Documentation:Open Case Studies/FRST522/2024/The past, present and future of biodiversity credits. A review of the IAPB Framework for high integrity biodiversity credit markets and the HIFOR project in Nouabalé-Ndoki National Park, Republic of Congo

Summary of Case Study

The following article is a look at the emerging role of biodiversity credits and how they will differentiate between themselves, as well as from the more established and controversial carbon credits in the bustling international field of payment for ecosystem services (PES). I will begin with some background on biodiversity credits, including how they are defined, and by whom, as well as touch on the current surge in their development. Next, I will take a look at the recently released High Integrity Biodiversity Credit Framework (HIBCF), and examine some of the key elements that have been highlighted by its developers in the hopes that biodiversity credits become a credible and transparent means of conservation financing. Diving a little deeper, I will then introduce the High Integrity Forest (HIFOR) Investment Initiative, a new biodiversity-credit framework designed by the Wilderness Conservation Society (WCS), and its current pilot project in Nouabalé-Ndoki National Park (NNNP), Republic of Congo. Through the lens of this case study of the NNNP HIFOR pilot project, I will examine some of the areas where HIBCF recommendations align with HIFOR methodologies, where they differ and how they are addressing the conceptual issues they were designed for. Finally, I will make some conclusions about how existing frameworks like HIFOR and the HIBCF recommendations seem to have learned lessons from the carbon-credit markets, and provide some ideas of my own for potential further development.

Keywords

Biodiversity, biodiversity credits, carbon credits, REDD+, HIFOR, Republic of Congo, Indigenous engagement, forest tenure, Indigenous rights, IP&LCs, conservation, UNCBD, mitigation hierarchy

Introduction to Biodiversity Credits - Background and Criticisms

While this report is focused on voluntary biodiversity credits, it is important to mention that there has been a long history of biodiversity offsetting in the regulatory sense, including policies as far back as the 1970’s like the US Clean Water Act, requiring ‘no net loss’ (of wetlands habitats), as well as other regional frameworks like Germany’s Federal Nature Conservation Act in 1976, and Victoria’s (Australia) Native Vegetation Framework in 2002. More recently, England’s 2021 Environment Act, for example, mandates that for new planning permission to be granted, all developments are required to deliver a minimum of 10% increase in Biodiversity Net Gain (BNG), where biodiversity losses from development in one location not only need to be offset by improvements elsewhere, but they must be offset by an additional amount.

Adopted at the 15th Conference of Parties to the UN Convention on Biological Diversity (COP15) in 2022, the United Nations' Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework (GBF) had several major goals, including most notably in this case, Target 3 and the 30 by 30 goal. This goal aims to protect at least 30% of the world's land, inland waters, coastal areas, and oceans by 2030. This protection, however, comes at a cost, and implementation plans currently suffer from a funding gap of roughly $600 billion annually. Funding from governments, despite promises, has been slow to increase, even since the Aichi Biodiversity Targets were agreed to in 2010, so private funding options like the financial markets have been recognized as an essential way to fill this gap. To this note, in 2022, the GBF highlighted biodiversity credits as one of the financing mechanisms that should be called upon to better align global finance flows and economic activities with international biodiversity goals.

Much like carbon offset credits, biodiversity credits are financial instruments designed to incentivize the conservation and restoration of a natural environment via payments to landowners and communities in developing countries. In this case, however, the goal is not for the reduction of emissions and the increase in carbon stocks, but for the protection of biodiversity. By biodiversity, or biological diversity this means “the variability among living organisms from all sources including, inter alia, terrestrial, marine and other aquatic ecosystems and the ecological complexes of which they are part; this includes diversity within species, between species and of ecosystems.” as defined by the UN Convention on Biological Diversity (UNCBD). In a sense, these credits could be viewed as a complementary, or even more holistic approach to carbon offset credits, as the protection of biodiversity also inherently improves emissions and other climate change factors. To facilitate a common understanding in the market, the International Advisory Panel on Biodiversity Credits (IAPB) has adopted, with some additions, the Biodiversity Credit Alliance’s (BCA) definition as “A certificate that represents a measured and evidence‐based unit of positive biodiversity outcome that is durable and additional to what would have otherwise occurred.”

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Subsidies for harmful industries like oil and gas could be better used to fill the funding gaps for environmental conservation and climate-change mitigation.

