''Leakage'': Refers to the shifting of emissions to outside the project boundary as a result of the project’s activities.

''Permanence:'' Permanence refers to the degree to which a carbon credit is equivalent to a permanent removal or reduction in emissions.
==Abstract==
This case study illustrates two examples of Indigenous-led REDD+ projects on Indigenous territory in Colombia and Brazil. Both countries have a relatively long history of engaging with REDD+ but have slightly different legal structures pertaining to the rights of Indigenous peoples on their traditional territories, and specifically their ‘carbon’ rights. As such, the intention is to evaluate how these differing ''de jure'' rights translate on the ground. With respect to REDD+, do certain rights result in legitimately positive benefits to IPLCs, as well as the environment that these projects were originally intended to protect? To reduce inconsistency, projects were chosen that utilized the same standard, namely Verra’s ‘Verified Carbon Standard’. The intention is such that the reader can evaluate the effectiveness and true benefit of REDD+ projects to IPLC’s, based upon the legal frameworks of the host country. A secondary intention is such that the reader is better equipped to conduct a prefeasibility assessment based upon available online literature, to evaluate the likelihood that REDD+ can be implemented in any chosen country, with the genuine intent of benefiting IPLC’s that are directly affected as a result of REDD+ project implementation.

==REDD+ and the VCM in Brazil and Colombia==
REDD+, originally introduced by the UNFCCC, is a market-based mechanism sitting within the VCM that aims to reverse the loss of forests and carbon stocks, specifically in developing countries. Simply put, an entity or an individual can voluntarily pay another that has engaged with REDD+ and subsequently sequestered carbon, to offset their own emissions using ‘credits’, sold as units of greenhouse gas equivalent to one ton of carbon dioxide (CO2e). Forestry and Land-Use remains to be the largest category of carbon credits traded by transaction volume on the VCM, with REDD+ being the most popular project type in this category, accounting for 78% of credits traded.<ref name=":0">Procton, A., (2024). ''State of the voluntary carbon market 2024: On the path to maturity.'' Forest Trends Ecosystem Marketplace.</ref> Furthermore, over one-third of the credits sold within this category were sourced from projects that had been implemented in LAC and the Caribbean in 2024.<ref name=":0" /> Of the four largest standards issuing carbon credits, Verra accounts for roughly 80% of issuances in Latin America,<ref>Pullins, T. (2022). Growth of carbon markets in Latin America. White & Case. [[/www.whitecase.com/publications/insight/latin-america-focus-fall-2022-growth-carbon-markets|https://www.whitecase.com/publications/insight/latin-america-focus-fall-2022-growth-carbon-markets]] </ref> and even in the face of recent scrutiny,<ref>West, T. A. P., Bofim, B., Haya, B. K. (2024). Methodological issues with deforestation baselines compromise the integrity of carbon offsets from REDD+. ''Global Environmental Change, 87'' [[/doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2024.102863|https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2024.102863]]</ref><ref>Wyburd I., & Dufrasne, G. (2023). Error Log: Exposing the methodological failures of REDD+ forestry projects. Carbon Market Watch. [[/carbonmarketwatch.org/publications/error-log-exposing-the-methodological-failures-of-redd-forestry-projects/|https://carbonmarketwatch.org/publications/error-log-exposing-the-methodological-failures-of-redd-forestry-projects/]]</ref><ref name=":15">Haya, B. K., Alford-Jones, K., Anderegg, W. R. L., Beymer-Farris, B., Blanchard, L., Bomfim, B., Chin, D., Evans, S., Hogan, M., Holm, J. A., McAfee, K., So, I. S., West, T. A. P., & Withey, L. (2023). ''Quality assessment of REDD+ carbon credit projects''. Berkeley Carbon Trading Project. [[/gspp.berkeley.edu/research-and-impact/centers/cepp/projects/berkeley-carbontrading-project/REDD+|https://gspp.berkeley.edu/research-and-impact/centers/cepp/projects/berkeley-carbontrading-project/REDD+]]</ref> REDD+ projects account for a significant proportion of the VCM with their continued application likely to persist.<ref>Gordon, O. (2022). ''The interwoven fortunes of carbon markets and indigenous communities.'' Energy Monitor. [[/www.energymonitor.ai/tech/carbon-removal/the-interwoven-fortunes-of-carbon-markets-and-indigenous-communities/|https://www.energymonitor.ai/tech/carbon-removal/the-interwoven-fortunes-of-carbon-markets-and-indigenous-communities/]]</ref><ref>Müller, M., Coustar, C., Bietta, F., Mathres, M. (2022). ''UNFCCC REDD+ and the power of sovereign carbon.'' Deutsche Banke Chief Investment Office. [[/www.rainforestcoalition.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/CIO-Special-UNFCCC-REDD-power-of-sovereign-carbon.pdf|https://www.rainforestcoalition.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/CIO-Special-UNFCCC-REDD-power-of-sovereign-carbon.pdf]]</ref><ref>Pullins, T. (2022). ''Growth of carbon markets in Latin America.'' White & Case. [[/www.whitecase.com/publications/insight/latin-america-focus-fall-2022-growth-carbon-markets|https://www.whitecase.com/publications/insight/latin-america-focus-fall-2022-growth-carbon-markets]] </ref> With the introduction of updated methodologies aimed at addressing these concerns,<ref>Verra (2023a). ''Setting the Standard: Verra’s Revolutionary New REDD Methodology.'' [[/verra.org/program-notice/setting-the-standard-verras-revolutionary-new-redd-methodology/|https://verra.org/program-notice/setting-the-standard-verras-revolutionary-new-redd-methodology/]]</ref><ref>Verra (2023b). ''VM0048 Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation, v1.0.'' [[/verra.org/methodologies/vm0048-reducing-emissions-from-deforestation-and-forest-degradation-v1-0/|https://verra.org/methodologies/vm0048-reducing-emissions-from-deforestation-and-forest-degradation-v1-0/]]</ref> there is hope for renewed buyer confidence in the integrity of this market,<ref>MSCI (2023). ''Verra’s New Methodology for Unplanned Deforestation Aims to Silence the Critics''. [[/www.msci.com/www/blog-posts/verra-s-new-methodology-for/04577808942|https://www.msci.com/www/blog-posts/verra-s-new-methodology-for/04577808942]]</ref> though more work still needs to be done.

Both Colombia and Brazil have a relatively long history of implementing REDD+ projects, using both fund-based and market-based mechanisms. For example, both countries were participants in the ‘Amazon Indigenous REDD+ (RIA in Spanish) initiative, with the first pilot implementation project being initiated in Colombia’s Puiawai Natural Reserve.<ref>Garzón, E., (2017). ''Amazon Indigenous REDD+: An innovative approach to conserve Colombian forests?'' Mongabay. [[/news.mongabay.com/2017/01/amazon-indigenous-redd-an-innovative-approach-to-conserve-colombian-forests/|https://news.mongabay.com/2017/01/amazon-indigenous-redd-an-innovative-approach-to-conserve-colombian-forests/]]</ref> The relevance of these two countries with respect to REDD+ is simple. Much of the Amazon’s primary tropical rainforest falls within these countries jurisdiction and this rainforest has been consistently under threat from external pressures and encroachment, whether that be in the form of land-clearing for commercial ranching, subsistence purposes, illicit drug production or illegal mining practices,<ref name=":8">Sánchez García, P. A. & Wong, G. Y., (2024) “The political economy of deforestation in the Colombian Amazon”, ''Journal of Political Ecology'' ''31''(1), 178–199. [[/doi.org/10.2458/jpe.5230|https://doi.org/10.2458/jpe.5230]]</ref><ref>Radwin, M. (2023). ''Drug trafficking fuels other deforestation drivers in the Amazon: report.'' Mongabay. [[/news.mongabay.com/2023/07/drug-trafficking-fuels-other-deforestation-drivers-in-the-amazon-report/|https://news.mongabay.com/2023/07/drug-trafficking-fuels-other-deforestation-drivers-in-the-amazon-report/]]</ref><ref>Haddad, E.A., Araújo, I.F., Feltran-Barbieri, R., Perobelli, F. S., Rocha, A., Sass, K. S., Nobre, C. A. (2024). Economic drivers of deforestation in the Brazilian Legal Amazon. ''Nat Sustain'' ''7'', 1141–1148. [[/doi.org/10.1038/s41893-024-01387-7|https://doi.org/10.1038/s41893-024-01387-7]] </ref><ref>Hänggli, A., Levy, S. A., Armenteras, D., Bovolo, C. I., Brandão, J., Rueda, X., & Garrett, R. D. (2023). A systematic comparison of deforestation drivers and policy effectiveness across the amazon biome. ''Environmental Research Letters, 18''(7), 073001. [[/doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/acd408|https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/acd408]]</ref> to name a few.

In theory, REDD+ can be used to provide the economic incentive to promote sustained environmental protection of Indigenous lands, with a focus on the rights and livelihoods of IPLCs. Currently the overall funding to IPLCs tenure rights and forest management in tropical countries is low, receiving just $270 million per year between 2011-2020 from bilateral and multilateral donors and private philanthropies.<ref>Hatcher, J., Owen, M., Yin, D., (2021). ''Falling short: Donor funding for Indigenous peoples and local communities to secure tenure rights and manage forests in tropical countries (2011 -2020).'' Rainforest Foundation Norway. [[/dv719tqmsuwvb.cloudfront.net/documents/Publikasjoner/Andre-rapporter/RFN Falling short 2021.pdf|https://dv719tqmsuwvb.cloudfront.net/documents/Publikasjoner/Andre-rapporter/RFN_Falling_short_2021.pdf]]</ref> REDD+ has the potential to channel funding as to promote Indigenous rights and autonomy, provided there is transparent and equitable benefit-sharing for those involved. Fundamentally, only with the inclusion of IPLC’s, or preferably with IPLC’s acting as project proponents, is REDD+ able to promote Indigenous agency and improve IPLC rights and governance. And only when the rights of those inhabiting the land are formally recognized can the land be effectively conserved.<ref name=":16">Reytar, K., Veit, P., von Braun, J. (2024). ''Protecting Biodiversity Hinges on Securing Indigenous and Community Land Rights.'' WRI. [[/www.wri.org/insights/indigenous-and-local-community-land-rights-protect-biodiversity|https://www.wri.org/insights/indigenous-and-local-community-land-rights-protect-biodiversity]]</ref> The inclusion of IPLCs in REDD+ project development is therefore considered to be essential for project success, and this is in theory embodied in the very nature of REDD+.<ref name=":1">Alvarez, G., Elfving, M. and Andrade, C. (2016) ‘REDD+ governance and indigenous peoples in Latin America: the case of Suruí Carbon Project in the Brazilian Amazon Forest’, ''Latin American J. Management for Sustainable Development 3''(2) pp.133–146. [[/dx.doi.org/10.1504/LAJMSD.2016.083705|10.1504/LAJMSD.2016.083705]]</ref> Partially owing to a long history of dealing with REDD+, Colombia and Brazil are amongst just a few of the countries hosting tropical rainforests that explicitly recognise community rights to carbon and tie these rights to the legal ownership of lands and forests. In Colombia, carbon rights are tied to rights of the land, whereas in Brazil carbon rights are tied to forest rights.<ref name=":2">RRI and McGill University (2021). Technical report: ''Status of legal recognition of Indigenous Peoples’, Local Communities’ and Afro-descendant Peoples’ rights to carbon stored in tropical lands and forests''. Rights and Resources Initiative. [[/doi.org/10.53892/MLQQ5744|https://doi.org/10.53892/MLQQ5744]]</ref>

==Brazil: The Suruí Forest Carbon Project==
[[File:The Amazon Basin, Brazil.jpg|thumb|316x316px|Brazil's Amazon rainforest]]

=== Project description and location ===
The Surui Forest Carbon project was implemented in 2009 on the territory of the Surui people, which is situated in the southern part of Brazil’s Amazon between the states of Rondônia and Mato Grosso. Surui Indigenous territory covers an area of 2,481 km2, though the intention of the PCFS was to protect a portion of this total area. According to the PD, the stated objective was to “prevent 13,575.3 hectares of tropical forest from being cleared by 2038, to avoid the emission of 7,258,352.3 tCO2e to the atmosphere, and to contribute to the preservation of the Paiter Surui lifestyle and traditions.”<ref>IDESAM (2011). ''Project description: Surui forest carbon project''. Institute for Conservation and Sustainable Development of Amazonas. Link: "PROJ_DESC_1118_02FEB2012.PDF" found at [[/registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/1118|https://registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/1118]] </ref> This region sits within one of the Brazilian Amazon’s main ‘arcs of deforestation’ and pressure from loggers and ranchers is a matter of concern.

Notably, the PCFS was the first REDD+ project to be proposed by Indigenous peoples in the Brazilian Amazon on their own territory and was the first to receive certification by both the VCS and CCBS.<ref name=":1" />. Metareilá, the Surui’s own Indigenous association, acted as project proponent and the Institute for Conservation and Sustainable Development of Amazonas (IDESAM) assisted with project development, alongside multiple other stakeholder groups. As an endogenous initiative procured and conducted by the Surui community, the SFCP had a ‘non-centralized model of governance’, which reflected the characteristics and traditions of the Surui people. <ref name=":1" />

Only after two years of consultations between the 24 communities involved and the relevant governmental agencies (primarily FUNAI and the Ministry of Environment) was a Memorandum of Understanding signed, showing community consent to develop the project.<ref name=":3">Garcia, B., Rimmer, L., Canal Vieira, L., Mackey, B., (2021). REDD+ and forest protection on indigenous lands in the Amazon. ''RECIEL 30'', 207–219. [[/doi.org/10.1111/reel.12389|https://doi.org/10.1111/reel.12389]]</ref> In 2012 after verification from an independent third-party body, the Surui were able to sell carbon credits on the international market. Between 2009 and 2014 the project drastically helped limit the deforestation occurring within the project’s site, causing many to deem it a success.<ref name=":4">Howard, F. E., (2023). ''An Analysis of the Suruí Forest Carbon Project in Context of Settler Colonialism''. Masters thesis. Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University. [[/vtechworks.lib.vt.edu/server/api/core/bitstreams/b0cde6de-794c-453f-856b-ee72bde3db06/content|https://vtechworks.lib.vt.edu/server/api/core/bitstreams/b0cde6de-794c-453f-856b-ee72bde3db06/content]]</ref>

=== National climate targets, policies and legislation ===
Rates of deforestation in Brazil’s legal Amazon are significantly impacted by the government in charge. This is evidenced in the decade between 2012 and 2021 whilst under the conservative Bolsonaro administration, when deforestation in the Amazon increased 185% — from a loss of 4,571 km2 in 2012 to 13,038 km2 in 2021.<ref>INPE (2022). ''Observação da Terra. [[/www.obt.inpe.br/OBT/assuntos/programas/amazonia/prodes|http://www.obt.inpe.br/OBT/assuntos/programas/amazonia/prodes]]''</ref> However, since Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s appointment in 2022 there has been a steady decline in the rate of deforestation, which is now roughly half what it was in 2021.<ref>Terra Brasilis (2024). ''PRODES (deforestation): Deforestation rates – Legal Amazon – States''. [[/terrabrasilis.dpi.inpe.br/app/dashboard/deforestation/biomes/legal amazon/rates|https://terrabrasilis.dpi.inpe.br/app/dashboard/deforestation/biomes/legal_amazon/rates]]</ref> A significant proportion of emissions result from the clearing of rainforest and its subsequent conversion to ranching.<ref>MCTI (2022). ''Estimativas Anuais De Emissões De Gases De Efeito Estufa No Brasil.'' 6ª Edição. Ministério da Estado da Ciência, Tecnologia e Inovações. [[/www.gov.br/mcti/pt-br/acompanhe-o-mcti/sirene/publicacoes/estimativas-anuais-de-emissoes-gee/arquivos/6a-ed-estimativas-anuais.pdf|https://www.gov.br/mcti/pt-br/acompanhe-o-mcti/sirene/publicacoes/estimativas-anuais-de-emissoes-gee/arquivos/6a-ed-estimativas-anuais.pdf]]</ref> To address these emissions Brazil has implemented various adaptation policies, legislation and targets which are summarized below:
{| class="wikitable"
|'''Document name'''
|'''Type (target, policy or legislation)'''
|'''Publication year'''
|'''Key takeaways'''
|-
|National policy on climate change
|Policy
|2009
|
|-
|National Plan on Climate Change Adaptation
|Policy
|2016
|
|-
|GHG emissions target under Paris agreement: NDC update (2024*
|Target
|2024
|Reduce net greenhouse gas emissions by 59 to 67 percent below 2005 levels by 2035
|-
|?
|Target
|?
|Eliminate illegal deforestation in the Amazon by 2030 and restore 12 million hectares of degraded lands.

|-
|Federal Constitution of Brazil of 2006, Article 225
|
|
|The Amazon rainforest is considered as a ‘national heritage’ in Brazil and all levels of government have a shared responsibility to protect it and the environment (Federal Constitution of Brazil of 2006, Article 225).
|-
| colspan="4" |Relating to REDD+
|-
|Plan of Action for the Prevention and Control of Deforestation in the Legal Amazon (PPCDAM)
|
|2004
|
|-
|Forest code
|Policy
|2012
|No specific mention of REDD+
|-
|Amazon Indigenous REDD+ Initiative
|Policy
|2012
|
|-
|National REDD+ Strategy (ENREDD+)
|
|2016
|aims to eliminate deforestation, promote the conservation and restoration of forests, and enable a sustainable forestry economy. Specific objectives include monitoring and evaluating the impact of REDD+ policies, ensuring consistency between (federal, state and municipal) policies, and mobilizing capacity and resources for forest conservation and sustainable use. There is no explicit reference to REDD+ as a market-based mechanism in the VCM and REDD+ is defined under ENREDD+ as a funded-based mechanism
|}

=== Indigenous rights - Constitutional, tenure and bundle rights ===
In Brazil, Indigenous rights are robust and clearly defined according to the Brazilian Constitution. As a result, the Indigenous communities of the Brazilian Amazon have legal title to 13.8% of the national territory totalling 1.175 million km2, with a total of 631 territories.<ref>Federal government of Brazil (2024). ''Brazil’s NDC: National determination to contribute and transform''. [[/unfccc.int/sites/default/files/2024-11/Brazil Second Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) November2024.pdf|https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/2024-11/Brazil_Second%20Nationally%20Determined%20Contribution%20%28NDC%29_November2024.pdf]]</ref>
{| class="wikitable"
| colspan="3" |'''Laws'''
|-
|Article 231 of the 1988 Constitution
|indigenous peoples to have their exclusive right to use their territories to derive economic benefits

“Grants indigenous peoples the right to land, prohibits eviction, and restricts mining without authorization from the federal government.”

|
|-
|Indigenous Peoples statute (1973).

|No acts restricting the full exercise of indigenous peoples’ permanent tenure over the land should be permitted.

|
|-
| colspan="3" | '''(International) Treaties'''
|-
|United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2007)
|
|Requires States to obtain free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) for the approval of any projects affecting indigenous territories.
|-
|International Labour Organization Convention 169 (2019)
|
|Ratified ILO Convention No. 169, which was incorporated under domestic law through Decree 10.088/2019, and endorsed UNDRIP

Whilst the State retains ownership of mineral and other subsurface resources, governments must ensure consultation procedures, benefit-sharing and compensation for indigenous communities.*
|-
|Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention (1989)
|
|*?
|-
|American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2016)
|
|
|}
Whilst Indigenous communities in Brazil have legal title to land, it is the State that owns it. Indigenous people simply exercise permanent tenure over lands that they traditionally occupy and have ‘original rights’ to these traditional lands, which no other rights can prevail over.<ref name=":3" /> Indigenous lands, though not classified as protected areas, “have the highest level of protection by law because they are regulated by the Constitution” and cannot be leased or restricted without violating their original rights. The Suruí's right to develop the PCFS is grounded in the Brazilian Constitution, which grants Indigenous peoples exclusive rights to use the ‘riches of the soil, rivers and lakes’ of their land, and these rights cannot be overridden. Thus, Indigenous people and only Indigenous people are legally allowed to engage in productive activities on their land, provided these activities are conducted according to their own customs and traditions and are necessary for the wellbeing and cultural expression of their own people. In Brazil, it is the armed forces and federal police that are responsible for enforcing these laws, and FUNAI is responsible for representing Indigenous communities in judicial disputes.<ref name=":3" /> As such, provided a REDD+ does not violate the rights to territorial integrity, permanent land tenure and original rights, it is legally allowed.
[[File:Two Pataxo indians (Brasília, 04 April 2006).jpeg|thumb|414x414px|Two Indigenous in Brazil]]
'''CARBON RIGHTS:''' In Brazil, carbon rights are tied to forest rights.<ref name=":2" /> Carbon credits from REDD+ projects are seen as part of the economic benefits derived from indigenous lands, and as such, Indigenous communities are entitled to own, control and distribute these revenues themselves. The carbon credits generated from the (SFCP) were wholly owned by the Suruí people through Metareilá, with the Suruí Fund (managed by the Brazilian Biodiversity Fund - FUNBIO) acting as recipient. This legality reinforces Indigenous control over both land and carbon rights, as whoever has rights to the forest land is usually recognized as the owner of carbon rights.<ref name=":3" />

'''FPIC OBLIGATION:''' Furthermore, Brazilian law requires Free, Prior, and Informed Consent (FPIC) for REDD+ projects affecting indigenous lands, ensuring that international standards such as the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) and ILO Convention No. 169 are adhered to; Indigenous consent is, ''de jure,'' a necessity. Projects that violate these rights and fail to consult communities are therefore considered illegal. Notably there are no specific rules or procedures that have been written into the Brazilian constitution that provide guidance on how to achieve FPIC. This freedom reinforces Indigenous autonomy as it allows an Indigenous community to define the rules of consultation according to their customs and traditions.

Collectively these national and international laws provide an important safeguard to Indigenous peoples, making their consent a prerequisite for the establishment of REDD+ projects and recognizing their rights as the main beneficiaries of REDD+ revenues.<ref name=":3" /> However, as carbon rights are tied to forest rights in Brazil and not land rights, carbon is considered to be an ‘environmental service’ (Article 41(I)(A) Brazilian Forestry Code), and states, as well as the federal government, have the jurisdiction to exercise full legislative authority over carbon. <ref name=":2" /> As such, certain states have interpreted the law to imply that the title to carbon credits is attributable to the state.<ref>Loft, L., Ravikumar, A., Gebara, M. F., Pham, T. T., Resosudarmo, I. A. P., Assembe, S., Tovar, J. G., Mwangi, E., & Andersson, K. (2015). Taking Stock of Carbon Rights in REDD+ Candidate Countries: Concept Meets Reality. ''Forests'', ''6''(4), 1031-1060. [[/doi.org/10.3390/f6041031|https://doi.org/10.3390/f6041031]]</ref> Hence, even when carbon rights are clearly defined and tied to forest title it is insufficient in itself, and only by legally recognizing the customary rights of IPLCs can a fair and equitable outcome be realised.

=== Interested and affected stakeholders ===
{| class="wikitable"
| colspan="5" |'''Affected stakeholders'''
|-
|Stakeholders
|Primary objective(s)
|Secondary objective(s)
|Relative power
|Scope of influence
|-
|Metareilá Association of the Suruí Indigenous People
|<nowiki>- Project proponent</nowiki>

- Works to defend and preserve the cultural and territorial heritage of the Suruí people
|
|
|
|-
|Gãbgir Association of the Paiter Suruí Indigenous People
|Provide support to improve the quality and performance of schools in the TISS
|
|Low
|
|-
|Kabaney Association of the Forest People
|Supports the implementation of economic systems for the sustainable use of TISS‟ natural resources that meet the Paiter Suruí people's needs
|
|
|
|-
|Pamaur Association for the Protection of the Paiter Suruí People's Makor Clan
|Supporting the identification of more effective alternatives to address the health problems faced by the Paiter people
|
|
|
|-
|Yabner Gãbgir Forestry Institute of the Paiter Suruí people
|Encouraging the revitalization, strengthening and enhancement of traditional cultural property
|
|
|
|-
| colspan="5" |'''Interested stakeholders'''
|-
|Kanindé Association for Ethno-Environmental Defense – non-profit
|Responsible for the ethno-zoning of TISS. Coordination and organization of activities for Food Security and income generation, monitoring of biodiversity and socio-economic benefits
|
|
|
|-
|IDESAM - Institute for Conservation and Sustainable Development of Amazonas – non-profit NGO
|''Technical coordination''; - calculation of baseline scenario - preparation of Project Design Document (PDD) as well as the validation and verification to VCS and CCB standards. Coordination of biomass and carbon inventories and forest monitoring in support of the PCFS (remote sensing). Also supports policy and technical coordination related to REDD for the PCFS (p.9).
|
|
|
|-
|Forest Trends
|Supported formulation and implementation of the project. Raised funds
|
|
|International
|-
|Amazon Conservation Team - ACT Brazil
|Support to activities for food security and income generation, monitoring of biodiversity and socio-economic benefits, legal advice and communication to the project. Development of the Land Protection Plan, environmental monitoring and carbon stocks.
|
|
|
|-
|Brazilian Biodiversity Fund (FUNBIO)

|Responsible for the financial resources management mechanism generated by the Suruí forest carbon projects - Suruí Fund - and other income activities within the Management Plan.
|
|
|
|-
|Ministry of Environment (MMA)
|
|
|
|
|-
|Government of the State of Mato Grosso
|
|
|
|
|-
|Government of the State of Mato Grosso
|
|
|
|
|-
|National Indian Foundation (FUNAI)
|FUNAI does not necessarily need to take part in the governance of the project (Sales et al., 2010), but it should have formal knowledge of the direction and initiative proposals.

|
|
|National
|}

=== Discussion ===
Although originally successful in achieving its goal of reducing deforestation and degradation, in 2016 diamonds were discovered in Surui territory, leading to an increase in illegal logging and mining.<ref name=":1" /> By 2018 the project site had been completely overrun by ''garimpeiros'' (small-scale gold miners), ultimately leading to the projects suspension that year. <ref name=":4" />

While the project had initially garnered support, divisions emerged within the community post-project implementation. Disputes arose over the unequal distribution of project revenues, leading to internal conflicts between different Suruí clans. These criticisms escalated in 2014 when the Catholic Indigenous Missionary Council supported calls for an end to the project due to mismanagement of revenues from carbon credit sales. <ref name=":3" /> Some Suruí members also argued that the REDD+ initiative harmed their way of life.<ref>Lang, C. (2014). ''“What are projects for that destroy life?” Interview with Henrique Suruí about the Paiter-Suruí REDD project, Brazil.'' REDD-Monitor. [[/redd-monitor.org/2014/12/17/what-are-projects-for-that-destroy-life-interview-with-henrique-surui-about-the-paiter-surui-redd-project-brazil/|https://redd-monitor.org/2014/12/17/what-are-projects-for-that-destroy-life-interview-with-henrique-surui-about-the-paiter-surui-redd-project-brazil/]]</ref>

Further complicating the situation was the controversial role of Henrique Suruí, one of the Suruí tribal leaders. In 2011, it was revealed that Henrique had violated the tribe's logging moratorium, collaborating with loggers in illegal activities. While Henrique later denied responsibility for the project’s failure, his actions, combined with internal disagreements, illustrated the lack of consensus within the Suruí leadership on the project’s goals and outcomes. Both of the tribe’s leaders possessed dramatically different perspectives on how they believed they could ensure agency, autonomy, and economic benefits for the Suruí people.<ref name=":4" /> This fragmentation within the community, in combination with the discovery of diamonds and the state's failure to protect indigenous land rights led to the indefinite suspension of the REDD+ project.

The project's collapse highlights broader structural issues, particularly the state's inconsistent support for indigenous land rights, influenced by settler colonialism, which undermined the project’s long-term viability.<ref name=":4" /> Additionally, the project’s creation was shaped by external actors, including the collaboration between Almir Suruí and Borges from Forest Trends, a Washington-based NGO. This partnership introduced a Western perspective on viewing the Suruí peoples forest, in contrast with their own perspectives on land use and governance. Furthermore, despite Borges’ Brazilian background, the power dynamics between a global North organization and a developing, Indigenous community were apparent.

=== Summary ===
The Suruí Forest Carbon Project provides an interesting example of how, even when the rights of IPLC’s are relatively robust, challenges persist in ensuring REDD+ project longevity. As such, in its current state, REDD+ in the Brazilian Amazon may not be a suitable market-based option for indigenous communities in the Amazon.<ref name=":3" /> Although initially successful in promoting indigenous autonomy and reducing deforestation, the project resulted in failure due to of a myriad of factors. Division between Surui communities was exacerbated by a perceived unequal benefit-sharing, and the impact of imposing REDD+ seems to have complicated the traditional social structure that the Surui were dependent on. These issues were influenced by Brazil's settler state dynamics, where indigenous land rights, although legally recognized, are often not upheld in practice due to insufficient enforcement.<ref name=":4" /> Ultimately, the Surui project reveals how settler colonialism's structural flaws make long-term project success difficult, despite initial progress in promoting indigenous autonomy.

At the national and state level, complex institutional and legal land governance structures convolute and impede REDD+ in Brazil. Multiple institutions share responsibilities and there is no comprehensive, authoritative database of land ownership, which hampers efforts to protect indigenous territories.<ref name=":5">Costa, R. (2016)''. Insecure land rights in Brazil: Consequences for rural areas and challenges for improvement.'' Climate Policy Initiative. [[/www.climatepolicyinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/Insecure Land Rights in Brazil CPI.pdf|https://www.climatepolicyinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/Insecure_Land_Rights_in_Brazil_CPI.pdf]]</ref> As a result, land tenure disputes remain common and can be witnessed occurring between the public as well between public and state actors. For example, Brazil’s 1964 Land Statute (Law No. 4504) allows the government to takeover unproductive farms and transfer those lands to landless peasants. This often results in the clearing of forest, as only when the land is cleared is it evidenced to be ‘productive’.<ref name=":5" /> Hence, not only does this law cause insecurity for Indigenous populations in Brazil, it also forces them to go against customary traditions of stewarding the land in an effort to maintain its control.

Whilst the aforementioned points to the futility of REDD+ in Brazil, there is reason to maintain optimism. In a recent landmark ruling Brazil’s supreme court voted in favour of the Xoleng peoples, and the decision will serve as a precedent for all cases involving Indigenous peoples.<ref name=":6">Amos-Flom, K., (2023). ''Triumph and Turmoil: The Xokleng Case and the Future of Indigenous Land Rights in Brazil.'' Columbia Journal of Transnational Law. [[/www.jtl.columbia.edu/bulletin-blog/triumph-and-turmoil-the-xokleng-case-and-the-future-of-indigenous-land-rights-in-brazil|https://www.jtl.columbia.edu/bulletin-blog/triumph-and-turmoil-the-xokleng-case-and-the-future-of-indigenous-land-rights-in-brazil]]</ref> The Xokleng’s land dispute, settled in 2023, “rejected Santa Catarina state’s marco temporal (“time limit”) argument, which would have required Indigenous people to prove they occupied or legally contested the territory they claimed before the Brazilian Constitution came into force in 1988. If successful, this argument would have led to disastrous repercussions, as many indigenous peoples had been forcibly removed or are traditionally nomadic.”<ref name=":6" /> Evidently, whilst slow, progress has been made in Brazil in recent years with respect to Indigenous rights as well as the voluntary carbon market itself.

There are currently 159 AFOLU projects listed on the Verra database in Brazil, with only two specifically focused on REDD+ initiatives in collaboration with Indigenous groups. These are the Ka’a Pyahu project, <ref>Verra (n.d.) ''Project 5087: KA'A PYAHU.'' https://registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/5087</ref> initiated by the Guajajara Indigenous people in collaboration with external organizations and validated in 2021, and the ‘Together for the forest Awaete REDD+ project’<ref>Verra (n.d.) ''Project 5200: TOGETHER FOR THE FOREST AWAETÉ REDD+ PROJECT.'' https://registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/5200</ref> which is still under development. Both projects involve Indigenous groups working with Brazilian organizations to build technical capacity and expertise. This could signal a growing trend of Indigenous-led REDD+ projects in the future. To ensure a positive future for REDD+ in Brazil, the customary rights of IPLC’s must be formally recognized. IPLC should have legal ownership of their traditional lands, and in doing so the carbon rights of these communities would be less convoluted, leading to more equitable benefit-sharing and increased cohesion amongst these groups post-project implementation.

==Colombia: ''REDD+ project Resguardo Indigena Unificado - Selva de Mataven (RUI-SM)''==

=== '''Project description and location''' ===
[[File:RS6524 MG 3944.jpg|thumb|407x407px|A view of the Mataven]]
According to the PD,<ref name=":7">ACATISEMA & Mediamos (2017). ''Joint project description and monitoring report: REDD+ project: Resguardo Indigena Unificado – Selva de Mataven (RIU – SM).'' Link: “10 06 2017_VCS Final Report_ Matavin Project.pdf” found at [[/registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/1566|https://registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/1566]]</ref> the Resguardo Indígena Unificado – Selva de Matavén (RIU-SM) project is located east of the Colombian Orinoco high plain, in the eastern part of the Department of Vichada, municipality of Cumaribo. It resides on the formalized resguardo of the Sikuani, Piaroa, Puinave, Curripaco, Cubeo and Piapoco ethnic groups, spanning 1,856,836 hectares, with 1,477,115 hectares (79.6%) being forested. The project states that it will reduce greenhouse gas emissions, with a total estimated net reduction of 108,670,562 tons of CO2 equivalent over thirty years, from years 2013 – 2042. By this metric, it is the 14th largest project on the Verra registry, out of over 1700 projects.<ref name=":9">Dufrasne, D., (2021). ''Two Shades of Green: How hot air forest credits are being used to avoid carbon taxes in Colombia''. Carbon Market Watch. [[/carbonmarketwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Two-shades-of-green EN WEB.pdf|https://carbonmarketwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Two-shades-of-green_EN_WEB.pdf]]</ref> There are 12,312 indigenous people living in the RIU-SM, belonging to 2,517 families and 250 communities as of 2017.

The project was initiated by the Asociación de Cabildos y Autoridades Indígenas de la Selva de Matavén (ACETISMA), an Indigenous association, and developed by MEDIAMOS F&M, a Colombian consultancy firm. ACETISMA is comprised of Indigenous leaders that represent the 17 communities of the reservation in charge of governing the territory, and it has administrative autonomy, as well as “the capacity to acquire, to own and to dispose of property, to accept donations, to hold national and international conventions, scientific and cultural exchanges and generally, to celebrate all kinds of negotiations and agreements with which the Association can achieve its objectives.”<ref name=":7" />

There is a stated focus on various means of improving the living conditions of the Indigenous peoples living within the project area. To summarise, the main objectives of the REDD+ project RIU-SM include:

· Community development, in the form of improved education.

· Community engagement with respect to the project; developing information channels to reveal project progress.

· Support local initiatives for environmental education and waste management.

· Developing an effective response system that addresses community proposals and concerns relating to the project.

· Strengthening the governance of ACATISEMA.

=== National climate targets, policies and legislation ===
[[File:Figure 6 Colombian Manual Eradicators Destroying Coca Fields (31352594937).jpg|thumb|292x292px|The Colombian government fight against cocoa production.]]
The Colombian Amazon makes up over one-third of Colombia’s national territory, and up until 2005 only 7.3% of the Colombian Amazon had been deforested, largely due to the country's 60-year armed conflict between the government, multiple left-wing guerillas such as FARC, and several far-right paramilitary groups.<ref name=":8" /> However, following the signing of the Peace Treaty in 2016 and demobilization of the FARC, limits to deforestation were weakened in the Colombian Amazon. Poor but opportunistic peasants began to encroach into previously unchartered territory and capitalize from the rainforest. Due to the poor economic integration of the Amazon, many were forced to engage with the traditional economies of cocoa and cattle ranching, as these markets were already well connected to regional and global markets.<ref name=":8" /> To address the drivers of deforestation and its associated emissions, the federal government has implemented various initiatives, which are summarized below:

{| class="wikitable"
|'''Document name'''
|'''Type'''
|'''Publication year'''
|'''Key takeaways'''
|-
|Nationally Determined Contribution(s)
|Target
|2020
|Reduce GHG emissions by 51 % by 2030 and net-zero by 2050
|-
|National Climate Change Policy (PNCC)
|Policy
|2018
|Address climate change and foster sustainable development
|-
|National Forest Conservation Program
|Policy
|2011
|Address deforestation
|-
|Law 1931 of 2018 – Climate Change Law

|Legislation
|2018
|Establishes the framework for addressing climate change
|-
| colspan="4" |'''Relating to REDD+:'''
|-
|National Strategy for Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (ENREDD+)
|Initiative
|2009
|Particular focus on the Amazon and Choco rainforests
|-
|Amazon Indigenous REDD+ Initiative
|Initiative
|2016
|Respect Indigenous rights. FPIC focus.
|-
|BIOREDD+ program
|Initiative
|2012
|Portfolio of 8 REDD+ projects in four geographic nodes covering over 700,000 hectares in the Colombian Pacific.

|-
|Vision Amazonia
|Initiative
|2015
|Part of the REDD+ strategy, financed by three foreign countries: Germany, Norway and United Kingdom
|}
As a result of the many fund and market-based initiatives that Colombia has engaged with, it hosts the second most REDD+ projects in the world. REDD+ projects now cover at least 56% of the area of legally recognized Indigenous territories in the Colombian Amazon, with an overwhelming majority of carbon projects located on Indigenous territories.<ref name=":10">Schmid, D., & Castro. C., (2023). ''REDD+ projects in the Colombian Amazon: Social challenges and lack of transparency''. Rainforest Foundation Norway. [[/dv719tqmsuwvb.cloudfront.net/documents/REDD rapport 2024 ENG.pdf|https://dv719tqmsuwvb.cloudfront.net/documents/REDD_rapport_2024_ENG.pdf]]</ref> Evidently REDD+ plays an integral part in the country’s efforts of environmental conservation, and incentives have been introduced to promote the development of such projects. For example, in 2016 the government adopted a higher tax that covered fossil fuels, but companies are able to avoid paying the tax by investing in carbon offsets that have been generated domestically.<ref name=":9" /> This led to a boost in the domestic REDD+ market in 2017, as Colombian companies invested as to escape higher taxes. Notably, 23 of the 36 REDD+ projects currently under development in the Amazon region were initiated in or after 2018.<ref name=":10" /> Currently Colombia’s REDD+ program sits at over 45 pilot and voluntary carbon projects, as well as one large-scale jurisdictional approach in the Amazon.<ref name=":11">Zambrano-Cortés, D. G. (2024). ''The politics, spaces and subjects of forest conservation in Colombia''. [internal PhD, WU, Wageningen University]. Wageningen University. [[/doi.org/10.18174/675328|https://doi.org/10.18174/675328]]</ref>

=== Indigenous rights - Constitutional, tenure and bundle rights ===
''De jure'', the Indigenous peoples of Colombia have comprehensive tenure and bundle rights that have been articulated in the national constitution. Collective land titles are granted to Indigenous communities by the Colombian government, and as a result about 34 percent of Colombian land (almost 38 million hectares) is legally recognized as Indigenous territory or collective lands of Afro-descendent communities.<ref name=":10" /> These collective land tenure rights have been in effect since the implementation of the 1991 constitution, granting them the authority to exercise legal control over their territories in accordance with their own customs and procedures.<ref>Max Planck Institute (n.d.) ''Colombia 1991 (rev. 2015).'' Institute. [[/www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Colombia 2015|https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Colombia_2015]]</ref> Furthermore, the carbon rights of Indigenous peoples are explicitly defined in the constitution and tied specifically to the ownership of land of the communities.<ref name=":2" /> This in theory provides a solid legal basis for upholding the rights of Indigenous communities in Colombia, specifically relating to REDD+ activities, as it allows communities to define and negotiate the terms of said projects. A summary of the various laws relating to Indigenous rights have been summarized below:
{| class="wikitable"
| colspan="2" |'''Law (1991 constitution)'''
|-
|Article 63

|Indigenous territories are considered collective property. Land is not owned by individuals but is shared by the community. The state must respect these collective rights and cannot alter land ownership without the consent of the Indigenous peoples.
|-
|Article 76 - ''Consulta previa''.
|Pertains to the right of Indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities; prior consultation must be undertaken before any entity undertakes activities that may affect their territories, culture, or way of life.
|-
|Article 330
|Indigenous communities have the right to govern their territories.
|-
|Article 329
|The Reservation is a collective, inalienable, and indefeasible property.
|-
|Decree 1386 of 1994, Article 10; Decree 2164 of 1995, Article 22) 39.
|"The administration and management of these lands are subjected to uses and customs of the beneficiaries."
|}
Whilst land and tenure rights are enshrined into the constitution, the precariousness of these rights persists due to a lack of resources to ensure enforcement, as well as the deeper issue of corruption. As previously stated, the rate of deforestation increased significantly in Colombia’s post-conflict era, evidencing the nations inability to maintain control over unlawful acts of land-grabbing and disposition. Whilst this began with new peasants converting the Amazon for subsistence purposes, it ultimately led to new areas for the growth of cocoa, much to the benefit of narco-traffickers who could monopolize on this illegal surplus in ‘accumulation by dispossession’.<ref name=":8" />

With respect to the legalities of consultation, Colombia has enshrined ''consulta previa'' into the constitution. Translating to ‘prior consultation’, this legal text provides the formal grounds for Indigenous engagement when any legislative or administrative measures are implemented on Indigenous territory. Importantly, consultation should be achieved in accordance with the customs of the ethnic group with which the project is being imposed upon. However, there have been recent cases of contestation specifically relating to how ''consulta previa'' applies to REDD+ on Indigenous lands, and the RIU – SM project was one that was involved with such a case.

=== Affected and interested stakeholders ===
{| class="wikitable"
| colspan="5" |'''Affected stakeholders'''
|-
|Stakeholders
|Primary objective(s)
|Secondary objective(s)
|Relative power
|Scope of influence
|-
|ACATISEMA - Asociación de Cabildos y Autoridades Indígenas de la Selva de Matavén
|
* Foster the integral development, social and cultural preservation of the indigenous communities in the Mataven Jungle and to
* Consolidate the territory, selfgovernment by partners, the defense, conservation and preservation of the environment and biodiversity of the Mataven Jungle

|
|It is the highest authority in the reservation.
|
|-
|Indigenous ''resguardos'' of the RIU-SM
|
* Primary and direct beneficiaries
* Seek to maintain land rights
* Promote traditional and cultural beliefs
|
|
|
|-
|Colonists
|
|
|
|
|-
| colspan="5" |'''Interested stakeholders'''
|-
|MEDIAMOS F&M – A consultancy
|Project developer
|
|
|
|-
|Mining companies
|Compete with the Project for the territory's resources.
|
|
|
|-
|Ministerio de Ambiente y Desarrollo Sostenible
|Its main interest is to achieve environmental planning, through the consolidation of a policy of sustainable development and strategic alliances with social and institutional participants in different sectoral and territorial scenarios.
|
|
|
|-
|Dirección de Asuntos Indígenas, ROM y Minorías - Ministerio del Interior
|Public agency that advises the national level, prepares and proposes the formulation of public policy in favor of indigenous peoples within the framework of the defense, support, reinforcement and consolidation of ethnic and cultural rights.
|
|
|
|-
|Corporinoquía
|Regional environmental authority to ensure the proper use of natural resources in their area of jurisdiction.
|
|
|
|-
|Other government institutions: Governor ofice of Vichada, Mayor ofice Cumaribo
|The Reservation for being part of the Cumaribo, Vichada, has territorial jurisdiction relations with the Governor’s office and the Mayor’s office.
|
|
|
|-
|Fundación NATURA
|Civil organization whose mission is the conservation, use and management of biodiversity to generate social, economic and environmental benefits in the context of sustainable human development.
|
|
|
|-
|FONDO ACCIÓN
|Colombian non-profit organization in the private scheme. Encourage the participation of civil society and the private sector in the implementation of the country’s public policies in two areas: - Conservation and sustainable development; and protection -development of children.
|
|
|
|-
|SENA, Department of Social Prosperity (DPS), NGOs and private consultants
|Supporting the implementation of rural development activities.
|
|
|Regional
|-
|Other indigenous communities neighboring RIU-SM
|
|
|Low
|Local
|-
|Financial institutions
|They fund local development activities.
|
|
|
|-
|Asocarbono – An industry association, including Verra, ProClima, Biofix, and ACATISEMA.

|
|
|
|
|-
|OPIAC: the National Oganization of the Indigenous Peoples of the Colombian Amazon

|
|
|
|
|}

=== Discussion ===
According to the official REDD+ Mataven website<ref>RIU – SM (n.d.). ''REDD+ Mataven''. [[/reddmataven.com/|https://reddmataven.com/]]</ref> the project has resulted in a myriad of benefits to the Indigenous communities of the region. For example, as a result of the funds generated from the projects activities, there have been improvements in infrastructure, transportation and education, ultimately leading to the empowerment and improved governance of ACETISMA. However, the project has come under fire for multiple reasons.

For one, in 2015 some of the Indigenous communities filed a lawsuit referring to the violation of their right to ''consulta previa''. However, the court ruled that their Indigenous rights had not been violated as it was ACETISMA that initially sought MEDIAMOS to develop the project, and that ACETISMA were the best representatives of those Indigenous communities. Furthermore, the projects main focus was the conservation of the rainforest and therefore did not threaten the cultural integrity of those communities.<ref name=":10" /> However, regardless of the outcome of this case, its occurrence points to internal disagreement amongst Indigenous participants of the RIU-SM project. In a study involving interviews with Indigenous members of the project, there was a significant proportion of interviewees that had little knowledge regarding various aspects of the project, such as responsibilities of participation, or the benefit-sharing mechanism in place.<ref name=":2" /> This further reinforces the point that, in the case of the RIU-SM project it may not be ‘bottom-up’ and eludes to the power imbalance experienced between Mediamos, the project developer, and Indigenous community members. In the PD there is a breakdown of the distribution of income between ACETISMA and Mediamos, which shows a significant proportion of revenue flowing to the former organisation throughout the project’s operations.<ref name=":7" /> However, there is currently no publicly available documentation supporting this initial claim<ref name=":9" /> as there is no obligation to provide this information, leading to a general lack of transparency in the market and between all of the relevant actors. Subsequent meetings with Indigenous leaders have however shown a marked support of the Mataven project, with one Indigenous leader explicitly stating “...the Redd+ project has brought resources that they never had before, which allowed them to open new school classrooms, 21 rural aqueducts, cocoa crops and even headquarters in Cumaribo and Inírida.”<ref>Lievano, A. B. (2021) Colombia's biggest carbon credit project could be selling hot air. Latin American Center for Investigative Journalism. [[/www.elclip.org/el-mayor-proyecto-de-bonos-de-carbono-de-colombia-podria-estar-vendiendo-aire-caliente/|https://www.elclip.org/el-mayor-proyecto-de-bonos-de-carbono-de-colombia-podria-estar-vendiendo-aire-caliente/]] </ref> Clearly there have been benefits for IPLC’s involved with this project, though the details of this benefit-sharing remain a mystery.

Secondly, the Mataven project has caused controversy due to its apparently inflated carbon credit issuance. The report states that this has been achieved by using a reference area that is not representative of the project area, as well as assuming an uncharacteristically heigh assumed rate of deforestation.<ref name=":12">Global Atlas of Environmental Justice (2023). ''Resguardo Indigena Unificado-Selva de Matavén (RIU SM) REDD+ Project, Colombia.'' [[/ejatlas.org/conflict/redd-project-resguardo-indigena-unificado-selva-de-mataven-riu-sm|https://ejatlas.org/conflict/redd-project-resguardo-indigena-unificado-selva-de-mataven-riu-sm]]</ref> The project used a baseline deforestation rate of 0.86% per year, which is significantly more than the Colombian government's national rate of 0.18%. Additionally, according to the report the reference area chosen is more easily accessed and therefore more prone to deforestation, making it an inaccurate comparison to the relatively remote project area.<ref name=":2" /> This has led to the creation of excess carbon credits, or “hot air” credits, which have been criticized for not reflecting real environmental benefits.<ref name=":9" /> To add further insult to injury these credits have been used by a Colombian fossil fuel distributor company to avoid paying taxes, as described earlier by Colombia’s change in policy in 2017. In doing so, the company avoided paying approximately $18.9 million in taxes.<ref name=":2" /> There has been subsequent back and forth between Verra and Carbon Market Watch, with Verra refuting the claims<ref>Verra (2021). ''Carbon Market Watch Report on Colombian REDD+ Projects Contains Flawed Allegations.'' [[/verra.org/carbon-market-watch-report-on-colombian-redd-projects-contains-flawed-allegations/|https://verra.org/carbon-market-watch-report-on-colombian-redd-projects-contains-flawed-allegations/]] </ref> Regardless of the science, Colombia recently introduced a resolution in 2018 (Resolution 1447 – 2018) that requires projects to use baselines that comply with national reference levels.<ref name=":13">Dufrasne, D. (2021b). Companies use ”hot air” forestry offsets to avoid taxes in Colombia: Carbon Market Watch’s fact-check of Verra’s response. Carbon Market Watch. [[/carbonmarketwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/CMWs-fact-check-of-Verras-response-on-Colombia.pdf|https://carbonmarketwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/CMWs-fact-check-of-Verras-response-on-Colombia.pdf]]</ref><ref>IEA (2022). ''Resolution 1447 – 2018. Monitoring, Reporting, and Verification System for mitigation actions at the national level.'' International Energy Agency. [[/www.iea.org/policies/14772-resolution-1447-2018-monitoring-reporting-and-verification-system-for-mitigation-actions-at-the-national-level|https://www.iea.org/policies/14772-resolution-1447-2018-monitoring-reporting-and-verification-system-for-mitigation-actions-at-the-national-level]]</ref> Going forward, REDD+ projects that are being implemented in Colombia will have to abide by Colombia’s national legislation.

=== Summary ===
Colombia has a long history of engaging in REDD+ as it has been used to limit environmental degradation in the post-conflict era, in alignment with the country’s national peacebuilding agenda.<ref name=":11" /> Owing to the country’s comprehensive tenure and bundle rights, IPLC’s have robust ''de jure'' rights to land as they collectively own it, and rights to carbon are tied to this ownership. This puts Colombia as one of the world leaders in legal terms relating to REDD+ project implementation, but due to a lack of resources to ensure enforcement, as well as corruption, historically these laws have not been adhered to.<ref name=":10" /><ref name=":2" /> There are many documented cases showing the displacement on IPLC’s from traditional lands, poor efforts to adhere to ''consulta previa'', and inequitable benefit sharing.<ref>Greenfield, P. (2023''). The ‘carbon pirates’ preying on Amazon’s Indigenous communities.'' The Guardian. [[/www.theguardian.com/environment/2023/jan/21/amazon-indigenous-communities-carbon-offsetting-pirates-aoe|https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2023/jan/21/amazon-indigenous-communities-carbon-offsetting-pirates-aoe]]</ref><ref name=":14">Lang, C., (2024). ''Colombia’s Constitutional Court rules in favour of Indigenous Peoples. Identifies serious flaws in the REDD+ Baka Rokarire project.'' REDD_Monitor. [[/reddmonitor.substack.com/p/colombias-constitutional-court-rules|https://reddmonitor.substack.com/p/colombias-constitutional-court-rules]]</ref>

The case of the Mataven project provides an interesting example of how it is the market itself that is failing to address concerns regarding transparency, whether that be relating to benefit-sharing amongst relevant stakeholders, or Indigenous representation and engagement throughout the implementation of REDD+ projects. Some ACATISEMA members have explicitly stated their support for the Mataven project,<ref name=":12" /> and its benefits can be seen first-hand in the form of improved infrastructure in local communities involved with the project.<ref>Myers, J. E., Parra, M. A., Bedford, C. (2021). ''How Carbon Offsetting Can Build a Forest.'' Stanford Social Innovation Review. [[/ssir.org/articles/entry/how carbon offsetting can build a forest|https://ssir.org/articles/entry/how_carbon_offsetting_can_build_a_forest]]</ref> However, an exact breakdown of how and where revenue is being distributed to IPLC’s remains elusive.<ref name=":13" /> Furthermore, the level of IPLC engagement has come into question, specifically with reference to ''consulta previa'' and the overall understanding that IPLC’s have regarding the project’s intended outcomes and activities.<ref name=":10" /> This is not a rare case in Colombia and has been witnessed occurring with other projects that have been implemented on Indigenous territories in the Colombian Amazon.<ref name=":17">Lang, C., (2023''). “It destroys everything,” says Indigenous leader about the REDD+ Baka Rokarire project in Colombia''. REDD Monitor. [[/reddmonitor.substack.com/p/it-destroys-everything-says-indigenous|https://reddmonitor.substack.com/p/it-destroys-everything-says-indigenous]]</ref> However, a recent ruling by the Colombian Constitutional court voted in favour of Indigenous groups in Colombia, upholding “the rights to self-determination, autonomy, self-government, territory, identity, physical and cultural integrity, and free, prior and informed consent of the indigenous communities”.<ref name=":14" /> This review ultimately sets a legal precedent safeguarding the fundamental rights of IPLCs with REDD+ project implementation and shows that progress is being made to improve the likelihood that REDD+ will result in genuine benefits to those affected by project implementation.

To ensure a more authentic engagement with IPLC’s as to result in legitimate and equitable benefit-sharing, improvements must be made by the Colombian government, as well as within the VCM itself. For the former, Colombia’s national registry for GHG mitigation activities must be updated; it has been offline since 2022.<ref name=":10" /> As a result, transparency is lacking. International finance could be utilized as to alleviate this issue, and only with an accurate and reliable database may the market be regulated. In the broader sense, VCM registries must create stricter guidelines promoting transparency. Often PD’s refer to annexed documents that contain relevant information regarding benefit-sharing, though these are often not publicly available.<ref name=":9" /> This limits transparency and increases the likelihood of inequitable agreements being made between project proponents and developers, further exacerbating existing power asymmetries between the two groups and limiting the likelihood that ''consulta previa'' is honestly adhered to.<ref name=":10" /> This has led to conflict within Indigenous communities, rather than a strengthening of their social fabric.

Furthermore, the Mataven project calls into question the actual emissions reduction that REDD+ projects achieve. Whilst Colombia has since updated its regulations such that REDD+ must use baselines that comply with national reference levels, it is up in the air as to how representative these guidelines are. Reference areas must represent project areas and without the appropriate regulations in place project developers lack the incentive to create realistic baselines; ultimately they are aiming to produce the maximum number of credits as to generate the greatest possible revenues.

==Conclusion==
As a market-based mechanism, REDD+ is shackled by the construct in which it operates; fundamentally it is a capitalist means of fixing a capitalist problem, which comes with limitations. Both Brazil and Colombia have relatively robust laws that have been written into the constitution, ultimately promoting more equitable results of project implementation. However, as in Colombia IPLC’s collectively own the land, whereas in Brazil these groups only own rights to use the land,<ref name=":2" /> Colombia can be considered better equipped for the establishment of REDD+ projects on traditional Indigenous territory. However, even with these laws in place enforcement remain a matter of concern. Furthermore, given the wide variety of ontological and epistemological perspectives of Indigenous communities, and how these views conflict with the Western worldview from which market-based REDD+ came to fruition, there is an inherent difficulty in implementing a system of governance in REDD+ on Indigenous lands.<ref name=":1" />. Putting a price on nature conflicts with Indigenous perspectives and there have been instances where this has attacked the social and cultural fabric of IPLC’s.<ref name=":17" /> To avoid this REDD+ developers must have the genuine intent of understanding the perspective of the Indigenous group they are working with and aim to implement REDD+ with a bottom-up approach.

In both countries, transparency must be improved to ensure that FPIC is adhered to and subsequently ensure fair IPLC representation and engagement. This issue predominantly arises due to the poor requirements of standards in the VCM. As such, proponents are guided by developers which have little incentive to truly act in the interests of Indigenous groups; ultimately the organizations in charge of project development are interested in increasing project revenues. This has led to instances of over-crediting, as without a transparent framework in which to operate it is difficult to evaluate the legitimacy of the claims being made by project proponents and developers. However, with recent advances that address concerns of additionality<ref name=":15" /> there is hope for improved market integrity. Standards of the VCM must continue to be scrutinized to ensure that progress continues to be made.

Going forward, progress should be made to formalize the customary laws and traditional lands of IPLCs, and finance should be directed towards the enforcement of these laws. The environmental,<ref name=":16" /> economic,<ref name=":5" /><ref>Ding, H., Veit, P. G., Blackman, A., Gray, E., Reytar, K., Altamirano, J. C., Hodgdon, B., (2016). ''Climate benefits, tenure costs: The economic case for securing Indigenous land rights in the Amazon''. WRI. [[/files.wri.org/d8/s3fs-public/Climate Benefits Tenure Costs Executive Summary.pdf|https://files.wri.org/d8/s3fs-public/Climate_Benefits_Tenure_Costs_Executive_Summary.pdf]]</ref> and social<ref>Sarmiento Barletti, J. P., Heise Vigil, N., & Larson, A. M. (2023). ''Safeguards at a glance: Are voluntary standards supporting community land, resource and carbon rights?'' CIFOR-ICRAF. [[/www.cifor-icraf.org/publications/pdf files/Flyer/REDD-Safeguards-7.pdf|https://www.cifor-icraf.org/publications/pdf_files/Flyer/REDD-Safeguards-7.pdf]] </ref> benefits of this have been researched and are well understood. By developing culturally appropriate frameworks for rights-based conservation regimes, that work with IPLCs in accordance with their worldviews, REDD+ could be used to promote Indigenous autonomy. However, progress still must be made to achieve this goal.

==References==

Documentation:Open Case Studies/FRST522/2024/REDD+ in Indigenous Amazonia: What works and what doesn’t?

2024-12-12T22:20:40Z

ConnorHaynes: /* Interested and affected stakeholders */

__TOC__

==Positionality==
First and foremost I am not Indigenous, and whilst there are a myriad of cultures, ontologies and epistemologies that are not sufficiently represented by simply stating ‘Indigenous’, it is commonly accepted that these worldviews are vastly different to those of the ‘Western’ world, which is the world in which I grew up and matured. I am therefore only understanding of Indigenous cultures, beliefs and customary laws based upon available online literature and those which I have learnt through life, in addition to those introduced to me in my Master’s degree. As such, I will never be able to fully relate to an Indigenous person; the best I can do is try to understand and learn. Only throughout this process am I able to work towards reconciliation and attempt to address the inequities experienced by Indigenous folk globally.

Additionally, I am yet to act as a carbon project proponent and so do not understand the nuances or stresses of undertaking such a task. Whilst an individual proponent may have the best intention of procuring a carbon project for its social and environmental benefits, there are a number of stakeholders involved throughout the entire process which influence its eventual outcome. Without experience acting as a project proponent I am naïve in understanding the process and it's difficulties.

==Acronyms / Terminology==
'''Acronyms:'''

AFOLU: Agriculture, Forestry and Other Land-Use

ICVCM: Integrity Council for the Voluntary Carbon Market

IPLC: Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities

KMGBF: Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework

LAC: Latin American Countries

MRV: Monitoring, Reporting and Verification

REDD+: Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation

UNCBD: United Nations Convention on Biological Biodiversity

VCMI: Voluntary Carbon Markets Integrity Initiative

'''Terminology:'''

''Additionality:'' Additionality is the determination of whether the project will lead to the expected outcomes when compared to the baseline or ‘business as usual’ emissions.

''Leakage'': Refers to the shifting of emissions to outside the project boundary as a result of the project’s activities.

''Permanence:'' Permanence refers to the degree to which a carbon credit is equivalent to a permanent removal or reduction in emissions.
==Abstract==
This case study illustrates two examples of Indigenous-led REDD+ projects on Indigenous territory in Colombia and Brazil. Both countries have a relatively long history of engaging with REDD+ but have slightly different legal structures pertaining to the rights of Indigenous peoples on their traditional territories, and specifically their ‘carbon’ rights. As such, the intention is to evaluate how these differing ''de jure'' rights translate on the ground. With respect to REDD+, do certain rights result in legitimately positive benefits to IPLCs, as well as the environment that these projects were originally intended to protect? To reduce inconsistency, projects were chosen that utilized the same standard, namely Verra’s ‘Verified Carbon Standard’. The intention is such that the reader can evaluate the effectiveness and true benefit of REDD+ projects to IPLC’s, based upon the legal frameworks of the host country. A secondary intention is such that the reader is better equipped to conduct a prefeasibility assessment based upon available online literature, to evaluate the likelihood that REDD+ can be implemented in any chosen country, with the genuine intent of benefiting IPLC’s that are directly affected as a result of REDD+ project implementation.

==REDD+ and the VCM in Brazil and Colombia==
REDD+, originally introduced by the UNFCCC, is a market-based mechanism sitting within the VCM that aims to reverse the loss of forests and carbon stocks, specifically in developing countries. Simply put, an entity or an individual can voluntarily pay another that has engaged with REDD+ and subsequently sequestered carbon, to offset their own emissions using ‘credits’, sold as units of greenhouse gas equivalent to one ton of carbon dioxide (CO2e). Forestry and Land-Use remains to be the largest category of carbon credits traded by transaction volume on the VCM, with REDD+ being the most popular project type in this category, accounting for 78% of credits traded.<ref name=":0">Procton, A., (2024). ''State of the voluntary carbon market 2024: On the path to maturity.'' Forest Trends Ecosystem Marketplace.</ref> Furthermore, over one-third of the credits sold within this category were sourced from projects that had been implemented in LAC and the Caribbean in 2024.<ref name=":0" /> Of the four largest standards issuing carbon credits, Verra accounts for roughly 80% of issuances in Latin America,<ref>Pullins, T. (2022). Growth of carbon markets in Latin America. White & Case. [[/www.whitecase.com/publications/insight/latin-america-focus-fall-2022-growth-carbon-markets|https://www.whitecase.com/publications/insight/latin-america-focus-fall-2022-growth-carbon-markets]] </ref> and even in the face of recent scrutiny,<ref>West, T. A. P., Bofim, B., Haya, B. K. (2024). Methodological issues with deforestation baselines compromise the integrity of carbon offsets from REDD+. ''Global Environmental Change, 87'' [[/doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2024.102863|https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2024.102863]]</ref><ref>Wyburd I., & Dufrasne, G. (2023). Error Log: Exposing the methodological failures of REDD+ forestry projects. Carbon Market Watch. [[/carbonmarketwatch.org/publications/error-log-exposing-the-methodological-failures-of-redd-forestry-projects/|https://carbonmarketwatch.org/publications/error-log-exposing-the-methodological-failures-of-redd-forestry-projects/]]</ref><ref name=":15">Haya, B. K., Alford-Jones, K., Anderegg, W. R. L., Beymer-Farris, B., Blanchard, L., Bomfim, B., Chin, D., Evans, S., Hogan, M., Holm, J. A., McAfee, K., So, I. S., West, T. A. P., & Withey, L. (2023). ''Quality assessment of REDD+ carbon credit projects''. Berkeley Carbon Trading Project. [[/gspp.berkeley.edu/research-and-impact/centers/cepp/projects/berkeley-carbontrading-project/REDD+|https://gspp.berkeley.edu/research-and-impact/centers/cepp/projects/berkeley-carbontrading-project/REDD+]]</ref> REDD+ projects account for a significant proportion of the VCM with their continued application likely to persist.<ref>Gordon, O. (2022). ''The interwoven fortunes of carbon markets and indigenous communities.'' Energy Monitor. [[/www.energymonitor.ai/tech/carbon-removal/the-interwoven-fortunes-of-carbon-markets-and-indigenous-communities/|https://www.energymonitor.ai/tech/carbon-removal/the-interwoven-fortunes-of-carbon-markets-and-indigenous-communities/]]</ref><ref>Müller, M., Coustar, C., Bietta, F., Mathres, M. (2022). ''UNFCCC REDD+ and the power of sovereign carbon.'' Deutsche Banke Chief Investment Office. [[/www.rainforestcoalition.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/CIO-Special-UNFCCC-REDD-power-of-sovereign-carbon.pdf|https://www.rainforestcoalition.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/CIO-Special-UNFCCC-REDD-power-of-sovereign-carbon.pdf]]</ref><ref>Pullins, T. (2022). ''Growth of carbon markets in Latin America.'' White & Case. [[/www.whitecase.com/publications/insight/latin-america-focus-fall-2022-growth-carbon-markets|https://www.whitecase.com/publications/insight/latin-america-focus-fall-2022-growth-carbon-markets]] </ref> With the introduction of updated methodologies aimed at addressing these concerns,<ref>Verra (2023a). ''Setting the Standard: Verra’s Revolutionary New REDD Methodology.'' [[/verra.org/program-notice/setting-the-standard-verras-revolutionary-new-redd-methodology/|https://verra.org/program-notice/setting-the-standard-verras-revolutionary-new-redd-methodology/]]</ref><ref>Verra (2023b). ''VM0048 Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation, v1.0.'' [[/verra.org/methodologies/vm0048-reducing-emissions-from-deforestation-and-forest-degradation-v1-0/|https://verra.org/methodologies/vm0048-reducing-emissions-from-deforestation-and-forest-degradation-v1-0/]]</ref> there is hope for renewed buyer confidence in the integrity of this market,<ref>MSCI (2023). ''Verra’s New Methodology for Unplanned Deforestation Aims to Silence the Critics''. [[/www.msci.com/www/blog-posts/verra-s-new-methodology-for/04577808942|https://www.msci.com/www/blog-posts/verra-s-new-methodology-for/04577808942]]</ref> though more work still needs to be done.

Both Colombia and Brazil have a relatively long history of implementing REDD+ projects, using both fund-based and market-based mechanisms. For example, both countries were participants in the ‘Amazon Indigenous REDD+ (RIA in Spanish) initiative, with the first pilot implementation project being initiated in Colombia’s Puiawai Natural Reserve.<ref>Garzón, E., (2017). ''Amazon Indigenous REDD+: An innovative approach to conserve Colombian forests?'' Mongabay. [[/news.mongabay.com/2017/01/amazon-indigenous-redd-an-innovative-approach-to-conserve-colombian-forests/|https://news.mongabay.com/2017/01/amazon-indigenous-redd-an-innovative-approach-to-conserve-colombian-forests/]]</ref> The relevance of these two countries with respect to REDD+ is simple. Much of the Amazon’s primary tropical rainforest falls within these countries jurisdiction and this rainforest has been consistently under threat from external pressures and encroachment, whether that be in the form of land-clearing for commercial ranching, subsistence purposes, illicit drug production or illegal mining practices,<ref name=":8">Sánchez García, P. A. & Wong, G. Y., (2024) “The political economy of deforestation in the Colombian Amazon”, ''Journal of Political Ecology'' ''31''(1), 178–199. [[/doi.org/10.2458/jpe.5230|https://doi.org/10.2458/jpe.5230]]</ref><ref>Radwin, M. (2023). ''Drug trafficking fuels other deforestation drivers in the Amazon: report.'' Mongabay. [[/news.mongabay.com/2023/07/drug-trafficking-fuels-other-deforestation-drivers-in-the-amazon-report/|https://news.mongabay.com/2023/07/drug-trafficking-fuels-other-deforestation-drivers-in-the-amazon-report/]]</ref><ref>Haddad, E.A., Araújo, I.F., Feltran-Barbieri, R., Perobelli, F. S., Rocha, A., Sass, K. S., Nobre, C. A. (2024). Economic drivers of deforestation in the Brazilian Legal Amazon. ''Nat Sustain'' ''7'', 1141–1148. [[/doi.org/10.1038/s41893-024-01387-7|https://doi.org/10.1038/s41893-024-01387-7]] </ref><ref>Hänggli, A., Levy, S. A., Armenteras, D., Bovolo, C. I., Brandão, J., Rueda, X., & Garrett, R. D. (2023). A systematic comparison of deforestation drivers and policy effectiveness across the amazon biome. ''Environmental Research Letters, 18''(7), 073001. [[/doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/acd408|https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/acd408]]</ref> to name a few.

In theory, REDD+ can be used to provide the economic incentive to promote sustained environmental protection of Indigenous lands, with a focus on the rights and livelihoods of IPLCs. Currently the overall funding to IPLCs tenure rights and forest management in tropical countries is low, receiving just $270 million per year between 2011-2020 from bilateral and multilateral donors and private philanthropies.<ref>Hatcher, J., Owen, M., Yin, D., (2021). ''Falling short: Donor funding for Indigenous peoples and local communities to secure tenure rights and manage forests in tropical countries (2011 -2020).'' Rainforest Foundation Norway. [[/dv719tqmsuwvb.cloudfront.net/documents/Publikasjoner/Andre-rapporter/RFN Falling short 2021.pdf|https://dv719tqmsuwvb.cloudfront.net/documents/Publikasjoner/Andre-rapporter/RFN_Falling_short_2021.pdf]]</ref> REDD+ has the potential to channel funding as to promote Indigenous rights and autonomy, provided there is transparent and equitable benefit-sharing for those involved. Fundamentally, only with the inclusion of IPLC’s, or preferably with IPLC’s acting as project proponents, is REDD+ able to promote Indigenous agency and improve IPLC rights and governance. And only when the rights of those inhabiting the land are formally recognized can the land be effectively conserved.<ref name=":16">Reytar, K., Veit, P., von Braun, J. (2024). ''Protecting Biodiversity Hinges on Securing Indigenous and Community Land Rights.'' WRI. [[/www.wri.org/insights/indigenous-and-local-community-land-rights-protect-biodiversity|https://www.wri.org/insights/indigenous-and-local-community-land-rights-protect-biodiversity]]</ref> The inclusion of IPLCs in REDD+ project development is therefore considered to be essential for project success, and this is in theory embodied in the very nature of REDD+.<ref name=":1">Alvarez, G., Elfving, M. and Andrade, C. (2016) ‘REDD+ governance and indigenous peoples in Latin America: the case of Suruí Carbon Project in the Brazilian Amazon Forest’, ''Latin American J. Management for Sustainable Development 3''(2) pp.133–146. [[/dx.doi.org/10.1504/LAJMSD.2016.083705|10.1504/LAJMSD.2016.083705]]</ref> Partially owing to a long history of dealing with REDD+, Colombia and Brazil are amongst just a few of the countries hosting tropical rainforests that explicitly recognise community rights to carbon and tie these rights to the legal ownership of lands and forests. In Colombia, carbon rights are tied to rights of the land, whereas in Brazil carbon rights are tied to forest rights.<ref name=":2">RRI and McGill University (2021). Technical report: ''Status of legal recognition of Indigenous Peoples’, Local Communities’ and Afro-descendant Peoples’ rights to carbon stored in tropical lands and forests''. Rights and Resources Initiative. [[/doi.org/10.53892/MLQQ5744|https://doi.org/10.53892/MLQQ5744]]</ref>

==Brazil: The Suruí Forest Carbon Project==

=== Project description and location ===
The Surui Forest Carbon project was implemented in 2009 on the territory of the Surui people, which is situated in the southern part of Brazil’s Amazon between the states of Rondônia and Mato Grosso. Surui Indigenous territory covers an area of 2,481 km2, though the intention of the PCFS was to protect a portion of this total area. According to the PD, the stated objective was to “prevent 13,575.3 hectares of tropical forest from being cleared by 2038, to avoid the emission of 7,258,352.3 tCO2e to the atmosphere, and to contribute to the preservation of the Paiter Surui lifestyle and traditions.”<ref>IDESAM (2011). ''Project description: Surui forest carbon project''. Institute for Conservation and Sustainable Development of Amazonas. Link: "PROJ_DESC_1118_02FEB2012.PDF" found at [[/registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/1118|https://registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/1118]] </ref> This region sits within one of the Brazilian Amazon’s main ‘arcs of deforestation’ and pressure from loggers and ranchers is a matter of concern.

Notably, the PCFS was the first REDD+ project to be proposed by Indigenous peoples in the Brazilian Amazon on their own territory and was the first to receive certification by both the VCS and CCBS.<ref name=":1" />. Metareilá, the Surui’s own Indigenous association, acted as project proponent and the Institute for Conservation and Sustainable Development of Amazonas (IDESAM) assisted with project development, alongside multiple other stakeholder groups. As an endogenous initiative procured and conducted by the Surui community, the SFCP had a ‘non-centralized model of governance’, which reflected the characteristics and traditions of the Surui people. <ref name=":1" />

Only after two years of consultations between the 24 communities involved and the relevant governmental agencies (primarily FUNAI and the Ministry of Environment) was a Memorandum of Understanding signed, showing community consent to develop the project.<ref name=":3">Garcia, B., Rimmer, L., Canal Vieira, L., Mackey, B., (2021). REDD+ and forest protection on indigenous lands in the Amazon. ''RECIEL 30'', 207–219. [[/doi.org/10.1111/reel.12389|https://doi.org/10.1111/reel.12389]]</ref> In 2012 after verification from an independent third-party body, the Surui were able to sell carbon credits on the international market. Between 2009 and 2014 the project drastically helped limit the deforestation occurring within the project’s site, causing many to deem it a success.<ref name=":4">Howard, F. E., (2023). ''An Analysis of the Suruí Forest Carbon Project in Context of Settler Colonialism''. Masters thesis. Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University. [[/vtechworks.lib.vt.edu/server/api/core/bitstreams/b0cde6de-794c-453f-856b-ee72bde3db06/content|https://vtechworks.lib.vt.edu/server/api/core/bitstreams/b0cde6de-794c-453f-856b-ee72bde3db06/content]]</ref>

=== National climate targets, policies and legislation ===
Rates of deforestation in Brazil’s legal Amazon are significantly impacted by the government in charge. This is evidenced in the decade between 2012 and 2021 whilst under the conservative Bolsonaro administration, when deforestation in the Amazon increased 185% — from a loss of 4,571 km2 in 2012 to 13,038 km2 in 2021.<ref>INPE (2022). ''Observação da Terra. [[/www.obt.inpe.br/OBT/assuntos/programas/amazonia/prodes|http://www.obt.inpe.br/OBT/assuntos/programas/amazonia/prodes]]''</ref> However, since Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s appointment in 2022 there has been a steady decline in the rate of deforestation, which is now roughly half what it was in 2021.<ref>Terra Brasilis (2024). ''PRODES (deforestation): Deforestation rates – Legal Amazon – States''. [[/terrabrasilis.dpi.inpe.br/app/dashboard/deforestation/biomes/legal amazon/rates|https://terrabrasilis.dpi.inpe.br/app/dashboard/deforestation/biomes/legal_amazon/rates]]</ref> A significant proportion of emissions result from the clearing of rainforest and its subsequent conversion to ranching.<ref>MCTI (2022). ''Estimativas Anuais De Emissões De Gases De Efeito Estufa No Brasil.'' 6ª Edição. Ministério da Estado da Ciência, Tecnologia e Inovações. [[/www.gov.br/mcti/pt-br/acompanhe-o-mcti/sirene/publicacoes/estimativas-anuais-de-emissoes-gee/arquivos/6a-ed-estimativas-anuais.pdf|https://www.gov.br/mcti/pt-br/acompanhe-o-mcti/sirene/publicacoes/estimativas-anuais-de-emissoes-gee/arquivos/6a-ed-estimativas-anuais.pdf]]</ref> To address these emissions Brazil has implemented various adaptation policies, legislation and targets which are summarized below:
{| class="wikitable"
|'''Document name'''
|'''Type (target, policy or legislation)'''
|'''Publication year'''
|'''Key takeaways'''
|-
|National policy on climate change
|Policy
|2009
|
|-
|National Plan on Climate Change Adaptation
|Policy
|2016
|
|-
|GHG emissions target under Paris agreement: NDC update (2024*
|Target
|2024
|Reduce net greenhouse gas emissions by 59 to 67 percent below 2005 levels by 2035
|-
|?
|Target
|?
|Eliminate illegal deforestation in the Amazon by 2030 and restore 12 million hectares of degraded lands.

|-
|Federal Constitution of Brazil of 2006, Article 225
|
|
|The Amazon rainforest is considered as a ‘national heritage’ in Brazil and all levels of government have a shared responsibility to protect it and the environment (Federal Constitution of Brazil of 2006, Article 225).
|-
| colspan="4" |Relating to REDD+
|-
|Plan of Action for the Prevention and Control of Deforestation in the Legal Amazon (PPCDAM)
|
|2004
|
|-
|Forest code
|Policy
|2012
|No specific mention of REDD+
|-
|Amazon Indigenous REDD+ Initiative
|Policy
|2012
|
|-
|National REDD+ Strategy (ENREDD+)
|
|2016
|aims to eliminate deforestation, promote the conservation and restoration of forests, and enable a sustainable forestry economy. Specific objectives include monitoring and evaluating the impact of REDD+ policies, ensuring consistency between (federal, state and municipal) policies, and mobilizing capacity and resources for forest conservation and sustainable use. There is no explicit reference to REDD+ as a market-based mechanism in the VCM and REDD+ is defined under ENREDD+ as a funded-based mechanism
|}

=== Indigenous rights - Constitutional, tenure and bundle rights ===
In Brazil, Indigenous rights are robust and clearly defined according to the Brazilian Constitution. As a result, the Indigenous communities of the Brazilian Amazon have legal title to 13.8% of the national territory totalling 1.175 million km2, with a total of 631 territories.<ref>Federal government of Brazil (2024). ''Brazil’s NDC: National determination to contribute and transform''. [[/unfccc.int/sites/default/files/2024-11/Brazil Second Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) November2024.pdf|https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/2024-11/Brazil_Second%20Nationally%20Determined%20Contribution%20%28NDC%29_November2024.pdf]]</ref>
{| class="wikitable"
| colspan="3" |'''Laws'''
|-
|Article 231 of the 1988 Constitution
|indigenous peoples to have their exclusive right to use their territories to derive economic benefits

“Grants indigenous peoples the right to land, prohibits eviction, and restricts mining without authorization from the federal government.”

|
|-
|Indigenous Peoples statute (1973).

|No acts restricting the full exercise of indigenous peoples’ permanent tenure over the land should be permitted.

|
|-
| colspan="3" | '''(International) Treaties'''
|-
|United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2007)
|
|Requires States to obtain free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) for the approval of any projects affecting indigenous territories.
|-
|International Labour Organization Convention 169 (2019)
|
|Ratified ILO Convention No. 169, which was incorporated under domestic law through Decree 10.088/2019, and endorsed UNDRIP

Whilst the State retains ownership of mineral and other subsurface resources, governments must ensure consultation procedures, benefit-sharing and compensation for indigenous communities.*
|-
|Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention (1989)
|
|*?
|-
|American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2016)
|
|
|}
Whilst Indigenous communities in Brazil have legal title to land, it is the State that owns it. Indigenous people simply exercise permanent tenure over lands that they traditionally occupy and have ‘original rights’ to these traditional lands, which no other rights can prevail over.<ref name=":3" /> Indigenous lands, though not classified as protected areas, “have the highest level of protection by law because they are regulated by the Constitution” and cannot be leased or restricted without violating their original rights. The Suruí's right to develop the PCFS is grounded in the Brazilian Constitution, which grants Indigenous peoples exclusive rights to use the ‘riches of the soil, rivers and lakes’ of their land, and these rights cannot be overridden. Thus, Indigenous people and only Indigenous people are legally allowed to engage in productive activities on their land, provided these activities are conducted according to their own customs and traditions and are necessary for the wellbeing and cultural expression of their own people. In Brazil, it is the armed forces and federal police that are responsible for enforcing these laws, and FUNAI is responsible for representing Indigenous communities in judicial disputes.<ref name=":3" /> As such, provided a REDD+ does not violate the rights to territorial integrity, permanent land tenure and original rights, it is legally allowed.

'''CARBON RIGHTS:''' In Brazil, carbon rights are tied to forest rights.<ref name=":2" /> Carbon credits from REDD+ projects are seen as part of the economic benefits derived from indigenous lands, and as such, Indigenous communities are entitled to own, control and distribute these revenues themselves. The carbon credits generated from the (SFCP) were wholly owned by the Suruí people through Metareilá, with the Suruí Fund (managed by the Brazilian Biodiversity Fund - FUNBIO) acting as recipient. This legality reinforces Indigenous control over both land and carbon rights, as whoever has rights to the forest land is usually recognized as the owner of carbon rights.<ref name=":3" />

'''FPIC OBLIGATION:''' Furthermore, Brazilian law requires Free, Prior, and Informed Consent (FPIC) for REDD+ projects affecting indigenous lands, ensuring that international standards such as the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) and ILO Convention No. 169 are adhered to; Indigenous consent is, ''de jure,'' a necessity. Projects that violate these rights and fail to consult communities are therefore considered illegal. Notably there are no specific rules or procedures that have been written into the Brazilian constitution that provide guidance on how to achieve FPIC. This freedom reinforces Indigenous autonomy as it allows an Indigenous community to define the rules of consultation according to their customs and traditions.

Collectively these national and international laws provide an important safeguard to Indigenous peoples, making their consent a prerequisite for the establishment of REDD+ projects and recognizing their rights as the main beneficiaries of REDD+ revenues.<ref name=":3" /> However, as carbon rights are tied to forest rights in Brazil and not land rights, carbon is considered to be an ‘environmental service’ (Article 41(I)(A) Brazilian Forestry Code), and states, as well as the federal government, have the jurisdiction to exercise full legislative authority over carbon. <ref name=":2" /> As such, certain states have interpreted the law to imply that the title to carbon credits is attributable to the state.<ref>Loft, L., Ravikumar, A., Gebara, M. F., Pham, T. T., Resosudarmo, I. A. P., Assembe, S., Tovar, J. G., Mwangi, E., & Andersson, K. (2015). Taking Stock of Carbon Rights in REDD+ Candidate Countries: Concept Meets Reality. ''Forests'', ''6''(4), 1031-1060. [[/doi.org/10.3390/f6041031|https://doi.org/10.3390/f6041031]]</ref> Hence, even when carbon rights are clearly defined and tied to forest title it is insufficient in itself, and only by legally recognizing the customary rights of IPLCs can a fair and equitable outcome be realised.

=== Interested and affected stakeholders ===
{| class="wikitable"
| colspan="5" |'''Affected stakeholders'''
|-
|Stakeholders
|Primary objective(s)
|Secondary objective(s)
|Relative power
|Scope of influence
|-
|Metareilá Association of the Suruí Indigenous People
|<nowiki>- Project proponent</nowiki>

- Works to defend and preserve the cultural and territorial heritage of the Suruí people
|
|
|
|-
|Gãbgir Association of the Paiter Suruí Indigenous People
|Provide support to improve the quality and performance of schools in the TISS
|
|Low
|
|-
|Kabaney Association of the Forest People
|Supports the implementation of economic systems for the sustainable use of TISS‟ natural resources that meet the Paiter Suruí people's needs
|
|
|
|-
|Pamaur Association for the Protection of the Paiter Suruí People's Makor Clan
|Supporting the identification of more effective alternatives to address the health problems faced by the Paiter people
|
|
|
|-
|Yabner Gãbgir Forestry Institute of the Paiter Suruí people
|Encouraging the revitalization, strengthening and enhancement of traditional cultural property
|
|
|
|-
| colspan="5" |'''Interested stakeholders'''
|-
|Kanindé Association for Ethno-Environmental Defense – non-profit
|Responsible for the ethno-zoning of TISS. Coordination and organization of activities for Food Security and income generation, monitoring of biodiversity and socio-economic benefits
|
|
|
|-
|IDESAM - Institute for Conservation and Sustainable Development of Amazonas – non-profit NGO
|''Technical coordination''; - calculation of baseline scenario - preparation of Project Design Document (PDD) as well as the validation and verification to VCS and CCB standards. Coordination of biomass and carbon inventories and forest monitoring in support of the PCFS (remote sensing). Also supports policy and technical coordination related to REDD for the PCFS (p.9).
|
|
|
|-
|Forest Trends
|Supported formulation and implementation of the project. Raised funds
|
|
|International
|-
|Amazon Conservation Team - ACT Brazil
|Support to activities for food security and income generation, monitoring of biodiversity and socio-economic benefits, legal advice and communication to the project. Development of the Land Protection Plan, environmental monitoring and carbon stocks.
|
|
|
|-
|Brazilian Biodiversity Fund (FUNBIO)

|Responsible for the financial resources management mechanism generated by the Suruí forest carbon projects - Suruí Fund - and other income activities within the Management Plan.
|
|
|
|-
|Ministry of Environment (MMA)
|
|
|
|
|-
|Government of the State of Mato Grosso
|
|
|
|
|-
|Government of the State of Mato Grosso
|
|
|
|
|-
|National Indian Foundation (FUNAI)
|FUNAI does not necessarily need to take part in the governance of the project (Sales et al., 2010), but it should have formal knowledge of the direction and initiative proposals.

|
|
|National
|}

=== Discussion ===
Although originally successful in achieving its goal of reducing deforestation and degradation, in 2016 diamonds were discovered in Surui territory, leading to an increase in illegal logging and mining.<ref name=":1" /> By 2018 the project site had been completely overrun by ''garimpeiros'' (small-scale gold miners), ultimately leading to the projects suspension that year. <ref name=":4" />

While the project had initially garnered support, divisions emerged within the community post-project implementation. Disputes arose over the unequal distribution of project revenues, leading to internal conflicts between different Suruí clans. These criticisms escalated in 2014 when the Catholic Indigenous Missionary Council supported calls for an end to the project due to mismanagement of revenues from carbon credit sales. <ref name=":3" /> Some Suruí members also argued that the REDD+ initiative harmed their way of life.<ref>Lang, C. (2014). ''“What are projects for that destroy life?” Interview with Henrique Suruí about the Paiter-Suruí REDD project, Brazil.'' REDD-Monitor. [[/redd-monitor.org/2014/12/17/what-are-projects-for-that-destroy-life-interview-with-henrique-surui-about-the-paiter-surui-redd-project-brazil/|https://redd-monitor.org/2014/12/17/what-are-projects-for-that-destroy-life-interview-with-henrique-surui-about-the-paiter-surui-redd-project-brazil/]]</ref>

Further complicating the situation was the controversial role of Henrique Suruí, one of the Suruí tribal leaders. In 2011, it was revealed that Henrique had violated the tribe's logging moratorium, collaborating with loggers in illegal activities. While Henrique later denied responsibility for the project’s failure, his actions, combined with internal disagreements, illustrated the lack of consensus within the Suruí leadership on the project’s goals and outcomes. Both of the tribe’s leaders possessed dramatically different perspectives on how they believed they could ensure agency, autonomy, and economic benefits for the Suruí people.<ref name=":4" /> This fragmentation within the community, in combination with the discovery of diamonds and the state's failure to protect indigenous land rights led to the indefinite suspension of the REDD+ project.

The project's collapse highlights broader structural issues, particularly the state's inconsistent support for indigenous land rights, influenced by settler colonialism, which undermined the project’s long-term viability.<ref name=":4" /> Additionally, the project’s creation was shaped by external actors, including the collaboration between Almir Suruí and Borges from Forest Trends, a Washington-based NGO. This partnership introduced a Western perspective on viewing the Suruí peoples forest, in contrast with their own perspectives on land use and governance. Furthermore, despite Borges’ Brazilian background, the power dynamics between a global North organization and a developing, Indigenous community were apparent.

=== Summary ===
The Suruí Forest Carbon Project provides an interesting example of how, even when the rights of IPLC’s are relatively robust, challenges persist in ensuring REDD+ project longevity. As such, in its current state, REDD+ in the Brazilian Amazon may not be a suitable market-based option for indigenous communities in the Amazon.<ref name=":3" /> Although initially successful in promoting indigenous autonomy and reducing deforestation, the project resulted in failure due to of a myriad of factors. Division between Surui communities was exacerbated by a perceived unequal benefit-sharing, and the impact of imposing REDD+ seems to have complicated the traditional social structure that the Surui were dependent on. These issues were influenced by Brazil's settler state dynamics, where indigenous land rights, although legally recognized, are often not upheld in practice due to insufficient enforcement.<ref name=":4" /> Ultimately, the Surui project reveals how settler colonialism's structural flaws make long-term project success difficult, despite initial progress in promoting indigenous autonomy.

