Documentation:Open Case Studies/FRST522/2025/Collective Forest Tenure Reform in Fujian Province, China: From Pilot Implementation to Full-Scale Execution (2000-2020)

Abstract

This paper examines the collective forest tenure reform in Fujian Province, China over the past two decades and places this provincial experience within the national development process of China's collective forest tenure reform (CFTR). Through policy documents, secondary literature and comparative case studies, this paper traces how the reform gradually devolved forest tenure rights from collective to households since the late 1970s, while reshaping ownership structures, local governance mechanisms and farmers' investment incentives.

First of all, I reviewed the development processes of national policies, from Three Fixes and Household Responsibility System in 1978 to Document No. 9 (2003) and the 2008 Decisions on comprehensive CFTR. In this background, I analysis the specific pathway in Fujian, the early implementation of share-hold system, the 1998 pilot of forest tenure individualization in Hongtian Village, subsequent provincial pilots after 2003, and full-scale implementation after 2008. Nowadays, Fujian has diverse ownership categories and tenure types, including individual household management and partnership forestland to ecological public forests and ecological reserves.

The case study in Fujian shows that forest tenure reform enhanced farmers’ rights awareness and improved their tenure security. Furthermore, it significantly improves forest investments, especially in high-value economic forests and bamboo forests. Besides, the transfer of forest tenure became more active, increasing afforestation and improving carbon sequestrations. However, through comparisons between national and international, especially Hunan, China and Alabama, USA, I figure out there are still some gaps between home and abroad. And China is still facing continuous challenges, such as low growth rates, low quality issues, etc.

Then, this article talks about governance and equity concerns. Fragmentation and parcelization, multi-level and sometimes overlapping management, elite capture, uneven regional effects, and tensions between customary regulations and formal law all complicate implementations. Unclear boundaries, limited compensation for ecological forests, and difficulties in understanding contracts for low-educated local people undermine tenure security in practice. Therefore, I share my opinions on future directions: prioritizing substantive security over formalism; reforming harvest quota systems; strengthening forest cooperatives; refining forest classification and compensation rules; and expanding market-based payments for ecosystem services, including carbon credits, to better align ecological protection with rural livelihoods and farmers’ long-term incentives.

Key Words

Collective forest tenure reform; Fujian Province, China; Forest property rights; Tenure security; Farmer investment incentives; Forest governance and local institutions.

Positionality Statement

I write this paper as a Han Chinese international student from a coastal city in Fujian Province, China. I grew up in a middle-class family in an area with rich forest resources, and I had limited direct experience of the livelihood insecurities that many rural and upland forest communities face. My current position is as a graduate student in international forestry in Canada. This means that I am situated within, and influenced by, Western scientific knowledge, concepts, and debates about forest governance, rights, and tenure.

My interest in collective forest tenure reform is both personal and academic. Personally, Fujian is my hometown. I have strong emotional connections with its scenarios and forests. Academically, when I was studying international forestry, I learnt a bunch of knowledge relating to forestry policy, forest certification, and forest management. These motivate me to think about what a good forest policy is, and how we can balance economic and ecological benefits. This dual position allows me to see through problems from various perspectives, not only in the views of local, but also in the views of international. At the same time, my position may be due to placing professional knowledge and quantitative indicators in an important position and ignoring perspectives of smallholders and ethnic minorities.

Meanwhile, as a Han mid-class researcher living in the city, my community does not rely on forestry, differing from indigenous communities living in remote mountainous areas. Besides, my research is mainly based on literature, other people’s case study, and government’s policy documents. The lack of on-site field trip makes me unable to obtain first-hand information, and causes my divorce from reality and a insufficient understanding of some conflicts.

Considering my positionalities, I will try to be explicit about my standpoints and cautious in my claims. I aim to balance national and policy-level stories with local farmers’ experiences. I won’t pretend to give a single fully “objective” account. Instead, I would like to reflect forest tenure reforms in Fujian, and I admit my social and academic background may limit the way I understand these changes.