The credits that companies or governments purchase would represent specific benefits to biodiversity that have been created or maintained by a certain project, and could include things like habitat restoration or protection, species reintroduction or protection, or other sustainable ecosystem management practices. Much like carbon offset credits, each biodiversity credit should correspond to the measurable and verified outcomes of these benefits and COULD enable companies and governments to claim that they are offsetting the environmental impacts of their operations. This is an area of heated debate, however, as the very idea of offsetting has been called into question for decades now in the carbon credit field. The carbon offset credits such as those from REDD+ projects, have long been criticized as greenwashing, especially if they are done in lieu of rapid decarbonization instead of in addition to it. Furthermore, critics of carbon offsetting argue that the practice is not only quite ineffectual but is actually hindering plans for a clean energy transition. A group of over 60 climate scientists calling for “real zero not net zero” strategies are concerned that offsetting schemes are not generating the emissions reductions that they promised, and even if they did in the short term, it’s a losing numbers game that is being played. Essentially saying, that without actually reducing emissions, the offset emissions will all eventually end up in the atmosphere as those replanted trees die, either pre-maturely or otherwise, hundreds of years before the emissions they were meant to offset have dissipated. These same concerns are echoed by critics of biodiversity credits, some of whom are against the idea of the credits in general. They point out the risks that biodiversity credit projects pose in driving land grabs and human-rights abuses, focusing attention and money on these projects instead of more impactful solutions for the underlying causes of climate change and biodiversity loss. Signatories of a recent civil society statement refute the claims that funding gaps for environmental conservation and climate-change mitigation need to be filled by monetizing nature when what should really be done is the redirecting of subsidies for harmful industries to these causes. They also state that more proven forms of conservation like recognition of Indigenous land tenure should be instituted instead of these novel and risky new schemes that are just a means of allowing the richer, Global North countries to continue their pattern of overconsumption and offshoring of the impacts of their destructive habits. There is also the worry that improperly defined limitations and expectations of biodiversity credits, and the hasty implementation of their market availability could lead to negative unintended consequences, including misleading the public into thinking their conservation claims are already proven and guaranteed. On top of all this, there is the dangerous reality that a number of key stakeholders ranging from governments, private industry, credit buyers, and issuers could all benefit handsomely from an up-and-running biodiversity credit market while neither the environment, the biodiversity or any other under-represented dependent stakeholders in these areas improve at all. Some reviews of these concerns, especially those relating to offsetting, have countered that they do not entirely invalidate the calls for biodiversity credits, but that they certainly warrant an abundance of caution in moving forward with them.

High-Level Principles to Guide the Biodiversity Credit Market

While the carbon offset credit projects and their associated markets have had the REDD+ framework to guide their implementation since 2013, there had yet to be such a thing for biodiversity credits until just recently. Unveiled at COP16 in Cali, Colombia in October 2024, the Biodiversity Credit Alliance (BCA), the International Advisory Panel on Biodiversity Credits (IAPB) and the World Economic Forum (WEF) partnered together in coming up with a working paper on a set of 21 “High-level Principles to Guide the Biodiversity Credit Market” or HLPs. These HLPs act as a set of guidelines and standards “to define, guide and encourage the development of high integrity biodiversity credits and credit markets.” Essentially, and likely as a result of lessons learned in the carbon credits markets, it is to ensure that biodiversity credits become a credible and transparent means of partnering private funds with real conservation and restoration outcomes.

The following section looks at some of the key elements of the HLPs and their framework, the High Integrity Biodiversity Credit Framework (HIBCF) and how it has been structured to include, mitigate, enhance or reduce various aspects of each.

The Mitigation Hierarchy

In their recent policy brief, the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) states that biodiversity offsets are “only appropriate for projects which have rigorously applied the mitigation hierarchy (avoid, minimise, restore/rehabilitate and offset; see section 6) and when a full set of alternatives to the project have been considered.” See image below.

In reference to biodiversity credit projects. The argument that these projects should be approved on a number of criteria, including whether they are being done only after considering all the previous available options of mitigation.

In this case, they are stating that projects should be approved on a number of criteria, one of which is whether this project is being done only after considering all the previous available options of mitigation. The HIBCF position on this tends to be more project friendly, as it takes the mitigation hierarchy from the buyers perspective. HLP2, Demand Integrity and the Mitigation Hierarchy, recommends that BUYERS of biodiversity credits should only consider these as an option, if they have taken all other steps at mitigation beforehand. In this case, the HIBCF is not necessarily making recommendations on whether biodiversity credit projects should or should not be implemented, but assumes that they have been and is putting the onus on the buyers. While also recognizing this important need to prioritize avoidance of biodiversity loss before offsetting it, this position is in line with an organization inherently invested in the creation of these projects, as the HIBCF partners would be.