At the national and state level, complex institutional and legal land governance structures convolute and impede REDD+ in Brazil. Multiple institutions share responsibilities and there is no comprehensive, authoritative database of land ownership, which hampers efforts to protect indigenous territories.<ref name=":5">Costa, R. (2016)''. Insecure land rights in Brazil: Consequences for rural areas and challenges for improvement.'' Climate Policy Initiative. [[/www.climatepolicyinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/Insecure Land Rights in Brazil CPI.pdf|https://www.climatepolicyinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/Insecure_Land_Rights_in_Brazil_CPI.pdf]]</ref> As a result, land tenure disputes remain common and can be witnessed occurring between the public as well between public and state actors. For example, Brazil’s 1964 Land Statute (Law No. 4504) allows the government to takeover unproductive farms and transfer those lands to landless peasants. This often results in the clearing of forest, as only when the land is cleared is it evidenced to be ‘productive’.<ref name=":5" /> Hence, not only does this law cause insecurity for Indigenous populations in Brazil, it also forces them to go against customary traditions of stewarding the land in an effort to maintain its control.

Whilst the aforementioned points to the futility of REDD+ in Brazil, there is reason to maintain optimism. In a recent landmark ruling Brazil’s supreme court voted in favour of the Xoleng peoples, and the decision will serve as a precedent for all cases involving Indigenous peoples.<ref name=":6">Amos-Flom, K., (2023). ''Triumph and Turmoil: The Xokleng Case and the Future of Indigenous Land Rights in Brazil.'' Columbia Journal of Transnational Law. [[/www.jtl.columbia.edu/bulletin-blog/triumph-and-turmoil-the-xokleng-case-and-the-future-of-indigenous-land-rights-in-brazil|https://www.jtl.columbia.edu/bulletin-blog/triumph-and-turmoil-the-xokleng-case-and-the-future-of-indigenous-land-rights-in-brazil]]</ref> The Xokleng’s land dispute, settled in 2023, “rejected Santa Catarina state’s marco temporal (“time limit”) argument, which would have required Indigenous people to prove they occupied or legally contested the territory they claimed before the Brazilian Constitution came into force in 1988. If successful, this argument would have led to disastrous repercussions, as many indigenous peoples had been forcibly removed or are traditionally nomadic.”<ref name=":6" /> Evidently, whilst slow, progress has been made in Brazil in recent years with respect to Indigenous rights as well as the voluntary carbon market itself.

There are currently 159 AFOLU projects listed on the Verra database in Brazil, with only two specifically focused on REDD+ initiatives in collaboration with Indigenous groups. These are the Ka’a Pyahu project, <ref>Verra (n.d.) ''Project 5087: KA'A PYAHU.'' https://registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/5087</ref> initiated by the Guajajara Indigenous people in collaboration with external organizations and validated in 2021, and the ‘Together for the forest Awaete REDD+ project’<ref>Verra (n.d.) ''Project 5200: TOGETHER FOR THE FOREST AWAETÉ REDD+ PROJECT.'' https://registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/5200</ref> which is still under development. Both projects involve Indigenous groups working with Brazilian organizations to build technical capacity and expertise. This could signal a growing trend of Indigenous-led REDD+ projects in the future. To ensure a positive future for REDD+ in Brazil, the customary rights of IPLC’s must be formally recognized. IPLC should have legal ownership of their traditional lands, and in doing so the carbon rights of these communities would be less convoluted, leading to more equitable benefit-sharing and increased cohesion amongst these groups post-project implementation.

==Colombia: ''REDD+ project Resguardo Indigena Unificado - Selva de Mataven (RUI-SM)''==

=== '''Project description and location''' ===
According to the PD,<ref name=":7">ACATISEMA & Mediamos (2017). ''Joint project description and monitoring report: REDD+ project: Resguardo Indigena Unificado – Selva de Mataven (RIU – SM).'' Link: “10 06 2017_VCS Final Report_ Matavin Project.pdf” found at [[/registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/1566|https://registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/1566]]</ref> the Resguardo Indígena Unificado – Selva de Matavén (RIU-SM) project is located east of the Colombian Orinoco high plain, in the eastern part of the Department of Vichada, municipality of Cumaribo. It resides on the formalized resguardo of the Sikuani, Piaroa, Puinave, Curripaco, Cubeo and Piapoco ethnic groups, spanning 1,856,836 hectares, with 1,477,115 hectares (79.6%) being forested. The project states that it will reduce greenhouse gas emissions, with a total estimated net reduction of 108,670,562 tons of CO2 equivalent over thirty years, from years 2013 – 2042. By this metric, it is the 14th largest project on the Verra registry, out of over 1700 projects.<ref name=":9">Dufrasne, D., (2021). ''Two Shades of Green: How hot air forest credits are being used to avoid carbon taxes in Colombia''. Carbon Market Watch. [[/carbonmarketwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Two-shades-of-green EN WEB.pdf|https://carbonmarketwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Two-shades-of-green_EN_WEB.pdf]]</ref> There are 12,312 indigenous people living in the RIU-SM, belonging to 2,517 families and 250 communities as of 2017.

The project was initiated by the Asociación de Cabildos y Autoridades Indígenas de la Selva de Matavén (ACETISMA), an Indigenous association, and developed by MEDIAMOS F&M, a Colombian consultancy firm. ACETISMA is comprised of Indigenous leaders that represent the 17 communities of the reservation in charge of governing the territory, and it has administrative autonomy, as well as “the capacity to acquire, to own and to dispose of property, to accept donations, to hold national and international conventions, scientific and cultural exchanges and generally, to celebrate all kinds of negotiations and agreements with which the Association can achieve its objectives.”<ref name=":7" />

There is a stated focus on various means of improving the living conditions of the Indigenous peoples living within the project area. To summarise, the main objectives of the REDD+ project RIU-SM include:

· Community development, in the form of improved education.

· Community engagement with respect to the project; developing information channels to reveal project progress.

· Support local initiatives for environmental education and waste management.

· Developing an effective response system that addresses community proposals and concerns relating to the project.

· Strengthening the governance of ACATISEMA.

=== National climate targets, policies and legislation ===
The Colombian Amazon makes up over one-third of Colombia’s national territory, and up until 2005 only 7.3% of the Colombian Amazon had been deforested, largely due to the country's 60-year armed conflict between the government, multiple left-wing guerillas such as FARC, and several far-right paramilitary groups.<ref name=":8" /> However, following the signing of the Peace Treaty in 2016 and demobilization of the FARC, limits to deforestation were weakened in the Colombian Amazon. Poor but opportunistic peasants began to encroach into previously unchartered territory and capitalize from the rainforest. Due to the poor economic integration of the Amazon, many were forced to engage with the traditional economies of cocoa and cattle ranching, as these markets were already well connected to regional and global markets.<ref name=":8" /> To address the drivers of deforestation and its associated emissions, the federal government has implemented various initiatives, which are summarized below:
{| class="wikitable"
|'''Document name'''
|'''Type'''
|'''Publication year'''
|'''Key takeaways'''
|-
|Nationally Determined Contribution(s)
|Target
|2020
|Reduce GHG emissions by 51 % by 2030 and net-zero by 2050
|-
|National Climate Change Policy (PNCC)
|Policy
|2018
|Address climate change and foster sustainable development
|-
|National Forest Conservation Program
|Policy
|2011
|Address deforestation
|-
|Law 1931 of 2018 – Climate Change Law

|Legislation
|2018
|Establishes the framework for addressing climate change
|-
| colspan="4" |'''Relating to REDD+:'''
|-
|National Strategy for Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (ENREDD+)
|Initiative
|2009
|Particular focus on the Amazon and Choco rainforests
|-
|Amazon Indigenous REDD+ Initiative
|Initiative
|2016
|Respect Indigenous rights. FPIC focus.
|-
|BIOREDD+ program
|Initiative
|2012
|Portfolio of 8 REDD+ projects in four geographic nodes covering over 700,000 hectares in the Colombian Pacific.

|-
|Vision Amazonia
|Initiative
|2015
|Part of the REDD+ strategy, financed by three foreign countries: Germany, Norway and United Kingdom
|}
As a result of the many fund and market-based initiatives that Colombia has engaged with, it hosts the second most REDD+ projects in the world. REDD+ projects now cover at least 56% of the area of legally recognized Indigenous territories in the Colombian Amazon, with an overwhelming majority of carbon projects located on Indigenous territories.<ref name=":10">Schmid, D., & Castro. C., (2023). ''REDD+ projects in the Colombian Amazon: Social challenges and lack of transparency''. Rainforest Foundation Norway. [[/dv719tqmsuwvb.cloudfront.net/documents/REDD rapport 2024 ENG.pdf|https://dv719tqmsuwvb.cloudfront.net/documents/REDD_rapport_2024_ENG.pdf]]</ref> Evidently REDD+ plays an integral part in the country’s efforts of environmental conservation, and incentives have been introduced to promote the development of such projects. For example, in 2016 the government adopted a higher tax that covered fossil fuels, but companies are able to avoid paying the tax by investing in carbon offsets that have been generated domestically.<ref name=":9" /> This led to a boost in the domestic REDD+ market in 2017, as Colombian companies invested as to escape higher taxes. Notably, 23 of the 36 REDD+ projects currently under development in the Amazon region were initiated in or after 2018.<ref name=":10" /> Currently Colombia’s REDD+ program sits at over 45 pilot and voluntary carbon projects, as well as one large-scale jurisdictional approach in the Amazon.<ref name=":11">Zambrano-Cortés, D. G. (2024). ''The politics, spaces and subjects of forest conservation in Colombia''. [internal PhD, WU, Wageningen University]. Wageningen University. [[/doi.org/10.18174/675328|https://doi.org/10.18174/675328]]</ref>

=== Indigenous rights - Constitutional, tenure and bundle rights ===
''De jure'', the Indigenous peoples of Colombia have comprehensive tenure and bundle rights that have been articulated in the national constitution. Collective land titles are granted to Indigenous communities by the Colombian government, and as a result about 34 percent of Colombian land (almost 38 million hectares) is legally recognized as Indigenous territory or collective lands of Afro-descendent communities.<ref name=":10" /> These collective land tenure rights have been in effect since the implementation of the 1991 constitution, granting them the authority to exercise legal control over their territories in accordance with their own customs and procedures.<ref>Max Planck Institute (n.d.) ''Colombia 1991 (rev. 2015).'' Institute. [[/www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Colombia 2015|https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Colombia_2015]]</ref> Furthermore, the carbon rights of Indigenous peoples are explicitly defined in the constitution and tied specifically to the ownership of land of the communities.<ref name=":2" /> This in theory provides a solid legal basis for upholding the rights of Indigenous communities in Colombia, specifically relating to REDD+ activities, as it allows communities to define and negotiate the terms of said projects. A summary of the various laws relating to Indigenous rights have been summarized below:
{| class="wikitable"
| colspan="2" |'''Law (1991 constitution)'''
|-
|Article 63

|Indigenous territories are considered collective property. Land is not owned by individuals but is shared by the community. The state must respect these collective rights and cannot alter land ownership without the consent of the Indigenous peoples.
|-
|Article 76 - ''Consulta previa''.
|Pertains to the right of Indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities; prior consultation must be undertaken before any entity undertakes activities that may affect their territories, culture, or way of life.
|-
|Article 330
|Indigenous communities have the right to govern their territories.
|-
|Article 329
|The Reservation is a collective, inalienable, and indefeasible property.
|-
|Decree 1386 of 1994, Article 10; Decree 2164 of 1995, Article 22) 39.
|"The administration and management of these lands are subjected to uses and customs of the beneficiaries."
|}
Whilst land and tenure rights are enshrined into the constitution, the precariousness of these rights persists due to a lack of resources to ensure enforcement, as well as the deeper issue of corruption. As previously stated, the rate of deforestation increased significantly in Colombia’s post-conflict era, evidencing the nations inability to maintain control over unlawful acts of land-grabbing and disposition. Whilst this began with new peasants converting the Amazon for subsistence purposes, it ultimately led to new areas for the growth of cocoa, much to the benefit of narco-traffickers who could monopolize on this illegal surplus in ‘accumulation by dispossession’.<ref name=":8" />

With respect to the legalities of consultation, Colombia has enshrined ''consulta previa'' into the constitution. Translating to ‘prior consultation’, this legal text provides the formal grounds for Indigenous engagement when any legislative or administrative measures are implemented on Indigenous territory. Importantly, consultation should be achieved in accordance with the customs of the ethnic group with which the project is being imposed upon. However, there have been recent cases of contestation specifically relating to how ''consulta previa'' applies to REDD+ on Indigenous lands, and the RIU – SM project was one that was involved with such a case.

=== Affected and interested stakeholders ===
{| class="wikitable"
| colspan="5" |'''Affected stakeholders'''
|-
|Stakeholders
|Primary objective(s)
|Secondary objective(s)
|Relative power
|Scope of influence
|-
|ACATISEMA - Asociación de Cabildos y Autoridades Indígenas de la Selva de Matavén
|
* Foster the integral development, social and cultural preservation of the indigenous communities in the Mataven Jungle and to
* Consolidate the territory, selfgovernment by partners, the defense, conservation and preservation of the environment and biodiversity of the Mataven Jungle

|
|It is the highest authority in the reservation.
|
|-
|Indigenous ''resguardos'' of the RIU-SM
|
* Primary and direct beneficiaries
* Seek to maintain land rights
* Promote traditional and cultural beliefs
|
|
|
|-
|Colonists
|
|
|
|
|-
| colspan="5" |'''Interested stakeholders'''
|-
|MEDIAMOS F&M – A consultancy
|Project developer
|
|
|
|-
|Mining companies
|Compete with the Project for the territory's resources.
|
|
|
|-
|Ministerio de Ambiente y Desarrollo Sostenible
|Its main interest is to achieve environmental planning, through the consolidation of a policy of sustainable development and strategic alliances with social and institutional participants in different sectoral and territorial scenarios.
|
|
|
|-
|Dirección de Asuntos Indígenas, ROM y Minorías - Ministerio del Interior
|Public agency that advises the national level, prepares and proposes the formulation of public policy in favor of indigenous peoples within the framework of the defense, support, reinforcement and consolidation of ethnic and cultural rights.
|
|
|
|-
|Corporinoquía
|Regional environmental authority to ensure the proper use of natural resources in their area of jurisdiction.
|
|
|
|-
|Other government institutions: Governor ofice of Vichada, Mayor ofice Cumaribo
|The Reservation for being part of the Cumaribo, Vichada, has territorial jurisdiction relations with the Governor’s office and the Mayor’s office.
|
|
|
|-
|Fundación NATURA
|Civil organization whose mission is the conservation, use and management of biodiversity to generate social, economic and environmental benefits in the context of sustainable human development.
|
|
|
|-
|FONDO ACCIÓN
|Colombian non-profit organization in the private scheme. Encourage the participation of civil society and the private sector in the implementation of the country’s public policies in two areas: - Conservation and sustainable development; and protection -development of children.
|
|
|
|-
|SENA, Department of Social Prosperity (DPS), NGOs and private consultants
|Supporting the implementation of rural development activities.
|
|
|Regional
|-
|Other indigenous communities neighboring RIU-SM
|
|
|Low
|Local
|-
|Financial institutions
|They fund local development activities.
|
|
|
|-
|Asocarbono – An industry association, including Verra, ProClima, Biofix, and ACATISEMA.

|
|
|
|
|-
|OPIAC: the National Oganization of the Indigenous Peoples of the Colombian Amazon

|
|
|
|
|}

=== Discussion ===
According to the official REDD+ Mataven website<ref>RIU – SM (n.d.). ''REDD+ Mataven''. [[/reddmataven.com/|https://reddmataven.com/]]</ref> the project has resulted in a myriad of benefits to the Indigenous communities of the region. For example, as a result of the funds generated from the projects activities, there have been improvements in infrastructure, transportation and education, ultimately leading to the empowerment and improved governance of ACETISMA. However, the project has come under fire for multiple reasons.

For one, in 2015 some of the Indigenous communities filed a lawsuit referring to the violation of their right to ''consulta previa''. However, the court ruled that their Indigenous rights had not been violated as it was ACETISMA that initially sought MEDIAMOS to develop the project, and that ACETISMA were the best representatives of those Indigenous communities. Furthermore, the projects main focus was the conservation of the rainforest and therefore did not threaten the cultural integrity of those communities.<ref name=":10" /> However, regardless of the outcome of this case, its occurrence points to internal disagreement amongst Indigenous participants of the RIU-SM project. In a study involving interviews with Indigenous members of the project, there was a significant proportion of interviewees that had little knowledge regarding various aspects of the project, such as responsibilities of participation, or the benefit-sharing mechanism in place.<ref name=":2" /> This further reinforces the point that, in the case of the RIU-SM project it may not be ‘bottom-up’ and eludes to the power imbalance experienced between Mediamos, the project developer, and Indigenous community members. In the PD there is a breakdown of the distribution of income between ACETISMA and Mediamos, which shows a significant proportion of revenue flowing to the former organisation throughout the project’s operations.<ref name=":7" /> However, there is currently no publicly available documentation supporting this initial claim<ref name=":9" /> as there is no obligation to provide this information, leading to a general lack of transparency in the market and between all of the relevant actors. Subsequent meetings with Indigenous leaders have however shown a marked support of the Mataven project, with one Indigenous leader explicitly stating “...the Redd+ project has brought resources that they never had before, which allowed them to open new school classrooms, 21 rural aqueducts, cocoa crops and even headquarters in Cumaribo and Inírida.”<ref>Lievano, A. B. (2021) Colombia's biggest carbon credit project could be selling hot air. Latin American Center for Investigative Journalism. [[/www.elclip.org/el-mayor-proyecto-de-bonos-de-carbono-de-colombia-podria-estar-vendiendo-aire-caliente/|https://www.elclip.org/el-mayor-proyecto-de-bonos-de-carbono-de-colombia-podria-estar-vendiendo-aire-caliente/]] </ref> Clearly there have been benefits for IPLC’s involved with this project, though the details of this benefit-sharing remain a mystery.

Secondly, the Mataven project has caused controversy due to its apparently inflated carbon credit issuance. The report states that this has been achieved by using a reference area that is not representative of the project area, as well as assuming an uncharacteristically heigh assumed rate of deforestation.<ref name=":12">Global Atlas of Environmental Justice (2023). ''Resguardo Indigena Unificado-Selva de Matavén (RIU SM) REDD+ Project, Colombia.'' [[/ejatlas.org/conflict/redd-project-resguardo-indigena-unificado-selva-de-mataven-riu-sm|https://ejatlas.org/conflict/redd-project-resguardo-indigena-unificado-selva-de-mataven-riu-sm]]</ref> The project used a baseline deforestation rate of 0.86% per year, which is significantly more than the Colombian government's national rate of 0.18%. Additionally, according to the report the reference area chosen is more easily accessed and therefore more prone to deforestation, making it an inaccurate comparison to the relatively remote project area.<ref name=":2" /> This has led to the creation of excess carbon credits, or “hot air” credits, which have been criticized for not reflecting real environmental benefits.<ref name=":9" /> To add further insult to injury these credits have been used by a Colombian fossil fuel distributor company to avoid paying taxes, as described earlier by Colombia’s change in policy in 2017. In doing so, the company avoided paying approximately $18.9 million in taxes.<ref name=":2" /> There has been subsequent back and forth between Verra and Carbon Market Watch, with Verra refuting the claims<ref>Verra (2021). ''Carbon Market Watch Report on Colombian REDD+ Projects Contains Flawed Allegations.'' [[/verra.org/carbon-market-watch-report-on-colombian-redd-projects-contains-flawed-allegations/|https://verra.org/carbon-market-watch-report-on-colombian-redd-projects-contains-flawed-allegations/]] </ref> Regardless of the science, Colombia recently introduced a resolution in 2018 (Resolution 1447 – 2018) that requires projects to use baselines that comply with national reference levels.<ref name=":13">Dufrasne, D. (2021b). Companies use ”hot air” forestry offsets to avoid taxes in Colombia: Carbon Market Watch’s fact-check of Verra’s response. Carbon Market Watch. [[/carbonmarketwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/CMWs-fact-check-of-Verras-response-on-Colombia.pdf|https://carbonmarketwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/CMWs-fact-check-of-Verras-response-on-Colombia.pdf]]</ref><ref>IEA (2022). ''Resolution 1447 – 2018. Monitoring, Reporting, and Verification System for mitigation actions at the national level.'' International Energy Agency. [[/www.iea.org/policies/14772-resolution-1447-2018-monitoring-reporting-and-verification-system-for-mitigation-actions-at-the-national-level|https://www.iea.org/policies/14772-resolution-1447-2018-monitoring-reporting-and-verification-system-for-mitigation-actions-at-the-national-level]]</ref> Going forward, REDD+ projects that are being implemented in Colombia will have to abide by Colombia’s national legislation.

=== Summary ===
Colombia has a long history of engaging in REDD+ as it has been used to limit environmental degradation in the post-conflict era, in alignment with the country’s national peacebuilding agenda.<ref name=":11" /> Owing to the country’s comprehensive tenure and bundle rights, IPLC’s have robust ''de jure'' rights to land as they collectively own it, and rights to carbon are tied to this ownership. This puts Colombia as one of the world leaders in legal terms relating to REDD+ project implementation, but due to a lack of resources to ensure enforcement, as well as corruption, historically these laws have not been adhered to.<ref name=":10" /><ref name=":2" /> There are many documented cases showing the displacement on IPLC’s from traditional lands, poor efforts to adhere to ''consulta previa'', and inequitable benefit sharing.<ref>Greenfield, P. (2023''). The ‘carbon pirates’ preying on Amazon’s Indigenous communities.'' The Guardian. [[/www.theguardian.com/environment/2023/jan/21/amazon-indigenous-communities-carbon-offsetting-pirates-aoe|https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2023/jan/21/amazon-indigenous-communities-carbon-offsetting-pirates-aoe]]</ref><ref name=":14">Lang, C., (2024). ''Colombia’s Constitutional Court rules in favour of Indigenous Peoples. Identifies serious flaws in the REDD+ Baka Rokarire project.'' REDD_Monitor. [[/reddmonitor.substack.com/p/colombias-constitutional-court-rules|https://reddmonitor.substack.com/p/colombias-constitutional-court-rules]]</ref>

The case of the Mataven project provides an interesting example of how it is the market itself that is failing to address concerns regarding transparency, whether that be relating to benefit-sharing amongst relevant stakeholders, or Indigenous representation and engagement throughout the implementation of REDD+ projects. Some ACATISEMA members have explicitly stated their support for the Mataven project,<ref name=":12" /> and its benefits can be seen first-hand in the form of improved infrastructure in local communities involved with the project.<ref>Myers, J. E., Parra, M. A., Bedford, C. (2021). ''How Carbon Offsetting Can Build a Forest.'' Stanford Social Innovation Review. [[/ssir.org/articles/entry/how carbon offsetting can build a forest|https://ssir.org/articles/entry/how_carbon_offsetting_can_build_a_forest]]</ref> However, an exact breakdown of how and where revenue is being distributed to IPLC’s remains elusive.<ref name=":13" /> Furthermore, the level of IPLC engagement has come into question, specifically with reference to ''consulta previa'' and the overall understanding that IPLC’s have regarding the project’s intended outcomes and activities.<ref name=":10" /> This is not a rare case in Colombia and has been witnessed occurring with other projects that have been implemented on Indigenous territories in the Colombian Amazon.<ref name=":17">Lang, C., (2023''). “It destroys everything,” says Indigenous leader about the REDD+ Baka Rokarire project in Colombia''. REDD Monitor. [[/reddmonitor.substack.com/p/it-destroys-everything-says-indigenous|https://reddmonitor.substack.com/p/it-destroys-everything-says-indigenous]]</ref> However, a recent ruling by the Colombian Constitutional court voted in favour of Indigenous groups in Colombia, upholding “the rights to self-determination, autonomy, self-government, territory, identity, physical and cultural integrity, and free, prior and informed consent of the indigenous communities”.<ref name=":14" /> This review ultimately sets a legal precedent safeguarding the fundamental rights of IPLCs with REDD+ project implementation and shows that progress is being made to improve the likelihood that REDD+ will result in genuine benefits to those affected by project implementation.

To ensure a more authentic engagement with IPLC’s as to result in legitimate and equitable benefit-sharing, improvements must be made by the Colombian government, as well as within the VCM itself. For the former, Colombia’s national registry for GHG mitigation activities must be updated; it has been offline since 2022.<ref name=":10" /> As a result, transparency is lacking. International finance could be utilized as to alleviate this issue, and only with an accurate and reliable database may the market be regulated. In the broader sense, VCM registries must create stricter guidelines promoting transparency. Often PD’s refer to annexed documents that contain relevant information regarding benefit-sharing, though these are often not publicly available.<ref name=":9" /> This limits transparency and increases the likelihood of inequitable agreements being made between project proponents and developers, further exacerbating existing power asymmetries between the two groups and limiting the likelihood that ''consulta previa'' is honestly adhered to.<ref name=":10" /> This has led to conflict within Indigenous communities, rather than a strengthening of their social fabric.

Furthermore, the Mataven project calls into question the actual emissions reduction that REDD+ projects achieve. Whilst Colombia has since updated its regulations such that REDD+ must use baselines that comply with national reference levels, it is up in the air as to how representative these guidelines are. Reference areas must represent project areas and without the appropriate regulations in place project developers lack the incentive to create realistic baselines; ultimately they are aiming to produce the maximum number of credits as to generate the greatest possible revenues.

==Conclusion==
As a market-based mechanism, REDD+ is shackled by the construct in which it operates; fundamentally it is a capitalist means of fixing a capitalist problem, which comes with limitations. Both Brazil and Colombia have relatively robust laws that have been written into the constitution, ultimately promoting more equitable results of project implementation. However, as in Colombia IPLC’s collectively own the land, whereas in Brazil these groups only own rights to use the land,<ref name=":2" /> Colombia can be considered better equipped for the establishment of REDD+ projects on traditional Indigenous territory. However, even with these laws in place enforcement remain a matter of concern. Furthermore, given the wide variety of ontological and epistemological perspectives of Indigenous communities, and how these views conflict with the Western worldview from which market-based REDD+ came to fruition, there is an inherent difficulty in implementing a system of governance in REDD+ on Indigenous lands.<ref name=":1" />. Putting a price on nature conflicts with Indigenous perspectives and there have been instances where this has attacked the social and cultural fabric of IPLC’s.<ref name=":17" /> To avoid this REDD+ developers must have the genuine intent of understanding the perspective of the Indigenous group they are working with and aim to implement REDD+ with a bottom-up approach.

In both countries, transparency must be improved to ensure that FPIC is adhered to and subsequently ensure fair IPLC representation and engagement. This issue predominantly arises due to the poor requirements of standards in the VCM. As such, proponents are guided by developers which have little incentive to truly act in the interests of Indigenous groups; ultimately the organizations in charge of project development are interested in increasing project revenues. This has led to instances of over-crediting, as without a transparent framework in which to operate it is difficult to evaluate the legitimacy of the claims being made by project proponents and developers. However, with recent advances that address concerns of additionality<ref name=":15" /> there is hope for improved market integrity. Standards of the VCM must continue to be scrutinized to ensure that progress continues to be made.

Going forward, progress should be made to formalize the customary laws and traditional lands of IPLCs, and finance should be directed towards the enforcement of these laws. The environmental,<ref name=":16" /> economic,<ref name=":5" /><ref>Ding, H., Veit, P. G., Blackman, A., Gray, E., Reytar, K., Altamirano, J. C., Hodgdon, B., (2016). ''Climate benefits, tenure costs: The economic case for securing Indigenous land rights in the Amazon''. WRI. [[/files.wri.org/d8/s3fs-public/Climate Benefits Tenure Costs Executive Summary.pdf|https://files.wri.org/d8/s3fs-public/Climate_Benefits_Tenure_Costs_Executive_Summary.pdf]]</ref> and social<ref>Sarmiento Barletti, J. P., Heise Vigil, N., & Larson, A. M. (2023). ''Safeguards at a glance: Are voluntary standards supporting community land, resource and carbon rights?'' CIFOR-ICRAF. [[/www.cifor-icraf.org/publications/pdf files/Flyer/REDD-Safeguards-7.pdf|https://www.cifor-icraf.org/publications/pdf_files/Flyer/REDD-Safeguards-7.pdf]] </ref> benefits of this have been researched and are well understood. By developing culturally appropriate frameworks for rights-based conservation regimes, that work with IPLCs in accordance with their worldviews, REDD+ could be used to promote Indigenous autonomy. However, progress still must be made to achieve this goal.

==References==

Documentation:Open Case Studies/FRST522/2024/REDD+ in Indigenous Amazonia: What works and what doesn’t?

2024-12-12T22:18:50Z

ConnorHaynes: /* National climate targets, policies and legislation */

__TOC__

==Positionality==
First and foremost I am not Indigenous, and whilst there are a myriad of cultures, ontologies and epistemologies that are not sufficiently represented by simply stating ‘Indigenous’, it is commonly accepted that these worldviews are vastly different to those of the ‘Western’ world, which is the world in which I grew up and matured. I am therefore only understanding of Indigenous cultures, beliefs and customary laws based upon available online literature and those which I have learnt through life, in addition to those introduced to me in my Master’s degree. As such, I will never be able to fully relate to an Indigenous person; the best I can do is try to understand and learn. Only throughout this process am I able to work towards reconciliation and attempt to address the inequities experienced by Indigenous folk globally.

Additionally, I am yet to act as a carbon project proponent and so do not understand the nuances or stresses of undertaking such a task. Whilst an individual proponent may have the best intention of procuring a carbon project for its social and environmental benefits, there are a number of stakeholders involved throughout the entire process which influence its eventual outcome. Without experience acting as a project proponent I am naïve in understanding the process and it's difficulties.

==Acronyms / Terminology==
'''Acronyms:'''

AFOLU: Agriculture, Forestry and Other Land-Use

ICVCM: Integrity Council for the Voluntary Carbon Market

IPLC: Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities

KMGBF: Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework

LAC: Latin American Countries

MRV: Monitoring, Reporting and Verification

REDD+: Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation

UNCBD: United Nations Convention on Biological Biodiversity

VCMI: Voluntary Carbon Markets Integrity Initiative

'''Terminology:'''

''Additionality:'' Additionality is the determination of whether the project will lead to the expected outcomes when compared to the baseline or ‘business as usual’ emissions.

''Leakage'': Refers to the shifting of emissions to outside the project boundary as a result of the project’s activities.

''Permanence:'' Permanence refers to the degree to which a carbon credit is equivalent to a permanent removal or reduction in emissions.
==Abstract==
This case study illustrates two examples of Indigenous-led REDD+ projects on Indigenous territory in Colombia and Brazil. Both countries have a relatively long history of engaging with REDD+ but have slightly different legal structures pertaining to the rights of Indigenous peoples on their traditional territories, and specifically their ‘carbon’ rights. As such, the intention is to evaluate how these differing ''de jure'' rights translate on the ground. With respect to REDD+, do certain rights result in legitimately positive benefits to IPLCs, as well as the environment that these projects were originally intended to protect? To reduce inconsistency, projects were chosen that utilized the same standard, namely Verra’s ‘Verified Carbon Standard’. The intention is such that the reader can evaluate the effectiveness and true benefit of REDD+ projects to IPLC’s, based upon the legal frameworks of the host country. A secondary intention is such that the reader is better equipped to conduct a prefeasibility assessment based upon available online literature, to evaluate the likelihood that REDD+ can be implemented in any chosen country, with the genuine intent of benefiting IPLC’s that are directly affected as a result of REDD+ project implementation.

==REDD+ and the VCM in Brazil and Colombia==
REDD+, originally introduced by the UNFCCC, is a market-based mechanism sitting within the VCM that aims to reverse the loss of forests and carbon stocks, specifically in developing countries. Simply put, an entity or an individual can voluntarily pay another that has engaged with REDD+ and subsequently sequestered carbon, to offset their own emissions using ‘credits’, sold as units of greenhouse gas equivalent to one ton of carbon dioxide (CO2e). Forestry and Land-Use remains to be the largest category of carbon credits traded by transaction volume on the VCM, with REDD+ being the most popular project type in this category, accounting for 78% of credits traded.<ref name=":0">Procton, A., (2024). ''State of the voluntary carbon market 2024: On the path to maturity.'' Forest Trends Ecosystem Marketplace.</ref> Furthermore, over one-third of the credits sold within this category were sourced from projects that had been implemented in LAC and the Caribbean in 2024.<ref name=":0" /> Of the four largest standards issuing carbon credits, Verra accounts for roughly 80% of issuances in Latin America,<ref>Pullins, T. (2022). Growth of carbon markets in Latin America. White & Case. [[/www.whitecase.com/publications/insight/latin-america-focus-fall-2022-growth-carbon-markets|https://www.whitecase.com/publications/insight/latin-america-focus-fall-2022-growth-carbon-markets]] </ref> and even in the face of recent scrutiny,<ref>West, T. A. P., Bofim, B., Haya, B. K. (2024). Methodological issues with deforestation baselines compromise the integrity of carbon offsets from REDD+. ''Global Environmental Change, 87'' [[/doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2024.102863|https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2024.102863]]</ref><ref>Wyburd I., & Dufrasne, G. (2023). Error Log: Exposing the methodological failures of REDD+ forestry projects. Carbon Market Watch. [[/carbonmarketwatch.org/publications/error-log-exposing-the-methodological-failures-of-redd-forestry-projects/|https://carbonmarketwatch.org/publications/error-log-exposing-the-methodological-failures-of-redd-forestry-projects/]]</ref><ref name=":15">Haya, B. K., Alford-Jones, K., Anderegg, W. R. L., Beymer-Farris, B., Blanchard, L., Bomfim, B., Chin, D., Evans, S., Hogan, M., Holm, J. A., McAfee, K., So, I. S., West, T. A. P., & Withey, L. (2023). ''Quality assessment of REDD+ carbon credit projects''. Berkeley Carbon Trading Project. [[/gspp.berkeley.edu/research-and-impact/centers/cepp/projects/berkeley-carbontrading-project/REDD+|https://gspp.berkeley.edu/research-and-impact/centers/cepp/projects/berkeley-carbontrading-project/REDD+]]</ref> REDD+ projects account for a significant proportion of the VCM with their continued application likely to persist.<ref>Gordon, O. (2022). ''The interwoven fortunes of carbon markets and indigenous communities.'' Energy Monitor. [[/www.energymonitor.ai/tech/carbon-removal/the-interwoven-fortunes-of-carbon-markets-and-indigenous-communities/|https://www.energymonitor.ai/tech/carbon-removal/the-interwoven-fortunes-of-carbon-markets-and-indigenous-communities/]]</ref><ref>Müller, M., Coustar, C., Bietta, F., Mathres, M. (2022). ''UNFCCC REDD+ and the power of sovereign carbon.'' Deutsche Banke Chief Investment Office. [[/www.rainforestcoalition.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/CIO-Special-UNFCCC-REDD-power-of-sovereign-carbon.pdf|https://www.rainforestcoalition.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/CIO-Special-UNFCCC-REDD-power-of-sovereign-carbon.pdf]]</ref><ref>Pullins, T. (2022). ''Growth of carbon markets in Latin America.'' White & Case. [[/www.whitecase.com/publications/insight/latin-america-focus-fall-2022-growth-carbon-markets|https://www.whitecase.com/publications/insight/latin-america-focus-fall-2022-growth-carbon-markets]] </ref> With the introduction of updated methodologies aimed at addressing these concerns,<ref>Verra (2023a). ''Setting the Standard: Verra’s Revolutionary New REDD Methodology.'' [[/verra.org/program-notice/setting-the-standard-verras-revolutionary-new-redd-methodology/|https://verra.org/program-notice/setting-the-standard-verras-revolutionary-new-redd-methodology/]]</ref><ref>Verra (2023b). ''VM0048 Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation, v1.0.'' [[/verra.org/methodologies/vm0048-reducing-emissions-from-deforestation-and-forest-degradation-v1-0/|https://verra.org/methodologies/vm0048-reducing-emissions-from-deforestation-and-forest-degradation-v1-0/]]</ref> there is hope for renewed buyer confidence in the integrity of this market,<ref>MSCI (2023). ''Verra’s New Methodology for Unplanned Deforestation Aims to Silence the Critics''. [[/www.msci.com/www/blog-posts/verra-s-new-methodology-for/04577808942|https://www.msci.com/www/blog-posts/verra-s-new-methodology-for/04577808942]]</ref> though more work still needs to be done.

Both Colombia and Brazil have a relatively long history of implementing REDD+ projects, using both fund-based and market-based mechanisms. For example, both countries were participants in the ‘Amazon Indigenous REDD+ (RIA in Spanish) initiative, with the first pilot implementation project being initiated in Colombia’s Puiawai Natural Reserve.<ref>Garzón, E., (2017). ''Amazon Indigenous REDD+: An innovative approach to conserve Colombian forests?'' Mongabay. [[/news.mongabay.com/2017/01/amazon-indigenous-redd-an-innovative-approach-to-conserve-colombian-forests/|https://news.mongabay.com/2017/01/amazon-indigenous-redd-an-innovative-approach-to-conserve-colombian-forests/]]</ref> The relevance of these two countries with respect to REDD+ is simple. Much of the Amazon’s primary tropical rainforest falls within these countries jurisdiction and this rainforest has been consistently under threat from external pressures and encroachment, whether that be in the form of land-clearing for commercial ranching, subsistence purposes, illicit drug production or illegal mining practices,<ref name=":8">Sánchez García, P. A. & Wong, G. Y., (2024) “The political economy of deforestation in the Colombian Amazon”, ''Journal of Political Ecology'' ''31''(1), 178–199. [[/doi.org/10.2458/jpe.5230|https://doi.org/10.2458/jpe.5230]]</ref><ref>Radwin, M. (2023). ''Drug trafficking fuels other deforestation drivers in the Amazon: report.'' Mongabay. [[/news.mongabay.com/2023/07/drug-trafficking-fuels-other-deforestation-drivers-in-the-amazon-report/|https://news.mongabay.com/2023/07/drug-trafficking-fuels-other-deforestation-drivers-in-the-amazon-report/]]</ref><ref>Haddad, E.A., Araújo, I.F., Feltran-Barbieri, R., Perobelli, F. S., Rocha, A., Sass, K. S., Nobre, C. A. (2024). Economic drivers of deforestation in the Brazilian Legal Amazon. ''Nat Sustain'' ''7'', 1141–1148. [[/doi.org/10.1038/s41893-024-01387-7|https://doi.org/10.1038/s41893-024-01387-7]] </ref><ref>Hänggli, A., Levy, S. A., Armenteras, D., Bovolo, C. I., Brandão, J., Rueda, X., & Garrett, R. D. (2023). A systematic comparison of deforestation drivers and policy effectiveness across the amazon biome. ''Environmental Research Letters, 18''(7), 073001. [[/doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/acd408|https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/acd408]]</ref> to name a few.

In theory, REDD+ can be used to provide the economic incentive to promote sustained environmental protection of Indigenous lands, with a focus on the rights and livelihoods of IPLCs. Currently the overall funding to IPLCs tenure rights and forest management in tropical countries is low, receiving just $270 million per year between 2011-2020 from bilateral and multilateral donors and private philanthropies.<ref>Hatcher, J., Owen, M., Yin, D., (2021). ''Falling short: Donor funding for Indigenous peoples and local communities to secure tenure rights and manage forests in tropical countries (2011 -2020).'' Rainforest Foundation Norway. [[/dv719tqmsuwvb.cloudfront.net/documents/Publikasjoner/Andre-rapporter/RFN Falling short 2021.pdf|https://dv719tqmsuwvb.cloudfront.net/documents/Publikasjoner/Andre-rapporter/RFN_Falling_short_2021.pdf]]</ref> REDD+ has the potential to channel funding as to promote Indigenous rights and autonomy, provided there is transparent and equitable benefit-sharing for those involved. Fundamentally, only with the inclusion of IPLC’s, or preferably with IPLC’s acting as project proponents, is REDD+ able to promote Indigenous agency and improve IPLC rights and governance. And only when the rights of those inhabiting the land are formally recognized can the land be effectively conserved.<ref name=":16">Reytar, K., Veit, P., von Braun, J. (2024). ''Protecting Biodiversity Hinges on Securing Indigenous and Community Land Rights.'' WRI. [[/www.wri.org/insights/indigenous-and-local-community-land-rights-protect-biodiversity|https://www.wri.org/insights/indigenous-and-local-community-land-rights-protect-biodiversity]]</ref> The inclusion of IPLCs in REDD+ project development is therefore considered to be essential for project success, and this is in theory embodied in the very nature of REDD+.<ref name=":1">Alvarez, G., Elfving, M. and Andrade, C. (2016) ‘REDD+ governance and indigenous peoples in Latin America: the case of Suruí Carbon Project in the Brazilian Amazon Forest’, ''Latin American J. Management for Sustainable Development 3''(2) pp.133–146. [[/dx.doi.org/10.1504/LAJMSD.2016.083705|10.1504/LAJMSD.2016.083705]]</ref> Partially owing to a long history of dealing with REDD+, Colombia and Brazil are amongst just a few of the countries hosting tropical rainforests that explicitly recognise community rights to carbon and tie these rights to the legal ownership of lands and forests. In Colombia, carbon rights are tied to rights of the land, whereas in Brazil carbon rights are tied to forest rights.<ref name=":2">RRI and McGill University (2021). Technical report: ''Status of legal recognition of Indigenous Peoples’, Local Communities’ and Afro-descendant Peoples’ rights to carbon stored in tropical lands and forests''. Rights and Resources Initiative. [[/doi.org/10.53892/MLQQ5744|https://doi.org/10.53892/MLQQ5744]]</ref>

==Brazil: The Suruí Forest Carbon Project==
====Project description and location====
The Surui Forest Carbon project was implemented in 2009 on the territory of the Surui people, which is situated in the southern part of Brazil’s Amazon between the states of Rondônia and Mato Grosso. Surui Indigenous territory covers an area of 2,481 km2, though the intention of the PCFS was to protect a portion of this total area. According to the PD, the stated objective was to “prevent 13,575.3 hectares of tropical forest from being cleared by 2038, to avoid the emission of 7,258,352.3 tCO2e to the atmosphere, and to contribute to the preservation of the Paiter Surui lifestyle and traditions.”<ref>IDESAM (2011). ''Project description: Surui forest carbon project''. Institute for Conservation and Sustainable Development of Amazonas. Link: "PROJ_DESC_1118_02FEB2012.PDF" found at [[/registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/1118|https://registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/1118]] </ref> This region sits within one of the Brazilian Amazon’s main ‘arcs of deforestation’ and pressure from loggers and ranchers is a matter of concern.

Notably, the PCFS was the first REDD+ project to be proposed by Indigenous peoples in the Brazilian Amazon on their own territory and was the first to receive certification by both the VCS and CCBS.<ref name=":1" />. Metareilá, the Surui’s own Indigenous association, acted as project proponent and the Institute for Conservation and Sustainable Development of Amazonas (IDESAM) assisted with project development, alongside multiple other stakeholder groups. As an endogenous initiative procured and conducted by the Surui community, the SFCP had a ‘non-centralized model of governance’, which reflected the characteristics and traditions of the Surui people. <ref name=":1" />

Only after two years of consultations between the 24 communities involved and the relevant governmental agencies (primarily FUNAI and the Ministry of Environment) was a Memorandum of Understanding signed, showing community consent to develop the project.<ref name=":3">Garcia, B., Rimmer, L., Canal Vieira, L., Mackey, B., (2021). REDD+ and forest protection on indigenous lands in the Amazon. ''RECIEL 30'', 207–219. [[/doi.org/10.1111/reel.12389|https://doi.org/10.1111/reel.12389]]</ref> In 2012 after verification from an independent third-party body, the Surui were able to sell carbon credits on the international market. Between 2009 and 2014 the project drastically helped limit the deforestation occurring within the project’s site, causing many to deem it a success.<ref name=":4">Howard, F. E., (2023). ''An Analysis of the Suruí Forest Carbon Project in Context of Settler Colonialism''. Masters thesis. Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University. [[/vtechworks.lib.vt.edu/server/api/core/bitstreams/b0cde6de-794c-453f-856b-ee72bde3db06/content|https://vtechworks.lib.vt.edu/server/api/core/bitstreams/b0cde6de-794c-453f-856b-ee72bde3db06/content]]</ref>

====National climate targets, policies and legislation====
Rates of deforestation in Brazil’s legal Amazon are significantly impacted by the government in charge. This is evidenced in the decade between 2012 and 2021 whilst under the conservative Bolsonaro administration, when deforestation in the Amazon increased 185% — from a loss of 4,571 km2 in 2012 to 13,038 km2 in 2021.<ref>INPE (2022). ''Observação da Terra. [[/www.obt.inpe.br/OBT/assuntos/programas/amazonia/prodes|http://www.obt.inpe.br/OBT/assuntos/programas/amazonia/prodes]]''</ref> However, since Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s appointment in 2022 there has been a steady decline in the rate of deforestation, which is now roughly half what it was in 2021.<ref>Terra Brasilis (2024). ''PRODES (deforestation): Deforestation rates – Legal Amazon – States''. [[/terrabrasilis.dpi.inpe.br/app/dashboard/deforestation/biomes/legal amazon/rates|https://terrabrasilis.dpi.inpe.br/app/dashboard/deforestation/biomes/legal_amazon/rates]]</ref> A significant proportion of emissions result from the clearing of rainforest and its subsequent conversion to ranching.<ref>MCTI (2022). ''Estimativas Anuais De Emissões De Gases De Efeito Estufa No Brasil.'' 6ª Edição. Ministério da Estado da Ciência, Tecnologia e Inovações. [[/www.gov.br/mcti/pt-br/acompanhe-o-mcti/sirene/publicacoes/estimativas-anuais-de-emissoes-gee/arquivos/6a-ed-estimativas-anuais.pdf|https://www.gov.br/mcti/pt-br/acompanhe-o-mcti/sirene/publicacoes/estimativas-anuais-de-emissoes-gee/arquivos/6a-ed-estimativas-anuais.pdf]]</ref> To address these emissions Brazil has implemented various adaptation policies, legislation and targets which are summarized below:
{| class="wikitable"
|'''Document name'''
|'''Type (target, policy or legislation)'''
|'''Publication year'''
|'''Key takeaways'''
|-
|National policy on climate change
|Policy
|2009
|
|-
|National Plan on Climate Change Adaptation
|Policy
|2016
|
|-
|GHG emissions target under Paris agreement: NDC update (2024*
|Target
|2024
|Reduce net greenhouse gas emissions by 59 to 67 percent below 2005 levels by 2035
|-
|?
|Target
|?
|Eliminate illegal deforestation in the Amazon by 2030 and restore 12 million hectares of degraded lands.

|-
|Federal Constitution of Brazil of 2006, Article 225
|
|
|The Amazon rainforest is considered as a ‘national heritage’ in Brazil and all levels of government have a shared responsibility to protect it and the environment (Federal Constitution of Brazil of 2006, Article 225).
|-
| colspan="4" |Relating to REDD+
|-
|Plan of Action for the Prevention and Control of Deforestation in the Legal Amazon (PPCDAM)
|
|2004
|
|-
|Forest code
|Policy
|2012
|No specific mention of REDD+
|-
|Amazon Indigenous REDD+ Initiative
|Policy
|2012
|
|-
|National REDD+ Strategy (ENREDD+)
|
|2016
|aims to eliminate deforestation, promote the conservation and restoration of forests, and enable a sustainable forestry economy. Specific objectives include monitoring and evaluating the impact of REDD+ policies, ensuring consistency between (federal, state and municipal) policies, and mobilizing capacity and resources for forest conservation and sustainable use. There is no explicit reference to REDD+ as a market-based mechanism in the VCM and REDD+ is defined under ENREDD+ as a funded-based mechanism
|}

====Indigenous rights - Constitutional, tenure and bundle rights====
In Brazil, Indigenous rights are robust and clearly defined according to the Brazilian Constitution. As a result, the Indigenous communities of the Brazilian Amazon have legal title to 13.8% of the national territory totalling 1.175 million km2, with a total of 631 territories.<ref>Federal government of Brazil (2024). ''Brazil’s NDC: National determination to contribute and transform''. [[/unfccc.int/sites/default/files/2024-11/Brazil Second Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) November2024.pdf|https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/2024-11/Brazil_Second%20Nationally%20Determined%20Contribution%20%28NDC%29_November2024.pdf]]</ref>
{| class="wikitable"
| colspan="3" |'''Laws'''
|-
|Article 231 of the 1988 Constitution
|indigenous peoples to have their exclusive right to use their territories to derive economic benefits

“Grants indigenous peoples the right to land, prohibits eviction, and restricts mining without authorization from the federal government.”

|
|-
|Indigenous Peoples statute (1973).

|No acts restricting the full exercise of indigenous peoples’ permanent tenure over the land should be permitted.

|
|-
| colspan="3" | '''(International) Treaties'''
|-
|United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2007)
|
|Requires States to obtain free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) for the approval of any projects affecting indigenous territories.
|-
|International Labour Organization Convention 169 (2019)
|
|Ratified ILO Convention No. 169, which was incorporated under domestic law through Decree 10.088/2019, and endorsed UNDRIP

Whilst the State retains ownership of mineral and other subsurface resources, governments must ensure consultation procedures, benefit-sharing and compensation for indigenous communities.*
|-
|Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention (1989)
|
|*?
|-
|American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2016)
|
|
|}
Whilst Indigenous communities in Brazil have legal title to land, it is the State that owns it. Indigenous people simply exercise permanent tenure over lands that they traditionally occupy and have ‘original rights’ to these traditional lands, which no other rights can prevail over.<ref name=":3" /> Indigenous lands, though not classified as protected areas, “have the highest level of protection by law because they are regulated by the Constitution” and cannot be leased or restricted without violating their original rights. The Suruí's right to develop the PCFS is grounded in the Brazilian Constitution, which grants Indigenous peoples exclusive rights to use the ‘riches of the soil, rivers and lakes’ of their land, and these rights cannot be overridden. Thus, Indigenous people and only Indigenous people are legally allowed to engage in productive activities on their land, provided these activities are conducted according to their own customs and traditions and are necessary for the wellbeing and cultural expression of their own people. In Brazil, it is the armed forces and federal police that are responsible for enforcing these laws, and FUNAI is responsible for representing Indigenous communities in judicial disputes.<ref name=":3" /> As such, provided a REDD+ does not violate the rights to territorial integrity, permanent land tenure and original rights, it is legally allowed.

'''CARBON RIGHTS:''' In Brazil, carbon rights are tied to forest rights.<ref name=":2" /> Carbon credits from REDD+ projects are seen as part of the economic benefits derived from indigenous lands, and as such, Indigenous communities are entitled to own, control and distribute these revenues themselves. The carbon credits generated from the (SFCP) were wholly owned by the Suruí people through Metareilá, with the Suruí Fund (managed by the Brazilian Biodiversity Fund - FUNBIO) acting as recipient. This legality reinforces Indigenous control over both land and carbon rights, as whoever has rights to the forest land is usually recognized as the owner of carbon rights.<ref name=":3" />

'''FPIC OBLIGATION:''' Furthermore, Brazilian law requires Free, Prior, and Informed Consent (FPIC) for REDD+ projects affecting indigenous lands, ensuring that international standards such as the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) and ILO Convention No. 169 are adhered to; Indigenous consent is, ''de jure,'' a necessity. Projects that violate these rights and fail to consult communities are therefore considered illegal. Notably there are no specific rules or procedures that have been written into the Brazilian constitution that provide guidance on how to achieve FPIC. This freedom reinforces Indigenous autonomy as it allows an Indigenous community to define the rules of consultation according to their customs and traditions.

Collectively these national and international laws provide an important safeguard to Indigenous peoples, making their consent a prerequisite for the establishment of REDD+ projects and recognizing their rights as the main beneficiaries of REDD+ revenues.<ref name=":3" /> However, as carbon rights are tied to forest rights in Brazil and not land rights, carbon is considered to be an ‘environmental service’ (Article 41(I)(A) Brazilian Forestry Code), and states, as well as the federal government, have the jurisdiction to exercise full legislative authority over carbon. <ref name=":2" /> As such, certain states have interpreted the law to imply that the title to carbon credits is attributable to the state.<ref>Loft, L., Ravikumar, A., Gebara, M. F., Pham, T. T., Resosudarmo, I. A. P., Assembe, S., Tovar, J. G., Mwangi, E., & Andersson, K. (2015). Taking Stock of Carbon Rights in REDD+ Candidate Countries: Concept Meets Reality. ''Forests'', ''6''(4), 1031-1060. [[/doi.org/10.3390/f6041031|https://doi.org/10.3390/f6041031]]</ref> Hence, even when carbon rights are clearly defined and tied to forest title it is insufficient in itself, and only by legally recognizing the customary rights of IPLCs can a fair and equitable outcome be realised.

====Interested and affected stakeholders====
{| class="wikitable"
| colspan="5" |'''Affected stakeholders'''
|-
|Stakeholders
|Primary objective(s)
|Secondary objective(s)
|Relative power
|Scope of influence
|-
|Metareilá Association of the Suruí Indigenous People
|<nowiki>- Project proponent</nowiki>

- Works to defend and preserve the cultural and territorial heritage of the Suruí people
|
|
|
|-
|Gãbgir Association of the Paiter Suruí Indigenous People
|Provide support to improve the quality and performance of schools in the TISS
|
|Low
|
|-
|Kabaney Association of the Forest People
|Supports the implementation of economic systems for the sustainable use of TISS‟ natural resources that meet the Paiter Suruí people's needs
|
|
|
|-
|Pamaur Association for the Protection of the Paiter Suruí People's Makor Clan
|Supporting the identification of more effective alternatives to address the health problems faced by the Paiter people
|
|
|
|-
|Yabner Gãbgir Forestry Institute of the Paiter Suruí people
|Encouraging the revitalization, strengthening and enhancement of traditional cultural property
|
|
|
|-
| colspan="5" |'''Interested stakeholders'''
|-
|Kanindé Association for Ethno-Environmental Defense – non-profit
|Responsible for the ethno-zoning of TISS. Coordination and organization of activities for Food Security and income generation, monitoring of biodiversity and socio-economic benefits
|
|
|
|-
|IDESAM - Institute for Conservation and Sustainable Development of Amazonas – non-profit NGO
|''Technical coordination''; - calculation of baseline scenario - preparation of Project Design Document (PDD) as well as the validation and verification to VCS and CCB standards. Coordination of biomass and carbon inventories and forest monitoring in support of the PCFS (remote sensing). Also supports policy and technical coordination related to REDD for the PCFS (p.9).
|
|
|
|-
|Forest Trends
|Supported formulation and implementation of the project. Raised funds
|
|
|International
|-
|Amazon Conservation Team - ACT Brazil
|Support to activities for food security and income generation, monitoring of biodiversity and socio-economic benefits, legal advice and communication to the project. Development of the Land Protection Plan, environmental monitoring and carbon stocks.
|
|
|
|-
|Brazilian Biodiversity Fund (FUNBIO)

|Responsible for the financial resources management mechanism generated by the Suruí forest carbon projects - Suruí Fund - and other income activities within the Management Plan.
|
|
|
|-
|Ministry of Environment (MMA)
|
|
|
|
|-
|Government of the State of Mato Grosso
|
|
|
|
|-
|Government of the State of Mato Grosso
|
|
|
|
|-
|National Indian Foundation (FUNAI)
|FUNAI does not necessarily need to take part in the governance of the project (Sales et al., 2010), but it should have formal knowledge of the direction and initiative proposals.

|
|
|National
|}

====Discussion====
Although originally successful in achieving its goal of reducing deforestation and degradation, in 2016 diamonds were discovered in Surui territory, leading to an increase in illegal logging and mining.<ref name=":1" /> By 2018 the project site had been completely overrun by ''garimpeiros'' (small-scale gold miners), ultimately leading to the projects suspension that year. <ref name=":4" />

While the project had initially garnered support, divisions emerged within the community post-project implementation. Disputes arose over the unequal distribution of project revenues, leading to internal conflicts between different Suruí clans. These criticisms escalated in 2014 when the Catholic Indigenous Missionary Council supported calls for an end to the project due to mismanagement of revenues from carbon credit sales. <ref name=":3" /> Some Suruí members also argued that the REDD+ initiative harmed their way of life.<ref>Lang, C. (2014). ''“What are projects for that destroy life?” Interview with Henrique Suruí about the Paiter-Suruí REDD project, Brazil.'' REDD-Monitor. [[/redd-monitor.org/2014/12/17/what-are-projects-for-that-destroy-life-interview-with-henrique-surui-about-the-paiter-surui-redd-project-brazil/|https://redd-monitor.org/2014/12/17/what-are-projects-for-that-destroy-life-interview-with-henrique-surui-about-the-paiter-surui-redd-project-brazil/]]</ref>

Further complicating the situation was the controversial role of Henrique Suruí, one of the Suruí tribal leaders. In 2011, it was revealed that Henrique had violated the tribe's logging moratorium, collaborating with loggers in illegal activities. While Henrique later denied responsibility for the project’s failure, his actions, combined with internal disagreements, illustrated the lack of consensus within the Suruí leadership on the project’s goals and outcomes. Both of the tribe’s leaders possessed dramatically different perspectives on how they believed they could ensure agency, autonomy, and economic benefits for the Suruí people.<ref name=":4" /> This fragmentation within the community, in combination with the discovery of diamonds and the state's failure to protect indigenous land rights led to the indefinite suspension of the REDD+ project.

The project's collapse highlights broader structural issues, particularly the state's inconsistent support for indigenous land rights, influenced by settler colonialism, which undermined the project’s long-term viability.<ref name=":4" /> Additionally, the project’s creation was shaped by external actors, including the collaboration between Almir Suruí and Borges from Forest Trends, a Washington-based NGO. This partnership introduced a Western perspective on viewing the Suruí peoples forest, in contrast with their own perspectives on land use and governance. Furthermore, despite Borges’ Brazilian background, the power dynamics between a global North organization and a developing, Indigenous community were apparent.

====Summary====
The Suruí Forest Carbon Project provides an interesting example of how, even when the rights of IPLC’s are relatively robust, challenges persist in ensuring REDD+ project longevity. As such, in its current state, REDD+ in the Brazilian Amazon may not be a suitable market-based option for indigenous communities in the Amazon.<ref name=":3" /> Although initially successful in promoting indigenous autonomy and reducing deforestation, the project resulted in failure due to of a myriad of factors. Division between Surui communities was exacerbated by a perceived unequal benefit-sharing, and the impact of imposing REDD+ seems to have complicated the traditional social structure that the Surui were dependent on. These issues were influenced by Brazil's settler state dynamics, where indigenous land rights, although legally recognized, are often not upheld in practice due to insufficient enforcement.<ref name=":4" /> Ultimately, the Surui project reveals how settler colonialism's structural flaws make long-term project success difficult, despite initial progress in promoting indigenous autonomy.

At the national and state level, complex institutional and legal land governance structures convolute and impede REDD+ in Brazil. Multiple institutions share responsibilities and there is no comprehensive, authoritative database of land ownership, which hampers efforts to protect indigenous territories.<ref name=":5">Costa, R. (2016)''. Insecure land rights in Brazil: Consequences for rural areas and challenges for improvement.'' Climate Policy Initiative. [[/www.climatepolicyinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/Insecure Land Rights in Brazil CPI.pdf|https://www.climatepolicyinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/Insecure_Land_Rights_in_Brazil_CPI.pdf]]</ref> As a result, land tenure disputes remain common and can be witnessed occurring between the public as well between public and state actors. For example, Brazil’s 1964 Land Statute (Law No. 4504) allows the government to takeover unproductive farms and transfer those lands to landless peasants. This often results in the clearing of forest, as only when the land is cleared is it evidenced to be ‘productive’.<ref name=":5" /> Hence, not only does this law cause insecurity for Indigenous populations in Brazil, it also forces them to go against customary traditions of stewarding the land in an effort to maintain its control.

Whilst the aforementioned points to the futility of REDD+ in Brazil, there is reason to maintain optimism. In a recent landmark ruling Brazil’s supreme court voted in favour of the Xoleng peoples, and the decision will serve as a precedent for all cases involving Indigenous peoples.<ref name=":6">Amos-Flom, K., (2023). ''Triumph and Turmoil: The Xokleng Case and the Future of Indigenous Land Rights in Brazil.'' Columbia Journal of Transnational Law. [[/www.jtl.columbia.edu/bulletin-blog/triumph-and-turmoil-the-xokleng-case-and-the-future-of-indigenous-land-rights-in-brazil|https://www.jtl.columbia.edu/bulletin-blog/triumph-and-turmoil-the-xokleng-case-and-the-future-of-indigenous-land-rights-in-brazil]]</ref> The Xokleng’s land dispute, settled in 2023, “rejected Santa Catarina state’s marco temporal (“time limit”) argument, which would have required Indigenous people to prove they occupied or legally contested the territory they claimed before the Brazilian Constitution came into force in 1988. If successful, this argument would have led to disastrous repercussions, as many indigenous peoples had been forcibly removed or are traditionally nomadic.”<ref name=":6" /> Evidently, whilst slow, progress has been made in Brazil in recent years with respect to Indigenous rights as well as the voluntary carbon market itself.

There are currently 159 AFOLU projects listed on the Verra database in Brazil, with only two specifically focused on REDD+ initiatives in collaboration with Indigenous groups. These are the Ka’a Pyahu project, <ref>Verra (n.d.) ''Project 5087: KA'A PYAHU.'' https://registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/5087</ref> initiated by the Guajajara Indigenous people in collaboration with external organizations and validated in 2021, and the ‘Together for the forest Awaete REDD+ project’<ref>Verra (n.d.) ''Project 5200: TOGETHER FOR THE FOREST AWAETÉ REDD+ PROJECT.'' https://registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/5200</ref> which is still under development. Both projects involve Indigenous groups working with Brazilian organizations to build technical capacity and expertise. This could signal a growing trend of Indigenous-led REDD+ projects in the future. To ensure a positive future for REDD+ in Brazil, the customary rights of IPLC’s must be formally recognized. IPLC should have legal ownership of their traditional lands, and in doing so the carbon rights of these communities would be less convoluted, leading to more equitable benefit-sharing and increased cohesion amongst these groups post-project implementation.

==Colombia: ''REDD+ project Resguardo Indigena Unificado - Selva de Mataven (RUI-SM)''==
'''Project description and location'''

According to the PD,<ref name=":7">ACATISEMA & Mediamos (2017). ''Joint project description and monitoring report: REDD+ project: Resguardo Indigena Unificado – Selva de Mataven (RIU – SM).'' Link: “10 06 2017_VCS Final Report_ Matavin Project.pdf” found at [[/registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/1566|https://registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/1566]]</ref> the Resguardo Indígena Unificado – Selva de Matavén (RIU-SM) project is located east of the Colombian Orinoco high plain, in the eastern part of the Department of Vichada, municipality of Cumaribo. It resides on the formalized resguardo of the Sikuani, Piaroa, Puinave, Curripaco, Cubeo and Piapoco ethnic groups, spanning 1,856,836 hectares, with 1,477,115 hectares (79.6%) being forested. The project states that it will reduce greenhouse gas emissions, with a total estimated net reduction of 108,670,562 tons of CO2 equivalent over thirty years, from years 2013 – 2042. By this metric, it is the 14th largest project on the Verra registry, out of over 1700 projects.<ref name=":9">Dufrasne, D., (2021). ''Two Shades of Green: How hot air forest credits are being used to avoid carbon taxes in Colombia''. Carbon Market Watch. [[/carbonmarketwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Two-shades-of-green EN WEB.pdf|https://carbonmarketwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Two-shades-of-green_EN_WEB.pdf]]</ref> There are 12,312 indigenous people living in the RIU-SM, belonging to 2,517 families and 250 communities as of 2017.

The project was initiated by the Asociación de Cabildos y Autoridades Indígenas de la Selva de Matavén (ACETISMA), an Indigenous association, and developed by MEDIAMOS F&M, a Colombian consultancy firm. ACETISMA is comprised of Indigenous leaders that represent the 17 communities of the reservation in charge of governing the territory, and it has administrative autonomy, as well as “the capacity to acquire, to own and to dispose of property, to accept donations, to hold national and international conventions, scientific and cultural exchanges and generally, to celebrate all kinds of negotiations and agreements with which the Association can achieve its objectives.”<ref name=":7" />

There is a stated focus on various means of improving the living conditions of the Indigenous peoples living within the project area. To summarise, the main objectives of the REDD+ project RIU-SM include:

· Community development, in the form of improved education.

· Community engagement with respect to the project; developing information channels to reveal project progress.

· Support local initiatives for environmental education and waste management.

· Developing an effective response system that addresses community proposals and concerns relating to the project.

· Strengthening the governance of ACATISEMA.

====National climate targets, policies and legislation====
The Colombian Amazon makes up over one-third of Colombia’s national territory, and up until 2005 only 7.3% of the Colombian Amazon had been deforested, largely due to the country's 60-year armed conflict between the government, multiple left-wing guerillas such as FARC, and several far-right paramilitary groups.<ref name=":8" /> However, following the signing of the Peace Treaty in 2016 and demobilization of the FARC, limits to deforestation were weakened in the Colombian Amazon. Poor but opportunistic peasants began to encroach into previously unchartered territory and capitalize from the rainforest. Due to the poor economic integration of the Amazon, many were forced to engage with the traditional economies of cocoa and cattle ranching, as these markets were already well connected to regional and global markets.<ref name=":8" /> To address the drivers of deforestation and its associated emissions, the federal government has implemented various initiatives, which are summarized below:
{| class="wikitable"
|'''Document name'''
|'''Type'''
|'''Publication year'''
|'''Key takeaways'''
|-
|Nationally Determined Contribution(s)
|Target
|2020
|Reduce GHG emissions by 51 % by 2030 and net-zero by 2050
|-
|National Climate Change Policy (PNCC)
|Policy
|2018
|Address climate change and foster sustainable development
|-
|National Forest Conservation Program
|Policy
|2011
|Address deforestation
|-
|Law 1931 of 2018 – Climate Change Law

|Legislation
|2018
|Establishes the framework for addressing climate change
|-
| colspan="4" |'''Relating to REDD+:'''
|-
|National Strategy for Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (ENREDD+)
|Initiative
|2009
|Particular focus on the Amazon and Choco rainforests
|-
|Amazon Indigenous REDD+ Initiative
|Initiative
|2016
|Respect Indigenous rights. FPIC focus.
|-
|BIOREDD+ program
|Initiative
|2012
|Portfolio of 8 REDD+ projects in four geographic nodes covering over 700,000 hectares in the Colombian Pacific.

|-
|Vision Amazonia
|Initiative
|2015
|Part of the REDD+ strategy, financed by three foreign countries: Germany, Norway and United Kingdom
|}
As a result of the many fund and market-based initiatives that Colombia has engaged with, it hosts the second most REDD+ projects in the world. REDD+ projects now cover at least 56% of the area of legally recognized Indigenous territories in the Colombian Amazon, with an overwhelming majority of carbon projects located on Indigenous territories.<ref name=":10">Schmid, D., & Castro. C., (2023). ''REDD+ projects in the Colombian Amazon: Social challenges and lack of transparency''. Rainforest Foundation Norway. [[/dv719tqmsuwvb.cloudfront.net/documents/REDD rapport 2024 ENG.pdf|https://dv719tqmsuwvb.cloudfront.net/documents/REDD_rapport_2024_ENG.pdf]]</ref> Evidently REDD+ plays an integral part in the country’s efforts of environmental conservation, and incentives have been introduced to promote the development of such projects. For example, in 2016 the government adopted a higher tax that covered fossil fuels, but companies are able to avoid paying the tax by investing in carbon offsets that have been generated domestically.<ref name=":9" /> This led to a boost in the domestic REDD+ market in 2017, as Colombian companies invested as to escape higher taxes. Notably, 23 of the 36 REDD+ projects currently under development in the Amazon region were initiated in or after 2018.<ref name=":10" /> Currently Colombia’s REDD+ program sits at over 45 pilot and voluntary carbon projects, as well as one large-scale jurisdictional approach in the Amazon.<ref name=":11">Zambrano-Cortés, D. G. (2024). ''The politics, spaces and subjects of forest conservation in Colombia''. [internal PhD, WU, Wageningen University]. Wageningen University. [[/doi.org/10.18174/675328|https://doi.org/10.18174/675328]]</ref>

====Indigenous rights - Constitutional, tenure and bundle rights====
''De jure'', the Indigenous peoples of Colombia have comprehensive tenure and bundle rights that have been articulated in the national constitution. Collective land titles are granted to Indigenous communities by the Colombian government, and as a result about 34 percent of Colombian land (almost 38 million hectares) is legally recognized as Indigenous territory or collective lands of Afro-descendent communities.<ref name=":10" /> These collective land tenure rights have been in effect since the implementation of the 1991 constitution, granting them the authority to exercise legal control over their territories in accordance with their own customs and procedures.<ref>Max Planck Institute (n.d.) ''Colombia 1991 (rev. 2015).'' Institute. [[/www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Colombia 2015|https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Colombia_2015]]</ref> Furthermore, the carbon rights of Indigenous peoples are explicitly defined in the constitution and tied specifically to the ownership of land of the communities.<ref name=":2" /> This in theory provides a solid legal basis for upholding the rights of Indigenous communities in Colombia, specifically relating to REDD+ activities, as it allows communities to define and negotiate the terms of said projects. A summary of the various laws relating to Indigenous rights have been summarized below:
{| class="wikitable"
| colspan="2" |'''Law (1991 constitution)'''
|-
|Article 63

|Indigenous territories are considered collective property. Land is not owned by individuals but is shared by the community. The state must respect these collective rights and cannot alter land ownership without the consent of the Indigenous peoples.
|-
|Article 76 - ''Consulta previa''.
|Pertains to the right of Indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities; prior consultation must be undertaken before any entity undertakes activities that may affect their territories, culture, or way of life.
|-
|Article 330
|Indigenous communities have the right to govern their territories.
|-
|Article 329
|The Reservation is a collective, inalienable, and indefeasible property.
|-
|Decree 1386 of 1994, Article 10; Decree 2164 of 1995, Article 22) 39.
|"The administration and management of these lands are subjected to uses and customs of the beneficiaries."
|}
Whilst land and tenure rights are enshrined into the constitution, the precariousness of these rights persists due to a lack of resources to ensure enforcement, as well as the deeper issue of corruption. As previously stated, the rate of deforestation increased significantly in Colombia’s post-conflict era, evidencing the nations inability to maintain control over unlawful acts of land-grabbing and disposition. Whilst this began with new peasants converting the Amazon for subsistence purposes, it ultimately led to new areas for the growth of cocoa, much to the benefit of narco-traffickers who could monopolize on this illegal surplus in ‘accumulation by dispossession’.<ref name=":8" />

With respect to the legalities of consultation, Colombia has enshrined ''consulta previa'' into the constitution. Translating to ‘prior consultation’, this legal text provides the formal grounds for Indigenous engagement when any legislative or administrative measures are implemented on Indigenous territory. Importantly, consultation should be achieved in accordance with the customs of the ethnic group with which the project is being imposed upon. However, there have been recent cases of contestation specifically relating to how ''consulta previa'' applies to REDD+ on Indigenous lands, and the RIU – SM project was one that was involved with such a case.

====Affected and interested stakeholders====
{| class="wikitable"
| colspan="5" |'''Affected stakeholders'''
|-
|Stakeholders
|Primary objective(s)
|Secondary objective(s)
|Relative power
|Scope of influence
|-
|ACATISEMA - Asociación de Cabildos y Autoridades Indígenas de la Selva de Matavén
|
* Foster the integral development, social and cultural preservation of the indigenous communities in the Mataven Jungle and to
* Consolidate the territory, selfgovernment by partners, the defense, conservation and preservation of the environment and biodiversity of the Mataven Jungle

|
|It is the highest authority in the reservation.
|
|-
|Indigenous ''resguardos'' of the RIU-SM
|
* Primary and direct beneficiaries
* Seek to maintain land rights
* Promote traditional and cultural beliefs
|
|
|
|-
|Colonists
|
|
|
|
|-
| colspan="5" |'''Interested stakeholders'''
|-
|MEDIAMOS F&M – A consultancy
|Project developer
|
|
|
|-
|Mining companies
|Compete with the Project for the territory's resources.
|
|
|
|-
|Ministerio de Ambiente y Desarrollo Sostenible
|Its main interest is to achieve environmental planning, through the consolidation of a policy of sustainable development and strategic alliances with social and institutional participants in different sectoral and territorial scenarios.
|
|
|
|-
|Dirección de Asuntos Indígenas, ROM y Minorías - Ministerio del Interior
|Public agency that advises the national level, prepares and proposes the formulation of public policy in favor of indigenous peoples within the framework of the defense, support, reinforcement and consolidation of ethnic and cultural rights.
|
|
|
|-
|Corporinoquía
|Regional environmental authority to ensure the proper use of natural resources in their area of jurisdiction.
|
|
|
|-
|Other government institutions: Governor ofice of Vichada, Mayor ofice Cumaribo
|The Reservation for being part of the Cumaribo, Vichada, has territorial jurisdiction relations with the Governor’s office and the Mayor’s office.
|
|
|
|-
|Fundación NATURA
|Civil organization whose mission is the conservation, use and management of biodiversity to generate social, economic and environmental benefits in the context of sustainable human development.
|
|
|
|-
|FONDO ACCIÓN
|Colombian non-profit organization in the private scheme. Encourage the participation of civil society and the private sector in the implementation of the country’s public policies in two areas: - Conservation and sustainable development; and protection -development of children.
|
|
|
|-
|SENA, Department of Social Prosperity (DPS), NGOs and private consultants
|Supporting the implementation of rural development activities.
|
|
|Regional
|-
|Other indigenous communities neighboring RIU-SM
|
|
|Low
|Local
|-
|Financial institutions
|They fund local development activities.
|
|
|
|-
|Asocarbono – An industry association, including Verra, ProClima, Biofix, and ACATISEMA.

|
|
|
|
|-
|OPIAC: the National Oganization of the Indigenous Peoples of the Colombian Amazon

|
|
|
|
|}

====Discussion====
According to the official REDD+ Mataven website<ref>RIU – SM (n.d.). ''REDD+ Mataven''. [[/reddmataven.com/|https://reddmataven.com/]]</ref> the project has resulted in a myriad of benefits to the Indigenous communities of the region. For example, as a result of the funds generated from the projects activities, there have been improvements in infrastructure, transportation and education, ultimately leading to the empowerment and improved governance of ACETISMA. However, the project has come under fire for multiple reasons.

For one, in 2015 some of the Indigenous communities filed a lawsuit referring to the violation of their right to ''consulta previa''. However, the court ruled that their Indigenous rights had not been violated as it was ACETISMA that initially sought MEDIAMOS to develop the project, and that ACETISMA were the best representatives of those Indigenous communities. Furthermore, the projects main focus was the conservation of the rainforest and therefore did not threaten the cultural integrity of those communities.<ref name=":10" /> However, regardless of the outcome of this case, its occurrence points to internal disagreement amongst Indigenous participants of the RIU-SM project. In a study involving interviews with Indigenous members of the project, there was a significant proportion of interviewees that had little knowledge regarding various aspects of the project, such as responsibilities of participation, or the benefit-sharing mechanism in place.<ref name=":2" /> This further reinforces the point that, in the case of the RIU-SM project it may not be ‘bottom-up’ and eludes to the power imbalance experienced between Mediamos, the project developer, and Indigenous community members. In the PD there is a breakdown of the distribution of income between ACETISMA and Mediamos, which shows a significant proportion of revenue flowing to the former organisation throughout the project’s operations.<ref name=":7" /> However, there is currently no publicly available documentation supporting this initial claim<ref name=":9" /> as there is no obligation to provide this information, leading to a general lack of transparency in the market and between all of the relevant actors. Subsequent meetings with Indigenous leaders have however shown a marked support of the Mataven project, with one Indigenous leader explicitly stating “...the Redd+ project has brought resources that they never had before, which allowed them to open new school classrooms, 21 rural aqueducts, cocoa crops and even headquarters in Cumaribo and Inírida.”<ref>Lievano, A. B. (2021) Colombia's biggest carbon credit project could be selling hot air. Latin American Center for Investigative Journalism. [[/www.elclip.org/el-mayor-proyecto-de-bonos-de-carbono-de-colombia-podria-estar-vendiendo-aire-caliente/|https://www.elclip.org/el-mayor-proyecto-de-bonos-de-carbono-de-colombia-podria-estar-vendiendo-aire-caliente/]] </ref> Clearly there have been benefits for IPLC’s involved with this project, though the details of this benefit-sharing remain a mystery.

Secondly, the Mataven project has caused controversy due to its apparently inflated carbon credit issuance. The report states that this has been achieved by using a reference area that is not representative of the project area, as well as assuming an uncharacteristically heigh assumed rate of deforestation.<ref name=":12">Global Atlas of Environmental Justice (2023). ''Resguardo Indigena Unificado-Selva de Matavén (RIU SM) REDD+ Project, Colombia.'' [[/ejatlas.org/conflict/redd-project-resguardo-indigena-unificado-selva-de-mataven-riu-sm|https://ejatlas.org/conflict/redd-project-resguardo-indigena-unificado-selva-de-mataven-riu-sm]]</ref> The project used a baseline deforestation rate of 0.86% per year, which is significantly more than the Colombian government's national rate of 0.18%. Additionally, according to the report the reference area chosen is more easily accessed and therefore more prone to deforestation, making it an inaccurate comparison to the relatively remote project area.<ref name=":2" /> This has led to the creation of excess carbon credits, or “hot air” credits, which have been criticized for not reflecting real environmental benefits.<ref name=":9" /> To add further insult to injury these credits have been used by a Colombian fossil fuel distributor company to avoid paying taxes, as described earlier by Colombia’s change in policy in 2017. In doing so, the company avoided paying approximately $18.9 million in taxes.<ref name=":2" /> There has been subsequent back and forth between Verra and Carbon Market Watch, with Verra refuting the claims<ref>Verra (2021). ''Carbon Market Watch Report on Colombian REDD+ Projects Contains Flawed Allegations.'' [[/verra.org/carbon-market-watch-report-on-colombian-redd-projects-contains-flawed-allegations/|https://verra.org/carbon-market-watch-report-on-colombian-redd-projects-contains-flawed-allegations/]] </ref> Regardless of the science, Colombia recently introduced a resolution in 2018 (Resolution 1447 – 2018) that requires projects to use baselines that comply with national reference levels.<ref name=":13">Dufrasne, D. (2021b). Companies use ”hot air” forestry offsets to avoid taxes in Colombia: Carbon Market Watch’s fact-check of Verra’s response. Carbon Market Watch. [[/carbonmarketwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/CMWs-fact-check-of-Verras-response-on-Colombia.pdf|https://carbonmarketwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/CMWs-fact-check-of-Verras-response-on-Colombia.pdf]]</ref><ref>IEA (2022). ''Resolution 1447 – 2018. Monitoring, Reporting, and Verification System for mitigation actions at the national level.'' International Energy Agency. [[/www.iea.org/policies/14772-resolution-1447-2018-monitoring-reporting-and-verification-system-for-mitigation-actions-at-the-national-level|https://www.iea.org/policies/14772-resolution-1447-2018-monitoring-reporting-and-verification-system-for-mitigation-actions-at-the-national-level]]</ref> Going forward, REDD+ projects that are being implemented in Colombia will have to abide by Colombia’s national legislation.

====Summary====
Colombia has a long history of engaging in REDD+ as it has been used to limit environmental degradation in the post-conflict era, in alignment with the country’s national peacebuilding agenda.<ref name=":11" /> Owing to the country’s comprehensive tenure and bundle rights, IPLC’s have robust ''de jure'' rights to land as they collectively own it, and rights to carbon are tied to this ownership. This puts Colombia as one of the world leaders in legal terms relating to REDD+ project implementation, but due to a lack of resources to ensure enforcement, as well as corruption, historically these laws have not been adhered to.<ref name=":10" /><ref name=":2" /> There are many documented cases showing the displacement on IPLC’s from traditional lands, poor efforts to adhere to ''consulta previa'', and inequitable benefit sharing.<ref>Greenfield, P. (2023''). The ‘carbon pirates’ preying on Amazon’s Indigenous communities.'' The Guardian. [[/www.theguardian.com/environment/2023/jan/21/amazon-indigenous-communities-carbon-offsetting-pirates-aoe|https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2023/jan/21/amazon-indigenous-communities-carbon-offsetting-pirates-aoe]]</ref><ref name=":14">Lang, C., (2024). ''Colombia’s Constitutional Court rules in favour of Indigenous Peoples. Identifies serious flaws in the REDD+ Baka Rokarire project.'' REDD_Monitor. [[/reddmonitor.substack.com/p/colombias-constitutional-court-rules|https://reddmonitor.substack.com/p/colombias-constitutional-court-rules]]</ref>

The case of the Mataven project provides an interesting example of how it is the market itself that is failing to address concerns regarding transparency, whether that be relating to benefit-sharing amongst relevant stakeholders, or Indigenous representation and engagement throughout the implementation of REDD+ projects. Some ACATISEMA members have explicitly stated their support for the Mataven project,<ref name=":12" /> and its benefits can be seen first-hand in the form of improved infrastructure in local communities involved with the project.<ref>Myers, J. E., Parra, M. A., Bedford, C. (2021). ''How Carbon Offsetting Can Build a Forest.'' Stanford Social Innovation Review. [[/ssir.org/articles/entry/how carbon offsetting can build a forest|https://ssir.org/articles/entry/how_carbon_offsetting_can_build_a_forest]]</ref> However, an exact breakdown of how and where revenue is being distributed to IPLC’s remains elusive.<ref name=":13" /> Furthermore, the level of IPLC engagement has come into question, specifically with reference to ''consulta previa'' and the overall understanding that IPLC’s have regarding the project’s intended outcomes and activities.<ref name=":10" /> This is not a rare case in Colombia and has been witnessed occurring with other projects that have been implemented on Indigenous territories in the Colombian Amazon.<ref name=":17">Lang, C., (2023''). “It destroys everything,” says Indigenous leader about the REDD+ Baka Rokarire project in Colombia''. REDD Monitor. [[/reddmonitor.substack.com/p/it-destroys-everything-says-indigenous|https://reddmonitor.substack.com/p/it-destroys-everything-says-indigenous]]</ref> However, a recent ruling by the Colombian Constitutional court voted in favour of Indigenous groups in Colombia, upholding “the rights to self-determination, autonomy, self-government, territory, identity, physical and cultural integrity, and free, prior and informed consent of the indigenous communities”.<ref name=":14" /> This review ultimately sets a legal precedent safeguarding the fundamental rights of IPLCs with REDD+ project implementation and shows that progress is being made to improve the likelihood that REDD+ will result in genuine benefits to those affected by project implementation.

To ensure a more authentic engagement with IPLC’s as to result in legitimate and equitable benefit-sharing, improvements must be made by the Colombian government, as well as within the VCM itself. For the former, Colombia’s national registry for GHG mitigation activities must be updated; it has been offline since 2022.<ref name=":10" /> As a result, transparency is lacking. International finance could be utilized as to alleviate this issue, and only with an accurate and reliable database may the market be regulated. In the broader sense, VCM registries must create stricter guidelines promoting transparency. Often PD’s refer to annexed documents that contain relevant information regarding benefit-sharing, though these are often not publicly available.<ref name=":9" /> This limits transparency and increases the likelihood of inequitable agreements being made between project proponents and developers, further exacerbating existing power asymmetries between the two groups and limiting the likelihood that ''consulta previa'' is honestly adhered to.<ref name=":10" /> This has led to conflict within Indigenous communities, rather than a strengthening of their social fabric.

Furthermore, the Mataven project calls into question the actual emissions reduction that REDD+ projects achieve. Whilst Colombia has since updated its regulations such that REDD+ must use baselines that comply with national reference levels, it is up in the air as to how representative these guidelines are. Reference areas must represent project areas and without the appropriate regulations in place project developers lack the incentive to create realistic baselines; ultimately they are aiming to produce the maximum number of credits as to generate the greatest possible revenues.

==Conclusion==
As a market-based mechanism, REDD+ is shackled by the construct in which it operates; fundamentally it is a capitalist means of fixing a capitalist problem, which comes with limitations. Both Brazil and Colombia have relatively robust laws that have been written into the constitution, ultimately promoting more equitable results of project implementation. However, as in Colombia IPLC’s collectively own the land, whereas in Brazil these groups only own rights to use the land,<ref name=":2" /> Colombia can be considered better equipped for the establishment of REDD+ projects on traditional Indigenous territory. However, even with these laws in place enforcement remain a matter of concern. Furthermore, given the wide variety of ontological and epistemological perspectives of Indigenous communities, and how these views conflict with the Western worldview from which market-based REDD+ came to fruition, there is an inherent difficulty in implementing a system of governance in REDD+ on Indigenous lands.<ref name=":1" />. Putting a price on nature conflicts with Indigenous perspectives and there have been instances where this has attacked the social and cultural fabric of IPLC’s.<ref name=":17" /> To avoid this REDD+ developers must have the genuine intent of understanding the perspective of the Indigenous group they are working with and aim to implement REDD+ with a bottom-up approach.

In both countries, transparency must be improved to ensure that FPIC is adhered to and subsequently ensure fair IPLC representation and engagement. This issue predominantly arises due to the poor requirements of standards in the VCM. As such, proponents are guided by developers which have little incentive to truly act in the interests of Indigenous groups; ultimately the organizations in charge of project development are interested in increasing project revenues. This has led to instances of over-crediting, as without a transparent framework in which to operate it is difficult to evaluate the legitimacy of the claims being made by project proponents and developers. However, with recent advances that address concerns of additionality<ref name=":15" /> there is hope for improved market integrity. Standards of the VCM must continue to be scrutinized to ensure that progress continues to be made.

Going forward, progress should be made to formalize the customary laws and traditional lands of IPLCs, and finance should be directed towards the enforcement of these laws. The environmental,<ref name=":16" /> economic,<ref name=":5" /><ref>Ding, H., Veit, P. G., Blackman, A., Gray, E., Reytar, K., Altamirano, J. C., Hodgdon, B., (2016). ''Climate benefits, tenure costs: The economic case for securing Indigenous land rights in the Amazon''. WRI. [[/files.wri.org/d8/s3fs-public/Climate Benefits Tenure Costs Executive Summary.pdf|https://files.wri.org/d8/s3fs-public/Climate_Benefits_Tenure_Costs_Executive_Summary.pdf]]</ref> and social<ref>Sarmiento Barletti, J. P., Heise Vigil, N., & Larson, A. M. (2023). ''Safeguards at a glance: Are voluntary standards supporting community land, resource and carbon rights?'' CIFOR-ICRAF. [[/www.cifor-icraf.org/publications/pdf files/Flyer/REDD-Safeguards-7.pdf|https://www.cifor-icraf.org/publications/pdf_files/Flyer/REDD-Safeguards-7.pdf]] </ref> benefits of this have been researched and are well understood. By developing culturally appropriate frameworks for rights-based conservation regimes, that work with IPLCs in accordance with their worldviews, REDD+ could be used to promote Indigenous autonomy. However, progress still must be made to achieve this goal.

==References==

Documentation:Open Case Studies/FRST522/2024/REDD+ in Indigenous Amazonia: What works and what doesn’t?

2024-12-12T22:05:26Z

ConnorHaynes: /* Interested and affected stakeholders */

__TOC__

==Positionality==
First and foremost I am not Indigenous, and whilst there are a myriad of cultures, ontologies and epistemologies that are not sufficiently represented by simply stating ‘Indigenous’, it is commonly accepted that these worldviews are vastly different to those of the ‘Western’ world, which is the world in which I grew up and matured. I am therefore only understanding of Indigenous cultures, beliefs and customary laws based upon available online literature and those which I have learnt through life, in addition to those introduced to me in my Master’s degree. As such, I will never be able to fully relate to an Indigenous person; the best I can do is try to understand and learn. Only throughout this process am I able to work towards reconciliation and attempt to address the inequities experienced by Indigenous folk globally.