Background: the policy evolution and institutional change of Chinese Collective Forest Tenure Reform

First Forest Tenure Reform in 1978

The first round of tenure reform started in 1978. In agriculture, it is Household Responsibility System, HRS. And in forestry, it was the Three Fixes. The Three Fix mainly related to:

• Clarifying the rights to forest land, with an emphasis on forests in mountainous areas

• Delimiting private plots

• Establishing a forestry production responsibility system

By 1984, 70% of rural communities took part in the reform of rural land management.

Document No. 9 in 2003: Resolutions on Forestry Development

Document No. 9 represents a deepening and continuation of the previous reforms. It aimed at reaffirming the return of collectively owned forests to villagers (individually or in small groups). If at least two-thirds of the villagers or their representatives vote in favor, the new collective forest tenure arrangements will be implemented. And the devolution processes combined signing legal contracts with issuing usufruct certification. As a result, 90% of collectively owned forestland was divided and allocated to individual families.

The Decisions: Concerning the Comprehensive Implementation of Reforming the Tenure System of Collective Forest, 2008

Due to some limitations of the previous reforms, their effect in promoting the economy was not satisfactory, and at the same time, the enthusiasm of some farmers was not high. Therefore, a new pilot program was initiated in Fujian in 2003, and the new reform measures were rolled out nationwide in 2008. The main purposes of the new reform measures are as follows: accelerate developments in investments, resource growth, and productivity; increase families' income; and improve ecological environments and ecosystem services.

Power Structures and Forest Tenure Types

Ownership Structure

In the present, the state-owned forest lands are less than half, and collectively owned lands are around 60%, owned by entities through contracts.

Table 1. Overall Ownership Category

Ownership Category	Main Content
Individual household management (dan-hu-jing-ying)	It is a combination of both private and responsibility plots. And it has 30-70 years contracts. It is certificated.
Partnership forestland (lian-hu-jing-ying)	It is managed by group of local farmers.
Outsider managed lands (market allocated plots) (lin-di-liu-zhuan)	It is managed by individuals or organizations through contracts. And it allows a short-term using rights for commercial timber harvest.
Collectively managed lands (ji-ti-jing-ling)	It is directly managed by the Village Council or a collective farm that is supervised by the Village Council.
Villager clusters (zi-ran-cun, xiao-zu)	It is managed by groups of families living in the same neighborhood. And it is a collective product from the planned economic period, so it is similar to collective management, but on a smaller scale.
Ecological reserves (sheng-tai-gong-yi-lin)	It is a new category, established in the late 1990s, and the early 20th century. It is for a protected area and not allowed commercial activities. And it is managed by their original tenure categories.

Tenure Types in Fujian

• Private plot (Zi-Liu-Shan): It takes 27% of sample forest land. It covers 32% of commercial timber forests, 30% of bamboo forests, and 23% of economic forests.
• Planter owning the plantation (Shui-Zao-Shui-You): They are owned by people who planted them; it is economic forest lead. It covers 37% of economic forests land.
• Joint-household contract (Lian-Hu-Jing-Ying): It is mainly in the management of commercial timber forests. It was 9% in 2003, then, increased to 13% in 2005.
• Single-household contract, includes: Single-household contract (Dan-Hu-Jing-Ying), Lease (Zu-Lin), Mortgage contract (Ya-Jin-Guan-Hu-Cheng-Bao), Transferred young and middle-aged plantations (Zhuan-Rang-Zhong-You-Lin), Responsibility plot (Zeren-Shan). Al of them covers 32% of commercial timber forests, 60% of bamboo forests, and 40% of economic forests.

The distinctions between each tenure type are mainly in security, upfront investment requirements, and whether it is jointly managed by multiple households.

Two Decades of Collective Forest Tenure Reform in Fujian

Basic Background of Fujian

The Fujian province is a mountainous province with 9,000,000 hectares of designated forestland, taking almost 70% of the total land, and it has around 63% forestry coverage, which is the highest in China. At the same time, it is an ethnically diverse province, with 70% of ethnic minorities living in the remote upland valley and relying on forest products.

In Yi's research, they found that compared with other provinces, forest owners feel stronger rights in Fujian than some others. And Fujian has a high level of forestry income. Furthermore, forest tenure transfer in Fujian is more active than in the other provinces, and the transferred area is the largest. In Boya Song's opinion, Fujian has a high proportion of bamboo, which has high economic value. And the high economic value may drive the improvement of investment and management.