Verification, Monitoring, Transparency, and Reporting Requirements

Transparency (HLP18) and credibility (HLP1) are expected when confirming biodiversity outcomes, however the framework does state that there should be a balance between the practicality and the rigour of this assessment. This implies using a high degree of monitoring (HLP9) and using third-parties for verification (HLP10), but, due to the metrics of measuring biodiversity being inherently more complex than simply measuring carbon levels, reporting standards are expected to be more tailored to local conditions on a project by project basis. Beyond this, there is also the recognition of the value of more diverse knowledge systems, with local and traditional knowledge recommended along with other scientific evidence (HLP14). Other than biodiversity criteria, monitoring for adverse effects on IPLCs should also be monitored for the entire life-cycle of the project.

Safeguards and Stakeholder Engagement

Stakeholder engagement is also a major priority in HIBCF, with Indigenous knowledge and participation being of particular importance. In fact, it is stated that project developers should not only position IPLCs as equity partners in the projects but that as suppliers of biodiversity credits they must ensure “...full and effective participation (of IPLCs) in all decision-making processes…”(p.64) Going into more detail, HLP14 states that “If projects impact Indigenous Peoples and local communities due to the usage of land, territories, water, natural resources, or other impacts on the local environment and culture, affected persons and communities must be given the option to participate fully in project design, governance, execution and oversight to ensure that their rights and well-being are respected and upheld.” (p. 23)

As for safeguards, HLP 15 is a detailed set of steps to ensure that biodiversity credit projects cause no harm to Indigenous Peoples and local communities, broader communities, nature and climate. It covers an entire range of potential harms that a biodiversity credit project could unwittingly commit, and what they should do to mitigate this. This could be anything from ensuring against false claims and withholding information, to upholding human rights protections. Moving beyond doing no harm, HLP16 lays out the basis for ensuring an equitable sharing of benefits, and HLP17 details a grievance mechanism in case anything does arise that requires mediation.

Land Tenure and Land Rights Requirements

HIBCF guidance HLP11 on this matter is quite clear in its terms, that biodiversity credit projects must recognize customary rights -- whether legal rights have been granted or not -- for a project to be recognized. Despite the highly complex nature of the issue of land rights, IPLCs rights to “access, withdrawal, management, exclusion, alienation and transferability – must be respected regardless of whether legally registered or registered through customary means.” (p. 64) Furthermore, in recognition of the tenuous land tenure situations that IPLCs often find themselves burdened with, this framework states that project requirements “be designed flexibly to enable biodiversity crediting projects even where having full rights and disposition is not practical or where tenure is not formal.” (p. 64)

Additionality, Permanence, and Leakage

Additionality refers to the positive effects on the environment resulting from a human intervention compared to what would have occurred without that intervention. Specifically for biodiversity credits, this means “a requirement that credits can only be assigned to biodiversity outcomes that are attributable to the project intervention, and would not have otherwise happened.”

Additionality when monitoring biodiversity is a bit of a double-edged sword. On one hand, it is an important metric to show improvement, because without any additional improvements in biodiversity in its project areas, the biodiversity credit market could be plagued by claims of greenwashing, and suffer from funding issues. On the other hand, when setting additionality requirements too strictly there is the risk that projects doing good conservation work in areas that have not seen much deforestation or degradation, known as “high-forest, low deforestation (HFLD)”, would be unable to generate biodiversity credits to benefit from and continue their work.

HLP5 is dedicated entirely to the topic of additionality, and sets out the cases of two separate biodiversity credits, “uplift and avoided loss” biodiversity credits and “maintenance” biodiversity credits. For uplift and avoided loss credits, additionality would be recognized when there is confirmed improvement in biodiversity outcomes for some species, habitat, or ecosystem. Maintenance credits, on the other hand, would relate to cases where a species, habitat, or ecosystem were not under immediate threat, but that the project outcomes were some sort of long-term sustainable funding that ensures the maintenance of this unthreatened state.

When it comes to where this additionality takes place, this is yet another matter where the HIBCF has taken steps to address previous issues in other credit markets. Likely based on learning from the mistakes made along the way in the carbon offsets markets, the HIBCF makes important recommendations guarding against known flaws with secondary market trading and use of non-local credits.