Additionally, I am yet to act as a carbon project proponent and so do not understand the nuances or stresses of undertaking such a task. Whilst an individual proponent may have the best intention of procuring a carbon project for its social and environmental benefits, there are a number of stakeholders involved throughout the entire process which influence its eventual outcome. Without experience acting as a project proponent I am naïve in understanding the process and it's difficulties.

==Acronyms / Terminology==
'''Acronyms:'''

AFOLU: Agriculture, Forestry and Other Land-Use

ICVCM: Integrity Council for the Voluntary Carbon Market

IPLC: Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities

KMGBF: Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework

LAC: Latin American Countries

MRV: Monitoring, Reporting and Verification

REDD+: Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation

UNCBD: United Nations Convention on Biological Biodiversity

VCMI: Voluntary Carbon Markets Integrity Initiative

'''Terminology:'''

''Additionality:'' Additionality is the determination of whether the project will lead to the expected outcomes when compared to the baseline or ‘business as usual’ emissions.

''Leakage'': Refers to the shifting of emissions to outside the project boundary as a result of the project’s activities.

''Permanence:'' Permanence refers to the degree to which a carbon credit is equivalent to a permanent removal or reduction in emissions.
==Abstract==
This case study illustrates two examples of Indigenous-led REDD+ projects on Indigenous territory in Colombia and Brazil. Both countries have a relatively long history of engaging with REDD+ but have slightly different legal structures pertaining to the rights of Indigenous peoples on their traditional territories, and specifically their ‘carbon’ rights. As such, the intention is to evaluate how these differing ''de jure'' rights translate on the ground. With respect to REDD+, do certain rights result in legitimately positive benefits to IPLCs, as well as the environment that these projects were originally intended to protect? To reduce inconsistency, projects were chosen that utilized the same standard, namely Verra’s ‘Verified Carbon Standard’. The intention is such that the reader can evaluate the effectiveness and true benefit of REDD+ projects to IPLC’s, based upon the legal frameworks of the host country. A secondary intention is such that the reader is better equipped to conduct a prefeasibility assessment based upon available online literature, to evaluate the likelihood that REDD+ can be implemented in any chosen country, with the genuine intent of benefiting IPLC’s that are directly affected as a result of REDD+ project implementation.

==REDD+ and the VCM in Brazil and Colombia==
REDD+, originally introduced by the UNFCCC, is a market-based mechanism sitting within the VCM that aims to reverse the loss of forests and carbon stocks, specifically in developing countries. Simply put, an entity or an individual can voluntarily pay another that has engaged with REDD+ and subsequently sequestered carbon, to offset their own emissions using ‘credits’, sold as units of greenhouse gas equivalent to one ton of carbon dioxide (CO2e). Forestry and Land-Use remains to be the largest category of carbon credits traded by transaction volume on the VCM, with REDD+ being the most popular project type in this category, accounting for 78% of credits traded.<ref name=":0">Procton, A., (2024). ''State of the voluntary carbon market 2024: On the path to maturity.'' Forest Trends Ecosystem Marketplace.</ref> Furthermore, over one-third of the credits sold within this category were sourced from projects that had been implemented in LAC and the Caribbean in 2024.<ref name=":0" /> Of the four largest standards issuing carbon credits, Verra accounts for roughly 80% of issuances in Latin America,<ref>Pullins, T. (2022). Growth of carbon markets in Latin America. White & Case. [[/www.whitecase.com/publications/insight/latin-america-focus-fall-2022-growth-carbon-markets|https://www.whitecase.com/publications/insight/latin-america-focus-fall-2022-growth-carbon-markets]] </ref> and even in the face of recent scrutiny,<ref>West, T. A. P., Bofim, B., Haya, B. K. (2024). Methodological issues with deforestation baselines compromise the integrity of carbon offsets from REDD+. ''Global Environmental Change, 87'' [[/doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2024.102863|https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2024.102863]]</ref><ref>Wyburd I., & Dufrasne, G. (2023). Error Log: Exposing the methodological failures of REDD+ forestry projects. Carbon Market Watch. [[/carbonmarketwatch.org/publications/error-log-exposing-the-methodological-failures-of-redd-forestry-projects/|https://carbonmarketwatch.org/publications/error-log-exposing-the-methodological-failures-of-redd-forestry-projects/]]</ref><ref name=":15">Haya, B. K., Alford-Jones, K., Anderegg, W. R. L., Beymer-Farris, B., Blanchard, L., Bomfim, B., Chin, D., Evans, S., Hogan, M., Holm, J. A., McAfee, K., So, I. S., West, T. A. P., & Withey, L. (2023). ''Quality assessment of REDD+ carbon credit projects''. Berkeley Carbon Trading Project. [[/gspp.berkeley.edu/research-and-impact/centers/cepp/projects/berkeley-carbontrading-project/REDD+|https://gspp.berkeley.edu/research-and-impact/centers/cepp/projects/berkeley-carbontrading-project/REDD+]]</ref> REDD+ projects account for a significant proportion of the VCM with their continued application likely to persist.<ref>Gordon, O. (2022). ''The interwoven fortunes of carbon markets and indigenous communities.'' Energy Monitor. [[/www.energymonitor.ai/tech/carbon-removal/the-interwoven-fortunes-of-carbon-markets-and-indigenous-communities/|https://www.energymonitor.ai/tech/carbon-removal/the-interwoven-fortunes-of-carbon-markets-and-indigenous-communities/]]</ref><ref>Müller, M., Coustar, C., Bietta, F., Mathres, M. (2022). ''UNFCCC REDD+ and the power of sovereign carbon.'' Deutsche Banke Chief Investment Office. [[/www.rainforestcoalition.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/CIO-Special-UNFCCC-REDD-power-of-sovereign-carbon.pdf|https://www.rainforestcoalition.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/CIO-Special-UNFCCC-REDD-power-of-sovereign-carbon.pdf]]</ref><ref>Pullins, T. (2022). ''Growth of carbon markets in Latin America.'' White & Case. [[/www.whitecase.com/publications/insight/latin-america-focus-fall-2022-growth-carbon-markets|https://www.whitecase.com/publications/insight/latin-america-focus-fall-2022-growth-carbon-markets]] </ref> With the introduction of updated methodologies aimed at addressing these concerns,<ref>Verra (2023a). ''Setting the Standard: Verra’s Revolutionary New REDD Methodology.'' [[/verra.org/program-notice/setting-the-standard-verras-revolutionary-new-redd-methodology/|https://verra.org/program-notice/setting-the-standard-verras-revolutionary-new-redd-methodology/]]</ref><ref>Verra (2023b). ''VM0048 Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation, v1.0.'' [[/verra.org/methodologies/vm0048-reducing-emissions-from-deforestation-and-forest-degradation-v1-0/|https://verra.org/methodologies/vm0048-reducing-emissions-from-deforestation-and-forest-degradation-v1-0/]]</ref> there is hope for renewed buyer confidence in the integrity of this market,<ref>MSCI (2023). ''Verra’s New Methodology for Unplanned Deforestation Aims to Silence the Critics''. [[/www.msci.com/www/blog-posts/verra-s-new-methodology-for/04577808942|https://www.msci.com/www/blog-posts/verra-s-new-methodology-for/04577808942]]</ref> though more work still needs to be done.

Both Colombia and Brazil have a relatively long history of implementing REDD+ projects, using both fund-based and market-based mechanisms. For example, both countries were participants in the ‘Amazon Indigenous REDD+ (RIA in Spanish) initiative, with the first pilot implementation project being initiated in Colombia’s Puiawai Natural Reserve.<ref>Garzón, E., (2017). ''Amazon Indigenous REDD+: An innovative approach to conserve Colombian forests?'' Mongabay. [[/news.mongabay.com/2017/01/amazon-indigenous-redd-an-innovative-approach-to-conserve-colombian-forests/|https://news.mongabay.com/2017/01/amazon-indigenous-redd-an-innovative-approach-to-conserve-colombian-forests/]]</ref> The relevance of these two countries with respect to REDD+ is simple. Much of the Amazon’s primary tropical rainforest falls within these countries jurisdiction and this rainforest has been consistently under threat from external pressures and encroachment, whether that be in the form of land-clearing for commercial ranching, subsistence purposes, illicit drug production or illegal mining practices,<ref name=":8">Sánchez García, P. A. & Wong, G. Y., (2024) “The political economy of deforestation in the Colombian Amazon”, ''Journal of Political Ecology'' ''31''(1), 178–199. [[/doi.org/10.2458/jpe.5230|https://doi.org/10.2458/jpe.5230]]</ref><ref>Radwin, M. (2023). ''Drug trafficking fuels other deforestation drivers in the Amazon: report.'' Mongabay. [[/news.mongabay.com/2023/07/drug-trafficking-fuels-other-deforestation-drivers-in-the-amazon-report/|https://news.mongabay.com/2023/07/drug-trafficking-fuels-other-deforestation-drivers-in-the-amazon-report/]]</ref><ref>Haddad, E.A., Araújo, I.F., Feltran-Barbieri, R., Perobelli, F. S., Rocha, A., Sass, K. S., Nobre, C. A. (2024). Economic drivers of deforestation in the Brazilian Legal Amazon. ''Nat Sustain'' ''7'', 1141–1148. [[/doi.org/10.1038/s41893-024-01387-7|https://doi.org/10.1038/s41893-024-01387-7]] </ref><ref>Hänggli, A., Levy, S. A., Armenteras, D., Bovolo, C. I., Brandão, J., Rueda, X., & Garrett, R. D. (2023). A systematic comparison of deforestation drivers and policy effectiveness across the amazon biome. ''Environmental Research Letters, 18''(7), 073001. [[/doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/acd408|https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/acd408]]</ref> to name a few.

In theory, REDD+ can be used to provide the economic incentive to promote sustained environmental protection of Indigenous lands, with a focus on the rights and livelihoods of IPLCs. Currently the overall funding to IPLCs tenure rights and forest management in tropical countries is low, receiving just $270 million per year between 2011-2020 from bilateral and multilateral donors and private philanthropies.<ref>Hatcher, J., Owen, M., Yin, D., (2021). ''Falling short: Donor funding for Indigenous peoples and local communities to secure tenure rights and manage forests in tropical countries (2011 -2020).'' Rainforest Foundation Norway. [[/dv719tqmsuwvb.cloudfront.net/documents/Publikasjoner/Andre-rapporter/RFN Falling short 2021.pdf|https://dv719tqmsuwvb.cloudfront.net/documents/Publikasjoner/Andre-rapporter/RFN_Falling_short_2021.pdf]]</ref> REDD+ has the potential to channel funding as to promote Indigenous rights and autonomy, provided there is transparent and equitable benefit-sharing for those involved. Fundamentally, only with the inclusion of IPLC’s, or preferably with IPLC’s acting as project proponents, is REDD+ able to promote Indigenous agency and improve IPLC rights and governance. And only when the rights of those inhabiting the land are formally recognized can the land be effectively conserved.<ref name=":16">Reytar, K., Veit, P., von Braun, J. (2024). ''Protecting Biodiversity Hinges on Securing Indigenous and Community Land Rights.'' WRI. [[/www.wri.org/insights/indigenous-and-local-community-land-rights-protect-biodiversity|https://www.wri.org/insights/indigenous-and-local-community-land-rights-protect-biodiversity]]</ref> The inclusion of IPLCs in REDD+ project development is therefore considered to be essential for project success, and this is in theory embodied in the very nature of REDD+.<ref name=":1">Alvarez, G., Elfving, M. and Andrade, C. (2016) ‘REDD+ governance and indigenous peoples in Latin America: the case of Suruí Carbon Project in the Brazilian Amazon Forest’, ''Latin American J. Management for Sustainable Development 3''(2) pp.133–146. [[/dx.doi.org/10.1504/LAJMSD.2016.083705|10.1504/LAJMSD.2016.083705]]</ref> Partially owing to a long history of dealing with REDD+, Colombia and Brazil are amongst just a few of the countries hosting tropical rainforests that explicitly recognise community rights to carbon and tie these rights to the legal ownership of lands and forests. In Colombia, carbon rights are tied to rights of the land, whereas in Brazil carbon rights are tied to forest rights.<ref name=":2">RRI and McGill University (2021). Technical report: ''Status of legal recognition of Indigenous Peoples’, Local Communities’ and Afro-descendant Peoples’ rights to carbon stored in tropical lands and forests''. Rights and Resources Initiative. [[/doi.org/10.53892/MLQQ5744|https://doi.org/10.53892/MLQQ5744]]</ref>

==Brazil: The Suruí Forest Carbon Project==
====Project description and location====
The Surui Forest Carbon project was implemented in 2009 on the territory of the Surui people, which is situated in the southern part of Brazil’s Amazon between the states of Rondônia and Mato Grosso. Surui Indigenous territory covers an area of 2,481 km2, though the intention of the PCFS was to protect a portion of this total area. According to the PD, the stated objective was to “prevent 13,575.3 hectares of tropical forest from being cleared by 2038, to avoid the emission of 7,258,352.3 tCO2e to the atmosphere, and to contribute to the preservation of the Paiter Surui lifestyle and traditions.”<ref>IDESAM (2011). ''Project description: Surui forest carbon project''. Institute for Conservation and Sustainable Development of Amazonas. Link: "PROJ_DESC_1118_02FEB2012.PDF" found at [[/registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/1118|https://registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/1118]] </ref> This region sits within one of the Brazilian Amazon’s main ‘arcs of deforestation’ and pressure from loggers and ranchers is a matter of concern.

Notably, the PCFS was the first REDD+ project to be proposed by Indigenous peoples in the Brazilian Amazon on their own territory and was the first to receive certification by both the VCS and CCBS.<ref name=":1" />. Metareilá, the Surui’s own Indigenous association, acted as project proponent and the Institute for Conservation and Sustainable Development of Amazonas (IDESAM) assisted with project development, alongside multiple other stakeholder groups. As an endogenous initiative procured and conducted by the Surui community, the SFCP had a ‘non-centralized model of governance’, which reflected the characteristics and traditions of the Surui people. <ref name=":1" />

Only after two years of consultations between the 24 communities involved and the relevant governmental agencies (primarily FUNAI and the Ministry of Environment) was a Memorandum of Understanding signed, showing community consent to develop the project.<ref name=":3">Garcia, B., Rimmer, L., Canal Vieira, L., Mackey, B., (2021). REDD+ and forest protection on indigenous lands in the Amazon. ''RECIEL 30'', 207–219. [[/doi.org/10.1111/reel.12389|https://doi.org/10.1111/reel.12389]]</ref> In 2012 after verification from an independent third-party body, the Surui were able to sell carbon credits on the international market. Between 2009 and 2014 the project drastically helped limit the deforestation occurring within the project’s site, causing many to deem it a success.<ref name=":4">Howard, F. E., (2023). ''An Analysis of the Suruí Forest Carbon Project in Context of Settler Colonialism''. Masters thesis. Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University. [[/vtechworks.lib.vt.edu/server/api/core/bitstreams/b0cde6de-794c-453f-856b-ee72bde3db06/content|https://vtechworks.lib.vt.edu/server/api/core/bitstreams/b0cde6de-794c-453f-856b-ee72bde3db06/content]]</ref>

====National climate targets, policies and legislation====
Rates of deforestation in Brazil’s legal Amazon are significantly impacted by the government in charge. This is evidenced in the decade between 2012 and 2021 whilst under the conservative Bolsonaro administration, when deforestation in the Amazon increased 185% — from a loss of 4,571 km2 in 2012 to 13,038 km2 in 2021.<ref>INPE (2022). ''Observação da Terra. [[/www.obt.inpe.br/OBT/assuntos/programas/amazonia/prodes|http://www.obt.inpe.br/OBT/assuntos/programas/amazonia/prodes]]''</ref> However, since Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s appointment in 2022 there has been a steady decline in the rate of deforestation, which is now roughly half what it was in 2021.<ref>Terra Brasilis (2024). ''PRODES (deforestation): Deforestation rates – Legal Amazon – States''. [[/terrabrasilis.dpi.inpe.br/app/dashboard/deforestation/biomes/legal amazon/rates|https://terrabrasilis.dpi.inpe.br/app/dashboard/deforestation/biomes/legal_amazon/rates]]</ref> A significant proportion of emissions result from the clearing of rainforest and its subsequent conversion to ranching.<ref>MCTI (2022). ''Estimativas Anuais De Emissões De Gases De Efeito Estufa No Brasil.'' 6ª Edição. Ministério da Estado da Ciência, Tecnologia e Inovações. [[/www.gov.br/mcti/pt-br/acompanhe-o-mcti/sirene/publicacoes/estimativas-anuais-de-emissoes-gee/arquivos/6a-ed-estimativas-anuais.pdf|https://www.gov.br/mcti/pt-br/acompanhe-o-mcti/sirene/publicacoes/estimativas-anuais-de-emissoes-gee/arquivos/6a-ed-estimativas-anuais.pdf]]</ref> To address these emissions Brazil has implemented various adaptation policies, legislation and targets which are summarized below:

TABLE
====Indigenous rights - Constitutional, tenure and bundle rights====
In Brazil, Indigenous rights are robust and clearly defined according to the Brazilian Constitution. As a result, the Indigenous communities of the Brazilian Amazon have legal title to 13.8% of the national territory totalling 1.175 million km2, with a total of 631 territories.<ref>Federal government of Brazil (2024). ''Brazil’s NDC: National determination to contribute and transform''. [[/unfccc.int/sites/default/files/2024-11/Brazil Second Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) November2024.pdf|https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/2024-11/Brazil_Second%20Nationally%20Determined%20Contribution%20%28NDC%29_November2024.pdf]]</ref>

TABLE

Whilst Indigenous communities in Brazil have legal title to land, it is the State that owns it. Indigenous people simply exercise permanent tenure over lands that they traditionally occupy and have ‘original rights’ to these traditional lands, which no other rights can prevail over.<ref name=":3" /> Indigenous lands, though not classified as protected areas, “have the highest level of protection by law because they are regulated by the Constitution” and cannot be leased or restricted without violating their original rights. The Suruí's right to develop the PCFS is grounded in the Brazilian Constitution, which grants Indigenous peoples exclusive rights to use the ‘riches of the soil, rivers and lakes’ of their land, and these rights cannot be overridden. Thus, Indigenous people and only Indigenous people are legally allowed to engage in productive activities on their land, provided these activities are conducted according to their own customs and traditions and are necessary for the wellbeing and cultural expression of their own people. In Brazil, it is the armed forces and federal police that are responsible for enforcing these laws, and FUNAI is responsible for representing Indigenous communities in judicial disputes.<ref name=":3" /> As such, provided a REDD+ does not violate the rights to territorial integrity, permanent land tenure and original rights, it is legally allowed.

'''CARBON RIGHTS:''' In Brazil, carbon rights are tied to forest rights.<ref name=":2" /> Carbon credits from REDD+ projects are seen as part of the economic benefits derived from indigenous lands, and as such, Indigenous communities are entitled to own, control and distribute these revenues themselves. The carbon credits generated from the (SFCP) were wholly owned by the Suruí people through Metareilá, with the Suruí Fund (managed by the Brazilian Biodiversity Fund - FUNBIO) acting as recipient. This legality reinforces Indigenous control over both land and carbon rights, as whoever has rights to the forest land is usually recognized as the owner of carbon rights.<ref name=":3" />

'''FPIC OBLIGATION:''' Furthermore, Brazilian law requires Free, Prior, and Informed Consent (FPIC) for REDD+ projects affecting indigenous lands, ensuring that international standards such as the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) and ILO Convention No. 169 are adhered to; Indigenous consent is, ''de jure,'' a necessity. Projects that violate these rights and fail to consult communities are therefore considered illegal. Notably there are no specific rules or procedures that have been written into the Brazilian constitution that provide guidance on how to achieve FPIC. This freedom reinforces Indigenous autonomy as it allows an Indigenous community to define the rules of consultation according to their customs and traditions.

Collectively these national and international laws provide an important safeguard to Indigenous peoples, making their consent a prerequisite for the establishment of REDD+ projects and recognizing their rights as the main beneficiaries of REDD+ revenues.<ref name=":3" /> However, as carbon rights are tied to forest rights in Brazil and not land rights, carbon is considered to be an ‘environmental service’ (Article 41(I)(A) Brazilian Forestry Code), and states, as well as the federal government, have the jurisdiction to exercise full legislative authority over carbon. <ref name=":2" /> As such, certain states have interpreted the law to imply that the title to carbon credits is attributable to the state.<ref>Loft, L., Ravikumar, A., Gebara, M. F., Pham, T. T., Resosudarmo, I. A. P., Assembe, S., Tovar, J. G., Mwangi, E., & Andersson, K. (2015). Taking Stock of Carbon Rights in REDD+ Candidate Countries: Concept Meets Reality. ''Forests'', ''6''(4), 1031-1060. [[/doi.org/10.3390/f6041031|https://doi.org/10.3390/f6041031]]</ref> Hence, even when carbon rights are clearly defined and tied to forest title it is insufficient in itself, and only by legally recognizing the customary rights of IPLCs can a fair and equitable outcome be realised.

====Interested and affected stakeholders====
TABLE
====Discussion====
Although originally successful in achieving its goal of reducing deforestation and degradation, in 2016 diamonds were discovered in Surui territory, leading to an increase in illegal logging and mining.<ref name=":1" /> By 2018 the project site had been completely overrun by ''garimpeiros'' (small-scale gold miners), ultimately leading to the projects suspension that year. <ref name=":4" />

While the project had initially garnered support, divisions emerged within the community post-project implementation. Disputes arose over the unequal distribution of project revenues, leading to internal conflicts between different Suruí clans. These criticisms escalated in 2014 when the Catholic Indigenous Missionary Council supported calls for an end to the project due to mismanagement of revenues from carbon credit sales. <ref name=":3" /> Some Suruí members also argued that the REDD+ initiative harmed their way of life.<ref>Lang, C. (2014). ''“What are projects for that destroy life?” Interview with Henrique Suruí about the Paiter-Suruí REDD project, Brazil.'' REDD-Monitor. [[/redd-monitor.org/2014/12/17/what-are-projects-for-that-destroy-life-interview-with-henrique-surui-about-the-paiter-surui-redd-project-brazil/|https://redd-monitor.org/2014/12/17/what-are-projects-for-that-destroy-life-interview-with-henrique-surui-about-the-paiter-surui-redd-project-brazil/]]</ref>

Further complicating the situation was the controversial role of Henrique Suruí, one of the Suruí tribal leaders. In 2011, it was revealed that Henrique had violated the tribe's logging moratorium, collaborating with loggers in illegal activities. While Henrique later denied responsibility for the project’s failure, his actions, combined with internal disagreements, illustrated the lack of consensus within the Suruí leadership on the project’s goals and outcomes. Both of the tribe’s leaders possessed dramatically different perspectives on how they believed they could ensure agency, autonomy, and economic benefits for the Suruí people.<ref name=":4" /> This fragmentation within the community, in combination with the discovery of diamonds and the state's failure to protect indigenous land rights led to the indefinite suspension of the REDD+ project.

The project's collapse highlights broader structural issues, particularly the state's inconsistent support for indigenous land rights, influenced by settler colonialism, which undermined the project’s long-term viability.<ref name=":4" /> Additionally, the project’s creation was shaped by external actors, including the collaboration between Almir Suruí and Borges from Forest Trends, a Washington-based NGO. This partnership introduced a Western perspective on viewing the Suruí peoples forest, in contrast with their own perspectives on land use and governance. Furthermore, despite Borges’ Brazilian background, the power dynamics between a global North organization and a developing, Indigenous community were apparent.

====Summary====
The Suruí Forest Carbon Project provides an interesting example of how, even when the rights of IPLC’s are relatively robust, challenges persist in ensuring REDD+ project longevity. As such, in its current state, REDD+ in the Brazilian Amazon may not be a suitable market-based option for indigenous communities in the Amazon.<ref name=":3" /> Although initially successful in promoting indigenous autonomy and reducing deforestation, the project resulted in failure due to of a myriad of factors. Division between Surui communities was exacerbated by a perceived unequal benefit-sharing, and the impact of imposing REDD+ seems to have complicated the traditional social structure that the Surui were dependent on. These issues were influenced by Brazil's settler state dynamics, where indigenous land rights, although legally recognized, are often not upheld in practice due to insufficient enforcement.<ref name=":4" /> Ultimately, the Surui project reveals how settler colonialism's structural flaws make long-term project success difficult, despite initial progress in promoting indigenous autonomy.

At the national and state level, complex institutional and legal land governance structures convolute and impede REDD+ in Brazil. Multiple institutions share responsibilities and there is no comprehensive, authoritative database of land ownership, which hampers efforts to protect indigenous territories.<ref name=":5">Costa, R. (2016)''. Insecure land rights in Brazil: Consequences for rural areas and challenges for improvement.'' Climate Policy Initiative. [[/www.climatepolicyinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/Insecure Land Rights in Brazil CPI.pdf|https://www.climatepolicyinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/Insecure_Land_Rights_in_Brazil_CPI.pdf]]</ref> As a result, land tenure disputes remain common and can be witnessed occurring between the public as well between public and state actors. For example, Brazil’s 1964 Land Statute (Law No. 4504) allows the government to takeover unproductive farms and transfer those lands to landless peasants. This often results in the clearing of forest, as only when the land is cleared is it evidenced to be ‘productive’.<ref name=":5" /> Hence, not only does this law cause insecurity for Indigenous populations in Brazil, it also forces them to go against customary traditions of stewarding the land in an effort to maintain its control.

Whilst the aforementioned points to the futility of REDD+ in Brazil, there is reason to maintain optimism. In a recent landmark ruling Brazil’s supreme court voted in favour of the Xoleng peoples, and the decision will serve as a precedent for all cases involving Indigenous peoples.<ref name=":6">Amos-Flom, K., (2023). ''Triumph and Turmoil: The Xokleng Case and the Future of Indigenous Land Rights in Brazil.'' Columbia Journal of Transnational Law. [[/www.jtl.columbia.edu/bulletin-blog/triumph-and-turmoil-the-xokleng-case-and-the-future-of-indigenous-land-rights-in-brazil|https://www.jtl.columbia.edu/bulletin-blog/triumph-and-turmoil-the-xokleng-case-and-the-future-of-indigenous-land-rights-in-brazil]]</ref> The Xokleng’s land dispute, settled in 2023, “rejected Santa Catarina state’s marco temporal (“time limit”) argument, which would have required Indigenous people to prove they occupied or legally contested the territory they claimed before the Brazilian Constitution came into force in 1988. If successful, this argument would have led to disastrous repercussions, as many indigenous peoples had been forcibly removed or are traditionally nomadic.”<ref name=":6" /> Evidently, whilst slow, progress has been made in Brazil in recent years with respect to Indigenous rights as well as the voluntary carbon market itself.

There are currently 159 AFOLU projects listed on the Verra database in Brazil, with only two specifically focused on REDD+ initiatives in collaboration with Indigenous groups. These are the Ka’a Pyahu project, <ref>Verra (n.d.) ''Project 5087: KA'A PYAHU.'' https://registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/5087</ref> initiated by the Guajajara Indigenous people in collaboration with external organizations and validated in 2021, and the ‘Together for the forest Awaete REDD+ project’<ref>Verra (n.d.) ''Project 5200: TOGETHER FOR THE FOREST AWAETÉ REDD+ PROJECT.'' https://registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/5200</ref> which is still under development. Both projects involve Indigenous groups working with Brazilian organizations to build technical capacity and expertise. This could signal a growing trend of Indigenous-led REDD+ projects in the future. To ensure a positive future for REDD+ in Brazil, the customary rights of IPLC’s must be formally recognized. IPLC should have legal ownership of their traditional lands, and in doing so the carbon rights of these communities would be less convoluted, leading to more equitable benefit-sharing and increased cohesion amongst these groups post-project implementation.

==Colombia: ''REDD+ project Resguardo Indigena Unificado - Selva de Mataven (RUI-SM)''==
'''Project description and location'''

According to the PD,<ref name=":7">ACATISEMA & Mediamos (2017). ''Joint project description and monitoring report: REDD+ project: Resguardo Indigena Unificado – Selva de Mataven (RIU – SM).'' Link: “10 06 2017_VCS Final Report_ Matavin Project.pdf” found at [[/registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/1566|https://registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/1566]]</ref> the Resguardo Indígena Unificado – Selva de Matavén (RIU-SM) project is located east of the Colombian Orinoco high plain, in the eastern part of the Department of Vichada, municipality of Cumaribo. It resides on the formalized resguardo of the Sikuani, Piaroa, Puinave, Curripaco, Cubeo and Piapoco ethnic groups, spanning 1,856,836 hectares, with 1,477,115 hectares (79.6%) being forested. The project states that it will reduce greenhouse gas emissions, with a total estimated net reduction of 108,670,562 tons of CO2 equivalent over thirty years, from years 2013 – 2042. By this metric, it is the 14th largest project on the Verra registry, out of over 1700 projects.<ref name=":9">Dufrasne, D., (2021). ''Two Shades of Green: How hot air forest credits are being used to avoid carbon taxes in Colombia''. Carbon Market Watch. [[/carbonmarketwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Two-shades-of-green EN WEB.pdf|https://carbonmarketwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Two-shades-of-green_EN_WEB.pdf]]</ref> There are 12,312 indigenous people living in the RIU-SM, belonging to 2,517 families and 250 communities as of 2017.

The project was initiated by the Asociación de Cabildos y Autoridades Indígenas de la Selva de Matavén (ACETISMA), an Indigenous association, and developed by MEDIAMOS F&M, a Colombian consultancy firm. ACETISMA is comprised of Indigenous leaders that represent the 17 communities of the reservation in charge of governing the territory, and it has administrative autonomy, as well as “the capacity to acquire, to own and to dispose of property, to accept donations, to hold national and international conventions, scientific and cultural exchanges and generally, to celebrate all kinds of negotiations and agreements with which the Association can achieve its objectives.”<ref name=":7" />

There is a stated focus on various means of improving the living conditions of the Indigenous peoples living within the project area. To summarise, the main objectives of the REDD+ project RIU-SM include:

· Community development, in the form of improved education.

· Community engagement with respect to the project; developing information channels to reveal project progress.

· Support local initiatives for environmental education and waste management.

· Developing an effective response system that addresses community proposals and concerns relating to the project.

· Strengthening the governance of ACATISEMA.

====National climate targets, policies and legislation====
The Colombian Amazon makes up over one-third of Colombia’s national territory, and up until 2005 only 7.3% of the Colombian Amazon had been deforested, largely due to the country's 60-year armed conflict between the government, multiple left-wing guerillas such as FARC, and several far-right paramilitary groups.<ref name=":8" /> However, following the signing of the Peace Treaty in 2016 and demobilization of the FARC, limits to deforestation were weakened in the Colombian Amazon. Poor but opportunistic peasants began to encroach into previously unchartered territory and capitalize from the rainforest. Due to the poor economic integration of the Amazon, many were forced to engage with the traditional economies of cocoa and cattle ranching, as these markets were already well connected to regional and global markets.<ref name=":8" /> To address the drivers of deforestation and its associated emissions, the federal government has implemented various initiatives, which are summarized below:
{| class="wikitable"
|'''Document name'''
|'''Type (target, policy or legislation)'''
|'''Publication year'''
|'''Key takeaways'''
|-
|
|Target
|?
|Reduce GHG emissions by 51 % by 2030.
|-
|
|Target
|?
|Net zero by 2050
|-
|National Climate Change Policy (PNCC)
|
|2018
|
|-
|National Forest Conservation Program
|
|2011
|
|-
|Law 1931 of 2018 – Climate Change Law

|
|2018
|
|-
| colspan="4" |Relating to REDD+
|-
|National Strategy for Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (ENREDD+).”
|
|2009
|
|-
|Amazon Indigenous REDD+ Initiative
|
|2012
|
|-
|USAID's Colombia BIOREDD+ program
|
|
|Develop a portfolio of 8 REDD+ projects in four geographic nodes covering over 700,000 hectares in the Colombian Pacific.

|-
|Vision Amazonia
|
|2015
|part of the REDD+ strategy in the country financed by three foreign countries: Germany, Norway and United Kingdom
|}
As a result of the many fund and market-based initiatives that Colombia has engaged with, it hosts the second most REDD+ projects in the world. REDD+ projects now cover at least 56% of the area of legally recognized Indigenous territories in the Colombian Amazon, with an overwhelming majority of carbon projects located on Indigenous territories.<ref name=":10">Schmid, D., & Castro. C., (2023). ''REDD+ projects in the Colombian Amazon: Social challenges and lack of transparency''. Rainforest Foundation Norway. [[/dv719tqmsuwvb.cloudfront.net/documents/REDD rapport 2024 ENG.pdf|https://dv719tqmsuwvb.cloudfront.net/documents/REDD_rapport_2024_ENG.pdf]]</ref> Evidently REDD+ plays an integral part in the country’s efforts of environmental conservation, and incentives have been introduced to promote the development of such projects. For example, in 2016 the government adopted a higher tax that covered fossil fuels, but companies are able to avoid paying the tax by investing in carbon offsets that have been generated domestically.<ref name=":9" /> This led to a boost in the domestic REDD+ market in 2017, as Colombian companies invested as to escape higher taxes. Notably, 23 of the 36 REDD+ projects currently under development in the Amazon region were initiated in or after 2018.<ref name=":10" /> Currently Colombia’s REDD+ program sits at over 45 pilot and voluntary carbon projects, as well as one large-scale jurisdictional approach in the Amazon.<ref name=":11">Zambrano-Cortés, D. G. (2024). ''The politics, spaces and subjects of forest conservation in Colombia''. [internal PhD, WU, Wageningen University]. Wageningen University. [[/doi.org/10.18174/675328|https://doi.org/10.18174/675328]]</ref>

====Indigenous rights - Constitutional, tenure and bundle rights====
''De jure'', the Indigenous peoples of Colombia have comprehensive tenure and bundle rights that have been articulated in the national constitution. Collective land titles are granted to Indigenous communities by the Colombian government, and as a result about 34 percent of Colombian land (almost 38 million hectares) is legally recognized as Indigenous territory or collective lands of Afro-descendent communities.<ref name=":10" /> These collective land tenure rights have been in effect since the implementation of the 1991 constitution, granting them the authority to exercise legal control over their territories in accordance with their own customs and procedures.<ref>Max Planck Institute (n.d.) ''Colombia 1991 (rev. 2015).'' Institute. [[/www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Colombia 2015|https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Colombia_2015]]</ref> Furthermore, the carbon rights of Indigenous peoples are explicitly defined in the constitution and tied specifically to the ownership of land of the communities.<ref name=":2" /> This in theory provides a solid legal basis for upholding the rights of Indigenous communities in Colombia, specifically relating to REDD+ activities, as it allows communities to define and negotiate the terms of said projects. A summary of the various laws relating to Indigenous rights have been summarized below:
{| class="wikitable"
| colspan="2" |'''Law (1991 constitution)'''
|-
|Article 63

|Indigenous territories are considered collective property. Land is not owned by individuals but is shared by the community. The state must respect these collective rights and cannot alter land ownership without the consent of the Indigenous peoples.
|-
|Article 76 - ''Consulta previa''.
|Pertains to the right of Indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities; prior consultation must be undertaken before any entity undertakes activities that may affect their territories, culture, or way of life.
|-
|Article 330
|Indigenous communities have the right to govern their territories.
|-
|Article 329
|The Reservation is a collective, inalienable, and indefeasible property.
|-
|Decree 1386 of 1994, Article 10; Decree 2164 of 1995, Article 22) 39.
|"The administration and management of these lands are subjected to uses and customs of the beneficiaries."
|}
Whilst land and tenure rights are enshrined into the constitution, the precariousness of these rights persists due to a lack of resources to ensure enforcement, as well as the deeper issue of corruption. As previously stated, the rate of deforestation increased significantly in Colombia’s post-conflict era, evidencing the nations inability to maintain control over unlawful acts of land-grabbing and disposition. Whilst this began with new peasants converting the Amazon for subsistence purposes, it ultimately led to new areas for the growth of cocoa, much to the benefit of narco-traffickers who could monopolize on this illegal surplus in ‘accumulation by dispossession’.<ref name=":8" />

With respect to the legalities of consultation, Colombia has enshrined ''consulta previa'' into the constitution. Translating to ‘prior consultation’, this legal text provides the formal grounds for Indigenous engagement when any legislative or administrative measures are implemented on Indigenous territory. Importantly, consultation should be achieved in accordance with the customs of the ethnic group with which the project is being imposed upon. However, there have been recent cases of contestation specifically relating to how ''consulta previa'' applies to REDD+ on Indigenous lands, and the RIU – SM project was one that was involved with such a case.

====Affected and interested stakeholders====
{| class="wikitable"
| colspan="5" |'''Affected stakeholders'''
|-
|Stakeholders
|Primary objective(s)
|Secondary objective(s)
|Relative power
|Scope of influence
|-
|ACATISEMA - Asociación de Cabildos y Autoridades Indígenas de la Selva de Matavén
|
* Foster the integral development, social and cultural preservation of the indigenous communities in the Mataven Jungle and to
* Consolidate the territory, selfgovernment by partners, the defense, conservation and preservation of the environment and biodiversity of the Mataven Jungle

|
|It is the highest authority in the reservation.
|
|-
|Indigenous ''resguardos'' of the RIU-SM
|
* Primary and direct beneficiaries
* Seek to maintain land rights
* Promote traditional and cultural beliefs
|
|
|
|-
|Colonists
|
|
|
|
|-
| colspan="5" |'''Interested stakeholders'''
|-
|MEDIAMOS F&M – A consultancy
|Project developer
|
|
|
|-
|Mining companies
|Compete with the Project for the territory's resources.
|
|
|
|-
|Ministerio de Ambiente y Desarrollo Sostenible
|Its main interest is to achieve environmental planning, through the consolidation of a policy of sustainable development and strategic alliances with social and institutional participants in different sectoral and territorial scenarios.
|
|
|
|-
|Dirección de Asuntos Indígenas, ROM y Minorías - Ministerio del Interior
|Public agency that advises the national level, prepares and proposes the formulation of public policy in favor of indigenous peoples within the framework of the defense, support, reinforcement and consolidation of ethnic and cultural rights.
|
|
|
|-
|Corporinoquía
|Regional environmental authority to ensure the proper use of natural resources in their area of jurisdiction.
|
|
|
|-
|Other government institutions: Governor ofice of Vichada, Mayor ofice Cumaribo
|The Reservation for being part of the Cumaribo, Vichada, has territorial jurisdiction relations with the Governor’s office and the Mayor’s office.
|
|
|
|-
|Fundación NATURA
|Civil organization whose mission is the conservation, use and management of biodiversity to generate social, economic and environmental benefits in the context of sustainable human development.
|
|
|
|-
|FONDO ACCIÓN
|Colombian non-profit organization in the private scheme. Encourage the participation of civil society and the private sector in the implementation of the country’s public policies in two areas: - Conservation and sustainable development; and protection -development of children.
|
|
|
|-
|SENA, Department of Social Prosperity (DPS), NGOs and private consultants
|Supporting the implementation of rural development activities.
|
|
|Regional
|-
|Other indigenous communities neighboring RIU-SM
|
|
|Low
|Local
|-
|Financial institutions
|They fund local development activities.
|
|
|
|-
|Asocarbono – An industry association, including Verra, ProClima, Biofix, and ACATISEMA.

|
|
|
|
|-
|OPIAC: the National Oganization of the Indigenous Peoples of the Colombian Amazon

|
|
|
|
|}

====Discussion====
According to the official REDD+ Mataven website<ref>RIU – SM (n.d.). ''REDD+ Mataven''. [[/reddmataven.com/|https://reddmataven.com/]]</ref> the project has resulted in a myriad of benefits to the Indigenous communities of the region. For example, as a result of the funds generated from the projects activities, there have been improvements in infrastructure, transportation and education, ultimately leading to the empowerment and improved governance of ACETISMA. However, the project has come under fire for multiple reasons.

For one, in 2015 some of the Indigenous communities filed a lawsuit referring to the violation of their right to ''consulta previa''. However, the court ruled that their Indigenous rights had not been violated as it was ACETISMA that initially sought MEDIAMOS to develop the project, and that ACETISMA were the best representatives of those Indigenous communities. Furthermore, the projects main focus was the conservation of the rainforest and therefore did not threaten the cultural integrity of those communities.<ref name=":10" /> However, regardless of the outcome of this case, its occurrence points to internal disagreement amongst Indigenous participants of the RIU-SM project. In a study involving interviews with Indigenous members of the project, there was a significant proportion of interviewees that had little knowledge regarding various aspects of the project, such as responsibilities of participation, or the benefit-sharing mechanism in place.<ref name=":2" /> This further reinforces the point that, in the case of the RIU-SM project it may not be ‘bottom-up’ and eludes to the power imbalance experienced between Mediamos, the project developer, and Indigenous community members. In the PD there is a breakdown of the distribution of income between ACETISMA and Mediamos, which shows a significant proportion of revenue flowing to the former organisation throughout the project’s operations.<ref name=":7" /> However, there is currently no publicly available documentation supporting this initial claim<ref name=":9" /> as there is no obligation to provide this information, leading to a general lack of transparency in the market and between all of the relevant actors. Subsequent meetings with Indigenous leaders have however shown a marked support of the Mataven project, with one Indigenous leader explicitly stating “...the Redd+ project has brought resources that they never had before, which allowed them to open new school classrooms, 21 rural aqueducts, cocoa crops and even headquarters in Cumaribo and Inírida.”<ref>Lievano, A. B. (2021) Colombia's biggest carbon credit project could be selling hot air. Latin American Center for Investigative Journalism. [[/www.elclip.org/el-mayor-proyecto-de-bonos-de-carbono-de-colombia-podria-estar-vendiendo-aire-caliente/|https://www.elclip.org/el-mayor-proyecto-de-bonos-de-carbono-de-colombia-podria-estar-vendiendo-aire-caliente/]] </ref> Clearly there have been benefits for IPLC’s involved with this project, though the details of this benefit-sharing remain a mystery.

Secondly, the Mataven project has caused controversy due to its apparently inflated carbon credit issuance. The report states that this has been achieved by using a reference area that is not representative of the project area, as well as assuming an uncharacteristically heigh assumed rate of deforestation.<ref name=":12">Global Atlas of Environmental Justice (2023). ''Resguardo Indigena Unificado-Selva de Matavén (RIU SM) REDD+ Project, Colombia.'' [[/ejatlas.org/conflict/redd-project-resguardo-indigena-unificado-selva-de-mataven-riu-sm|https://ejatlas.org/conflict/redd-project-resguardo-indigena-unificado-selva-de-mataven-riu-sm]]</ref> The project used a baseline deforestation rate of 0.86% per year, which is significantly more than the Colombian government's national rate of 0.18%. Additionally, according to the report the reference area chosen is more easily accessed and therefore more prone to deforestation, making it an inaccurate comparison to the relatively remote project area.<ref name=":2" /> This has led to the creation of excess carbon credits, or “hot air” credits, which have been criticized for not reflecting real environmental benefits.<ref name=":9" /> To add further insult to injury these credits have been used by a Colombian fossil fuel distributor company to avoid paying taxes, as described earlier by Colombia’s change in policy in 2017. In doing so, the company avoided paying approximately $18.9 million in taxes.<ref name=":2" /> There has been subsequent back and forth between Verra and Carbon Market Watch, with Verra refuting the claims<ref>Verra (2021). ''Carbon Market Watch Report on Colombian REDD+ Projects Contains Flawed Allegations.'' [[/verra.org/carbon-market-watch-report-on-colombian-redd-projects-contains-flawed-allegations/|https://verra.org/carbon-market-watch-report-on-colombian-redd-projects-contains-flawed-allegations/]] </ref> Regardless of the science, Colombia recently introduced a resolution in 2018 (Resolution 1447 – 2018) that requires projects to use baselines that comply with national reference levels.<ref name=":13">Dufrasne, D. (2021b). Companies use ”hot air” forestry offsets to avoid taxes in Colombia: Carbon Market Watch’s fact-check of Verra’s response. Carbon Market Watch. [[/carbonmarketwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/CMWs-fact-check-of-Verras-response-on-Colombia.pdf|https://carbonmarketwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/CMWs-fact-check-of-Verras-response-on-Colombia.pdf]]</ref><ref>IEA (2022). ''Resolution 1447 – 2018. Monitoring, Reporting, and Verification System for mitigation actions at the national level.'' International Energy Agency. [[/www.iea.org/policies/14772-resolution-1447-2018-monitoring-reporting-and-verification-system-for-mitigation-actions-at-the-national-level|https://www.iea.org/policies/14772-resolution-1447-2018-monitoring-reporting-and-verification-system-for-mitigation-actions-at-the-national-level]]</ref> Going forward, REDD+ projects that are being implemented in Colombia will have to abide by Colombia’s national legislation.

====Summary====
Colombia has a long history of engaging in REDD+ as it has been used to limit environmental degradation in the post-conflict era, in alignment with the country’s national peacebuilding agenda.<ref name=":11" /> Owing to the country’s comprehensive tenure and bundle rights, IPLC’s have robust ''de jure'' rights to land as they collectively own it, and rights to carbon are tied to this ownership. This puts Colombia as one of the world leaders in legal terms relating to REDD+ project implementation, but due to a lack of resources to ensure enforcement, as well as corruption, historically these laws have not been adhered to.<ref name=":10" /><ref name=":2" /> There are many documented cases showing the displacement on IPLC’s from traditional lands, poor efforts to adhere to ''consulta previa'', and inequitable benefit sharing.<ref>Greenfield, P. (2023''). The ‘carbon pirates’ preying on Amazon’s Indigenous communities.'' The Guardian. [[/www.theguardian.com/environment/2023/jan/21/amazon-indigenous-communities-carbon-offsetting-pirates-aoe|https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2023/jan/21/amazon-indigenous-communities-carbon-offsetting-pirates-aoe]]</ref><ref name=":14">Lang, C., (2024). ''Colombia’s Constitutional Court rules in favour of Indigenous Peoples. Identifies serious flaws in the REDD+ Baka Rokarire project.'' REDD_Monitor. [[/reddmonitor.substack.com/p/colombias-constitutional-court-rules|https://reddmonitor.substack.com/p/colombias-constitutional-court-rules]]</ref>

The case of the Mataven project provides an interesting example of how it is the market itself that is failing to address concerns regarding transparency, whether that be relating to benefit-sharing amongst relevant stakeholders, or Indigenous representation and engagement throughout the implementation of REDD+ projects. Some ACATISEMA members have explicitly stated their support for the Mataven project,<ref name=":12" /> and its benefits can be seen first-hand in the form of improved infrastructure in local communities involved with the project.<ref>Myers, J. E., Parra, M. A., Bedford, C. (2021). ''How Carbon Offsetting Can Build a Forest.'' Stanford Social Innovation Review. [[/ssir.org/articles/entry/how carbon offsetting can build a forest|https://ssir.org/articles/entry/how_carbon_offsetting_can_build_a_forest]]</ref> However, an exact breakdown of how and where revenue is being distributed to IPLC’s remains elusive.<ref name=":13" /> Furthermore, the level of IPLC engagement has come into question, specifically with reference to ''consulta previa'' and the overall understanding that IPLC’s have regarding the project’s intended outcomes and activities.<ref name=":10" /> This is not a rare case in Colombia and has been witnessed occurring with other projects that have been implemented on Indigenous territories in the Colombian Amazon.<ref name=":17">Lang, C., (2023''). “It destroys everything,” says Indigenous leader about the REDD+ Baka Rokarire project in Colombia''. REDD Monitor. [[/reddmonitor.substack.com/p/it-destroys-everything-says-indigenous|https://reddmonitor.substack.com/p/it-destroys-everything-says-indigenous]]</ref> However, a recent ruling by the Colombian Constitutional court voted in favour of Indigenous groups in Colombia, upholding “the rights to self-determination, autonomy, self-government, territory, identity, physical and cultural integrity, and free, prior and informed consent of the indigenous communities”.<ref name=":14" /> This review ultimately sets a legal precedent safeguarding the fundamental rights of IPLCs with REDD+ project implementation and shows that progress is being made to improve the likelihood that REDD+ will result in genuine benefits to those affected by project implementation.

To ensure a more authentic engagement with IPLC’s as to result in legitimate and equitable benefit-sharing, improvements must be made by the Colombian government, as well as within the VCM itself. For the former, Colombia’s national registry for GHG mitigation activities must be updated; it has been offline since 2022.<ref name=":10" /> As a result, transparency is lacking. International finance could be utilized as to alleviate this issue, and only with an accurate and reliable database may the market be regulated. In the broader sense, VCM registries must create stricter guidelines promoting transparency. Often PD’s refer to annexed documents that contain relevant information regarding benefit-sharing, though these are often not publicly available.<ref name=":9" /> This limits transparency and increases the likelihood of inequitable agreements being made between project proponents and developers, further exacerbating existing power asymmetries between the two groups and limiting the likelihood that ''consulta previa'' is honestly adhered to.<ref name=":10" /> This has led to conflict within Indigenous communities, rather than a strengthening of their social fabric.

Furthermore, the Mataven project calls into question the actual emissions reduction that REDD+ projects achieve. Whilst Colombia has since updated its regulations such that REDD+ must use baselines that comply with national reference levels, it is up in the air as to how representative these guidelines are. Reference areas must represent project areas and without the appropriate regulations in place project developers lack the incentive to create realistic baselines; ultimately they are aiming to produce the maximum number of credits as to generate the greatest possible revenues.

==Conclusion==
As a market-based mechanism, REDD+ is shackled by the construct in which it operates; fundamentally it is a capitalist means of fixing a capitalist problem, which comes with limitations. Both Brazil and Colombia have relatively robust laws that have been written into the constitution, ultimately promoting more equitable results of project implementation. However, as in Colombia IPLC’s collectively own the land, whereas in Brazil these groups only own rights to use the land,<ref name=":2" /> Colombia can be considered better equipped for the establishment of REDD+ projects on traditional Indigenous territory. However, even with these laws in place enforcement remain a matter of concern. Furthermore, given the wide variety of ontological and epistemological perspectives of Indigenous communities, and how these views conflict with the Western worldview from which market-based REDD+ came to fruition, there is an inherent difficulty in implementing a system of governance in REDD+ on Indigenous lands.<ref name=":1" />. Putting a price on nature conflicts with Indigenous perspectives and there have been instances where this has attacked the social and cultural fabric of IPLC’s.<ref name=":17" /> To avoid this REDD+ developers must have the genuine intent of understanding the perspective of the Indigenous group they are working with and aim to implement REDD+ with a bottom-up approach.

In both countries, transparency must be improved to ensure that FPIC is adhered to and subsequently ensure fair IPLC representation and engagement. This issue predominantly arises due to the poor requirements of standards in the VCM. As such, proponents are guided by developers which have little incentive to truly act in the interests of Indigenous groups; ultimately the organizations in charge of project development are interested in increasing project revenues. This has led to instances of over-crediting, as without a transparent framework in which to operate it is difficult to evaluate the legitimacy of the claims being made by project proponents and developers. However, with recent advances that address concerns of additionality<ref name=":15" /> there is hope for improved market integrity. Standards of the VCM must continue to be scrutinized to ensure that progress continues to be made.

Going forward, progress should be made to formalize the customary laws and traditional lands of IPLCs, and finance should be directed towards the enforcement of these laws. The environmental,<ref name=":16" /> economic,<ref name=":5" /><ref>Ding, H., Veit, P. G., Blackman, A., Gray, E., Reytar, K., Altamirano, J. C., Hodgdon, B., (2016). ''Climate benefits, tenure costs: The economic case for securing Indigenous land rights in the Amazon''. WRI. [[/files.wri.org/d8/s3fs-public/Climate Benefits Tenure Costs Executive Summary.pdf|https://files.wri.org/d8/s3fs-public/Climate_Benefits_Tenure_Costs_Executive_Summary.pdf]]</ref> and social<ref>Sarmiento Barletti, J. P., Heise Vigil, N., & Larson, A. M. (2023). ''Safeguards at a glance: Are voluntary standards supporting community land, resource and carbon rights?'' CIFOR-ICRAF. [[/www.cifor-icraf.org/publications/pdf files/Flyer/REDD-Safeguards-7.pdf|https://www.cifor-icraf.org/publications/pdf_files/Flyer/REDD-Safeguards-7.pdf]] </ref> benefits of this have been researched and are well understood. By developing culturally appropriate frameworks for rights-based conservation regimes, that work with IPLCs in accordance with their worldviews, REDD+ could be used to promote Indigenous autonomy. However, progress still must be made to achieve this goal.

==References==

Documentation:Open Case Studies/FRST522/2024/REDD+ in Indigenous Amazonia: What works and what doesn’t?

2024-12-12T21:49:38Z

ConnorHaynes: /* Colombia: REDD+ project Resguardo Indigena Unificado - Selva de Mataven (RUI-SM) */

__TOC__

==Positionality==
First and foremost I am not Indigenous, and whilst there are a myriad of cultures, ontologies and epistemologies that are not sufficiently represented by simply stating ‘Indigenous’, it is commonly accepted that these worldviews are vastly different to those of the ‘Western’ world, which is the world in which I grew up and matured. I am therefore only understanding of Indigenous cultures, beliefs and customary laws based upon available online literature and those which I have learnt through life, in addition to those introduced to me in my Master’s degree. As such, I will never be able to fully relate to an Indigenous person; the best I can do is try to understand and learn. Only throughout this process am I able to work towards reconciliation and attempt to address the inequities experienced by Indigenous folk globally.

Additionally, I am yet to act as a carbon project proponent and so do not understand the nuances or stresses of undertaking such a task. Whilst an individual proponent may have the best intention of procuring a carbon project for its social and environmental benefits, there are a number of stakeholders involved throughout the entire process which influence its eventual outcome. Without experience acting as a project proponent I am naïve in understanding the process and it's difficulties.

==Acronyms / Terminology==
'''Acronyms:'''

AFOLU: Agriculture, Forestry and Other Land-Use

ICVCM: Integrity Council for the Voluntary Carbon Market

IPLC: Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities

KMGBF: Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework

LAC: Latin American Countries

MRV: Monitoring, Reporting and Verification

REDD+: Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation

UNCBD: United Nations Convention on Biological Biodiversity

VCMI: Voluntary Carbon Markets Integrity Initiative

'''Terminology:'''

''Additionality:'' Additionality is the determination of whether the project will lead to the expected outcomes when compared to the baseline or ‘business as usual’ emissions.

''Leakage'': Refers to the shifting of emissions to outside the project boundary as a result of the project’s activities.

''Permanence:'' Permanence refers to the degree to which a carbon credit is equivalent to a permanent removal or reduction in emissions.
==Abstract==
This case study illustrates two examples of Indigenous-led REDD+ projects on Indigenous territory in Colombia and Brazil. Both countries have a relatively long history of engaging with REDD+ but have slightly different legal structures pertaining to the rights of Indigenous peoples on their traditional territories, and specifically their ‘carbon’ rights. As such, the intention is to evaluate how these differing ''de jure'' rights translate on the ground. With respect to REDD+, do certain rights result in legitimately positive benefits to IPLCs, as well as the environment that these projects were originally intended to protect? To reduce inconsistency, projects were chosen that utilized the same standard, namely Verra’s ‘Verified Carbon Standard’. The intention is such that the reader can evaluate the effectiveness and true benefit of REDD+ projects to IPLC’s, based upon the legal frameworks of the host country. A secondary intention is such that the reader is better equipped to conduct a prefeasibility assessment based upon available online literature, to evaluate the likelihood that REDD+ can be implemented in any chosen country, with the genuine intent of benefiting IPLC’s that are directly affected as a result of REDD+ project implementation.

==REDD+ and the VCM in Brazil and Colombia==
REDD+, originally introduced by the UNFCCC, is a market-based mechanism sitting within the VCM that aims to reverse the loss of forests and carbon stocks, specifically in developing countries. Simply put, an entity or an individual can voluntarily pay another that has engaged with REDD+ and subsequently sequestered carbon, to offset their own emissions using ‘credits’, sold as units of greenhouse gas equivalent to one ton of carbon dioxide (CO2e). Forestry and Land-Use remains to be the largest category of carbon credits traded by transaction volume on the VCM, with REDD+ being the most popular project type in this category, accounting for 78% of credits traded.<ref name=":0">Procton, A., (2024). ''State of the voluntary carbon market 2024: On the path to maturity.'' Forest Trends Ecosystem Marketplace.</ref> Furthermore, over one-third of the credits sold within this category were sourced from projects that had been implemented in LAC and the Caribbean in 2024.<ref name=":0" /> Of the four largest standards issuing carbon credits, Verra accounts for roughly 80% of issuances in Latin America,<ref>Pullins, T. (2022). Growth of carbon markets in Latin America. White & Case. [[/www.whitecase.com/publications/insight/latin-america-focus-fall-2022-growth-carbon-markets|https://www.whitecase.com/publications/insight/latin-america-focus-fall-2022-growth-carbon-markets]] </ref> and even in the face of recent scrutiny,<ref>West, T. A. P., Bofim, B., Haya, B. K. (2024). Methodological issues with deforestation baselines compromise the integrity of carbon offsets from REDD+. ''Global Environmental Change, 87'' [[/doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2024.102863|https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2024.102863]]</ref><ref>Wyburd I., & Dufrasne, G. (2023). Error Log: Exposing the methodological failures of REDD+ forestry projects. Carbon Market Watch. [[/carbonmarketwatch.org/publications/error-log-exposing-the-methodological-failures-of-redd-forestry-projects/|https://carbonmarketwatch.org/publications/error-log-exposing-the-methodological-failures-of-redd-forestry-projects/]]</ref><ref name=":15">Haya, B. K., Alford-Jones, K., Anderegg, W. R. L., Beymer-Farris, B., Blanchard, L., Bomfim, B., Chin, D., Evans, S., Hogan, M., Holm, J. A., McAfee, K., So, I. S., West, T. A. P., & Withey, L. (2023). ''Quality assessment of REDD+ carbon credit projects''. Berkeley Carbon Trading Project. [[/gspp.berkeley.edu/research-and-impact/centers/cepp/projects/berkeley-carbontrading-project/REDD+|https://gspp.berkeley.edu/research-and-impact/centers/cepp/projects/berkeley-carbontrading-project/REDD+]]</ref> REDD+ projects account for a significant proportion of the VCM with their continued application likely to persist.<ref>Gordon, O. (2022). ''The interwoven fortunes of carbon markets and indigenous communities.'' Energy Monitor. [[/www.energymonitor.ai/tech/carbon-removal/the-interwoven-fortunes-of-carbon-markets-and-indigenous-communities/|https://www.energymonitor.ai/tech/carbon-removal/the-interwoven-fortunes-of-carbon-markets-and-indigenous-communities/]]</ref><ref>Müller, M., Coustar, C., Bietta, F., Mathres, M. (2022). ''UNFCCC REDD+ and the power of sovereign carbon.'' Deutsche Banke Chief Investment Office. [[/www.rainforestcoalition.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/CIO-Special-UNFCCC-REDD-power-of-sovereign-carbon.pdf|https://www.rainforestcoalition.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/CIO-Special-UNFCCC-REDD-power-of-sovereign-carbon.pdf]]</ref><ref>Pullins, T. (2022). ''Growth of carbon markets in Latin America.'' White & Case. [[/www.whitecase.com/publications/insight/latin-america-focus-fall-2022-growth-carbon-markets|https://www.whitecase.com/publications/insight/latin-america-focus-fall-2022-growth-carbon-markets]] </ref> With the introduction of updated methodologies aimed at addressing these concerns,<ref>Verra (2023a). ''Setting the Standard: Verra’s Revolutionary New REDD Methodology.'' [[/verra.org/program-notice/setting-the-standard-verras-revolutionary-new-redd-methodology/|https://verra.org/program-notice/setting-the-standard-verras-revolutionary-new-redd-methodology/]]</ref><ref>Verra (2023b). ''VM0048 Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation, v1.0.'' [[/verra.org/methodologies/vm0048-reducing-emissions-from-deforestation-and-forest-degradation-v1-0/|https://verra.org/methodologies/vm0048-reducing-emissions-from-deforestation-and-forest-degradation-v1-0/]]</ref> there is hope for renewed buyer confidence in the integrity of this market,<ref>MSCI (2023). ''Verra’s New Methodology for Unplanned Deforestation Aims to Silence the Critics''. [[/www.msci.com/www/blog-posts/verra-s-new-methodology-for/04577808942|https://www.msci.com/www/blog-posts/verra-s-new-methodology-for/04577808942]]</ref> though more work still needs to be done.

Both Colombia and Brazil have a relatively long history of implementing REDD+ projects, using both fund-based and market-based mechanisms. For example, both countries were participants in the ‘Amazon Indigenous REDD+ (RIA in Spanish) initiative, with the first pilot implementation project being initiated in Colombia’s Puiawai Natural Reserve.<ref>Garzón, E., (2017). ''Amazon Indigenous REDD+: An innovative approach to conserve Colombian forests?'' Mongabay. [[/news.mongabay.com/2017/01/amazon-indigenous-redd-an-innovative-approach-to-conserve-colombian-forests/|https://news.mongabay.com/2017/01/amazon-indigenous-redd-an-innovative-approach-to-conserve-colombian-forests/]]</ref> The relevance of these two countries with respect to REDD+ is simple. Much of the Amazon’s primary tropical rainforest falls within these countries jurisdiction and this rainforest has been consistently under threat from external pressures and encroachment, whether that be in the form of land-clearing for commercial ranching, subsistence purposes, illicit drug production or illegal mining practices,<ref name=":8">Sánchez García, P. A. & Wong, G. Y., (2024) “The political economy of deforestation in the Colombian Amazon”, ''Journal of Political Ecology'' ''31''(1), 178–199. [[/doi.org/10.2458/jpe.5230|https://doi.org/10.2458/jpe.5230]]</ref><ref>Radwin, M. (2023). ''Drug trafficking fuels other deforestation drivers in the Amazon: report.'' Mongabay. [[/news.mongabay.com/2023/07/drug-trafficking-fuels-other-deforestation-drivers-in-the-amazon-report/|https://news.mongabay.com/2023/07/drug-trafficking-fuels-other-deforestation-drivers-in-the-amazon-report/]]</ref><ref>Haddad, E.A., Araújo, I.F., Feltran-Barbieri, R., Perobelli, F. S., Rocha, A., Sass, K. S., Nobre, C. A. (2024). Economic drivers of deforestation in the Brazilian Legal Amazon. ''Nat Sustain'' ''7'', 1141–1148. [[/doi.org/10.1038/s41893-024-01387-7|https://doi.org/10.1038/s41893-024-01387-7]] </ref><ref>Hänggli, A., Levy, S. A., Armenteras, D., Bovolo, C. I., Brandão, J., Rueda, X., & Garrett, R. D. (2023). A systematic comparison of deforestation drivers and policy effectiveness across the amazon biome. ''Environmental Research Letters, 18''(7), 073001. [[/doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/acd408|https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/acd408]]</ref> to name a few.

In theory, REDD+ can be used to provide the economic incentive to promote sustained environmental protection of Indigenous lands, with a focus on the rights and livelihoods of IPLCs. Currently the overall funding to IPLCs tenure rights and forest management in tropical countries is low, receiving just $270 million per year between 2011-2020 from bilateral and multilateral donors and private philanthropies.<ref>Hatcher, J., Owen, M., Yin, D., (2021). ''Falling short: Donor funding for Indigenous peoples and local communities to secure tenure rights and manage forests in tropical countries (2011 -2020).'' Rainforest Foundation Norway. [[/dv719tqmsuwvb.cloudfront.net/documents/Publikasjoner/Andre-rapporter/RFN Falling short 2021.pdf|https://dv719tqmsuwvb.cloudfront.net/documents/Publikasjoner/Andre-rapporter/RFN_Falling_short_2021.pdf]]</ref> REDD+ has the potential to channel funding as to promote Indigenous rights and autonomy, provided there is transparent and equitable benefit-sharing for those involved. Fundamentally, only with the inclusion of IPLC’s, or preferably with IPLC’s acting as project proponents, is REDD+ able to promote Indigenous agency and improve IPLC rights and governance. And only when the rights of those inhabiting the land are formally recognized can the land be effectively conserved.<ref name=":16">Reytar, K., Veit, P., von Braun, J. (2024). ''Protecting Biodiversity Hinges on Securing Indigenous and Community Land Rights.'' WRI. [[/www.wri.org/insights/indigenous-and-local-community-land-rights-protect-biodiversity|https://www.wri.org/insights/indigenous-and-local-community-land-rights-protect-biodiversity]]</ref> The inclusion of IPLCs in REDD+ project development is therefore considered to be essential for project success, and this is in theory embodied in the very nature of REDD+.<ref name=":1">Alvarez, G., Elfving, M. and Andrade, C. (2016) ‘REDD+ governance and indigenous peoples in Latin America: the case of Suruí Carbon Project in the Brazilian Amazon Forest’, ''Latin American J. Management for Sustainable Development 3''(2) pp.133–146. [[/dx.doi.org/10.1504/LAJMSD.2016.083705|10.1504/LAJMSD.2016.083705]]</ref> Partially owing to a long history of dealing with REDD+, Colombia and Brazil are amongst just a few of the countries hosting tropical rainforests that explicitly recognise community rights to carbon and tie these rights to the legal ownership of lands and forests. In Colombia, carbon rights are tied to rights of the land, whereas in Brazil carbon rights are tied to forest rights.<ref name=":2">RRI and McGill University (2021). Technical report: ''Status of legal recognition of Indigenous Peoples’, Local Communities’ and Afro-descendant Peoples’ rights to carbon stored in tropical lands and forests''. Rights and Resources Initiative. [[/doi.org/10.53892/MLQQ5744|https://doi.org/10.53892/MLQQ5744]]</ref>

==Brazil: The Suruí Forest Carbon Project==
====Project description and location====
The Surui Forest Carbon project was implemented in 2009 on the territory of the Surui people, which is situated in the southern part of Brazil’s Amazon between the states of Rondônia and Mato Grosso. Surui Indigenous territory covers an area of 2,481 km2, though the intention of the PCFS was to protect a portion of this total area. According to the PD, the stated objective was to “prevent 13,575.3 hectares of tropical forest from being cleared by 2038, to avoid the emission of 7,258,352.3 tCO2e to the atmosphere, and to contribute to the preservation of the Paiter Surui lifestyle and traditions.”<ref>IDESAM (2011). ''Project description: Surui forest carbon project''. Institute for Conservation and Sustainable Development of Amazonas. Link: "PROJ_DESC_1118_02FEB2012.PDF" found at [[/registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/1118|https://registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/1118]] </ref> This region sits within one of the Brazilian Amazon’s main ‘arcs of deforestation’ and pressure from loggers and ranchers is a matter of concern.

Notably, the PCFS was the first REDD+ project to be proposed by Indigenous peoples in the Brazilian Amazon on their own territory and was the first to receive certification by both the VCS and CCBS.<ref name=":1" />. Metareilá, the Surui’s own Indigenous association, acted as project proponent and the Institute for Conservation and Sustainable Development of Amazonas (IDESAM) assisted with project development, alongside multiple other stakeholder groups. As an endogenous initiative procured and conducted by the Surui community, the SFCP had a ‘non-centralized model of governance’, which reflected the characteristics and traditions of the Surui people. <ref name=":1" />

Only after two years of consultations between the 24 communities involved and the relevant governmental agencies (primarily FUNAI and the Ministry of Environment) was a Memorandum of Understanding signed, showing community consent to develop the project.<ref name=":3">Garcia, B., Rimmer, L., Canal Vieira, L., Mackey, B., (2021). REDD+ and forest protection on indigenous lands in the Amazon. ''RECIEL 30'', 207–219. [[/doi.org/10.1111/reel.12389|https://doi.org/10.1111/reel.12389]]</ref> In 2012 after verification from an independent third-party body, the Surui were able to sell carbon credits on the international market. Between 2009 and 2014 the project drastically helped limit the deforestation occurring within the project’s site, causing many to deem it a success.<ref name=":4">Howard, F. E., (2023). ''An Analysis of the Suruí Forest Carbon Project in Context of Settler Colonialism''. Masters thesis. Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University. [[/vtechworks.lib.vt.edu/server/api/core/bitstreams/b0cde6de-794c-453f-856b-ee72bde3db06/content|https://vtechworks.lib.vt.edu/server/api/core/bitstreams/b0cde6de-794c-453f-856b-ee72bde3db06/content]]</ref>

====National climate targets, policies and legislation====
Rates of deforestation in Brazil’s legal Amazon are significantly impacted by the government in charge. This is evidenced in the decade between 2012 and 2021 whilst under the conservative Bolsonaro administration, when deforestation in the Amazon increased 185% — from a loss of 4,571 km2 in 2012 to 13,038 km2 in 2021.<ref>INPE (2022). ''Observação da Terra. [[/www.obt.inpe.br/OBT/assuntos/programas/amazonia/prodes|http://www.obt.inpe.br/OBT/assuntos/programas/amazonia/prodes]]''</ref> However, since Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s appointment in 2022 there has been a steady decline in the rate of deforestation, which is now roughly half what it was in 2021.<ref>Terra Brasilis (2024). ''PRODES (deforestation): Deforestation rates – Legal Amazon – States''. [[/terrabrasilis.dpi.inpe.br/app/dashboard/deforestation/biomes/legal amazon/rates|https://terrabrasilis.dpi.inpe.br/app/dashboard/deforestation/biomes/legal_amazon/rates]]</ref> A significant proportion of emissions result from the clearing of rainforest and its subsequent conversion to ranching.<ref>MCTI (2022). ''Estimativas Anuais De Emissões De Gases De Efeito Estufa No Brasil.'' 6ª Edição. Ministério da Estado da Ciência, Tecnologia e Inovações. [[/www.gov.br/mcti/pt-br/acompanhe-o-mcti/sirene/publicacoes/estimativas-anuais-de-emissoes-gee/arquivos/6a-ed-estimativas-anuais.pdf|https://www.gov.br/mcti/pt-br/acompanhe-o-mcti/sirene/publicacoes/estimativas-anuais-de-emissoes-gee/arquivos/6a-ed-estimativas-anuais.pdf]]</ref> To address these emissions Brazil has implemented various adaptation policies, legislation and targets which are summarized below:

TABLE
====Indigenous rights - Constitutional, tenure and bundle rights====
In Brazil, Indigenous rights are robust and clearly defined according to the Brazilian Constitution. As a result, the Indigenous communities of the Brazilian Amazon have legal title to 13.8% of the national territory totalling 1.175 million km2, with a total of 631 territories.<ref>Federal government of Brazil (2024). ''Brazil’s NDC: National determination to contribute and transform''. [[/unfccc.int/sites/default/files/2024-11/Brazil Second Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) November2024.pdf|https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/2024-11/Brazil_Second%20Nationally%20Determined%20Contribution%20%28NDC%29_November2024.pdf]]</ref>

TABLE

Whilst Indigenous communities in Brazil have legal title to land, it is the State that owns it. Indigenous people simply exercise permanent tenure over lands that they traditionally occupy and have ‘original rights’ to these traditional lands, which no other rights can prevail over.<ref name=":3" /> Indigenous lands, though not classified as protected areas, “have the highest level of protection by law because they are regulated by the Constitution” and cannot be leased or restricted without violating their original rights. The Suruí's right to develop the PCFS is grounded in the Brazilian Constitution, which grants Indigenous peoples exclusive rights to use the ‘riches of the soil, rivers and lakes’ of their land, and these rights cannot be overridden. Thus, Indigenous people and only Indigenous people are legally allowed to engage in productive activities on their land, provided these activities are conducted according to their own customs and traditions and are necessary for the wellbeing and cultural expression of their own people. In Brazil, it is the armed forces and federal police that are responsible for enforcing these laws, and FUNAI is responsible for representing Indigenous communities in judicial disputes.<ref name=":3" /> As such, provided a REDD+ does not violate the rights to territorial integrity, permanent land tenure and original rights, it is legally allowed.

'''CARBON RIGHTS:''' In Brazil, carbon rights are tied to forest rights.<ref name=":2" /> Carbon credits from REDD+ projects are seen as part of the economic benefits derived from indigenous lands, and as such, Indigenous communities are entitled to own, control and distribute these revenues themselves. The carbon credits generated from the (SFCP) were wholly owned by the Suruí people through Metareilá, with the Suruí Fund (managed by the Brazilian Biodiversity Fund - FUNBIO) acting as recipient. This legality reinforces Indigenous control over both land and carbon rights, as whoever has rights to the forest land is usually recognized as the owner of carbon rights.<ref name=":3" />

'''FPIC OBLIGATION:''' Furthermore, Brazilian law requires Free, Prior, and Informed Consent (FPIC) for REDD+ projects affecting indigenous lands, ensuring that international standards such as the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) and ILO Convention No. 169 are adhered to; Indigenous consent is, ''de jure,'' a necessity. Projects that violate these rights and fail to consult communities are therefore considered illegal. Notably there are no specific rules or procedures that have been written into the Brazilian constitution that provide guidance on how to achieve FPIC. This freedom reinforces Indigenous autonomy as it allows an Indigenous community to define the rules of consultation according to their customs and traditions.

Collectively these national and international laws provide an important safeguard to Indigenous peoples, making their consent a prerequisite for the establishment of REDD+ projects and recognizing their rights as the main beneficiaries of REDD+ revenues.<ref name=":3" /> However, as carbon rights are tied to forest rights in Brazil and not land rights, carbon is considered to be an ‘environmental service’ (Article 41(I)(A) Brazilian Forestry Code), and states, as well as the federal government, have the jurisdiction to exercise full legislative authority over carbon. <ref name=":2" /> As such, certain states have interpreted the law to imply that the title to carbon credits is attributable to the state.<ref>Loft, L., Ravikumar, A., Gebara, M. F., Pham, T. T., Resosudarmo, I. A. P., Assembe, S., Tovar, J. G., Mwangi, E., & Andersson, K. (2015). Taking Stock of Carbon Rights in REDD+ Candidate Countries: Concept Meets Reality. ''Forests'', ''6''(4), 1031-1060. [[/doi.org/10.3390/f6041031|https://doi.org/10.3390/f6041031]]</ref> Hence, even when carbon rights are clearly defined and tied to forest title it is insufficient in itself, and only by legally recognizing the customary rights of IPLCs can a fair and equitable outcome be realised.

====Interested and affected stakeholders====
TABLE
====Discussion====
Although originally successful in achieving its goal of reducing deforestation and degradation, in 2016 diamonds were discovered in Surui territory, leading to an increase in illegal logging and mining.<ref name=":1" /> By 2018 the project site had been completely overrun by ''garimpeiros'' (small-scale gold miners), ultimately leading to the projects suspension that year. <ref name=":4" />

While the project had initially garnered support, divisions emerged within the community post-project implementation. Disputes arose over the unequal distribution of project revenues, leading to internal conflicts between different Suruí clans. These criticisms escalated in 2014 when the Catholic Indigenous Missionary Council supported calls for an end to the project due to mismanagement of revenues from carbon credit sales. <ref name=":3" /> Some Suruí members also argued that the REDD+ initiative harmed their way of life.<ref>Lang, C. (2014). ''“What are projects for that destroy life?” Interview with Henrique Suruí about the Paiter-Suruí REDD project, Brazil.'' REDD-Monitor. [[/redd-monitor.org/2014/12/17/what-are-projects-for-that-destroy-life-interview-with-henrique-surui-about-the-paiter-surui-redd-project-brazil/|https://redd-monitor.org/2014/12/17/what-are-projects-for-that-destroy-life-interview-with-henrique-surui-about-the-paiter-surui-redd-project-brazil/]]</ref>

Further complicating the situation was the controversial role of Henrique Suruí, one of the Suruí tribal leaders. In 2011, it was revealed that Henrique had violated the tribe's logging moratorium, collaborating with loggers in illegal activities. While Henrique later denied responsibility for the project’s failure, his actions, combined with internal disagreements, illustrated the lack of consensus within the Suruí leadership on the project’s goals and outcomes. Both of the tribe’s leaders possessed dramatically different perspectives on how they believed they could ensure agency, autonomy, and economic benefits for the Suruí people.<ref name=":4" /> This fragmentation within the community, in combination with the discovery of diamonds and the state's failure to protect indigenous land rights led to the indefinite suspension of the REDD+ project.

The project's collapse highlights broader structural issues, particularly the state's inconsistent support for indigenous land rights, influenced by settler colonialism, which undermined the project’s long-term viability.<ref name=":4" /> Additionally, the project’s creation was shaped by external actors, including the collaboration between Almir Suruí and Borges from Forest Trends, a Washington-based NGO. This partnership introduced a Western perspective on viewing the Suruí peoples forest, in contrast with their own perspectives on land use and governance. Furthermore, despite Borges’ Brazilian background, the power dynamics between a global North organization and a developing, Indigenous community were apparent.

====Summary====
The Suruí Forest Carbon Project provides an interesting example of how, even when the rights of IPLC’s are relatively robust, challenges persist in ensuring REDD+ project longevity. As such, in its current state, REDD+ in the Brazilian Amazon may not be a suitable market-based option for indigenous communities in the Amazon.<ref name=":3" /> Although initially successful in promoting indigenous autonomy and reducing deforestation, the project resulted in failure due to of a myriad of factors. Division between Surui communities was exacerbated by a perceived unequal benefit-sharing, and the impact of imposing REDD+ seems to have complicated the traditional social structure that the Surui were dependent on. These issues were influenced by Brazil's settler state dynamics, where indigenous land rights, although legally recognized, are often not upheld in practice due to insufficient enforcement.<ref name=":4" /> Ultimately, the Surui project reveals how settler colonialism's structural flaws make long-term project success difficult, despite initial progress in promoting indigenous autonomy.

At the national and state level, complex institutional and legal land governance structures convolute and impede REDD+ in Brazil. Multiple institutions share responsibilities and there is no comprehensive, authoritative database of land ownership, which hampers efforts to protect indigenous territories.<ref name=":5">Costa, R. (2016)''. Insecure land rights in Brazil: Consequences for rural areas and challenges for improvement.'' Climate Policy Initiative. [[/www.climatepolicyinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/Insecure Land Rights in Brazil CPI.pdf|https://www.climatepolicyinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/Insecure_Land_Rights_in_Brazil_CPI.pdf]]</ref> As a result, land tenure disputes remain common and can be witnessed occurring between the public as well between public and state actors. For example, Brazil’s 1964 Land Statute (Law No. 4504) allows the government to takeover unproductive farms and transfer those lands to landless peasants. This often results in the clearing of forest, as only when the land is cleared is it evidenced to be ‘productive’.<ref name=":5" /> Hence, not only does this law cause insecurity for Indigenous populations in Brazil, it also forces them to go against customary traditions of stewarding the land in an effort to maintain its control.

Whilst the aforementioned points to the futility of REDD+ in Brazil, there is reason to maintain optimism. In a recent landmark ruling Brazil’s supreme court voted in favour of the Xoleng peoples, and the decision will serve as a precedent for all cases involving Indigenous peoples.<ref name=":6">Amos-Flom, K., (2023). ''Triumph and Turmoil: The Xokleng Case and the Future of Indigenous Land Rights in Brazil.'' Columbia Journal of Transnational Law. [[/www.jtl.columbia.edu/bulletin-blog/triumph-and-turmoil-the-xokleng-case-and-the-future-of-indigenous-land-rights-in-brazil|https://www.jtl.columbia.edu/bulletin-blog/triumph-and-turmoil-the-xokleng-case-and-the-future-of-indigenous-land-rights-in-brazil]]</ref> The Xokleng’s land dispute, settled in 2023, “rejected Santa Catarina state’s marco temporal (“time limit”) argument, which would have required Indigenous people to prove they occupied or legally contested the territory they claimed before the Brazilian Constitution came into force in 1988. If successful, this argument would have led to disastrous repercussions, as many indigenous peoples had been forcibly removed or are traditionally nomadic.”<ref name=":6" /> Evidently, whilst slow, progress has been made in Brazil in recent years with respect to Indigenous rights as well as the voluntary carbon market itself.

There are currently 159 AFOLU projects listed on the Verra database in Brazil, with only two specifically focused on REDD+ initiatives in collaboration with Indigenous groups. These are the Ka’a Pyahu project, <ref>Verra (n.d.) ''Project 5087: KA'A PYAHU.'' https://registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/5087</ref> initiated by the Guajajara Indigenous people in collaboration with external organizations and validated in 2021, and the ‘Together for the forest Awaete REDD+ project’<ref>Verra (n.d.) ''Project 5200: TOGETHER FOR THE FOREST AWAETÉ REDD+ PROJECT.'' https://registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/5200</ref> which is still under development. Both projects involve Indigenous groups working with Brazilian organizations to build technical capacity and expertise. This could signal a growing trend of Indigenous-led REDD+ projects in the future. To ensure a positive future for REDD+ in Brazil, the customary rights of IPLC’s must be formally recognized. IPLC should have legal ownership of their traditional lands, and in doing so the carbon rights of these communities would be less convoluted, leading to more equitable benefit-sharing and increased cohesion amongst these groups post-project implementation.

==Colombia: ''REDD+ project Resguardo Indigena Unificado - Selva de Mataven (RUI-SM)''==
'''Project description and location'''

According to the PD,<ref name=":7">ACATISEMA & Mediamos (2017). ''Joint project description and monitoring report: REDD+ project: Resguardo Indigena Unificado – Selva de Mataven (RIU – SM).'' Link: “10 06 2017_VCS Final Report_ Matavin Project.pdf” found at [[/registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/1566|https://registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/1566]]</ref> the Resguardo Indígena Unificado – Selva de Matavén (RIU-SM) project is located east of the Colombian Orinoco high plain, in the eastern part of the Department of Vichada, municipality of Cumaribo. It resides on the formalized resguardo of the Sikuani, Piaroa, Puinave, Curripaco, Cubeo and Piapoco ethnic groups, spanning 1,856,836 hectares, with 1,477,115 hectares (79.6%) being forested. The project states that it will reduce greenhouse gas emissions, with a total estimated net reduction of 108,670,562 tons of CO2 equivalent over thirty years, from years 2013 – 2042. By this metric, it is the 14th largest project on the Verra registry, out of over 1700 projects.<ref name=":9">Dufrasne, D., (2021). ''Two Shades of Green: How hot air forest credits are being used to avoid carbon taxes in Colombia''. Carbon Market Watch. [[/carbonmarketwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Two-shades-of-green EN WEB.pdf|https://carbonmarketwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Two-shades-of-green_EN_WEB.pdf]]</ref> There are 12,312 indigenous people living in the RIU-SM, belonging to 2,517 families and 250 communities as of 2017.

The project was initiated by the Asociación de Cabildos y Autoridades Indígenas de la Selva de Matavén (ACETISMA), an Indigenous association, and developed by MEDIAMOS F&M, a Colombian consultancy firm. ACETISMA is comprised of Indigenous leaders that represent the 17 communities of the reservation in charge of governing the territory, and it has administrative autonomy, as well as “the capacity to acquire, to own and to dispose of property, to accept donations, to hold national and international conventions, scientific and cultural exchanges and generally, to celebrate all kinds of negotiations and agreements with which the Association can achieve its objectives.”<ref name=":7" />

There is a stated focus on various means of improving the living conditions of the Indigenous peoples living within the project area. To summarise, the main objectives of the REDD+ project RIU-SM include:

· Community development, in the form of improved education.

· Community engagement with respect to the project; developing information channels to reveal project progress.

· Support local initiatives for environmental education and waste management.

· Developing an effective response system that addresses community proposals and concerns relating to the project.

· Strengthening the governance of ACATISEMA.

====National climate targets, policies and legislation====
The Colombian Amazon makes up over one-third of Colombia’s national territory, and up until 2005 only 7.3% of the Colombian Amazon had been deforested, largely due to the country's 60-year armed conflict between the government, multiple left-wing guerillas such as FARC, and several far-right paramilitary groups.<ref name=":8" /> However, following the signing of the Peace Treaty in 2016 and demobilization of the FARC, limits to deforestation were weakened in the Colombian Amazon. Poor but opportunistic peasants began to encroach into previously unchartered territory and capitalize from the rainforest. Due to the poor economic integration of the Amazon, many were forced to engage with the traditional economies of cocoa and cattle ranching, as these markets were already well connected to regional and global markets.<ref name=":8" /> To address the drivers of deforestation and its associated emissions, the federal government has implemented various initiatives, which are summarized below:
{| class="wikitable"
|'''Document name'''
|'''Type (target, policy or legislation)'''
|'''Publication year'''
|'''Key takeaways'''
|-
|
|Target
|?
|Reduce GHG emissions by 51 % by 2030.
|-
|
|Target
|?
|Net zero by 2050
|-
|National Climate Change Policy (PNCC)
|
|2018
|
|-
|National Forest Conservation Program
|
|2011
|
|-
|Law 1931 of 2018 – Climate Change Law

|
|2018
|
|-
| colspan="4" |Relating to REDD+
|-
|National Strategy for Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (ENREDD+).”
|
|2009
|
|-
|Amazon Indigenous REDD+ Initiative
|
|2012
|
|-
|USAID's Colombia BIOREDD+ program
|
|
|Develop a portfolio of 8 REDD+ projects in four geographic nodes covering over 700,000 hectares in the Colombian Pacific.

|-
|Vision Amazonia
|
|2015
|part of the REDD+ strategy in the country financed by three foreign countries: Germany, Norway and United Kingdom
|}
As a result of the many fund and market-based initiatives that Colombia has engaged with, it hosts the second most REDD+ projects in the world. REDD+ projects now cover at least 56% of the area of legally recognized Indigenous territories in the Colombian Amazon, with an overwhelming majority of carbon projects located on Indigenous territories.<ref name=":10">Schmid, D., & Castro. C., (2023). ''REDD+ projects in the Colombian Amazon: Social challenges and lack of transparency''. Rainforest Foundation Norway. [[/dv719tqmsuwvb.cloudfront.net/documents/REDD rapport 2024 ENG.pdf|https://dv719tqmsuwvb.cloudfront.net/documents/REDD_rapport_2024_ENG.pdf]]</ref> Evidently REDD+ plays an integral part in the country’s efforts of environmental conservation, and incentives have been introduced to promote the development of such projects. For example, in 2016 the government adopted a higher tax that covered fossil fuels, but companies are able to avoid paying the tax by investing in carbon offsets that have been generated domestically.<ref name=":9" /> This led to a boost in the domestic REDD+ market in 2017, as Colombian companies invested as to escape higher taxes. Notably, 23 of the 36 REDD+ projects currently under development in the Amazon region were initiated in or after 2018.<ref name=":10" /> Currently Colombia’s REDD+ program sits at over 45 pilot and voluntary carbon projects, as well as one large-scale jurisdictional approach in the Amazon.<ref name=":11">Zambrano-Cortés, D. G. (2024). ''The politics, spaces and subjects of forest conservation in Colombia''. [internal PhD, WU, Wageningen University]. Wageningen University. [[/doi.org/10.18174/675328|https://doi.org/10.18174/675328]]</ref>

====Indigenous rights - Constitutional, tenure and bundle rights====
''De jure'', the Indigenous peoples of Colombia have comprehensive tenure and bundle rights that have been articulated in the national constitution. Collective land titles are granted to Indigenous communities by the Colombian government, and as a result about 34 percent of Colombian land (almost 38 million hectares) is legally recognized as Indigenous territory or collective lands of Afro-descendent communities.<ref name=":10" /> These collective land tenure rights have been in effect since the implementation of the 1991 constitution, granting them the authority to exercise legal control over their territories in accordance with their own customs and procedures.<ref>Max Planck Institute (n.d.) ''Colombia 1991 (rev. 2015).'' Institute. [[/www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Colombia 2015|https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Colombia_2015]]</ref> Furthermore, the carbon rights of Indigenous peoples are explicitly defined in the constitution and tied specifically to the ownership of land of the communities.<ref name=":2" /> This in theory provides a solid legal basis for upholding the rights of Indigenous communities in Colombia, specifically relating to REDD+ activities, as it allows communities to define and negotiate the terms of said projects. A summary of the various laws relating to Indigenous rights have been summarized below:
{| class="wikitable"
| colspan="2" |'''Laws'''
|-
| colspan="2" |'''1991 constitution'''
|-
|Article 63

|Indigenous territories are considered collective property. This means that land is not owned by individuals but is shared by the community. The state must respect these collective rights and cannot alter land ownership without the consent of the Indigenous peoples.
|-
|Article 330
|Indigenous communities have the right to govern their territories.
|-
|Article 76 - ''Consulta previa''.
|Pertains to the right of Indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities to prior consultation before the government or private companies undertake activities that may affect their territories, culture, or way of life.

|-
|Article 329
|The Reservation is a collective, inalienable, and indefeasible property.
|-
|Decree 1386 of 1994, Article 10; Decree 2164 of 1995, Article 22) 39.
|The administration and management of these lands are subjected to uses and customs of the beneficiaries
|}
Whilst land and tenure rights are enshrined into the constitution, the precariousness of these rights persists due to a lack of resources to ensure enforcement, as well as the deeper issue of corruption. As previously stated, the rate of deforestation increased significantly in Colombia’s post-conflict era, evidencing the nations inability to maintain control over unlawful acts of land-grabbing and disposition. Whilst this began with new peasants converting the Amazon for subsistence purposes, it ultimately led to new areas for the growth of cocoa, much to the benefit of narco-traffickers who could monopolize on this illegal surplus in ‘accumulation by dispossession’.<ref name=":8" />

With respect to the legalities of consultation, Colombia has enshrined ''consulta previa'' into the constitution. Translating to ‘prior consultation’, this legal text provides the formal grounds for Indigenous engagement when any legislative or administrative measures are implemented on Indigenous territory. Importantly, consultation should be achieved in accordance with the customs of the ethnic group with which the project is being imposed upon. However, there have been recent cases of contestation specifically relating to how ''consulta previa'' applies to REDD+ on Indigenous lands, and the RIU – SM project was one that was involved with such a case.