Reform Timeline in Fujian

1980s: Fujian didn't join the first-round reform; instead, it carried out another policy: the share-hold system, managing forests collectively and sharing economic benefits with each villager.

1998: The local pilot policy, called forest tenure individualization, started in Hongtian Village, Sanming City, Fujian Province.

2003: Forest tenure individualization became a provincial pilot policy in Fujian.

2008: The Comprehensive Implementation of Reforming the Tenure System of Collective Forest.

Local Pilot Implementation of Fujian before 2003 (starting in 1998)

Generally, the share-hold system didn't activate farmers' engagements, and the contributions of forestry were limited, whether in economy or ecological issues. Therefore, the local governments decided to implement a new pilot policy in Hongtian Village. In the first year of the reform, the forestation rates increased 7.68% of forest land, and after the year of reform, the increasing rate is around 1.61% each year.

The changes in forest ownership at the community level are institutionally diverse, dependent on specific paths and plots. Besides, it was influenced by a series of factors such as forest species, forest area, existing management types, customary management rules, and community characteristics.

Provincial Pilot Implementation of Fujian after 2003

What is new in pilot reform, 2003? First, it delegated user rights to private farmers through contracts. Second, it clarified and established a household-based production responsibility system and property rights on the forest. Third, it set a harvest quota every 5 years. And on their forestlands, farmers have rights to grow crops under trees, choose forest type, transfer to local villagers, and transfer to outside villagers.

Zhang thought it was more like a process of consolidating the existing system rather than a large-scale reform. And Yiwen had similar concerns. She mentioned that the proportions of reallocation are small, and formalization is the subject, and it may ignore non-agricultural entities.

Table 2. Forest ownership categories after reform in 2003.

Forest ownership category	Description
Ecological public forest	There was almost no change in forest ownership. Before and after the reform, it was all managed by the village collective.
Economic forest	Mainly characterized by improved contracts, clear contract terms, and clear boundaries, etc. Before and after the reform, most were still operated by "small households".
Timber forests	The changes in forest ownership are the most complex, and they are more likely to undergo various forms of transformation. However, the proportion of actual distribution to small-scale farmers is still not high. Many are still managed uniformly by village collectives, villagers' groups, or large acquiring entities.

Full-Scale Execution after 2008

The advancement of the new round of collective forest tenure system reform has achieved some important breakthroughs. As of now, over 99% of the collective forest land area across the country has completed the reform and rights confirmation, and the ownership of forest ownership and forest tenure in the most of reforming regions has been clearly defined. In terms of the poeple's participating, the total number of households involved in the reform across the country has exceeded 89.8 million, which means that the direct interests of hundreds of millions of farmers are closely linked to the development of forestry. This forest tenure reform involving millions of households not only has released the vitality of forest land management but also has found an effective balance point between ecological protection and farmers' income increase.

Achievements

Overall policy aspects

The policy reformed the taxation policy and restructured the financial system. And it relaxed the harvesting regulation gradually and reorganized the forest administration. Besides, it set up local centers for forest transactions to facilitate the transfer of timberland and the sale of timber. Generally, it improved the basic incentive structure and activated forestry developments, increased farmers’ interest in forestry, and improved afforestation and harvesting.

Farmer-level aspect

Qin & Xu mentioned that the different tenure types would affect investment, and higher satisfaction with tenure security will increase investment willingness. According to the research, 98% of farmers thought that they had the right to grow crops under trees. 78% of farmers considered that they had the right to choose the type of forest to plant. 73% of farmers believed that they had the right to transfer to local villagers. 58% of farmers thought that they had the right to transfer to outside villagers. The article used "the number of collective farmland reallocations in the past five years" as proxy variable. The average of this value is 1.26, with maximum 8 and minimum 0, meaning farmer's adjustment of cultivated land is not frequent. It indirectly proved that farmers had a high sense of security regarding the contracts. Besides, Qin and Xu also focused on the labor and fertilizer input. It showed that householders are more willing to invest in economic forests. Compared with timber forest and bamboo forest, farmers spent 22.42 working day/mu in economic forests, which is more than 10 times of that spending in timber forests (1.46 working day/mu), and 7 times of that spending in bamboo forests (3.64 working day/mu). And for fertilizer input, it is highly centralized to economic forests, which is 98.85 yuan/mu. All this evidence proved householders are becoming more willing to manage invest economic forests and their sense of safety had been increased, and their investment would be more stable.