Secondary market trading refers to the process where offset credits are repeatedly bought and sold after the initial purchase, a practice that leads to speculation, price manipulation and profits for credit flippers, not the original project or its landowners. Also, as credits are sold simply for the credit’s sake, the ecological importance and basis of the project and any connection to it are lost. HLP21 tackles this by insisting that if and when any secondary trading occurs there must be clear and accurate attribution of the originator, AND an appropriate portion of the profits going back to the original project (according to the benefit sharing agreements that were made).

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The Republic of Congo, also known as Congo-Brazzaville or – more simply – Congo, is home to around 125,000 western lowland gorillas. Offsetting biodiversity loss in their habitat with conservation in another part of the world, or vice versa, would not be an example of 'local for local, like for like' offsetting.

Non-local credits refers to the situation where offset credits, in this case for biodiversity loss, are purchased for a project in a significantly different area or biodiversity region than where the losses are going to happen. The IAPB’s view in terms of the HIBCF framework is that “biodiversity credits for compensation must be based on local‐to‐local and like‐for‐like ecological equivalence.” (p.42) The problem they are addressing here lies in the fact that biodiversity in one particular area is not equal to that in all others, so a simple trade of equal weights of apples for oranges would eventually lead to an abundance of oranges, and a lack of apples. Biodiversity in some regions, like northern Boreal landscapes, or at high-alpine altitudes is completely different from those in others like tropical rainforests, for example, taking significantly longer to develop, and also having unique cultural values. So if a company is going to offset the losses to biodiversity from its operations in one region by purchasing the most cost-efficient credits on the market, it could end up being for a project in an entirely different ecosystem. This unchecked favouritism of projects in cheaper, faster growing, or perhaps more marketably picturesque regions can lead to a loss of biodiversity, and leaving those communities directly affected with no compensation. As the framework states: “(biodiversity credits)… should support global investment in local markets, while avoiding uncontrolled international claims of ‘offsetting’ using credits that are disconnected from specific local impacts and responsibilities.” (p.42)

For permanence, this refers to the same positive effects on the environment as with additionality, but relates to how they are being maintained for the duration of the project and lasting well into the future afterwards. Durability as it is called in HLP7, refers to how, and how long, the positive biodiversity outcomes of a project will be maintained during and well after the end of the crediting period or end of the project. This involves having adequate financial and technical capacity, and evidence of reasonable confidence to be able to carry this out for a specified period of time. Interestingly though, there is still ongoing discussions on the meaning of permanence when it comes to biodiversity outcomes. Furthermore, some critics say that current projects guarantee no more than 20 years, if any at all, and that much like the carbon credits going up in smoke, there are no viable mechanisms to ensure biodiversity benefits are delivered permanently, especially when climate change is affecting these ecosystems beyond our control anyway.

Leakage (HLP8) is a potential negative side-effect of many nature-based solutions (NbS) projects, whereby the conservation actions of the project in one area simply pushes the threat (e.g. deforestation) into another area. At this point, there are relatively few recommendations on this topic in the HIBCF working paper, other than to recommend that projects should be required to assess and take steps to mitigate the potential for leakage.

HIFOR

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The High Integrity Forest (HIFOR) Investment Initiative is a framework for a payment for ecosystem services (PES) program developed by the Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS).

The High Integrity Forest (HIFOR) Investment Initiative is a framework for a payment for ecosystem services (PES) program developed by the Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS). Essentially, it incentivizes climate change mitigation actions and/or biodiversity conservation by offering long-term financing, through the sale of biodiversity credits, to managers of ‘high-integrity’ forests. . The term ‘high-integrity’ forest refers to the highest designation of forests based on the Forest Landscape Integrity Index (FLII), where there is nearly no evidence of anthropogenic disturbance, and high levels of ecological integrity, biodiversity, and ecosystem functionality have been retained. Designated sections of this forest area are then broken down into HIFOR units, with one unit representing “one hectare of healthy, high integrity tropical forest actively conserved within a large landscape for a decade.” These units deliver far-reaching benefits common with those of other healthy forest ecosystems, including the ongoing removal of CO2, regulation of regional rainfall, local and regional cooling, and protection of high levels of biodiversity.