====Interested and affected stakeholders====
{| class="wikitable"
| colspan="5" |'''Affected stakeholders'''
|-
|Stakeholders
|Primary objective(s)
|Secondary objective(s)
|Relative power
|Scope of influence
|-
|ACATISEMA - Asociación de Cabildos y Autoridades Indígenas de la Selva de Matavén
|the Indigenous association comprised of Indigenous leaders in representation of the 16 communities of the reservation in charge of governing the territory.

foster the integral development, social and cultural preservation of the indigenous communities in the Mataven Jungle and to consolidate the territory, selfgovernment by partners, the defense, conservation and preservation of the environment and biodiversity of the Mataven Jungle (ACATISEMA, 2010)

|
|It is the highest authority in the reservation.
|
|-
|MEDIAMOS F&M – A consultancy
|Project developer
|
|
|
|-
|Communities of indigenous peoples of the RIU-SM
|<nowiki>- Primary and direct beneficiaries.</nowiki>
|
|
|
|-
|Teachers of primary and secondary basic education indigenous Reservation
|
|
|
|
|-
|Colonists
|
|
|
|
|-
| colspan="5" |'''Interested stakeholders'''
|-
|Mining Companies and individuals
|Compete with the Project for the territory's resources.
|
|
|
|-
|Ministerio de Ambiente y Desarrollo Sostenible

- Direct participation
|Its main interest is to achieve environmental planning, through the consolidation of a policy of sustainable development and strategic alliances with social and institutional participants in different sectoral and territorial scenarios.
|
|
|
|-
|Dirección de Asuntos Indígenas, ROM y Minorías - Ministerio del Interior

Direct participation
|Public agency that advises the national level, prepares and proposes the formulation of public policy in favor of indigenous peoples within the framework of the defense, support, reinforcement and consolidation of ethnic and cultural rights.
|
|
|
|-
|Corporinoquía

Direct participation
|Regional environmental authority to ensure the proper use of natural resources in their area of jurisdiction.
|
|
|
|-
|Other government institutions: Governor ofice of Vichada, Mayor ofice Cumaribo

Direct participation
|The Reservation for being part of the Cumaribo, Vichada, has territorial jurisdiction relations with the Governor’s office and the Mayor’s office.
|
|
|
|-
|Fundación NATURA

Direct participation
|Civil organization whose mission is the conservation, use and management of biodiversity to generate social, economic and environmental benefits in the context of sustainable human development.
|
|
|
|-
|FONDO ACCIÓN

Direct participation
|Colombian non-profit organization in the private scheme. Encourage the participation of civil society and the private sector in the implementation of the country’s public policies in two areas: - Conservation and sustainable development; and protection -development of children.
|
|
|
|-
|SENA, Department of Social Prosperity (DPS), NGOs and private consultants
|Connected to the area - supporting the implementation of rural development activities.
|
|
|
|-
|Other indigenous communities neighboring RIU-SM
|
|
|
|
|-
|Financial institutions
|They fund local development activities.
|
|
|
|-
|Asocarbono – An industry association, including Verra, ProClima, Biofix, and ACATISEMA.

|
|
|
|
|-
|OPIAC: the National Oganization of the Indigenous Peoples of the Colombian Amazon

|
|
|
|
|}

====Discussion====
According to the official REDD+ Mataven website<ref>RIU – SM (n.d.). ''REDD+ Mataven''. [[/reddmataven.com/|https://reddmataven.com/]]</ref> the project has resulted in a myriad of benefits to the Indigenous communities of the region. For example, as a result of the funds generated from the projects activities, there have been improvements in infrastructure, transportation and education, ultimately leading to the empowerment and improved governance of ACETISMA. However, the project has come under fire for multiple reasons.

For one, in 2015 some of the Indigenous communities filed a lawsuit referring to the violation of their right to ''consulta previa''. However, the court ruled that their Indigenous rights had not been violated as it was ACETISMA that initially sought MEDIAMOS to develop the project, and that ACETISMA were the best representatives of those Indigenous communities. Furthermore, the projects main focus was the conservation of the rainforest and therefore did not threaten the cultural integrity of those communities.<ref name=":10" /> However, regardless of the outcome of this case, its occurrence points to internal disagreement amongst Indigenous participants of the RIU-SM project. In a study involving interviews with Indigenous members of the project, there was a significant proportion of interviewees that had little knowledge regarding various aspects of the project, such as responsibilities of participation, or the benefit-sharing mechanism in place.<ref name=":2" /> This further reinforces the point that, in the case of the RIU-SM project it may not be ‘bottom-up’ and eludes to the power imbalance experienced between Mediamos, the project developer, and Indigenous community members. In the PD there is a breakdown of the distribution of income between ACETISMA and Mediamos, which shows a significant proportion of revenue flowing to the former organisation throughout the project’s operations.<ref name=":7" /> However, there is currently no publicly available documentation supporting this initial claim<ref name=":9" /> as there is no obligation to provide this information, leading to a general lack of transparency in the market and between all of the relevant actors. Subsequent meetings with Indigenous leaders have however shown a marked support of the Mataven project, with one Indigenous leader explicitly stating “...the Redd+ project has brought resources that they never had before, which allowed them to open new school classrooms, 21 rural aqueducts, cocoa crops and even headquarters in Cumaribo and Inírida.”<ref>Lievano, A. B. (2021) Colombia's biggest carbon credit project could be selling hot air. Latin American Center for Investigative Journalism. [[/www.elclip.org/el-mayor-proyecto-de-bonos-de-carbono-de-colombia-podria-estar-vendiendo-aire-caliente/|https://www.elclip.org/el-mayor-proyecto-de-bonos-de-carbono-de-colombia-podria-estar-vendiendo-aire-caliente/]] </ref> Clearly there have been benefits for IPLC’s involved with this project, though the details of this benefit-sharing remain a mystery.

Secondly, the Mataven project has caused controversy due to its apparently inflated carbon credit issuance. The report states that this has been achieved by using a reference area that is not representative of the project area, as well as assuming an uncharacteristically heigh assumed rate of deforestation.<ref name=":12">Global Atlas of Environmental Justice (2023). ''Resguardo Indigena Unificado-Selva de Matavén (RIU SM) REDD+ Project, Colombia.'' [[/ejatlas.org/conflict/redd-project-resguardo-indigena-unificado-selva-de-mataven-riu-sm|https://ejatlas.org/conflict/redd-project-resguardo-indigena-unificado-selva-de-mataven-riu-sm]]</ref> The project used a baseline deforestation rate of 0.86% per year, which is significantly more than the Colombian government's national rate of 0.18%. Additionally, according to the report the reference area chosen is more easily accessed and therefore more prone to deforestation, making it an inaccurate comparison to the relatively remote project area.<ref name=":2" /> This has led to the creation of excess carbon credits, or “hot air” credits, which have been criticized for not reflecting real environmental benefits.<ref name=":9" /> To add further insult to injury these credits have been used by a Colombian fossil fuel distributor company to avoid paying taxes, as described earlier by Colombia’s change in policy in 2017. In doing so, the company avoided paying approximately $18.9 million in taxes.<ref name=":2" /> There has been subsequent back and forth between Verra and Carbon Market Watch, with Verra refuting the claims<ref>Verra (2021). ''Carbon Market Watch Report on Colombian REDD+ Projects Contains Flawed Allegations.'' [[/verra.org/carbon-market-watch-report-on-colombian-redd-projects-contains-flawed-allegations/|https://verra.org/carbon-market-watch-report-on-colombian-redd-projects-contains-flawed-allegations/]] </ref> Regardless of the science, Colombia recently introduced a resolution in 2018 (Resolution 1447 – 2018) that requires projects to use baselines that comply with national reference levels.<ref name=":13">Dufrasne, D. (2021b). Companies use ”hot air” forestry offsets to avoid taxes in Colombia: Carbon Market Watch’s fact-check of Verra’s response. Carbon Market Watch. [[/carbonmarketwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/CMWs-fact-check-of-Verras-response-on-Colombia.pdf|https://carbonmarketwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/CMWs-fact-check-of-Verras-response-on-Colombia.pdf]]</ref><ref>IEA (2022). ''Resolution 1447 – 2018. Monitoring, Reporting, and Verification System for mitigation actions at the national level.'' International Energy Agency. [[/www.iea.org/policies/14772-resolution-1447-2018-monitoring-reporting-and-verification-system-for-mitigation-actions-at-the-national-level|https://www.iea.org/policies/14772-resolution-1447-2018-monitoring-reporting-and-verification-system-for-mitigation-actions-at-the-national-level]]</ref> Going forward, REDD+ projects that are being implemented in Colombia will have to abide by Colombia’s national legislation.

====Summary====
Colombia has a long history of engaging in REDD+ as it has been used to limit environmental degradation in the post-conflict era, in alignment with the country’s national peacebuilding agenda.<ref name=":11" /> Owing to the country’s comprehensive tenure and bundle rights, IPLC’s have robust ''de jure'' rights to land as they collectively own it, and rights to carbon are tied to this ownership. This puts Colombia as one of the world leaders in legal terms relating to REDD+ project implementation, but due to a lack of resources to ensure enforcement, as well as corruption, historically these laws have not been adhered to.<ref name=":10" /><ref name=":2" /> There are many documented cases showing the displacement on IPLC’s from traditional lands, poor efforts to adhere to ''consulta previa'', and inequitable benefit sharing.<ref>Greenfield, P. (2023''). The ‘carbon pirates’ preying on Amazon’s Indigenous communities.'' The Guardian. [[/www.theguardian.com/environment/2023/jan/21/amazon-indigenous-communities-carbon-offsetting-pirates-aoe|https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2023/jan/21/amazon-indigenous-communities-carbon-offsetting-pirates-aoe]]</ref><ref name=":14">Lang, C., (2024). ''Colombia’s Constitutional Court rules in favour of Indigenous Peoples. Identifies serious flaws in the REDD+ Baka Rokarire project.'' REDD_Monitor. [[/reddmonitor.substack.com/p/colombias-constitutional-court-rules|https://reddmonitor.substack.com/p/colombias-constitutional-court-rules]]</ref>

The case of the Mataven project provides an interesting example of how it is the market itself that is failing to address concerns regarding transparency, whether that be relating to benefit-sharing amongst relevant stakeholders, or Indigenous representation and engagement throughout the implementation of REDD+ projects. Some ACATISEMA members have explicitly stated their support for the Mataven project,<ref name=":12" /> and its benefits can be seen first-hand in the form of improved infrastructure in local communities involved with the project.<ref>Myers, J. E., Parra, M. A., Bedford, C. (2021). ''How Carbon Offsetting Can Build a Forest.'' Stanford Social Innovation Review. [[/ssir.org/articles/entry/how carbon offsetting can build a forest|https://ssir.org/articles/entry/how_carbon_offsetting_can_build_a_forest]]</ref> However, an exact breakdown of how and where revenue is being distributed to IPLC’s remains elusive.<ref name=":13" /> Furthermore, the level of IPLC engagement has come into question, specifically with reference to ''consulta previa'' and the overall understanding that IPLC’s have regarding the project’s intended outcomes and activities.<ref name=":10" /> This is not a rare case in Colombia and has been witnessed occurring with other projects that have been implemented on Indigenous territories in the Colombian Amazon.<ref name=":17">Lang, C., (2023''). “It destroys everything,” says Indigenous leader about the REDD+ Baka Rokarire project in Colombia''. REDD Monitor. [[/reddmonitor.substack.com/p/it-destroys-everything-says-indigenous|https://reddmonitor.substack.com/p/it-destroys-everything-says-indigenous]]</ref> However, a recent ruling by the Colombian Constitutional court voted in favour of Indigenous groups in Colombia, upholding “the rights to self-determination, autonomy, self-government, territory, identity, physical and cultural integrity, and free, prior and informed consent of the indigenous communities”.<ref name=":14" /> This review ultimately sets a legal precedent safeguarding the fundamental rights of IPLCs with REDD+ project implementation and shows that progress is being made to improve the likelihood that REDD+ will result in genuine benefits to those affected by project implementation.

To ensure a more authentic engagement with IPLC’s as to result in legitimate and equitable benefit-sharing, improvements must be made by the Colombian government, as well as within the VCM itself. For the former, Colombia’s national registry for GHG mitigation activities must be updated; it has been offline since 2022.<ref name=":10" /> As a result, transparency is lacking. International finance could be utilized as to alleviate this issue, and only with an accurate and reliable database may the market be regulated. In the broader sense, VCM registries must create stricter guidelines promoting transparency. Often PD’s refer to annexed documents that contain relevant information regarding benefit-sharing, though these are often not publicly available.<ref name=":9" /> This limits transparency and increases the likelihood of inequitable agreements being made between project proponents and developers, further exacerbating existing power asymmetries between the two groups and limiting the likelihood that ''consulta previa'' is honestly adhered to.<ref name=":10" /> This has led to conflict within Indigenous communities, rather than a strengthening of their social fabric.

Furthermore, the Mataven project calls into question the actual emissions reduction that REDD+ projects achieve. Whilst Colombia has since updated its regulations such that REDD+ must use baselines that comply with national reference levels, it is up in the air as to how representative these guidelines are. Reference areas must represent project areas and without the appropriate regulations in place project developers lack the incentive to create realistic baselines; ultimately they are aiming to produce the maximum number of credits as to generate the greatest possible revenues.

==Conclusion==
As a market-based mechanism, REDD+ is shackled by the construct in which it operates; fundamentally it is a capitalist means of fixing a capitalist problem, which comes with limitations. Both Brazil and Colombia have relatively robust laws that have been written into the constitution, ultimately promoting more equitable results of project implementation. However, as in Colombia IPLC’s collectively own the land, whereas in Brazil these groups only own rights to use the land,<ref name=":2" /> Colombia can be considered better equipped for the establishment of REDD+ projects on traditional Indigenous territory. However, even with these laws in place enforcement remain a matter of concern. Furthermore, given the wide variety of ontological and epistemological perspectives of Indigenous communities, and how these views conflict with the Western worldview from which market-based REDD+ came to fruition, there is an inherent difficulty in implementing a system of governance in REDD+ on Indigenous lands.<ref name=":1" />. Putting a price on nature conflicts with Indigenous perspectives and there have been instances where this has attacked the social and cultural fabric of IPLC’s.<ref name=":17" /> To avoid this REDD+ developers must have the genuine intent of understanding the perspective of the Indigenous group they are working with and aim to implement REDD+ with a bottom-up approach.

In both countries, transparency must be improved to ensure that FPIC is adhered to and subsequently ensure fair IPLC representation and engagement. This issue predominantly arises due to the poor requirements of standards in the VCM. As such, proponents are guided by developers which have little incentive to truly act in the interests of Indigenous groups; ultimately the organizations in charge of project development are interested in increasing project revenues. This has led to instances of over-crediting, as without a transparent framework in which to operate it is difficult to evaluate the legitimacy of the claims being made by project proponents and developers. However, with recent advances that address concerns of additionality<ref name=":15" /> there is hope for improved market integrity. Standards of the VCM must continue to be scrutinized to ensure that progress continues to be made.

Going forward, progress should be made to formalize the customary laws and traditional lands of IPLCs, and finance should be directed towards the enforcement of these laws. The environmental,<ref name=":16" /> economic,<ref name=":5" /><ref>Ding, H., Veit, P. G., Blackman, A., Gray, E., Reytar, K., Altamirano, J. C., Hodgdon, B., (2016). ''Climate benefits, tenure costs: The economic case for securing Indigenous land rights in the Amazon''. WRI. [[/files.wri.org/d8/s3fs-public/Climate Benefits Tenure Costs Executive Summary.pdf|https://files.wri.org/d8/s3fs-public/Climate_Benefits_Tenure_Costs_Executive_Summary.pdf]]</ref> and social<ref>Sarmiento Barletti, J. P., Heise Vigil, N., & Larson, A. M. (2023). ''Safeguards at a glance: Are voluntary standards supporting community land, resource and carbon rights?'' CIFOR-ICRAF. [[/www.cifor-icraf.org/publications/pdf files/Flyer/REDD-Safeguards-7.pdf|https://www.cifor-icraf.org/publications/pdf_files/Flyer/REDD-Safeguards-7.pdf]] </ref> benefits of this have been researched and are well understood. By developing culturally appropriate frameworks for rights-based conservation regimes, that work with IPLCs in accordance with their worldviews, REDD+ could be used to promote Indigenous autonomy. However, progress still must be made to achieve this goal.

==References==

Documentation:Open Case Studies/FRST522/2024/REDD+ in Indigenous Amazonia: What works and what doesn’t?

2024-12-12T21:36:59Z

ConnorHaynes: /* REDD+ and the VCM in Brazil and Colombia */

__TOC__

==Positionality==
First and foremost I am not Indigenous, and whilst there are a myriad of cultures, ontologies and epistemologies that are not sufficiently represented by simply stating ‘Indigenous’, it is commonly accepted that these worldviews are vastly different to those of the ‘Western’ world, which is the world in which I grew up and matured. I am therefore only understanding of Indigenous cultures, beliefs and customary laws based upon available online literature and those which I have learnt through life, in addition to those introduced to me in my Master’s degree. As such, I will never be able to fully relate to an Indigenous person; the best I can do is try to understand and learn. Only throughout this process am I able to work towards reconciliation and attempt to address the inequities experienced by Indigenous folk globally.

Additionally, I am yet to act as a carbon project proponent and so do not understand the nuances or stresses of undertaking such a task. Whilst an individual proponent may have the best intention of procuring a carbon project for its social and environmental benefits, there are a number of stakeholders involved throughout the entire process which influence its eventual outcome. Without experience acting as a project proponent I am naïve in understanding the process and it's difficulties.

==Acronyms / Terminology==
'''Acronyms:'''

AFOLU: Agriculture, Forestry and Other Land-Use

ICVCM: Integrity Council for the Voluntary Carbon Market

IPLC: Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities

KMGBF: Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework

LAC: Latin American Countries

MRV: Monitoring, Reporting and Verification

REDD+: Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation

UNCBD: United Nations Convention on Biological Biodiversity

VCMI: Voluntary Carbon Markets Integrity Initiative

'''Terminology:'''

''Additionality:'' Additionality is the determination of whether the project will lead to the expected outcomes when compared to the baseline or ‘business as usual’ emissions.

''Leakage'': Refers to the shifting of emissions to outside the project boundary as a result of the project’s activities.

''Permanence:'' Permanence refers to the degree to which a carbon credit is equivalent to a permanent removal or reduction in emissions.
==Abstract==
This case study illustrates two examples of Indigenous-led REDD+ projects on Indigenous territory in Colombia and Brazil. Both countries have a relatively long history of engaging with REDD+ but have slightly different legal structures pertaining to the rights of Indigenous peoples on their traditional territories, and specifically their ‘carbon’ rights. As such, the intention is to evaluate how these differing ''de jure'' rights translate on the ground. With respect to REDD+, do certain rights result in legitimately positive benefits to IPLCs, as well as the environment that these projects were originally intended to protect? To reduce inconsistency, projects were chosen that utilized the same standard, namely Verra’s ‘Verified Carbon Standard’. The intention is such that the reader can evaluate the effectiveness and true benefit of REDD+ projects to IPLC’s, based upon the legal frameworks of the host country. A secondary intention is such that the reader is better equipped to conduct a prefeasibility assessment based upon available online literature, to evaluate the likelihood that REDD+ can be implemented in any chosen country, with the genuine intent of benefiting IPLC’s that are directly affected as a result of REDD+ project implementation.

==REDD+ and the VCM in Brazil and Colombia==
REDD+, originally introduced by the UNFCCC, is a market-based mechanism sitting within the VCM that aims to reverse the loss of forests and carbon stocks, specifically in developing countries. Simply put, an entity or an individual can voluntarily pay another that has engaged with REDD+ and subsequently sequestered carbon, to offset their own emissions using ‘credits’, sold as units of greenhouse gas equivalent to one ton of carbon dioxide (CO2e). Forestry and Land-Use remains to be the largest category of carbon credits traded by transaction volume on the VCM, with REDD+ being the most popular project type in this category, accounting for 78% of credits traded.<ref name=":0">Procton, A., (2024). ''State of the voluntary carbon market 2024: On the path to maturity.'' Forest Trends Ecosystem Marketplace.</ref> Furthermore, over one-third of the credits sold within this category were sourced from projects that had been implemented in LAC and the Caribbean in 2024.<ref name=":0" /> Of the four largest standards issuing carbon credits, Verra accounts for roughly 80% of issuances in Latin America,<ref>Pullins, T. (2022). Growth of carbon markets in Latin America. White & Case. [[/www.whitecase.com/publications/insight/latin-america-focus-fall-2022-growth-carbon-markets|https://www.whitecase.com/publications/insight/latin-america-focus-fall-2022-growth-carbon-markets]] </ref> and even in the face of recent scrutiny,<ref>West, T. A. P., Bofim, B., Haya, B. K. (2024). Methodological issues with deforestation baselines compromise the integrity of carbon offsets from REDD+. ''Global Environmental Change, 87'' [[/doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2024.102863|https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2024.102863]]</ref><ref>Wyburd I., & Dufrasne, G. (2023). Error Log: Exposing the methodological failures of REDD+ forestry projects. Carbon Market Watch. [[/carbonmarketwatch.org/publications/error-log-exposing-the-methodological-failures-of-redd-forestry-projects/|https://carbonmarketwatch.org/publications/error-log-exposing-the-methodological-failures-of-redd-forestry-projects/]]</ref><ref name=":15">Haya, B. K., Alford-Jones, K., Anderegg, W. R. L., Beymer-Farris, B., Blanchard, L., Bomfim, B., Chin, D., Evans, S., Hogan, M., Holm, J. A., McAfee, K., So, I. S., West, T. A. P., & Withey, L. (2023). ''Quality assessment of REDD+ carbon credit projects''. Berkeley Carbon Trading Project. [[/gspp.berkeley.edu/research-and-impact/centers/cepp/projects/berkeley-carbontrading-project/REDD+|https://gspp.berkeley.edu/research-and-impact/centers/cepp/projects/berkeley-carbontrading-project/REDD+]]</ref> REDD+ projects account for a significant proportion of the VCM with their continued application likely to persist.<ref>Gordon, O. (2022). ''The interwoven fortunes of carbon markets and indigenous communities.'' Energy Monitor. [[/www.energymonitor.ai/tech/carbon-removal/the-interwoven-fortunes-of-carbon-markets-and-indigenous-communities/|https://www.energymonitor.ai/tech/carbon-removal/the-interwoven-fortunes-of-carbon-markets-and-indigenous-communities/]]</ref><ref>Müller, M., Coustar, C., Bietta, F., Mathres, M. (2022). ''UNFCCC REDD+ and the power of sovereign carbon.'' Deutsche Banke Chief Investment Office. [[/www.rainforestcoalition.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/CIO-Special-UNFCCC-REDD-power-of-sovereign-carbon.pdf|https://www.rainforestcoalition.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/CIO-Special-UNFCCC-REDD-power-of-sovereign-carbon.pdf]]</ref><ref>Pullins, T. (2022). ''Growth of carbon markets in Latin America.'' White & Case. [[/www.whitecase.com/publications/insight/latin-america-focus-fall-2022-growth-carbon-markets|https://www.whitecase.com/publications/insight/latin-america-focus-fall-2022-growth-carbon-markets]] </ref> With the introduction of updated methodologies aimed at addressing these concerns,<ref>Verra (2023a). ''Setting the Standard: Verra’s Revolutionary New REDD Methodology.'' [[/verra.org/program-notice/setting-the-standard-verras-revolutionary-new-redd-methodology/|https://verra.org/program-notice/setting-the-standard-verras-revolutionary-new-redd-methodology/]]</ref><ref>Verra (2023b). ''VM0048 Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation, v1.0.'' [[/verra.org/methodologies/vm0048-reducing-emissions-from-deforestation-and-forest-degradation-v1-0/|https://verra.org/methodologies/vm0048-reducing-emissions-from-deforestation-and-forest-degradation-v1-0/]]</ref> there is hope for renewed buyer confidence in the integrity of this market,<ref>MSCI (2023). ''Verra’s New Methodology for Unplanned Deforestation Aims to Silence the Critics''. [[/www.msci.com/www/blog-posts/verra-s-new-methodology-for/04577808942|https://www.msci.com/www/blog-posts/verra-s-new-methodology-for/04577808942]]</ref> though more work still needs to be done.

Both Colombia and Brazil have a relatively long history of implementing REDD+ projects, using both fund-based and market-based mechanisms. For example, both countries were participants in the ‘Amazon Indigenous REDD+ (RIA in Spanish) initiative, with the first pilot implementation project being initiated in Colombia’s Puiawai Natural Reserve.<ref>Garzón, E., (2017). ''Amazon Indigenous REDD+: An innovative approach to conserve Colombian forests?'' Mongabay. [[/news.mongabay.com/2017/01/amazon-indigenous-redd-an-innovative-approach-to-conserve-colombian-forests/|https://news.mongabay.com/2017/01/amazon-indigenous-redd-an-innovative-approach-to-conserve-colombian-forests/]]</ref> The relevance of these two countries with respect to REDD+ is simple. Much of the Amazon’s primary tropical rainforest falls within these countries jurisdiction and this rainforest has been consistently under threat from external pressures and encroachment, whether that be in the form of land-clearing for commercial ranching, subsistence purposes, illicit drug production or illegal mining practices,<ref name=":8">Sánchez García, P. A. & Wong, G. Y., (2024) “The political economy of deforestation in the Colombian Amazon”, ''Journal of Political Ecology'' ''31''(1), 178–199. [[/doi.org/10.2458/jpe.5230|https://doi.org/10.2458/jpe.5230]]</ref><ref>Radwin, M. (2023). ''Drug trafficking fuels other deforestation drivers in the Amazon: report.'' Mongabay. [[/news.mongabay.com/2023/07/drug-trafficking-fuels-other-deforestation-drivers-in-the-amazon-report/|https://news.mongabay.com/2023/07/drug-trafficking-fuels-other-deforestation-drivers-in-the-amazon-report/]]</ref><ref>Haddad, E.A., Araújo, I.F., Feltran-Barbieri, R., Perobelli, F. S., Rocha, A., Sass, K. S., Nobre, C. A. (2024). Economic drivers of deforestation in the Brazilian Legal Amazon. ''Nat Sustain'' ''7'', 1141–1148. [[/doi.org/10.1038/s41893-024-01387-7|https://doi.org/10.1038/s41893-024-01387-7]] </ref><ref>Hänggli, A., Levy, S. A., Armenteras, D., Bovolo, C. I., Brandão, J., Rueda, X., & Garrett, R. D. (2023). A systematic comparison of deforestation drivers and policy effectiveness across the amazon biome. ''Environmental Research Letters, 18''(7), 073001. [[/doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/acd408|https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/acd408]]</ref> to name a few.

In theory, REDD+ can be used to provide the economic incentive to promote sustained environmental protection of Indigenous lands, with a focus on the rights and livelihoods of IPLCs. Currently the overall funding to IPLCs tenure rights and forest management in tropical countries is low, receiving just $270 million per year between 2011-2020 from bilateral and multilateral donors and private philanthropies.<ref>Hatcher, J., Owen, M., Yin, D., (2021). ''Falling short: Donor funding for Indigenous peoples and local communities to secure tenure rights and manage forests in tropical countries (2011 -2020).'' Rainforest Foundation Norway. [[/dv719tqmsuwvb.cloudfront.net/documents/Publikasjoner/Andre-rapporter/RFN Falling short 2021.pdf|https://dv719tqmsuwvb.cloudfront.net/documents/Publikasjoner/Andre-rapporter/RFN_Falling_short_2021.pdf]]</ref> REDD+ has the potential to channel funding as to promote Indigenous rights and autonomy, provided there is transparent and equitable benefit-sharing for those involved. Fundamentally, only with the inclusion of IPLC’s, or preferably with IPLC’s acting as project proponents, is REDD+ able to promote Indigenous agency and improve IPLC rights and governance. And only when the rights of those inhabiting the land are formally recognized can the land be effectively conserved.<ref name=":16">Reytar, K., Veit, P., von Braun, J. (2024). ''Protecting Biodiversity Hinges on Securing Indigenous and Community Land Rights.'' WRI. [[/www.wri.org/insights/indigenous-and-local-community-land-rights-protect-biodiversity|https://www.wri.org/insights/indigenous-and-local-community-land-rights-protect-biodiversity]]</ref> The inclusion of IPLCs in REDD+ project development is therefore considered to be essential for project success, and this is in theory embodied in the very nature of REDD+.<ref name=":1">Alvarez, G., Elfving, M. and Andrade, C. (2016) ‘REDD+ governance and indigenous peoples in Latin America: the case of Suruí Carbon Project in the Brazilian Amazon Forest’, ''Latin American J. Management for Sustainable Development 3''(2) pp.133–146. [[/dx.doi.org/10.1504/LAJMSD.2016.083705|10.1504/LAJMSD.2016.083705]]</ref> Partially owing to a long history of dealing with REDD+, Colombia and Brazil are amongst just a few of the countries hosting tropical rainforests that explicitly recognise community rights to carbon and tie these rights to the legal ownership of lands and forests. In Colombia, carbon rights are tied to rights of the land, whereas in Brazil carbon rights are tied to forest rights.<ref name=":2">RRI and McGill University (2021). Technical report: ''Status of legal recognition of Indigenous Peoples’, Local Communities’ and Afro-descendant Peoples’ rights to carbon stored in tropical lands and forests''. Rights and Resources Initiative. [[/doi.org/10.53892/MLQQ5744|https://doi.org/10.53892/MLQQ5744]]</ref>

==Brazil: The Suruí Forest Carbon Project==
====Project description and location====
The Surui Forest Carbon project was implemented in 2009 on the territory of the Surui people, which is situated in the southern part of Brazil’s Amazon between the states of Rondônia and Mato Grosso. Surui Indigenous territory covers an area of 2,481 km2, though the intention of the PCFS was to protect a portion of this total area. According to the PD, the stated objective was to “prevent 13,575.3 hectares of tropical forest from being cleared by 2038, to avoid the emission of 7,258,352.3 tCO2e to the atmosphere, and to contribute to the preservation of the Paiter Surui lifestyle and traditions.”<ref>IDESAM (2011). ''Project description: Surui forest carbon project''. Institute for Conservation and Sustainable Development of Amazonas. Link: "PROJ_DESC_1118_02FEB2012.PDF" found at [[/registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/1118|https://registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/1118]] </ref> This region sits within one of the Brazilian Amazon’s main ‘arcs of deforestation’ and pressure from loggers and ranchers is a matter of concern.

Notably, the PCFS was the first REDD+ project to be proposed by Indigenous peoples in the Brazilian Amazon on their own territory and was the first to receive certification by both the VCS and CCBS.<ref name=":1" />. Metareilá, the Surui’s own Indigenous association, acted as project proponent and the Institute for Conservation and Sustainable Development of Amazonas (IDESAM) assisted with project development, alongside multiple other stakeholder groups. As an endogenous initiative procured and conducted by the Surui community, the SFCP had a ‘non-centralized model of governance’, which reflected the characteristics and traditions of the Surui people. <ref name=":1" />

Only after two years of consultations between the 24 communities involved and the relevant governmental agencies (primarily FUNAI and the Ministry of Environment) was a Memorandum of Understanding signed, showing community consent to develop the project.<ref name=":3">Garcia, B., Rimmer, L., Canal Vieira, L., Mackey, B., (2021). REDD+ and forest protection on indigenous lands in the Amazon. ''RECIEL 30'', 207–219. [[/doi.org/10.1111/reel.12389|https://doi.org/10.1111/reel.12389]]</ref> In 2012 after verification from an independent third-party body, the Surui were able to sell carbon credits on the international market. Between 2009 and 2014 the project drastically helped limit the deforestation occurring within the project’s site, causing many to deem it a success.<ref name=":4">Howard, F. E., (2023). ''An Analysis of the Suruí Forest Carbon Project in Context of Settler Colonialism''. Masters thesis. Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University. [[/vtechworks.lib.vt.edu/server/api/core/bitstreams/b0cde6de-794c-453f-856b-ee72bde3db06/content|https://vtechworks.lib.vt.edu/server/api/core/bitstreams/b0cde6de-794c-453f-856b-ee72bde3db06/content]]</ref>

====National climate targets, policies and legislation====
Rates of deforestation in Brazil’s legal Amazon are significantly impacted by the government in charge. This is evidenced in the decade between 2012 and 2021 whilst under the conservative Bolsonaro administration, when deforestation in the Amazon increased 185% — from a loss of 4,571 km2 in 2012 to 13,038 km2 in 2021.<ref>INPE (2022). ''Observação da Terra. [[/www.obt.inpe.br/OBT/assuntos/programas/amazonia/prodes|http://www.obt.inpe.br/OBT/assuntos/programas/amazonia/prodes]]''</ref> However, since Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s appointment in 2022 there has been a steady decline in the rate of deforestation, which is now roughly half what it was in 2021.<ref>Terra Brasilis (2024). ''PRODES (deforestation): Deforestation rates – Legal Amazon – States''. [[/terrabrasilis.dpi.inpe.br/app/dashboard/deforestation/biomes/legal amazon/rates|https://terrabrasilis.dpi.inpe.br/app/dashboard/deforestation/biomes/legal_amazon/rates]]</ref> A significant proportion of emissions result from the clearing of rainforest and its subsequent conversion to ranching.<ref>MCTI (2022). ''Estimativas Anuais De Emissões De Gases De Efeito Estufa No Brasil.'' 6ª Edição. Ministério da Estado da Ciência, Tecnologia e Inovações. [[/www.gov.br/mcti/pt-br/acompanhe-o-mcti/sirene/publicacoes/estimativas-anuais-de-emissoes-gee/arquivos/6a-ed-estimativas-anuais.pdf|https://www.gov.br/mcti/pt-br/acompanhe-o-mcti/sirene/publicacoes/estimativas-anuais-de-emissoes-gee/arquivos/6a-ed-estimativas-anuais.pdf]]</ref> To address these emissions Brazil has implemented various adaptation policies, legislation and targets which are summarized below:

TABLE
====Indigenous rights - Constitutional, tenure and bundle rights====
In Brazil, Indigenous rights are robust and clearly defined according to the Brazilian Constitution. As a result, the Indigenous communities of the Brazilian Amazon have legal title to 13.8% of the national territory totalling 1.175 million km2, with a total of 631 territories.<ref>Federal government of Brazil (2024). ''Brazil’s NDC: National determination to contribute and transform''. [[/unfccc.int/sites/default/files/2024-11/Brazil Second Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) November2024.pdf|https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/2024-11/Brazil_Second%20Nationally%20Determined%20Contribution%20%28NDC%29_November2024.pdf]]</ref>

TABLE

Whilst Indigenous communities in Brazil have legal title to land, it is the State that owns it. Indigenous people simply exercise permanent tenure over lands that they traditionally occupy and have ‘original rights’ to these traditional lands, which no other rights can prevail over.<ref name=":3" /> Indigenous lands, though not classified as protected areas, “have the highest level of protection by law because they are regulated by the Constitution” and cannot be leased or restricted without violating their original rights. The Suruí's right to develop the PCFS is grounded in the Brazilian Constitution, which grants Indigenous peoples exclusive rights to use the ‘riches of the soil, rivers and lakes’ of their land, and these rights cannot be overridden. Thus, Indigenous people and only Indigenous people are legally allowed to engage in productive activities on their land, provided these activities are conducted according to their own customs and traditions and are necessary for the wellbeing and cultural expression of their own people. In Brazil, it is the armed forces and federal police that are responsible for enforcing these laws, and FUNAI is responsible for representing Indigenous communities in judicial disputes.<ref name=":3" /> As such, provided a REDD+ does not violate the rights to territorial integrity, permanent land tenure and original rights, it is legally allowed.

'''CARBON RIGHTS:''' In Brazil, carbon rights are tied to forest rights.<ref name=":2" /> Carbon credits from REDD+ projects are seen as part of the economic benefits derived from indigenous lands, and as such, Indigenous communities are entitled to own, control and distribute these revenues themselves. The carbon credits generated from the (SFCP) were wholly owned by the Suruí people through Metareilá, with the Suruí Fund (managed by the Brazilian Biodiversity Fund - FUNBIO) acting as recipient. This legality reinforces Indigenous control over both land and carbon rights, as whoever has rights to the forest land is usually recognized as the owner of carbon rights.<ref name=":3" />

'''FPIC OBLIGATION:''' Furthermore, Brazilian law requires Free, Prior, and Informed Consent (FPIC) for REDD+ projects affecting indigenous lands, ensuring that international standards such as the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) and ILO Convention No. 169 are adhered to; Indigenous consent is, ''de jure,'' a necessity. Projects that violate these rights and fail to consult communities are therefore considered illegal. Notably there are no specific rules or procedures that have been written into the Brazilian constitution that provide guidance on how to achieve FPIC. This freedom reinforces Indigenous autonomy as it allows an Indigenous community to define the rules of consultation according to their customs and traditions.

Collectively these national and international laws provide an important safeguard to Indigenous peoples, making their consent a prerequisite for the establishment of REDD+ projects and recognizing their rights as the main beneficiaries of REDD+ revenues.<ref name=":3" /> However, as carbon rights are tied to forest rights in Brazil and not land rights, carbon is considered to be an ‘environmental service’ (Article 41(I)(A) Brazilian Forestry Code), and states, as well as the federal government, have the jurisdiction to exercise full legislative authority over carbon. <ref name=":2" /> As such, certain states have interpreted the law to imply that the title to carbon credits is attributable to the state.<ref>Loft, L., Ravikumar, A., Gebara, M. F., Pham, T. T., Resosudarmo, I. A. P., Assembe, S., Tovar, J. G., Mwangi, E., & Andersson, K. (2015). Taking Stock of Carbon Rights in REDD+ Candidate Countries: Concept Meets Reality. ''Forests'', ''6''(4), 1031-1060. [[/doi.org/10.3390/f6041031|https://doi.org/10.3390/f6041031]]</ref> Hence, even when carbon rights are clearly defined and tied to forest title it is insufficient in itself, and only by legally recognizing the customary rights of IPLCs can a fair and equitable outcome be realised.

====Interested and affected stakeholders====
TABLE
====Discussion====
Although originally successful in achieving its goal of reducing deforestation and degradation, in 2016 diamonds were discovered in Surui territory, leading to an increase in illegal logging and mining.<ref name=":1" /> By 2018 the project site had been completely overrun by ''garimpeiros'' (small-scale gold miners), ultimately leading to the projects suspension that year. <ref name=":4" />

While the project had initially garnered support, divisions emerged within the community post-project implementation. Disputes arose over the unequal distribution of project revenues, leading to internal conflicts between different Suruí clans. These criticisms escalated in 2014 when the Catholic Indigenous Missionary Council supported calls for an end to the project due to mismanagement of revenues from carbon credit sales. <ref name=":3" /> Some Suruí members also argued that the REDD+ initiative harmed their way of life.<ref>Lang, C. (2014). ''“What are projects for that destroy life?” Interview with Henrique Suruí about the Paiter-Suruí REDD project, Brazil.'' REDD-Monitor. [[/redd-monitor.org/2014/12/17/what-are-projects-for-that-destroy-life-interview-with-henrique-surui-about-the-paiter-surui-redd-project-brazil/|https://redd-monitor.org/2014/12/17/what-are-projects-for-that-destroy-life-interview-with-henrique-surui-about-the-paiter-surui-redd-project-brazil/]]</ref>

Further complicating the situation was the controversial role of Henrique Suruí, one of the Suruí tribal leaders. In 2011, it was revealed that Henrique had violated the tribe's logging moratorium, collaborating with loggers in illegal activities. While Henrique later denied responsibility for the project’s failure, his actions, combined with internal disagreements, illustrated the lack of consensus within the Suruí leadership on the project’s goals and outcomes. Both of the tribe’s leaders possessed dramatically different perspectives on how they believed they could ensure agency, autonomy, and economic benefits for the Suruí people.<ref name=":4" /> This fragmentation within the community, in combination with the discovery of diamonds and the state's failure to protect indigenous land rights led to the indefinite suspension of the REDD+ project.

The project's collapse highlights broader structural issues, particularly the state's inconsistent support for indigenous land rights, influenced by settler colonialism, which undermined the project’s long-term viability.<ref name=":4" /> Additionally, the project’s creation was shaped by external actors, including the collaboration between Almir Suruí and Borges from Forest Trends, a Washington-based NGO. This partnership introduced a Western perspective on viewing the Suruí peoples forest, in contrast with their own perspectives on land use and governance. Furthermore, despite Borges’ Brazilian background, the power dynamics between a global North organization and a developing, Indigenous community were apparent.

====Summary====
The Suruí Forest Carbon Project provides an interesting example of how, even when the rights of IPLC’s are relatively robust, challenges persist in ensuring REDD+ project longevity. As such, in its current state, REDD+ in the Brazilian Amazon may not be a suitable market-based option for indigenous communities in the Amazon.<ref name=":3" /> Although initially successful in promoting indigenous autonomy and reducing deforestation, the project resulted in failure due to of a myriad of factors. Division between Surui communities was exacerbated by a perceived unequal benefit-sharing, and the impact of imposing REDD+ seems to have complicated the traditional social structure that the Surui were dependent on. These issues were influenced by Brazil's settler state dynamics, where indigenous land rights, although legally recognized, are often not upheld in practice due to insufficient enforcement.<ref name=":4" /> Ultimately, the Surui project reveals how settler colonialism's structural flaws make long-term project success difficult, despite initial progress in promoting indigenous autonomy.

At the national and state level, complex institutional and legal land governance structures convolute and impede REDD+ in Brazil. Multiple institutions share responsibilities and there is no comprehensive, authoritative database of land ownership, which hampers efforts to protect indigenous territories.<ref name=":5">Costa, R. (2016)''. Insecure land rights in Brazil: Consequences for rural areas and challenges for improvement.'' Climate Policy Initiative. [[/www.climatepolicyinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/Insecure Land Rights in Brazil CPI.pdf|https://www.climatepolicyinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/Insecure_Land_Rights_in_Brazil_CPI.pdf]]</ref> As a result, land tenure disputes remain common and can be witnessed occurring between the public as well between public and state actors. For example, Brazil’s 1964 Land Statute (Law No. 4504) allows the government to takeover unproductive farms and transfer those lands to landless peasants. This often results in the clearing of forest, as only when the land is cleared is it evidenced to be ‘productive’.<ref name=":5" /> Hence, not only does this law cause insecurity for Indigenous populations in Brazil, it also forces them to go against customary traditions of stewarding the land in an effort to maintain its control.

Whilst the aforementioned points to the futility of REDD+ in Brazil, there is reason to maintain optimism. In a recent landmark ruling Brazil’s supreme court voted in favour of the Xoleng peoples, and the decision will serve as a precedent for all cases involving Indigenous peoples.<ref name=":6">Amos-Flom, K., (2023). ''Triumph and Turmoil: The Xokleng Case and the Future of Indigenous Land Rights in Brazil.'' Columbia Journal of Transnational Law. [[/www.jtl.columbia.edu/bulletin-blog/triumph-and-turmoil-the-xokleng-case-and-the-future-of-indigenous-land-rights-in-brazil|https://www.jtl.columbia.edu/bulletin-blog/triumph-and-turmoil-the-xokleng-case-and-the-future-of-indigenous-land-rights-in-brazil]]</ref> The Xokleng’s land dispute, settled in 2023, “rejected Santa Catarina state’s marco temporal (“time limit”) argument, which would have required Indigenous people to prove they occupied or legally contested the territory they claimed before the Brazilian Constitution came into force in 1988. If successful, this argument would have led to disastrous repercussions, as many indigenous peoples had been forcibly removed or are traditionally nomadic.”<ref name=":6" /> Evidently, whilst slow, progress has been made in Brazil in recent years with respect to Indigenous rights as well as the voluntary carbon market itself.

There are currently 159 AFOLU projects listed on the Verra database in Brazil, with only two specifically focused on REDD+ initiatives in collaboration with Indigenous groups. These are the Ka’a Pyahu project, <ref>Verra (n.d.) ''Project 5087: KA'A PYAHU.'' https://registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/5087</ref> initiated by the Guajajara Indigenous people in collaboration with external organizations and validated in 2021, and the ‘Together for the forest Awaete REDD+ project’<ref>Verra (n.d.) ''Project 5200: TOGETHER FOR THE FOREST AWAETÉ REDD+ PROJECT.'' https://registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/5200</ref> which is still under development. Both projects involve Indigenous groups working with Brazilian organizations to build technical capacity and expertise. This could signal a growing trend of Indigenous-led REDD+ projects in the future. To ensure a positive future for REDD+ in Brazil, the customary rights of IPLC’s must be formally recognized. IPLC should have legal ownership of their traditional lands, and in doing so the carbon rights of these communities would be less convoluted, leading to more equitable benefit-sharing and increased cohesion amongst these groups post-project implementation.

==Colombia: ''REDD+ project Resguardo Indigena Unificado - Selva de Mataven (RUI-SM)''==
'''Project description and location'''

According to the PD,<ref name=":7">ACATISEMA & Mediamos (2017). ''Joint project description and monitoring report: REDD+ project: Resguardo Indigena Unificado – Selva de Mataven (RIU – SM).'' Link: “10 06 2017_VCS Final Report_ Matavin Project.pdf” found at [[/registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/1566|https://registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/1566]]</ref> the Resguardo Indígena Unificado – Selva de Matavén (RIU-SM) project is located east of the Colombian Orinoco high plain, in the eastern part of the Department of Vichada, municipality of Cumaribo. It resides on the formalized resguardo of the Sikuani, Piaroa, Puinave, Curripaco, Cubeo and Piapoco ethnic groups, spanning 1,856,836 hectares, with 1,477,115 hectares (79.6%) being forested. The project states that it will reduce greenhouse gas emissions, with a total estimated net reduction of 108,670,562 tons of CO2 equivalent over thirty years, from years 2013 – 2042. By this metric, it is the 14th largest project on the Verra registry, out of over 1700 projects.<ref name=":9">Dufrasne, D., (2021). ''Two Shades of Green: How hot air forest credits are being used to avoid carbon taxes in Colombia''. Carbon Market Watch. [[/carbonmarketwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Two-shades-of-green EN WEB.pdf|https://carbonmarketwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Two-shades-of-green_EN_WEB.pdf]]</ref> There are 12,312 indigenous people living in the RIU-SM, belonging to 2,517 families and 250 communities as of 2017.

The project was initiated and developed by the Asociación de Cabildos y Autoridades Indígenas de la Selva de Matavén (ACETISMA), an Indigenous association, and MEDIAMOS F&M, a Colombian consultancy firm. ACETISMA is comprised of Indigenous leaders that represent the 17 communities of the reservation in charge of governing the territory, and it has administrative autonomy, as well as “the capacity to acquire, to own and to dispose of property, to accept donations, to hold national and international conventions, scientific and cultural exchanges and generally, to celebrate all kinds of negotiations and agreements with which the Association can achieve its objectives.”<ref name=":7" />

There is a stated focus on various means of improving the living conditions of the Indigenous peoples living within the project area. To summarise, the main objectives of the REDD+ project RIU-SM include:

· Community development, in the form of improved education.

· Community engagement with respect to the project; developing information channels to reveal project progress.

· Support local initiatives for environmental education and waste management.

· Developing an effective response system that addresses community proposals and concerns relating to the project.

· Strengthening the governance of ACATISEMA.

====National climate targets, policies and legislation====
The Colombian Amazon makes up over one-third of Colombia’s national territory, and up until 2005 only 7.3% of the Colombian Amazon had been deforested, largely due to the country's 60-year armed conflict between the government, multiple left-wing guerillas such as FARC, and several far-right paramilitary groups.<ref name=":8" /> However, following the signing of the Peace Treaty in 2016 and demobilization of the FARC, limits to deforestation were weakened in the Colombian Amazon. Poor but opportunistic peasants began to encroach into previously unchartered territory and capitalize from the rainforest. Due to the poor economic integration of the Amazon, many were forced to engage with the traditional economies of cocoa and cattle ranching, as these markets were already well connected to regional and global markets.<ref name=":8" /> To address the drivers of deforestation and its associated emissions, the federal government has implemented various initiatives, which are summarized below:
{| class="wikitable"
|'''Document name'''
|'''Type (target, policy or legislation)'''
|'''Publication year'''
|'''Key takeaways'''
|-
|
|Target
|?
|Reduce GHG emissions by 51 % by 2030.
|-
|
|Target
|?
|Net zero by 2050
|-
|National Climate Change Policy (PNCC)
|
|2018
|
|-
|National Forest Conservation Program
|
|2011
|
|-
|Law 1931 of 2018 – Climate Change Law

|
|2018
|
|-
| colspan="4" |Relating to REDD+
|-
|National Strategy for Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (ENREDD+).”
|
|2009
|
|-
|Amazon Indigenous REDD+ Initiative
|
|2012
|
|-
|USAID's Colombia BIOREDD+ program
|
|
|Develop a portfolio of 8 REDD+ projects in four geographic nodes covering over 700,000 hectares in the Colombian Pacific.

|-
|Vision Amazonia
|
|2015
|part of the REDD+ strategy in the country financed by three foreign countries: Germany, Norway and United Kingdom
|}
As a result of the many fund and market-based initiatives that Colombia has engaged with, it hosts the second most REDD+ projects in the world. REDD+ projects now cover at least 56% of the area of legally recognized Indigenous territories in the Colombian Amazon, with an overwhelming majority of carbon projects located on Indigenous territories.<ref name=":10">Schmid, D., & Castro. C., (2023). ''REDD+ projects in the Colombian Amazon: Social challenges and lack of transparency''. Rainforest Foundation Norway. [[/dv719tqmsuwvb.cloudfront.net/documents/REDD rapport 2024 ENG.pdf|https://dv719tqmsuwvb.cloudfront.net/documents/REDD_rapport_2024_ENG.pdf]]</ref> Evidently REDD+ plays an integral part in the country’s efforts of environmental conservation, and incentives have been introduced to promote the development of such projects. For example, in 2016 the government adopted a higher tax that covered fossil fuels, but companies are able to avoid paying the tax by investing in carbon offsets that have been generated domestically.<ref name=":9" /> This led to a boost in the domestic REDD+ market in 2017, as Colombian companies invested as to escape higher taxes. Notably, 23 of the 36 REDD+ projects currently under development in the Amazon region have been initiated in or after 2018.<ref name=":10" /> Currently Colombia’s REDD+ program sits at over 45 pilot and voluntary carbon projects, as well as one large-scale jurisdictional approach in the Amazon.<ref name=":11">Zambrano-Cortés, D. G. (2024). ''The politics, spaces and subjects of forest conservation in Colombia''. [internal PhD, WU, Wageningen University]. Wageningen University. [[/doi.org/10.18174/675328|https://doi.org/10.18174/675328]]</ref>

====Indigenous rights - Constitutional, tenure and bundle rights====
''De jure'', the Indigenous peoples of Colombia have comprehensive tenure and bundle rights that have been articulated in the national constitution. Collective land titles are granted to Indigenous communities by the Colombian government, and as a result about 34 percent of Colombian land (almost 38 million hectares) is legally recognized as Indigenous territory or collective lands of Afro-descendent communities. (Schmid & Castro, 2023) These collective land tenure rights have been in effect since the implementation of the 1991 constitution, granting them the authority to exercise legal control over their territories in accordance with their own customs and procedures.<ref>Max Planck Institute (n.d.) ''Colombia 1991 (rev. 2015).'' Institute. [[/www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Colombia 2015|https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Colombia_2015]]</ref> Furthermore, the carbon rights of Indigenous peoples are explicitly defined in the constitution and tied specifically to the ownership of land of the communities.<ref name=":2" /> This in theory provides a solid legal basis for upholding the rights of Indigenous communities in Colombia, specifically relating to REDD+ activities, as it allows communities to define and negotiate the terms of said projects. A summary of the various laws relating to Indigenous rights have been summarized below:
{| class="wikitable"
| colspan="2" |'''Laws'''
|-
| colspan="2" |'''1991 constitution'''
|-
|Article 63

|Indigenous territories are considered collective property. This means that land is not owned by individuals but is shared by the community. The state must respect these collective rights and cannot alter land ownership without the consent of the Indigenous peoples.
|-
|Article 330
|Indigenous communities have the right to govern their territories.
|-
|Article 76 - ''Consulta previa''.
|Pertains to the right of Indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities to prior consultation before the government or private companies undertake activities that may affect their territories, culture, or way of life.

|-
|Article 63 and 329
|The Reservation is a collective, inalienable, and indefeasible property.
|-
|Decree 1386 of 1994, Article 10; Decree 2164 of 1995, Article 22) 39.
|The administration and management of these lands are subjected to uses and customs of the beneficiaries
|}
Whilst land and tenure rights are enshrined into the constitution, the precariousness of these rights persists due to a lack of resources to ensure enforcement, as well as the deeper issue of corruption. As previously stated, the rate of deforestation increased significantly in Colombia’s post-conflict era, evidencing the nations inability to maintain control over unlawful acts of land-grabbing and disposition. Whilst this began with new peasants converting the Amazon for subsistence purposes, it ultimately led to new areas for the growth of cocoa, much to the benefit of narco-traffickers who could monopolize on this illegal surplus in ‘accumulation by dispossession’.<ref name=":8" />

With respect to the legalities of consultation, Colombia has enshrined ''consulta previa'' into the constitution. Translating to ‘prior consultation’, this legal text provides the formal grounds for Indigenous engagement when any legislative or administrative measures are implemented on Indigenous territory. Importantly, consultation should be achieved in accordance with the customs of the ethnic group with which the project is being imposed upon. However, there have been recent cases of contestation specifically relating to how ''consulta previa'' applies to REDD+ on Indigenous lands, and the RIU – SM project was one that was involved with such a case.

====Interested and affected stakeholders====
{| class="wikitable"
| colspan="5" |'''Affected stakeholders'''
|-
|Stakeholders
|Primary objective(s)
|Secondary objective(s)
|Relative power
|Scope of influence
|-
|ACATISEMA - Asociación de Cabildos y Autoridades Indígenas de la Selva de Matavén
|the Indigenous association comprised of Indigenous leaders in representation of the 16 communities of the reservation in charge of governing the territory.

foster the integral development, social and cultural preservation of the indigenous communities in the Mataven Jungle and to consolidate the territory, selfgovernment by partners, the defense, conservation and preservation of the environment and biodiversity of the Mataven Jungle (ACATISEMA, 2010)

|
|It is the highest authority in the reservation.
|
|-
|MEDIAMOS F&M – A consultancy
|Project developer
|
|
|
|-
|Communities of indigenous peoples of the RIU-SM
|<nowiki>- Primary and direct beneficiaries.</nowiki>
|
|
|
|-
|Teachers of primary and secondary basic education indigenous Reservation
|
|
|
|
|-
|Colonists
|
|
|
|
|-
| colspan="5" |'''Interested stakeholders'''
|-
|Mining Companies and individuals
|Compete with the Project for the territory's resources.
|
|
|
|-
|Ministerio de Ambiente y Desarrollo Sostenible

- Direct participation
|Its main interest is to achieve environmental planning, through the consolidation of a policy of sustainable development and strategic alliances with social and institutional participants in different sectoral and territorial scenarios.
|
|
|
|-
|Dirección de Asuntos Indígenas, ROM y Minorías - Ministerio del Interior

Direct participation
|Public agency that advises the national level, prepares and proposes the formulation of public policy in favor of indigenous peoples within the framework of the defense, support, reinforcement and consolidation of ethnic and cultural rights.
|
|
|
|-
|Corporinoquía

Direct participation
|Regional environmental authority to ensure the proper use of natural resources in their area of jurisdiction.
|
|
|
|-
|Other government institutions: Governor ofice of Vichada, Mayor ofice Cumaribo

Direct participation
|The Reservation for being part of the Cumaribo, Vichada, has territorial jurisdiction relations with the Governor’s office and the Mayor’s office.
|
|
|
|-
|Fundación NATURA

Direct participation
|Civil organization whose mission is the conservation, use and management of biodiversity to generate social, economic and environmental benefits in the context of sustainable human development.
|
|
|
|-
|FONDO ACCIÓN

Direct participation
|Colombian non-profit organization in the private scheme. Encourage the participation of civil society and the private sector in the implementation of the country’s public policies in two areas: - Conservation and sustainable development; and protection -development of children.
|
|
|
|-
|SENA, Department of Social Prosperity (DPS), NGOs and private consultants
|Connected to the area - supporting the implementation of rural development activities.
|
|
|
|-
|Other indigenous communities neighboring RIU-SM
|
|
|
|
|-
|Financial institutions
|They fund local development activities.
|
|
|
|-
|Asocarbono – An industry association, including Verra, ProClima, Biofix, and ACATISEMA.

|
|
|
|
|-
|OPIAC: the National Oganization of the Indigenous Peoples of the Colombian Amazon

|
|
|
|
|}

====Discussion====
According to the official REDD+ Mataven website<ref>RIU – SM (n.d.). ''REDD+ Mataven''. [[/reddmataven.com/|https://reddmataven.com/]]</ref> the project has resulted in a myriad of benefits to the Indigenous communities of the region. For example, as a result of the funds generated from the projects activities, there have been improvements in infrastructure, transportation and education, ultimately leading to the empowerment and improved governance of ACETISMA. However, the project has come under fire for multiple reasons.

For one, in 2015 some of the Indigenous communities filed a lawsuit referring to the violation of their right to ''consulta previa''. However, the court ruled that their Indigenous rights had not been violated as it was ACETISMA that initially sought MEDIAMOS to develop the project, and that ACETISMA were the best representatives of those Indigenous communities. Furthermore, the projects main focus was the conservation of the rainforest and therefore did not threaten the cultural integrity of those communities.<ref name=":10" /> However, regardless of the outcome of this case, its occurrence points to internal disagreement amongst Indigenous participants of the RIU-SM project. In a study involving interviews with Indigenous members of the project, there was a significant proportion of interviewees that had little knowledge regarding various aspects of the project, such as responsibilities of participation, or the benefit-sharing mechanism in place.<ref name=":2" /> This further reinforces the point that, in the case of the RIU-SM project it may not be ‘bottom-up’ and eludes to the power imbalance experienced between the project developer Mediamos and Indigenous community members. In the PD there does exist a breakdown of the distribution of income between ACETISMA, the Indigenous association, and Mediamos, the project developer, which shows a significant proportion of revenue flowing to the former organisation throughout the project’s operations<ref name=":7" /> However, there is currently no publicly available documentation supporting this initial claim<ref name=":9" /> as there is no obligation to do so, leading to a general lack of transparency in the market, and between all of the relevant actors. Subsequent meetings with Indigenous leaders have however shown a marked support of the Mataven project, with one Indigenous leader explicitly stating “...the Redd+ project has brought resources that they never had before, which allowed them to open new school classrooms, 21 rural aqueducts, cocoa crops and even headquarters in Cumaribo and Inírida.”<ref>Lievano, A. B. (2021) Colombia's biggest carbon credit project could be selling hot air. Latin American Center for Investigative Journalism. [[/www.elclip.org/el-mayor-proyecto-de-bonos-de-carbono-de-colombia-podria-estar-vendiendo-aire-caliente/|https://www.elclip.org/el-mayor-proyecto-de-bonos-de-carbono-de-colombia-podria-estar-vendiendo-aire-caliente/]] </ref> Clearly there have been benefits for IPLC’s involved with this project, though the details of this benefit-sharing remain a mystery.

Secondly, the Mataven project has caused controversy due to its apparently inflated carbon credit issuance. This has been achieved by using a reference area that is not representative of the project area, as well as assuming an uncharacteristically heigh assumed rate of deforestation.<ref name=":12">Global Atlas of Environmental Justice (2023). ''Resguardo Indigena Unificado-Selva de Matavén (RIU SM) REDD+ Project, Colombia.'' [[/ejatlas.org/conflict/redd-project-resguardo-indigena-unificado-selva-de-mataven-riu-sm|https://ejatlas.org/conflict/redd-project-resguardo-indigena-unificado-selva-de-mataven-riu-sm]]</ref> The project used a baseline deforestation rate of 0.86% per year, which is significantly more than the Colombian government's national rate of 0.18%. Additionally, according to the report the reference area chosen is more easily accessed and therefore more prone to deforestation, making it an inaccurate comparison to the relatively remote project area.<ref name=":2" /> This has led to the creation of excess carbon credits, or “hot air” credits, which have been criticized for not reflecting real environmental benefits.<ref name=":9" /> To add further insult to injury these credits have been used by a Colombian fossil fuel distributor company to avoid paying taxes, as described earlier by Colombia’s change in policy in 2017. In doing so, the company avoided paying approximately $18.9 million in taxes.<ref name=":2" /> There has been subsequent back and forth between Verra and Carbon Market Watch, with Verra refuting the claims<ref>Verra (2021). ''Carbon Market Watch Report on Colombian REDD+ Projects Contains Flawed Allegations.'' [[/verra.org/carbon-market-watch-report-on-colombian-redd-projects-contains-flawed-allegations/|https://verra.org/carbon-market-watch-report-on-colombian-redd-projects-contains-flawed-allegations/]] </ref> Regardless of the science, Colombia recently introduced a resolution in 2018 (Resolution 1447 – 2018) that requires projects to use baselines that comply with national reference levels.<ref name=":13">Dufrasne, D. (2021b). Companies use ”hot air” forestry offsets to avoid taxes in Colombia: Carbon Market Watch’s fact-check of Verra’s response. Carbon Market Watch. [[/carbonmarketwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/CMWs-fact-check-of-Verras-response-on-Colombia.pdf|https://carbonmarketwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/CMWs-fact-check-of-Verras-response-on-Colombia.pdf]]</ref><ref>IEA (2022). ''Resolution 1447 – 2018. Monitoring, Reporting, and Verification System for mitigation actions at the national level.'' International Energy Agency. [[/www.iea.org/policies/14772-resolution-1447-2018-monitoring-reporting-and-verification-system-for-mitigation-actions-at-the-national-level|https://www.iea.org/policies/14772-resolution-1447-2018-monitoring-reporting-and-verification-system-for-mitigation-actions-at-the-national-level]]</ref> Going forward, REDD+ projects that are being implemented in Colombia will have to abide by Colombia’s national legislation.

====Summary====
Colombia has a long history of engaging in REDD+ as it has been used to limit environmental degradation in the post-conflict era, in alignment with the country’s national peacebuilding agenda.<ref name=":11" /> Owing to the country’s comprehensive tenure and bundle rights, IPLC’s have robust ''de jure'' rights to land as they collectively own it, and rights to carbon are tied to this ownership. This puts Colombia as one of the world leaders in legal terms relating to REDD+ project implementation, but due to a lack of resources to ensure enforcement, as well as corruption, historically these laws have not been adhered to.<ref name=":10" /><ref name=":2" /> There are many documented cases showing the displacement on IPLC’s from traditional lands, poor efforts to adhere to ''consulta previa'', and inequitable benefit sharing.<ref>Greenfield, P. (2023''). The ‘carbon pirates’ preying on Amazon’s Indigenous communities.'' The Guardian. [[/www.theguardian.com/environment/2023/jan/21/amazon-indigenous-communities-carbon-offsetting-pirates-aoe|https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2023/jan/21/amazon-indigenous-communities-carbon-offsetting-pirates-aoe]]</ref><ref name=":14">Lang, C., (2024). ''Colombia’s Constitutional Court rules in favour of Indigenous Peoples. Identifies serious flaws in the REDD+ Baka Rokarire project.'' REDD_Monitor. [[/reddmonitor.substack.com/p/colombias-constitutional-court-rules|https://reddmonitor.substack.com/p/colombias-constitutional-court-rules]]</ref>

The case of the Mataven project provides an interesting example of how it is the market itself that is failing to address concerns regarding transparency, whether that be relating to benefit-sharing amongst relevant stakeholders, or Indigenous representation and engagement throughout the implementation of REDD+ projects. Some ACATISEMA members have explicitly stated their support for the Mataven project,<ref name=":12" /> and its benefits can be seen first-hand in the form of improved infrastructure in local communities involved with the project.<ref>Myers, J. E., Parra, M. A., Bedford, C. (2021). ''How Carbon Offsetting Can Build a Forest.'' Stanford Social Innovation Review. [[/ssir.org/articles/entry/how carbon offsetting can build a forest|https://ssir.org/articles/entry/how_carbon_offsetting_can_build_a_forest]]</ref> However, an exact breakdown of how and where revenue is being distributed to IPLC’s remains elusive.<ref name=":13" /> Furthermore, the level of IPLC engagement has come into question, specifically with reference to ''consulta previa'' and the overall understanding that IPLC’s have regarding the project’s intended outcomes and activities.<ref name=":10" /> This is not a rare case in Colombia and has been witnessed occurring with other projects that have been implemented on Indigenous territories in the Colombian Amazon.<ref name=":17">Lang, C., (2023''). “It destroys everything,” says Indigenous leader about the REDD+ Baka Rokarire project in Colombia''. REDD Monitor. [[/reddmonitor.substack.com/p/it-destroys-everything-says-indigenous|https://reddmonitor.substack.com/p/it-destroys-everything-says-indigenous]]</ref> However, a recent ruling by the Colombian Constitutional court voted in favour of Indigenous groups in Colombia, upholding “the rights to self-determination, autonomy, self-government, territory, identity, physical and cultural integrity, and free, prior and informed consent of the indigenous communities”.<ref name=":14" /> This review ultimately sets a legal precedent safeguarding the fundamental rights of IPLCs with REDD+ project implementation and shows that progress is being made to improve the likelihood that REDD+ will result in genuine benefits to those affected by project implementation.

To ensure a more authentic engagement with IPLC’s as to result in legitimate and equitable benefit-sharing, improvements must be made by the Colombian government, as well as within the VCM itself. For the former, Colombia’s national registry for GHG mitigation activities must be updated; it has been offline since 2022.<ref name=":10" /> As a result, transparency is lacking. International finance could be utilized as to alleviate this issue, and only with an accurate and reliable database may the market be regulated. In the broader sense, VCM registries must create stricter guidelines promoting transparency. Often PD’s refer to annexed documents that contain relevant information regarding benefit-sharing, though these are often not publicly available.<ref name=":9" /> This limits transparency and increases the likelihood of inequitable agreements being made between project proponents and developers, further exacerbating existing power asymmetries between the two groups and limiting the likelihood that ''consulta previa'' is honestly adhered to.<ref name=":10" /> This has led to conflict within Indigenous communities, rather than a strengthening of their social fabric.

Furthermore, the Mataven project calls into question the actual emissions reduction that REDD+ projects achievce. Whilst Colombia has since updated its regulations such that REDD+ must use baselines that comply with national reference levels, it is up in the air as to how representative these guidelines are. Reference areas must represent project areas and without the appropriate regulations in place project developers lack the incentive to create realistic baselines; ultimately they are aiming to produce the maximum number of credits as to generate the greatest possible revenues.

==Conclusion==
As a market-based mechanism, REDD+ is shackled by the construct in which it operates; fundamentally it is a capitalist means of fixing a capitalist problem, which comes with limitations. Both Brazil and Colombia have relatively robust laws that have been written into the constitution, ultimately promoting more equitable results post project implementation. However, as in Colombia IPLC’s collectively own the land, whereas in Brazil these groups only own rights to use the land,<ref name=":2" /> Colombia can be considered better equipped for the establishment of REDD+ projects on traditional Indigenous territory. However, even with these laws in place enforcement remain a matter of concern. Furthermore, given the wide variety of ontological and epistemological perspectives of Indigenous communities, and how these views conflict with the Western worldview from which market-based REDD+ came to fruition, there is an inherent difficulty in implementing a system of governance in REDD+ on Indigenous lands.<ref name=":1" />. Putting a price on nature conflicts with Indigenous perspectives and there have been instances where this has attacked the social and cultural fabric of IPLC’s;<ref name=":17" /> to avoid this REDD+ developers must have the genuine intent of understanding the perspective of the Indigenous group they are working with and aim to implement REDD+ with a bottom-up approach.

In both countries, transparency must be improved to ensure that FPIC is adhered to and subsequently ensure fair IPLC representation and engagement. This issue predominantly arises due to the poor requirements of standards in the VCM. As such, proponents are guided by developers which have little incentive to truly act in the interests of Indigenous groups; ultimately the organizations in charge of project development are interested in increasing project revenues. This has led to instances of over-crediting, as without a transparent framework in which to operate it is difficult to evaluate the legitimacy of the claims being made by project proponents and developers. However, with recent advances that address concerns of additionality<ref name=":15" /> there is hope for improved market integrity. Standards of the VCM must continue to be scrutinized to ensure that progress continues to be made.

Going forward, progress should be made to formalize the customary laws and traditional lands of IPLCs, and finance should be directed towards the enforcement of these laws. The environmental,<ref name=":16" /> economic,<ref name=":5" /><ref>Ding, H., Veit, P. G., Blackman, A., Gray, E., Reytar, K., Altamirano, J. C., Hodgdon, B., (2016). ''Climate benefits, tenure costs: The economic case for securing Indigenous land rights in the Amazon''. WRI. [[/files.wri.org/d8/s3fs-public/Climate Benefits Tenure Costs Executive Summary.pdf|https://files.wri.org/d8/s3fs-public/Climate_Benefits_Tenure_Costs_Executive_Summary.pdf]]</ref> and social<ref>Sarmiento Barletti, J. P., Heise Vigil, N., & Larson, A. M. (2023). ''Safeguards at a glance: Are voluntary standards supporting community land, resource and carbon rights?'' CIFOR-ICRAF. [[/www.cifor-icraf.org/publications/pdf files/Flyer/REDD-Safeguards-7.pdf|https://www.cifor-icraf.org/publications/pdf_files/Flyer/REDD-Safeguards-7.pdf]] </ref> benefits of this have been researched and are well understood. By developing culturally appropriate frameworks for rights-based conservation regimes, that work with IPLCs in accordance with their worldviews, REDD+ could be used to promote Indigenous autonomy. However, much progress still must be made to achieve this goal.

==References==

Documentation:Open Case Studies/FRST522/2024/REDD+ in Indigenous Amazonia: What works and what doesn’t?

2024-12-12T21:25:47Z

ConnorHaynes: /* Abstract */

__TOC__

==Positionality==
First and foremost I am not Indigenous, and whilst there are a myriad of cultures, ontologies and epistemologies that are not sufficiently represented by simply stating ‘Indigenous’, it is commonly accepted that these worldviews are vastly different to those of the ‘Western’ world, which is the world in which I grew up and matured. I am therefore only understanding of Indigenous cultures, beliefs and customary laws based upon available online literature and those which I have learnt through life, in addition to those introduced to me in my Master’s degree. As such, I will never be able to fully relate to an Indigenous person; the best I can do is try to understand and learn. Only throughout this process am I able to work towards reconciliation and attempt to address the inequities experienced by Indigenous folk globally.

Additionally, I am yet to act as a carbon project proponent and so do not understand the nuances or stresses of undertaking such a task. Whilst an individual proponent may have the best intention of procuring a carbon project for its social and environmental benefits, there are a number of stakeholders involved throughout the entire process which influence its eventual outcome. Without experience acting as a project proponent I am naïve in understanding the process and it's difficulties.

==Acronyms / Terminology==
'''Acronyms:'''

AFOLU: Agriculture, Forestry and Other Land-Use

ICVCM: Integrity Council for the Voluntary Carbon Market

IPLC: Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities

KMGBF: Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework

LAC: Latin American Countries

MRV: Monitoring, Reporting and Verification

REDD+: Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation

UNCBD: United Nations Convention on Biological Biodiversity

VCMI: Voluntary Carbon Markets Integrity Initiative

'''Terminology:'''

''Additionality:'' Additionality is the determination of whether the project will lead to the expected outcomes when compared to the baseline or ‘business as usual’ emissions.

''Leakage'': Refers to the shifting of emissions to outside the project boundary as a result of the project’s activities.

''Permanence:'' Permanence refers to the degree to which a carbon credit is equivalent to a permanent removal or reduction in emissions.
==Abstract==
This case study illustrates two examples of Indigenous-led REDD+ projects on Indigenous territory in Colombia and Brazil. Both countries have a relatively long history of engaging with REDD+ but have slightly different legal structures pertaining to the rights of Indigenous peoples on their traditional territories, and specifically their ‘carbon’ rights. As such, the intention is to evaluate how these differing ''de jure'' rights translate on the ground. With respect to REDD+, do certain rights result in legitimately positive benefits to IPLCs, as well as the environment that these projects were originally intended to protect? To reduce inconsistency, projects were chosen that utilized the same standard, namely Verra’s ‘Verified Carbon Standard’. The intention is such that the reader can evaluate the effectiveness and true benefit of REDD+ projects to IPLC’s, based upon the legal frameworks of the host country. A secondary intention is such that the reader is better equipped to conduct a prefeasibility assessment based upon available online literature, to evaluate the likelihood that REDD+ can be implemented in any chosen country, with the genuine intent of benefiting IPLC’s that are directly affected as a result of REDD+ project implementation.

==REDD+ and the VCM in Brazil and Colombia==
REDD+, originally introduced by the UNFCCC, is a market-based mechanism sitting within the VCM that aims to reverse the loss of forests and carbon stocks, specifically in developing countries. Simply put, an entity or an individual can voluntarily pay another that has engaged with REDD+ and subsequently sequestered carbon, to offset their own emissions using ‘credits’, sold as units of greenhouse gas equivalent to one ton of carbon dioxide (CO2e). Forestry and Land-Use remains to be the largest category of carbon credits traded by transaction volume on the VCM, with REDD+ being the most popular project type in this category, accounting for 78% of credits traded.<ref name=":0">Procton, A., (2024). ''State of the voluntary carbon market 2024: On the path to maturity.'' Forest Trends Ecosystem Marketplace.</ref> Furthermore, over one-third of the credits sold within this category were sourced from projects that had been implemented in LAC and the Caribbean in 2024.<ref name=":0" /> Of the four largest standards issuing carbon credits, Verra accounts for roughly 80% of issuances in Latin America,<ref>Pullins, T. (2022). Growth of carbon markets in Latin America. White & Case. [[/www.whitecase.com/publications/insight/latin-america-focus-fall-2022-growth-carbon-markets|https://www.whitecase.com/publications/insight/latin-america-focus-fall-2022-growth-carbon-markets]] </ref> and even in the face of recent scrutiny,<ref>West, T. A. P., Bofim, B., Haya, B. K. (2024). Methodological issues with deforestation baselines compromise the integrity of carbon offsets from REDD+. ''Global Environmental Change, 87'' [[/doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2024.102863|https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2024.102863]]</ref><ref>Wyburd I., & Dufrasne, G. (2023). Error Log: Exposing the methodological failures of REDD+ forestry projects. Carbon Market Watch. [[/carbonmarketwatch.org/publications/error-log-exposing-the-methodological-failures-of-redd-forestry-projects/|https://carbonmarketwatch.org/publications/error-log-exposing-the-methodological-failures-of-redd-forestry-projects/]]</ref><ref name=":15">Haya, B. K., Alford-Jones, K., Anderegg, W. R. L., Beymer-Farris, B., Blanchard, L., Bomfim, B., Chin, D., Evans, S., Hogan, M., Holm, J. A., McAfee, K., So, I. S., West, T. A. P., & Withey, L. (2023). ''Quality assessment of REDD+ carbon credit projects''. Berkeley Carbon Trading Project. [[/gspp.berkeley.edu/research-and-impact/centers/cepp/projects/berkeley-carbontrading-project/REDD+|https://gspp.berkeley.edu/research-and-impact/centers/cepp/projects/berkeley-carbontrading-project/REDD+]]</ref> REDD+ projects clearly account for a significant proportion of the VCM with their continued application likely to persist.<ref>Gordon, O. (2022). ''The interwoven fortunes of carbon markets and indigenous communities.'' Energy Monitor. [[/www.energymonitor.ai/tech/carbon-removal/the-interwoven-fortunes-of-carbon-markets-and-indigenous-communities/|https://www.energymonitor.ai/tech/carbon-removal/the-interwoven-fortunes-of-carbon-markets-and-indigenous-communities/]]</ref><ref>Müller, M., Coustar, C., Bietta, F., Mathres, M. (2022). ''UNFCCC REDD+ and the power of sovereign carbon.'' Deutsche Banke Chief Investment Office. [[/www.rainforestcoalition.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/CIO-Special-UNFCCC-REDD-power-of-sovereign-carbon.pdf|https://www.rainforestcoalition.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/CIO-Special-UNFCCC-REDD-power-of-sovereign-carbon.pdf]]</ref><ref>Pullins, T. (2022). ''Growth of carbon markets in Latin America.'' White & Case. [[/www.whitecase.com/publications/insight/latin-america-focus-fall-2022-growth-carbon-markets|https://www.whitecase.com/publications/insight/latin-america-focus-fall-2022-growth-carbon-markets]] </ref> With the introduction of updated methodologies aimed at addressing these concerns,<ref>Verra (2023a). ''Setting the Standard: Verra’s Revolutionary New REDD Methodology.'' [[/verra.org/program-notice/setting-the-standard-verras-revolutionary-new-redd-methodology/|https://verra.org/program-notice/setting-the-standard-verras-revolutionary-new-redd-methodology/]]</ref><ref>Verra (2023b). ''VM0048 Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation, v1.0.'' [[/verra.org/methodologies/vm0048-reducing-emissions-from-deforestation-and-forest-degradation-v1-0/|https://verra.org/methodologies/vm0048-reducing-emissions-from-deforestation-and-forest-degradation-v1-0/]]</ref> there is hope for renewed buyer confidence in the integrity of this market,<ref>MSCI (2023). ''Verra’s New Methodology for Unplanned Deforestation Aims to Silence the Critics''. [[/www.msci.com/www/blog-posts/verra-s-new-methodology-for/04577808942|https://www.msci.com/www/blog-posts/verra-s-new-methodology-for/04577808942]]</ref> though more work still needs to be done.

Both Colombia and Brazil have a relatively long history of implementing REDD+ projects, using both fund-based and market-based mechanisms. For example, both countries were participants in the ‘Amazon Indigenous REDD+ (RIA in Spanish) initiative, with the first pilot implementation project being initiated in Colombia’s Puiawai Natural Reserve.<ref>Garzón, E., (2017). ''Amazon Indigenous REDD+: An innovative approach to conserve Colombian forests?'' Mongabay. [[/news.mongabay.com/2017/01/amazon-indigenous-redd-an-innovative-approach-to-conserve-colombian-forests/|https://news.mongabay.com/2017/01/amazon-indigenous-redd-an-innovative-approach-to-conserve-colombian-forests/]]</ref> The relevance of these two countries with respect to REDD+ is simple. Much of the Amazon’s primary tropical rainforest falls within these countries jurisdiction and this rainforest has been consistently under threat from external pressures and encroachment, whether that be in the form of land-clearing for commercial ranching, subsistence purposes, illicit drug production or illegal mining practices,<ref name=":8">Sánchez García, P. A. & Wong, G. Y., (2024) “The political economy of deforestation in the Colombian Amazon”, ''Journal of Political Ecology'' ''31''(1), 178–199. [[/doi.org/10.2458/jpe.5230|https://doi.org/10.2458/jpe.5230]]</ref><ref>Radwin, M. (2023). ''Drug trafficking fuels other deforestation drivers in the Amazon: report.'' Mongabay. [[/news.mongabay.com/2023/07/drug-trafficking-fuels-other-deforestation-drivers-in-the-amazon-report/|https://news.mongabay.com/2023/07/drug-trafficking-fuels-other-deforestation-drivers-in-the-amazon-report/]]</ref><ref>Haddad, E.A., Araújo, I.F., Feltran-Barbieri, R., Perobelli, F. S., Rocha, A., Sass, K. S., Nobre, C. A. (2024). Economic drivers of deforestation in the Brazilian Legal Amazon. ''Nat Sustain'' ''7'', 1141–1148. [[/doi.org/10.1038/s41893-024-01387-7|https://doi.org/10.1038/s41893-024-01387-7]] </ref><ref>Hänggli, A., Levy, S. A., Armenteras, D., Bovolo, C. I., Brandão, J., Rueda, X., & Garrett, R. D. (2023). A systematic comparison of deforestation drivers and policy effectiveness across the amazon biome. ''Environmental Research Letters, 18''(7), 073001. [[/doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/acd408|https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/acd408]]</ref> to name a few.

In theory, REDD+ can be used to provide the economic incentive to promote sustained environmental protection of Indigenous land, with a focus on the rights and livelihoods of IPLCs. Currently the overall funding to IPLCs tenure rights and forest management in tropical countries is low, receiving just $270 million per year between 2011-2020 from bilateral and multilateral donors and private philanthropies.<ref>Hatcher, J., Owen, M., Yin, D., (2021). ''Falling short: Donor funding for Indigenous peoples and local communities to secure tenure rights and manage forests in tropical countries (2011 -2020).'' Rainforest Foundation Norway. [[/dv719tqmsuwvb.cloudfront.net/documents/Publikasjoner/Andre-rapporter/RFN Falling short 2021.pdf|https://dv719tqmsuwvb.cloudfront.net/documents/Publikasjoner/Andre-rapporter/RFN_Falling_short_2021.pdf]]</ref> REDD+ has the potential to channel funding as to promote Indigenous rights and autonomy, provided there is transparent and equitable benefit-sharing for those involved. Fundamentally, only with the inclusion of IPLC’s or preferably with IPLC’s acting as project proponents is REDD+ able to promote Indigenous agency and improve IPLC rights and governance. And only when the rights of those inhabiting the land are formally recognized can the land be effectively conserved.<ref name=":16">Reytar, K., Veit, P., von Braun, J. (2024). ''Protecting Biodiversity Hinges on Securing Indigenous and Community Land Rights.'' WRI. [[/www.wri.org/insights/indigenous-and-local-community-land-rights-protect-biodiversity|https://www.wri.org/insights/indigenous-and-local-community-land-rights-protect-biodiversity]]</ref> The inclusion of IPLCs in REDD+ project development is therefore considered to be essential for project success, and this is in theory embodied in the very nature of REDD+.<ref name=":1">Alvarez, G., Elfving, M. and Andrade, C. (2016) ‘REDD+ governance and indigenous peoples in Latin America: the case of Suruí Carbon Project in the Brazilian Amazon Forest’, ''Latin American J. Management for Sustainable Development 3''(2) pp.133–146. [[/dx.doi.org/10.1504/LAJMSD.2016.083705|10.1504/LAJMSD.2016.083705]]</ref> Partially owing to a long history of dealing with REDD+, Colombia and Brazil are amongst just a few of the countries hosting tropical rainforests that explicitly recognise community rights to carbon and tie these rights to the legal ownership of lands and forests. In Colombia, carbon rights are tied to rights of the land, whereas in Brazil carbon rights are tied to forest rights.<ref name=":2">RRI and McGill University (2021). Technical report: ''Status of legal recognition of Indigenous Peoples’, Local Communities’ and Afro-descendant Peoples’ rights to carbon stored in tropical lands and forests''. Rights and Resources Initiative. [[/doi.org/10.53892/MLQQ5744|https://doi.org/10.53892/MLQQ5744]]</ref>

==Brazil: The Suruí Forest Carbon Project==
====Project description and location====
The Surui Forest Carbon project was implemented in 2009 on the territory of the Surui people, which is situated in the southern part of Brazil’s Amazon between the states of Rondônia and Mato Grosso. Surui Indigenous territory covers an area of 2,481 km2, though the intention of the PCFS was to protect a portion of this total area. According to the PD, the stated objective was to “prevent 13,575.3 hectares of tropical forest from being cleared by 2038, to avoid the emission of 7,258,352.3 tCO2e to the atmosphere, and to contribute to the preservation of the Paiter Surui lifestyle and traditions.”<ref>IDESAM (2011). ''Project description: Surui forest carbon project''. Institute for Conservation and Sustainable Development of Amazonas. Link: "PROJ_DESC_1118_02FEB2012.PDF" found at [[/registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/1118|https://registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/1118]] </ref> This region sits within one of the Brazilian Amazon’s main ‘arcs of deforestation’ and pressure from loggers and ranchers is a matter of concern.