Yi et al. and Zhang, Y. proved that after reform, farmers' rights were strengthened, and the subjective tenure safety feelings were becoming more positive. In Yi et al.'s research, 89% of householders thought they would own the forest land in the next 5 years, and only 1.9% of samples considered they would not own the lands. Therefore, in general, farmers had high satisfaction of tenure security. For property rights, in Fujian, the property rights index is 4.99, higher than the average, 4.53. But for Hunan, both property rights and tenure security were very low and in the last place of all samples. On the other hand, Hunan had the highest proportion of individual household management, which is 92%. It was almost twice that in Fujian (50%).

In the research of Song et al., the forest investment level of farmers increased. From 2010 to 2015, the average household forestry investment kept increasing and continuously covered more than 60% of family production investments. In 2011, it reached its peak, which was 94.67%. And the rate of forest tenure transfer became more active after reform. For example, in 2015, the transferred forestland area of sample households reached 32.23% of their total managed forestland in Fujian. Compared with other sample provinces, Fujian was always regarded as a high level of forest investments. Besides, in this article, it mentioned variables that may affect farmers’ forestry investments. Forestry subsidies, Forestry Rights Mortgage Loan, and joints of forestry cooperatives significantly affect the level of investment. And these policy tools motivate households to input in forestry.

Ecological aspects

Overall, after reform, afforestation rose and the efficiency of planting trees increased. It increased the productivity of timber products and non-timber products. Besides, the CFTR (China's Collective Forest Tenure Reform) has a positive influence on forest carbon sequestration through land use optimization and industrial structure upgrading.

Comparative perspective: national and international

Although the collective forest rights reform in Fujian seems relatively successful in strengthening farmers' rights and stimulating investment, it needs to be understood in the broader national context. Liu, Yin, and Li argue that China's forest tenure reform is "at a crossroads". Farmers' use-rights bundles covered access, management, benefit claiming, forestland transferring, inheriting, and mortgaging. Although on paper the rights of householders have been expanded, they are still subject to complex and sometimes confusing institutional arrangements and governance systems. These institutional problems bring risks, insecurity and uncertainty, finally weakening farmers' motivation to manage forests effectively.

Their comparative analysis of Hunan Province in China and Alabama in the United States highlights the severity of this challenge. The collective forests average stand age in Hunan is around 17, but in Alabama, this number is 38, much older than that in Hunan. Comparing their average DBH (diameter at breast height), trees in Hunan (10–11 cm) is smaller than that in Alabama (19–20 cm). Correspondingly, the carbon stock in Hunan (9.1 t/ha) has a huge gap with that in Alabama (51.8 t/ha), which is nearly five times. And there was a gap of nearly ten times in annual carbon growth with 0.2 t/ha/year in Hunan and 2.3 t/ha/year in Alabama.

Through the comparisons, although the reform has been implemented for several years and achieved some important goals, we are still facing low increasing rates, low stocking levels, and poor stand quality at a national scale. And we still need to put efforts into chasing further international standards. From this perspective, the cases in Fujian can be judged as an advanced example in China, but also meet a gap with international level. Fujian provides us with a possibility and big picture of the future. Chinese forestry development still has great potential. And we should also be careful with a scenario where speed is prioritized to the exclusion of quality.

Challenges and Concerns

Local Management and Governance

From this aspect, the challenges can be summarized into 3 parts: parcelization and fragmentation, multi-level management, and uneven and short-term effects. Parcelization and fragmentation limited the development of scale-sensitive silvicultural operations and increased the difficulties of monitoring and management. There are too many management subjects, such as village councils and forest user groups, improving flexibility but increasing governance difficulties. As time goes by, the effects of reform are weakened. Although collective logging and commercial timber production are increasing in the short term, some forest lands are overharvested and abandoned, causing long-term forest issues. Besides, the reform effects are uneven in various areas. The reform effects in carbon trading pilot areas are more significant than those in non-pilot areas, and their positive effects decreased as time went by.