In contrast with forest areas under threat of deforestation which could be eligible for carbon offsetting projects like REDD+, ‘high-integrity’ tropical forests are by definition, quite intact, and not under imminent threat. Current market-based finance schemes for tropical forest conservation, such as REDD+ do not include high integrity forests, thus leaving a gap in incentives for their protection. The HIFOR Initiative looks to enable a continuous stream of finance to “support governments and Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities (IP&LCs) to protect their high integrity forests while developing sustainable, low-carbon rural economies and livelihoods.”

As biodiversity credits, and NOT biodiversity ‘offset’ credits, HIFOR units are even further distinguished from carbon credits in that they cannot be used by buyers to offset their emissions or biodiversity losses. Instead, the incentive for purchasing these credits would be in making claims related to land/biodiversity/wildlife conservation, climate improvement, and socio-economic benefits. These claims are becoming more prevalent as environmental, social, and governance (ESG) data is being used to measure a companies' environmental and social impacts either voluntarily, or as part of a broader regulatory reporting practice.

Case study: HIFOR in Nouabalé-Ndoki National Park

Positionality statement

Before delving into this case study, I would like to acknowledge my identity as a white, middle-class, university educated male from Canada as my perspective has certainly been shaped by these cultural, economic, and social contexts. My background, including culturally, socially, financially and educationally influences my understanding of environmental and social dynamics in the Republic of Congo, a place which I would love to, but have never visited. As such, I am relying completely on sources such as academic papers, news articles, and reports. While I have tried to draw from diverse perspectives in my research, including local, academic and corporate viewpoints, there are limitations in using published sources, not least of which is the fact that these sources will themselves reflect their own specific narratives or biases. In even writing this case study in the first place there is the issue of global power dynamics, where perspectives from the Global North (like Canada), and in english often dominate discussions on the majority of subjects, including in this case, biodiversity and climate solutions. I recognize that I have the privilege of writing about biodiversity credits and this pilot project from a completely removed position, but I intend to approach the topic with respect for the local contexts which I am completely unfamiliar and uninvolved with, and to acknowledge the complex socio-economic and environmental realities of the Republic of Congo.

My interest in biodiversity credits and this specific case is based on a broader interest in forest conservation, recognizing global climate change inequalities, and global environmental justice.

Aims and intentions of the case study

The aim of this case study is to identify and address positions of the various key stakeholders involved in the HIFOR project in NNNP, as well as evaluate it in relation to the newly proposed framework of high-level principles guiding biodiversity credits, HIBCF (as described above). This involves looking both behind the scenes, and back in time, to understand the institutional mechanisms, the stakeholders’ concerns, objectives and relative power, and historic and ongoing conflicts that have lead to this project as it is now.

Location, history; national or regional context

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Nouabalé-Ndoki National Park (NNNP) is located in a part of the Congo Basin in northern Republic of Congo.

Nouabalé-Ndoki National Park (NNNP) is located in a part of the Congo Basin in northern Republic of Congo. It covers more than 4,000 square kilometres of lush, intact lowland rainforest, which has never been logged, or degraded with roads anywhere within its borders. Created in 1993, as part of the larger Sangha Tri-National Forest Landscape, it is considered one of the most crucial protected areas in Central Africa, acting as a sanctuary for elephants, western lowland gorillas and chimpanzees, among countless other species of plants and wildlife. The area of the park itself was originally cast as just one of a number of other timber concessions in the region. Logging activity in the timber concessions around the park had been happening since the 1960’s, however, it really began to accelerate after the end of the civil war in 1999. As new roads were laid, access to the forests became easier and logging camps began growing into small towns. This sudden spike in population led to an increased demand for bushmeat and it wasn’t long before these areas had depleted the wildlife numbers to dangerously low levels. At this point, local communities were struggling to survive by relying on the forests for sustenance as they had before. “The Buffer Zone Project” was started to combat this growing concern for the livelihoods of the local communities, as well as these increasing threats of logging around the perimeter of the park. It was a quite controversial partnership between WCS Congo, the national timber company, Congolaise Industrielle des Bois (CIB), the government and local communities, but within a few short years was already being heralded as a success, at least in terms of biodiversity.