Notably, the PCFS was the first REDD+ project to be proposed by Indigenous peoples in the Brazilian Amazon on their own territory and was the first to receive certification by both the VCS and CCBS.<ref name=":1" />. Metareilá, the Surui’s own Indigenous association, acted as project proponent and the Institute for Conservation and Sustainable Development of Amazonas (IDESAM) assisted with project development, alongside multiple other stakeholder groups. As an endogenous initiative procured and conducted by the Surui community, the SFCP had a ‘non-centralized model of governance’, which reflected the characteristics and traditions of the Surui people. <ref name=":1" />

Only after two years of consultations between the 24 communities involved and the relevant governmental agencies (primarily FUNAI and the Ministry of Environment) was a Memorandum of Understanding signed, showing community consent to develop the project.<ref name=":3">Garcia, B., Rimmer, L., Canal Vieira, L., Mackey, B., (2021). REDD+ and forest protection on indigenous lands in the Amazon. ''RECIEL 30'', 207–219. [[/doi.org/10.1111/reel.12389|https://doi.org/10.1111/reel.12389]]</ref> In 2012 after verification from an independent third-party body, the Surui were able to sell carbon credits on the international market. Between 2009 and 2014 the project drastically helped limit the deforestation occurring within the project’s site, causing many to deem it a success.<ref name=":4">Howard, F. E., (2023). ''An Analysis of the Suruí Forest Carbon Project in Context of Settler Colonialism''. Masters thesis. Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University. [[/vtechworks.lib.vt.edu/server/api/core/bitstreams/b0cde6de-794c-453f-856b-ee72bde3db06/content|https://vtechworks.lib.vt.edu/server/api/core/bitstreams/b0cde6de-794c-453f-856b-ee72bde3db06/content]]</ref>

====National climate targets, policies and legislation====
Rates of deforestation in Brazil’s legal Amazon are significantly impacted by the government in charge. This is evidenced in the decade between 2012 and 2021 whilst under the conservative Bolsonaro administration, when deforestation in the Amazon increased 185% — from a loss of 4,571 km2 in 2012 to 13,038 km2 in 2021.<ref>INPE (2022). ''Observação da Terra. [[/www.obt.inpe.br/OBT/assuntos/programas/amazonia/prodes|http://www.obt.inpe.br/OBT/assuntos/programas/amazonia/prodes]]''</ref> However, since Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s appointment in 2022 there has been a steady decline in the rate of deforestation, which is now roughly half what it was in 2021.<ref>Terra Brasilis (2024). ''PRODES (deforestation): Deforestation rates – Legal Amazon – States''. [[/terrabrasilis.dpi.inpe.br/app/dashboard/deforestation/biomes/legal amazon/rates|https://terrabrasilis.dpi.inpe.br/app/dashboard/deforestation/biomes/legal_amazon/rates]]</ref> A significant proportion of emissions result from the clearing of rainforest and its subsequent conversion to ranching.<ref>MCTI (2022). ''Estimativas Anuais De Emissões De Gases De Efeito Estufa No Brasil.'' 6ª Edição. Ministério da Estado da Ciência, Tecnologia e Inovações. [[/www.gov.br/mcti/pt-br/acompanhe-o-mcti/sirene/publicacoes/estimativas-anuais-de-emissoes-gee/arquivos/6a-ed-estimativas-anuais.pdf|https://www.gov.br/mcti/pt-br/acompanhe-o-mcti/sirene/publicacoes/estimativas-anuais-de-emissoes-gee/arquivos/6a-ed-estimativas-anuais.pdf]]</ref> To address these emissions Brazil has implemented various adaptation policies, legislation and targets which are summarized below:

TABLE
====Indigenous rights - Constitutional, tenure and bundle rights====
In Brazil, Indigenous rights are robust and clearly defined according to the Brazilian Constitution. As a result, the Indigenous communities of the Brazilian Amazon have legal title to 13.8% of the national territory totalling 1.175 million km2, with a total of 631 territories.<ref>Federal government of Brazil (2024). ''Brazil’s NDC: National determination to contribute and transform''. [[/unfccc.int/sites/default/files/2024-11/Brazil Second Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) November2024.pdf|https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/2024-11/Brazil_Second%20Nationally%20Determined%20Contribution%20%28NDC%29_November2024.pdf]]</ref>

TABLE

Whilst Indigenous communities in Brazil have legal title to land, it is the State that owns it. Indigenous people simply exercise permanent tenure over lands that they traditionally occupy and have ‘original rights’ to these traditional lands, which no other rights can prevail over.<ref name=":3" /> Indigenous lands, though not classified as protected areas, “have the highest level of protection by law because they are regulated by the Constitution” and cannot be leased or restricted without violating their original rights. The Suruí's right to develop the PCFS is grounded in the Brazilian Constitution, which grants Indigenous peoples exclusive rights to use the ‘riches of the soil, rivers and lakes’ of their land, and these rights cannot be overridden. Thus, Indigenous people and only Indigenous people are legally allowed to engage in productive activities on their land, provided these activities are conducted according to their own customs and traditions and are necessary for the wellbeing and cultural expression of their own people. In Brazil, it is the armed forces and federal police that are responsible for enforcing these laws, and FUNAI is responsible for representing Indigenous communities in judicial disputes.<ref name=":3" /> As such, provided a REDD+ does not violate the rights to territorial integrity, permanent land tenure and original rights, it is legally allowed.

'''CARBON RIGHTS:''' In Brazil, carbon rights are tied to forest rights.<ref name=":2" /> Carbon credits from REDD+ projects are seen as part of the economic benefits derived from indigenous lands, and as such, Indigenous communities are entitled to own, control and distribute these revenues themselves. The carbon credits generated from the (SFCP) were wholly owned by the Suruí people through Metareilá, with the Suruí Fund (managed by the Brazilian Biodiversity Fund - FUNBIO) acting as recipient. This legality reinforces Indigenous control over both land and carbon rights, as whoever has rights to the forest land is usually recognized as the owner of carbon rights.<ref name=":3" />

'''FPIC OBLIGATION:''' Furthermore, Brazilian law requires Free, Prior, and Informed Consent (FPIC) for REDD+ projects affecting indigenous lands, ensuring that international standards such as the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) and ILO Convention No. 169 are adhered to; Indigenous consent is, ''de jure,'' a necessity. Projects that violate these rights and fail to consult communities are therefore considered illegal. Notably there are no specific rules or procedures that have been written into the Brazilian constitution that provide guidance on how to achieve FPIC. This freedom reinforces Indigenous autonomy as it allows an Indigenous community to define the rules of consultation according to their customs and traditions.

Collectively these national and international laws provide an important safeguard to Indigenous peoples, making their consent a prerequisite for the establishment of REDD+ projects and recognizing their rights as the main beneficiaries of REDD+ revenues.<ref name=":3" /> However, as carbon rights are tied to forest rights in Brazil and not land rights, carbon is considered to be an ‘environmental service’ (Article 41(I)(A) Brazilian Forestry Code), and states, as well as the federal government, have the jurisdiction to exercise full legislative authority over carbon. <ref name=":2" /> As such, certain states have interpreted the law to imply that the title to carbon credits is attributable to the state.<ref>Loft, L., Ravikumar, A., Gebara, M. F., Pham, T. T., Resosudarmo, I. A. P., Assembe, S., Tovar, J. G., Mwangi, E., & Andersson, K. (2015). Taking Stock of Carbon Rights in REDD+ Candidate Countries: Concept Meets Reality. ''Forests'', ''6''(4), 1031-1060. [[/doi.org/10.3390/f6041031|https://doi.org/10.3390/f6041031]]</ref> Hence, even when carbon rights are clearly defined and tied to forest title it is insufficient in itself, and only by legally recognizing the customary rights of IPLCs can a fair and equitable outcome be realised.

====Interested and affected stakeholders====
TABLE
====Discussion====
Although originally successful in achieving its goal of reducing deforestation and degradation, in 2016 diamonds were discovered in Surui territory, leading to an increase in illegal logging and mining.<ref name=":1" /> By 2018 the project site had been completely overrun by ''garimpeiros'' (small-scale gold miners), ultimately leading to the projects suspension that year. <ref name=":4" />

While the project had initially garnered support, divisions emerged within the community post-project implementation. Disputes arose over the unequal distribution of project revenues, leading to internal conflicts between different Suruí clans. These criticisms escalated in 2014 when the Catholic Indigenous Missionary Council supported calls for an end to the project due to mismanagement of revenues from carbon credit sales. <ref name=":3" /> Some Suruí members also argued that the REDD+ initiative harmed their way of life.<ref>Lang, C. (2014). ''“What are projects for that destroy life?” Interview with Henrique Suruí about the Paiter-Suruí REDD project, Brazil.'' REDD-Monitor. [[/redd-monitor.org/2014/12/17/what-are-projects-for-that-destroy-life-interview-with-henrique-surui-about-the-paiter-surui-redd-project-brazil/|https://redd-monitor.org/2014/12/17/what-are-projects-for-that-destroy-life-interview-with-henrique-surui-about-the-paiter-surui-redd-project-brazil/]]</ref>

Further complicating the situation was the controversial role of Henrique Suruí, one of the Suruí tribal leaders. In 2011, it was revealed that Henrique had violated the tribe's logging moratorium, collaborating with loggers in illegal activities. While Henrique later denied responsibility for the project’s failure, his actions, combined with internal disagreements, illustrated the lack of consensus within the Suruí leadership on the project’s goals and outcomes. Both of the tribe’s leaders possessed dramatically different perspectives on how they believed they could ensure agency, autonomy, and economic benefits for the Suruí people.<ref name=":4" /> This fragmentation within the community, in combination with the discovery of diamonds and the state's failure to protect indigenous land rights led to the indefinite suspension of the REDD+ project.

The project's collapse highlights broader structural issues, particularly the state's inconsistent support for indigenous land rights, influenced by settler colonialism, which undermined the project’s long-term viability.<ref name=":4" /> Additionally, the project’s creation was shaped by external actors, including the collaboration between Almir Suruí and Borges from Forest Trends, a Washington-based NGO. This partnership introduced a Western perspective on viewing the Suruí peoples forest, in contrast with their own perspectives on land use and governance. Furthermore, despite Borges’ Brazilian background, the power dynamics between a global North organization and a developing, Indigenous community were apparent.

====Summary====
The Suruí Forest Carbon Project provides an interesting example of how, even when the rights of IPLC’s are relatively robust, challenges persist in ensuring REDD+ project longevity. As such, in its current state, REDD+ in the Brazilian Amazon may not be a suitable market-based option for indigenous communities in the Amazon.<ref name=":3" /> Although initially successful in promoting indigenous autonomy and reducing deforestation, the project resulted in failure due to of a myriad of factors. Division between Surui communities was exacerbated by a perceived unequal benefit-sharing, and the impact of imposing REDD+ seems to have complicated the traditional social structure that the Surui were dependent on. These issues were influenced by Brazil's settler state dynamics, where indigenous land rights, although legally recognized, are often not upheld in practice due to insufficient enforcement.<ref name=":4" /> Ultimately, the Surui project reveals how settler colonialism's structural flaws make long-term project success difficult, despite initial progress in promoting indigenous autonomy.

At the national and state level, complex institutional and legal land governance structures convolute and impede REDD+ in Brazil. Multiple institutions share responsibilities and there is no comprehensive, authoritative database of land ownership, which hampers efforts to protect indigenous territories.<ref name=":5">Costa, R. (2016)''. Insecure land rights in Brazil: Consequences for rural areas and challenges for improvement.'' Climate Policy Initiative. [[/www.climatepolicyinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/Insecure Land Rights in Brazil CPI.pdf|https://www.climatepolicyinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/Insecure_Land_Rights_in_Brazil_CPI.pdf]]</ref> As a result, land tenure disputes remain common and can be witnessed occurring between the public as well between public and state actors. For example, Brazil’s 1964 Land Statute (Law No. 4504) allows the government to takeover unproductive farms and transfer those lands to landless peasants. This often results in the clearing of forest, as only when the land is cleared is it evidenced to be ‘productive’.<ref name=":5" /> Hence, not only does this law cause insecurity for Indigenous populations in Brazil, it also forces them to go against customary traditions of stewarding the land in an effort to maintain its control.

Whilst the aforementioned points to the futility of REDD+ in Brazil, there is reason to maintain optimism. In a recent landmark ruling Brazil’s supreme court voted in favour of the Xoleng peoples, and the decision will serve as a precedent for all cases involving Indigenous peoples.<ref name=":6">Amos-Flom, K., (2023). ''Triumph and Turmoil: The Xokleng Case and the Future of Indigenous Land Rights in Brazil.'' Columbia Journal of Transnational Law. [[/www.jtl.columbia.edu/bulletin-blog/triumph-and-turmoil-the-xokleng-case-and-the-future-of-indigenous-land-rights-in-brazil|https://www.jtl.columbia.edu/bulletin-blog/triumph-and-turmoil-the-xokleng-case-and-the-future-of-indigenous-land-rights-in-brazil]]</ref> The Xokleng’s land dispute, settled in 2023, “rejected Santa Catarina state’s marco temporal (“time limit”) argument, which would have required Indigenous people to prove they occupied or legally contested the territory they claimed before the Brazilian Constitution came into force in 1988. If successful, this argument would have led to disastrous repercussions, as many indigenous peoples had been forcibly removed or are traditionally nomadic.”<ref name=":6" /> Whilst slow, progress has been made in Brazil in recent years with respect to Indigenous rights as well as the voluntary carbon market itself.

There are currently 159 AFOLU projects listed on the Verra database in Brazil, with only two specifically focused on REDD+ initiatives in collaboration with Indigenous groups. These are the Ka’a Pyahu project, <ref>Verra (n.d.) ''Project 5087: KA'A PYAHU.'' https://registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/5087</ref> initiated by the Guajajara Indigenous people in collaboration with external organizations and validated in 2021, and the ‘Together for the forest Awaete REDD+ project’<ref>Verra (n.d.) ''Project 5200: TOGETHER FOR THE FOREST AWAETÉ REDD+ PROJECT.'' https://registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/5200</ref> which is still under development. Both projects involve Indigenous groups working with Brazilian organizations to build technical capacity and expertise. This could signal a growing trend of Indigenous-led REDD+ projects in the future. To ensure a positive future for REDD+ in Brazil, the customary rights of IPLC’s must be formally recognized. IPLC should have legal ownership of their traditional lands, and in doing so the carbon rights of these communities would be less convoluted, leading to more equitable benefit-sharing and increased cohesion amongst these groups post-project implementation.

To ensure a positive future for REDD+ in Brazil, the customary rights of IPLC’s must be formally recognized. IPLC should have legal ownership of their traditional lands, and in doing so the carbon rights of these communities would be less convoluted, leading to more equitable benefit-sharing and increased cohesion amongst these groups post-project implementation.

==Colombia: ''REDD+ project Resguardo Indigena Unificado - Selva de Mataven (RUI-SM)''==
'''Project description and location'''

According to the PD,<ref name=":7">ACATISEMA & Mediamos (2017). ''Joint project description and monitoring report: REDD+ project: Resguardo Indigena Unificado – Selva de Mataven (RIU – SM).'' Link: “10 06 2017_VCS Final Report_ Matavin Project.pdf” found at [[/registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/1566|https://registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/1566]]</ref> the Resguardo Indígena Unificado – Selva de Matavén (RIU-SM) project is located east of the Colombian Orinoco high plain, in the eastern part of the Department of Vichada, municipality of Cumaribo. It resides on the formalized resguardo of the Sikuani, Piaroa, Puinave, Curripaco, Cubeo and Piapoco ethnic groups, spanning 1,856,836 hectares, with 1,477,115 hectares (79.6%) being forested. The project states that it will reduce greenhouse gas emissions, with a total estimated net reduction of 108,670,562 tons of CO2 equivalent over thirty years, from years 2013 – 2042. By this metric, it is the 14th largest project on the Verra registry, out of over 1700 projects.<ref name=":9">Dufrasne, D., (2021). ''Two Shades of Green: How hot air forest credits are being used to avoid carbon taxes in Colombia''. Carbon Market Watch. [[/carbonmarketwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Two-shades-of-green EN WEB.pdf|https://carbonmarketwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Two-shades-of-green_EN_WEB.pdf]]</ref> There are 12,312 indigenous people living in the RIU-SM, belonging to 2,517 families and 250 communities as of 2017.

The project was initiated and developed by the Asociación de Cabildos y Autoridades Indígenas de la Selva de Matavén (ACETISMA), an Indigenous association, and MEDIAMOS F&M, a Colombian consultancy firm. ACETISMA is comprised of Indigenous leaders that represent the 17 communities of the reservation in charge of governing the territory, and it has administrative autonomy, as well as “the capacity to acquire, to own and to dispose of property, to accept donations, to hold national and international conventions, scientific and cultural exchanges and generally, to celebrate all kinds of negotiations and agreements with which the Association can achieve its objectives.”<ref name=":7" />

There is a stated focus on various means of improving the living conditions of the Indigenous peoples living within the project area. To summarise, the main objectives of the REDD+ project RIU-SM include:

· Community development, in the form of improved education.

· Community engagement with respect to the project; developing information channels to reveal project progress.

· Support local initiatives for environmental education and waste management.

· Developing an effective response system that addresses community proposals and concerns relating to the project.

· Strengthening the governance of ACATISEMA.

====National climate targets, policies and legislation====
The Colombian Amazon makes up over one-third of Colombia’s national territory, and up until 2005 only 7.3% of the Colombian Amazon had been deforested, largely due to the country's 60-year armed conflict between the government, multiple left-wing guerillas such as FARC, and several far-right paramilitary groups.<ref name=":8" /> However, following the signing of the Peace Treaty in 2016 and demobilization of the FARC, limits to deforestation were weakened in the Colombian Amazon. Poor but opportunistic peasants began to encroach into previously unchartered territory and capitalize from the rainforest. Due to the poor economic integration of the Amazon, many were forced to engage with the traditional economies of cocoa and cattle ranching, as these markets were already well connected to regional and global markets.<ref name=":8" /> To address the drivers of deforestation and its associated emissions, the federal government has implemented various initiatives, which are summarized below:
{| class="wikitable"
|'''Document name'''
|'''Type (target, policy or legislation)'''
|'''Publication year'''
|'''Key takeaways'''
|-
|
|Target
|?
|Reduce GHG emissions by 51 % by 2030.
|-
|
|Target
|?
|Net zero by 2050
|-
|National Climate Change Policy (PNCC)
|
|2018
|
|-
|National Forest Conservation Program
|
|2011
|
|-
|Law 1931 of 2018 – Climate Change Law

|
|2018
|
|-
| colspan="4" |Relating to REDD+
|-
|National Strategy for Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (ENREDD+).”
|
|2009
|
|-
|Amazon Indigenous REDD+ Initiative
|
|2012
|
|-
|USAID's Colombia BIOREDD+ program
|
|
|Develop a portfolio of 8 REDD+ projects in four geographic nodes covering over 700,000 hectares in the Colombian Pacific.

|-
|Vision Amazonia
|
|2015
|part of the REDD+ strategy in the country financed by three foreign countries: Germany, Norway and United Kingdom
|}
As a result of the many fund and market-based initiatives that Colombia has engaged with, it hosts the second most REDD+ projects in the world. REDD+ projects now cover at least 56% of the area of legally recognized Indigenous territories in the Colombian Amazon, with an overwhelming majority of carbon projects located on Indigenous territories.<ref name=":10">Schmid, D., & Castro. C., (2023). ''REDD+ projects in the Colombian Amazon: Social challenges and lack of transparency''. Rainforest Foundation Norway. [[/dv719tqmsuwvb.cloudfront.net/documents/REDD rapport 2024 ENG.pdf|https://dv719tqmsuwvb.cloudfront.net/documents/REDD_rapport_2024_ENG.pdf]]</ref> Evidently REDD+ plays an integral part in the country’s efforts of environmental conservation, and incentives have been introduced to promote the development of such projects. For example, in 2016 the government adopted a higher tax that covered fossil fuels, but companies are able to avoid paying the tax by investing in carbon offsets that have been generated domestically.<ref name=":9" /> This led to a boost in the domestic REDD+ market in 2017, as Colombian companies invested as to escape higher taxes. Notably, 23 of the 36 REDD+ projects currently under development in the Amazon region have been initiated in or after 2018.<ref name=":10" /> Currently Colombia’s REDD+ program sits at over 45 pilot and voluntary carbon projects, as well as one large-scale jurisdictional approach in the Amazon.<ref name=":11">Zambrano-Cortés, D. G. (2024). ''The politics, spaces and subjects of forest conservation in Colombia''. [internal PhD, WU, Wageningen University]. Wageningen University. [[/doi.org/10.18174/675328|https://doi.org/10.18174/675328]]</ref>

====Indigenous rights - Constitutional, tenure and bundle rights====
''De jure'', the Indigenous peoples of Colombia have comprehensive tenure and bundle rights that have been articulated in the national constitution. Collective land titles are granted to Indigenous communities by the Colombian government, and as a result about 34 percent of Colombian land (almost 38 million hectares) is legally recognized as Indigenous territory or collective lands of Afro-descendent communities. (Schmid & Castro, 2023) These collective land tenure rights have been in effect since the implementation of the 1991 constitution, granting them the authority to exercise legal control over their territories in accordance with their own customs and procedures.<ref>Max Planck Institute (n.d.) ''Colombia 1991 (rev. 2015).'' Institute. [[/www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Colombia 2015|https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Colombia_2015]]</ref> Furthermore, the carbon rights of Indigenous peoples are explicitly defined in the constitution and tied specifically to the ownership of land of the communities.<ref name=":2" /> This in theory provides a solid legal basis for upholding the rights of Indigenous communities in Colombia, specifically relating to REDD+ activities, as it allows communities to define and negotiate the terms of said projects. A summary of the various laws relating to Indigenous rights have been summarized below:
{| class="wikitable"
| colspan="2" |'''Laws'''
|-
| colspan="2" |'''1991 constitution'''
|-
|Article 63

|Indigenous territories are considered collective property. This means that land is not owned by individuals but is shared by the community. The state must respect these collective rights and cannot alter land ownership without the consent of the Indigenous peoples.
|-
|Article 330
|Indigenous communities have the right to govern their territories.
|-
|Article 76 - ''Consulta previa''.
|Pertains to the right of Indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities to prior consultation before the government or private companies undertake activities that may affect their territories, culture, or way of life.

|-
|Article 63 and 329
|The Reservation is a collective, inalienable, and indefeasible property.
|-
|Decree 1386 of 1994, Article 10; Decree 2164 of 1995, Article 22) 39.
|The administration and management of these lands are subjected to uses and customs of the beneficiaries
|}
Whilst land and tenure rights are enshrined into the constitution, the precariousness of these rights persists due to a lack of resources to ensure enforcement, as well as the deeper issue of corruption. As previously stated, the rate of deforestation increased significantly in Colombia’s post-conflict era, evidencing the nations inability to maintain control over unlawful acts of land-grabbing and disposition. Whilst this began with new peasants converting the Amazon for subsistence purposes, it ultimately led to new areas for the growth of cocoa, much to the benefit of narco-traffickers who could monopolize on this illegal surplus in ‘accumulation by dispossession’.<ref name=":8" />

With respect to the legalities of consultation, Colombia has enshrined ''consulta previa'' into the constitution. Translating to ‘prior consultation’, this legal text provides the formal grounds for Indigenous engagement when any legislative or administrative measures are implemented on Indigenous territory. Importantly, consultation should be achieved in accordance with the customs of the ethnic group with which the project is being imposed upon. However, there have been recent cases of contestation specifically relating to how ''consulta previa'' applies to REDD+ on Indigenous lands, and the RIU – SM project was one that was involved with such a case.

====Interested and affected stakeholders====
{| class="wikitable"
| colspan="5" |'''Affected stakeholders'''
|-
|Stakeholders
|Primary objective(s)
|Secondary objective(s)
|Relative power
|Scope of influence
|-
|ACATISEMA - Asociación de Cabildos y Autoridades Indígenas de la Selva de Matavén
|the Indigenous association comprised of Indigenous leaders in representation of the 16 communities of the reservation in charge of governing the territory.

foster the integral development, social and cultural preservation of the indigenous communities in the Mataven Jungle and to consolidate the territory, selfgovernment by partners, the defense, conservation and preservation of the environment and biodiversity of the Mataven Jungle (ACATISEMA, 2010)

|
|It is the highest authority in the reservation.
|
|-
|MEDIAMOS F&M – A consultancy
|Project developer
|
|
|
|-
|Communities of indigenous peoples of the RIU-SM
|<nowiki>- Primary and direct beneficiaries.</nowiki>
|
|
|
|-
|Teachers of primary and secondary basic education indigenous Reservation
|
|
|
|
|-
|Colonists
|
|
|
|
|-
| colspan="5" |'''Interested stakeholders'''
|-
|Mining Companies and individuals
|Compete with the Project for the territory's resources.
|
|
|
|-
|Ministerio de Ambiente y Desarrollo Sostenible

- Direct participation
|Its main interest is to achieve environmental planning, through the consolidation of a policy of sustainable development and strategic alliances with social and institutional participants in different sectoral and territorial scenarios.
|
|
|
|-
|Dirección de Asuntos Indígenas, ROM y Minorías - Ministerio del Interior

Direct participation
|Public agency that advises the national level, prepares and proposes the formulation of public policy in favor of indigenous peoples within the framework of the defense, support, reinforcement and consolidation of ethnic and cultural rights.
|
|
|
|-
|Corporinoquía

Direct participation
|Regional environmental authority to ensure the proper use of natural resources in their area of jurisdiction.
|
|
|
|-
|Other government institutions: Governor ofice of Vichada, Mayor ofice Cumaribo

Direct participation
|The Reservation for being part of the Cumaribo, Vichada, has territorial jurisdiction relations with the Governor’s office and the Mayor’s office.
|
|
|
|-
|Fundación NATURA

Direct participation
|Civil organization whose mission is the conservation, use and management of biodiversity to generate social, economic and environmental benefits in the context of sustainable human development.
|
|
|
|-
|FONDO ACCIÓN

Direct participation
|Colombian non-profit organization in the private scheme. Encourage the participation of civil society and the private sector in the implementation of the country’s public policies in two areas: - Conservation and sustainable development; and protection -development of children.
|
|
|
|-
|SENA, Department of Social Prosperity (DPS), NGOs and private consultants
|Connected to the area - supporting the implementation of rural development activities.
|
|
|
|-
|Other indigenous communities neighboring RIU-SM
|
|
|
|
|-
|Financial institutions
|They fund local development activities.
|
|
|
|-
|Asocarbono – An industry association, including Verra, ProClima, Biofix, and ACATISEMA.

|
|
|
|
|-
|OPIAC: the National Oganization of the Indigenous Peoples of the Colombian Amazon

|
|
|
|
|}

====Discussion====
According to the official REDD+ Mataven website<ref>RIU – SM (n.d.). ''REDD+ Mataven''. [[/reddmataven.com/|https://reddmataven.com/]]</ref> the project has resulted in a myriad of benefits to the Indigenous communities of the region. For example, as a result of the funds generated from the projects activities, there have been improvements in infrastructure, transportation and education, ultimately leading to the empowerment and improved governance of ACETISMA. However, the project has come under fire for multiple reasons.

For one, in 2015 some of the Indigenous communities filed a lawsuit referring to the violation of their right to ''consulta previa''. However, the court ruled that their Indigenous rights had not been violated as it was ACETISMA that initially sought MEDIAMOS to develop the project, and that ACETISMA were the best representatives of those Indigenous communities. Furthermore, the projects main focus was the conservation of the rainforest and therefore did not threaten the cultural integrity of those communities.<ref name=":10" /> However, regardless of the outcome of this case, its occurrence points to internal disagreement amongst Indigenous participants of the RIU-SM project. In a study involving interviews with Indigenous members of the project, there was a significant proportion of interviewees that had little knowledge regarding various aspects of the project, such as responsibilities of participation, or the benefit-sharing mechanism in place.<ref name=":2" /> This further reinforces the point that, in the case of the RIU-SM project it may not be ‘bottom-up’ and eludes to the power imbalance experienced between the project developer Mediamos and Indigenous community members. In the PD there does exist a breakdown of the distribution of income between ACETISMA, the Indigenous association, and Mediamos, the project developer, which shows a significant proportion of revenue flowing to the former organisation throughout the project’s operations<ref name=":7" /> However, there is currently no publicly available documentation supporting this initial claim<ref name=":9" /> as there is no obligation to do so, leading to a general lack of transparency in the market, and between all of the relevant actors. Subsequent meetings with Indigenous leaders have however shown a marked support of the Mataven project, with one Indigenous leader explicitly stating “...the Redd+ project has brought resources that they never had before, which allowed them to open new school classrooms, 21 rural aqueducts, cocoa crops and even headquarters in Cumaribo and Inírida.”<ref>Lievano, A. B. (2021) Colombia's biggest carbon credit project could be selling hot air. Latin American Center for Investigative Journalism. [[/www.elclip.org/el-mayor-proyecto-de-bonos-de-carbono-de-colombia-podria-estar-vendiendo-aire-caliente/|https://www.elclip.org/el-mayor-proyecto-de-bonos-de-carbono-de-colombia-podria-estar-vendiendo-aire-caliente/]] </ref> Clearly there have been benefits for IPLC’s involved with this project, though the details of this benefit-sharing remain a mystery.

Secondly, the Mataven project has caused controversy due to its apparently inflated carbon credit issuance. This has been achieved by using a reference area that is not representative of the project area, as well as assuming an uncharacteristically heigh assumed rate of deforestation.<ref name=":12">Global Atlas of Environmental Justice (2023). ''Resguardo Indigena Unificado-Selva de Matavén (RIU SM) REDD+ Project, Colombia.'' [[/ejatlas.org/conflict/redd-project-resguardo-indigena-unificado-selva-de-mataven-riu-sm|https://ejatlas.org/conflict/redd-project-resguardo-indigena-unificado-selva-de-mataven-riu-sm]]</ref> The project used a baseline deforestation rate of 0.86% per year, which is significantly more than the Colombian government's national rate of 0.18%. Additionally, according to the report the reference area chosen is more easily accessed and therefore more prone to deforestation, making it an inaccurate comparison to the relatively remote project area.<ref name=":2" /> This has led to the creation of excess carbon credits, or “hot air” credits, which have been criticized for not reflecting real environmental benefits.<ref name=":9" /> To add further insult to injury these credits have been used by a Colombian fossil fuel distributor company to avoid paying taxes, as described earlier by Colombia’s change in policy in 2017. In doing so, the company avoided paying approximately $18.9 million in taxes.<ref name=":2" /> There has been subsequent back and forth between Verra and Carbon Market Watch, with Verra refuting the claims<ref>Verra (2021). ''Carbon Market Watch Report on Colombian REDD+ Projects Contains Flawed Allegations.'' [[/verra.org/carbon-market-watch-report-on-colombian-redd-projects-contains-flawed-allegations/|https://verra.org/carbon-market-watch-report-on-colombian-redd-projects-contains-flawed-allegations/]] </ref> Regardless of the science, Colombia recently introduced a resolution in 2018 (Resolution 1447 – 2018) that requires projects to use baselines that comply with national reference levels.<ref name=":13">Dufrasne, D. (2021b). Companies use ”hot air” forestry offsets to avoid taxes in Colombia: Carbon Market Watch’s fact-check of Verra’s response. Carbon Market Watch. [[/carbonmarketwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/CMWs-fact-check-of-Verras-response-on-Colombia.pdf|https://carbonmarketwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/CMWs-fact-check-of-Verras-response-on-Colombia.pdf]]</ref><ref>IEA (2022). ''Resolution 1447 – 2018. Monitoring, Reporting, and Verification System for mitigation actions at the national level.'' International Energy Agency. [[/www.iea.org/policies/14772-resolution-1447-2018-monitoring-reporting-and-verification-system-for-mitigation-actions-at-the-national-level|https://www.iea.org/policies/14772-resolution-1447-2018-monitoring-reporting-and-verification-system-for-mitigation-actions-at-the-national-level]]</ref> Going forward, REDD+ projects that are being implemented in Colombia will have to abide by Colombia’s national legislation.

====Summary====
Colombia has a long history of engaging in REDD+ as it has been used to limit environmental degradation in the post-conflict era, in alignment with the country’s national peacebuilding agenda.<ref name=":11" /> Owing to the country’s comprehensive tenure and bundle rights, IPLC’s have robust ''de jure'' rights to land as they collectively own it, and rights to carbon are tied to this ownership. This puts Colombia as one of the world leaders in legal terms relating to REDD+ project implementation, but due to a lack of resources to ensure enforcement, as well as corruption, historically these laws have not been adhered to.<ref name=":10" /><ref name=":2" /> There are many documented cases showing the displacement on IPLC’s from traditional lands, poor efforts to adhere to ''consulta previa'', and inequitable benefit sharing.<ref>Greenfield, P. (2023''). The ‘carbon pirates’ preying on Amazon’s Indigenous communities.'' The Guardian. [[/www.theguardian.com/environment/2023/jan/21/amazon-indigenous-communities-carbon-offsetting-pirates-aoe|https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2023/jan/21/amazon-indigenous-communities-carbon-offsetting-pirates-aoe]]</ref><ref name=":14">Lang, C., (2024). ''Colombia’s Constitutional Court rules in favour of Indigenous Peoples. Identifies serious flaws in the REDD+ Baka Rokarire project.'' REDD_Monitor. [[/reddmonitor.substack.com/p/colombias-constitutional-court-rules|https://reddmonitor.substack.com/p/colombias-constitutional-court-rules]]</ref>

The case of the Mataven project provides an interesting example of how it is the market itself that is failing to address concerns regarding transparency, whether that be relating to benefit-sharing amongst relevant stakeholders, or Indigenous representation and engagement throughout the implementation of REDD+ projects. Some ACATISEMA members have explicitly stated their support for the Mataven project,<ref name=":12" /> and its benefits can be seen first-hand in the form of improved infrastructure in local communities involved with the project.<ref>Myers, J. E., Parra, M. A., Bedford, C. (2021). ''How Carbon Offsetting Can Build a Forest.'' Stanford Social Innovation Review. [[/ssir.org/articles/entry/how carbon offsetting can build a forest|https://ssir.org/articles/entry/how_carbon_offsetting_can_build_a_forest]]</ref> However, an exact breakdown of how and where revenue is being distributed to IPLC’s remains elusive.<ref name=":13" /> Furthermore, the level of IPLC engagement has come into question, specifically with reference to ''consulta previa'' and the overall understanding that IPLC’s have regarding the project’s intended outcomes and activities.<ref name=":10" /> This is not a rare case in Colombia and has been witnessed occurring with other projects that have been implemented on Indigenous territories in the Colombian Amazon.<ref name=":17">Lang, C., (2023''). “It destroys everything,” says Indigenous leader about the REDD+ Baka Rokarire project in Colombia''. REDD Monitor. [[/reddmonitor.substack.com/p/it-destroys-everything-says-indigenous|https://reddmonitor.substack.com/p/it-destroys-everything-says-indigenous]]</ref> However, a recent ruling by the Colombian Constitutional court voted in favour of Indigenous groups in Colombia, upholding “the rights to self-determination, autonomy, self-government, territory, identity, physical and cultural integrity, and free, prior and informed consent of the indigenous communities”.<ref name=":14" /> This review ultimately sets a legal precedent safeguarding the fundamental rights of IPLCs with REDD+ project implementation and shows that progress is being made to improve the likelihood that REDD+ will result in genuine benefits to those affected by project implementation.

To ensure a more authentic engagement with IPLC’s as to result in legitimate and equitable benefit-sharing, improvements must be made by the Colombian government, as well as within the VCM itself. For the former, Colombia’s national registry for GHG mitigation activities must be updated; it has been offline since 2022.<ref name=":10" /> As a result, transparency is lacking. International finance could be utilized as to alleviate this issue, and only with an accurate and reliable database may the market be regulated. In the broader sense, VCM registries must create stricter guidelines promoting transparency. Often PD’s refer to annexed documents that contain relevant information regarding benefit-sharing, though these are often not publicly available.<ref name=":9" /> This limits transparency and increases the likelihood of inequitable agreements being made between project proponents and developers, further exacerbating existing power asymmetries between the two groups and limiting the likelihood that ''consulta previa'' is honestly adhered to.<ref name=":10" /> This has led to conflict within Indigenous communities, rather than a strengthening of their social fabric.

Furthermore, the Mataven project calls into question the actual emissions reduction that REDD+ projects achievce. Whilst Colombia has since updated its regulations such that REDD+ must use baselines that comply with national reference levels, it is up in the air as to how representative these guidelines are. Reference areas must represent project areas and without the appropriate regulations in place project developers lack the incentive to create realistic baselines; ultimately they are aiming to produce the maximum number of credits as to generate the greatest possible revenues.

==Conclusion==
As a market-based mechanism, REDD+ is shackled by the construct in which it operates; fundamentally it is a capitalist means of fixing a capitalist problem, which comes with limitations. Both Brazil and Colombia have relatively robust laws that have been written into the constitution, ultimately promoting more equitable results post project implementation. However, as in Colombia IPLC’s collectively own the land, whereas in Brazil these groups only own rights to use the land,<ref name=":2" /> Colombia can be considered better equipped for the establishment of REDD+ projects on traditional Indigenous territory. However, even with these laws in place enforcement remain a matter of concern. Furthermore, given the wide variety of ontological and epistemological perspectives of Indigenous communities, and how these views conflict with the Western worldview from which market-based REDD+ came to fruition, there is an inherent difficulty in implementing a system of governance in REDD+ on Indigenous lands.<ref name=":1" />. Putting a price on nature conflicts with Indigenous perspectives and there have been instances where this has attacked the social and cultural fabric of IPLC’s;<ref name=":17" /> to avoid this REDD+ developers must have the genuine intent of understanding the perspective of the Indigenous group they are working with and aim to implement REDD+ with a bottom-up approach.

In both countries, transparency must be improved to ensure that FPIC is adhered to and subsequently ensure fair IPLC representation and engagement. This issue predominantly arises due to the poor requirements of standards in the VCM. As such, proponents are guided by developers which have little incentive to truly act in the interests of Indigenous groups; ultimately the organizations in charge of project development are interested in increasing project revenues. This has led to instances of over-crediting, as without a transparent framework in which to operate it is difficult to evaluate the legitimacy of the claims being made by project proponents and developers. However, with recent advances that address concerns of additionality<ref name=":15" /> there is hope for improved market integrity. Standards of the VCM must continue to be scrutinized to ensure that progress continues to be made.

Going forward, progress should be made to formalize the customary laws and traditional lands of IPLCs, and finance should be directed towards the enforcement of these laws. The environmental,<ref name=":16" /> economic,<ref name=":5" /><ref>Ding, H., Veit, P. G., Blackman, A., Gray, E., Reytar, K., Altamirano, J. C., Hodgdon, B., (2016). ''Climate benefits, tenure costs: The economic case for securing Indigenous land rights in the Amazon''. WRI. [[/files.wri.org/d8/s3fs-public/Climate Benefits Tenure Costs Executive Summary.pdf|https://files.wri.org/d8/s3fs-public/Climate_Benefits_Tenure_Costs_Executive_Summary.pdf]]</ref> and social<ref>Sarmiento Barletti, J. P., Heise Vigil, N., & Larson, A. M. (2023). ''Safeguards at a glance: Are voluntary standards supporting community land, resource and carbon rights?'' CIFOR-ICRAF. [[/www.cifor-icraf.org/publications/pdf files/Flyer/REDD-Safeguards-7.pdf|https://www.cifor-icraf.org/publications/pdf_files/Flyer/REDD-Safeguards-7.pdf]] </ref> benefits of this have been researched and are well understood. By developing culturally appropriate frameworks for rights-based conservation regimes, that work with IPLCs in accordance with their worldviews, REDD+ could be used to promote Indigenous autonomy. However, much progress still must be made to achieve this goal.

==References==

Documentation:Open Case Studies/FRST522/2024/REDD+ in Indigenous Amazonia: What works and what doesn’t?

2024-12-12T21:23:33Z

ConnorHaynes: /* Positionality */

__TOC__

==Positionality==
First and foremost I am not Indigenous, and whilst there are a myriad of cultures, ontologies and epistemologies that are not sufficiently represented by simply stating ‘Indigenous’, it is commonly accepted that these worldviews are vastly different to those of the ‘Western’ world, which is the world in which I grew up and matured. I am therefore only understanding of Indigenous cultures, beliefs and customary laws based upon available online literature and those which I have learnt through life, in addition to those introduced to me in my Master’s degree. As such, I will never be able to fully relate to an Indigenous person; the best I can do is try to understand and learn. Only throughout this process am I able to work towards reconciliation and attempt to address the inequities experienced by Indigenous folk globally.

Additionally, I am yet to act as a carbon project proponent and so do not understand the nuances or stresses of undertaking such a task. Whilst an individual proponent may have the best intention of procuring a carbon project for its social and environmental benefits, there are a number of stakeholders involved throughout the entire process which influence its eventual outcome. Without experience acting as a project proponent I am naïve in understanding the process and it's difficulties.

==Acronyms / Terminology==
'''Acronyms:'''

AFOLU: Agriculture, Forestry and Other Land-Use

ICVCM: Integrity Council for the Voluntary Carbon Market

IPLC: Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities

KMGBF: Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework

LAC: Latin American Countries

MRV: Monitoring, Reporting and Verification

REDD+: Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation

UNCBD: United Nations Convention on Biological Biodiversity

VCMI: Voluntary Carbon Markets Integrity Initiative

'''Terminology:'''

''Additionality:'' Additionality is the determination of whether the project will lead to the expected outcomes when compared to the baseline or ‘business as usual’ emissions.

''Leakage'': Refers to the shifting of emissions to outside the project boundary as a result of the project’s activities.

''Permanence:'' Permanence refers to the degree to which a carbon credit is equivalent to a permanent removal or reduction in emissions.
==Abstract==
This case study illustrates two examples of Indigenous-led REDD+ projects on Indigenous territory in Colombia and Brazil. Both countries have a relatively long history of engaging with REDD+ but have slightly different legal structures pertaining to the rights of Indigenous peoples in their traditional territories, as well as IPLC’s ‘carbon’ rights. As such, the intention is to evaluate how these differing ''de jure'' rights translate on the ground. With respect to REDD+, do certain ''de jure'' rights result in legitimately positive benefits to IPLCs, as well as the environment that these projects were originally intended to protect? To reduce inconsistency, projects were chosen that utilized the same standard, namely Verra’s ‘Verified Carbon Standard’.

The overall intention is such that the reader can evaluate the effectiveness and true benefit of REDD+ projects to IPLC’s, based upon the legal frameworks of the host country. A secondary intention is such that the reader is better equipped to conduct a prefeasibility assessment based upon available online literature, to evaluate the likelihood that REDD+ can be implemented in any chosen country, with the genuine intent of benefiting IPLC’s that are directly affected as a result of REDD+ project implementation.

==REDD+ and the VCM in Brazil and Colombia==
REDD+, originally introduced by the UNFCCC, is a market-based mechanism sitting within the VCM that aims to reverse the loss of forests and carbon stocks, specifically in developing countries. Simply put, an entity or an individual can voluntarily pay another that has engaged with REDD+ and subsequently sequestered carbon, to offset their own emissions using ‘credits’, sold as units of greenhouse gas equivalent to one ton of carbon dioxide (CO2e). Forestry and Land-Use remains to be the largest category of carbon credits traded by transaction volume on the VCM, with REDD+ being the most popular project type in this category, accounting for 78% of credits traded.<ref name=":0">Procton, A., (2024). ''State of the voluntary carbon market 2024: On the path to maturity.'' Forest Trends Ecosystem Marketplace.</ref> Furthermore, over one-third of the credits sold within this category were sourced from projects that had been implemented in LAC and the Caribbean in 2024.<ref name=":0" /> Of the four largest standards issuing carbon credits, Verra accounts for roughly 80% of issuances in Latin America,<ref>Pullins, T. (2022). Growth of carbon markets in Latin America. White & Case. [[/www.whitecase.com/publications/insight/latin-america-focus-fall-2022-growth-carbon-markets|https://www.whitecase.com/publications/insight/latin-america-focus-fall-2022-growth-carbon-markets]] </ref> and even in the face of recent scrutiny,<ref>West, T. A. P., Bofim, B., Haya, B. K. (2024). Methodological issues with deforestation baselines compromise the integrity of carbon offsets from REDD+. ''Global Environmental Change, 87'' [[/doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2024.102863|https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2024.102863]]</ref><ref>Wyburd I., & Dufrasne, G. (2023). Error Log: Exposing the methodological failures of REDD+ forestry projects. Carbon Market Watch. [[/carbonmarketwatch.org/publications/error-log-exposing-the-methodological-failures-of-redd-forestry-projects/|https://carbonmarketwatch.org/publications/error-log-exposing-the-methodological-failures-of-redd-forestry-projects/]]</ref><ref name=":15">Haya, B. K., Alford-Jones, K., Anderegg, W. R. L., Beymer-Farris, B., Blanchard, L., Bomfim, B., Chin, D., Evans, S., Hogan, M., Holm, J. A., McAfee, K., So, I. S., West, T. A. P., & Withey, L. (2023). ''Quality assessment of REDD+ carbon credit projects''. Berkeley Carbon Trading Project. [[/gspp.berkeley.edu/research-and-impact/centers/cepp/projects/berkeley-carbontrading-project/REDD+|https://gspp.berkeley.edu/research-and-impact/centers/cepp/projects/berkeley-carbontrading-project/REDD+]]</ref> REDD+ projects clearly account for a significant proportion of the VCM with their continued application likely to persist.<ref>Gordon, O. (2022). ''The interwoven fortunes of carbon markets and indigenous communities.'' Energy Monitor. [[/www.energymonitor.ai/tech/carbon-removal/the-interwoven-fortunes-of-carbon-markets-and-indigenous-communities/|https://www.energymonitor.ai/tech/carbon-removal/the-interwoven-fortunes-of-carbon-markets-and-indigenous-communities/]]</ref><ref>Müller, M., Coustar, C., Bietta, F., Mathres, M. (2022). ''UNFCCC REDD+ and the power of sovereign carbon.'' Deutsche Banke Chief Investment Office. [[/www.rainforestcoalition.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/CIO-Special-UNFCCC-REDD-power-of-sovereign-carbon.pdf|https://www.rainforestcoalition.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/CIO-Special-UNFCCC-REDD-power-of-sovereign-carbon.pdf]]</ref><ref>Pullins, T. (2022). ''Growth of carbon markets in Latin America.'' White & Case. [[/www.whitecase.com/publications/insight/latin-america-focus-fall-2022-growth-carbon-markets|https://www.whitecase.com/publications/insight/latin-america-focus-fall-2022-growth-carbon-markets]] </ref> With the introduction of updated methodologies aimed at addressing these concerns,<ref>Verra (2023a). ''Setting the Standard: Verra’s Revolutionary New REDD Methodology.'' [[/verra.org/program-notice/setting-the-standard-verras-revolutionary-new-redd-methodology/|https://verra.org/program-notice/setting-the-standard-verras-revolutionary-new-redd-methodology/]]</ref><ref>Verra (2023b). ''VM0048 Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation, v1.0.'' [[/verra.org/methodologies/vm0048-reducing-emissions-from-deforestation-and-forest-degradation-v1-0/|https://verra.org/methodologies/vm0048-reducing-emissions-from-deforestation-and-forest-degradation-v1-0/]]</ref> there is hope for renewed buyer confidence in the integrity of this market,<ref>MSCI (2023). ''Verra’s New Methodology for Unplanned Deforestation Aims to Silence the Critics''. [[/www.msci.com/www/blog-posts/verra-s-new-methodology-for/04577808942|https://www.msci.com/www/blog-posts/verra-s-new-methodology-for/04577808942]]</ref> though more work still needs to be done.

Both Colombia and Brazil have a relatively long history of implementing REDD+ projects, using both fund-based and market-based mechanisms. For example, both countries were participants in the ‘Amazon Indigenous REDD+ (RIA in Spanish) initiative, with the first pilot implementation project being initiated in Colombia’s Puiawai Natural Reserve.<ref>Garzón, E., (2017). ''Amazon Indigenous REDD+: An innovative approach to conserve Colombian forests?'' Mongabay. [[/news.mongabay.com/2017/01/amazon-indigenous-redd-an-innovative-approach-to-conserve-colombian-forests/|https://news.mongabay.com/2017/01/amazon-indigenous-redd-an-innovative-approach-to-conserve-colombian-forests/]]</ref> The relevance of these two countries with respect to REDD+ is simple. Much of the Amazon’s primary tropical rainforest falls within these countries jurisdiction and this rainforest has been consistently under threat from external pressures and encroachment, whether that be in the form of land-clearing for commercial ranching, subsistence purposes, illicit drug production or illegal mining practices,<ref name=":8">Sánchez García, P. A. & Wong, G. Y., (2024) “The political economy of deforestation in the Colombian Amazon”, ''Journal of Political Ecology'' ''31''(1), 178–199. [[/doi.org/10.2458/jpe.5230|https://doi.org/10.2458/jpe.5230]]</ref><ref>Radwin, M. (2023). ''Drug trafficking fuels other deforestation drivers in the Amazon: report.'' Mongabay. [[/news.mongabay.com/2023/07/drug-trafficking-fuels-other-deforestation-drivers-in-the-amazon-report/|https://news.mongabay.com/2023/07/drug-trafficking-fuels-other-deforestation-drivers-in-the-amazon-report/]]</ref><ref>Haddad, E.A., Araújo, I.F., Feltran-Barbieri, R., Perobelli, F. S., Rocha, A., Sass, K. S., Nobre, C. A. (2024). Economic drivers of deforestation in the Brazilian Legal Amazon. ''Nat Sustain'' ''7'', 1141–1148. [[/doi.org/10.1038/s41893-024-01387-7|https://doi.org/10.1038/s41893-024-01387-7]] </ref><ref>Hänggli, A., Levy, S. A., Armenteras, D., Bovolo, C. I., Brandão, J., Rueda, X., & Garrett, R. D. (2023). A systematic comparison of deforestation drivers and policy effectiveness across the amazon biome. ''Environmental Research Letters, 18''(7), 073001. [[/doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/acd408|https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/acd408]]</ref> to name a few.

In theory, REDD+ can be used to provide the economic incentive to promote sustained environmental protection of Indigenous land, with a focus on the rights and livelihoods of IPLCs. Currently the overall funding to IPLCs tenure rights and forest management in tropical countries is low, receiving just $270 million per year between 2011-2020 from bilateral and multilateral donors and private philanthropies.<ref>Hatcher, J., Owen, M., Yin, D., (2021). ''Falling short: Donor funding for Indigenous peoples and local communities to secure tenure rights and manage forests in tropical countries (2011 -2020).'' Rainforest Foundation Norway. [[/dv719tqmsuwvb.cloudfront.net/documents/Publikasjoner/Andre-rapporter/RFN Falling short 2021.pdf|https://dv719tqmsuwvb.cloudfront.net/documents/Publikasjoner/Andre-rapporter/RFN_Falling_short_2021.pdf]]</ref> REDD+ has the potential to channel funding as to promote Indigenous rights and autonomy, provided there is transparent and equitable benefit-sharing for those involved. Fundamentally, only with the inclusion of IPLC’s or preferably with IPLC’s acting as project proponents is REDD+ able to promote Indigenous agency and improve IPLC rights and governance. And only when the rights of those inhabiting the land are formally recognized can the land be effectively conserved.<ref name=":16">Reytar, K., Veit, P., von Braun, J. (2024). ''Protecting Biodiversity Hinges on Securing Indigenous and Community Land Rights.'' WRI. [[/www.wri.org/insights/indigenous-and-local-community-land-rights-protect-biodiversity|https://www.wri.org/insights/indigenous-and-local-community-land-rights-protect-biodiversity]]</ref> The inclusion of IPLCs in REDD+ project development is therefore considered to be essential for project success, and this is in theory embodied in the very nature of REDD+.<ref name=":1">Alvarez, G., Elfving, M. and Andrade, C. (2016) ‘REDD+ governance and indigenous peoples in Latin America: the case of Suruí Carbon Project in the Brazilian Amazon Forest’, ''Latin American J. Management for Sustainable Development 3''(2) pp.133–146. [[/dx.doi.org/10.1504/LAJMSD.2016.083705|10.1504/LAJMSD.2016.083705]]</ref> Partially owing to a long history of dealing with REDD+, Colombia and Brazil are amongst just a few of the countries hosting tropical rainforests that explicitly recognise community rights to carbon and tie these rights to the legal ownership of lands and forests. In Colombia, carbon rights are tied to rights of the land, whereas in Brazil carbon rights are tied to forest rights.<ref name=":2">RRI and McGill University (2021). Technical report: ''Status of legal recognition of Indigenous Peoples’, Local Communities’ and Afro-descendant Peoples’ rights to carbon stored in tropical lands and forests''. Rights and Resources Initiative. [[/doi.org/10.53892/MLQQ5744|https://doi.org/10.53892/MLQQ5744]]</ref>

==Brazil: The Suruí Forest Carbon Project==
====Project description and location====
The Surui Forest Carbon project was implemented in 2009 on the territory of the Surui people, which is situated in the southern part of Brazil’s Amazon between the states of Rondônia and Mato Grosso. Surui Indigenous territory covers an area of 2,481 km2, though the intention of the PCFS was to protect a portion of this total area. According to the PD, the stated objective was to “prevent 13,575.3 hectares of tropical forest from being cleared by 2038, to avoid the emission of 7,258,352.3 tCO2e to the atmosphere, and to contribute to the preservation of the Paiter Surui lifestyle and traditions.”<ref>IDESAM (2011). ''Project description: Surui forest carbon project''. Institute for Conservation and Sustainable Development of Amazonas. Link: "PROJ_DESC_1118_02FEB2012.PDF" found at [[/registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/1118|https://registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/1118]] </ref> This region sits within one of the Brazilian Amazon’s main ‘arcs of deforestation’ and pressure from loggers and ranchers is a matter of concern.

Notably, the PCFS was the first REDD+ project to be proposed by Indigenous peoples in the Brazilian Amazon on their own territory and was the first to receive certification by both the VCS and CCBS.<ref name=":1" />. Metareilá, the Surui’s own Indigenous association, acted as project proponent and the Institute for Conservation and Sustainable Development of Amazonas (IDESAM) assisted with project development, alongside multiple other stakeholder groups. As an endogenous initiative procured and conducted by the Surui community, the SFCP had a ‘non-centralized model of governance’, which reflected the characteristics and traditions of the Surui people. <ref name=":1" />

Only after two years of consultations between the 24 communities involved and the relevant governmental agencies (primarily FUNAI and the Ministry of Environment) was a Memorandum of Understanding signed, showing community consent to develop the project.<ref name=":3">Garcia, B., Rimmer, L., Canal Vieira, L., Mackey, B., (2021). REDD+ and forest protection on indigenous lands in the Amazon. ''RECIEL 30'', 207–219. [[/doi.org/10.1111/reel.12389|https://doi.org/10.1111/reel.12389]]</ref> In 2012 after verification from an independent third-party body, the Surui were able to sell carbon credits on the international market. Between 2009 and 2014 the project drastically helped limit the deforestation occurring within the project’s site, causing many to deem it a success.<ref name=":4">Howard, F. E., (2023). ''An Analysis of the Suruí Forest Carbon Project in Context of Settler Colonialism''. Masters thesis. Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University. [[/vtechworks.lib.vt.edu/server/api/core/bitstreams/b0cde6de-794c-453f-856b-ee72bde3db06/content|https://vtechworks.lib.vt.edu/server/api/core/bitstreams/b0cde6de-794c-453f-856b-ee72bde3db06/content]]</ref>

====National climate targets, policies and legislation====
Rates of deforestation in Brazil’s legal Amazon are significantly impacted by the government in charge. This is evidenced in the decade between 2012 and 2021 whilst under the conservative Bolsonaro administration, when deforestation in the Amazon increased 185% — from a loss of 4,571 km2 in 2012 to 13,038 km2 in 2021.<ref>INPE (2022). ''Observação da Terra. [[/www.obt.inpe.br/OBT/assuntos/programas/amazonia/prodes|http://www.obt.inpe.br/OBT/assuntos/programas/amazonia/prodes]]''</ref> However, since Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s appointment in 2022 there has been a steady decline in the rate of deforestation, which is now roughly half what it was in 2021.<ref>Terra Brasilis (2024). ''PRODES (deforestation): Deforestation rates – Legal Amazon – States''. [[/terrabrasilis.dpi.inpe.br/app/dashboard/deforestation/biomes/legal amazon/rates|https://terrabrasilis.dpi.inpe.br/app/dashboard/deforestation/biomes/legal_amazon/rates]]</ref> A significant proportion of emissions result from the clearing of rainforest and its subsequent conversion to ranching.<ref>MCTI (2022). ''Estimativas Anuais De Emissões De Gases De Efeito Estufa No Brasil.'' 6ª Edição. Ministério da Estado da Ciência, Tecnologia e Inovações. [[/www.gov.br/mcti/pt-br/acompanhe-o-mcti/sirene/publicacoes/estimativas-anuais-de-emissoes-gee/arquivos/6a-ed-estimativas-anuais.pdf|https://www.gov.br/mcti/pt-br/acompanhe-o-mcti/sirene/publicacoes/estimativas-anuais-de-emissoes-gee/arquivos/6a-ed-estimativas-anuais.pdf]]</ref> To address these emissions Brazil has implemented various adaptation policies, legislation and targets which are summarized below:

TABLE
====Indigenous rights - Constitutional, tenure and bundle rights====
In Brazil, Indigenous rights are robust and clearly defined according to the Brazilian Constitution. As a result, the Indigenous communities of the Brazilian Amazon have legal title to 13.8% of the national territory totalling 1.175 million km2, with a total of 631 territories.<ref>Federal government of Brazil (2024). ''Brazil’s NDC: National determination to contribute and transform''. [[/unfccc.int/sites/default/files/2024-11/Brazil Second Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) November2024.pdf|https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/2024-11/Brazil_Second%20Nationally%20Determined%20Contribution%20%28NDC%29_November2024.pdf]]</ref>

TABLE

Whilst Indigenous communities in Brazil have legal title to land, it is the State that owns it. Indigenous people simply exercise permanent tenure over lands that they traditionally occupy and have ‘original rights’ to these traditional lands, which no other rights can prevail over.<ref name=":3" /> Indigenous lands, though not classified as protected areas, “have the highest level of protection by law because they are regulated by the Constitution” and cannot be leased or restricted without violating their original rights. The Suruí's right to develop the PCFS is grounded in the Brazilian Constitution, which grants Indigenous peoples exclusive rights to use the ‘riches of the soil, rivers and lakes’ of their land, and these rights cannot be overridden. Thus, Indigenous people and only Indigenous people are legally allowed to engage in productive activities on their land, provided these activities are conducted according to their own customs and traditions and are necessary for the wellbeing and cultural expression of their own people. In Brazil, it is the armed forces and federal police that are responsible for enforcing these laws, and FUNAI is responsible for representing Indigenous communities in judicial disputes.<ref name=":3" /> As such, provided a REDD+ does not violate the rights to territorial integrity, permanent land tenure and original rights, it is legally allowed.

'''CARBON RIGHTS:''' In Brazil, carbon rights are tied to forest rights.<ref name=":2" /> Carbon credits from REDD+ projects are seen as part of the economic benefits derived from indigenous lands, and as such, Indigenous communities are entitled to own, control and distribute these revenues themselves. The carbon credits generated from the (SFCP) were wholly owned by the Suruí people through Metareilá, with the Suruí Fund (managed by the Brazilian Biodiversity Fund - FUNBIO) acting as recipient. This legality reinforces Indigenous control over both land and carbon rights, as whoever has rights to the forest land is usually recognized as the owner of carbon rights.<ref name=":3" />

'''FPIC OBLIGATION:''' Furthermore, Brazilian law requires Free, Prior, and Informed Consent (FPIC) for REDD+ projects affecting indigenous lands, ensuring that international standards such as the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) and ILO Convention No. 169 are adhered to; Indigenous consent is, ''de jure,'' a necessity. Projects that violate these rights and fail to consult communities are therefore considered illegal. Notably there are no specific rules or procedures that have been written into the Brazilian constitution that provide guidance on how to achieve FPIC. This freedom reinforces Indigenous autonomy as it allows an Indigenous community to define the rules of consultation according to their customs and traditions.

Collectively these national and international laws provide an important safeguard to Indigenous peoples, making their consent a prerequisite for the establishment of REDD+ projects and recognizing their rights as the main beneficiaries of REDD+ revenues.<ref name=":3" /> However, as carbon rights are tied to forest rights in Brazil and not land rights, carbon is considered to be an ‘environmental service’ (Article 41(I)(A) Brazilian Forestry Code), and states, as well as the federal government, have the jurisdiction to exercise full legislative authority over carbon. <ref name=":2" /> As such, certain states have interpreted the law to imply that the title to carbon credits is attributable to the state.<ref>Loft, L., Ravikumar, A., Gebara, M. F., Pham, T. T., Resosudarmo, I. A. P., Assembe, S., Tovar, J. G., Mwangi, E., & Andersson, K. (2015). Taking Stock of Carbon Rights in REDD+ Candidate Countries: Concept Meets Reality. ''Forests'', ''6''(4), 1031-1060. [[/doi.org/10.3390/f6041031|https://doi.org/10.3390/f6041031]]</ref> Hence, even when carbon rights are clearly defined and tied to forest title it is insufficient in itself, and only by legally recognizing the customary rights of IPLCs can a fair and equitable outcome be realised.

====Interested and affected stakeholders====
TABLE
====Discussion====
Although originally successful in achieving its goal of reducing deforestation and degradation, in 2016 diamonds were discovered in Surui territory, leading to an increase in illegal logging and mining.<ref name=":1" /> By 2018 the project site had been completely overrun by ''garimpeiros'' (small-scale gold miners), ultimately leading to the projects suspension that year. <ref name=":4" />

While the project had initially garnered support, divisions emerged within the community post-project implementation. Disputes arose over the unequal distribution of project revenues, leading to internal conflicts between different Suruí clans. These criticisms escalated in 2014 when the Catholic Indigenous Missionary Council supported calls for an end to the project due to mismanagement of revenues from carbon credit sales. <ref name=":3" /> Some Suruí members also argued that the REDD+ initiative harmed their way of life.<ref>Lang, C. (2014). ''“What are projects for that destroy life?” Interview with Henrique Suruí about the Paiter-Suruí REDD project, Brazil.'' REDD-Monitor. [[/redd-monitor.org/2014/12/17/what-are-projects-for-that-destroy-life-interview-with-henrique-surui-about-the-paiter-surui-redd-project-brazil/|https://redd-monitor.org/2014/12/17/what-are-projects-for-that-destroy-life-interview-with-henrique-surui-about-the-paiter-surui-redd-project-brazil/]]</ref>

Further complicating the situation was the controversial role of Henrique Suruí, one of the Suruí tribal leaders. In 2011, it was revealed that Henrique had violated the tribe's logging moratorium, collaborating with loggers in illegal activities. While Henrique later denied responsibility for the project’s failure, his actions, combined with internal disagreements, illustrated the lack of consensus within the Suruí leadership on the project’s goals and outcomes. Both of the tribe’s leaders possessed dramatically different perspectives on how they believed they could ensure agency, autonomy, and economic benefits for the Suruí people.<ref name=":4" /> This fragmentation within the community, in combination with the discovery of diamonds and the state's failure to protect indigenous land rights led to the indefinite suspension of the REDD+ project.

The project's collapse highlights broader structural issues, particularly the state's inconsistent support for indigenous land rights, influenced by settler colonialism, which undermined the project’s long-term viability.<ref name=":4" /> Additionally, the project’s creation was shaped by external actors, including the collaboration between Almir Suruí and Borges from Forest Trends, a Washington-based NGO. This partnership introduced a Western perspective on viewing the Suruí peoples forest, in contrast with their own perspectives on land use and governance. Furthermore, despite Borges’ Brazilian background, the power dynamics between a global North organization and a developing, Indigenous community were apparent.

====Summary====
The Suruí Forest Carbon Project provides an interesting example of how, even when the rights of IPLC’s are relatively robust, challenges persist in ensuring REDD+ project longevity. As such, in its current state, REDD+ in the Brazilian Amazon may not be a suitable market-based option for indigenous communities in the Amazon.<ref name=":3" /> Although initially successful in promoting indigenous autonomy and reducing deforestation, the project resulted in failure due to of a myriad of factors. Division between Surui communities was exacerbated by a perceived unequal benefit-sharing, and the impact of imposing REDD+ seems to have complicated the traditional social structure that the Surui were dependent on. These issues were influenced by Brazil's settler state dynamics, where indigenous land rights, although legally recognized, are often not upheld in practice due to insufficient enforcement.<ref name=":4" /> Ultimately, the Surui project reveals how settler colonialism's structural flaws make long-term project success difficult, despite initial progress in promoting indigenous autonomy.

At the national and state level, complex institutional and legal land governance structures convolute and impede REDD+ in Brazil. Multiple institutions share responsibilities and there is no comprehensive, authoritative database of land ownership, which hampers efforts to protect indigenous territories.<ref name=":5">Costa, R. (2016)''. Insecure land rights in Brazil: Consequences for rural areas and challenges for improvement.'' Climate Policy Initiative. [[/www.climatepolicyinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/Insecure Land Rights in Brazil CPI.pdf|https://www.climatepolicyinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/Insecure_Land_Rights_in_Brazil_CPI.pdf]]</ref> As a result, land tenure disputes remain common and can be witnessed occurring between the public as well between public and state actors. For example, Brazil’s 1964 Land Statute (Law No. 4504) allows the government to takeover unproductive farms and transfer those lands to landless peasants. This often results in the clearing of forest, as only when the land is cleared is it evidenced to be ‘productive’.<ref name=":5" /> Hence, not only does this law cause insecurity for Indigenous populations in Brazil, it also forces them to go against customary traditions of stewarding the land in an effort to maintain its control.

Whilst the aforementioned points to the futility of REDD+ in Brazil, there is reason to maintain optimism. In a recent landmark ruling Brazil’s supreme court voted in favour of the Xoleng peoples, and the decision will serve as a precedent for all cases involving Indigenous peoples.<ref name=":6">Amos-Flom, K., (2023). ''Triumph and Turmoil: The Xokleng Case and the Future of Indigenous Land Rights in Brazil.'' Columbia Journal of Transnational Law. [[/www.jtl.columbia.edu/bulletin-blog/triumph-and-turmoil-the-xokleng-case-and-the-future-of-indigenous-land-rights-in-brazil|https://www.jtl.columbia.edu/bulletin-blog/triumph-and-turmoil-the-xokleng-case-and-the-future-of-indigenous-land-rights-in-brazil]]</ref> The Xokleng’s land dispute, settled in 2023, “rejected Santa Catarina state’s marco temporal (“time limit”) argument, which would have required Indigenous people to prove they occupied or legally contested the territory they claimed before the Brazilian Constitution came into force in 1988. If successful, this argument would have led to disastrous repercussions, as many indigenous peoples had been forcibly removed or are traditionally nomadic.”<ref name=":6" /> Whilst slow, progress has been made in Brazil in recent years with respect to Indigenous rights as well as the voluntary carbon market itself.

There are currently 159 AFOLU projects listed on the Verra database in Brazil, with only two specifically focused on REDD+ initiatives in collaboration with Indigenous groups. These are the Ka’a Pyahu project, <ref>Verra (n.d.) ''Project 5087: KA'A PYAHU.'' https://registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/5087</ref> initiated by the Guajajara Indigenous people in collaboration with external organizations and validated in 2021, and the ‘Together for the forest Awaete REDD+ project’<ref>Verra (n.d.) ''Project 5200: TOGETHER FOR THE FOREST AWAETÉ REDD+ PROJECT.'' https://registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/5200</ref> which is still under development. Both projects involve Indigenous groups working with Brazilian organizations to build technical capacity and expertise. This could signal a growing trend of Indigenous-led REDD+ projects in the future. To ensure a positive future for REDD+ in Brazil, the customary rights of IPLC’s must be formally recognized. IPLC should have legal ownership of their traditional lands, and in doing so the carbon rights of these communities would be less convoluted, leading to more equitable benefit-sharing and increased cohesion amongst these groups post-project implementation.

To ensure a positive future for REDD+ in Brazil, the customary rights of IPLC’s must be formally recognized. IPLC should have legal ownership of their traditional lands, and in doing so the carbon rights of these communities would be less convoluted, leading to more equitable benefit-sharing and increased cohesion amongst these groups post-project implementation.

==Colombia: ''REDD+ project Resguardo Indigena Unificado - Selva de Mataven (RUI-SM)''==
'''Project description and location'''

According to the PD,<ref name=":7">ACATISEMA & Mediamos (2017). ''Joint project description and monitoring report: REDD+ project: Resguardo Indigena Unificado – Selva de Mataven (RIU – SM).'' Link: “10 06 2017_VCS Final Report_ Matavin Project.pdf” found at [[/registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/1566|https://registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/1566]]</ref> the Resguardo Indígena Unificado – Selva de Matavén (RIU-SM) project is located east of the Colombian Orinoco high plain, in the eastern part of the Department of Vichada, municipality of Cumaribo. It resides on the formalized resguardo of the Sikuani, Piaroa, Puinave, Curripaco, Cubeo and Piapoco ethnic groups, spanning 1,856,836 hectares, with 1,477,115 hectares (79.6%) being forested. The project states that it will reduce greenhouse gas emissions, with a total estimated net reduction of 108,670,562 tons of CO2 equivalent over thirty years, from years 2013 – 2042. By this metric, it is the 14th largest project on the Verra registry, out of over 1700 projects.<ref name=":9">Dufrasne, D., (2021). ''Two Shades of Green: How hot air forest credits are being used to avoid carbon taxes in Colombia''. Carbon Market Watch. [[/carbonmarketwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Two-shades-of-green EN WEB.pdf|https://carbonmarketwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Two-shades-of-green_EN_WEB.pdf]]</ref> There are 12,312 indigenous people living in the RIU-SM, belonging to 2,517 families and 250 communities as of 2017.

The project was initiated and developed by the Asociación de Cabildos y Autoridades Indígenas de la Selva de Matavén (ACETISMA), an Indigenous association, and MEDIAMOS F&M, a Colombian consultancy firm. ACETISMA is comprised of Indigenous leaders that represent the 17 communities of the reservation in charge of governing the territory, and it has administrative autonomy, as well as “the capacity to acquire, to own and to dispose of property, to accept donations, to hold national and international conventions, scientific and cultural exchanges and generally, to celebrate all kinds of negotiations and agreements with which the Association can achieve its objectives.”<ref name=":7" />

There is a stated focus on various means of improving the living conditions of the Indigenous peoples living within the project area. To summarise, the main objectives of the REDD+ project RIU-SM include:

· Community development, in the form of improved education.

· Community engagement with respect to the project; developing information channels to reveal project progress.

· Support local initiatives for environmental education and waste management.

· Developing an effective response system that addresses community proposals and concerns relating to the project.

· Strengthening the governance of ACATISEMA.

====National climate targets, policies and legislation====
The Colombian Amazon makes up over one-third of Colombia’s national territory, and up until 2005 only 7.3% of the Colombian Amazon had been deforested, largely due to the country's 60-year armed conflict between the government, multiple left-wing guerillas such as FARC, and several far-right paramilitary groups.<ref name=":8" /> However, following the signing of the Peace Treaty in 2016 and demobilization of the FARC, limits to deforestation were weakened in the Colombian Amazon. Poor but opportunistic peasants began to encroach into previously unchartered territory and capitalize from the rainforest. Due to the poor economic integration of the Amazon, many were forced to engage with the traditional economies of cocoa and cattle ranching, as these markets were already well connected to regional and global markets.<ref name=":8" /> To address the drivers of deforestation and its associated emissions, the federal government has implemented various initiatives, which are summarized below:
{| class="wikitable"
|'''Document name'''
|'''Type (target, policy or legislation)'''
|'''Publication year'''
|'''Key takeaways'''
|-
|
|Target
|?
|Reduce GHG emissions by 51 % by 2030.
|-
|
|Target
|?
|Net zero by 2050
|-
|National Climate Change Policy (PNCC)
|
|2018
|
|-
|National Forest Conservation Program
|
|2011
|
|-
|Law 1931 of 2018 – Climate Change Law

|
|2018
|
|-
| colspan="4" |Relating to REDD+
|-
|National Strategy for Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (ENREDD+).”
|
|2009
|
|-
|Amazon Indigenous REDD+ Initiative
|
|2012
|
|-
|USAID's Colombia BIOREDD+ program
|
|
|Develop a portfolio of 8 REDD+ projects in four geographic nodes covering over 700,000 hectares in the Colombian Pacific.

|-
|Vision Amazonia
|
|2015
|part of the REDD+ strategy in the country financed by three foreign countries: Germany, Norway and United Kingdom
|}
As a result of the many fund and market-based initiatives that Colombia has engaged with, it hosts the second most REDD+ projects in the world. REDD+ projects now cover at least 56% of the area of legally recognized Indigenous territories in the Colombian Amazon, with an overwhelming majority of carbon projects located on Indigenous territories.<ref name=":10">Schmid, D., & Castro. C., (2023). ''REDD+ projects in the Colombian Amazon: Social challenges and lack of transparency''. Rainforest Foundation Norway. [[/dv719tqmsuwvb.cloudfront.net/documents/REDD rapport 2024 ENG.pdf|https://dv719tqmsuwvb.cloudfront.net/documents/REDD_rapport_2024_ENG.pdf]]</ref> Evidently REDD+ plays an integral part in the country’s efforts of environmental conservation, and incentives have been introduced to promote the development of such projects. For example, in 2016 the government adopted a higher tax that covered fossil fuels, but companies are able to avoid paying the tax by investing in carbon offsets that have been generated domestically.<ref name=":9" /> This led to a boost in the domestic REDD+ market in 2017, as Colombian companies invested as to escape higher taxes. Notably, 23 of the 36 REDD+ projects currently under development in the Amazon region have been initiated in or after 2018.<ref name=":10" /> Currently Colombia’s REDD+ program sits at over 45 pilot and voluntary carbon projects, as well as one large-scale jurisdictional approach in the Amazon.<ref name=":11">Zambrano-Cortés, D. G. (2024). ''The politics, spaces and subjects of forest conservation in Colombia''. [internal PhD, WU, Wageningen University]. Wageningen University. [[/doi.org/10.18174/675328|https://doi.org/10.18174/675328]]</ref>

====Indigenous rights - Constitutional, tenure and bundle rights====
''De jure'', the Indigenous peoples of Colombia have comprehensive tenure and bundle rights that have been articulated in the national constitution. Collective land titles are granted to Indigenous communities by the Colombian government, and as a result about 34 percent of Colombian land (almost 38 million hectares) is legally recognized as Indigenous territory or collective lands of Afro-descendent communities. (Schmid & Castro, 2023) These collective land tenure rights have been in effect since the implementation of the 1991 constitution, granting them the authority to exercise legal control over their territories in accordance with their own customs and procedures.<ref>Max Planck Institute (n.d.) ''Colombia 1991 (rev. 2015).'' Institute. [[/www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Colombia 2015|https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Colombia_2015]]</ref> Furthermore, the carbon rights of Indigenous peoples are explicitly defined in the constitution and tied specifically to the ownership of land of the communities.<ref name=":2" /> This in theory provides a solid legal basis for upholding the rights of Indigenous communities in Colombia, specifically relating to REDD+ activities, as it allows communities to define and negotiate the terms of said projects. A summary of the various laws relating to Indigenous rights have been summarized below:
{| class="wikitable"
| colspan="2" |'''Laws'''
|-
| colspan="2" |'''1991 constitution'''
|-
|Article 63

|Indigenous territories are considered collective property. This means that land is not owned by individuals but is shared by the community. The state must respect these collective rights and cannot alter land ownership without the consent of the Indigenous peoples.
|-
|Article 330
|Indigenous communities have the right to govern their territories.
|-
|Article 76 - ''Consulta previa''.
|Pertains to the right of Indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities to prior consultation before the government or private companies undertake activities that may affect their territories, culture, or way of life.

|-
|Article 63 and 329
|The Reservation is a collective, inalienable, and indefeasible property.
|-
|Decree 1386 of 1994, Article 10; Decree 2164 of 1995, Article 22) 39.
|The administration and management of these lands are subjected to uses and customs of the beneficiaries
|}
Whilst land and tenure rights are enshrined into the constitution, the precariousness of these rights persists due to a lack of resources to ensure enforcement, as well as the deeper issue of corruption. As previously stated, the rate of deforestation increased significantly in Colombia’s post-conflict era, evidencing the nations inability to maintain control over unlawful acts of land-grabbing and disposition. Whilst this began with new peasants converting the Amazon for subsistence purposes, it ultimately led to new areas for the growth of cocoa, much to the benefit of narco-traffickers who could monopolize on this illegal surplus in ‘accumulation by dispossession’.<ref name=":8" />

With respect to the legalities of consultation, Colombia has enshrined ''consulta previa'' into the constitution. Translating to ‘prior consultation’, this legal text provides the formal grounds for Indigenous engagement when any legislative or administrative measures are implemented on Indigenous territory. Importantly, consultation should be achieved in accordance with the customs of the ethnic group with which the project is being imposed upon. However, there have been recent cases of contestation specifically relating to how ''consulta previa'' applies to REDD+ on Indigenous lands, and the RIU – SM project was one that was involved with such a case.

====Interested and affected stakeholders====
{| class="wikitable"
| colspan="5" |'''Affected stakeholders'''
|-
|Stakeholders
|Primary objective(s)
|Secondary objective(s)
|Relative power
|Scope of influence
|-
|ACATISEMA - Asociación de Cabildos y Autoridades Indígenas de la Selva de Matavén
|the Indigenous association comprised of Indigenous leaders in representation of the 16 communities of the reservation in charge of governing the territory.

foster the integral development, social and cultural preservation of the indigenous communities in the Mataven Jungle and to consolidate the territory, selfgovernment by partners, the defense, conservation and preservation of the environment and biodiversity of the Mataven Jungle (ACATISEMA, 2010)

|
|It is the highest authority in the reservation.
|
|-
|MEDIAMOS F&M – A consultancy
|Project developer
|
|
|
|-
|Communities of indigenous peoples of the RIU-SM
|<nowiki>- Primary and direct beneficiaries.</nowiki>
|
|
|
|-
|Teachers of primary and secondary basic education indigenous Reservation
|
|
|
|
|-
|Colonists
|
|
|
|
|-
| colspan="5" |'''Interested stakeholders'''
|-
|Mining Companies and individuals
|Compete with the Project for the territory's resources.
|
|
|
|-
|Ministerio de Ambiente y Desarrollo Sostenible

- Direct participation
|Its main interest is to achieve environmental planning, through the consolidation of a policy of sustainable development and strategic alliances with social and institutional participants in different sectoral and territorial scenarios.
|
|
|
|-
|Dirección de Asuntos Indígenas, ROM y Minorías - Ministerio del Interior

Direct participation
|Public agency that advises the national level, prepares and proposes the formulation of public policy in favor of indigenous peoples within the framework of the defense, support, reinforcement and consolidation of ethnic and cultural rights.
|
|
|
|-
|Corporinoquía

Direct participation
|Regional environmental authority to ensure the proper use of natural resources in their area of jurisdiction.
|
|
|
|-
|Other government institutions: Governor ofice of Vichada, Mayor ofice Cumaribo

Direct participation
|The Reservation for being part of the Cumaribo, Vichada, has territorial jurisdiction relations with the Governor’s office and the Mayor’s office.
|
|
|
|-
|Fundación NATURA

Direct participation
|Civil organization whose mission is the conservation, use and management of biodiversity to generate social, economic and environmental benefits in the context of sustainable human development.
|
|
|
|-
|FONDO ACCIÓN

Direct participation
|Colombian non-profit organization in the private scheme. Encourage the participation of civil society and the private sector in the implementation of the country’s public policies in two areas: - Conservation and sustainable development; and protection -development of children.
|
|
|
|-
|SENA, Department of Social Prosperity (DPS), NGOs and private consultants
|Connected to the area - supporting the implementation of rural development activities.
|
|
|
|-
|Other indigenous communities neighboring RIU-SM
|
|
|
|
|-
|Financial institutions
|They fund local development activities.
|
|
|
|-
|Asocarbono – An industry association, including Verra, ProClima, Biofix, and ACATISEMA.

|
|
|
|
|-
|OPIAC: the National Oganization of the Indigenous Peoples of the Colombian Amazon

|
|
|
|
|}

====Discussion====
According to the official REDD+ Mataven website<ref>RIU – SM (n.d.). ''REDD+ Mataven''. [[/reddmataven.com/|https://reddmataven.com/]]</ref> the project has resulted in a myriad of benefits to the Indigenous communities of the region. For example, as a result of the funds generated from the projects activities, there have been improvements in infrastructure, transportation and education, ultimately leading to the empowerment and improved governance of ACETISMA. However, the project has come under fire for multiple reasons.

For one, in 2015 some of the Indigenous communities filed a lawsuit referring to the violation of their right to ''consulta previa''. However, the court ruled that their Indigenous rights had not been violated as it was ACETISMA that initially sought MEDIAMOS to develop the project, and that ACETISMA were the best representatives of those Indigenous communities. Furthermore, the projects main focus was the conservation of the rainforest and therefore did not threaten the cultural integrity of those communities.<ref name=":10" /> However, regardless of the outcome of this case, its occurrence points to internal disagreement amongst Indigenous participants of the RIU-SM project. In a study involving interviews with Indigenous members of the project, there was a significant proportion of interviewees that had little knowledge regarding various aspects of the project, such as responsibilities of participation, or the benefit-sharing mechanism in place.<ref name=":2" /> This further reinforces the point that, in the case of the RIU-SM project it may not be ‘bottom-up’ and eludes to the power imbalance experienced between the project developer Mediamos and Indigenous community members. In the PD there does exist a breakdown of the distribution of income between ACETISMA, the Indigenous association, and Mediamos, the project developer, which shows a significant proportion of revenue flowing to the former organisation throughout the project’s operations<ref name=":7" /> However, there is currently no publicly available documentation supporting this initial claim<ref name=":9" /> as there is no obligation to do so, leading to a general lack of transparency in the market, and between all of the relevant actors. Subsequent meetings with Indigenous leaders have however shown a marked support of the Mataven project, with one Indigenous leader explicitly stating “...the Redd+ project has brought resources that they never had before, which allowed them to open new school classrooms, 21 rural aqueducts, cocoa crops and even headquarters in Cumaribo and Inírida.”<ref>Lievano, A. B. (2021) Colombia's biggest carbon credit project could be selling hot air. Latin American Center for Investigative Journalism. [[/www.elclip.org/el-mayor-proyecto-de-bonos-de-carbono-de-colombia-podria-estar-vendiendo-aire-caliente/|https://www.elclip.org/el-mayor-proyecto-de-bonos-de-carbono-de-colombia-podria-estar-vendiendo-aire-caliente/]] </ref> Clearly there have been benefits for IPLC’s involved with this project, though the details of this benefit-sharing remain a mystery.

Secondly, the Mataven project has caused controversy due to its apparently inflated carbon credit issuance. This has been achieved by using a reference area that is not representative of the project area, as well as assuming an uncharacteristically heigh assumed rate of deforestation.<ref name=":12">Global Atlas of Environmental Justice (2023). ''Resguardo Indigena Unificado-Selva de Matavén (RIU SM) REDD+ Project, Colombia.'' [[/ejatlas.org/conflict/redd-project-resguardo-indigena-unificado-selva-de-mataven-riu-sm|https://ejatlas.org/conflict/redd-project-resguardo-indigena-unificado-selva-de-mataven-riu-sm]]</ref> The project used a baseline deforestation rate of 0.86% per year, which is significantly more than the Colombian government's national rate of 0.18%. Additionally, according to the report the reference area chosen is more easily accessed and therefore more prone to deforestation, making it an inaccurate comparison to the relatively remote project area.<ref name=":2" /> This has led to the creation of excess carbon credits, or “hot air” credits, which have been criticized for not reflecting real environmental benefits.<ref name=":9" /> To add further insult to injury these credits have been used by a Colombian fossil fuel distributor company to avoid paying taxes, as described earlier by Colombia’s change in policy in 2017. In doing so, the company avoided paying approximately $18.9 million in taxes.<ref name=":2" /> There has been subsequent back and forth between Verra and Carbon Market Watch, with Verra refuting the claims<ref>Verra (2021). ''Carbon Market Watch Report on Colombian REDD+ Projects Contains Flawed Allegations.'' [[/verra.org/carbon-market-watch-report-on-colombian-redd-projects-contains-flawed-allegations/|https://verra.org/carbon-market-watch-report-on-colombian-redd-projects-contains-flawed-allegations/]] </ref> Regardless of the science, Colombia recently introduced a resolution in 2018 (Resolution 1447 – 2018) that requires projects to use baselines that comply with national reference levels.<ref name=":13">Dufrasne, D. (2021b). Companies use ”hot air” forestry offsets to avoid taxes in Colombia: Carbon Market Watch’s fact-check of Verra’s response. Carbon Market Watch. [[/carbonmarketwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/CMWs-fact-check-of-Verras-response-on-Colombia.pdf|https://carbonmarketwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/CMWs-fact-check-of-Verras-response-on-Colombia.pdf]]</ref><ref>IEA (2022). ''Resolution 1447 – 2018. Monitoring, Reporting, and Verification System for mitigation actions at the national level.'' International Energy Agency. [[/www.iea.org/policies/14772-resolution-1447-2018-monitoring-reporting-and-verification-system-for-mitigation-actions-at-the-national-level|https://www.iea.org/policies/14772-resolution-1447-2018-monitoring-reporting-and-verification-system-for-mitigation-actions-at-the-national-level]]</ref> Going forward, REDD+ projects that are being implemented in Colombia will have to abide by Colombia’s national legislation.

====Summary====
Colombia has a long history of engaging in REDD+ as it has been used to limit environmental degradation in the post-conflict era, in alignment with the country’s national peacebuilding agenda.<ref name=":11" /> Owing to the country’s comprehensive tenure and bundle rights, IPLC’s have robust ''de jure'' rights to land as they collectively own it, and rights to carbon are tied to this ownership. This puts Colombia as one of the world leaders in legal terms relating to REDD+ project implementation, but due to a lack of resources to ensure enforcement, as well as corruption, historically these laws have not been adhered to.<ref name=":10" /><ref name=":2" /> There are many documented cases showing the displacement on IPLC’s from traditional lands, poor efforts to adhere to ''consulta previa'', and inequitable benefit sharing.<ref>Greenfield, P. (2023''). The ‘carbon pirates’ preying on Amazon’s Indigenous communities.'' The Guardian. [[/www.theguardian.com/environment/2023/jan/21/amazon-indigenous-communities-carbon-offsetting-pirates-aoe|https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2023/jan/21/amazon-indigenous-communities-carbon-offsetting-pirates-aoe]]</ref><ref name=":14">Lang, C., (2024). ''Colombia’s Constitutional Court rules in favour of Indigenous Peoples. Identifies serious flaws in the REDD+ Baka Rokarire project.'' REDD_Monitor. [[/reddmonitor.substack.com/p/colombias-constitutional-court-rules|https://reddmonitor.substack.com/p/colombias-constitutional-court-rules]]</ref>

The case of the Mataven project provides an interesting example of how it is the market itself that is failing to address concerns regarding transparency, whether that be relating to benefit-sharing amongst relevant stakeholders, or Indigenous representation and engagement throughout the implementation of REDD+ projects. Some ACATISEMA members have explicitly stated their support for the Mataven project,<ref name=":12" /> and its benefits can be seen first-hand in the form of improved infrastructure in local communities involved with the project.<ref>Myers, J. E., Parra, M. A., Bedford, C. (2021). ''How Carbon Offsetting Can Build a Forest.'' Stanford Social Innovation Review. [[/ssir.org/articles/entry/how carbon offsetting can build a forest|https://ssir.org/articles/entry/how_carbon_offsetting_can_build_a_forest]]</ref> However, an exact breakdown of how and where revenue is being distributed to IPLC’s remains elusive.<ref name=":13" /> Furthermore, the level of IPLC engagement has come into question, specifically with reference to ''consulta previa'' and the overall understanding that IPLC’s have regarding the project’s intended outcomes and activities.<ref name=":10" /> This is not a rare case in Colombia and has been witnessed occurring with other projects that have been implemented on Indigenous territories in the Colombian Amazon.<ref name=":17">Lang, C., (2023''). “It destroys everything,” says Indigenous leader about the REDD+ Baka Rokarire project in Colombia''. REDD Monitor. [[/reddmonitor.substack.com/p/it-destroys-everything-says-indigenous|https://reddmonitor.substack.com/p/it-destroys-everything-says-indigenous]]</ref> However, a recent ruling by the Colombian Constitutional court voted in favour of Indigenous groups in Colombia, upholding “the rights to self-determination, autonomy, self-government, territory, identity, physical and cultural integrity, and free, prior and informed consent of the indigenous communities”.<ref name=":14" /> This review ultimately sets a legal precedent safeguarding the fundamental rights of IPLCs with REDD+ project implementation and shows that progress is being made to improve the likelihood that REDD+ will result in genuine benefits to those affected by project implementation.