Implementation Challenges

During the real practices, the devolved forests, used as ecological forests, sometimes lack fair compensation. The logging and thinning restrictions on commercial forests may affect economic efficiency and affect rightsholders' enthusiasm. Also, unclear boundaries and conflicting claims may make it hard for smallholders to defend their own rights. Besides, limited by educational experience, some local people are unable to understand complex contracts and satellite pictures. These may increase the risks of being cheated and severe the rights insecurity. In Luo et al.'s case study, they meet the fair issue as well: who takes the "good forests", and who takes the "bad forest"? Furthermore, the various local conditions will challenge the governance and implementation of policy.

Customary Regulation vs. Formal Legal Regulation

The legal membership is based on the household registers on the payroll, but villagers have complex customary regulations based on oral agreements, and there are a few distinctions with legal regulations. For villages, customary regulation is robust and effective. The forest tenure systems are easy for the government to use but not friendly for them. Besides, some of them regard satellite maps as inaccurate and divorced from reality. Furthermore, the Forest Tenure Certification System simplified forestland rights, and without long-term renewed statistical data, the forest ownership system may no longer be clear.

Luo, Y., Liu, J., Zhang, D., & Dong, J. showed a specific example of the distinctions between customary regulation and formal law in the forest allocation criteria. First, sons in law, who are married in, if they have the village residential registration, they are able to be allocated forest lands, in national law. However, according to the customary regulations, they are not regarded as native and have no right to be allocated forest lands. For daughters in law, villagers accepted them as a part of the village. And they can have their forest lands. But in formal laws, it still depends on whether they have village residential registrations. For women from village but married to outsiders, local people thought they were no longer a part of the village, so they don’t have the rights. For students, if they are still in the school, they can gain the rights. And after they graduate, if they decide to go home and work on the farm, they also have the right to be allocated forest land. But if they have jobs outside the village and are able to raise themselves, they cannot gain the rights. Besides, if a villager changes his or her living places to outside the village, it depends on if they can make a living outside. And this ensures that the village can be the last safeguard for him or her. Furthermore, if someone is arrested, and put into prison, they are exiled.

Overall, as for me, the customary regulations seem to be more humanistic, because the regulations focus more on villagers' survival, whether they can live with their own hands. At the same time, there are still some kinds of or some so-call "feudal dross". Women marrying outsiders were no longer regarded as part of the community. And sons in law are facing similar situations. This can be described as cohesion, as well as exclusiveness. On the other hand, formal regulations are simple and direct. The only proof is the village residential registration. It is easy to govern but lack flexibility. That may probably cause security issues on local people's tenure rights. Some people might try to take advantage of loopholes to gain access to more benefits, and lead to unfairness and inequity.

Future Directions

In the future, we should pay more attention to securities than forms. This includes reforming harvest quota system, avoiding a one-size-fits-all and highly controlled quota system, and improving the consistency and clearance of policy implementations. Meanwhile, we should weaken the monopoly of local elite, address the issues of land fragmentations by designing more effectively functioning forest cooperatives, and revise the rules for forest classification and ecosystem service compensation.

Additionally, we can implement market-based payments for ecosystem services (PES), changing stallholders into ecosystem service providers, increasing their income and enhancing their participation in ecological protections.

What are payments for ecosystem services (PES)? It is a management method which uses economic incentives to improve ecosystem protection. But it is not simply "buying natural resources through markets". It admits that ecosystem services are public resources. Those who truly benefit should pay for ecological protection. And through payments or market regulations, people caring about land safety and protecting ecosystems could benefit from their actions. It motivates them to continuously provide ecosystem services. This takes into account ecological sustainability, fair distribution and a certain degree of efficiency at the same time. For example, a rural community lives in a remote mountainous area. They are lacking in foundations of economic development. But they are located in the upper reaches of the river. In this situation, urban people living downstream can pay certain amount of money or taxes as an ecological compensation fund. It is a win-win resolution, supporting rural communities’ developments and ensuring urban clean water supply.

Also, carbon credit can be a kind of payment for ecosystem services (PES). Active combinations of carbon sinks and farmers' benefits can achieve both ecological and economic goals simultaneously.