Institutional/Administrative arrangements

The park has been managed as a collaborative partnership between the Congolese Government and Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS) for 25 years now. In 2014, the WCS signed a Cooperative Agreement with the Congolese Ministry for Forest Economy (MEF) forming the Nouabalé-Ndoki Foundation (NNF), with the aim of better ensuring the long-term management and financial security of the park. This foundation is an example of a Public-Private Partnership (PPP). This type of arrangement is advantageous when the management and financial skills of private businesses translate to a more efficient and effective use of taxpayers money than if the government handled it internally. For the NNNP, the benefits on the ground from this foundation included allowing them to professionalize their park operations, and to afford staffing increases and infrastructure improvements to befit a national park of this size in the 21^st century. The other major benefits included WCS support in developing management and business plans and securing new investments. Through the NNF, the park is managed in a more transparent framework, allowing representatives of local Indigenous communities, the WCS, the Government and the private sector to have a place to discuss issues and opportunities, but also voice concerns.

Stakeholders

The main stakeholders involved in this project are the Congolese government, specifically the MEF, the WCS, and very importantly, the Indigenous and local communities (IPLCs) around the perimeter of the park. An important point to bring up here though is in recognizing an opportunity for less ‘anthropocentric’ view of what it means to be a stakeholder. In recent years, groundbreaking decisions around the world have led to the legal recognition of the rights of nature in general, as first seen in Bolivia’s recognition of “Pachamama” – or Mother Earth, as well as cases in several other countries. With this in mind, there is ample evidence for including the 'nature' or plant and wildlife biodiversity of the park as a very affected stakeholder.

Otherwise, the roughly 2000 people of Bomassa and Makao, the two Indigenous communities nearest to the park region, represent the only affected forest stakeholders in this equation, as they are the ones whose livelihoods rely solely on their ability to continue successfully hunting, gathering and living directly in these forests. Nearly 80% of the households in these communities include someone now employed by the park, representing at least 90,000 USD per month in income to these communities. In these situations, it could be argued that these individuals may blur the line between being affected and interested stakeholders as they become employed by the NNNP, but the community as an entity itself arguably remains an affected party. The objectives of these communities are fairly straightforward in that at it its core, they are asking for not just the recognition of their customary rights to these lands, as in some cases these have already been laid out in law, but the actual enforcement of these rights. Beyond this, or possibly just in awaiting this recognition, they are looking for the freedom to continue their practices of hunting, roaming and gathering as they have always done, without the threat of harassment and human-rights abuses from park rangers or eco-guards.

The Congolese government’s objectives with the project, as with the park in general, are for the improvement of the livelihoods of the people in northern Congo through employment opportunities and the development of new livelihood activities, but also so specifically to fill a funding gap in the budget to protect the ROC’s forests for the long-term.

For the WCS, the NNNP represents one of the crown jewels of their worldwide conservation portfolio. Their objective for the HIFOR project, as co-manager of the park, is also the generation of funding for its ongoing protection, however, beyond financial reasons, there is also the hope that this project will reduce some of the pressure being put on the park’s ecosystem by enabling some diversification of income to the local communities around it. More broadly, the aim of this project is to pilot the HIFOR framework which will eventually be able to be scaled up and act as a model for projects in many other countries.

Critical issues and conflicts

The key conservation challenges in the park are illegal poaching and trafficking, commercial hunting, and increased accessibility.

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Forest elephant in the Mbeli River, Nouabalé-Ndoki National Park, Congo.

Poaching of elephants for their ivory is a major threat in the park, coming not just from Congolese poachers, but from other armed groups. These outside groups, like one recently having traveled over 400 miles from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) are venturing into the park from neighbouring conflict areas, likely due to their own African elephant populations being wiped out. The park is trying to manage this crisis with an ever expanding force of park rangers and eco-guards tasked with patrolling every square kilometre of the vast area. This management strategy, known as ‘fortress conservation’, is quite common around the world but has increasingly come into question about the tactics, effectiveness, and negative consequences like dispossession of lands and overuse of force that have come with it.

Illegal hunting is not the only challenge at the park, as fishing, and commercial hunting of antelope, monkeys and other bushmeat for food is also significant, and this increased pressure on the forest has already proven unsustainable in the timber concessions bordering the park. The management of this unsustainable commercial hunting and fishing has unfortunately previously been lumped in with that of illegal poaching. As local Indigenous hunters and fisherman have been easier and less risky to catch than more violent and heavily armed poachers and traffickers, it is they who have been commonly targeted by the rangers. More recently though, the park has turned to embracing the cooperation of local communities in strengthening the buffer areas around the perimeter, ensuring these areas continue to be managed sustainability for their natural resources. The NNF has been working with the local communities in improving their own governance systems, including forming a new fisheries charter, developed collectively with traditional fishermen and founded on their locally-defined rules.