To ensure a more authentic engagement with IPLC’s as to result in legitimate and equitable benefit-sharing, improvements must be made by the Colombian government, as well as within the VCM itself. For the former, Colombia’s national registry for GHG mitigation activities must be updated; it has been offline since 2022.<ref name=":10" /> As a result, transparency is lacking. International finance could be utilized as to alleviate this issue, and only with an accurate and reliable database may the market be regulated. In the broader sense, VCM registries must create stricter guidelines promoting transparency. Often PD’s refer to annexed documents that contain relevant information regarding benefit-sharing, though these are often not publicly available.<ref name=":9" /> This limits transparency and increases the likelihood of inequitable agreements being made between project proponents and developers, further exacerbating existing power asymmetries between the two groups and limiting the likelihood that ''consulta previa'' is honestly adhered to.<ref name=":10" /> This has led to conflict within Indigenous communities, rather than a strengthening of their social fabric.

Furthermore, the Mataven project calls into question the actual emissions reduction that REDD+ projects achievce. Whilst Colombia has since updated its regulations such that REDD+ must use baselines that comply with national reference levels, it is up in the air as to how representative these guidelines are. Reference areas must represent project areas and without the appropriate regulations in place project developers lack the incentive to create realistic baselines; ultimately they are aiming to produce the maximum number of credits as to generate the greatest possible revenues.

==Conclusion==
As a market-based mechanism, REDD+ is shackled by the construct in which it operates; fundamentally it is a capitalist means of fixing a capitalist problem, which comes with limitations. Both Brazil and Colombia have relatively robust laws that have been written into the constitution, ultimately promoting more equitable results post project implementation. However, as in Colombia IPLC’s collectively own the land, whereas in Brazil these groups only own rights to use the land,<ref name=":2" /> Colombia can be considered better equipped for the establishment of REDD+ projects on traditional Indigenous territory. However, even with these laws in place enforcement remain a matter of concern. Furthermore, given the wide variety of ontological and epistemological perspectives of Indigenous communities, and how these views conflict with the Western worldview from which market-based REDD+ came to fruition, there is an inherent difficulty in implementing a system of governance in REDD+ on Indigenous lands.<ref name=":1" />. Putting a price on nature conflicts with Indigenous perspectives and there have been instances where this has attacked the social and cultural fabric of IPLC’s;<ref name=":17" /> to avoid this REDD+ developers must have the genuine intent of understanding the perspective of the Indigenous group they are working with and aim to implement REDD+ with a bottom-up approach.

In both countries, transparency must be improved to ensure that FPIC is adhered to and subsequently ensure fair IPLC representation and engagement. This issue predominantly arises due to the poor requirements of standards in the VCM. As such, proponents are guided by developers which have little incentive to truly act in the interests of Indigenous groups; ultimately the organizations in charge of project development are interested in increasing project revenues. This has led to instances of over-crediting, as without a transparent framework in which to operate it is difficult to evaluate the legitimacy of the claims being made by project proponents and developers. However, with recent advances that address concerns of additionality<ref name=":15" /> there is hope for improved market integrity. Standards of the VCM must continue to be scrutinized to ensure that progress continues to be made.

Going forward, progress should be made to formalize the customary laws and traditional lands of IPLCs, and finance should be directed towards the enforcement of these laws. The environmental,<ref name=":16" /> economic,<ref name=":5" /><ref>Ding, H., Veit, P. G., Blackman, A., Gray, E., Reytar, K., Altamirano, J. C., Hodgdon, B., (2016). ''Climate benefits, tenure costs: The economic case for securing Indigenous land rights in the Amazon''. WRI. [[/files.wri.org/d8/s3fs-public/Climate Benefits Tenure Costs Executive Summary.pdf|https://files.wri.org/d8/s3fs-public/Climate_Benefits_Tenure_Costs_Executive_Summary.pdf]]</ref> and social<ref>Sarmiento Barletti, J. P., Heise Vigil, N., & Larson, A. M. (2023). ''Safeguards at a glance: Are voluntary standards supporting community land, resource and carbon rights?'' CIFOR-ICRAF. [[/www.cifor-icraf.org/publications/pdf files/Flyer/REDD-Safeguards-7.pdf|https://www.cifor-icraf.org/publications/pdf_files/Flyer/REDD-Safeguards-7.pdf]] </ref> benefits of this have been researched and are well understood. By developing culturally appropriate frameworks for rights-based conservation regimes, that work with IPLCs in accordance with their worldviews, REDD+ could be used to promote Indigenous autonomy. However, much progress still must be made to achieve this goal.

==References==

Documentation:Open Case Studies/FRST522/2024/REDD+ in Indigenous Amazonia: What works and what doesn’t?

2024-12-12T21:22:30Z

ConnorHaynes: /* Positionality */

__TOC__

==Positionality==
First and foremost I am not Indigenous, and whilst there are a myriad of cultures, ontologies and epistemologies that are not sufficiently represented by simply stating ‘Indigenous’, it is commonly accepted that these worldviews are vastly different to those of the ‘Western’ world, which is the world in which I grew up and matured. I am therefore only understanding of Indigenous cultures, beliefs and customary laws based upon available online literature and those which I have learnt through life, in addition to those introduced to me in my Master’s degree. As such, I will never be able to fully relate to an Indigenous person; the best I can do is try to understand and learn. Only throughout this process am I able to work towards reconciliation and attempt to address the inequities experienced by Indigenous folk globally.

Additionally, I am yet to act as a carbon project proponent and so do not understand the nuances or stresses of undertaking such a task. Whilst an individual proponent may have the best intention of procuring a carbon project for its social and environmental benefits, there are a number of stakeholders involved throughout the entire process which influence its eventual outcome. Without experience acting as a project proponent I am naïve in understanding the overall process and it's difficulties.

==Acronyms / Terminology==
AFOLU: Agriculture, Forestry and Other Land-Use

ICVCM: Integrity Council for the Voluntary Carbon Market

IPLC: Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities

KMGBF: Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework

LAC: Latin American Countries

MRV: Monitoring, Reporting and Verification

REDD+: Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation

UNCBD: United Nations Convention on Biological Biodiversity

VCMI: Voluntary Carbon Markets Integrity Initiative

''Additionality:'' Additionality is the determination of whether the project will lead to the expected outcomes when compared to the baseline or ‘business as usual’ emissions.

''Leakage'': Refers to the shifting of emissions to outside the project boundary as a result of the project’s activities.

''Permanence:'' Permanence refers to the degree to which a carbon credit is equivalent to a permanent removal or reduction in emissions.
==Abstract==
This case study illustrates two examples of Indigenous-led REDD+ projects on Indigenous territory in Colombia and Brazil. Both countries have a relatively long history of engaging with REDD+ but have slightly different legal structures pertaining to the rights of Indigenous peoples in their traditional territories, as well as IPLC’s ‘carbon’ rights. As such, the intention is to evaluate how these differing ''de jure'' rights translate on the ground. With respect to REDD+, do certain ''de jure'' rights result in legitimately positive benefits to IPLCs, as well as the environment that these projects were originally intended to protect? To reduce inconsistency, projects were chosen that utilized the same standard, namely Verra’s ‘Verified Carbon Standard’.

The overall intention is such that the reader can evaluate the effectiveness and true benefit of REDD+ projects to IPLC’s, based upon the legal frameworks of the host country. A secondary intention is such that the reader is better equipped to conduct a prefeasibility assessment based upon available online literature, to evaluate the likelihood that REDD+ can be implemented in any chosen country, with the genuine intent of benefiting IPLC’s that are directly affected as a result of REDD+ project implementation.

==REDD+ and the VCM in Brazil and Colombia==
REDD+, originally introduced by the UNFCCC, is a market-based mechanism sitting within the VCM that aims to reverse the loss of forests and carbon stocks, specifically in developing countries. Simply put, an entity or an individual can voluntarily pay another that has engaged with REDD+ and subsequently sequestered carbon, to offset their own emissions using ‘credits’, sold as units of greenhouse gas equivalent to one ton of carbon dioxide (CO2e). Forestry and Land-Use remains to be the largest category of carbon credits traded by transaction volume on the VCM, with REDD+ being the most popular project type in this category, accounting for 78% of credits traded.<ref name=":0">Procton, A., (2024). ''State of the voluntary carbon market 2024: On the path to maturity.'' Forest Trends Ecosystem Marketplace.</ref> Furthermore, over one-third of the credits sold within this category were sourced from projects that had been implemented in LAC and the Caribbean in 2024.<ref name=":0" /> Of the four largest standards issuing carbon credits, Verra accounts for roughly 80% of issuances in Latin America,<ref>Pullins, T. (2022). Growth of carbon markets in Latin America. White & Case. [[/www.whitecase.com/publications/insight/latin-america-focus-fall-2022-growth-carbon-markets|https://www.whitecase.com/publications/insight/latin-america-focus-fall-2022-growth-carbon-markets]] </ref> and even in the face of recent scrutiny,<ref>West, T. A. P., Bofim, B., Haya, B. K. (2024). Methodological issues with deforestation baselines compromise the integrity of carbon offsets from REDD+. ''Global Environmental Change, 87'' [[/doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2024.102863|https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2024.102863]]</ref><ref>Wyburd I., & Dufrasne, G. (2023). Error Log: Exposing the methodological failures of REDD+ forestry projects. Carbon Market Watch. [[/carbonmarketwatch.org/publications/error-log-exposing-the-methodological-failures-of-redd-forestry-projects/|https://carbonmarketwatch.org/publications/error-log-exposing-the-methodological-failures-of-redd-forestry-projects/]]</ref><ref name=":15">Haya, B. K., Alford-Jones, K., Anderegg, W. R. L., Beymer-Farris, B., Blanchard, L., Bomfim, B., Chin, D., Evans, S., Hogan, M., Holm, J. A., McAfee, K., So, I. S., West, T. A. P., & Withey, L. (2023). ''Quality assessment of REDD+ carbon credit projects''. Berkeley Carbon Trading Project. [[/gspp.berkeley.edu/research-and-impact/centers/cepp/projects/berkeley-carbontrading-project/REDD+|https://gspp.berkeley.edu/research-and-impact/centers/cepp/projects/berkeley-carbontrading-project/REDD+]]</ref> REDD+ projects clearly account for a significant proportion of the VCM with their continued application likely to persist.<ref>Gordon, O. (2022). ''The interwoven fortunes of carbon markets and indigenous communities.'' Energy Monitor. [[/www.energymonitor.ai/tech/carbon-removal/the-interwoven-fortunes-of-carbon-markets-and-indigenous-communities/|https://www.energymonitor.ai/tech/carbon-removal/the-interwoven-fortunes-of-carbon-markets-and-indigenous-communities/]]</ref><ref>Müller, M., Coustar, C., Bietta, F., Mathres, M. (2022). ''UNFCCC REDD+ and the power of sovereign carbon.'' Deutsche Banke Chief Investment Office. [[/www.rainforestcoalition.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/CIO-Special-UNFCCC-REDD-power-of-sovereign-carbon.pdf|https://www.rainforestcoalition.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/CIO-Special-UNFCCC-REDD-power-of-sovereign-carbon.pdf]]</ref><ref>Pullins, T. (2022). ''Growth of carbon markets in Latin America.'' White & Case. [[/www.whitecase.com/publications/insight/latin-america-focus-fall-2022-growth-carbon-markets|https://www.whitecase.com/publications/insight/latin-america-focus-fall-2022-growth-carbon-markets]] </ref> With the introduction of updated methodologies aimed at addressing these concerns,<ref>Verra (2023a). ''Setting the Standard: Verra’s Revolutionary New REDD Methodology.'' [[/verra.org/program-notice/setting-the-standard-verras-revolutionary-new-redd-methodology/|https://verra.org/program-notice/setting-the-standard-verras-revolutionary-new-redd-methodology/]]</ref><ref>Verra (2023b). ''VM0048 Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation, v1.0.'' [[/verra.org/methodologies/vm0048-reducing-emissions-from-deforestation-and-forest-degradation-v1-0/|https://verra.org/methodologies/vm0048-reducing-emissions-from-deforestation-and-forest-degradation-v1-0/]]</ref> there is hope for renewed buyer confidence in the integrity of this market,<ref>MSCI (2023). ''Verra’s New Methodology for Unplanned Deforestation Aims to Silence the Critics''. [[/www.msci.com/www/blog-posts/verra-s-new-methodology-for/04577808942|https://www.msci.com/www/blog-posts/verra-s-new-methodology-for/04577808942]]</ref> though more work still needs to be done.

Both Colombia and Brazil have a relatively long history of implementing REDD+ projects, using both fund-based and market-based mechanisms. For example, both countries were participants in the ‘Amazon Indigenous REDD+ (RIA in Spanish) initiative, with the first pilot implementation project being initiated in Colombia’s Puiawai Natural Reserve.<ref>Garzón, E., (2017). ''Amazon Indigenous REDD+: An innovative approach to conserve Colombian forests?'' Mongabay. [[/news.mongabay.com/2017/01/amazon-indigenous-redd-an-innovative-approach-to-conserve-colombian-forests/|https://news.mongabay.com/2017/01/amazon-indigenous-redd-an-innovative-approach-to-conserve-colombian-forests/]]</ref> The relevance of these two countries with respect to REDD+ is simple. Much of the Amazon’s primary tropical rainforest falls within these countries jurisdiction and this rainforest has been consistently under threat from external pressures and encroachment, whether that be in the form of land-clearing for commercial ranching, subsistence purposes, illicit drug production or illegal mining practices,<ref name=":8">Sánchez García, P. A. & Wong, G. Y., (2024) “The political economy of deforestation in the Colombian Amazon”, ''Journal of Political Ecology'' ''31''(1), 178–199. [[/doi.org/10.2458/jpe.5230|https://doi.org/10.2458/jpe.5230]]</ref><ref>Radwin, M. (2023). ''Drug trafficking fuels other deforestation drivers in the Amazon: report.'' Mongabay. [[/news.mongabay.com/2023/07/drug-trafficking-fuels-other-deforestation-drivers-in-the-amazon-report/|https://news.mongabay.com/2023/07/drug-trafficking-fuels-other-deforestation-drivers-in-the-amazon-report/]]</ref><ref>Haddad, E.A., Araújo, I.F., Feltran-Barbieri, R., Perobelli, F. S., Rocha, A., Sass, K. S., Nobre, C. A. (2024). Economic drivers of deforestation in the Brazilian Legal Amazon. ''Nat Sustain'' ''7'', 1141–1148. [[/doi.org/10.1038/s41893-024-01387-7|https://doi.org/10.1038/s41893-024-01387-7]] </ref><ref>Hänggli, A., Levy, S. A., Armenteras, D., Bovolo, C. I., Brandão, J., Rueda, X., & Garrett, R. D. (2023). A systematic comparison of deforestation drivers and policy effectiveness across the amazon biome. ''Environmental Research Letters, 18''(7), 073001. [[/doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/acd408|https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/acd408]]</ref> to name a few.

In theory, REDD+ can be used to provide the economic incentive to promote sustained environmental protection of Indigenous land, with a focus on the rights and livelihoods of IPLCs. Currently the overall funding to IPLCs tenure rights and forest management in tropical countries is low, receiving just $270 million per year between 2011-2020 from bilateral and multilateral donors and private philanthropies.<ref>Hatcher, J., Owen, M., Yin, D., (2021). ''Falling short: Donor funding for Indigenous peoples and local communities to secure tenure rights and manage forests in tropical countries (2011 -2020).'' Rainforest Foundation Norway. [[/dv719tqmsuwvb.cloudfront.net/documents/Publikasjoner/Andre-rapporter/RFN Falling short 2021.pdf|https://dv719tqmsuwvb.cloudfront.net/documents/Publikasjoner/Andre-rapporter/RFN_Falling_short_2021.pdf]]</ref> REDD+ has the potential to channel funding as to promote Indigenous rights and autonomy, provided there is transparent and equitable benefit-sharing for those involved. Fundamentally, only with the inclusion of IPLC’s or preferably with IPLC’s acting as project proponents is REDD+ able to promote Indigenous agency and improve IPLC rights and governance. And only when the rights of those inhabiting the land are formally recognized can the land be effectively conserved.<ref name=":16">Reytar, K., Veit, P., von Braun, J. (2024). ''Protecting Biodiversity Hinges on Securing Indigenous and Community Land Rights.'' WRI. [[/www.wri.org/insights/indigenous-and-local-community-land-rights-protect-biodiversity|https://www.wri.org/insights/indigenous-and-local-community-land-rights-protect-biodiversity]]</ref> The inclusion of IPLCs in REDD+ project development is therefore considered to be essential for project success, and this is in theory embodied in the very nature of REDD+.<ref name=":1">Alvarez, G., Elfving, M. and Andrade, C. (2016) ‘REDD+ governance and indigenous peoples in Latin America: the case of Suruí Carbon Project in the Brazilian Amazon Forest’, ''Latin American J. Management for Sustainable Development 3''(2) pp.133–146. [[/dx.doi.org/10.1504/LAJMSD.2016.083705|10.1504/LAJMSD.2016.083705]]</ref> Partially owing to a long history of dealing with REDD+, Colombia and Brazil are amongst just a few of the countries hosting tropical rainforests that explicitly recognise community rights to carbon and tie these rights to the legal ownership of lands and forests. In Colombia, carbon rights are tied to rights of the land, whereas in Brazil carbon rights are tied to forest rights.<ref name=":2">RRI and McGill University (2021). Technical report: ''Status of legal recognition of Indigenous Peoples’, Local Communities’ and Afro-descendant Peoples’ rights to carbon stored in tropical lands and forests''. Rights and Resources Initiative. [[/doi.org/10.53892/MLQQ5744|https://doi.org/10.53892/MLQQ5744]]</ref>

==Brazil: The Suruí Forest Carbon Project==
====Project description and location====
The Surui Forest Carbon project was implemented in 2009 on the territory of the Surui people, which is situated in the southern part of Brazil’s Amazon between the states of Rondônia and Mato Grosso. Surui Indigenous territory covers an area of 2,481 km2, though the intention of the PCFS was to protect a portion of this total area. According to the PD, the stated objective was to “prevent 13,575.3 hectares of tropical forest from being cleared by 2038, to avoid the emission of 7,258,352.3 tCO2e to the atmosphere, and to contribute to the preservation of the Paiter Surui lifestyle and traditions.”<ref>IDESAM (2011). ''Project description: Surui forest carbon project''. Institute for Conservation and Sustainable Development of Amazonas. Link: "PROJ_DESC_1118_02FEB2012.PDF" found at [[/registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/1118|https://registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/1118]] </ref> This region sits within one of the Brazilian Amazon’s main ‘arcs of deforestation’ and pressure from loggers and ranchers is a matter of concern.

Notably, the PCFS was the first REDD+ project to be proposed by Indigenous peoples in the Brazilian Amazon on their own territory and was the first to receive certification by both the VCS and CCBS.<ref name=":1" />. Metareilá, the Surui’s own Indigenous association, acted as project proponent and the Institute for Conservation and Sustainable Development of Amazonas (IDESAM) assisted with project development, alongside multiple other stakeholder groups. As an endogenous initiative procured and conducted by the Surui community, the SFCP had a ‘non-centralized model of governance’, which reflected the characteristics and traditions of the Surui people. <ref name=":1" />

Only after two years of consultations between the 24 communities involved and the relevant governmental agencies (primarily FUNAI and the Ministry of Environment) was a Memorandum of Understanding signed, showing community consent to develop the project.<ref name=":3">Garcia, B., Rimmer, L., Canal Vieira, L., Mackey, B., (2021). REDD+ and forest protection on indigenous lands in the Amazon. ''RECIEL 30'', 207–219. [[/doi.org/10.1111/reel.12389|https://doi.org/10.1111/reel.12389]]</ref> In 2012 after verification from an independent third-party body, the Surui were able to sell carbon credits on the international market. Between 2009 and 2014 the project drastically helped limit the deforestation occurring within the project’s site, causing many to deem it a success.<ref name=":4">Howard, F. E., (2023). ''An Analysis of the Suruí Forest Carbon Project in Context of Settler Colonialism''. Masters thesis. Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University. [[/vtechworks.lib.vt.edu/server/api/core/bitstreams/b0cde6de-794c-453f-856b-ee72bde3db06/content|https://vtechworks.lib.vt.edu/server/api/core/bitstreams/b0cde6de-794c-453f-856b-ee72bde3db06/content]]</ref>

====National climate targets, policies and legislation====
Rates of deforestation in Brazil’s legal Amazon are significantly impacted by the government in charge. This is evidenced in the decade between 2012 and 2021 whilst under the conservative Bolsonaro administration, when deforestation in the Amazon increased 185% — from a loss of 4,571 km2 in 2012 to 13,038 km2 in 2021.<ref>INPE (2022). ''Observação da Terra. [[/www.obt.inpe.br/OBT/assuntos/programas/amazonia/prodes|http://www.obt.inpe.br/OBT/assuntos/programas/amazonia/prodes]]''</ref> However, since Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s appointment in 2022 there has been a steady decline in the rate of deforestation, which is now roughly half what it was in 2021.<ref>Terra Brasilis (2024). ''PRODES (deforestation): Deforestation rates – Legal Amazon – States''. [[/terrabrasilis.dpi.inpe.br/app/dashboard/deforestation/biomes/legal amazon/rates|https://terrabrasilis.dpi.inpe.br/app/dashboard/deforestation/biomes/legal_amazon/rates]]</ref> A significant proportion of emissions result from the clearing of rainforest and its subsequent conversion to ranching.<ref>MCTI (2022). ''Estimativas Anuais De Emissões De Gases De Efeito Estufa No Brasil.'' 6ª Edição. Ministério da Estado da Ciência, Tecnologia e Inovações. [[/www.gov.br/mcti/pt-br/acompanhe-o-mcti/sirene/publicacoes/estimativas-anuais-de-emissoes-gee/arquivos/6a-ed-estimativas-anuais.pdf|https://www.gov.br/mcti/pt-br/acompanhe-o-mcti/sirene/publicacoes/estimativas-anuais-de-emissoes-gee/arquivos/6a-ed-estimativas-anuais.pdf]]</ref> To address these emissions Brazil has implemented various adaptation policies, legislation and targets which are summarized below:

TABLE
====Indigenous rights - Constitutional, tenure and bundle rights====
In Brazil, Indigenous rights are robust and clearly defined according to the Brazilian Constitution. As a result, the Indigenous communities of the Brazilian Amazon have legal title to 13.8% of the national territory totalling 1.175 million km2, with a total of 631 territories.<ref>Federal government of Brazil (2024). ''Brazil’s NDC: National determination to contribute and transform''. [[/unfccc.int/sites/default/files/2024-11/Brazil Second Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) November2024.pdf|https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/2024-11/Brazil_Second%20Nationally%20Determined%20Contribution%20%28NDC%29_November2024.pdf]]</ref>

TABLE

Whilst Indigenous communities in Brazil have legal title to land, it is the State that owns it. Indigenous people simply exercise permanent tenure over lands that they traditionally occupy and have ‘original rights’ to these traditional lands, which no other rights can prevail over.<ref name=":3" /> Indigenous lands, though not classified as protected areas, “have the highest level of protection by law because they are regulated by the Constitution” and cannot be leased or restricted without violating their original rights. The Suruí's right to develop the PCFS is grounded in the Brazilian Constitution, which grants Indigenous peoples exclusive rights to use the ‘riches of the soil, rivers and lakes’ of their land, and these rights cannot be overridden. Thus, Indigenous people and only Indigenous people are legally allowed to engage in productive activities on their land, provided these activities are conducted according to their own customs and traditions and are necessary for the wellbeing and cultural expression of their own people. In Brazil, it is the armed forces and federal police that are responsible for enforcing these laws, and FUNAI is responsible for representing Indigenous communities in judicial disputes.<ref name=":3" /> As such, provided a REDD+ does not violate the rights to territorial integrity, permanent land tenure and original rights, it is legally allowed.

'''CARBON RIGHTS:''' In Brazil, carbon rights are tied to forest rights.<ref name=":2" /> Carbon credits from REDD+ projects are seen as part of the economic benefits derived from indigenous lands, and as such, Indigenous communities are entitled to own, control and distribute these revenues themselves. The carbon credits generated from the (SFCP) were wholly owned by the Suruí people through Metareilá, with the Suruí Fund (managed by the Brazilian Biodiversity Fund - FUNBIO) acting as recipient. This legality reinforces Indigenous control over both land and carbon rights, as whoever has rights to the forest land is usually recognized as the owner of carbon rights.<ref name=":3" />

'''FPIC OBLIGATION:''' Furthermore, Brazilian law requires Free, Prior, and Informed Consent (FPIC) for REDD+ projects affecting indigenous lands, ensuring that international standards such as the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) and ILO Convention No. 169 are adhered to; Indigenous consent is, ''de jure,'' a necessity. Projects that violate these rights and fail to consult communities are therefore considered illegal. Notably there are no specific rules or procedures that have been written into the Brazilian constitution that provide guidance on how to achieve FPIC. This freedom reinforces Indigenous autonomy as it allows an Indigenous community to define the rules of consultation according to their customs and traditions.

Collectively these national and international laws provide an important safeguard to Indigenous peoples, making their consent a prerequisite for the establishment of REDD+ projects and recognizing their rights as the main beneficiaries of REDD+ revenues.<ref name=":3" /> However, as carbon rights are tied to forest rights in Brazil and not land rights, carbon is considered to be an ‘environmental service’ (Article 41(I)(A) Brazilian Forestry Code), and states, as well as the federal government, have the jurisdiction to exercise full legislative authority over carbon. <ref name=":2" /> As such, certain states have interpreted the law to imply that the title to carbon credits is attributable to the state.<ref>Loft, L., Ravikumar, A., Gebara, M. F., Pham, T. T., Resosudarmo, I. A. P., Assembe, S., Tovar, J. G., Mwangi, E., & Andersson, K. (2015). Taking Stock of Carbon Rights in REDD+ Candidate Countries: Concept Meets Reality. ''Forests'', ''6''(4), 1031-1060. [[/doi.org/10.3390/f6041031|https://doi.org/10.3390/f6041031]]</ref> Hence, even when carbon rights are clearly defined and tied to forest title it is insufficient in itself, and only by legally recognizing the customary rights of IPLCs can a fair and equitable outcome be realised.

====Interested and affected stakeholders====
TABLE
====Discussion====
Although originally successful in achieving its goal of reducing deforestation and degradation, in 2016 diamonds were discovered in Surui territory, leading to an increase in illegal logging and mining.<ref name=":1" /> By 2018 the project site had been completely overrun by ''garimpeiros'' (small-scale gold miners), ultimately leading to the projects suspension that year. <ref name=":4" />

While the project had initially garnered support, divisions emerged within the community post-project implementation. Disputes arose over the unequal distribution of project revenues, leading to internal conflicts between different Suruí clans. These criticisms escalated in 2014 when the Catholic Indigenous Missionary Council supported calls for an end to the project due to mismanagement of revenues from carbon credit sales. <ref name=":3" /> Some Suruí members also argued that the REDD+ initiative harmed their way of life.<ref>Lang, C. (2014). ''“What are projects for that destroy life?” Interview with Henrique Suruí about the Paiter-Suruí REDD project, Brazil.'' REDD-Monitor. [[/redd-monitor.org/2014/12/17/what-are-projects-for-that-destroy-life-interview-with-henrique-surui-about-the-paiter-surui-redd-project-brazil/|https://redd-monitor.org/2014/12/17/what-are-projects-for-that-destroy-life-interview-with-henrique-surui-about-the-paiter-surui-redd-project-brazil/]]</ref>

Further complicating the situation was the controversial role of Henrique Suruí, one of the Suruí tribal leaders. In 2011, it was revealed that Henrique had violated the tribe's logging moratorium, collaborating with loggers in illegal activities. While Henrique later denied responsibility for the project’s failure, his actions, combined with internal disagreements, illustrated the lack of consensus within the Suruí leadership on the project’s goals and outcomes. Both of the tribe’s leaders possessed dramatically different perspectives on how they believed they could ensure agency, autonomy, and economic benefits for the Suruí people.<ref name=":4" /> This fragmentation within the community, in combination with the discovery of diamonds and the state's failure to protect indigenous land rights led to the indefinite suspension of the REDD+ project.

The project's collapse highlights broader structural issues, particularly the state's inconsistent support for indigenous land rights, influenced by settler colonialism, which undermined the project’s long-term viability.<ref name=":4" /> Additionally, the project’s creation was shaped by external actors, including the collaboration between Almir Suruí and Borges from Forest Trends, a Washington-based NGO. This partnership introduced a Western perspective on viewing the Suruí peoples forest, in contrast with their own perspectives on land use and governance. Furthermore, despite Borges’ Brazilian background, the power dynamics between a global North organization and a developing, Indigenous community were apparent.

====Summary====
The Suruí Forest Carbon Project provides an interesting example of how, even when the rights of IPLC’s are relatively robust, challenges persist in ensuring REDD+ project longevity. As such, in its current state, REDD+ in the Brazilian Amazon may not be a suitable market-based option for indigenous communities in the Amazon.<ref name=":3" /> Although initially successful in promoting indigenous autonomy and reducing deforestation, the project resulted in failure due to of a myriad of factors. Division between Surui communities was exacerbated by a perceived unequal benefit-sharing, and the impact of imposing REDD+ seems to have complicated the traditional social structure that the Surui were dependent on. These issues were influenced by Brazil's settler state dynamics, where indigenous land rights, although legally recognized, are often not upheld in practice due to insufficient enforcement.<ref name=":4" /> Ultimately, the Surui project reveals how settler colonialism's structural flaws make long-term project success difficult, despite initial progress in promoting indigenous autonomy.

At the national and state level, complex institutional and legal land governance structures convolute and impede REDD+ in Brazil. Multiple institutions share responsibilities and there is no comprehensive, authoritative database of land ownership, which hampers efforts to protect indigenous territories.<ref name=":5">Costa, R. (2016)''. Insecure land rights in Brazil: Consequences for rural areas and challenges for improvement.'' Climate Policy Initiative. [[/www.climatepolicyinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/Insecure Land Rights in Brazil CPI.pdf|https://www.climatepolicyinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/Insecure_Land_Rights_in_Brazil_CPI.pdf]]</ref> As a result, land tenure disputes remain common and can be witnessed occurring between the public as well between public and state actors. For example, Brazil’s 1964 Land Statute (Law No. 4504) allows the government to takeover unproductive farms and transfer those lands to landless peasants. This often results in the clearing of forest, as only when the land is cleared is it evidenced to be ‘productive’.<ref name=":5" /> Hence, not only does this law cause insecurity for Indigenous populations in Brazil, it also forces them to go against customary traditions of stewarding the land in an effort to maintain its control.

Whilst the aforementioned points to the futility of REDD+ in Brazil, there is reason to maintain optimism. In a recent landmark ruling Brazil’s supreme court voted in favour of the Xoleng peoples, and the decision will serve as a precedent for all cases involving Indigenous peoples.<ref name=":6">Amos-Flom, K., (2023). ''Triumph and Turmoil: The Xokleng Case and the Future of Indigenous Land Rights in Brazil.'' Columbia Journal of Transnational Law. [[/www.jtl.columbia.edu/bulletin-blog/triumph-and-turmoil-the-xokleng-case-and-the-future-of-indigenous-land-rights-in-brazil|https://www.jtl.columbia.edu/bulletin-blog/triumph-and-turmoil-the-xokleng-case-and-the-future-of-indigenous-land-rights-in-brazil]]</ref> The Xokleng’s land dispute, settled in 2023, “rejected Santa Catarina state’s marco temporal (“time limit”) argument, which would have required Indigenous people to prove they occupied or legally contested the territory they claimed before the Brazilian Constitution came into force in 1988. If successful, this argument would have led to disastrous repercussions, as many indigenous peoples had been forcibly removed or are traditionally nomadic.”<ref name=":6" /> Whilst slow, progress has been made in Brazil in recent years with respect to Indigenous rights as well as the voluntary carbon market itself.

There are currently 159 AFOLU projects listed on the Verra database in Brazil, with only two specifically focused on REDD+ initiatives in collaboration with Indigenous groups. These are the Ka’a Pyahu project, <ref>Verra (n.d.) ''Project 5087: KA'A PYAHU.'' https://registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/5087</ref> initiated by the Guajajara Indigenous people in collaboration with external organizations and validated in 2021, and the ‘Together for the forest Awaete REDD+ project’<ref>Verra (n.d.) ''Project 5200: TOGETHER FOR THE FOREST AWAETÉ REDD+ PROJECT.'' https://registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/5200</ref> which is still under development. Both projects involve Indigenous groups working with Brazilian organizations to build technical capacity and expertise. This could signal a growing trend of Indigenous-led REDD+ projects in the future. To ensure a positive future for REDD+ in Brazil, the customary rights of IPLC’s must be formally recognized. IPLC should have legal ownership of their traditional lands, and in doing so the carbon rights of these communities would be less convoluted, leading to more equitable benefit-sharing and increased cohesion amongst these groups post-project implementation.

To ensure a positive future for REDD+ in Brazil, the customary rights of IPLC’s must be formally recognized. IPLC should have legal ownership of their traditional lands, and in doing so the carbon rights of these communities would be less convoluted, leading to more equitable benefit-sharing and increased cohesion amongst these groups post-project implementation.

==Colombia: ''REDD+ project Resguardo Indigena Unificado - Selva de Mataven (RUI-SM)''==
'''Project description and location'''

According to the PD,<ref name=":7">ACATISEMA & Mediamos (2017). ''Joint project description and monitoring report: REDD+ project: Resguardo Indigena Unificado – Selva de Mataven (RIU – SM).'' Link: “10 06 2017_VCS Final Report_ Matavin Project.pdf” found at [[/registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/1566|https://registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/1566]]</ref> the Resguardo Indígena Unificado – Selva de Matavén (RIU-SM) project is located east of the Colombian Orinoco high plain, in the eastern part of the Department of Vichada, municipality of Cumaribo. It resides on the formalized resguardo of the Sikuani, Piaroa, Puinave, Curripaco, Cubeo and Piapoco ethnic groups, spanning 1,856,836 hectares, with 1,477,115 hectares (79.6%) being forested. The project states that it will reduce greenhouse gas emissions, with a total estimated net reduction of 108,670,562 tons of CO2 equivalent over thirty years, from years 2013 – 2042. By this metric, it is the 14th largest project on the Verra registry, out of over 1700 projects.<ref name=":9">Dufrasne, D., (2021). ''Two Shades of Green: How hot air forest credits are being used to avoid carbon taxes in Colombia''. Carbon Market Watch. [[/carbonmarketwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Two-shades-of-green EN WEB.pdf|https://carbonmarketwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Two-shades-of-green_EN_WEB.pdf]]</ref> There are 12,312 indigenous people living in the RIU-SM, belonging to 2,517 families and 250 communities as of 2017.

The project was initiated and developed by the Asociación de Cabildos y Autoridades Indígenas de la Selva de Matavén (ACETISMA), an Indigenous association, and MEDIAMOS F&M, a Colombian consultancy firm. ACETISMA is comprised of Indigenous leaders that represent the 17 communities of the reservation in charge of governing the territory, and it has administrative autonomy, as well as “the capacity to acquire, to own and to dispose of property, to accept donations, to hold national and international conventions, scientific and cultural exchanges and generally, to celebrate all kinds of negotiations and agreements with which the Association can achieve its objectives.”<ref name=":7" />

There is a stated focus on various means of improving the living conditions of the Indigenous peoples living within the project area. To summarise, the main objectives of the REDD+ project RIU-SM include:

· Community development, in the form of improved education.

· Community engagement with respect to the project; developing information channels to reveal project progress.

· Support local initiatives for environmental education and waste management.

· Developing an effective response system that addresses community proposals and concerns relating to the project.

· Strengthening the governance of ACATISEMA.

====National climate targets, policies and legislation====
The Colombian Amazon makes up over one-third of Colombia’s national territory, and up until 2005 only 7.3% of the Colombian Amazon had been deforested, largely due to the country's 60-year armed conflict between the government, multiple left-wing guerillas such as FARC, and several far-right paramilitary groups.<ref name=":8" /> However, following the signing of the Peace Treaty in 2016 and demobilization of the FARC, limits to deforestation were weakened in the Colombian Amazon. Poor but opportunistic peasants began to encroach into previously unchartered territory and capitalize from the rainforest. Due to the poor economic integration of the Amazon, many were forced to engage with the traditional economies of cocoa and cattle ranching, as these markets were already well connected to regional and global markets.<ref name=":8" /> To address the drivers of deforestation and its associated emissions, the federal government has implemented various initiatives, which are summarized below:
{| class="wikitable"
|'''Document name'''
|'''Type (target, policy or legislation)'''
|'''Publication year'''
|'''Key takeaways'''
|-
|
|Target
|?
|Reduce GHG emissions by 51 % by 2030.
|-
|
|Target
|?
|Net zero by 2050
|-
|National Climate Change Policy (PNCC)
|
|2018
|
|-
|National Forest Conservation Program
|
|2011
|
|-
|Law 1931 of 2018 – Climate Change Law

|
|2018
|
|-
| colspan="4" |Relating to REDD+
|-
|National Strategy for Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (ENREDD+).”
|
|2009
|
|-
|Amazon Indigenous REDD+ Initiative
|
|2012
|
|-
|USAID's Colombia BIOREDD+ program
|
|
|Develop a portfolio of 8 REDD+ projects in four geographic nodes covering over 700,000 hectares in the Colombian Pacific.

|-
|Vision Amazonia
|
|2015
|part of the REDD+ strategy in the country financed by three foreign countries: Germany, Norway and United Kingdom
|}
As a result of the many fund and market-based initiatives that Colombia has engaged with, it hosts the second most REDD+ projects in the world. REDD+ projects now cover at least 56% of the area of legally recognized Indigenous territories in the Colombian Amazon, with an overwhelming majority of carbon projects located on Indigenous territories.<ref name=":10">Schmid, D., & Castro. C., (2023). ''REDD+ projects in the Colombian Amazon: Social challenges and lack of transparency''. Rainforest Foundation Norway. [[/dv719tqmsuwvb.cloudfront.net/documents/REDD rapport 2024 ENG.pdf|https://dv719tqmsuwvb.cloudfront.net/documents/REDD_rapport_2024_ENG.pdf]]</ref> Evidently REDD+ plays an integral part in the country’s efforts of environmental conservation, and incentives have been introduced to promote the development of such projects. For example, in 2016 the government adopted a higher tax that covered fossil fuels, but companies are able to avoid paying the tax by investing in carbon offsets that have been generated domestically.<ref name=":9" /> This led to a boost in the domestic REDD+ market in 2017, as Colombian companies invested as to escape higher taxes. Notably, 23 of the 36 REDD+ projects currently under development in the Amazon region have been initiated in or after 2018.<ref name=":10" /> Currently Colombia’s REDD+ program sits at over 45 pilot and voluntary carbon projects, as well as one large-scale jurisdictional approach in the Amazon.<ref name=":11">Zambrano-Cortés, D. G. (2024). ''The politics, spaces and subjects of forest conservation in Colombia''. [internal PhD, WU, Wageningen University]. Wageningen University. [[/doi.org/10.18174/675328|https://doi.org/10.18174/675328]]</ref>

====Indigenous rights - Constitutional, tenure and bundle rights====
''De jure'', the Indigenous peoples of Colombia have comprehensive tenure and bundle rights that have been articulated in the national constitution. Collective land titles are granted to Indigenous communities by the Colombian government, and as a result about 34 percent of Colombian land (almost 38 million hectares) is legally recognized as Indigenous territory or collective lands of Afro-descendent communities. (Schmid & Castro, 2023) These collective land tenure rights have been in effect since the implementation of the 1991 constitution, granting them the authority to exercise legal control over their territories in accordance with their own customs and procedures.<ref>Max Planck Institute (n.d.) ''Colombia 1991 (rev. 2015).'' Institute. [[/www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Colombia 2015|https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Colombia_2015]]</ref> Furthermore, the carbon rights of Indigenous peoples are explicitly defined in the constitution and tied specifically to the ownership of land of the communities.<ref name=":2" /> This in theory provides a solid legal basis for upholding the rights of Indigenous communities in Colombia, specifically relating to REDD+ activities, as it allows communities to define and negotiate the terms of said projects. A summary of the various laws relating to Indigenous rights have been summarized below:
{| class="wikitable"
| colspan="2" |'''Laws'''
|-
| colspan="2" |'''1991 constitution'''
|-
|Article 63

|Indigenous territories are considered collective property. This means that land is not owned by individuals but is shared by the community. The state must respect these collective rights and cannot alter land ownership without the consent of the Indigenous peoples.
|-
|Article 330
|Indigenous communities have the right to govern their territories.
|-
|Article 76 - ''Consulta previa''.
|Pertains to the right of Indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities to prior consultation before the government or private companies undertake activities that may affect their territories, culture, or way of life.

|-
|Article 63 and 329
|The Reservation is a collective, inalienable, and indefeasible property.
|-
|Decree 1386 of 1994, Article 10; Decree 2164 of 1995, Article 22) 39.
|The administration and management of these lands are subjected to uses and customs of the beneficiaries
|}
Whilst land and tenure rights are enshrined into the constitution, the precariousness of these rights persists due to a lack of resources to ensure enforcement, as well as the deeper issue of corruption. As previously stated, the rate of deforestation increased significantly in Colombia’s post-conflict era, evidencing the nations inability to maintain control over unlawful acts of land-grabbing and disposition. Whilst this began with new peasants converting the Amazon for subsistence purposes, it ultimately led to new areas for the growth of cocoa, much to the benefit of narco-traffickers who could monopolize on this illegal surplus in ‘accumulation by dispossession’.<ref name=":8" />

With respect to the legalities of consultation, Colombia has enshrined ''consulta previa'' into the constitution. Translating to ‘prior consultation’, this legal text provides the formal grounds for Indigenous engagement when any legislative or administrative measures are implemented on Indigenous territory. Importantly, consultation should be achieved in accordance with the customs of the ethnic group with which the project is being imposed upon. However, there have been recent cases of contestation specifically relating to how ''consulta previa'' applies to REDD+ on Indigenous lands, and the RIU – SM project was one that was involved with such a case.

====Interested and affected stakeholders====
{| class="wikitable"
| colspan="5" |'''Affected stakeholders'''
|-
|Stakeholders
|Primary objective(s)
|Secondary objective(s)
|Relative power
|Scope of influence
|-
|ACATISEMA - Asociación de Cabildos y Autoridades Indígenas de la Selva de Matavén
|the Indigenous association comprised of Indigenous leaders in representation of the 16 communities of the reservation in charge of governing the territory.

foster the integral development, social and cultural preservation of the indigenous communities in the Mataven Jungle and to consolidate the territory, selfgovernment by partners, the defense, conservation and preservation of the environment and biodiversity of the Mataven Jungle (ACATISEMA, 2010)

|
|It is the highest authority in the reservation.
|
|-
|MEDIAMOS F&M – A consultancy
|Project developer
|
|
|
|-
|Communities of indigenous peoples of the RIU-SM
|<nowiki>- Primary and direct beneficiaries.</nowiki>
|
|
|
|-
|Teachers of primary and secondary basic education indigenous Reservation
|
|
|
|
|-
|Colonists
|
|
|
|
|-
| colspan="5" |'''Interested stakeholders'''
|-
|Mining Companies and individuals
|Compete with the Project for the territory's resources.
|
|
|
|-
|Ministerio de Ambiente y Desarrollo Sostenible

- Direct participation
|Its main interest is to achieve environmental planning, through the consolidation of a policy of sustainable development and strategic alliances with social and institutional participants in different sectoral and territorial scenarios.
|
|
|
|-
|Dirección de Asuntos Indígenas, ROM y Minorías - Ministerio del Interior

Direct participation
|Public agency that advises the national level, prepares and proposes the formulation of public policy in favor of indigenous peoples within the framework of the defense, support, reinforcement and consolidation of ethnic and cultural rights.
|
|
|
|-
|Corporinoquía

Direct participation
|Regional environmental authority to ensure the proper use of natural resources in their area of jurisdiction.
|
|
|
|-
|Other government institutions: Governor ofice of Vichada, Mayor ofice Cumaribo

Direct participation
|The Reservation for being part of the Cumaribo, Vichada, has territorial jurisdiction relations with the Governor’s office and the Mayor’s office.
|
|
|
|-
|Fundación NATURA

Direct participation
|Civil organization whose mission is the conservation, use and management of biodiversity to generate social, economic and environmental benefits in the context of sustainable human development.
|
|
|
|-
|FONDO ACCIÓN

Direct participation
|Colombian non-profit organization in the private scheme. Encourage the participation of civil society and the private sector in the implementation of the country’s public policies in two areas: - Conservation and sustainable development; and protection -development of children.
|
|
|
|-
|SENA, Department of Social Prosperity (DPS), NGOs and private consultants
|Connected to the area - supporting the implementation of rural development activities.
|
|
|
|-
|Other indigenous communities neighboring RIU-SM
|
|
|
|
|-
|Financial institutions
|They fund local development activities.
|
|
|
|-
|Asocarbono – An industry association, including Verra, ProClima, Biofix, and ACATISEMA.

|
|
|
|
|-
|OPIAC: the National Oganization of the Indigenous Peoples of the Colombian Amazon

|
|
|
|
|}

====Discussion====
According to the official REDD+ Mataven website<ref>RIU – SM (n.d.). ''REDD+ Mataven''. [[/reddmataven.com/|https://reddmataven.com/]]</ref> the project has resulted in a myriad of benefits to the Indigenous communities of the region. For example, as a result of the funds generated from the projects activities, there have been improvements in infrastructure, transportation and education, ultimately leading to the empowerment and improved governance of ACETISMA. However, the project has come under fire for multiple reasons.

For one, in 2015 some of the Indigenous communities filed a lawsuit referring to the violation of their right to ''consulta previa''. However, the court ruled that their Indigenous rights had not been violated as it was ACETISMA that initially sought MEDIAMOS to develop the project, and that ACETISMA were the best representatives of those Indigenous communities. Furthermore, the projects main focus was the conservation of the rainforest and therefore did not threaten the cultural integrity of those communities.<ref name=":10" /> However, regardless of the outcome of this case, its occurrence points to internal disagreement amongst Indigenous participants of the RIU-SM project. In a study involving interviews with Indigenous members of the project, there was a significant proportion of interviewees that had little knowledge regarding various aspects of the project, such as responsibilities of participation, or the benefit-sharing mechanism in place.<ref name=":2" /> This further reinforces the point that, in the case of the RIU-SM project it may not be ‘bottom-up’ and eludes to the power imbalance experienced between the project developer Mediamos and Indigenous community members. In the PD there does exist a breakdown of the distribution of income between ACETISMA, the Indigenous association, and Mediamos, the project developer, which shows a significant proportion of revenue flowing to the former organisation throughout the project’s operations<ref name=":7" /> However, there is currently no publicly available documentation supporting this initial claim<ref name=":9" /> as there is no obligation to do so, leading to a general lack of transparency in the market, and between all of the relevant actors. Subsequent meetings with Indigenous leaders have however shown a marked support of the Mataven project, with one Indigenous leader explicitly stating “...the Redd+ project has brought resources that they never had before, which allowed them to open new school classrooms, 21 rural aqueducts, cocoa crops and even headquarters in Cumaribo and Inírida.”<ref>Lievano, A. B. (2021) Colombia's biggest carbon credit project could be selling hot air. Latin American Center for Investigative Journalism. [[/www.elclip.org/el-mayor-proyecto-de-bonos-de-carbono-de-colombia-podria-estar-vendiendo-aire-caliente/|https://www.elclip.org/el-mayor-proyecto-de-bonos-de-carbono-de-colombia-podria-estar-vendiendo-aire-caliente/]] </ref> Clearly there have been benefits for IPLC’s involved with this project, though the details of this benefit-sharing remain a mystery.

Secondly, the Mataven project has caused controversy due to its apparently inflated carbon credit issuance. This has been achieved by using a reference area that is not representative of the project area, as well as assuming an uncharacteristically heigh assumed rate of deforestation.<ref name=":12">Global Atlas of Environmental Justice (2023). ''Resguardo Indigena Unificado-Selva de Matavén (RIU SM) REDD+ Project, Colombia.'' [[/ejatlas.org/conflict/redd-project-resguardo-indigena-unificado-selva-de-mataven-riu-sm|https://ejatlas.org/conflict/redd-project-resguardo-indigena-unificado-selva-de-mataven-riu-sm]]</ref> The project used a baseline deforestation rate of 0.86% per year, which is significantly more than the Colombian government's national rate of 0.18%. Additionally, according to the report the reference area chosen is more easily accessed and therefore more prone to deforestation, making it an inaccurate comparison to the relatively remote project area.<ref name=":2" /> This has led to the creation of excess carbon credits, or “hot air” credits, which have been criticized for not reflecting real environmental benefits.<ref name=":9" /> To add further insult to injury these credits have been used by a Colombian fossil fuel distributor company to avoid paying taxes, as described earlier by Colombia’s change in policy in 2017. In doing so, the company avoided paying approximately $18.9 million in taxes.<ref name=":2" /> There has been subsequent back and forth between Verra and Carbon Market Watch, with Verra refuting the claims<ref>Verra (2021). ''Carbon Market Watch Report on Colombian REDD+ Projects Contains Flawed Allegations.'' [[/verra.org/carbon-market-watch-report-on-colombian-redd-projects-contains-flawed-allegations/|https://verra.org/carbon-market-watch-report-on-colombian-redd-projects-contains-flawed-allegations/]] </ref> Regardless of the science, Colombia recently introduced a resolution in 2018 (Resolution 1447 – 2018) that requires projects to use baselines that comply with national reference levels.<ref name=":13">Dufrasne, D. (2021b). Companies use ”hot air” forestry offsets to avoid taxes in Colombia: Carbon Market Watch’s fact-check of Verra’s response. Carbon Market Watch. [[/carbonmarketwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/CMWs-fact-check-of-Verras-response-on-Colombia.pdf|https://carbonmarketwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/CMWs-fact-check-of-Verras-response-on-Colombia.pdf]]</ref><ref>IEA (2022). ''Resolution 1447 – 2018. Monitoring, Reporting, and Verification System for mitigation actions at the national level.'' International Energy Agency. [[/www.iea.org/policies/14772-resolution-1447-2018-monitoring-reporting-and-verification-system-for-mitigation-actions-at-the-national-level|https://www.iea.org/policies/14772-resolution-1447-2018-monitoring-reporting-and-verification-system-for-mitigation-actions-at-the-national-level]]</ref> Going forward, REDD+ projects that are being implemented in Colombia will have to abide by Colombia’s national legislation.

====Summary====
Colombia has a long history of engaging in REDD+ as it has been used to limit environmental degradation in the post-conflict era, in alignment with the country’s national peacebuilding agenda.<ref name=":11" /> Owing to the country’s comprehensive tenure and bundle rights, IPLC’s have robust ''de jure'' rights to land as they collectively own it, and rights to carbon are tied to this ownership. This puts Colombia as one of the world leaders in legal terms relating to REDD+ project implementation, but due to a lack of resources to ensure enforcement, as well as corruption, historically these laws have not been adhered to.<ref name=":10" /><ref name=":2" /> There are many documented cases showing the displacement on IPLC’s from traditional lands, poor efforts to adhere to ''consulta previa'', and inequitable benefit sharing.<ref>Greenfield, P. (2023''). The ‘carbon pirates’ preying on Amazon’s Indigenous communities.'' The Guardian. [[/www.theguardian.com/environment/2023/jan/21/amazon-indigenous-communities-carbon-offsetting-pirates-aoe|https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2023/jan/21/amazon-indigenous-communities-carbon-offsetting-pirates-aoe]]</ref><ref name=":14">Lang, C., (2024). ''Colombia’s Constitutional Court rules in favour of Indigenous Peoples. Identifies serious flaws in the REDD+ Baka Rokarire project.'' REDD_Monitor. [[/reddmonitor.substack.com/p/colombias-constitutional-court-rules|https://reddmonitor.substack.com/p/colombias-constitutional-court-rules]]</ref>

The case of the Mataven project provides an interesting example of how it is the market itself that is failing to address concerns regarding transparency, whether that be relating to benefit-sharing amongst relevant stakeholders, or Indigenous representation and engagement throughout the implementation of REDD+ projects. Some ACATISEMA members have explicitly stated their support for the Mataven project,<ref name=":12" /> and its benefits can be seen first-hand in the form of improved infrastructure in local communities involved with the project.<ref>Myers, J. E., Parra, M. A., Bedford, C. (2021). ''How Carbon Offsetting Can Build a Forest.'' Stanford Social Innovation Review. [[/ssir.org/articles/entry/how carbon offsetting can build a forest|https://ssir.org/articles/entry/how_carbon_offsetting_can_build_a_forest]]</ref> However, an exact breakdown of how and where revenue is being distributed to IPLC’s remains elusive.<ref name=":13" /> Furthermore, the level of IPLC engagement has come into question, specifically with reference to ''consulta previa'' and the overall understanding that IPLC’s have regarding the project’s intended outcomes and activities.<ref name=":10" /> This is not a rare case in Colombia and has been witnessed occurring with other projects that have been implemented on Indigenous territories in the Colombian Amazon.<ref name=":17">Lang, C., (2023''). “It destroys everything,” says Indigenous leader about the REDD+ Baka Rokarire project in Colombia''. REDD Monitor. [[/reddmonitor.substack.com/p/it-destroys-everything-says-indigenous|https://reddmonitor.substack.com/p/it-destroys-everything-says-indigenous]]</ref> However, a recent ruling by the Colombian Constitutional court voted in favour of Indigenous groups in Colombia, upholding “the rights to self-determination, autonomy, self-government, territory, identity, physical and cultural integrity, and free, prior and informed consent of the indigenous communities”.<ref name=":14" /> This review ultimately sets a legal precedent safeguarding the fundamental rights of IPLCs with REDD+ project implementation and shows that progress is being made to improve the likelihood that REDD+ will result in genuine benefits to those affected by project implementation.

To ensure a more authentic engagement with IPLC’s as to result in legitimate and equitable benefit-sharing, improvements must be made by the Colombian government, as well as within the VCM itself. For the former, Colombia’s national registry for GHG mitigation activities must be updated; it has been offline since 2022.<ref name=":10" /> As a result, transparency is lacking. International finance could be utilized as to alleviate this issue, and only with an accurate and reliable database may the market be regulated. In the broader sense, VCM registries must create stricter guidelines promoting transparency. Often PD’s refer to annexed documents that contain relevant information regarding benefit-sharing, though these are often not publicly available.<ref name=":9" /> This limits transparency and increases the likelihood of inequitable agreements being made between project proponents and developers, further exacerbating existing power asymmetries between the two groups and limiting the likelihood that ''consulta previa'' is honestly adhered to.<ref name=":10" /> This has led to conflict within Indigenous communities, rather than a strengthening of their social fabric.

Furthermore, the Mataven project calls into question the actual emissions reduction that REDD+ projects achievce. Whilst Colombia has since updated its regulations such that REDD+ must use baselines that comply with national reference levels, it is up in the air as to how representative these guidelines are. Reference areas must represent project areas and without the appropriate regulations in place project developers lack the incentive to create realistic baselines; ultimately they are aiming to produce the maximum number of credits as to generate the greatest possible revenues.

==Conclusion==
As a market-based mechanism, REDD+ is shackled by the construct in which it operates; fundamentally it is a capitalist means of fixing a capitalist problem, which comes with limitations. Both Brazil and Colombia have relatively robust laws that have been written into the constitution, ultimately promoting more equitable results post project implementation. However, as in Colombia IPLC’s collectively own the land, whereas in Brazil these groups only own rights to use the land,<ref name=":2" /> Colombia can be considered better equipped for the establishment of REDD+ projects on traditional Indigenous territory. However, even with these laws in place enforcement remain a matter of concern. Furthermore, given the wide variety of ontological and epistemological perspectives of Indigenous communities, and how these views conflict with the Western worldview from which market-based REDD+ came to fruition, there is an inherent difficulty in implementing a system of governance in REDD+ on Indigenous lands.<ref name=":1" />. Putting a price on nature conflicts with Indigenous perspectives and there have been instances where this has attacked the social and cultural fabric of IPLC’s;<ref name=":17" /> to avoid this REDD+ developers must have the genuine intent of understanding the perspective of the Indigenous group they are working with and aim to implement REDD+ with a bottom-up approach.

In both countries, transparency must be improved to ensure that FPIC is adhered to and subsequently ensure fair IPLC representation and engagement. This issue predominantly arises due to the poor requirements of standards in the VCM. As such, proponents are guided by developers which have little incentive to truly act in the interests of Indigenous groups; ultimately the organizations in charge of project development are interested in increasing project revenues. This has led to instances of over-crediting, as without a transparent framework in which to operate it is difficult to evaluate the legitimacy of the claims being made by project proponents and developers. However, with recent advances that address concerns of additionality<ref name=":15" /> there is hope for improved market integrity. Standards of the VCM must continue to be scrutinized to ensure that progress continues to be made.

Going forward, progress should be made to formalize the customary laws and traditional lands of IPLCs, and finance should be directed towards the enforcement of these laws. The environmental,<ref name=":16" /> economic,<ref name=":5" /><ref>Ding, H., Veit, P. G., Blackman, A., Gray, E., Reytar, K., Altamirano, J. C., Hodgdon, B., (2016). ''Climate benefits, tenure costs: The economic case for securing Indigenous land rights in the Amazon''. WRI. [[/files.wri.org/d8/s3fs-public/Climate Benefits Tenure Costs Executive Summary.pdf|https://files.wri.org/d8/s3fs-public/Climate_Benefits_Tenure_Costs_Executive_Summary.pdf]]</ref> and social<ref>Sarmiento Barletti, J. P., Heise Vigil, N., & Larson, A. M. (2023). ''Safeguards at a glance: Are voluntary standards supporting community land, resource and carbon rights?'' CIFOR-ICRAF. [[/www.cifor-icraf.org/publications/pdf files/Flyer/REDD-Safeguards-7.pdf|https://www.cifor-icraf.org/publications/pdf_files/Flyer/REDD-Safeguards-7.pdf]] </ref> benefits of this have been researched and are well understood. By developing culturally appropriate frameworks for rights-based conservation regimes, that work with IPLCs in accordance with their worldviews, REDD+ could be used to promote Indigenous autonomy. However, much progress still must be made to achieve this goal.

==References==

Documentation:Open Case Studies/FRST522/2024/REDD+ in Indigenous Amazonia: What works and what doesn’t?

2024-12-12T21:21:42Z

ConnorHaynes: /* Conclusion */

__TOC__

==Positionality==
First and foremost I am not Indigenous, and whilst there are a myriad of cultures, ontologies and epistemologies that are not sufficiently represented by simply stating ‘Indigenous’, it is commonly accepted that these worldviews are vastly different to those of the ‘Western’ world, which is the world in which I grew up and matured. I am therefore only understanding of Indigenous cultures, beliefs and customary laws based upon available online literature and those which I have learnt through life, in addition to those introduced to me in my Master’s degree. As such, I will never be able to fully relate to an Indigenous person; the best I can do is try to understand and learn. Only throughout this process am I able to work towards reconciliation and attempt to address the inequities experienced by Indigenous folk globally.

Additionally, I am yet to act as a carbon project proponent and so do not understand the nuances or stresses of undertaking such a task. Whilst an individual proponent may have the best intention of procuring a carbon project for its social and environmental benefits, there are a number of stakeholders involved throughout the entire process which influence its eventual outcome. Without experience acting as a project proponent I am naïve in understanding the overall process and it's difficulties.

==Acronyms / Terminology==
AFOLU: Agriculture, Forestry and Other Land-Use

ICVCM: Integrity Council for the Voluntary Carbon Market

IPLC: Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities

KMGBF: Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework

LAC: Latin American Countries

MRV: Monitoring, Reporting and Verification

REDD+: Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation

UNCBD: United Nations Convention on Biological Biodiversity

VCMI: Voluntary Carbon Markets Integrity Initiative

''Additionality:'' Additionality is the determination of whether the project will lead to the expected outcomes when compared to the baseline or ‘business as usual’ emissions.

''Leakage'': Refers to the shifting of emissions to outside the project boundary as a result of the project’s activities.

''Permanence:'' Permanence refers to the degree to which a carbon credit is equivalent to a permanent removal or reduction in emissions.
==Abstract==
This case study illustrates two examples of Indigenous-led REDD+ projects on Indigenous territory in Colombia and Brazil. Both countries have a relatively long history of engaging with REDD+ but have slightly different legal structures pertaining to the rights of Indigenous peoples in their traditional territories, as well as IPLC’s ‘carbon’ rights. As such, the intention is to evaluate how these differing ''de jure'' rights translate on the ground. With respect to REDD+, do certain ''de jure'' rights result in legitimately positive benefits to IPLCs, as well as the environment that these projects were originally intended to protect? To reduce inconsistency, projects were chosen that utilized the same standard, namely Verra’s ‘Verified Carbon Standard’.

The overall intention is such that the reader can evaluate the effectiveness and true benefit of REDD+ projects to IPLC’s, based upon the legal frameworks of the host country. A secondary intention is such that the reader is better equipped to conduct a prefeasibility assessment based upon available online literature, to evaluate the likelihood that REDD+ can be implemented in any chosen country, with the genuine intent of benefiting IPLC’s that are directly affected as a result of REDD+ project implementation.

==REDD+ and the VCM in Brazil and Colombia==
REDD+, originally introduced by the UNFCCC, is a market-based mechanism sitting within the VCM that aims to reverse the loss of forests and carbon stocks, specifically in developing countries. Simply put, an entity or an individual can voluntarily pay another that has engaged with REDD+ and subsequently sequestered carbon, to offset their own emissions using ‘credits’, sold as units of greenhouse gas equivalent to one ton of carbon dioxide (CO2e). Forestry and Land-Use remains to be the largest category of carbon credits traded by transaction volume on the VCM, with REDD+ being the most popular project type in this category, accounting for 78% of credits traded.<ref name=":0">Procton, A., (2024). ''State of the voluntary carbon market 2024: On the path to maturity.'' Forest Trends Ecosystem Marketplace.</ref> Furthermore, over one-third of the credits sold within this category were sourced from projects that had been implemented in LAC and the Caribbean in 2024.<ref name=":0" /> Of the four largest standards issuing carbon credits, Verra accounts for roughly 80% of issuances in Latin America,<ref>Pullins, T. (2022). Growth of carbon markets in Latin America. White & Case. [[/www.whitecase.com/publications/insight/latin-america-focus-fall-2022-growth-carbon-markets|https://www.whitecase.com/publications/insight/latin-america-focus-fall-2022-growth-carbon-markets]] </ref> and even in the face of recent scrutiny,<ref>West, T. A. P., Bofim, B., Haya, B. K. (2024). Methodological issues with deforestation baselines compromise the integrity of carbon offsets from REDD+. ''Global Environmental Change, 87'' [[/doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2024.102863|https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2024.102863]]</ref><ref>Wyburd I., & Dufrasne, G. (2023). Error Log: Exposing the methodological failures of REDD+ forestry projects. Carbon Market Watch. [[/carbonmarketwatch.org/publications/error-log-exposing-the-methodological-failures-of-redd-forestry-projects/|https://carbonmarketwatch.org/publications/error-log-exposing-the-methodological-failures-of-redd-forestry-projects/]]</ref><ref name=":15">Haya, B. K., Alford-Jones, K., Anderegg, W. R. L., Beymer-Farris, B., Blanchard, L., Bomfim, B., Chin, D., Evans, S., Hogan, M., Holm, J. A., McAfee, K., So, I. S., West, T. A. P., & Withey, L. (2023). ''Quality assessment of REDD+ carbon credit projects''. Berkeley Carbon Trading Project. [[/gspp.berkeley.edu/research-and-impact/centers/cepp/projects/berkeley-carbontrading-project/REDD+|https://gspp.berkeley.edu/research-and-impact/centers/cepp/projects/berkeley-carbontrading-project/REDD+]]</ref> REDD+ projects clearly account for a significant proportion of the VCM with their continued application likely to persist.<ref>Gordon, O. (2022). ''The interwoven fortunes of carbon markets and indigenous communities.'' Energy Monitor. [[/www.energymonitor.ai/tech/carbon-removal/the-interwoven-fortunes-of-carbon-markets-and-indigenous-communities/|https://www.energymonitor.ai/tech/carbon-removal/the-interwoven-fortunes-of-carbon-markets-and-indigenous-communities/]]</ref><ref>Müller, M., Coustar, C., Bietta, F., Mathres, M. (2022). ''UNFCCC REDD+ and the power of sovereign carbon.'' Deutsche Banke Chief Investment Office. [[/www.rainforestcoalition.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/CIO-Special-UNFCCC-REDD-power-of-sovereign-carbon.pdf|https://www.rainforestcoalition.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/CIO-Special-UNFCCC-REDD-power-of-sovereign-carbon.pdf]]</ref><ref>Pullins, T. (2022). ''Growth of carbon markets in Latin America.'' White & Case. [[/www.whitecase.com/publications/insight/latin-america-focus-fall-2022-growth-carbon-markets|https://www.whitecase.com/publications/insight/latin-america-focus-fall-2022-growth-carbon-markets]] </ref> With the introduction of updated methodologies aimed at addressing these concerns,<ref>Verra (2023a). ''Setting the Standard: Verra’s Revolutionary New REDD Methodology.'' [[/verra.org/program-notice/setting-the-standard-verras-revolutionary-new-redd-methodology/|https://verra.org/program-notice/setting-the-standard-verras-revolutionary-new-redd-methodology/]]</ref><ref>Verra (2023b). ''VM0048 Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation, v1.0.'' [[/verra.org/methodologies/vm0048-reducing-emissions-from-deforestation-and-forest-degradation-v1-0/|https://verra.org/methodologies/vm0048-reducing-emissions-from-deforestation-and-forest-degradation-v1-0/]]</ref> there is hope for renewed buyer confidence in the integrity of this market,<ref>MSCI (2023). ''Verra’s New Methodology for Unplanned Deforestation Aims to Silence the Critics''. [[/www.msci.com/www/blog-posts/verra-s-new-methodology-for/04577808942|https://www.msci.com/www/blog-posts/verra-s-new-methodology-for/04577808942]]</ref> though more work still needs to be done.

Both Colombia and Brazil have a relatively long history of implementing REDD+ projects, using both fund-based and market-based mechanisms. For example, both countries were participants in the ‘Amazon Indigenous REDD+ (RIA in Spanish) initiative, with the first pilot implementation project being initiated in Colombia’s Puiawai Natural Reserve.<ref>Garzón, E., (2017). ''Amazon Indigenous REDD+: An innovative approach to conserve Colombian forests?'' Mongabay. [[/news.mongabay.com/2017/01/amazon-indigenous-redd-an-innovative-approach-to-conserve-colombian-forests/|https://news.mongabay.com/2017/01/amazon-indigenous-redd-an-innovative-approach-to-conserve-colombian-forests/]]</ref> The relevance of these two countries with respect to REDD+ is simple. Much of the Amazon’s primary tropical rainforest falls within these countries jurisdiction and this rainforest has been consistently under threat from external pressures and encroachment, whether that be in the form of land-clearing for commercial ranching, subsistence purposes, illicit drug production or illegal mining practices,<ref name=":8">Sánchez García, P. A. & Wong, G. Y., (2024) “The political economy of deforestation in the Colombian Amazon”, ''Journal of Political Ecology'' ''31''(1), 178–199. [[/doi.org/10.2458/jpe.5230|https://doi.org/10.2458/jpe.5230]]</ref><ref>Radwin, M. (2023). ''Drug trafficking fuels other deforestation drivers in the Amazon: report.'' Mongabay. [[/news.mongabay.com/2023/07/drug-trafficking-fuels-other-deforestation-drivers-in-the-amazon-report/|https://news.mongabay.com/2023/07/drug-trafficking-fuels-other-deforestation-drivers-in-the-amazon-report/]]</ref><ref>Haddad, E.A., Araújo, I.F., Feltran-Barbieri, R., Perobelli, F. S., Rocha, A., Sass, K. S., Nobre, C. A. (2024). Economic drivers of deforestation in the Brazilian Legal Amazon. ''Nat Sustain'' ''7'', 1141–1148. [[/doi.org/10.1038/s41893-024-01387-7|https://doi.org/10.1038/s41893-024-01387-7]] </ref><ref>Hänggli, A., Levy, S. A., Armenteras, D., Bovolo, C. I., Brandão, J., Rueda, X., & Garrett, R. D. (2023). A systematic comparison of deforestation drivers and policy effectiveness across the amazon biome. ''Environmental Research Letters, 18''(7), 073001. [[/doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/acd408|https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/acd408]]</ref> to name a few.

In theory, REDD+ can be used to provide the economic incentive to promote sustained environmental protection of Indigenous land, with a focus on the rights and livelihoods of IPLCs. Currently the overall funding to IPLCs tenure rights and forest management in tropical countries is low, receiving just $270 million per year between 2011-2020 from bilateral and multilateral donors and private philanthropies.<ref>Hatcher, J., Owen, M., Yin, D., (2021). ''Falling short: Donor funding for Indigenous peoples and local communities to secure tenure rights and manage forests in tropical countries (2011 -2020).'' Rainforest Foundation Norway. [[/dv719tqmsuwvb.cloudfront.net/documents/Publikasjoner/Andre-rapporter/RFN Falling short 2021.pdf|https://dv719tqmsuwvb.cloudfront.net/documents/Publikasjoner/Andre-rapporter/RFN_Falling_short_2021.pdf]]</ref> REDD+ has the potential to channel funding as to promote Indigenous rights and autonomy, provided there is transparent and equitable benefit-sharing for those involved. Fundamentally, only with the inclusion of IPLC’s or preferably with IPLC’s acting as project proponents is REDD+ able to promote Indigenous agency and improve IPLC rights and governance. And only when the rights of those inhabiting the land are formally recognized can the land be effectively conserved.<ref name=":16">Reytar, K., Veit, P., von Braun, J. (2024). ''Protecting Biodiversity Hinges on Securing Indigenous and Community Land Rights.'' WRI. [[/www.wri.org/insights/indigenous-and-local-community-land-rights-protect-biodiversity|https://www.wri.org/insights/indigenous-and-local-community-land-rights-protect-biodiversity]]</ref> The inclusion of IPLCs in REDD+ project development is therefore considered to be essential for project success, and this is in theory embodied in the very nature of REDD+.<ref name=":1">Alvarez, G., Elfving, M. and Andrade, C. (2016) ‘REDD+ governance and indigenous peoples in Latin America: the case of Suruí Carbon Project in the Brazilian Amazon Forest’, ''Latin American J. Management for Sustainable Development 3''(2) pp.133–146. [[/dx.doi.org/10.1504/LAJMSD.2016.083705|10.1504/LAJMSD.2016.083705]]</ref> Partially owing to a long history of dealing with REDD+, Colombia and Brazil are amongst just a few of the countries hosting tropical rainforests that explicitly recognise community rights to carbon and tie these rights to the legal ownership of lands and forests. In Colombia, carbon rights are tied to rights of the land, whereas in Brazil carbon rights are tied to forest rights.<ref name=":2">RRI and McGill University (2021). Technical report: ''Status of legal recognition of Indigenous Peoples’, Local Communities’ and Afro-descendant Peoples’ rights to carbon stored in tropical lands and forests''. Rights and Resources Initiative. [[/doi.org/10.53892/MLQQ5744|https://doi.org/10.53892/MLQQ5744]]</ref>

==Brazil: The Suruí Forest Carbon Project==
====Project description and location====
The Surui Forest Carbon project was implemented in 2009 on the territory of the Surui people, which is situated in the southern part of Brazil’s Amazon between the states of Rondônia and Mato Grosso. Surui Indigenous territory covers an area of 2,481 km2, though the intention of the PCFS was to protect a portion of this total area. According to the PD, the stated objective was to “prevent 13,575.3 hectares of tropical forest from being cleared by 2038, to avoid the emission of 7,258,352.3 tCO2e to the atmosphere, and to contribute to the preservation of the Paiter Surui lifestyle and traditions.”<ref>IDESAM (2011). ''Project description: Surui forest carbon project''. Institute for Conservation and Sustainable Development of Amazonas. Link: "PROJ_DESC_1118_02FEB2012.PDF" found at [[/registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/1118|https://registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/1118]] </ref> This region sits within one of the Brazilian Amazon’s main ‘arcs of deforestation’ and pressure from loggers and ranchers is a matter of concern.

Notably, the PCFS was the first REDD+ project to be proposed by Indigenous peoples in the Brazilian Amazon on their own territory and was the first to receive certification by both the VCS and CCBS.<ref name=":1" />. Metareilá, the Surui’s own Indigenous association, acted as project proponent and the Institute for Conservation and Sustainable Development of Amazonas (IDESAM) assisted with project development, alongside multiple other stakeholder groups. As an endogenous initiative procured and conducted by the Surui community, the SFCP had a ‘non-centralized model of governance’, which reflected the characteristics and traditions of the Surui people. <ref name=":1" />

Only after two years of consultations between the 24 communities involved and the relevant governmental agencies (primarily FUNAI and the Ministry of Environment) was a Memorandum of Understanding signed, showing community consent to develop the project.<ref name=":3">Garcia, B., Rimmer, L., Canal Vieira, L., Mackey, B., (2021). REDD+ and forest protection on indigenous lands in the Amazon. ''RECIEL 30'', 207–219. [[/doi.org/10.1111/reel.12389|https://doi.org/10.1111/reel.12389]]</ref> In 2012 after verification from an independent third-party body, the Surui were able to sell carbon credits on the international market. Between 2009 and 2014 the project drastically helped limit the deforestation occurring within the project’s site, causing many to deem it a success.<ref name=":4">Howard, F. E., (2023). ''An Analysis of the Suruí Forest Carbon Project in Context of Settler Colonialism''. Masters thesis. Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University. [[/vtechworks.lib.vt.edu/server/api/core/bitstreams/b0cde6de-794c-453f-856b-ee72bde3db06/content|https://vtechworks.lib.vt.edu/server/api/core/bitstreams/b0cde6de-794c-453f-856b-ee72bde3db06/content]]</ref>

====National climate targets, policies and legislation====
Rates of deforestation in Brazil’s legal Amazon are significantly impacted by the government in charge. This is evidenced in the decade between 2012 and 2021 whilst under the conservative Bolsonaro administration, when deforestation in the Amazon increased 185% — from a loss of 4,571 km2 in 2012 to 13,038 km2 in 2021.<ref>INPE (2022). ''Observação da Terra. [[/www.obt.inpe.br/OBT/assuntos/programas/amazonia/prodes|http://www.obt.inpe.br/OBT/assuntos/programas/amazonia/prodes]]''</ref> However, since Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s appointment in 2022 there has been a steady decline in the rate of deforestation, which is now roughly half what it was in 2021.<ref>Terra Brasilis (2024). ''PRODES (deforestation): Deforestation rates – Legal Amazon – States''. [[/terrabrasilis.dpi.inpe.br/app/dashboard/deforestation/biomes/legal amazon/rates|https://terrabrasilis.dpi.inpe.br/app/dashboard/deforestation/biomes/legal_amazon/rates]]</ref> A significant proportion of emissions result from the clearing of rainforest and its subsequent conversion to ranching.<ref>MCTI (2022). ''Estimativas Anuais De Emissões De Gases De Efeito Estufa No Brasil.'' 6ª Edição. Ministério da Estado da Ciência, Tecnologia e Inovações. [[/www.gov.br/mcti/pt-br/acompanhe-o-mcti/sirene/publicacoes/estimativas-anuais-de-emissoes-gee/arquivos/6a-ed-estimativas-anuais.pdf|https://www.gov.br/mcti/pt-br/acompanhe-o-mcti/sirene/publicacoes/estimativas-anuais-de-emissoes-gee/arquivos/6a-ed-estimativas-anuais.pdf]]</ref> To address these emissions Brazil has implemented various adaptation policies, legislation and targets which are summarized below:

TABLE
====Indigenous rights - Constitutional, tenure and bundle rights====
In Brazil, Indigenous rights are robust and clearly defined according to the Brazilian Constitution. As a result, the Indigenous communities of the Brazilian Amazon have legal title to 13.8% of the national territory totalling 1.175 million km2, with a total of 631 territories.<ref>Federal government of Brazil (2024). ''Brazil’s NDC: National determination to contribute and transform''. [[/unfccc.int/sites/default/files/2024-11/Brazil Second Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) November2024.pdf|https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/2024-11/Brazil_Second%20Nationally%20Determined%20Contribution%20%28NDC%29_November2024.pdf]]</ref>

TABLE

Whilst Indigenous communities in Brazil have legal title to land, it is the State that owns it. Indigenous people simply exercise permanent tenure over lands that they traditionally occupy and have ‘original rights’ to these traditional lands, which no other rights can prevail over.<ref name=":3" /> Indigenous lands, though not classified as protected areas, “have the highest level of protection by law because they are regulated by the Constitution” and cannot be leased or restricted without violating their original rights. The Suruí's right to develop the PCFS is grounded in the Brazilian Constitution, which grants Indigenous peoples exclusive rights to use the ‘riches of the soil, rivers and lakes’ of their land, and these rights cannot be overridden. Thus, Indigenous people and only Indigenous people are legally allowed to engage in productive activities on their land, provided these activities are conducted according to their own customs and traditions and are necessary for the wellbeing and cultural expression of their own people. In Brazil, it is the armed forces and federal police that are responsible for enforcing these laws, and FUNAI is responsible for representing Indigenous communities in judicial disputes.<ref name=":3" /> As such, provided a REDD+ does not violate the rights to territorial integrity, permanent land tenure and original rights, it is legally allowed.

'''CARBON RIGHTS:''' In Brazil, carbon rights are tied to forest rights.<ref name=":2" /> Carbon credits from REDD+ projects are seen as part of the economic benefits derived from indigenous lands, and as such, Indigenous communities are entitled to own, control and distribute these revenues themselves. The carbon credits generated from the (SFCP) were wholly owned by the Suruí people through Metareilá, with the Suruí Fund (managed by the Brazilian Biodiversity Fund - FUNBIO) acting as recipient. This legality reinforces Indigenous control over both land and carbon rights, as whoever has rights to the forest land is usually recognized as the owner of carbon rights.<ref name=":3" />

'''FPIC OBLIGATION:''' Furthermore, Brazilian law requires Free, Prior, and Informed Consent (FPIC) for REDD+ projects affecting indigenous lands, ensuring that international standards such as the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) and ILO Convention No. 169 are adhered to; Indigenous consent is, ''de jure,'' a necessity. Projects that violate these rights and fail to consult communities are therefore considered illegal. Notably there are no specific rules or procedures that have been written into the Brazilian constitution that provide guidance on how to achieve FPIC. This freedom reinforces Indigenous autonomy as it allows an Indigenous community to define the rules of consultation according to their customs and traditions.

Collectively these national and international laws provide an important safeguard to Indigenous peoples, making their consent a prerequisite for the establishment of REDD+ projects and recognizing their rights as the main beneficiaries of REDD+ revenues.<ref name=":3" /> However, as carbon rights are tied to forest rights in Brazil and not land rights, carbon is considered to be an ‘environmental service’ (Article 41(I)(A) Brazilian Forestry Code), and states, as well as the federal government, have the jurisdiction to exercise full legislative authority over carbon. <ref name=":2" /> As such, certain states have interpreted the law to imply that the title to carbon credits is attributable to the state.<ref>Loft, L., Ravikumar, A., Gebara, M. F., Pham, T. T., Resosudarmo, I. A. P., Assembe, S., Tovar, J. G., Mwangi, E., & Andersson, K. (2015). Taking Stock of Carbon Rights in REDD+ Candidate Countries: Concept Meets Reality. ''Forests'', ''6''(4), 1031-1060. [[/doi.org/10.3390/f6041031|https://doi.org/10.3390/f6041031]]</ref> Hence, even when carbon rights are clearly defined and tied to forest title it is insufficient in itself, and only by legally recognizing the customary rights of IPLCs can a fair and equitable outcome be realised.

====Interested and affected stakeholders====
TABLE
====Discussion====
Although originally successful in achieving its goal of reducing deforestation and degradation, in 2016 diamonds were discovered in Surui territory, leading to an increase in illegal logging and mining.<ref name=":1" /> By 2018 the project site had been completely overrun by ''garimpeiros'' (small-scale gold miners), ultimately leading to the projects suspension that year. <ref name=":4" />

While the project had initially garnered support, divisions emerged within the community post-project implementation. Disputes arose over the unequal distribution of project revenues, leading to internal conflicts between different Suruí clans. These criticisms escalated in 2014 when the Catholic Indigenous Missionary Council supported calls for an end to the project due to mismanagement of revenues from carbon credit sales. <ref name=":3" /> Some Suruí members also argued that the REDD+ initiative harmed their way of life.<ref>Lang, C. (2014). ''“What are projects for that destroy life?” Interview with Henrique Suruí about the Paiter-Suruí REDD project, Brazil.'' REDD-Monitor. [[/redd-monitor.org/2014/12/17/what-are-projects-for-that-destroy-life-interview-with-henrique-surui-about-the-paiter-surui-redd-project-brazil/|https://redd-monitor.org/2014/12/17/what-are-projects-for-that-destroy-life-interview-with-henrique-surui-about-the-paiter-surui-redd-project-brazil/]]</ref>

Further complicating the situation was the controversial role of Henrique Suruí, one of the Suruí tribal leaders. In 2011, it was revealed that Henrique had violated the tribe's logging moratorium, collaborating with loggers in illegal activities. While Henrique later denied responsibility for the project’s failure, his actions, combined with internal disagreements, illustrated the lack of consensus within the Suruí leadership on the project’s goals and outcomes. Both of the tribe’s leaders possessed dramatically different perspectives on how they believed they could ensure agency, autonomy, and economic benefits for the Suruí people.<ref name=":4" /> This fragmentation within the community, in combination with the discovery of diamonds and the state's failure to protect indigenous land rights led to the indefinite suspension of the REDD+ project.

The project's collapse highlights broader structural issues, particularly the state's inconsistent support for indigenous land rights, influenced by settler colonialism, which undermined the project’s long-term viability.<ref name=":4" /> Additionally, the project’s creation was shaped by external actors, including the collaboration between Almir Suruí and Borges from Forest Trends, a Washington-based NGO. This partnership introduced a Western perspective on viewing the Suruí peoples forest, in contrast with their own perspectives on land use and governance. Furthermore, despite Borges’ Brazilian background, the power dynamics between a global North organization and a developing, Indigenous community were apparent.

====Summary====
The Suruí Forest Carbon Project provides an interesting example of how, even when the rights of IPLC’s are relatively robust, challenges persist in ensuring REDD+ project longevity. As such, in its current state, REDD+ in the Brazilian Amazon may not be a suitable market-based option for indigenous communities in the Amazon.<ref name=":3" /> Although initially successful in promoting indigenous autonomy and reducing deforestation, the project resulted in failure due to of a myriad of factors. Division between Surui communities was exacerbated by a perceived unequal benefit-sharing, and the impact of imposing REDD+ seems to have complicated the traditional social structure that the Surui were dependent on. These issues were influenced by Brazil's settler state dynamics, where indigenous land rights, although legally recognized, are often not upheld in practice due to insufficient enforcement.<ref name=":4" /> Ultimately, the Surui project reveals how settler colonialism's structural flaws make long-term project success difficult, despite initial progress in promoting indigenous autonomy.

At the national and state level, complex institutional and legal land governance structures convolute and impede REDD+ in Brazil. Multiple institutions share responsibilities and there is no comprehensive, authoritative database of land ownership, which hampers efforts to protect indigenous territories.<ref name=":5">Costa, R. (2016)''. Insecure land rights in Brazil: Consequences for rural areas and challenges for improvement.'' Climate Policy Initiative. [[/www.climatepolicyinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/Insecure Land Rights in Brazil CPI.pdf|https://www.climatepolicyinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/Insecure_Land_Rights_in_Brazil_CPI.pdf]]</ref> As a result, land tenure disputes remain common and can be witnessed occurring between the public as well between public and state actors. For example, Brazil’s 1964 Land Statute (Law No. 4504) allows the government to takeover unproductive farms and transfer those lands to landless peasants. This often results in the clearing of forest, as only when the land is cleared is it evidenced to be ‘productive’.<ref name=":5" /> Hence, not only does this law cause insecurity for Indigenous populations in Brazil, it also forces them to go against customary traditions of stewarding the land in an effort to maintain its control.

Whilst the aforementioned points to the futility of REDD+ in Brazil, there is reason to maintain optimism. In a recent landmark ruling Brazil’s supreme court voted in favour of the Xoleng peoples, and the decision will serve as a precedent for all cases involving Indigenous peoples.<ref name=":6">Amos-Flom, K., (2023). ''Triumph and Turmoil: The Xokleng Case and the Future of Indigenous Land Rights in Brazil.'' Columbia Journal of Transnational Law. [[/www.jtl.columbia.edu/bulletin-blog/triumph-and-turmoil-the-xokleng-case-and-the-future-of-indigenous-land-rights-in-brazil|https://www.jtl.columbia.edu/bulletin-blog/triumph-and-turmoil-the-xokleng-case-and-the-future-of-indigenous-land-rights-in-brazil]]</ref> The Xokleng’s land dispute, settled in 2023, “rejected Santa Catarina state’s marco temporal (“time limit”) argument, which would have required Indigenous people to prove they occupied or legally contested the territory they claimed before the Brazilian Constitution came into force in 1988. If successful, this argument would have led to disastrous repercussions, as many indigenous peoples had been forcibly removed or are traditionally nomadic.”<ref name=":6" /> Whilst slow, progress has been made in Brazil in recent years with respect to Indigenous rights as well as the voluntary carbon market itself.

There are currently 159 AFOLU projects listed on the Verra database in Brazil, with only two specifically focused on REDD+ initiatives in collaboration with Indigenous groups. These are the Ka’a Pyahu project, <ref>Verra (n.d.) ''Project 5087: KA'A PYAHU.'' https://registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/5087</ref> initiated by the Guajajara Indigenous people in collaboration with external organizations and validated in 2021, and the ‘Together for the forest Awaete REDD+ project’<ref>Verra (n.d.) ''Project 5200: TOGETHER FOR THE FOREST AWAETÉ REDD+ PROJECT.'' https://registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/5200</ref> which is still under development. Both projects involve Indigenous groups working with Brazilian organizations to build technical capacity and expertise. This could signal a growing trend of Indigenous-led REDD+ projects in the future. To ensure a positive future for REDD+ in Brazil, the customary rights of IPLC’s must be formally recognized. IPLC should have legal ownership of their traditional lands, and in doing so the carbon rights of these communities would be less convoluted, leading to more equitable benefit-sharing and increased cohesion amongst these groups post-project implementation.

To ensure a positive future for REDD+ in Brazil, the customary rights of IPLC’s must be formally recognized. IPLC should have legal ownership of their traditional lands, and in doing so the carbon rights of these communities would be less convoluted, leading to more equitable benefit-sharing and increased cohesion amongst these groups post-project implementation.

==Colombia: ''REDD+ project Resguardo Indigena Unificado - Selva de Mataven (RUI-SM)''==
'''Project description and location'''

According to the PD,<ref name=":7">ACATISEMA & Mediamos (2017). ''Joint project description and monitoring report: REDD+ project: Resguardo Indigena Unificado – Selva de Mataven (RIU – SM).'' Link: “10 06 2017_VCS Final Report_ Matavin Project.pdf” found at [[/registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/1566|https://registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/1566]]</ref> the Resguardo Indígena Unificado – Selva de Matavén (RIU-SM) project is located east of the Colombian Orinoco high plain, in the eastern part of the Department of Vichada, municipality of Cumaribo. It resides on the formalized resguardo of the Sikuani, Piaroa, Puinave, Curripaco, Cubeo and Piapoco ethnic groups, spanning 1,856,836 hectares, with 1,477,115 hectares (79.6%) being forested. The project states that it will reduce greenhouse gas emissions, with a total estimated net reduction of 108,670,562 tons of CO2 equivalent over thirty years, from years 2013 – 2042. By this metric, it is the 14th largest project on the Verra registry, out of over 1700 projects.<ref name=":9">Dufrasne, D., (2021). ''Two Shades of Green: How hot air forest credits are being used to avoid carbon taxes in Colombia''. Carbon Market Watch. [[/carbonmarketwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Two-shades-of-green EN WEB.pdf|https://carbonmarketwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Two-shades-of-green_EN_WEB.pdf]]</ref> There are 12,312 indigenous people living in the RIU-SM, belonging to 2,517 families and 250 communities as of 2017.

The project was initiated and developed by the Asociación de Cabildos y Autoridades Indígenas de la Selva de Matavén (ACETISMA), an Indigenous association, and MEDIAMOS F&M, a Colombian consultancy firm. ACETISMA is comprised of Indigenous leaders that represent the 17 communities of the reservation in charge of governing the territory, and it has administrative autonomy, as well as “the capacity to acquire, to own and to dispose of property, to accept donations, to hold national and international conventions, scientific and cultural exchanges and generally, to celebrate all kinds of negotiations and agreements with which the Association can achieve its objectives.”<ref name=":7" />

There is a stated focus on various means of improving the living conditions of the Indigenous peoples living within the project area. To summarise, the main objectives of the REDD+ project RIU-SM include:

· Community development, in the form of improved education.

· Community engagement with respect to the project; developing information channels to reveal project progress.

· Support local initiatives for environmental education and waste management.

· Developing an effective response system that addresses community proposals and concerns relating to the project.

· Strengthening the governance of ACATISEMA.

====National climate targets, policies and legislation====
The Colombian Amazon makes up over one-third of Colombia’s national territory, and up until 2005 only 7.3% of the Colombian Amazon had been deforested, largely due to the country's 60-year armed conflict between the government, multiple left-wing guerillas such as FARC, and several far-right paramilitary groups.<ref name=":8" /> However, following the signing of the Peace Treaty in 2016 and demobilization of the FARC, limits to deforestation were weakened in the Colombian Amazon. Poor but opportunistic peasants began to encroach into previously unchartered territory and capitalize from the rainforest. Due to the poor economic integration of the Amazon, many were forced to engage with the traditional economies of cocoa and cattle ranching, as these markets were already well connected to regional and global markets.<ref name=":8" /> To address the drivers of deforestation and its associated emissions, the federal government has implemented various initiatives, which are summarized below:
{| class="wikitable"
|'''Document name'''
|'''Type (target, policy or legislation)'''
|'''Publication year'''
|'''Key takeaways'''
|-
|
|Target
|?
|Reduce GHG emissions by 51 % by 2030.
|-
|
|Target
|?
|Net zero by 2050
|-
|National Climate Change Policy (PNCC)
|
|2018
|
|-
|National Forest Conservation Program
|
|2011
|
|-
|Law 1931 of 2018 – Climate Change Law

|
|2018
|
|-
| colspan="4" |Relating to REDD+
|-
|National Strategy for Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (ENREDD+).”
|
|2009
|
|-
|Amazon Indigenous REDD+ Initiative
|
|2012
|
|-
|USAID's Colombia BIOREDD+ program
|
|
|Develop a portfolio of 8 REDD+ projects in four geographic nodes covering over 700,000 hectares in the Colombian Pacific.

|-
|Vision Amazonia
|
|2015
|part of the REDD+ strategy in the country financed by three foreign countries: Germany, Norway and United Kingdom
|}
As a result of the many fund and market-based initiatives that Colombia has engaged with, it hosts the second most REDD+ projects in the world. REDD+ projects now cover at least 56% of the area of legally recognized Indigenous territories in the Colombian Amazon, with an overwhelming majority of carbon projects located on Indigenous territories.<ref name=":10">Schmid, D., & Castro. C., (2023). ''REDD+ projects in the Colombian Amazon: Social challenges and lack of transparency''. Rainforest Foundation Norway. [[/dv719tqmsuwvb.cloudfront.net/documents/REDD rapport 2024 ENG.pdf|https://dv719tqmsuwvb.cloudfront.net/documents/REDD_rapport_2024_ENG.pdf]]</ref> Evidently REDD+ plays an integral part in the country’s efforts of environmental conservation, and incentives have been introduced to promote the development of such projects. For example, in 2016 the government adopted a higher tax that covered fossil fuels, but companies are able to avoid paying the tax by investing in carbon offsets that have been generated domestically.<ref name=":9" /> This led to a boost in the domestic REDD+ market in 2017, as Colombian companies invested as to escape higher taxes. Notably, 23 of the 36 REDD+ projects currently under development in the Amazon region have been initiated in or after 2018.<ref name=":10" /> Currently Colombia’s REDD+ program sits at over 45 pilot and voluntary carbon projects, as well as one large-scale jurisdictional approach in the Amazon.<ref name=":11">Zambrano-Cortés, D. G. (2024). ''The politics, spaces and subjects of forest conservation in Colombia''. [internal PhD, WU, Wageningen University]. Wageningen University. [[/doi.org/10.18174/675328|https://doi.org/10.18174/675328]]</ref>

====Indigenous rights - Constitutional, tenure and bundle rights====
''De jure'', the Indigenous peoples of Colombia have comprehensive tenure and bundle rights that have been articulated in the national constitution. Collective land titles are granted to Indigenous communities by the Colombian government, and as a result about 34 percent of Colombian land (almost 38 million hectares) is legally recognized as Indigenous territory or collective lands of Afro-descendent communities. (Schmid & Castro, 2023) These collective land tenure rights have been in effect since the implementation of the 1991 constitution, granting them the authority to exercise legal control over their territories in accordance with their own customs and procedures.<ref>Max Planck Institute (n.d.) ''Colombia 1991 (rev. 2015).'' Institute. [[/www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Colombia 2015|https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Colombia_2015]]</ref> Furthermore, the carbon rights of Indigenous peoples are explicitly defined in the constitution and tied specifically to the ownership of land of the communities.<ref name=":2" /> This in theory provides a solid legal basis for upholding the rights of Indigenous communities in Colombia, specifically relating to REDD+ activities, as it allows communities to define and negotiate the terms of said projects. A summary of the various laws relating to Indigenous rights have been summarized below:
{| class="wikitable"
| colspan="2" |'''Laws'''
|-
| colspan="2" |'''1991 constitution'''
|-
|Article 63

|Indigenous territories are considered collective property. This means that land is not owned by individuals but is shared by the community. The state must respect these collective rights and cannot alter land ownership without the consent of the Indigenous peoples.
|-
|Article 330
|Indigenous communities have the right to govern their territories.
|-
|Article 76 - ''Consulta previa''.
|Pertains to the right of Indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities to prior consultation before the government or private companies undertake activities that may affect their territories, culture, or way of life.

|-
|Article 63 and 329
|The Reservation is a collective, inalienable, and indefeasible property.
|-
|Decree 1386 of 1994, Article 10; Decree 2164 of 1995, Article 22) 39.
|The administration and management of these lands are subjected to uses and customs of the beneficiaries
|}
Whilst land and tenure rights are enshrined into the constitution, the precariousness of these rights persists due to a lack of resources to ensure enforcement, as well as the deeper issue of corruption. As previously stated, the rate of deforestation increased significantly in Colombia’s post-conflict era, evidencing the nations inability to maintain control over unlawful acts of land-grabbing and disposition. Whilst this began with new peasants converting the Amazon for subsistence purposes, it ultimately led to new areas for the growth of cocoa, much to the benefit of narco-traffickers who could monopolize on this illegal surplus in ‘accumulation by dispossession’.<ref name=":8" />

With respect to the legalities of consultation, Colombia has enshrined ''consulta previa'' into the constitution. Translating to ‘prior consultation’, this legal text provides the formal grounds for Indigenous engagement when any legislative or administrative measures are implemented on Indigenous territory. Importantly, consultation should be achieved in accordance with the customs of the ethnic group with which the project is being imposed upon. However, there have been recent cases of contestation specifically relating to how ''consulta previa'' applies to REDD+ on Indigenous lands, and the RIU – SM project was one that was involved with such a case.

====Interested and affected stakeholders====
{| class="wikitable"
| colspan="5" |'''Affected stakeholders'''
|-
|Stakeholders
|Primary objective(s)
|Secondary objective(s)
|Relative power
|Scope of influence
|-
|ACATISEMA - Asociación de Cabildos y Autoridades Indígenas de la Selva de Matavén
|the Indigenous association comprised of Indigenous leaders in representation of the 16 communities of the reservation in charge of governing the territory.

foster the integral development, social and cultural preservation of the indigenous communities in the Mataven Jungle and to consolidate the territory, selfgovernment by partners, the defense, conservation and preservation of the environment and biodiversity of the Mataven Jungle (ACATISEMA, 2010)

|
|It is the highest authority in the reservation.
|
|-
|MEDIAMOS F&M – A consultancy
|Project developer
|
|
|
|-
|Communities of indigenous peoples of the RIU-SM
|<nowiki>- Primary and direct beneficiaries.</nowiki>
|
|
|
|-
|Teachers of primary and secondary basic education indigenous Reservation
|
|
|
|
|-
|Colonists
|
|
|
|
|-
| colspan="5" |'''Interested stakeholders'''
|-
|Mining Companies and individuals
|Compete with the Project for the territory's resources.
|
|
|
|-
|Ministerio de Ambiente y Desarrollo Sostenible

- Direct participation
|Its main interest is to achieve environmental planning, through the consolidation of a policy of sustainable development and strategic alliances with social and institutional participants in different sectoral and territorial scenarios.
|
|
|
|-
|Dirección de Asuntos Indígenas, ROM y Minorías - Ministerio del Interior

Direct participation
|Public agency that advises the national level, prepares and proposes the formulation of public policy in favor of indigenous peoples within the framework of the defense, support, reinforcement and consolidation of ethnic and cultural rights.
|
|
|
|-
|Corporinoquía

Direct participation
|Regional environmental authority to ensure the proper use of natural resources in their area of jurisdiction.
|
|
|
|-
|Other government institutions: Governor ofice of Vichada, Mayor ofice Cumaribo

Direct participation
|The Reservation for being part of the Cumaribo, Vichada, has territorial jurisdiction relations with the Governor’s office and the Mayor’s office.
|
|
|
|-
|Fundación NATURA

Direct participation
|Civil organization whose mission is the conservation, use and management of biodiversity to generate social, economic and environmental benefits in the context of sustainable human development.
|
|
|
|-
|FONDO ACCIÓN

Direct participation
|Colombian non-profit organization in the private scheme. Encourage the participation of civil society and the private sector in the implementation of the country’s public policies in two areas: - Conservation and sustainable development; and protection -development of children.
|
|
|
|-
|SENA, Department of Social Prosperity (DPS), NGOs and private consultants
|Connected to the area - supporting the implementation of rural development activities.
|
|
|
|-
|Other indigenous communities neighboring RIU-SM
|
|
|
|
|-
|Financial institutions
|They fund local development activities.
|
|
|
|-
|Asocarbono – An industry association, including Verra, ProClima, Biofix, and ACATISEMA.

|
|
|
|
|-
|OPIAC: the National Oganization of the Indigenous Peoples of the Colombian Amazon

|
|
|
|
|}

====Discussion====
According to the official REDD+ Mataven website<ref>RIU – SM (n.d.). ''REDD+ Mataven''. [[/reddmataven.com/|https://reddmataven.com/]]</ref> the project has resulted in a myriad of benefits to the Indigenous communities of the region. For example, as a result of the funds generated from the projects activities, there have been improvements in infrastructure, transportation and education, ultimately leading to the empowerment and improved governance of ACETISMA. However, the project has come under fire for multiple reasons.

For one, in 2015 some of the Indigenous communities filed a lawsuit referring to the violation of their right to ''consulta previa''. However, the court ruled that their Indigenous rights had not been violated as it was ACETISMA that initially sought MEDIAMOS to develop the project, and that ACETISMA were the best representatives of those Indigenous communities. Furthermore, the projects main focus was the conservation of the rainforest and therefore did not threaten the cultural integrity of those communities.<ref name=":10" /> However, regardless of the outcome of this case, its occurrence points to internal disagreement amongst Indigenous participants of the RIU-SM project. In a study involving interviews with Indigenous members of the project, there was a significant proportion of interviewees that had little knowledge regarding various aspects of the project, such as responsibilities of participation, or the benefit-sharing mechanism in place.<ref name=":2" /> This further reinforces the point that, in the case of the RIU-SM project it may not be ‘bottom-up’ and eludes to the power imbalance experienced between the project developer Mediamos and Indigenous community members. In the PD there does exist a breakdown of the distribution of income between ACETISMA, the Indigenous association, and Mediamos, the project developer, which shows a significant proportion of revenue flowing to the former organisation throughout the project’s operations<ref name=":7" /> However, there is currently no publicly available documentation supporting this initial claim<ref name=":9" /> as there is no obligation to do so, leading to a general lack of transparency in the market, and between all of the relevant actors. Subsequent meetings with Indigenous leaders have however shown a marked support of the Mataven project, with one Indigenous leader explicitly stating “...the Redd+ project has brought resources that they never had before, which allowed them to open new school classrooms, 21 rural aqueducts, cocoa crops and even headquarters in Cumaribo and Inírida.”<ref>Lievano, A. B. (2021) Colombia's biggest carbon credit project could be selling hot air. Latin American Center for Investigative Journalism. [[/www.elclip.org/el-mayor-proyecto-de-bonos-de-carbono-de-colombia-podria-estar-vendiendo-aire-caliente/|https://www.elclip.org/el-mayor-proyecto-de-bonos-de-carbono-de-colombia-podria-estar-vendiendo-aire-caliente/]] </ref> Clearly there have been benefits for IPLC’s involved with this project, though the details of this benefit-sharing remain a mystery.

Secondly, the Mataven project has caused controversy due to its apparently inflated carbon credit issuance. This has been achieved by using a reference area that is not representative of the project area, as well as assuming an uncharacteristically heigh assumed rate of deforestation.<ref name=":12">Global Atlas of Environmental Justice (2023). ''Resguardo Indigena Unificado-Selva de Matavén (RIU SM) REDD+ Project, Colombia.'' [[/ejatlas.org/conflict/redd-project-resguardo-indigena-unificado-selva-de-mataven-riu-sm|https://ejatlas.org/conflict/redd-project-resguardo-indigena-unificado-selva-de-mataven-riu-sm]]</ref> The project used a baseline deforestation rate of 0.86% per year, which is significantly more than the Colombian government's national rate of 0.18%. Additionally, according to the report the reference area chosen is more easily accessed and therefore more prone to deforestation, making it an inaccurate comparison to the relatively remote project area.<ref name=":2" /> This has led to the creation of excess carbon credits, or “hot air” credits, which have been criticized for not reflecting real environmental benefits.<ref name=":9" /> To add further insult to injury these credits have been used by a Colombian fossil fuel distributor company to avoid paying taxes, as described earlier by Colombia’s change in policy in 2017. In doing so, the company avoided paying approximately $18.9 million in taxes.<ref name=":2" /> There has been subsequent back and forth between Verra and Carbon Market Watch, with Verra refuting the claims<ref>Verra (2021). ''Carbon Market Watch Report on Colombian REDD+ Projects Contains Flawed Allegations.'' [[/verra.org/carbon-market-watch-report-on-colombian-redd-projects-contains-flawed-allegations/|https://verra.org/carbon-market-watch-report-on-colombian-redd-projects-contains-flawed-allegations/]] </ref> Regardless of the science, Colombia recently introduced a resolution in 2018 (Resolution 1447 – 2018) that requires projects to use baselines that comply with national reference levels.<ref name=":13">Dufrasne, D. (2021b). Companies use ”hot air” forestry offsets to avoid taxes in Colombia: Carbon Market Watch’s fact-check of Verra’s response. Carbon Market Watch. [[/carbonmarketwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/CMWs-fact-check-of-Verras-response-on-Colombia.pdf|https://carbonmarketwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/CMWs-fact-check-of-Verras-response-on-Colombia.pdf]]</ref><ref>IEA (2022). ''Resolution 1447 – 2018. Monitoring, Reporting, and Verification System for mitigation actions at the national level.'' International Energy Agency. [[/www.iea.org/policies/14772-resolution-1447-2018-monitoring-reporting-and-verification-system-for-mitigation-actions-at-the-national-level|https://www.iea.org/policies/14772-resolution-1447-2018-monitoring-reporting-and-verification-system-for-mitigation-actions-at-the-national-level]]</ref> Going forward, REDD+ projects that are being implemented in Colombia will have to abide by Colombia’s national legislation.

====Summary====
Colombia has a long history of engaging in REDD+ as it has been used to limit environmental degradation in the post-conflict era, in alignment with the country’s national peacebuilding agenda.<ref name=":11" /> Owing to the country’s comprehensive tenure and bundle rights, IPLC’s have robust ''de jure'' rights to land as they collectively own it, and rights to carbon are tied to this ownership. This puts Colombia as one of the world leaders in legal terms relating to REDD+ project implementation, but due to a lack of resources to ensure enforcement, as well as corruption, historically these laws have not been adhered to.<ref name=":10" /><ref name=":2" /> There are many documented cases showing the displacement on IPLC’s from traditional lands, poor efforts to adhere to ''consulta previa'', and inequitable benefit sharing.<ref>Greenfield, P. (2023''). The ‘carbon pirates’ preying on Amazon’s Indigenous communities.'' The Guardian. [[/www.theguardian.com/environment/2023/jan/21/amazon-indigenous-communities-carbon-offsetting-pirates-aoe|https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2023/jan/21/amazon-indigenous-communities-carbon-offsetting-pirates-aoe]]</ref><ref name=":14">Lang, C., (2024). ''Colombia’s Constitutional Court rules in favour of Indigenous Peoples. Identifies serious flaws in the REDD+ Baka Rokarire project.'' REDD_Monitor. [[/reddmonitor.substack.com/p/colombias-constitutional-court-rules|https://reddmonitor.substack.com/p/colombias-constitutional-court-rules]]</ref>

The case of the Mataven project provides an interesting example of how it is the market itself that is failing to address concerns regarding transparency, whether that be relating to benefit-sharing amongst relevant stakeholders, or Indigenous representation and engagement throughout the implementation of REDD+ projects. Some ACATISEMA members have explicitly stated their support for the Mataven project,<ref name=":12" /> and its benefits can be seen first-hand in the form of improved infrastructure in local communities involved with the project.<ref>Myers, J. E., Parra, M. A., Bedford, C. (2021). ''How Carbon Offsetting Can Build a Forest.'' Stanford Social Innovation Review. [[/ssir.org/articles/entry/how carbon offsetting can build a forest|https://ssir.org/articles/entry/how_carbon_offsetting_can_build_a_forest]]</ref> However, an exact breakdown of how and where revenue is being distributed to IPLC’s remains elusive.<ref name=":13" /> Furthermore, the level of IPLC engagement has come into question, specifically with reference to ''consulta previa'' and the overall understanding that IPLC’s have regarding the project’s intended outcomes and activities.<ref name=":10" /> This is not a rare case in Colombia and has been witnessed occurring with other projects that have been implemented on Indigenous territories in the Colombian Amazon.<ref name=":17">Lang, C., (2023''). “It destroys everything,” says Indigenous leader about the REDD+ Baka Rokarire project in Colombia''. REDD Monitor. [[/reddmonitor.substack.com/p/it-destroys-everything-says-indigenous|https://reddmonitor.substack.com/p/it-destroys-everything-says-indigenous]]</ref> However, a recent ruling by the Colombian Constitutional court voted in favour of Indigenous groups in Colombia, upholding “the rights to self-determination, autonomy, self-government, territory, identity, physical and cultural integrity, and free, prior and informed consent of the indigenous communities”.<ref name=":14" /> This review ultimately sets a legal precedent safeguarding the fundamental rights of IPLCs with REDD+ project implementation and shows that progress is being made to improve the likelihood that REDD+ will result in genuine benefits to those affected by project implementation.

To ensure a more authentic engagement with IPLC’s as to result in legitimate and equitable benefit-sharing, improvements must be made by the Colombian government, as well as within the VCM itself. For the former, Colombia’s national registry for GHG mitigation activities must be updated; it has been offline since 2022.<ref name=":10" /> As a result, transparency is lacking. International finance could be utilized as to alleviate this issue, and only with an accurate and reliable database may the market be regulated. In the broader sense, VCM registries must create stricter guidelines promoting transparency. Often PD’s refer to annexed documents that contain relevant information regarding benefit-sharing, though these are often not publicly available.<ref name=":9" /> This limits transparency and increases the likelihood of inequitable agreements being made between project proponents and developers, further exacerbating existing power asymmetries between the two groups and limiting the likelihood that ''consulta previa'' is honestly adhered to.<ref name=":10" /> This has led to conflict within Indigenous communities, rather than a strengthening of their social fabric.

Furthermore, the Mataven project calls into question the actual emissions reduction that REDD+ projects achievce. Whilst Colombia has since updated its regulations such that REDD+ must use baselines that comply with national reference levels, it is up in the air as to how representative these guidelines are. Reference areas must represent project areas and without the appropriate regulations in place project developers lack the incentive to create realistic baselines; ultimately they are aiming to produce the maximum number of credits as to generate the greatest possible revenues.

==Conclusion==
As a market-based mechanism, REDD+ is shackled by the construct in which it operates; fundamentally it is a capitalist means of fixing a capitalist problem, which comes with limitations. Both Brazil and Colombia have relatively robust laws that have been written into the constitution, ultimately promoting more equitable results post project implementation. However, as in Colombia IPLC’s collectively own the land, whereas in Brazil these groups only own rights to use the land,<ref name=":2" /> Colombia can be considered better equipped for the establishment of REDD+ projects on traditional Indigenous territory. However, even with these laws in place enforcement remain a matter of concern. Furthermore, given the wide variety of ontological and epistemological perspectives of Indigenous communities, and how these views conflict with the Western worldview from which market-based REDD+ came to fruition, there is an inherent difficulty in implementing a system of governance in REDD+ on Indigenous lands.<ref name=":1" />. Putting a price on nature conflicts with Indigenous perspectives and there have been instances where this has attacked the social and cultural fabric of IPLC’s;<ref name=":17" /> to avoid this REDD+ developers must have the genuine intent of understanding the perspective of the Indigenous group they are working with and aim to implement REDD+ with a bottom-up approach.

In both countries, transparency must be improved to ensure that FPIC is adhered to and subsequently ensure fair IPLC representation and engagement. This issue predominantly arises due to the poor requirements of standards in the VCM. As such, proponents are guided by developers which have little incentive to truly act in the interests of Indigenous groups; ultimately the organizations in charge of project development are interested in increasing project revenues. This has led to instances of over-crediting, as without a transparent framework in which to operate it is difficult to evaluate the legitimacy of the claims being made by project proponents and developers. However, with recent advances that address concerns of additionality<ref name=":15" /> there is hope for improved market integrity. Standards of the VCM must continue to be scrutinized to ensure that progress continues to be made.

Going forward, progress should be made to formalize the customary laws and traditional lands of IPLCs, and finance should be directed towards the enforcement of these laws. The environmental,<ref name=":16" /> economic,<ref name=":5" /><ref>Ding, H., Veit, P. G., Blackman, A., Gray, E., Reytar, K., Altamirano, J. C., Hodgdon, B., (2016). ''Climate benefits, tenure costs: The economic case for securing Indigenous land rights in the Amazon''. WRI. [[/files.wri.org/d8/s3fs-public/Climate Benefits Tenure Costs Executive Summary.pdf|https://files.wri.org/d8/s3fs-public/Climate_Benefits_Tenure_Costs_Executive_Summary.pdf]]</ref> and social<ref>Sarmiento Barletti, J. P., Heise Vigil, N., & Larson, A. M. (2023). ''Safeguards at a glance: Are voluntary standards supporting community land, resource and carbon rights?'' CIFOR-ICRAF. [[/www.cifor-icraf.org/publications/pdf files/Flyer/REDD-Safeguards-7.pdf|https://www.cifor-icraf.org/publications/pdf_files/Flyer/REDD-Safeguards-7.pdf]] </ref> benefits of this have been researched and are well understood. By developing culturally appropriate frameworks for rights-based conservation regimes, that work with IPLCs in accordance with their worldviews, REDD+ could be used to promote Indigenous autonomy. However, much progress still must be made to achieve this goal.

==References==

Documentation:Open Case Studies/FRST522/2024/REDD+ in Indigenous Amazonia: What works and what doesn’t?

2024-12-12T20:57:19Z

ConnorHaynes: /* Summary */

__TOC__

==Positionality==
First and foremost I am not Indigenous, and whilst there are a myriad of cultures, ontologies and epistemologies that are not sufficiently represented by simply stating ‘Indigenous’, it is commonly accepted that these worldviews are vastly different to those of the ‘Western’ world, which is the world in which I grew up and matured. I am therefore only understanding of Indigenous cultures, beliefs and customary laws based upon available online literature and those which I have learnt through life, in addition to those introduced to me in my Master’s degree. As such, I will never be able to fully relate to an Indigenous person; the best I can do is try to understand and learn. Only throughout this process am I able to work towards reconciliation and attempt to address the inequities experienced by Indigenous folk globally.

Additionally, I am yet to act as a carbon project proponent and so do not understand the nuances or stresses of undertaking such a task. Whilst an individual proponent may have the best intention of procuring a carbon project for its social and environmental benefits, there are a number of stakeholders involved throughout the entire process which influence its eventual outcome. Without experience acting as a project proponent I am naïve in understanding the overall process and it's difficulties.

==Acronyms / Terminology==
AFOLU: Agriculture, Forestry and Other Land-Use

ICVCM: Integrity Council for the Voluntary Carbon Market

IPLC: Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities

KMGBF: Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework

LAC: Latin American Countries

MRV: Monitoring, Reporting and Verification

REDD+: Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation

UNCBD: United Nations Convention on Biological Biodiversity

VCMI: Voluntary Carbon Markets Integrity Initiative

''Additionality:'' Additionality is the determination of whether the project will lead to the expected outcomes when compared to the baseline or ‘business as usual’ emissions.

''Leakage'': Refers to the shifting of emissions to outside the project boundary as a result of the project’s activities.

''Permanence:'' Permanence refers to the degree to which a carbon credit is equivalent to a permanent removal or reduction in emissions.
==Abstract==
This case study illustrates two examples of Indigenous-led REDD+ projects on Indigenous territory in Colombia and Brazil. Both countries have a relatively long history of engaging with REDD+ but have slightly different legal structures pertaining to the rights of Indigenous peoples in their traditional territories, as well as IPLC’s ‘carbon’ rights. As such, the intention is to evaluate how these differing ''de jure'' rights translate on the ground. With respect to REDD+, do certain ''de jure'' rights result in legitimately positive benefits to IPLCs, as well as the environment that these projects were originally intended to protect? To reduce inconsistency, projects were chosen that utilized the same standard, namely Verra’s ‘Verified Carbon Standard’.

The overall intention is such that the reader can evaluate the effectiveness and true benefit of REDD+ projects to IPLC’s, based upon the legal frameworks of the host country. A secondary intention is such that the reader is better equipped to conduct a prefeasibility assessment based upon available online literature, to evaluate the likelihood that REDD+ can be implemented in any chosen country, with the genuine intent of benefiting IPLC’s that are directly affected as a result of REDD+ project implementation.

==REDD+ and the VCM in Brazil and Colombia==
REDD+, originally introduced by the UNFCCC, is a market-based mechanism sitting within the VCM that aims to reverse the loss of forests and carbon stocks, specifically in developing countries. Simply put, an entity or an individual can voluntarily pay another that has engaged with REDD+ and subsequently sequestered carbon, to offset their own emissions using ‘credits’, sold as units of greenhouse gas equivalent to one ton of carbon dioxide (CO2e). Forestry and Land-Use remains to be the largest category of carbon credits traded by transaction volume on the VCM, with REDD+ being the most popular project type in this category, accounting for 78% of credits traded.<ref name=":0">Procton, A., (2024). ''State of the voluntary carbon market 2024: On the path to maturity.'' Forest Trends Ecosystem Marketplace.</ref> Furthermore, over one-third of the credits sold within this category were sourced from projects that had been implemented in LAC and the Caribbean in 2024.<ref name=":0" /> Of the four largest standards issuing carbon credits, Verra accounts for roughly 80% of issuances in Latin America,<ref>Pullins, T. (2022). Growth of carbon markets in Latin America. White & Case. [[/www.whitecase.com/publications/insight/latin-america-focus-fall-2022-growth-carbon-markets|https://www.whitecase.com/publications/insight/latin-america-focus-fall-2022-growth-carbon-markets]] </ref> and even in the face of recent scrutiny,<ref>West, T. A. P., Bofim, B., Haya, B. K. (2024). Methodological issues with deforestation baselines compromise the integrity of carbon offsets from REDD+. ''Global Environmental Change, 87'' [[/doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2024.102863|https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2024.102863]]</ref><ref>Wyburd I., & Dufrasne, G. (2023). Error Log: Exposing the methodological failures of REDD+ forestry projects. Carbon Market Watch. [[/carbonmarketwatch.org/publications/error-log-exposing-the-methodological-failures-of-redd-forestry-projects/|https://carbonmarketwatch.org/publications/error-log-exposing-the-methodological-failures-of-redd-forestry-projects/]]</ref><ref>Haya, B. K., Alford-Jones, K., Anderegg, W. R. L., Beymer-Farris, B., Blanchard, L., Bomfim, B., Chin, D., Evans, S., Hogan, M., Holm, J. A., McAfee, K., So, I. S., West, T. A. P., & Withey, L. (2023). ''Quality assessment of REDD+ carbon credit projects''. Berkeley Carbon Trading Project. [[/gspp.berkeley.edu/research-and-impact/centers/cepp/projects/berkeley-carbontrading-project/REDD+|https://gspp.berkeley.edu/research-and-impact/centers/cepp/projects/berkeley-carbontrading-project/REDD+]]</ref> REDD+ projects clearly account for a significant proportion of the VCM with their continued application likely to persist.<ref>Gordon, O. (2022). ''The interwoven fortunes of carbon markets and indigenous communities.'' Energy Monitor. [[/www.energymonitor.ai/tech/carbon-removal/the-interwoven-fortunes-of-carbon-markets-and-indigenous-communities/|https://www.energymonitor.ai/tech/carbon-removal/the-interwoven-fortunes-of-carbon-markets-and-indigenous-communities/]]</ref><ref>Müller, M., Coustar, C., Bietta, F., Mathres, M. (2022). ''UNFCCC REDD+ and the power of sovereign carbon.'' Deutsche Banke Chief Investment Office. [[/www.rainforestcoalition.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/CIO-Special-UNFCCC-REDD-power-of-sovereign-carbon.pdf|https://www.rainforestcoalition.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/CIO-Special-UNFCCC-REDD-power-of-sovereign-carbon.pdf]]</ref><ref>Pullins, T. (2022). ''Growth of carbon markets in Latin America.'' White & Case. [[/www.whitecase.com/publications/insight/latin-america-focus-fall-2022-growth-carbon-markets|https://www.whitecase.com/publications/insight/latin-america-focus-fall-2022-growth-carbon-markets]] </ref> With the introduction of updated methodologies aimed at addressing these concerns,<ref>Verra (2023a). ''Setting the Standard: Verra’s Revolutionary New REDD Methodology.'' [[/verra.org/program-notice/setting-the-standard-verras-revolutionary-new-redd-methodology/|https://verra.org/program-notice/setting-the-standard-verras-revolutionary-new-redd-methodology/]]</ref><ref>Verra (2023b). ''VM0048 Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation, v1.0.'' [[/verra.org/methodologies/vm0048-reducing-emissions-from-deforestation-and-forest-degradation-v1-0/|https://verra.org/methodologies/vm0048-reducing-emissions-from-deforestation-and-forest-degradation-v1-0/]]</ref> there is hope for renewed buyer confidence in the integrity of this market,<ref>MSCI (2023). ''Verra’s New Methodology for Unplanned Deforestation Aims to Silence the Critics''. [[/www.msci.com/www/blog-posts/verra-s-new-methodology-for/04577808942|https://www.msci.com/www/blog-posts/verra-s-new-methodology-for/04577808942]]</ref> though more work still needs to be done.

Both Colombia and Brazil have a relatively long history of implementing REDD+ projects, using both fund-based and market-based mechanisms. For example, both countries were participants in the ‘Amazon Indigenous REDD+ (RIA in Spanish) initiative, with the first pilot implementation project being initiated in Colombia’s Puiawai Natural Reserve.<ref>Garzón, E., (2017). ''Amazon Indigenous REDD+: An innovative approach to conserve Colombian forests?'' Mongabay. [[/news.mongabay.com/2017/01/amazon-indigenous-redd-an-innovative-approach-to-conserve-colombian-forests/|https://news.mongabay.com/2017/01/amazon-indigenous-redd-an-innovative-approach-to-conserve-colombian-forests/]]</ref> The relevance of these two countries with respect to REDD+ is simple. Much of the Amazon’s primary tropical rainforest falls within these countries jurisdiction and this rainforest has been consistently under threat from external pressures and encroachment, whether that be in the form of land-clearing for commercial ranching, subsistence purposes, illicit drug production or illegal mining practices,<ref name=":8">Sánchez García, P. A. & Wong, G. Y., (2024) “The political economy of deforestation in the Colombian Amazon”, ''Journal of Political Ecology'' ''31''(1), 178–199. [[/doi.org/10.2458/jpe.5230|https://doi.org/10.2458/jpe.5230]]</ref><ref>Radwin, M. (2023). ''Drug trafficking fuels other deforestation drivers in the Amazon: report.'' Mongabay. [[/news.mongabay.com/2023/07/drug-trafficking-fuels-other-deforestation-drivers-in-the-amazon-report/|https://news.mongabay.com/2023/07/drug-trafficking-fuels-other-deforestation-drivers-in-the-amazon-report/]]</ref><ref>Haddad, E.A., Araújo, I.F., Feltran-Barbieri, R., Perobelli, F. S., Rocha, A., Sass, K. S., Nobre, C. A. (2024). Economic drivers of deforestation in the Brazilian Legal Amazon. ''Nat Sustain'' ''7'', 1141–1148. [[/doi.org/10.1038/s41893-024-01387-7|https://doi.org/10.1038/s41893-024-01387-7]] </ref><ref>Hänggli, A., Levy, S. A., Armenteras, D., Bovolo, C. I., Brandão, J., Rueda, X., & Garrett, R. D. (2023). A systematic comparison of deforestation drivers and policy effectiveness across the amazon biome. ''Environmental Research Letters, 18''(7), 073001. [[/doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/acd408|https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/acd408]]</ref> to name a few.

In theory, REDD+ can be used to provide the economic incentive to promote sustained environmental protection of Indigenous land, with a focus on the rights and livelihoods of IPLCs. Currently the overall funding to IPLCs tenure rights and forest management in tropical countries is low, receiving just $270 million per year between 2011-2020 from bilateral and multilateral donors and private philanthropies.<ref>Hatcher, J., Owen, M., Yin, D., (2021). ''Falling short: Donor funding for Indigenous peoples and local communities to secure tenure rights and manage forests in tropical countries (2011 -2020).'' Rainforest Foundation Norway. [[/dv719tqmsuwvb.cloudfront.net/documents/Publikasjoner/Andre-rapporter/RFN Falling short 2021.pdf|https://dv719tqmsuwvb.cloudfront.net/documents/Publikasjoner/Andre-rapporter/RFN_Falling_short_2021.pdf]]</ref> REDD+ has the potential to channel funding as to promote Indigenous rights and autonomy, provided there is transparent and equitable benefit-sharing for those involved. Fundamentally, only with the inclusion of IPLC’s or preferably with IPLC’s acting as project proponents is REDD+ able to promote Indigenous agency and improve IPLC rights and governance. And only when the rights of those inhabiting the land are formally recognized can the land be effectively conserved.<ref>Reytar, K., Veit, P., von Braun, J. (2024). ''Protecting Biodiversity Hinges on Securing Indigenous and Community Land Rights.'' WRI. [[/www.wri.org/insights/indigenous-and-local-community-land-rights-protect-biodiversity|https://www.wri.org/insights/indigenous-and-local-community-land-rights-protect-biodiversity]]</ref> The inclusion of IPLCs in REDD+ project development is therefore considered to be essential for project success, and this is in theory embodied in the very nature of REDD+.<ref name=":1">Alvarez, G., Elfving, M. and Andrade, C. (2016) ‘REDD+ governance and indigenous peoples in Latin America: the case of Suruí Carbon Project in the Brazilian Amazon Forest’, ''Latin American J. Management for Sustainable Development 3''(2) pp.133–146. [[/dx.doi.org/10.1504/LAJMSD.2016.083705|10.1504/LAJMSD.2016.083705]]</ref> Partially owing to a long history of dealing with REDD+, Colombia and Brazil are amongst just a few of the countries hosting tropical rainforests that explicitly recognise community rights to carbon and tie these rights to the legal ownership of lands and forests. In Colombia, carbon rights are tied to rights of the land, whereas in Brazil carbon rights are tied to forest rights.<ref name=":2">RRI and McGill University (2021). Technical report: ''Status of legal recognition of Indigenous Peoples’, Local Communities’ and Afro-descendant Peoples’ rights to carbon stored in tropical lands and forests''. Rights and Resources Initiative. [[/doi.org/10.53892/MLQQ5744|https://doi.org/10.53892/MLQQ5744]]</ref>

==Brazil: The Suruí Forest Carbon Project==
====Project description and location====
The Surui Forest Carbon project was implemented in 2009 on the territory of the Surui people, which is situated in the southern part of Brazil’s Amazon between the states of Rondônia and Mato Grosso. Surui Indigenous territory covers an area of 2,481 km2, though the intention of the PCFS was to protect a portion of this total area. According to the PD, the stated objective was to “prevent 13,575.3 hectares of tropical forest from being cleared by 2038, to avoid the emission of 7,258,352.3 tCO2e to the atmosphere, and to contribute to the preservation of the Paiter Surui lifestyle and traditions.”<ref>IDESAM (2011). ''Project description: Surui forest carbon project''. Institute for Conservation and Sustainable Development of Amazonas. Link: "PROJ_DESC_1118_02FEB2012.PDF" found at [[/registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/1118|https://registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/1118]] </ref> This region sits within one of the Brazilian Amazon’s main ‘arcs of deforestation’ and pressure from loggers and ranchers is a matter of concern.

Notably, the PCFS was the first REDD+ project to be proposed by Indigenous peoples in the Brazilian Amazon on their own territory and was the first to receive certification by both the VCS and CCBS.<ref name=":1" />. Metareilá, the Surui’s own Indigenous association, acted as project proponent and the Institute for Conservation and Sustainable Development of Amazonas (IDESAM) assisted with project development, alongside multiple other stakeholder groups. As an endogenous initiative procured and conducted by the Surui community, the SFCP had a ‘non-centralized model of governance’, which reflected the characteristics and traditions of the Surui people. <ref name=":1" />

Only after two years of consultations between the 24 communities involved and the relevant governmental agencies (primarily FUNAI and the Ministry of Environment) was a Memorandum of Understanding signed, showing community consent to develop the project.<ref name=":3">Garcia, B., Rimmer, L., Canal Vieira, L., Mackey, B., (2021). REDD+ and forest protection on indigenous lands in the Amazon. ''RECIEL 30'', 207–219. [[/doi.org/10.1111/reel.12389|https://doi.org/10.1111/reel.12389]]</ref> In 2012 after verification from an independent third-party body, the Surui were able to sell carbon credits on the international market. Between 2009 and 2014 the project drastically helped limit the deforestation occurring within the project’s site, causing many to deem it a success.<ref name=":4">Howard, F. E., (2023). ''An Analysis of the Suruí Forest Carbon Project in Context of Settler Colonialism''. Masters thesis. Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University. [[/vtechworks.lib.vt.edu/server/api/core/bitstreams/b0cde6de-794c-453f-856b-ee72bde3db06/content|https://vtechworks.lib.vt.edu/server/api/core/bitstreams/b0cde6de-794c-453f-856b-ee72bde3db06/content]]</ref>

====National climate targets, policies and legislation====
Rates of deforestation in Brazil’s legal Amazon are significantly impacted by the government in charge. This is evidenced in the decade between 2012 and 2021 whilst under the conservative Bolsonaro administration, when deforestation in the Amazon increased 185% — from a loss of 4,571 km2 in 2012 to 13,038 km2 in 2021.<ref>INPE (2022). ''Observação da Terra. [[/www.obt.inpe.br/OBT/assuntos/programas/amazonia/prodes|http://www.obt.inpe.br/OBT/assuntos/programas/amazonia/prodes]]''</ref> However, since Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s appointment in 2022 there has been a steady decline in the rate of deforestation, which is now roughly half what it was in 2021.<ref>Terra Brasilis (2024). ''PRODES (deforestation): Deforestation rates – Legal Amazon – States''. [[/terrabrasilis.dpi.inpe.br/app/dashboard/deforestation/biomes/legal amazon/rates|https://terrabrasilis.dpi.inpe.br/app/dashboard/deforestation/biomes/legal_amazon/rates]]</ref> A significant proportion of emissions result from the clearing of rainforest and its subsequent conversion to ranching.<ref>MCTI (2022). ''Estimativas Anuais De Emissões De Gases De Efeito Estufa No Brasil.'' 6ª Edição. Ministério da Estado da Ciência, Tecnologia e Inovações. [[/www.gov.br/mcti/pt-br/acompanhe-o-mcti/sirene/publicacoes/estimativas-anuais-de-emissoes-gee/arquivos/6a-ed-estimativas-anuais.pdf|https://www.gov.br/mcti/pt-br/acompanhe-o-mcti/sirene/publicacoes/estimativas-anuais-de-emissoes-gee/arquivos/6a-ed-estimativas-anuais.pdf]]</ref> To address these emissions Brazil has implemented various adaptation policies, legislation and targets which are summarized below:

TABLE
====Indigenous rights - Constitutional, tenure and bundle rights====
In Brazil, Indigenous rights are robust and clearly defined according to the Brazilian Constitution. As a result, the Indigenous communities of the Brazilian Amazon have legal title to 13.8% of the national territory totalling 1.175 million km2, with a total of 631 territories.<ref>Federal government of Brazil (2024). ''Brazil’s NDC: National determination to contribute and transform''. [[/unfccc.int/sites/default/files/2024-11/Brazil Second Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) November2024.pdf|https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/2024-11/Brazil_Second%20Nationally%20Determined%20Contribution%20%28NDC%29_November2024.pdf]]</ref>

TABLE

Whilst Indigenous communities in Brazil have legal title to land, it is the State that owns it. Indigenous people simply exercise permanent tenure over lands that they traditionally occupy and have ‘original rights’ to these traditional lands, which no other rights can prevail over.<ref name=":3" /> Indigenous lands, though not classified as protected areas, “have the highest level of protection by law because they are regulated by the Constitution” and cannot be leased or restricted without violating their original rights. The Suruí's right to develop the PCFS is grounded in the Brazilian Constitution, which grants Indigenous peoples exclusive rights to use the ‘riches of the soil, rivers and lakes’ of their land, and these rights cannot be overridden. Thus, Indigenous people and only Indigenous people are legally allowed to engage in productive activities on their land, provided these activities are conducted according to their own customs and traditions and are necessary for the wellbeing and cultural expression of their own people. In Brazil, it is the armed forces and federal police that are responsible for enforcing these laws, and FUNAI is responsible for representing Indigenous communities in judicial disputes.<ref name=":3" /> As such, provided a REDD+ does not violate the rights to territorial integrity, permanent land tenure and original rights, it is legally allowed.

'''CARBON RIGHTS:''' In Brazil, carbon rights are tied to forest rights.<ref name=":2" /> Carbon credits from REDD+ projects are seen as part of the economic benefits derived from indigenous lands, and as such, Indigenous communities are entitled to own, control and distribute these revenues themselves. The carbon credits generated from the (SFCP) were wholly owned by the Suruí people through Metareilá, with the Suruí Fund (managed by the Brazilian Biodiversity Fund - FUNBIO) acting as recipient. This legality reinforces Indigenous control over both land and carbon rights, as whoever has rights to the forest land is usually recognized as the owner of carbon rights.<ref name=":3" />

'''FPIC OBLIGATION:''' Furthermore, Brazilian law requires Free, Prior, and Informed Consent (FPIC) for REDD+ projects affecting indigenous lands, ensuring that international standards such as the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) and ILO Convention No. 169 are adhered to; Indigenous consent is, ''de jure,'' a necessity. Projects that violate these rights and fail to consult communities are therefore considered illegal. Notably there are no specific rules or procedures that have been written into the Brazilian constitution that provide guidance on how to achieve FPIC. This freedom reinforces Indigenous autonomy as it allows an Indigenous community to define the rules of consultation according to their customs and traditions.

Collectively these national and international laws provide an important safeguard to Indigenous peoples, making their consent a prerequisite for the establishment of REDD+ projects and recognizing their rights as the main beneficiaries of REDD+ revenues.<ref name=":3" /> However, as carbon rights are tied to forest rights in Brazil and not land rights, carbon is considered to be an ‘environmental service’ (Article 41(I)(A) Brazilian Forestry Code), and states, as well as the federal government, have the jurisdiction to exercise full legislative authority over carbon. <ref name=":2" /> As such, certain states have interpreted the law to imply that the title to carbon credits is attributable to the state.<ref>Loft, L., Ravikumar, A., Gebara, M. F., Pham, T. T., Resosudarmo, I. A. P., Assembe, S., Tovar, J. G., Mwangi, E., & Andersson, K. (2015). Taking Stock of Carbon Rights in REDD+ Candidate Countries: Concept Meets Reality. ''Forests'', ''6''(4), 1031-1060. [[/doi.org/10.3390/f6041031|https://doi.org/10.3390/f6041031]]</ref> Hence, even when carbon rights are clearly defined and tied to forest title it is insufficient in itself, and only by legally recognizing the customary rights of IPLCs can a fair and equitable outcome be realised.

====Interested and affected stakeholders====
TABLE
====Discussion====
Although originally successful in achieving its goal of reducing deforestation and degradation, in 2016 diamonds were discovered in Surui territory, leading to an increase in illegal logging and mining.<ref name=":1" /> By 2018 the project site had been completely overrun by ''garimpeiros'' (small-scale gold miners), ultimately leading to the projects suspension that year. <ref name=":4" />

While the project had initially garnered support, divisions emerged within the community post-project implementation. Disputes arose over the unequal distribution of project revenues, leading to internal conflicts between different Suruí clans. These criticisms escalated in 2014 when the Catholic Indigenous Missionary Council supported calls for an end to the project due to mismanagement of revenues from carbon credit sales. <ref name=":3" /> Some Suruí members also argued that the REDD+ initiative harmed their way of life.<ref>Lang, C. (2014). ''“What are projects for that destroy life?” Interview with Henrique Suruí about the Paiter-Suruí REDD project, Brazil.'' REDD-Monitor. [[/redd-monitor.org/2014/12/17/what-are-projects-for-that-destroy-life-interview-with-henrique-surui-about-the-paiter-surui-redd-project-brazil/|https://redd-monitor.org/2014/12/17/what-are-projects-for-that-destroy-life-interview-with-henrique-surui-about-the-paiter-surui-redd-project-brazil/]]</ref>

Further complicating the situation was the controversial role of Henrique Suruí, one of the Suruí tribal leaders. In 2011, it was revealed that Henrique had violated the tribe's logging moratorium, collaborating with loggers in illegal activities. While Henrique later denied responsibility for the project’s failure, his actions, combined with internal disagreements, illustrated the lack of consensus within the Suruí leadership on the project’s goals and outcomes. Both of the tribe’s leaders possessed dramatically different perspectives on how they believed they could ensure agency, autonomy, and economic benefits for the Suruí people.<ref name=":4" /> This fragmentation within the community, in combination with the discovery of diamonds and the state's failure to protect indigenous land rights led to the indefinite suspension of the REDD+ project.

The project's collapse highlights broader structural issues, particularly the state's inconsistent support for indigenous land rights, influenced by settler colonialism, which undermined the project’s long-term viability.<ref name=":4" /> Additionally, the project’s creation was shaped by external actors, including the collaboration between Almir Suruí and Borges from Forest Trends, a Washington-based NGO. This partnership introduced a Western perspective on viewing the Suruí peoples forest, in contrast with their own perspectives on land use and governance. Furthermore, despite Borges’ Brazilian background, the power dynamics between a global North organization and a developing, Indigenous community were apparent.

====Summary====
The Suruí Forest Carbon Project provides an interesting example of how, even when the rights of IPLC’s are relatively robust, challenges persist in ensuring REDD+ project longevity. As such, in its current state, REDD+ in the Brazilian Amazon may not be a suitable market-based option for indigenous communities in the Amazon.<ref name=":3" /> Although initially successful in promoting indigenous autonomy and reducing deforestation, the project resulted in failure due to of a myriad of factors. Division between Surui communities was exacerbated by a perceived unequal benefit-sharing, and the impact of imposing REDD+ seems to have complicated the traditional social structure that the Surui were dependent on. These issues were influenced by Brazil's settler state dynamics, where indigenous land rights, although legally recognized, are often not upheld in practice due to insufficient enforcement.<ref name=":4" /> Ultimately, the Surui project reveals how settler colonialism's structural flaws make long-term project success difficult, despite initial progress in promoting indigenous autonomy.

At the national and state level, complex institutional and legal land governance structures convolute and impede REDD+ in Brazil. Multiple institutions share responsibilities and there is no comprehensive, authoritative database of land ownership, which hampers efforts to protect indigenous territories.<ref name=":5">Costa, R. (2016)''. Insecure land rights in Brazil: Consequences for rural areas and challenges for improvement.'' Climate Policy Initiative. [[/www.climatepolicyinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/Insecure Land Rights in Brazil CPI.pdf|https://www.climatepolicyinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/Insecure_Land_Rights_in_Brazil_CPI.pdf]]</ref> As a result, land tenure disputes remain common and can be witnessed occurring between the public as well between public and state actors. For example, Brazil’s 1964 Land Statute (Law No. 4504) allows the government to takeover unproductive farms and transfer those lands to landless peasants. This often results in the clearing of forest, as only when the land is cleared is it evidenced to be ‘productive’.<ref name=":5" /> Hence, not only does this law cause insecurity for Indigenous populations in Brazil, it also forces them to go against customary traditions of stewarding the land in an effort to maintain its control.

Whilst the aforementioned points to the futility of REDD+ in Brazil, there is reason to maintain optimism. In a recent landmark ruling Brazil’s supreme court voted in favour of the Xoleng peoples, and the decision will serve as a precedent for all cases involving Indigenous peoples.<ref name=":6">Amos-Flom, K., (2023). ''Triumph and Turmoil: The Xokleng Case and the Future of Indigenous Land Rights in Brazil.'' Columbia Journal of Transnational Law. [[/www.jtl.columbia.edu/bulletin-blog/triumph-and-turmoil-the-xokleng-case-and-the-future-of-indigenous-land-rights-in-brazil|https://www.jtl.columbia.edu/bulletin-blog/triumph-and-turmoil-the-xokleng-case-and-the-future-of-indigenous-land-rights-in-brazil]]</ref> The Xokleng’s land dispute, settled in 2023, “rejected Santa Catarina state’s marco temporal (“time limit”) argument, which would have required Indigenous people to prove they occupied or legally contested the territory they claimed before the Brazilian Constitution came into force in 1988. If successful, this argument would have led to disastrous repercussions, as many indigenous peoples had been forcibly removed or are traditionally nomadic.”<ref name=":6" /> Whilst slow, progress has been made in Brazil in recent years with respect to Indigenous rights as well as the voluntary carbon market itself.

There are currently 159 AFOLU projects listed on the Verra database in Brazil, with only two specifically focused on REDD+ initiatives in collaboration with Indigenous groups. These are the Ka’a Pyahu project, <ref>Verra (n.d.) ''Project 5087: KA'A PYAHU.'' https://registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/5087</ref> initiated by the Guajajara Indigenous people in collaboration with external organizations and validated in 2021, and the ‘Together for the forest Awaete REDD+ project’<ref>Verra (n.d.) ''Project 5200: TOGETHER FOR THE FOREST AWAETÉ REDD+ PROJECT.'' https://registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/5200</ref> which is still under development. Both projects involve Indigenous groups working with Brazilian organizations to build technical capacity and expertise. This could signal a growing trend of Indigenous-led REDD+ projects in the future. To ensure a positive future for REDD+ in Brazil, the customary rights of IPLC’s must be formally recognized. IPLC should have legal ownership of their traditional lands, and in doing so the carbon rights of these communities would be less convoluted, leading to more equitable benefit-sharing and increased cohesion amongst these groups post-project implementation.

To ensure a positive future for REDD+ in Brazil, the customary rights of IPLC’s must be formally recognized. IPLC should have legal ownership of their traditional lands, and in doing so the carbon rights of these communities would be less convoluted, leading to more equitable benefit-sharing and increased cohesion amongst these groups post-project implementation.

==Colombia: ''REDD+ project Resguardo Indigena Unificado - Selva de Mataven (RUI-SM)''==
'''Project description and location'''

According to the PD,<ref name=":7">ACATISEMA & Mediamos (2017). ''Joint project description and monitoring report: REDD+ project: Resguardo Indigena Unificado – Selva de Mataven (RIU – SM).'' Link: “10 06 2017_VCS Final Report_ Matavin Project.pdf” found at [[/registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/1566|https://registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/1566]]</ref> the Resguardo Indígena Unificado – Selva de Matavén (RIU-SM) project is located east of the Colombian Orinoco high plain, in the eastern part of the Department of Vichada, municipality of Cumaribo. It resides on the formalized resguardo of the Sikuani, Piaroa, Puinave, Curripaco, Cubeo and Piapoco ethnic groups, spanning 1,856,836 hectares, with 1,477,115 hectares (79.6%) being forested. The project states that it will reduce greenhouse gas emissions, with a total estimated net reduction of 108,670,562 tons of CO2 equivalent over thirty years, from years 2013 – 2042. By this metric, it is the 14th largest project on the Verra registry, out of over 1700 projects.<ref name=":9">Dufrasne, D., (2021). ''Two Shades of Green: How hot air forest credits are being used to avoid carbon taxes in Colombia''. Carbon Market Watch. [[/carbonmarketwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Two-shades-of-green EN WEB.pdf|https://carbonmarketwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Two-shades-of-green_EN_WEB.pdf]]</ref> There are 12,312 indigenous people living in the RIU-SM, belonging to 2,517 families and 250 communities as of 2017.

The project was initiated and developed by the Asociación de Cabildos y Autoridades Indígenas de la Selva de Matavén (ACETISMA), an Indigenous association, and MEDIAMOS F&M, a Colombian consultancy firm. ACETISMA is comprised of Indigenous leaders that represent the 17 communities of the reservation in charge of governing the territory, and it has administrative autonomy, as well as “the capacity to acquire, to own and to dispose of property, to accept donations, to hold national and international conventions, scientific and cultural exchanges and generally, to celebrate all kinds of negotiations and agreements with which the Association can achieve its objectives.”<ref name=":7" />

There is a stated focus on various means of improving the living conditions of the Indigenous peoples living within the project area. To summarise, the main objectives of the REDD+ project RIU-SM include:

· Community development, in the form of improved education.

· Community engagement with respect to the project; developing information channels to reveal project progress.

· Support local initiatives for environmental education and waste management.

· Developing an effective response system that addresses community proposals and concerns relating to the project.

· Strengthening the governance of ACATISEMA.

====National climate targets, policies and legislation====
The Colombian Amazon makes up over one-third of Colombia’s national territory, and up until 2005 only 7.3% of the Colombian Amazon had been deforested, largely due to the country's 60-year armed conflict between the government, multiple left-wing guerillas such as FARC, and several far-right paramilitary groups.<ref name=":8" /> However, following the signing of the Peace Treaty in 2016 and demobilization of the FARC, limits to deforestation were weakened in the Colombian Amazon. Poor but opportunistic peasants began to encroach into previously unchartered territory and capitalize from the rainforest. Due to the poor economic integration of the Amazon, many were forced to engage with the traditional economies of cocoa and cattle ranching, as these markets were already well connected to regional and global markets.<ref name=":8" /> To address the drivers of deforestation and its associated emissions, the federal government has implemented various initiatives, which are summarized below:
{| class="wikitable"
|'''Document name'''
|'''Type (target, policy or legislation)'''
|'''Publication year'''
|'''Key takeaways'''
|-
|
|Target
|?
|Reduce GHG emissions by 51 % by 2030.
|-
|
|Target
|?
|Net zero by 2050
|-
|National Climate Change Policy (PNCC)
|
|2018
|
|-
|National Forest Conservation Program
|
|2011
|
|-
|Law 1931 of 2018 – Climate Change Law

|
|2018
|
|-
| colspan="4" |Relating to REDD+
|-
|National Strategy for Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (ENREDD+).”
|
|2009
|
|-
|Amazon Indigenous REDD+ Initiative
|
|2012
|
|-
|USAID's Colombia BIOREDD+ program
|
|
|Develop a portfolio of 8 REDD+ projects in four geographic nodes covering over 700,000 hectares in the Colombian Pacific.

|-
|Vision Amazonia
|
|2015
|part of the REDD+ strategy in the country financed by three foreign countries: Germany, Norway and United Kingdom
|}
As a result of the many fund and market-based initiatives that Colombia has engaged with, it hosts the second most REDD+ projects in the world. REDD+ projects now cover at least 56% of the area of legally recognized Indigenous territories in the Colombian Amazon, with an overwhelming majority of carbon projects located on Indigenous territories.<ref name=":10">Schmid, D., & Castro. C., (2023). ''REDD+ projects in the Colombian Amazon: Social challenges and lack of transparency''. Rainforest Foundation Norway. [[/dv719tqmsuwvb.cloudfront.net/documents/REDD rapport 2024 ENG.pdf|https://dv719tqmsuwvb.cloudfront.net/documents/REDD_rapport_2024_ENG.pdf]]</ref> Evidently REDD+ plays an integral part in the country’s efforts of environmental conservation, and incentives have been introduced to promote the development of such projects. For example, in 2016 the government adopted a higher tax that covered fossil fuels, but companies are able to avoid paying the tax by investing in carbon offsets that have been generated domestically.<ref name=":9" /> This led to a boost in the domestic REDD+ market in 2017, as Colombian companies invested as to escape higher taxes. Notably, 23 of the 36 REDD+ projects currently under development in the Amazon region have been initiated in or after 2018.<ref name=":10" /> Currently Colombia’s REDD+ program sits at over 45 pilot and voluntary carbon projects, as well as one large-scale jurisdictional approach in the Amazon.<ref name=":11">Zambrano-Cortés, D. G. (2024). ''The politics, spaces and subjects of forest conservation in Colombia''. [internal PhD, WU, Wageningen University]. Wageningen University. [[/doi.org/10.18174/675328|https://doi.org/10.18174/675328]]</ref>

====Indigenous rights - Constitutional, tenure and bundle rights====
''De jure'', the Indigenous peoples of Colombia have comprehensive tenure and bundle rights that have been articulated in the national constitution. Collective land titles are granted to Indigenous communities by the Colombian government, and as a result about 34 percent of Colombian land (almost 38 million hectares) is legally recognized as Indigenous territory or collective lands of Afro-descendent communities. (Schmid & Castro, 2023) These collective land tenure rights have been in effect since the implementation of the 1991 constitution, granting them the authority to exercise legal control over their territories in accordance with their own customs and procedures.<ref>Max Planck Institute (n.d.) ''Colombia 1991 (rev. 2015).'' Institute. [[/www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Colombia 2015|https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Colombia_2015]]</ref> Furthermore, the carbon rights of Indigenous peoples are explicitly defined in the constitution and tied specifically to the ownership of land of the communities.<ref name=":2" /> This in theory provides a solid legal basis for upholding the rights of Indigenous communities in Colombia, specifically relating to REDD+ activities, as it allows communities to define and negotiate the terms of said projects. A summary of the various laws relating to Indigenous rights have been summarized below:
{| class="wikitable"
| colspan="2" |'''Laws'''
|-
| colspan="2" |'''1991 constitution'''
|-
|Article 63

|Indigenous territories are considered collective property. This means that land is not owned by individuals but is shared by the community. The state must respect these collective rights and cannot alter land ownership without the consent of the Indigenous peoples.
|-
|Article 330
|Indigenous communities have the right to govern their territories.
|-
|Article 76 - ''Consulta previa''.
|Pertains to the right of Indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities to prior consultation before the government or private companies undertake activities that may affect their territories, culture, or way of life.

|-
|Article 63 and 329
|The Reservation is a collective, inalienable, and indefeasible property.
|-
|Decree 1386 of 1994, Article 10; Decree 2164 of 1995, Article 22) 39.
|The administration and management of these lands are subjected to uses and customs of the beneficiaries
|}
Whilst land and tenure rights are enshrined into the constitution, the precariousness of these rights persists due to a lack of resources to ensure enforcement, as well as the deeper issue of corruption. As previously stated, the rate of deforestation increased significantly in Colombia’s post-conflict era, evidencing the nations inability to maintain control over unlawful acts of land-grabbing and disposition. Whilst this began with new peasants converting the Amazon for subsistence purposes, it ultimately led to new areas for the growth of cocoa, much to the benefit of narco-traffickers who could monopolize on this illegal surplus in ‘accumulation by dispossession’.<ref name=":8" />

With respect to the legalities of consultation, Colombia has enshrined ''consulta previa'' into the constitution. Translating to ‘prior consultation’, this legal text provides the formal grounds for Indigenous engagement when any legislative or administrative measures are implemented on Indigenous territory. Importantly, consultation should be achieved in accordance with the customs of the ethnic group with which the project is being imposed upon. However, there have been recent cases of contestation specifically relating to how ''consulta previa'' applies to REDD+ on Indigenous lands, and the RIU – SM project was one that was involved with such a case.

====Interested and affected stakeholders====
{| class="wikitable"
| colspan="5" |'''Affected stakeholders'''
|-
|Stakeholders
|Primary objective(s)
|Secondary objective(s)
|Relative power
|Scope of influence
|-
|ACATISEMA - Asociación de Cabildos y Autoridades Indígenas de la Selva de Matavén
|the Indigenous association comprised of Indigenous leaders in representation of the 16 communities of the reservation in charge of governing the territory.

foster the integral development, social and cultural preservation of the indigenous communities in the Mataven Jungle and to consolidate the territory, selfgovernment by partners, the defense, conservation and preservation of the environment and biodiversity of the Mataven Jungle (ACATISEMA, 2010)

|
|It is the highest authority in the reservation.
|
|-
|MEDIAMOS F&M – A consultancy
|Project developer
|
|
|
|-
|Communities of indigenous peoples of the RIU-SM
|<nowiki>- Primary and direct beneficiaries.</nowiki>
|
|
|
|-
|Teachers of primary and secondary basic education indigenous Reservation
|
|
|
|
|-
|Colonists
|
|
|
|
|-
| colspan="5" |'''Interested stakeholders'''
|-
|Mining Companies and individuals
|Compete with the Project for the territory's resources.
|
|
|
|-
|Ministerio de Ambiente y Desarrollo Sostenible

- Direct participation
|Its main interest is to achieve environmental planning, through the consolidation of a policy of sustainable development and strategic alliances with social and institutional participants in different sectoral and territorial scenarios.
|
|
|
|-
|Dirección de Asuntos Indígenas, ROM y Minorías - Ministerio del Interior

Direct participation
|Public agency that advises the national level, prepares and proposes the formulation of public policy in favor of indigenous peoples within the framework of the defense, support, reinforcement and consolidation of ethnic and cultural rights.
|
|
|
|-
|Corporinoquía

Direct participation
|Regional environmental authority to ensure the proper use of natural resources in their area of jurisdiction.
|
|
|
|-
|Other government institutions: Governor ofice of Vichada, Mayor ofice Cumaribo

Direct participation
|The Reservation for being part of the Cumaribo, Vichada, has territorial jurisdiction relations with the Governor’s office and the Mayor’s office.
|
|
|
|-
|Fundación NATURA

Direct participation
|Civil organization whose mission is the conservation, use and management of biodiversity to generate social, economic and environmental benefits in the context of sustainable human development.
|
|
|
|-
|FONDO ACCIÓN

Direct participation
|Colombian non-profit organization in the private scheme. Encourage the participation of civil society and the private sector in the implementation of the country’s public policies in two areas: - Conservation and sustainable development; and protection -development of children.
|
|
|
|-
|SENA, Department of Social Prosperity (DPS), NGOs and private consultants
|Connected to the area - supporting the implementation of rural development activities.
|
|
|
|-
|Other indigenous communities neighboring RIU-SM
|
|
|
|
|-
|Financial institutions
|They fund local development activities.
|
|
|
|-
|Asocarbono – An industry association, including Verra, ProClima, Biofix, and ACATISEMA.

|
|
|
|
|-
|OPIAC: the National Oganization of the Indigenous Peoples of the Colombian Amazon

|
|
|
|
|}

====Discussion====
According to the official REDD+ Mataven website<ref>RIU – SM (n.d.). ''REDD+ Mataven''. [[/reddmataven.com/|https://reddmataven.com/]]</ref> the project has resulted in a myriad of benefits to the Indigenous communities of the region. For example, as a result of the funds generated from the projects activities, there have been improvements in infrastructure, transportation and education, ultimately leading to the empowerment and improved governance of ACETISMA. However, the project has come under fire for multiple reasons.

For one, in 2015 some of the Indigenous communities filed a lawsuit referring to the violation of their right to ''consulta previa''. However, the court ruled that their Indigenous rights had not been violated as it was ACETISMA that initially sought MEDIAMOS to develop the project, and that ACETISMA were the best representatives of those Indigenous communities. Furthermore, the projects main focus was the conservation of the rainforest and therefore did not threaten the cultural integrity of those communities.<ref name=":10" /> However, regardless of the outcome of this case, its occurrence points to internal disagreement amongst Indigenous participants of the RIU-SM project. In a study involving interviews with Indigenous members of the project, there was a significant proportion of interviewees that had little knowledge regarding various aspects of the project, such as responsibilities of participation, or the benefit-sharing mechanism in place.<ref name=":2" /> This further reinforces the point that, in the case of the RIU-SM project it may not be ‘bottom-up’ and eludes to the power imbalance experienced between the project developer Mediamos and Indigenous community members. In the PD there does exist a breakdown of the distribution of income between ACETISMA, the Indigenous association, and Mediamos, the project developer, which shows a significant proportion of revenue flowing to the former organisation throughout the project’s operations<ref name=":7" /> However, there is currently no publicly available documentation supporting this initial claim<ref name=":9" /> as there is no obligation to do so, leading to a general lack of transparency in the market, and between all of the relevant actors. Subsequent meetings with Indigenous leaders have however shown a marked support of the Mataven project, with one Indigenous leader explicitly stating “...the Redd+ project has brought resources that they never had before, which allowed them to open new school classrooms, 21 rural aqueducts, cocoa crops and even headquarters in Cumaribo and Inírida.”<ref>Lievano, A. B. (2021) Colombia's biggest carbon credit project could be selling hot air. Latin American Center for Investigative Journalism. [[/www.elclip.org/el-mayor-proyecto-de-bonos-de-carbono-de-colombia-podria-estar-vendiendo-aire-caliente/|https://www.elclip.org/el-mayor-proyecto-de-bonos-de-carbono-de-colombia-podria-estar-vendiendo-aire-caliente/]] </ref> Clearly there have been benefits for IPLC’s involved with this project, though the details of this benefit-sharing remain a mystery.

Secondly, the Mataven project has caused controversy due to its apparently inflated carbon credit issuance. This has been achieved by using a reference area that is not representative of the project area, as well as assuming an uncharacteristically heigh assumed rate of deforestation.<ref name=":12">Global Atlas of Environmental Justice (2023). ''Resguardo Indigena Unificado-Selva de Matavén (RIU SM) REDD+ Project, Colombia.'' [[/ejatlas.org/conflict/redd-project-resguardo-indigena-unificado-selva-de-mataven-riu-sm|https://ejatlas.org/conflict/redd-project-resguardo-indigena-unificado-selva-de-mataven-riu-sm]]</ref> The project used a baseline deforestation rate of 0.86% per year, which is significantly more than the Colombian government's national rate of 0.18%. Additionally, according to the report the reference area chosen is more easily accessed and therefore more prone to deforestation, making it an inaccurate comparison to the relatively remote project area.<ref name=":2" /> This has led to the creation of excess carbon credits, or “hot air” credits, which have been criticized for not reflecting real environmental benefits.<ref name=":9" /> To add further insult to injury these credits have been used by a Colombian fossil fuel distributor company to avoid paying taxes, as described earlier by Colombia’s change in policy in 2017. In doing so, the company avoided paying approximately $18.9 million in taxes.<ref name=":2" /> There has been subsequent back and forth between Verra and Carbon Market Watch, with Verra refuting the claims<ref>Verra (2021). ''Carbon Market Watch Report on Colombian REDD+ Projects Contains Flawed Allegations.'' [[/verra.org/carbon-market-watch-report-on-colombian-redd-projects-contains-flawed-allegations/|https://verra.org/carbon-market-watch-report-on-colombian-redd-projects-contains-flawed-allegations/]] </ref> Regardless of the science, Colombia recently introduced a resolution in 2018 (Resolution 1447 – 2018) that requires projects to use baselines that comply with national reference levels.<ref name=":13">Dufrasne, D. (2021b). Companies use ”hot air” forestry offsets to avoid taxes in Colombia: Carbon Market Watch’s fact-check of Verra’s response. Carbon Market Watch. [[/carbonmarketwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/CMWs-fact-check-of-Verras-response-on-Colombia.pdf|https://carbonmarketwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/CMWs-fact-check-of-Verras-response-on-Colombia.pdf]]</ref><ref>IEA (2022). ''Resolution 1447 – 2018. Monitoring, Reporting, and Verification System for mitigation actions at the national level.'' International Energy Agency. [[/www.iea.org/policies/14772-resolution-1447-2018-monitoring-reporting-and-verification-system-for-mitigation-actions-at-the-national-level|https://www.iea.org/policies/14772-resolution-1447-2018-monitoring-reporting-and-verification-system-for-mitigation-actions-at-the-national-level]]</ref> Going forward, REDD+ projects that are being implemented in Colombia will have to abide by Colombia’s national legislation.

====Summary====
Colombia has a long history of engaging in REDD+ as it has been used to limit environmental degradation in the post-conflict era, in alignment with the country’s national peacebuilding agenda.<ref name=":11" /> Owing to the country’s comprehensive tenure and bundle rights, IPLC’s have robust ''de jure'' rights to land as they collectively own it, and rights to carbon are tied to this ownership. This puts Colombia as one of the world leaders in legal terms relating to REDD+ project implementation, but due to a lack of resources to ensure enforcement, as well as corruption, historically these laws have not been adhered to.<ref name=":10" /><ref name=":2" /> There are many documented cases showing the displacement on IPLC’s from traditional lands, poor efforts to adhere to ''consulta previa'', and inequitable benefit sharing.<ref>Greenfield, P. (2023''). The ‘carbon pirates’ preying on Amazon’s Indigenous communities.'' The Guardian. [[/www.theguardian.com/environment/2023/jan/21/amazon-indigenous-communities-carbon-offsetting-pirates-aoe|https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2023/jan/21/amazon-indigenous-communities-carbon-offsetting-pirates-aoe]]</ref><ref name=":14">Lang, C., (2024). ''Colombia’s Constitutional Court rules in favour of Indigenous Peoples. Identifies serious flaws in the REDD+ Baka Rokarire project.'' REDD_Monitor. [[/reddmonitor.substack.com/p/colombias-constitutional-court-rules|https://reddmonitor.substack.com/p/colombias-constitutional-court-rules]]</ref>

The case of the Mataven project provides an interesting example of how it is the market itself that is failing to address concerns regarding transparency, whether that be relating to benefit-sharing amongst relevant stakeholders, or Indigenous representation and engagement throughout the implementation of REDD+ projects. Some ACATISEMA members have explicitly stated their support for the Mataven project,<ref name=":12" /> and its benefits can be seen first-hand in the form of improved infrastructure in local communities involved with the project.<ref>Myers, J. E., Parra, M. A., Bedford, C. (2021). ''How Carbon Offsetting Can Build a Forest.'' Stanford Social Innovation Review. [[/ssir.org/articles/entry/how carbon offsetting can build a forest|https://ssir.org/articles/entry/how_carbon_offsetting_can_build_a_forest]]</ref> However, an exact breakdown of how and where revenue is being distributed to IPLC’s remains elusive.<ref name=":13" /> Furthermore, the level of IPLC engagement has come into question, specifically with reference to ''consulta previa'' and the overall understanding that IPLC’s have regarding the project’s intended outcomes and activities.<ref name=":10" /> This is not a rare case in Colombia and has been witnessed occurring with other projects that have been implemented on Indigenous territories in the Colombian Amazon.<ref>Lang, C., (2023''). “It destroys everything,” says Indigenous leader about the REDD+ Baka Rokarire project in Colombia''. REDD Monitor. [[/reddmonitor.substack.com/p/it-destroys-everything-says-indigenous|https://reddmonitor.substack.com/p/it-destroys-everything-says-indigenous]]</ref> However, a recent ruling by the Colombian Constitutional court voted in favour of Indigenous groups in Colombia, upholding “the rights to self-determination, autonomy, self-government, territory, identity, physical and cultural integrity, and free, prior and informed consent of the indigenous communities”.<ref name=":14" /> This review ultimately sets a legal precedent safeguarding the fundamental rights of IPLCs with REDD+ project implementation and shows that progress is being made to improve the likelihood that REDD+ will result in genuine benefits to those affected by project implementation.

To ensure a more authentic engagement with IPLC’s as to result in legitimate and equitable benefit-sharing, improvements must be made by the Colombian government, as well as within the VCM itself. For the former, Colombia’s national registry for GHG mitigation activities must be updated; it has been offline since 2022.<ref name=":10" /> As a result, transparency is lacking. International finance could be utilized as to alleviate this issue, and only with an accurate and reliable database may the market be regulated. In the broader sense, VCM registries must create stricter guidelines promoting transparency. Often PD’s refer to annexed documents that contain relevant information regarding benefit-sharing, though these are often not publicly available.<ref name=":9" /> This limits transparency and increases the likelihood of inequitable agreements being made between project proponents and developers, further exacerbating existing power asymmetries between the two groups and limiting the likelihood that ''consulta previa'' is honestly adhered to.<ref name=":10" /> This has led to conflict within Indigenous communities, rather than a strengthening of their social fabric.

Furthermore, the Mataven project calls into question the actual emissions reduction that REDD+ projects achievce. Whilst Colombia has since updated its regulations such that REDD+ must use baselines that comply with national reference levels, it is up in the air as to how representative these guidelines are. Reference areas must represent project areas and without the appropriate regulations in place project developers lack the incentive to create realistic baselines; ultimately they are aiming to produce the maximum number of credits as to generate the greatest possible revenues.

==Conclusion==
X
==References==

Documentation:Open Case Studies/FRST522/2024/REDD+ in Indigenous Amazonia: What works and what doesn’t?

2024-12-12T20:01:26Z

ConnorHaynes: /* Positionality */

__TOC__

==Positionality==
First and foremost I am not Indigenous, and whilst there are a myriad of cultures, ontologies and epistemologies that are not sufficiently represented by simply stating ‘Indigenous’, it is commonly accepted that these worldviews are vastly different to those of the ‘Western’ world, which is the world in which I grew up and matured. I am therefore only understanding of Indigenous cultures, beliefs and customary laws based upon available online literature and those which I have learnt through life, in addition to those introduced to me in my Master’s degree. As such, I will never be able to fully relate to an Indigenous person; the best I can do is try to understand and learn. Only throughout this process am I able to work towards reconciliation and attempt to address the inequities experienced by Indigenous folk globally.

Additionally, I am yet to act as a carbon project proponent and so do not understand the nuances or stresses of undertaking such a task. Whilst an individual proponent may have the best intention of procuring a carbon project for its social and environmental benefits, there are a number of stakeholders involved throughout the entire process which influence its eventual outcome. Without experience acting as a project proponent I am naïve in understanding the overall process and it's difficulties.

==Acronyms / Terminology==
AFOLU: Agriculture, Forestry and Other Land-Use

ICVCM: Integrity Council for the Voluntary Carbon Market

IPLC: Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities

KMGBF: Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework

LAC: Latin American Countries

MRV: Monitoring, Reporting and Verification

REDD+: Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation

UNCBD: United Nations Convention on Biological Biodiversity

VCMI: Voluntary Carbon Markets Integrity Initiative

''Additionality:'' Additionality is the determination of whether the project will lead to the expected outcomes when compared to the baseline or ‘business as usual’ emissions.

''Leakage'': Refers to the shifting of emissions to outside the project boundary as a result of the project’s activities.

''Permanence:'' Permanence refers to the degree to which a carbon credit is equivalent to a permanent removal or reduction in emissions.
==Abstract==
This case study illustrates two examples of Indigenous-led REDD+ projects on Indigenous territory in Colombia and Brazil. Both countries have a relatively long history of engaging with REDD+ but have slightly different legal structures pertaining to the rights of Indigenous peoples in their traditional territories, as well as IPLC’s ‘carbon’ rights. As such, the intention is to evaluate how these differing ''de jure'' rights translate on the ground. With respect to REDD+, do certain ''de jure'' rights result in legitimately positive benefits to IPLCs, as well as the environment that these projects were originally intended to protect? To reduce inconsistency, projects were chosen that utilized the same standard, namely Verra’s ‘Verified Carbon Standard’.

The overall intention is such that the reader can evaluate the effectiveness and true benefit of REDD+ projects to IPLC’s, based upon the legal frameworks of the host country. A secondary intention is such that the reader is better equipped to conduct a prefeasibility assessment based upon available online literature, to evaluate the likelihood that REDD+ can be implemented in any chosen country, with the genuine intent of benefiting IPLC’s that are directly affected as a result of REDD+ project implementation.

==REDD+ and the VCM in Brazil and Colombia==
REDD+, originally introduced by the UNFCCC, is a market-based mechanism sitting within the VCM that aims to reverse the loss of forests and carbon stocks, specifically in developing countries. Simply put, an entity or an individual can voluntarily pay another that has engaged with REDD+ and subsequently sequestered carbon, to offset their own emissions using ‘credits’, sold as units of greenhouse gas equivalent to one ton of carbon dioxide (CO2e). Forestry and Land-Use remains to be the largest category of carbon credits traded by transaction volume on the VCM, with REDD+ being the most popular project type in this category, accounting for 78% of credits traded.<ref name=":0">Procton, A., (2024). ''State of the voluntary carbon market 2024: On the path to maturity.'' Forest Trends Ecosystem Marketplace.</ref> Furthermore, over one-third of the credits sold within this category were sourced from projects that had been implemented in LAC and the Caribbean in 2024.<ref name=":0" /> Of the four largest standards issuing carbon credits, Verra accounts for roughly 80% of issuances in Latin America,<ref>Pullins, T. (2022). Growth of carbon markets in Latin America. White & Case. [[/www.whitecase.com/publications/insight/latin-america-focus-fall-2022-growth-carbon-markets|https://www.whitecase.com/publications/insight/latin-america-focus-fall-2022-growth-carbon-markets]] </ref> and even in the face of recent scrutiny,<ref>West, T. A. P., Bofim, B., Haya, B. K. (2024). Methodological issues with deforestation baselines compromise the integrity of carbon offsets from REDD+. ''Global Environmental Change, 87'' [[/doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2024.102863|https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2024.102863]]</ref><ref>Wyburd I., & Dufrasne, G. (2023). Error Log: Exposing the methodological failures of REDD+ forestry projects. Carbon Market Watch. [[/carbonmarketwatch.org/publications/error-log-exposing-the-methodological-failures-of-redd-forestry-projects/|https://carbonmarketwatch.org/publications/error-log-exposing-the-methodological-failures-of-redd-forestry-projects/]]</ref><ref>Haya, B. K., Alford-Jones, K., Anderegg, W. R. L., Beymer-Farris, B., Blanchard, L., Bomfim, B., Chin, D., Evans, S., Hogan, M., Holm, J. A., McAfee, K., So, I. S., West, T. A. P., & Withey, L. (2023). ''Quality assessment of REDD+ carbon credit projects''. Berkeley Carbon Trading Project. [[/gspp.berkeley.edu/research-and-impact/centers/cepp/projects/berkeley-carbontrading-project/REDD+|https://gspp.berkeley.edu/research-and-impact/centers/cepp/projects/berkeley-carbontrading-project/REDD+]]</ref> REDD+ projects clearly account for a significant proportion of the VCM with their continued application likely to persist.<ref>Gordon, O. (2022). ''The interwoven fortunes of carbon markets and indigenous communities.'' Energy Monitor. [[/www.energymonitor.ai/tech/carbon-removal/the-interwoven-fortunes-of-carbon-markets-and-indigenous-communities/|https://www.energymonitor.ai/tech/carbon-removal/the-interwoven-fortunes-of-carbon-markets-and-indigenous-communities/]]</ref><ref>Müller, M., Coustar, C., Bietta, F., Mathres, M. (2022). ''UNFCCC REDD+ and the power of sovereign carbon.'' Deutsche Banke Chief Investment Office. [[/www.rainforestcoalition.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/CIO-Special-UNFCCC-REDD-power-of-sovereign-carbon.pdf|https://www.rainforestcoalition.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/CIO-Special-UNFCCC-REDD-power-of-sovereign-carbon.pdf]]</ref><ref>Pullins, T. (2022). ''Growth of carbon markets in Latin America.'' White & Case. [[/www.whitecase.com/publications/insight/latin-america-focus-fall-2022-growth-carbon-markets|https://www.whitecase.com/publications/insight/latin-america-focus-fall-2022-growth-carbon-markets]] </ref> With the introduction of updated methodologies aimed at addressing these concerns,<ref>Verra (2023a). ''Setting the Standard: Verra’s Revolutionary New REDD Methodology.'' [[/verra.org/program-notice/setting-the-standard-verras-revolutionary-new-redd-methodology/|https://verra.org/program-notice/setting-the-standard-verras-revolutionary-new-redd-methodology/]]</ref><ref>Verra (2023b). ''VM0048 Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation, v1.0.'' [[/verra.org/methodologies/vm0048-reducing-emissions-from-deforestation-and-forest-degradation-v1-0/|https://verra.org/methodologies/vm0048-reducing-emissions-from-deforestation-and-forest-degradation-v1-0/]]</ref> there is hope for renewed buyer confidence in the integrity of this market,<ref>MSCI (2023). ''Verra’s New Methodology for Unplanned Deforestation Aims to Silence the Critics''. [[/www.msci.com/www/blog-posts/verra-s-new-methodology-for/04577808942|https://www.msci.com/www/blog-posts/verra-s-new-methodology-for/04577808942]]</ref> though more work still needs to be done.

Both Colombia and Brazil have a relatively long history of implementing REDD+ projects, using both fund-based and market-based mechanisms. For example, both countries were participants in the ‘Amazon Indigenous REDD+ (RIA in Spanish) initiative, with the first pilot implementation project being initiated in Colombia’s Puiawai Natural Reserve.<ref>Garzón, E., (2017). ''Amazon Indigenous REDD+: An innovative approach to conserve Colombian forests?'' Mongabay. [[/news.mongabay.com/2017/01/amazon-indigenous-redd-an-innovative-approach-to-conserve-colombian-forests/|https://news.mongabay.com/2017/01/amazon-indigenous-redd-an-innovative-approach-to-conserve-colombian-forests/]]</ref> The relevance of these two countries with respect to REDD+ is simple. Much of the Amazon’s primary tropical rainforest falls within these countries jurisdiction and this rainforest has been consistently under threat from external pressures and encroachment, whether that be in the form of land-clearing for commercial ranching, subsistence purposes, illicit drug production or illegal mining practices,<ref name=":8">Sánchez García, P. A. & Wong, G. Y., (2024) “The political economy of deforestation in the Colombian Amazon”, ''Journal of Political Ecology'' ''31''(1), 178–199. [[/doi.org/10.2458/jpe.5230|https://doi.org/10.2458/jpe.5230]]</ref><ref>Radwin, M. (2023). ''Drug trafficking fuels other deforestation drivers in the Amazon: report.'' Mongabay. [[/news.mongabay.com/2023/07/drug-trafficking-fuels-other-deforestation-drivers-in-the-amazon-report/|https://news.mongabay.com/2023/07/drug-trafficking-fuels-other-deforestation-drivers-in-the-amazon-report/]]</ref><ref>Haddad, E.A., Araújo, I.F., Feltran-Barbieri, R., Perobelli, F. S., Rocha, A., Sass, K. S., Nobre, C. A. (2024). Economic drivers of deforestation in the Brazilian Legal Amazon. ''Nat Sustain'' ''7'', 1141–1148. [[/doi.org/10.1038/s41893-024-01387-7|https://doi.org/10.1038/s41893-024-01387-7]] </ref><ref>Hänggli, A., Levy, S. A., Armenteras, D., Bovolo, C. I., Brandão, J., Rueda, X., & Garrett, R. D. (2023). A systematic comparison of deforestation drivers and policy effectiveness across the amazon biome. ''Environmental Research Letters, 18''(7), 073001. [[/doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/acd408|https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/acd408]]</ref> to name a few.

In theory, REDD+ can be used to provide the economic incentive to promote sustained environmental protection of Indigenous land, with a focus on the rights and livelihoods of IPLCs. Currently the overall funding to IPLCs tenure rights and forest management in tropical countries is low, receiving just $270 million per year between 2011-2020 from bilateral and multilateral donors and private philanthropies.<ref>Hatcher, J., Owen, M., Yin, D., (2021). ''Falling short: Donor funding for Indigenous peoples and local communities to secure tenure rights and manage forests in tropical countries (2011 -2020).'' Rainforest Foundation Norway. [[/dv719tqmsuwvb.cloudfront.net/documents/Publikasjoner/Andre-rapporter/RFN Falling short 2021.pdf|https://dv719tqmsuwvb.cloudfront.net/documents/Publikasjoner/Andre-rapporter/RFN_Falling_short_2021.pdf]]</ref> REDD+ has the potential to channel funding as to promote Indigenous rights and autonomy, provided there is transparent and equitable benefit-sharing for those involved. Fundamentally, only with the inclusion of IPLC’s or preferably with IPLC’s acting as project proponents is REDD+ able to promote Indigenous agency and improve IPLC rights and governance. And only when the rights of those inhabiting the land are formally recognized can the land be effectively conserved.<ref>Reytar, K., Veit, P., von Braun, J. (2024). ''Protecting Biodiversity Hinges on Securing Indigenous and Community Land Rights.'' WRI. [[/www.wri.org/insights/indigenous-and-local-community-land-rights-protect-biodiversity|https://www.wri.org/insights/indigenous-and-local-community-land-rights-protect-biodiversity]]</ref> The inclusion of IPLCs in REDD+ project development is therefore considered to be essential for project success, and this is in theory embodied in the very nature of REDD+.<ref name=":1">Alvarez, G., Elfving, M. and Andrade, C. (2016) ‘REDD+ governance and indigenous peoples in Latin America: the case of Suruí Carbon Project in the Brazilian Amazon Forest’, ''Latin American J. Management for Sustainable Development 3''(2) pp.133–146. [[/dx.doi.org/10.1504/LAJMSD.2016.083705|10.1504/LAJMSD.2016.083705]]</ref> Partially owing to a long history of dealing with REDD+, Colombia and Brazil are amongst just a few of the countries hosting tropical rainforests that explicitly recognise community rights to carbon and tie these rights to the legal ownership of lands and forests. In Colombia, carbon rights are tied to rights of the land, whereas in Brazil carbon rights are tied to forest rights.<ref name=":2">RRI and McGill University (2021). Technical report: ''Status of legal recognition of Indigenous Peoples’, Local Communities’ and Afro-descendant Peoples’ rights to carbon stored in tropical lands and forests''. Rights and Resources Initiative. [[/doi.org/10.53892/MLQQ5744|https://doi.org/10.53892/MLQQ5744]]</ref>

==Brazil: The Suruí Forest Carbon Project==
====Project description and location====
The Surui Forest Carbon project was implemented in 2009 on the territory of the Surui people, which is situated in the southern part of Brazil’s Amazon between the states of Rondônia and Mato Grosso. Surui Indigenous territory covers an area of 2,481 km2, though the intention of the PCFS was to protect a portion of this total area. According to the PD, the stated objective was to “prevent 13,575.3 hectares of tropical forest from being cleared by 2038, to avoid the emission of 7,258,352.3 tCO2e to the atmosphere, and to contribute to the preservation of the Paiter Surui lifestyle and traditions.”<ref>IDESAM (2011). ''Project description: Surui forest carbon project''. Institute for Conservation and Sustainable Development of Amazonas. Link: "PROJ_DESC_1118_02FEB2012.PDF" found at [[/registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/1118|https://registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/1118]] </ref> This region sits within one of the Brazilian Amazon’s main ‘arcs of deforestation’ and pressure from loggers and ranchers is a matter of concern.

Notably, the PCFS was the first REDD+ project to be proposed by Indigenous peoples in the Brazilian Amazon on their own territory and was the first to receive certification by both the VCS and CCBS.<ref name=":1" />. Metareilá, the Surui’s own Indigenous association, acted as project proponent and the Institute for Conservation and Sustainable Development of Amazonas (IDESAM) assisted with project development, alongside multiple other stakeholder groups. As an endogenous initiative procured and conducted by the Surui community, the SFCP had a ‘non-centralized model of governance’, which reflected the characteristics and traditions of the Surui people. <ref name=":1" />

Only after two years of consultations between the 24 communities involved and the relevant governmental agencies (primarily FUNAI and the Ministry of Environment) was a Memorandum of Understanding signed, showing community consent to develop the project.<ref name=":3">Garcia, B., Rimmer, L., Canal Vieira, L., Mackey, B., (2021). REDD+ and forest protection on indigenous lands in the Amazon. ''RECIEL 30'', 207–219. [[/doi.org/10.1111/reel.12389|https://doi.org/10.1111/reel.12389]]</ref> In 2012 after verification from an independent third-party body, the Surui were able to sell carbon credits on the international market. Between 2009 and 2014 the project drastically helped limit the deforestation occurring within the project’s site, causing many to deem it a success.<ref name=":4">Howard, F. E., (2023). ''An Analysis of the Suruí Forest Carbon Project in Context of Settler Colonialism''. Masters thesis. Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University. [[/vtechworks.lib.vt.edu/server/api/core/bitstreams/b0cde6de-794c-453f-856b-ee72bde3db06/content|https://vtechworks.lib.vt.edu/server/api/core/bitstreams/b0cde6de-794c-453f-856b-ee72bde3db06/content]]</ref>

====National climate targets, policies and legislation====
Rates of deforestation in Brazil’s legal Amazon are significantly impacted by the government in charge. This is evidenced in the decade between 2012 and 2021 whilst under the conservative Bolsonaro administration, when deforestation in the Amazon increased 185% — from a loss of 4,571 km2 in 2012 to 13,038 km2 in 2021.<ref>INPE (2022). ''Observação da Terra. [[/www.obt.inpe.br/OBT/assuntos/programas/amazonia/prodes|http://www.obt.inpe.br/OBT/assuntos/programas/amazonia/prodes]]''</ref> However, since Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s appointment in 2022 there has been a steady decline in the rate of deforestation, which is now roughly half what it was in 2021.<ref>Terra Brasilis (2024). ''PRODES (deforestation): Deforestation rates – Legal Amazon – States''. [[/terrabrasilis.dpi.inpe.br/app/dashboard/deforestation/biomes/legal amazon/rates|https://terrabrasilis.dpi.inpe.br/app/dashboard/deforestation/biomes/legal_amazon/rates]]</ref> A significant proportion of emissions result from the clearing of rainforest and its subsequent conversion to ranching.<ref>MCTI (2022). ''Estimativas Anuais De Emissões De Gases De Efeito Estufa No Brasil.'' 6ª Edição. Ministério da Estado da Ciência, Tecnologia e Inovações. [[/www.gov.br/mcti/pt-br/acompanhe-o-mcti/sirene/publicacoes/estimativas-anuais-de-emissoes-gee/arquivos/6a-ed-estimativas-anuais.pdf|https://www.gov.br/mcti/pt-br/acompanhe-o-mcti/sirene/publicacoes/estimativas-anuais-de-emissoes-gee/arquivos/6a-ed-estimativas-anuais.pdf]]</ref> To address these emissions Brazil has implemented various adaptation policies, legislation and targets which are summarized below:

TABLE
====Indigenous rights - Constitutional, tenure and bundle rights====
In Brazil, Indigenous rights are robust and clearly defined according to the Brazilian Constitution. As a result, the Indigenous communities of the Brazilian Amazon have legal title to 13.8% of the national territory totalling 1.175 million km2, with a total of 631 territories.<ref>Federal government of Brazil (2024). ''Brazil’s NDC: National determination to contribute and transform''. [[/unfccc.int/sites/default/files/2024-11/Brazil Second Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) November2024.pdf|https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/2024-11/Brazil_Second%20Nationally%20Determined%20Contribution%20%28NDC%29_November2024.pdf]]</ref>

TABLE

Whilst Indigenous communities in Brazil have legal title to land, it is the State that owns it. Indigenous people simply exercise permanent tenure over lands that they traditionally occupy and have ‘original rights’ to these traditional lands, which no other rights can prevail over.<ref name=":3" /> Indigenous lands, though not classified as protected areas, “have the highest level of protection by law because they are regulated by the Constitution” and cannot be leased or restricted without violating their original rights. The Suruí's right to develop the PCFS is grounded in the Brazilian Constitution, which grants Indigenous peoples exclusive rights to use the ‘riches of the soil, rivers and lakes’ of their land, and these rights cannot be overridden. Thus, Indigenous people and only Indigenous people are legally allowed to engage in productive activities on their land, provided these activities are conducted according to their own customs and traditions and are necessary for the wellbeing and cultural expression of their own people. In Brazil, it is the armed forces and federal police that are responsible for enforcing these laws, and FUNAI is responsible for representing Indigenous communities in judicial disputes.<ref name=":3" /> As such, provided a REDD+ does not violate the rights to territorial integrity, permanent land tenure and original rights, it is legally allowed.

'''CARBON RIGHTS:''' In Brazil, carbon rights are tied to forest rights.<ref name=":2" /> Carbon credits from REDD+ projects are seen as part of the economic benefits derived from indigenous lands, and as such, Indigenous communities are entitled to own, control and distribute these revenues themselves. The carbon credits generated from the (SFCP) were wholly owned by the Suruí people through Metareilá, with the Suruí Fund (managed by the Brazilian Biodiversity Fund - FUNBIO) acting as recipient. This legality reinforces Indigenous control over both land and carbon rights, as whoever has rights to the forest land is usually recognized as the owner of carbon rights.<ref name=":3" />

'''FPIC OBLIGATION:''' Furthermore, Brazilian law requires Free, Prior, and Informed Consent (FPIC) for REDD+ projects affecting indigenous lands, ensuring that international standards such as the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) and ILO Convention No. 169 are adhered to; Indigenous consent is, ''de jure,'' a necessity. Projects that violate these rights and fail to consult communities are therefore considered illegal. Notably there are no specific rules or procedures that have been written into the Brazilian constitution that provide guidance on how to achieve FPIC. This freedom reinforces Indigenous autonomy as it allows an Indigenous community to define the rules of consultation according to their customs and traditions.

Collectively these national and international laws provide an important safeguard to Indigenous peoples, making their consent a prerequisite for the establishment of REDD+ projects and recognizing their rights as the main beneficiaries of REDD+ revenues.<ref name=":3" /> However, as carbon rights are tied to forest rights in Brazil and not land rights, carbon is considered to be an ‘environmental service’ (Article 41(I)(A) Brazilian Forestry Code), and states, as well as the federal government, have the jurisdiction to exercise full legislative authority over carbon. <ref name=":2" /> As such, certain states have interpreted the law to imply that the title to carbon credits is attributable to the state.<ref>Loft, L., Ravikumar, A., Gebara, M. F., Pham, T. T., Resosudarmo, I. A. P., Assembe, S., Tovar, J. G., Mwangi, E., & Andersson, K. (2015). Taking Stock of Carbon Rights in REDD+ Candidate Countries: Concept Meets Reality. ''Forests'', ''6''(4), 1031-1060. [[/doi.org/10.3390/f6041031|https://doi.org/10.3390/f6041031]]</ref> Hence, even when carbon rights are clearly defined and tied to forest title it is insufficient in itself, and only by legally recognizing the customary rights of IPLCs can a fair and equitable outcome be realised.

====Interested and affected stakeholders====
TABLE
====Discussion====
Although originally successful in achieving its goal of reducing deforestation and degradation, in 2016 diamonds were discovered in Surui territory, leading to an increase in illegal logging and mining.<ref name=":1" /> By 2018 the project site had been completely overrun by ''garimpeiros'' (small-scale gold miners), ultimately leading to the projects suspension that year. <ref name=":4" />

While the project had initially garnered support, divisions emerged within the community post-project implementation. Disputes arose over the unequal distribution of project revenues, leading to internal conflicts between different Suruí clans. These criticisms escalated in 2014 when the Catholic Indigenous Missionary Council supported calls for an end to the project due to mismanagement of revenues from carbon credit sales. <ref name=":3" /> Some Suruí members also argued that the REDD+ initiative harmed their way of life.<ref>Lang, C. (2014). ''“What are projects for that destroy life?” Interview with Henrique Suruí about the Paiter-Suruí REDD project, Brazil.'' REDD-Monitor. [[/redd-monitor.org/2014/12/17/what-are-projects-for-that-destroy-life-interview-with-henrique-surui-about-the-paiter-surui-redd-project-brazil/|https://redd-monitor.org/2014/12/17/what-are-projects-for-that-destroy-life-interview-with-henrique-surui-about-the-paiter-surui-redd-project-brazil/]]</ref>

Further complicating the situation was the controversial role of Henrique Suruí, one of the Suruí tribal leaders. In 2011, it was revealed that Henrique had violated the tribe's logging moratorium, collaborating with loggers in illegal activities. While Henrique later denied responsibility for the project’s failure, his actions, combined with internal disagreements, illustrated the lack of consensus within the Suruí leadership on the project’s goals and outcomes. Both of the tribe’s leaders possessed dramatically different perspectives on how they believed they could ensure agency, autonomy, and economic benefits for the Suruí people.<ref name=":4" /> This fragmentation within the community, in combination with the discovery of diamonds and the state's failure to protect indigenous land rights led to the indefinite suspension of the REDD+ project.

The project's collapse highlights broader structural issues, particularly the state's inconsistent support for indigenous land rights, influenced by settler colonialism, which undermined the project’s long-term viability.<ref name=":4" /> Additionally, the project’s creation was shaped by external actors, including the collaboration between Almir Suruí and Borges from Forest Trends, a Washington-based NGO. This partnership introduced a Western perspective on viewing the Suruí peoples forest, in contrast with their own perspectives on land use and governance. Furthermore, despite Borges’ Brazilian background, the power dynamics between a global North organization and a developing, Indigenous community were apparent.

====Summary====
The Suruí Forest Carbon Project provides an interesting example of how, even when the rights of IPLC’s are relatively robust, challenges persist in ensuring REDD+ project longevity. As such, in its current state, REDD+ in the Brazilian Amazon may not be a suitable market-based option for indigenous communities in the Amazon.<ref name=":3" /> Although initially successful in promoting indigenous autonomy and reducing deforestation, the project resulted in failure due to of a myriad of factors. Division between Surui communities was exacerbated by a perceived unequal benefit-sharing, and the impact of imposing REDD+ seems to have complicated the traditional social structure that the Surui were dependent on. These issues were influenced by Brazil's settler state dynamics, where indigenous land rights, although legally recognized, are often not upheld in practice due to insufficient enforcement.<ref name=":4" /> Ultimately, the Surui project reveals how settler colonialism's structural flaws make long-term project success difficult, despite initial progress in promoting indigenous autonomy.

At the national and state level, complex institutional and legal land governance structures convolute and impede REDD+ in Brazil. Multiple institutions share responsibilities and there is no comprehensive, authoritative database of land ownership, which hampers efforts to protect indigenous territories.<ref name=":5">Costa, R. (2016)''. Insecure land rights in Brazil: Consequences for rural areas and challenges for improvement.'' Climate Policy Initiative. [[/www.climatepolicyinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/Insecure Land Rights in Brazil CPI.pdf|https://www.climatepolicyinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/Insecure_Land_Rights_in_Brazil_CPI.pdf]]</ref> As a result, land tenure disputes remain common and can be witnessed occurring between the public as well between public and state actors. For example, Brazil’s 1964 Land Statute (Law No. 4504) allows the government to takeover unproductive farms and transfer those lands to landless peasants. This often results in the clearing of forest, as only when the land is cleared is it evidenced to be ‘productive’.<ref name=":5" /> Hence, not only does this law cause insecurity for Indigenous populations in Brazil, it also forces them to go against customary traditions of stewarding the land in an effort to maintain its control.

Whilst the aforementioned points to the futility of REDD+ in Brazil, there is reason to maintain optimism. In a recent landmark ruling Brazil’s supreme court voted in favour of the Xoleng peoples, and the decision will serve as a precedent for all cases involving Indigenous peoples.<ref name=":6">Amos-Flom, K., (2023). ''Triumph and Turmoil: The Xokleng Case and the Future of Indigenous Land Rights in Brazil.'' Columbia Journal of Transnational Law. [[/www.jtl.columbia.edu/bulletin-blog/triumph-and-turmoil-the-xokleng-case-and-the-future-of-indigenous-land-rights-in-brazil|https://www.jtl.columbia.edu/bulletin-blog/triumph-and-turmoil-the-xokleng-case-and-the-future-of-indigenous-land-rights-in-brazil]]</ref> The Xokleng’s land dispute, settled in 2023, “rejected Santa Catarina state’s marco temporal (“time limit”) argument, which would have required Indigenous people to prove they occupied or legally contested the territory they claimed before the Brazilian Constitution came into force in 1988. If successful, this argument would have led to disastrous repercussions, as many indigenous peoples had been forcibly removed or are traditionally nomadic.”<ref name=":6" /> Whilst slow, progress has been made in Brazil in recent years with respect to Indigenous rights as well as the voluntary carbon market itself.

There are currently 159 AFOLU projects listed on the Verra database in Brazil, with only two specifically focused on REDD+ initiatives in collaboration with Indigenous groups. These are the Ka’a Pyahu project, <ref>Verra (n.d.) ''Project 5087: KA'A PYAHU.'' https://registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/5087</ref> initiated by the Guajajara Indigenous people in collaboration with external organizations and validated in 2021, and the ‘Together for the forest Awaete REDD+ project’<ref>Verra (n.d.) ''Project 5200: TOGETHER FOR THE FOREST AWAETÉ REDD+ PROJECT.'' https://registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/5200</ref> which is still under development. Both projects involve Indigenous groups working with Brazilian organizations to build technical capacity and expertise. This could signal a growing trend of Indigenous-led REDD+ projects in the future. To ensure a positive future for REDD+ in Brazil, the customary rights of IPLC’s must be formally recognized. IPLC should have legal ownership of their traditional lands, and in doing so the carbon rights of these communities would be less convoluted, leading to more equitable benefit-sharing and increased cohesion amongst these groups post-project implementation.

==Colombia: ''REDD+ project Resguardo Indigena Unificado - Selva de Mataven (RUI-SM)''==
'''Project description and location'''

According to the PD,<ref name=":7">ACATISEMA & Mediamos (2017). ''Joint project description and monitoring report: REDD+ project: Resguardo Indigena Unificado – Selva de Mataven (RIU – SM).'' Link: “10 06 2017_VCS Final Report_ Matavin Project.pdf” found at [[/registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/1566|https://registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/1566]]</ref> the Resguardo Indígena Unificado – Selva de Matavén (RIU-SM) project is located east of the Colombian Orinoco high plain, in the eastern part of the Department of Vichada, municipality of Cumaribo. It resides on the formalized resguardo of the Sikuani, Piaroa, Puinave, Curripaco, Cubeo and Piapoco ethnic groups, spanning 1,856,836 hectares, with 1,477,115 hectares (79.6%) being forested. The project states that it will reduce greenhouse gas emissions, with a total estimated net reduction of 108,670,562 tons of CO2 equivalent over thirty years, from years 2013 – 2042. By this metric, it is the 14th largest project on the Verra registry, out of over 1700 projects.<ref name=":9">Dufrasne, D., (2021). ''Two Shades of Green: How hot air forest credits are being used to avoid carbon taxes in Colombia''. Carbon Market Watch. [[/carbonmarketwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Two-shades-of-green EN WEB.pdf|https://carbonmarketwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Two-shades-of-green_EN_WEB.pdf]]</ref> There are 12,312 indigenous people living in the RIU-SM, belonging to 2,517 families and 250 communities as of 2017.

The project was initiated and developed by the Asociación de Cabildos y Autoridades Indígenas de la Selva de Matavén (ACETISMA), an Indigenous association, and MEDIAMOS F&M, a Colombian consultancy firm. ACETISMA is comprised of Indigenous leaders that represent the 17 communities of the reservation in charge of governing the territory, and it has administrative autonomy, as well as “the capacity to acquire, to own and to dispose of property, to accept donations, to hold national and international conventions, scientific and cultural exchanges and generally, to celebrate all kinds of negotiations and agreements with which the Association can achieve its objectives.”<ref name=":7" />

There is a stated focus on various means of improving the living conditions of the Indigenous peoples living within the project area. To summarise, the main objectives of the REDD+ project RIU-SM include:

· Community development, in the form of improved education.

· Community engagement with respect to the project; developing information channels to reveal project progress.

· Support local initiatives for environmental education and waste management.

· Developing an effective response system that addresses community proposals and concerns relating to the project.

· Strengthening the governance of ACATISEMA.

====National climate targets, policies and legislation====
The Colombian Amazon makes up over one-third of Colombia’s national territory, and up until 2005 only 7.3% of the Colombian Amazon had been deforested, largely due to the country's 60-year armed conflict between the government, multiple left-wing guerillas such as FARC, and several far-right paramilitary groups.<ref name=":8" /> However, following the signing of the Peace Treaty in 2016 and demobilization of the FARC, limits to deforestation were weakened in the Colombian Amazon. Poor but opportunistic peasants began to encroach into previously unchartered territory and capitalize from the rainforest. Due to the poor economic integration of the Amazon, many were forced to engage with the traditional economies of cocoa and cattle ranching, as these markets were already well connected to regional and global markets.<ref name=":8" /> To address the drivers of deforestation and its associated emissions, the federal government has implemented various initiatives, which are summarized below:
{| class="wikitable"
|'''Document name'''
|'''Type (target, policy or legislation)'''
|'''Publication year'''
|'''Key takeaways'''
|-
|
|Target
|?
|Reduce GHG emissions by 51 % by 2030.
|-
|
|Target
|?
|Net zero by 2050
|-
|National Climate Change Policy (PNCC)
|
|2018
|
|-
|National Forest Conservation Program
|
|2011
|
|-
|Law 1931 of 2018 – Climate Change Law

|
|2018
|
|-
| colspan="4" |Relating to REDD+
|-
|National Strategy for Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (ENREDD+).”
|
|2009
|
|-
|Amazon Indigenous REDD+ Initiative
|
|2012
|
|-
|USAID's Colombia BIOREDD+ program
|
|
|Develop a portfolio of 8 REDD+ projects in four geographic nodes covering over 700,000 hectares in the Colombian Pacific.

|-
|Vision Amazonia
|
|2015
|part of the REDD+ strategy in the country financed by three foreign countries: Germany, Norway and United Kingdom
|}
As a result of the many fund and market-based initiatives that Colombia has engaged with, it hosts the second most REDD+ projects in the world. REDD+ projects now cover at least 56% of the area of legally recognized Indigenous territories in the Colombian Amazon, with an overwhelming majority of carbon projects located on Indigenous territories.<ref name=":10">Schmid, D., & Castro. C., (2023). ''REDD+ projects in the Colombian Amazon: Social challenges and lack of transparency''. Rainforest Foundation Norway. [[/dv719tqmsuwvb.cloudfront.net/documents/REDD rapport 2024 ENG.pdf|https://dv719tqmsuwvb.cloudfront.net/documents/REDD_rapport_2024_ENG.pdf]]</ref> Evidently REDD+ plays an integral part in the country’s efforts of environmental conservation, and incentives have been introduced to promote the development of such projects. For example, in 2016 the government adopted a higher tax that covered fossil fuels, but companies are able to avoid paying the tax by investing in carbon offsets that have been generated domestically.<ref name=":9" /> This led to a boost in the domestic REDD+ market in 2017, as Colombian companies invested as to escape higher taxes. Notably, 23 of the 36 REDD+ projects currently under development in the Amazon region have been initiated in or after 2018.<ref name=":10" /> Currently Colombia’s REDD+ program sits at over 45 pilot and voluntary carbon projects, as well as one large-scale jurisdictional approach in the Amazon.<ref name=":11">Zambrano-Cortés, D. G. (2024). ''The politics, spaces and subjects of forest conservation in Colombia''. [internal PhD, WU, Wageningen University]. Wageningen University. [[/doi.org/10.18174/675328|https://doi.org/10.18174/675328]]</ref>

====Indigenous rights - Constitutional, tenure and bundle rights====
''De jure'', the Indigenous peoples of Colombia have comprehensive tenure and bundle rights that have been articulated in the national constitution. Collective land titles are granted to Indigenous communities by the Colombian government, and as a result about 34 percent of Colombian land (almost 38 million hectares) is legally recognized as Indigenous territory or collective lands of Afro-descendent communities. (Schmid & Castro, 2023) These collective land tenure rights have been in effect since the implementation of the 1991 constitution, granting them the authority to exercise legal control over their territories in accordance with their own customs and procedures.<ref>Max Planck Institute (n.d.) ''Colombia 1991 (rev. 2015).'' Institute. [[/www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Colombia 2015|https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Colombia_2015]]</ref> Furthermore, the carbon rights of Indigenous peoples are explicitly defined in the constitution and tied specifically to the ownership of land of the communities.<ref name=":2" /> This in theory provides a solid legal basis for upholding the rights of Indigenous communities in Colombia, specifically relating to REDD+ activities, as it allows communities to define and negotiate the terms of said projects. A summary of the various laws relating to Indigenous rights have been summarized below:
{| class="wikitable"
| colspan="2" |'''Laws'''
|-
| colspan="2" |'''1991 constitution'''
|-
|Article 63

|Indigenous territories are considered collective property. This means that land is not owned by individuals but is shared by the community. The state must respect these collective rights and cannot alter land ownership without the consent of the Indigenous peoples.
|-
|Article 330
|Indigenous communities have the right to govern their territories.
|-
|Article 76 - ''Consulta previa''.
|Pertains to the right of Indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities to prior consultation before the government or private companies undertake activities that may affect their territories, culture, or way of life.

|-
|Article 63 and 329
|The Reservation is a collective, inalienable, and indefeasible property.
|-
|Decree 1386 of 1994, Article 10; Decree 2164 of 1995, Article 22) 39.
|The administration and management of these lands are subjected to uses and customs of the beneficiaries
|}
Whilst land and tenure rights are enshrined into the constitution, the precariousness of these rights persists due to a lack of resources to ensure enforcement, as well as the deeper issue of corruption. As previously stated, the rate of deforestation increased significantly in Colombia’s post-conflict era, evidencing the nations inability to maintain control over unlawful acts of land-grabbing and disposition. Whilst this began with new peasants converting the Amazon for subsistence purposes, it ultimately led to new areas for the growth of cocoa, much to the benefit of narco-traffickers who could monopolize on this illegal surplus in ‘accumulation by dispossession’.<ref name=":8" />

With respect to the legalities of consultation, Colombia has enshrined ''consulta previa'' into the constitution. Translating to ‘prior consultation’, this legal text provides the formal grounds for Indigenous engagement when any legislative or administrative measures are implemented on Indigenous territory. Importantly, consultation should be achieved in accordance with the customs of the ethnic group with which the project is being imposed upon. However, there have been recent cases of contestation specifically relating to how ''consulta previa'' applies to REDD+ on Indigenous lands, and the RIU – SM project was one that was involved with such a case.

====Interested and affected stakeholders====
{| class="wikitable"
| colspan="5" |'''Affected stakeholders'''
|-
|Stakeholders
|Primary objective(s)
|Secondary objective(s)
|Relative power
|Scope of influence
|-
|ACATISEMA - Asociación de Cabildos y Autoridades Indígenas de la Selva de Matavén
|the Indigenous association comprised of Indigenous leaders in representation of the 16 communities of the reservation in charge of governing the territory.

foster the integral development, social and cultural preservation of the indigenous communities in the Mataven Jungle and to consolidate the territory, selfgovernment by partners, the defense, conservation and preservation of the environment and biodiversity of the Mataven Jungle (ACATISEMA, 2010)

|
|It is the highest authority in the reservation.
|
|-
|MEDIAMOS F&M – A consultancy
|Project developer
|
|
|
|-
|Communities of indigenous peoples of the RIU-SM
|<nowiki>- Primary and direct beneficiaries.</nowiki>
|
|
|
|-
|Teachers of primary and secondary basic education indigenous Reservation
|
|
|
|
|-
|Colonists
|
|
|
|
|-
| colspan="5" |'''Interested stakeholders'''
|-
|Mining Companies and individuals
|Compete with the Project for the territory's resources.
|
|
|
|-
|Ministerio de Ambiente y Desarrollo Sostenible

- Direct participation
|Its main interest is to achieve environmental planning, through the consolidation of a policy of sustainable development and strategic alliances with social and institutional participants in different sectoral and territorial scenarios.
|
|
|
|-
|Dirección de Asuntos Indígenas, ROM y Minorías - Ministerio del Interior

Direct participation
|Public agency that advises the national level, prepares and proposes the formulation of public policy in favor of indigenous peoples within the framework of the defense, support, reinforcement and consolidation of ethnic and cultural rights.
|
|
|
|-
|Corporinoquía

Direct participation
|Regional environmental authority to ensure the proper use of natural resources in their area of jurisdiction.
|
|
|
|-
|Other government institutions: Governor ofice of Vichada, Mayor ofice Cumaribo

Direct participation
|The Reservation for being part of the Cumaribo, Vichada, has territorial jurisdiction relations with the Governor’s office and the Mayor’s office.
|
|
|
|-
|Fundación NATURA

Direct participation
|Civil organization whose mission is the conservation, use and management of biodiversity to generate social, economic and environmental benefits in the context of sustainable human development.
|
|
|
|-
|FONDO ACCIÓN

Direct participation
|Colombian non-profit organization in the private scheme. Encourage the participation of civil society and the private sector in the implementation of the country’s public policies in two areas: - Conservation and sustainable development; and protection -development of children.
|
|
|
|-
|SENA, Department of Social Prosperity (DPS), NGOs and private consultants
|Connected to the area - supporting the implementation of rural development activities.
|
|
|
|-
|Other indigenous communities neighboring RIU-SM
|
|
|
|
|-
|Financial institutions
|They fund local development activities.
|
|
|
|-
|Asocarbono – An industry association, including Verra, ProClima, Biofix, and ACATISEMA.

|
|
|
|
|-
|OPIAC: the National Oganization of the Indigenous Peoples of the Colombian Amazon

|
|
|
|
|}

====Discussion====
According to the official REDD+ Mataven website<ref>RIU – SM (n.d.). ''REDD+ Mataven''. [[/reddmataven.com/|https://reddmataven.com/]]</ref> the project has resulted in a myriad of benefits to the Indigenous communities of the region. For example, as a result of the funds generated from the projects activities, there have been improvements in infrastructure, transportation and education, ultimately leading to the empowerment and improved governance of ACETISMA. However, the project has come under fire for multiple reasons.

For one, in 2015 some of the Indigenous communities filed a lawsuit referring to the violation of their right to ''consulta previa''. However, the court ruled that their Indigenous rights had not been violated as it was ACETISMA that initially sought MEDIAMOS to develop the project, and that ACETISMA were the best representatives of those Indigenous communities. Furthermore, the projects main focus was the conservation of the rainforest and therefore did not threaten the cultural integrity of those communities.<ref name=":10" /> However, regardless of the outcome of this case, its occurrence points to internal disagreement amongst Indigenous participants of the RIU-SM project. In a study involving interviews with Indigenous members of the project, there was a significant proportion of interviewees that had little knowledge regarding various aspects of the project, such as responsibilities of participation, or the benefit-sharing mechanism in place.<ref name=":2" /> This further reinforces the point that, in the case of the RIU-SM project it may not be ‘bottom-up’ and eludes to the power imbalance experienced between the project developer Mediamos and Indigenous community members. In the PD there does exist a breakdown of the distribution of income between ACETISMA, the Indigenous association, and Mediamos, the project developer, which shows a significant proportion of revenue flowing to the former organisation throughout the project’s operations<ref name=":7" /> However, there is currently no publicly available documentation supporting this initial claim<ref name=":9" /> as there is no obligation to do so, leading to a general lack of transparency in the market, and between all of the relevant actors. Subsequent meetings with Indigenous leaders have however shown a marked support of the Mataven project, with one Indigenous leader explicitly stating “...the Redd+ project has brought resources that they never had before, which allowed them to open new school classrooms, 21 rural aqueducts, cocoa crops and even headquarters in Cumaribo and Inírida.”<ref>Lievano, A. B. (2021) Colombia's biggest carbon credit project could be selling hot air. Latin American Center for Investigative Journalism. [[/www.elclip.org/el-mayor-proyecto-de-bonos-de-carbono-de-colombia-podria-estar-vendiendo-aire-caliente/|https://www.elclip.org/el-mayor-proyecto-de-bonos-de-carbono-de-colombia-podria-estar-vendiendo-aire-caliente/]] </ref> Clearly there have been benefits for IPLC’s involved with this project, though the details of this benefit-sharing remain a mystery.

Secondly, the Mataven project has caused controversy due to its apparently inflated carbon credit issuance. This has been achieved by using a reference area that is not representative of the project area, as well as assuming an uncharacteristically heigh assumed rate of deforestation.<ref name=":12">Global Atlas of Environmental Justice (2023). ''Resguardo Indigena Unificado-Selva de Matavén (RIU SM) REDD+ Project, Colombia.'' [[/ejatlas.org/conflict/redd-project-resguardo-indigena-unificado-selva-de-mataven-riu-sm|https://ejatlas.org/conflict/redd-project-resguardo-indigena-unificado-selva-de-mataven-riu-sm]]</ref> The project used a baseline deforestation rate of 0.86% per year, which is significantly more than the Colombian government's national rate of 0.18%. Additionally, according to the report the reference area chosen is more easily accessed and therefore more prone to deforestation, making it an inaccurate comparison to the relatively remote project area.<ref name=":2" /> This has led to the creation of excess carbon credits, or “hot air” credits, which have been criticized for not reflecting real environmental benefits.<ref name=":9" /> To add further insult to injury these credits have been used by a Colombian fossil fuel distributor company to avoid paying taxes, as described earlier by Colombia’s change in policy in 2017. In doing so, the company avoided paying approximately $18.9 million in taxes.<ref name=":2" /> There has been subsequent back and forth between Verra and Carbon Market Watch, with Verra refuting the claims<ref>Verra (2021). ''Carbon Market Watch Report on Colombian REDD+ Projects Contains Flawed Allegations.'' [[/verra.org/carbon-market-watch-report-on-colombian-redd-projects-contains-flawed-allegations/|https://verra.org/carbon-market-watch-report-on-colombian-redd-projects-contains-flawed-allegations/]] </ref> Regardless of the science, Colombia recently introduced a resolution in 2018 (Resolution 1447 – 2018) that requires projects to use baselines that comply with national reference levels.<ref name=":13">Dufrasne, D. (2021b). Companies use ”hot air” forestry offsets to avoid taxes in Colombia: Carbon Market Watch’s fact-check of Verra’s response. Carbon Market Watch. [[/carbonmarketwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/CMWs-fact-check-of-Verras-response-on-Colombia.pdf|https://carbonmarketwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/CMWs-fact-check-of-Verras-response-on-Colombia.pdf]]</ref><ref>IEA (2022). ''Resolution 1447 – 2018. Monitoring, Reporting, and Verification System for mitigation actions at the national level.'' International Energy Agency. [[/www.iea.org/policies/14772-resolution-1447-2018-monitoring-reporting-and-verification-system-for-mitigation-actions-at-the-national-level|https://www.iea.org/policies/14772-resolution-1447-2018-monitoring-reporting-and-verification-system-for-mitigation-actions-at-the-national-level]]</ref> Going forward, REDD+ projects that are being implemented in Colombia will have to abide by Colombia’s national legislation.

====Summary====
Colombia has a long history of engaging in REDD+ as it has been used to limit environmental degradation in the post-conflict era, in alignment with the country’s national peacebuilding agenda.<ref name=":11" /> Owing to the country’s comprehensive tenure and bundle rights, IPLC’s have robust ''de jure'' rights to land as they collectively own it, and rights to carbon are tied to this ownership. This puts Colombia as one of the world leaders in legal terms relating to REDD+ project implementation, but due to a lack of resources to ensure enforcement, as well as corruption, historically these laws have not been adhered to.<ref name=":10" /><ref name=":2" /> There are many documented cases showing the displacement on IPLC’s from traditional lands, poor efforts to adhere to ''consulta previa'', and inequitable benefit sharing.<ref>Greenfield, P. (2023''). The ‘carbon pirates’ preying on Amazon’s Indigenous communities.'' The Guardian. [[/www.theguardian.com/environment/2023/jan/21/amazon-indigenous-communities-carbon-offsetting-pirates-aoe|https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2023/jan/21/amazon-indigenous-communities-carbon-offsetting-pirates-aoe]]</ref><ref name=":14">Lang, C., (2024). ''Colombia’s Constitutional Court rules in favour of Indigenous Peoples. Identifies serious flaws in the REDD+ Baka Rokarire project.'' REDD_Monitor. [[/reddmonitor.substack.com/p/colombias-constitutional-court-rules|https://reddmonitor.substack.com/p/colombias-constitutional-court-rules]]</ref>

The case of the Mataven project provides an interesting example of how it is the market itself that is failing to address concerns regarding transparency, whether that be relating to benefit-sharing amongst relevant stakeholders, or Indigenous representation and engagement throughout the implementation of REDD+ projects. Some ACATISEMA members have explicitly stated their support for the Mataven project,<ref name=":12" /> and its benefits can be seen first-hand in the form of improved infrastructure in local communities involved with the project.<ref>Myers, J. E., Parra, M. A., Bedford, C. (2021). ''How Carbon Offsetting Can Build a Forest.'' Stanford Social Innovation Review. [[/ssir.org/articles/entry/how carbon offsetting can build a forest|https://ssir.org/articles/entry/how_carbon_offsetting_can_build_a_forest]]</ref> However, an exact breakdown of how and where revenue is being distributed to IPLC’s remains elusive.<ref name=":13" /> Furthermore, the level of IPLC engagement has come into question, specifically with reference to ''consulta previa'' and the overall understanding that IPLC’s have regarding the project’s intended outcomes and activities.<ref name=":10" /> This is not a rare case in Colombia and has been witnessed occurring with other projects that have been implemented on Indigenous territories in the Colombian Amazon.<ref>Lang, C., (2023''). “It destroys everything,” says Indigenous leader about the REDD+ Baka Rokarire project in Colombia''. REDD Monitor. [[/reddmonitor.substack.com/p/it-destroys-everything-says-indigenous|https://reddmonitor.substack.com/p/it-destroys-everything-says-indigenous]]</ref> However, a recent ruling by the Colombian Constitutional court voted in favour of Indigenous groups in Colombia, upholding “the rights to self-determination, autonomy, self-government, territory, identity, physical and cultural integrity, and free, prior and informed consent of the indigenous communities”.<ref name=":14" /> This review ultimately sets a legal precedent safeguarding the fundamental rights of IPLCs with REDD+ project implementation and shows that progress is being made to improve the likelihood that REDD+ will result in genuine benefits to those affected by project implementation.

To ensure a more authentic engagement with IPLC’s as to result in legitimate and equitable benefit-sharing, improvements must be made by the Colombian government, as well as within the VCM itself. For the former, Colombia’s national registry for GHG mitigation activities must be updated; it has been offline since 2022.<ref name=":10" /> As a result, transparency is lacking. International finance could be utilized as to alleviate this issue, and only with an accurate and reliable database may the market be regulated. In the broader sense, VCM registries must create stricter guidelines promoting transparency. Often PD’s refer to annexed documents that contain relevant information regarding benefit-sharing, though these are often not publicly available.<ref name=":9" /> This limits transparency and increases the likelihood of inequitable agreements being made between project proponents and developers, further exacerbating existing power asymmetries between the two groups and limiting the likelihood that ''consulta previa'' is honestly adhered to.<ref name=":10" /> This has led to conflict within Indigenous communities, rather than a strengthening of their social fabric.

Furthermore, the Mataven project calls into question the actual emissions reduction that REDD+ projects achievce. Whilst Colombia has since updated its regulations such that REDD+ must use baselines that comply with national reference levels, it is up in the air as to how representative these guidelines are. Reference areas must represent project areas and without the appropriate regulations in place project developers lack the incentive to create realistic baselines; ultimately they are aiming to produce the maximum number of credits as to generate the greatest possible revenues.

==Conclusion==
X
==References==

Documentation:Open Case Studies/FRST522/2024/REDD+ in Indigenous Amazonia: What works and what doesn’t?

2024-12-12T19:56:36Z

ConnorHaynes: /* Summary */

__TOC__

==Positionality==
First and foremost I am not Indigenous, and whilst there are a myriad of cultures, ontologies and epistemologies that are not sufficiently represented by simply stating ‘Indigenous’, it is commonly accepted that these worldviews are vastly different to those of the ‘Western’ world, which is the world in which I grew up and matured. I am therefore only understanding of Indigenous cultures, beliefs and customary laws based upon available online literature and those which I have learnt through life, in addition to those introduced to me in my Master’s degree. As such, I will never be able to fully relate to an Indigenous person; the best I can do is try to understand and learn. Only throughout this process am I able to work towards reconciliation and attempt to address the inequities experienced by Indigenous folk globally.

Additionally, I am yet to act as a carbon project proponent and so do not understand the nuances or stresses of undertaking such a task. Whilst an individual proponent may have the best intention of procuring a carbon project for its social and environmental benefits, ultimately there are a number of stakeholders involved throughout the entire process which influence its eventual outcome. As a market-based mechanism, REDD+ is shackled by the construct in which it operates; fundamentally it is a capitalist means of fixing a capitalist problem, which comes with limitations. Currently there are not the safeguards in place to ensure a project benefits holistically, but without experience acting as a project proponent I am naïve in understanding the influence of these shortcomings.

==Acronyms / Terminology==
AFOLU: Agriculture, Forestry and Other Land-Use

ICVCM: Integrity Council for the Voluntary Carbon Market

IPLC: Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities

KMGBF: Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework

LAC: Latin American Countries

MRV: Monitoring, Reporting and Verification

REDD+: Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation

UNCBD: United Nations Convention on Biological Biodiversity

VCMI: Voluntary Carbon Markets Integrity Initiative

''Additionality:'' Additionality is the determination of whether the project will lead to the expected outcomes when compared to the baseline or ‘business as usual’ emissions.

''Leakage'': Refers to the shifting of emissions to outside the project boundary as a result of the project’s activities.

''Permanence:'' Permanence refers to the degree to which a carbon credit is equivalent to a permanent removal or reduction in emissions.
==Abstract==
This case study illustrates two examples of Indigenous-led REDD+ projects on Indigenous territory in Colombia and Brazil. Both countries have a relatively long history of engaging with REDD+ but have slightly different legal structures pertaining to the rights of Indigenous peoples in their traditional territories, as well as IPLC’s ‘carbon’ rights. As such, the intention is to evaluate how these differing ''de jure'' rights translate on the ground. With respect to REDD+, do certain ''de jure'' rights result in legitimately positive benefits to IPLCs, as well as the environment that these projects were originally intended to protect? To reduce inconsistency, projects were chosen that utilized the same standard, namely Verra’s ‘Verified Carbon Standard’.

The overall intention is such that the reader can evaluate the effectiveness and true benefit of REDD+ projects to IPLC’s, based upon the legal frameworks of the host country. A secondary intention is such that the reader is better equipped to conduct a prefeasibility assessment based upon available online literature, to evaluate the likelihood that REDD+ can be implemented in any chosen country, with the genuine intent of benefiting IPLC’s that are directly affected as a result of REDD+ project implementation.

==REDD+ and the VCM in Brazil and Colombia==
REDD+, originally introduced by the UNFCCC, is a market-based mechanism sitting within the VCM that aims to reverse the loss of forests and carbon stocks, specifically in developing countries. Simply put, an entity or an individual can voluntarily pay another that has engaged with REDD+ and subsequently sequestered carbon, to offset their own emissions using ‘credits’, sold as units of greenhouse gas equivalent to one ton of carbon dioxide (CO2e). Forestry and Land-Use remains to be the largest category of carbon credits traded by transaction volume on the VCM, with REDD+ being the most popular project type in this category, accounting for 78% of credits traded.<ref name=":0">Procton, A., (2024). ''State of the voluntary carbon market 2024: On the path to maturity.'' Forest Trends Ecosystem Marketplace.</ref> Furthermore, over one-third of the credits sold within this category were sourced from projects that had been implemented in LAC and the Caribbean in 2024.<ref name=":0" /> Of the four largest standards issuing carbon credits, Verra accounts for roughly 80% of issuances in Latin America,<ref>Pullins, T. (2022). Growth of carbon markets in Latin America. White & Case. [[/www.whitecase.com/publications/insight/latin-america-focus-fall-2022-growth-carbon-markets|https://www.whitecase.com/publications/insight/latin-america-focus-fall-2022-growth-carbon-markets]] </ref> and even in the face of recent scrutiny,<ref>West, T. A. P., Bofim, B., Haya, B. K. (2024). Methodological issues with deforestation baselines compromise the integrity of carbon offsets from REDD+. ''Global Environmental Change, 87'' [[/doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2024.102863|https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2024.102863]]</ref><ref>Wyburd I., & Dufrasne, G. (2023). Error Log: Exposing the methodological failures of REDD+ forestry projects. Carbon Market Watch. [[/carbonmarketwatch.org/publications/error-log-exposing-the-methodological-failures-of-redd-forestry-projects/|https://carbonmarketwatch.org/publications/error-log-exposing-the-methodological-failures-of-redd-forestry-projects/]]</ref><ref>Haya, B. K., Alford-Jones, K., Anderegg, W. R. L., Beymer-Farris, B., Blanchard, L., Bomfim, B., Chin, D., Evans, S., Hogan, M., Holm, J. A., McAfee, K., So, I. S., West, T. A. P., & Withey, L. (2023). ''Quality assessment of REDD+ carbon credit projects''. Berkeley Carbon Trading Project. [[/gspp.berkeley.edu/research-and-impact/centers/cepp/projects/berkeley-carbontrading-project/REDD+|https://gspp.berkeley.edu/research-and-impact/centers/cepp/projects/berkeley-carbontrading-project/REDD+]]</ref> REDD+ projects clearly account for a significant proportion of the VCM with their continued application likely to persist.<ref>Gordon, O. (2022). ''The interwoven fortunes of carbon markets and indigenous communities.'' Energy Monitor. [[/www.energymonitor.ai/tech/carbon-removal/the-interwoven-fortunes-of-carbon-markets-and-indigenous-communities/|https://www.energymonitor.ai/tech/carbon-removal/the-interwoven-fortunes-of-carbon-markets-and-indigenous-communities/]]</ref><ref>Müller, M., Coustar, C., Bietta, F., Mathres, M. (2022). ''UNFCCC REDD+ and the power of sovereign carbon.'' Deutsche Banke Chief Investment Office. [[/www.rainforestcoalition.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/CIO-Special-UNFCCC-REDD-power-of-sovereign-carbon.pdf|https://www.rainforestcoalition.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/CIO-Special-UNFCCC-REDD-power-of-sovereign-carbon.pdf]]</ref><ref>Pullins, T. (2022). ''Growth of carbon markets in Latin America.'' White & Case. [[/www.whitecase.com/publications/insight/latin-america-focus-fall-2022-growth-carbon-markets|https://www.whitecase.com/publications/insight/latin-america-focus-fall-2022-growth-carbon-markets]] </ref> With the introduction of updated methodologies aimed at addressing these concerns,<ref>Verra (2023a). ''Setting the Standard: Verra’s Revolutionary New REDD Methodology.'' [[/verra.org/program-notice/setting-the-standard-verras-revolutionary-new-redd-methodology/|https://verra.org/program-notice/setting-the-standard-verras-revolutionary-new-redd-methodology/]]</ref><ref>Verra (2023b). ''VM0048 Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation, v1.0.'' [[/verra.org/methodologies/vm0048-reducing-emissions-from-deforestation-and-forest-degradation-v1-0/|https://verra.org/methodologies/vm0048-reducing-emissions-from-deforestation-and-forest-degradation-v1-0/]]</ref> there is hope for renewed buyer confidence in the integrity of this market,<ref>MSCI (2023). ''Verra’s New Methodology for Unplanned Deforestation Aims to Silence the Critics''. [[/www.msci.com/www/blog-posts/verra-s-new-methodology-for/04577808942|https://www.msci.com/www/blog-posts/verra-s-new-methodology-for/04577808942]]</ref> though more work still needs to be done.

Both Colombia and Brazil have a relatively long history of implementing REDD+ projects, using both fund-based and market-based mechanisms. For example, both countries were participants in the ‘Amazon Indigenous REDD+ (RIA in Spanish) initiative, with the first pilot implementation project being initiated in Colombia’s Puiawai Natural Reserve.<ref>Garzón, E., (2017). ''Amazon Indigenous REDD+: An innovative approach to conserve Colombian forests?'' Mongabay. [[/news.mongabay.com/2017/01/amazon-indigenous-redd-an-innovative-approach-to-conserve-colombian-forests/|https://news.mongabay.com/2017/01/amazon-indigenous-redd-an-innovative-approach-to-conserve-colombian-forests/]]</ref> The relevance of these two countries with respect to REDD+ is simple. Much of the Amazon’s primary tropical rainforest falls within these countries jurisdiction and this rainforest has been consistently under threat from external pressures and encroachment, whether that be in the form of land-clearing for commercial ranching, subsistence purposes, illicit drug production or illegal mining practices,<ref name=":8">Sánchez García, P. A. & Wong, G. Y., (2024) “The political economy of deforestation in the Colombian Amazon”, ''Journal of Political Ecology'' ''31''(1), 178–199. [[/doi.org/10.2458/jpe.5230|https://doi.org/10.2458/jpe.5230]]</ref><ref>Radwin, M. (2023). ''Drug trafficking fuels other deforestation drivers in the Amazon: report.'' Mongabay. [[/news.mongabay.com/2023/07/drug-trafficking-fuels-other-deforestation-drivers-in-the-amazon-report/|https://news.mongabay.com/2023/07/drug-trafficking-fuels-other-deforestation-drivers-in-the-amazon-report/]]</ref><ref>Haddad, E.A., Araújo, I.F., Feltran-Barbieri, R., Perobelli, F. S., Rocha, A., Sass, K. S., Nobre, C. A. (2024). Economic drivers of deforestation in the Brazilian Legal Amazon. ''Nat Sustain'' ''7'', 1141–1148. [[/doi.org/10.1038/s41893-024-01387-7|https://doi.org/10.1038/s41893-024-01387-7]] </ref><ref>Hänggli, A., Levy, S. A., Armenteras, D., Bovolo, C. I., Brandão, J., Rueda, X., & Garrett, R. D. (2023). A systematic comparison of deforestation drivers and policy effectiveness across the amazon biome. ''Environmental Research Letters, 18''(7), 073001. [[/doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/acd408|https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/acd408]]</ref> to name a few.

In theory, REDD+ can be used to provide the economic incentive to promote sustained environmental protection of Indigenous land, with a focus on the rights and livelihoods of IPLCs. Currently the overall funding to IPLCs tenure rights and forest management in tropical countries is low, receiving just $270 million per year between 2011-2020 from bilateral and multilateral donors and private philanthropies.<ref>Hatcher, J., Owen, M., Yin, D., (2021). ''Falling short: Donor funding for Indigenous peoples and local communities to secure tenure rights and manage forests in tropical countries (2011 -2020).'' Rainforest Foundation Norway. [[/dv719tqmsuwvb.cloudfront.net/documents/Publikasjoner/Andre-rapporter/RFN Falling short 2021.pdf|https://dv719tqmsuwvb.cloudfront.net/documents/Publikasjoner/Andre-rapporter/RFN_Falling_short_2021.pdf]]</ref> REDD+ has the potential to channel funding as to promote Indigenous rights and autonomy, provided there is transparent and equitable benefit-sharing for those involved. Fundamentally, only with the inclusion of IPLC’s or preferably with IPLC’s acting as project proponents is REDD+ able to promote Indigenous agency and improve IPLC rights and governance. And only when the rights of those inhabiting the land are formally recognized can the land be effectively conserved.<ref>Reytar, K., Veit, P., von Braun, J. (2024). ''Protecting Biodiversity Hinges on Securing Indigenous and Community Land Rights.'' WRI. [[/www.wri.org/insights/indigenous-and-local-community-land-rights-protect-biodiversity|https://www.wri.org/insights/indigenous-and-local-community-land-rights-protect-biodiversity]]</ref> The inclusion of IPLCs in REDD+ project development is therefore considered to be essential for project success, and this is in theory embodied in the very nature of REDD+.<ref name=":1">Alvarez, G., Elfving, M. and Andrade, C. (2016) ‘REDD+ governance and indigenous peoples in Latin America: the case of Suruí Carbon Project in the Brazilian Amazon Forest’, ''Latin American J. Management for Sustainable Development 3''(2) pp.133–146. [[/dx.doi.org/10.1504/LAJMSD.2016.083705|10.1504/LAJMSD.2016.083705]]</ref> Partially owing to a long history of dealing with REDD+, Colombia and Brazil are amongst just a few of the countries hosting tropical rainforests that explicitly recognise community rights to carbon and tie these rights to the legal ownership of lands and forests. In Colombia, carbon rights are tied to rights of the land, whereas in Brazil carbon rights are tied to forest rights.<ref name=":2">RRI and McGill University (2021). Technical report: ''Status of legal recognition of Indigenous Peoples’, Local Communities’ and Afro-descendant Peoples’ rights to carbon stored in tropical lands and forests''. Rights and Resources Initiative. [[/doi.org/10.53892/MLQQ5744|https://doi.org/10.53892/MLQQ5744]]</ref>

==Brazil: The Suruí Forest Carbon Project==
====Project description and location====
The Surui Forest Carbon project was implemented in 2009 on the territory of the Surui people, which is situated in the southern part of Brazil’s Amazon between the states of Rondônia and Mato Grosso. Surui Indigenous territory covers an area of 2,481 km2, though the intention of the PCFS was to protect a portion of this total area. According to the PD, the stated objective was to “prevent 13,575.3 hectares of tropical forest from being cleared by 2038, to avoid the emission of 7,258,352.3 tCO2e to the atmosphere, and to contribute to the preservation of the Paiter Surui lifestyle and traditions.”<ref>IDESAM (2011). ''Project description: Surui forest carbon project''. Institute for Conservation and Sustainable Development of Amazonas. Link: "PROJ_DESC_1118_02FEB2012.PDF" found at [[/registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/1118|https://registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/1118]] </ref> This region sits within one of the Brazilian Amazon’s main ‘arcs of deforestation’ and pressure from loggers and ranchers is a matter of concern.

Notably, the PCFS was the first REDD+ project to be proposed by Indigenous peoples in the Brazilian Amazon on their own territory and was the first to receive certification by both the VCS and CCBS.<ref name=":1" />. Metareilá, the Surui’s own Indigenous association, acted as project proponent and the Institute for Conservation and Sustainable Development of Amazonas (IDESAM) assisted with project development, alongside multiple other stakeholder groups. As an endogenous initiative procured and conducted by the Surui community, the SFCP had a ‘non-centralized model of governance’, which reflected the characteristics and traditions of the Surui people. <ref name=":1" />

Only after two years of consultations between the 24 communities involved and the relevant governmental agencies (primarily FUNAI and the Ministry of Environment) was a Memorandum of Understanding signed, showing community consent to develop the project.<ref name=":3">Garcia, B., Rimmer, L., Canal Vieira, L., Mackey, B., (2021). REDD+ and forest protection on indigenous lands in the Amazon. ''RECIEL 30'', 207–219. [[/doi.org/10.1111/reel.12389|https://doi.org/10.1111/reel.12389]]</ref> In 2012 after verification from an independent third-party body, the Surui were able to sell carbon credits on the international market. Between 2009 and 2014 the project drastically helped limit the deforestation occurring within the project’s site, causing many to deem it a success.<ref name=":4">Howard, F. E., (2023). ''An Analysis of the Suruí Forest Carbon Project in Context of Settler Colonialism''. Masters thesis. Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University. [[/vtechworks.lib.vt.edu/server/api/core/bitstreams/b0cde6de-794c-453f-856b-ee72bde3db06/content|https://vtechworks.lib.vt.edu/server/api/core/bitstreams/b0cde6de-794c-453f-856b-ee72bde3db06/content]]</ref>

====National climate targets, policies and legislation====
Rates of deforestation in Brazil’s legal Amazon are significantly impacted by the government in charge. This is evidenced in the decade between 2012 and 2021 whilst under the conservative Bolsonaro administration, when deforestation in the Amazon increased 185% — from a loss of 4,571 km2 in 2012 to 13,038 km2 in 2021.<ref>INPE (2022). ''Observação da Terra. [[/www.obt.inpe.br/OBT/assuntos/programas/amazonia/prodes|http://www.obt.inpe.br/OBT/assuntos/programas/amazonia/prodes]]''</ref> However, since Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s appointment in 2022 there has been a steady decline in the rate of deforestation, which is now roughly half what it was in 2021.<ref>Terra Brasilis (2024). ''PRODES (deforestation): Deforestation rates – Legal Amazon – States''. [[/terrabrasilis.dpi.inpe.br/app/dashboard/deforestation/biomes/legal amazon/rates|https://terrabrasilis.dpi.inpe.br/app/dashboard/deforestation/biomes/legal_amazon/rates]]</ref> A significant proportion of emissions result from the clearing of rainforest and its subsequent conversion to ranching.<ref>MCTI (2022). ''Estimativas Anuais De Emissões De Gases De Efeito Estufa No Brasil.'' 6ª Edição. Ministério da Estado da Ciência, Tecnologia e Inovações. [[/www.gov.br/mcti/pt-br/acompanhe-o-mcti/sirene/publicacoes/estimativas-anuais-de-emissoes-gee/arquivos/6a-ed-estimativas-anuais.pdf|https://www.gov.br/mcti/pt-br/acompanhe-o-mcti/sirene/publicacoes/estimativas-anuais-de-emissoes-gee/arquivos/6a-ed-estimativas-anuais.pdf]]</ref> To address these emissions Brazil has implemented various adaptation policies, legislation and targets which are summarized below:

TABLE
====Indigenous rights - Constitutional, tenure and bundle rights====
In Brazil, Indigenous rights are robust and clearly defined according to the Brazilian Constitution. As a result, the Indigenous communities of the Brazilian Amazon have legal title to 13.8% of the national territory totalling 1.175 million km2, with a total of 631 territories.<ref>Federal government of Brazil (2024). ''Brazil’s NDC: National determination to contribute and transform''. [[/unfccc.int/sites/default/files/2024-11/Brazil Second Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) November2024.pdf|https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/2024-11/Brazil_Second%20Nationally%20Determined%20Contribution%20%28NDC%29_November2024.pdf]]</ref>

TABLE

Whilst Indigenous communities in Brazil have legal title to land, it is the State that owns it. Indigenous people simply exercise permanent tenure over lands that they traditionally occupy and have ‘original rights’ to these traditional lands, which no other rights can prevail over.<ref name=":3" /> Indigenous lands, though not classified as protected areas, “have the highest level of protection by law because they are regulated by the Constitution” and cannot be leased or restricted without violating their original rights. The Suruí's right to develop the PCFS is grounded in the Brazilian Constitution, which grants Indigenous peoples exclusive rights to use the ‘riches of the soil, rivers and lakes’ of their land, and these rights cannot be overridden. Thus, Indigenous people and only Indigenous people are legally allowed to engage in productive activities on their land, provided these activities are conducted according to their own customs and traditions and are necessary for the wellbeing and cultural expression of their own people. In Brazil, it is the armed forces and federal police that are responsible for enforcing these laws, and FUNAI is responsible for representing Indigenous communities in judicial disputes.<ref name=":3" /> As such, provided a REDD+ does not violate the rights to territorial integrity, permanent land tenure and original rights, it is legally allowed.

'''CARBON RIGHTS:''' In Brazil, carbon rights are tied to forest rights.<ref name=":2" /> Carbon credits from REDD+ projects are seen as part of the economic benefits derived from indigenous lands, and as such, Indigenous communities are entitled to own, control and distribute these revenues themselves. The carbon credits generated from the (SFCP) were wholly owned by the Suruí people through Metareilá, with the Suruí Fund (managed by the Brazilian Biodiversity Fund - FUNBIO) acting as recipient. This legality reinforces Indigenous control over both land and carbon rights, as whoever has rights to the forest land is usually recognized as the owner of carbon rights.<ref name=":3" />

'''FPIC OBLIGATION:''' Furthermore, Brazilian law requires Free, Prior, and Informed Consent (FPIC) for REDD+ projects affecting indigenous lands, ensuring that international standards such as the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) and ILO Convention No. 169 are adhered to; Indigenous consent is, ''de jure,'' a necessity. Projects that violate these rights and fail to consult communities are therefore considered illegal. Notably there are no specific rules or procedures that have been written into the Brazilian constitution that provide guidance on how to achieve FPIC. This freedom reinforces Indigenous autonomy as it allows an Indigenous community to define the rules of consultation according to their customs and traditions.

Collectively these national and international laws provide an important safeguard to Indigenous peoples, making their consent a prerequisite for the establishment of REDD+ projects and recognizing their rights as the main beneficiaries of REDD+ revenues.<ref name=":3" /> However, as carbon rights are tied to forest rights in Brazil and not land rights, carbon is considered to be an ‘environmental service’ (Article 41(I)(A) Brazilian Forestry Code), and states, as well as the federal government, have the jurisdiction to exercise full legislative authority over carbon. <ref name=":2" /> As such, certain states have interpreted the law to imply that the title to carbon credits is attributable to the state.<ref>Loft, L., Ravikumar, A., Gebara, M. F., Pham, T. T., Resosudarmo, I. A. P., Assembe, S., Tovar, J. G., Mwangi, E., & Andersson, K. (2015). Taking Stock of Carbon Rights in REDD+ Candidate Countries: Concept Meets Reality. ''Forests'', ''6''(4), 1031-1060. [[/doi.org/10.3390/f6041031|https://doi.org/10.3390/f6041031]]</ref> Hence, even when carbon rights are clearly defined and tied to forest title it is insufficient in itself, and only by legally recognizing the customary rights of IPLCs can a fair and equitable outcome be realised.

====Interested and affected stakeholders====
TABLE
====Discussion====
Although originally successful in achieving its goal of reducing deforestation and degradation, in 2016 diamonds were discovered in Surui territory, leading to an increase in illegal logging and mining.<ref name=":1" /> By 2018 the project site had been completely overrun by ''garimpeiros'' (small-scale gold miners), ultimately leading to the projects suspension that year. <ref name=":4" />

While the project had initially garnered support, divisions emerged within the community post-project implementation. Disputes arose over the unequal distribution of project revenues, leading to internal conflicts between different Suruí clans. These criticisms escalated in 2014 when the Catholic Indigenous Missionary Council supported calls for an end to the project due to mismanagement of revenues from carbon credit sales. <ref name=":3" /> Some Suruí members also argued that the REDD+ initiative harmed their way of life.<ref>Lang, C. (2014). ''“What are projects for that destroy life?” Interview with Henrique Suruí about the Paiter-Suruí REDD project, Brazil.'' REDD-Monitor. [[/redd-monitor.org/2014/12/17/what-are-projects-for-that-destroy-life-interview-with-henrique-surui-about-the-paiter-surui-redd-project-brazil/|https://redd-monitor.org/2014/12/17/what-are-projects-for-that-destroy-life-interview-with-henrique-surui-about-the-paiter-surui-redd-project-brazil/]]</ref>

Further complicating the situation was the controversial role of Henrique Suruí, one of the Suruí tribal leaders. In 2011, it was revealed that Henrique had violated the tribe's logging moratorium, collaborating with loggers in illegal activities. While Henrique later denied responsibility for the project’s failure, his actions, combined with internal disagreements, illustrated the lack of consensus within the Suruí leadership on the project’s goals and outcomes. Both of the tribe’s leaders possessed dramatically different perspectives on how they believed they could ensure agency, autonomy, and economic benefits for the Suruí people.<ref name=":4" /> This fragmentation within the community, in combination with the discovery of diamonds and the state's failure to protect indigenous land rights led to the indefinite suspension of the REDD+ project.

The project's collapse highlights broader structural issues, particularly the state's inconsistent support for indigenous land rights, influenced by settler colonialism, which undermined the project’s long-term viability.<ref name=":4" /> Additionally, the project’s creation was shaped by external actors, including the collaboration between Almir Suruí and Borges from Forest Trends, a Washington-based NGO. This partnership introduced a Western perspective on viewing the Suruí peoples forest, in contrast with their own perspectives on land use and governance. Furthermore, despite Borges’ Brazilian background, the power dynamics between a global North organization and a developing, Indigenous community were apparent.

====Summary====
The Suruí Forest Carbon Project provides an interesting example of how, even when the rights of IPLC’s are relatively robust, challenges persist in ensuring REDD+ project longevity. As such, in its current state, REDD+ in the Brazilian Amazon may not be a suitable market-based option for indigenous communities in the Amazon.<ref name=":3" /> Although initially successful in promoting indigenous autonomy and reducing deforestation, the project resulted in failure due to of a myriad of factors. Division between Surui communities was exacerbated by a perceived unequal benefit-sharing, and the impact of imposing REDD+ seems to have complicated the traditional social structure that the Surui were dependent on. These issues were influenced by Brazil's settler state dynamics, where indigenous land rights, although legally recognized, are often not upheld in practice due to insufficient enforcement.<ref name=":4" /> Ultimately, the Surui project reveals how settler colonialism's structural flaws make long-term project success difficult, despite initial progress in promoting indigenous autonomy.

At the national and state level, complex institutional and legal land governance structures convolute and impede REDD+ in Brazil. Multiple institutions share responsibilities and there is no comprehensive, authoritative database of land ownership, which hampers efforts to protect indigenous territories.<ref name=":5">Costa, R. (2016)''. Insecure land rights in Brazil: Consequences for rural areas and challenges for improvement.'' Climate Policy Initiative. [[/www.climatepolicyinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/Insecure Land Rights in Brazil CPI.pdf|https://www.climatepolicyinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/Insecure_Land_Rights_in_Brazil_CPI.pdf]]</ref> As a result, land tenure disputes remain common and can be witnessed occurring between the public as well between public and state actors. For example, Brazil’s 1964 Land Statute (Law No. 4504) allows the government to takeover unproductive farms and transfer those lands to landless peasants. This often results in the clearing of forest, as only when the land is cleared is it evidenced to be ‘productive’.<ref name=":5" /> Hence, not only does this law cause insecurity for Indigenous populations in Brazil, it also forces them to go against customary traditions of stewarding the land in an effort to maintain its control.

Whilst the aforementioned points to the futility of REDD+ in Brazil, there is reason to maintain optimism. In a recent landmark ruling Brazil’s supreme court voted in favour of the Xoleng peoples, and the decision will serve as a precedent for all cases involving Indigenous peoples.<ref name=":6">Amos-Flom, K., (2023). ''Triumph and Turmoil: The Xokleng Case and the Future of Indigenous Land Rights in Brazil.'' Columbia Journal of Transnational Law. [[/www.jtl.columbia.edu/bulletin-blog/triumph-and-turmoil-the-xokleng-case-and-the-future-of-indigenous-land-rights-in-brazil|https://www.jtl.columbia.edu/bulletin-blog/triumph-and-turmoil-the-xokleng-case-and-the-future-of-indigenous-land-rights-in-brazil]]</ref> The Xokleng’s land dispute, settled in 2023, “rejected Santa Catarina state’s marco temporal (“time limit”) argument, which would have required Indigenous people to prove they occupied or legally contested the territory they claimed before the Brazilian Constitution came into force in 1988. If successful, this argument would have led to disastrous repercussions, as many indigenous peoples had been forcibly removed or are traditionally nomadic.”<ref name=":6" /> Whilst slow, progress has been made in Brazil in recent years with respect to Indigenous rights as well as the voluntary carbon market itself.

There are currently 159 AFOLU projects listed on the Verra database in Brazil, with only two specifically focused on REDD+ initiatives in collaboration with Indigenous groups. These are the Ka’a Pyahu project, <ref>Verra (n.d.) ''Project 5087: KA'A PYAHU.'' https://registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/5087</ref> initiated by the Guajajara Indigenous people in collaboration with external organizations and validated in 2021, and the ‘Together for the forest Awaete REDD+ project’<ref>Verra (n.d.) ''Project 5200: TOGETHER FOR THE FOREST AWAETÉ REDD+ PROJECT.'' https://registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/5200</ref> which is still under development. Both projects involve Indigenous groups working with Brazilian organizations to build technical capacity and expertise. This could signal a growing trend of Indigenous-led REDD+ projects in the future. To ensure a positive future for REDD+ in Brazil, the customary rights of IPLC’s must be formally recognized. IPLC should have legal ownership of their traditional lands, and in doing so the carbon rights of these communities would be less convoluted, leading to more equitable benefit-sharing and increased cohesion amongst these groups post-project implementation.

==Colombia: ''REDD+ project Resguardo Indigena Unificado - Selva de Mataven (RUI-SM)''==
'''Project description and location'''

According to the PD,<ref name=":7">ACATISEMA & Mediamos (2017). ''Joint project description and monitoring report: REDD+ project: Resguardo Indigena Unificado – Selva de Mataven (RIU – SM).'' Link: “10 06 2017_VCS Final Report_ Matavin Project.pdf” found at [[/registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/1566|https://registry.verra.org/app/projectDetail/VCS/1566]]</ref> the Resguardo Indígena Unificado – Selva de Matavén (RIU-SM) project is located east of the Colombian Orinoco high plain, in the eastern part of the Department of Vichada, municipality of Cumaribo. It resides on the formalized resguardo of the Sikuani, Piaroa, Puinave, Curripaco, Cubeo and Piapoco ethnic groups, spanning 1,856,836 hectares, with 1,477,115 hectares (79.6%) being forested. The project states that it will reduce greenhouse gas emissions, with a total estimated net reduction of 108,670,562 tons of CO2 equivalent over thirty years, from years 2013 – 2042. By this metric, it is the 14th largest project on the Verra registry, out of over 1700 projects.<ref name=":9">Dufrasne, D., (2021). ''Two Shades of Green: How hot air forest credits are being used to avoid carbon taxes in Colombia''. Carbon Market Watch. [[/carbonmarketwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Two-shades-of-green EN WEB.pdf|https://carbonmarketwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Two-shades-of-green_EN_WEB.pdf]]</ref> There are 12,312 indigenous people living in the RIU-SM, belonging to 2,517 families and 250 communities as of 2017.

The project was initiated and developed by the Asociación de Cabildos y Autoridades Indígenas de la Selva de Matavén (ACETISMA), an Indigenous association, and MEDIAMOS F&M, a Colombian consultancy firm. ACETISMA is comprised of Indigenous leaders that represent the 17 communities of the reservation in charge of governing the territory, and it has administrative autonomy, as well as “the capacity to acquire, to own and to dispose of property, to accept donations, to hold national and international conventions, scientific and cultural exchanges and generally, to celebrate all kinds of negotiations and agreements with which the Association can achieve its objectives.”<ref name=":7" />

There is a stated focus on various means of improving the living conditions of the Indigenous peoples living within the project area. To summarise, the main objectives of the REDD+ project RIU-SM include:

· Community development, in the form of improved education.

· Community engagement with respect to the project; developing information channels to reveal project progress.

· Support local initiatives for environmental education and waste management.

· Developing an effective response system that addresses community proposals and concerns relating to the project.

· Strengthening the governance of ACATISEMA.

====National climate targets, policies and legislation====
The Colombian Amazon makes up over one-third of Colombia’s national territory, and up until 2005 only 7.3% of the Colombian Amazon had been deforested, largely due to the country's 60-year armed conflict between the government, multiple left-wing guerillas such as FARC, and several far-right paramilitary groups.<ref name=":8" /> However, following the signing of the Peace Treaty in 2016 and demobilization of the FARC, limits to deforestation were weakened in the Colombian Amazon. Poor but opportunistic peasants began to encroach into previously unchartered territory and capitalize from the rainforest. Due to the poor economic integration of the Amazon, many were forced to engage with the traditional economies of cocoa and cattle ranching, as these markets were already well connected to regional and global markets.<ref name=":8" /> To address the drivers of deforestation and its associated emissions, the federal government has implemented various initiatives, which are summarized below:
{| class="wikitable"
|'''Document name'''
|'''Type (target, policy or legislation)'''
|'''Publication year'''
|'''Key takeaways'''
|-
|
|Target
|?
|Reduce GHG emissions by 51 % by 2030.
|-
|
|Target
|?
|Net zero by 2050
|-
|National Climate Change Policy (PNCC)
|
|2018
|
|-
|National Forest Conservation Program
|
|2011
|
|-
|Law 1931 of 2018 – Climate Change Law

|
|2018
|
|-
| colspan="4" |Relating to REDD+
|-
|National Strategy for Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (ENREDD+).”
|
|2009
|
|-
|Amazon Indigenous REDD+ Initiative
|
|2012
|
|-
|USAID's Colombia BIOREDD+ program
|
|
|Develop a portfolio of 8 REDD+ projects in four geographic nodes covering over 700,000 hectares in the Colombian Pacific.

|-
|Vision Amazonia
|
|2015
|part of the REDD+ strategy in the country financed by three foreign countries: Germany, Norway and United Kingdom
|}
As a result of the many fund and market-based initiatives that Colombia has engaged with, it hosts the second most REDD+ projects in the world. REDD+ projects now cover at least 56% of the area of legally recognized Indigenous territories in the Colombian Amazon, with an overwhelming majority of carbon projects located on Indigenous territories.<ref name=":10">Schmid, D., & Castro. C., (2023). ''REDD+ projects in the Colombian Amazon: Social challenges and lack of transparency''. Rainforest Foundation Norway. [[/dv719tqmsuwvb.cloudfront.net/documents/REDD rapport 2024 ENG.pdf|https://dv719tqmsuwvb.cloudfront.net/documents/REDD_rapport_2024_ENG.pdf]]</ref> Evidently REDD+ plays an integral part in the country’s efforts of environmental conservation, and incentives have been introduced to promote the development of such projects. For example, in 2016 the government adopted a higher tax that covered fossil fuels, but companies are able to avoid paying the tax by investing in carbon offsets that have been generated domestically.<ref name=":9" /> This led to a boost in the domestic REDD+ market in 2017, as Colombian companies invested as to escape higher taxes. Notably, 23 of the 36 REDD+ projects currently under development in the Amazon region have been initiated in or after 2018.<ref name=":10" /> Currently Colombia’s REDD+ program sits at over 45 pilot and voluntary carbon projects, as well as one large-scale jurisdictional approach in the Amazon.<ref name=":11">Zambrano-Cortés, D. G. (2024). ''The politics, spaces and subjects of forest conservation in Colombia''. [internal PhD, WU, Wageningen University]. Wageningen University. [[/doi.org/10.18174/675328|https://doi.org/10.18174/675328]]</ref>

====Indigenous rights - Constitutional, tenure and bundle rights====
''De jure'', the Indigenous peoples of Colombia have comprehensive tenure and bundle rights that have been articulated in the national constitution. Collective land titles are granted to Indigenous communities by the Colombian government, and as a result about 34 percent of Colombian land (almost 38 million hectares) is legally recognized as Indigenous territory or collective lands of Afro-descendent communities. (Schmid & Castro, 2023) These collective land tenure rights have been in effect since the implementation of the 1991 constitution, granting them the authority to exercise legal control over their territories in accordance with their own customs and procedures.<ref>Max Planck Institute (n.d.) ''Colombia 1991 (rev. 2015).'' Institute. [[/www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Colombia 2015|https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Colombia_2015]]</ref> Furthermore, the carbon rights of Indigenous peoples are explicitly defined in the constitution and tied specifically to the ownership of land of the communities.<ref name=":2" /> This in theory provides a solid legal basis for upholding the rights of Indigenous communities in Colombia, specifically relating to REDD+ activities, as it allows communities to define and negotiate the terms of said projects. A summary of the various laws relating to Indigenous rights have been summarized below:
{| class="wikitable"
| colspan="2" |'''Laws'''
|-
| colspan="2" |'''1991 constitution'''
|-
|Article 63

|Indigenous territories are considered collective property. This means that land is not owned by individuals but is shared by the community. The state must respect these collective rights and cannot alter land ownership without the consent of the Indigenous peoples.
|-
|Article 330
|Indigenous communities have the right to govern their territories.
|-
|Article 76 - ''Consulta previa''.
|Pertains to the right of Indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities to prior consultation before the government or private companies undertake activities that may affect their territories, culture, or way of life.

|-
|Article 63 and 329
|The Reservation is a collective, inalienable, and indefeasible property.
|-
|Decree 1386 of 1994, Article 10; Decree 2164 of 1995, Article 22) 39.
|The administration and management of these lands are subjected to uses and customs of the beneficiaries
|}
Whilst land and tenure rights are enshrined into the constitution, the precariousness of these rights persists due to a lack of resources to ensure enforcement, as well as the deeper issue of corruption. As previously stated, the rate of deforestation increased significantly in Colombia’s post-conflict era, evidencing the nations inability to maintain control over unlawful acts of land-grabbing and disposition. Whilst this began with new peasants converting the Amazon for subsistence purposes, it ultimately led to new areas for the growth of cocoa, much to the benefit of narco-traffickers who could monopolize on this illegal surplus in ‘accumulation by dispossession’.<ref name=":8" />

With respect to the legalities of consultation, Colombia has enshrined ''consulta previa'' into the constitution. Translating to ‘prior consultation’, this legal text provides the formal grounds for Indigenous engagement when any legislative or administrative measures are implemented on Indigenous territory. Importantly, consultation should be achieved in accordance with the customs of the ethnic group with which the project is being imposed upon. However, there have been recent cases of contestation specifically relating to how ''consulta previa'' applies to REDD+ on Indigenous lands, and the RIU – SM project was one that was involved with such a case.

====Interested and affected stakeholders====
{| class="wikitable"
| colspan="5" |'''Affected stakeholders'''
|-
|Stakeholders
|Primary objective(s)
|Secondary objective(s)
|Relative power
|Scope of influence
|-
|ACATISEMA - Asociación de Cabildos y Autoridades Indígenas de la Selva de Matavén
|the Indigenous association comprised of Indigenous leaders in representation of the 16 communities of the reservation in charge of governing the territory.

foster the integral development, social and cultural preservation of the indigenous communities in the Mataven Jungle and to consolidate the territory, selfgovernment by partners, the defense, conservation and preservation of the environment and biodiversity of the Mataven Jungle (ACATISEMA, 2010)

|
|It is the highest authority in the reservation.
|
|-
|MEDIAMOS F&M – A consultancy
|Project developer
|
|
|
|-
|Communities of indigenous peoples of the RIU-SM
|<nowiki>- Primary and direct beneficiaries.</nowiki>
|
|
|
|-
|Teachers of primary and secondary basic education indigenous Reservation
|
|
|
|
|-
|Colonists
|
|
|
|
|-
| colspan="5" |'''Interested stakeholders'''
|-
|Mining Companies and individuals
|Compete with the Project for the territory's resources.
|
|
|
|-
|Ministerio de Ambiente y Desarrollo Sostenible

- Direct participation
|Its main interest is to achieve environmental planning, through the consolidation of a policy of sustainable development and strategic alliances with social and institutional participants in different sectoral and territorial scenarios.
|
|
|
|-
|Dirección de Asuntos Indígenas, ROM y Minorías - Ministerio del Interior

Direct participation
|Public agency that advises the national level, prepares and proposes the formulation of public policy in favor of indigenous peoples within the framework of the defense, support, reinforcement and consolidation of ethnic and cultural rights.
|
|
|
|-
|Corporinoquía

Direct participation
|Regional environmental authority to ensure the proper use of natural resources in their area of jurisdiction.
|
|
|
|-
|Other government institutions: Governor ofice of Vichada, Mayor ofice Cumaribo

Direct participation
|The Reservation for being part of the Cumaribo, Vichada, has territorial jurisdiction relations with the Governor’s office and the Mayor’s office.
|
|
|
|-
|Fundación NATURA

Direct participation
|Civil organization whose mission is the conservation, use and management of biodiversity to generate social, economic and environmental benefits in the context of sustainable human development.
|
|
|
|-
|FONDO ACCIÓN

Direct participation
|Colombian non-profit organization in the private scheme. Encourage the participation of civil society and the private sector in the implementation of the country’s public policies in two areas: - Conservation and sustainable development; and protection -development of children.
|
|
|
|-
|SENA, Department of Social Prosperity (DPS), NGOs and private consultants
|Connected to the area - supporting the implementation of rural development activities.
|
|
|
|-
|Other indigenous communities neighboring RIU-SM
|
|
|
|
|-
|Financial institutions
|They fund local development activities.
|
|
|
|-
|Asocarbono – An industry association, including Verra, ProClima, Biofix, and ACATISEMA.

|
|
|
|
|-
|OPIAC: the National Oganization of the Indigenous Peoples of the Colombian Amazon

|
|
|
|
|}

====Discussion====
According to the official REDD+ Mataven website<ref>RIU – SM (n.d.). ''REDD+ Mataven''. [[/reddmataven.com/|https://reddmataven.com/]]</ref> the project has resulted in a myriad of benefits to the Indigenous communities of the region. For example, as a result of the funds generated from the projects activities, there have been improvements in infrastructure, transportation and education, ultimately leading to the empowerment and improved governance of ACETISMA. However, the project has come under fire for multiple reasons.

For one, in 2015 some of the Indigenous communities filed a lawsuit referring to the violation of their right to ''consulta previa''. However, the court ruled that their Indigenous rights had not been violated as it was ACETISMA that initially sought MEDIAMOS to develop the project, and that ACETISMA were the best representatives of those Indigenous communities. Furthermore, the projects main focus was the conservation of the rainforest and therefore did not threaten the cultural integrity of those communities.<ref name=":10" /> However, regardless of the outcome of this case, its occurrence points to internal disagreement amongst Indigenous participants of the RIU-SM project. In a study involving interviews with Indigenous members of the project, there was a significant proportion of interviewees that had little knowledge regarding various aspects of the project, such as responsibilities of participation, or the benefit-sharing mechanism in place.<ref name=":2" /> This further reinforces the point that, in the case of the RIU-SM project it may not be ‘bottom-up’ and eludes to the power imbalance experienced between the project developer Mediamos and Indigenous community members. In the PD there does exist a breakdown of the distribution of income between ACETISMA, the Indigenous association, and Mediamos, the project developer, which shows a significant proportion of revenue flowing to the former organisation throughout the project’s operations<ref name=":7" /> However, there is currently no publicly available documentation supporting this initial claim<ref name=":9" /> as there is no obligation to do so, leading to a general lack of transparency in the market, and between all of the relevant actors. Subsequent meetings with Indigenous leaders have however shown a marked support of the Mataven project, with one Indigenous leader explicitly stating “...the Redd+ project has brought resources that they never had before, which allowed them to open new school classrooms, 21 rural aqueducts, cocoa crops and even headquarters in Cumaribo and Inírida.”<ref>Lievano, A. B. (2021) Colombia's biggest carbon credit project could be selling hot air. Latin American Center for Investigative Journalism. [[/www.elclip.org/el-mayor-proyecto-de-bonos-de-carbono-de-colombia-podria-estar-vendiendo-aire-caliente/|https://www.elclip.org/el-mayor-proyecto-de-bonos-de-carbono-de-colombia-podria-estar-vendiendo-aire-caliente/]] </ref> Clearly there have been benefits for IPLC’s involved with this project, though the details of this benefit-sharing remain a mystery.

Secondly, the Mataven project has caused controversy due to its apparently inflated carbon credit issuance. This has been achieved by using a reference area that is not representative of the project area, as well as assuming an uncharacteristically heigh assumed rate of deforestation.<ref name=":12">Global Atlas of Environmental Justice (2023). ''Resguardo Indigena Unificado-Selva de Matavén (RIU SM) REDD+ Project, Colombia.'' [[/ejatlas.org/conflict/redd-project-resguardo-indigena-unificado-selva-de-mataven-riu-sm|https://ejatlas.org/conflict/redd-project-resguardo-indigena-unificado-selva-de-mataven-riu-sm]]</ref> The project used a baseline deforestation rate of 0.86% per year, which is significantly more than the Colombian government's national rate of 0.18%. Additionally, according to the report the reference area chosen is more easily accessed and therefore more prone to deforestation, making it an inaccurate comparison to the relatively remote project area.<ref name=":2" /> This has led to the creation of excess carbon credits, or “hot air” credits, which have been criticized for not reflecting real environmental benefits.<ref name=":9" /> To add further insult to injury these credits have been used by a Colombian fossil fuel distributor company to avoid paying taxes, as described earlier by Colombia’s change in policy in 2017. In doing so, the company avoided paying approximately $18.9 million in taxes.<ref name=":2" /> There has been subsequent back and forth between Verra and Carbon Market Watch, with Verra refuting the claims<ref>Verra (2021). ''Carbon Market Watch Report on Colombian REDD+ Projects Contains Flawed Allegations.'' [[/verra.org/carbon-market-watch-report-on-colombian-redd-projects-contains-flawed-allegations/|https://verra.org/carbon-market-watch-report-on-colombian-redd-projects-contains-flawed-allegations/]] </ref> Regardless of the science, Colombia recently introduced a resolution in 2018 (Resolution 1447 – 2018) that requires projects to use baselines that comply with national reference levels.<ref name=":13">Dufrasne, D. (2021b). Companies use ”hot air” forestry offsets to avoid taxes in Colombia: Carbon Market Watch’s fact-check of Verra’s response. Carbon Market Watch. [[/carbonmarketwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/CMWs-fact-check-of-Verras-response-on-Colombia.pdf|https://carbonmarketwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/CMWs-fact-check-of-Verras-response-on-Colombia.pdf]]</ref><ref>IEA (2022). ''Resolution 1447 – 2018. Monitoring, Reporting, and Verification System for mitigation actions at the national level.'' International Energy Agency. [[/www.iea.org/policies/14772-resolution-1447-2018-monitoring-reporting-and-verification-system-for-mitigation-actions-at-the-national-level|https://www.iea.org/policies/14772-resolution-1447-2018-monitoring-reporting-and-verification-system-for-mitigation-actions-at-the-national-level]]</ref> Going forward, REDD+ projects that are being implemented in Colombia will have to abide by Colombia’s national legislation.

====Summary====
Colombia has a long history of engaging in REDD+ as it has been used to limit environmental degradation in the post-conflict era, in alignment with the country’s national peacebuilding agenda.<ref name=":11" /> Owing to the country’s comprehensive tenure and bundle rights, IPLC’s have robust ''de jure'' rights to land as they collectively own it, and rights to carbon are tied to this ownership. This puts Colombia as one of the world leaders in legal terms relating to REDD+ project implementation, but due to a lack of resources to ensure enforcement, as well as corruption, historically these laws have not been adhered to.<ref name=":10" /><ref name=":2" /> There are many documented cases showing the displacement on IPLC’s from traditional lands, poor efforts to adhere to ''consulta previa'', and inequitable benefit sharing.<ref>Greenfield, P. (2023''). The ‘carbon pirates’ preying on Amazon’s Indigenous communities.'' The Guardian. [[/www.theguardian.com/environment/2023/jan/21/amazon-indigenous-communities-carbon-offsetting-pirates-aoe|https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2023/jan/21/amazon-indigenous-communities-carbon-offsetting-pirates-aoe]]</ref><ref name=":14">Lang, C., (2024). ''Colombia’s Constitutional Court rules in favour of Indigenous Peoples. Identifies serious flaws in the REDD+ Baka Rokarire project.'' REDD_Monitor. [[/reddmonitor.substack.com/p/colombias-constitutional-court-rules|https://reddmonitor.substack.com/p/colombias-constitutional-court-rules]]</ref>

The case of the Mataven project provides an interesting example of how it is the market itself that is failing to address concerns regarding transparency, whether that be relating to benefit-sharing amongst relevant stakeholders, or Indigenous representation and engagement throughout the implementation of REDD+ projects. Some ACATISEMA members have explicitly stated their support for the Mataven project,<ref name=":12" /> and its benefits can be seen first-hand in the form of improved infrastructure in local communities involved with the project.<ref>Myers, J. E., Parra, M. A., Bedford, C. (2021). ''How Carbon Offsetting Can Build a Forest.'' Stanford Social Innovation Review. [[/ssir.org/articles/entry/how carbon offsetting can build a forest|https://ssir.org/articles/entry/how_carbon_offsetting_can_build_a_forest]]</ref> However, an exact breakdown of how and where revenue is being distributed to IPLC’s remains elusive.<ref name=":13" /> Furthermore, the level of IPLC engagement has come into question, specifically with reference to ''consulta previa'' and the overall understanding that IPLC’s have regarding the project’s intended outcomes and activities.<ref name=":10" /> This is not a rare case in Colombia and has been witnessed occurring with other projects that have been implemented on Indigenous territories in the Colombian Amazon.<ref>Lang, C., (2023''). “It destroys everything,” says Indigenous leader about the REDD+ Baka Rokarire project in Colombia''. REDD Monitor. [[/reddmonitor.substack.com/p/it-destroys-everything-says-indigenous|https://reddmonitor.substack.com/p/it-destroys-everything-says-indigenous]]</ref> However, a recent ruling by the Colombian Constitutional court voted in favour of Indigenous groups in Colombia, upholding “the rights to self-determination, autonomy, self-government, territory, identity, physical and cultural integrity, and free, prior and informed consent of the indigenous communities”.<ref name=":14" /> This review ultimately sets a legal precedent safeguarding the fundamental rights of IPLCs with REDD+ project implementation and shows that progress is being made to improve the likelihood that REDD+ will result in genuine benefits to those affected by project implementation.

To ensure a more authentic engagement with IPLC’s as to result in legitimate and equitable benefit-sharing, improvements must be made by the Colombian government, as well as within the VCM itself. For the former, Colombia’s national registry for GHG mitigation activities must be updated; it has been offline since 2022.<ref name=":10" /> As a result, transparency is lacking. International finance could be utilized as to alleviate this issue, and only with an accurate and reliable database may the market be regulated. In the broader sense, VCM registries must create stricter guidelines promoting transparency. Often PD’s refer to annexed documents that contain relevant information regarding benefit-sharing, though these are often not publicly available.<ref name=":9" /> This limits transparency and increases the likelihood of inequitable agreements being made between project proponents and developers, further exacerbating existing power asymmetries between the two groups and limiting the likelihood that ''consulta previa'' is honestly adhered to.<ref name=":10" /> This has led to conflict within Indigenous communities, rather than a strengthening of their social fabric.

Furthermore, the Mataven project calls into question the actual emissions reduction that REDD+ projects achievce. Whilst Colombia has since updated its regulations such that REDD+ must use baselines that comply with national reference levels, it is up in the air as to how representative these guidelines are. Reference areas must represent project areas and without the appropriate regulations in place project developers lack the incentive to create realistic baselines; ultimately they are aiming to produce the maximum number of credits as to generate the greatest possible revenues.

==Conclusion==
X
==References==