The tie that binds these challenges together, so to speak, is the double-edged sword of increased accessibility. The remoteness of the park has long provided it its best shield of protection, however, as logging roads are cut around the perimeter of the park, and national highways are upgraded from dirt to paved, the area has become, for good and for worse, far more accessible. This accessibility has benefited the park operations itself, but also poachers. Beyond the outright physical damage to the environment and the poaching and hunting, there is also the increased chances of disease transfer as the once secluded animals come closer, and more often in touch with humans. These negative secondary effects, often from logging roads, actually represent some of the most damaging consequences to the forests.

The HIFOR NNNP pilot project through the lens of HIBCF

Despite not being a member of the Biodiversity Credit Alliance, one of the partner organizations involved in outlining the framework of High Level Principles to Guide the Biodiversity Credit Market (HIBCF), the HIFOR project in NNNP and its methodology comes quite close in recognition of the same values and requirements. Having only just recently started, in August 2024, specific details on all aspects of the pilot HIFOR project in Congo are not yet readily available. It would be reasonable to infer, however, that the criteria of the HIFOR methodology, as outlined above, would be applied to this project.

Regarding transparency in monitoring and reporting, the HIFOR methodology aligns closely with the HIBCF High Level Principles (HLPs) emphasizing open access to project information, enabling informed stakeholder engagement and mandatory third-party validation.

When it comes to stakeholder engagement, the HIBCF is quite clear in its recommendations that Indigenous Peoples and local communities should be fully involved and integrated into the planning and decision making of any projects. HIFOR methodology requires the creation of a Project Situation Analysis, detailing among other environmental criteria, a complete analysis of all social groups, specifically including IPLCs, women, and youth who are legally living in or regularly using the proposed area. Based on this terminology, there is some potential risk of unequal representation for some people whose residence in or use of this area is not legally recognized, as is not uncommon in the Congo basin. HIFOR methodology also ensures the agreements with IPLCs are in accordance with free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) and that these communities must have a significant, ongoing role in implementation of the project. In safeguarding that the project meets its criteria of improved outcomes and avoided negative outcomes for biodiversity and local communities, HIFOR methodology requires the development of clear, transparent, and measurable indicators of social benefits specific to local circumstances. If these criteria are found to be lacking during one of the monitoring events throughout the project’s duration, the credits would no longer be eligible for issuance.

One key aspect at the heart of all conflicts in this region is the widespread issue of land tenure and recognition of Indigenous Peoples’ customary traditional rights. The region of the NNNP, as with land in all Congo Basin countries, formally belongs to the state. Despite some policy frameworks and other acknowledgements of basic rights, Indigenous and forest communities do not have the security of any communal ownership or other forms of tenure security. HIFOR methodology states that projects cannot begin until they can demonstrate that any conflicts regarding land ownership have been resolved, including addressing any unrecognized land rights. Even further, there is a requirement to do this with regards to any stakeholders that have been active in the project area within the previous 10 years, paying special attention to any outstanding claims of land rights or collective titles which may or may not be recognized by the state. Finally, there are also provisions included for addressing the formal management requirements when documented proof of it is not available in cases of IPLC’s customary management situations. This all does mesh very well with the HIBCF’s firm position on that matter, that both legal AND customary rights are required for a project to be recognized, and that flexibility should be permitted for situations just like this, but in the end, considering the local IPLCs’ lack of actual land ownership or tenure security it seems unlikely that these issues can be entirely addressed. For one thing, displaced Indigenous communities like the Yorta Yorta People in Australia, and in many other cases have been unable to return to their traditional lands for periods as long as centuries, well over the 10 years considered in this methodology.

In addressing the issue of additionality, HIBCF made recommendations for the classification of two distinct types, one for showing additional biodiversity outcomes, and the other for showing long-term funding and policies to maintain an ecosystem’s high level of biodiversity. In the case of HIFOR units, they would seemingly qualify as the second type, by showing the creation of long-term funding and ability to maintain the high-integrity tropical forest ecosystem in the project for a duration of 30 to 100 years. However, HIFOR units, according to their own methodology, are not actually required to meet any definitions of additionality, permanence or leakage as they are not intended for any carbon or biodiversity offsetting claims.

When considering the rather large question of offsetting, HIBCF takes the position that biodiversity credits must maintain a strong connection between the buyer and the project (no secondary market trading) and the location of the environmental damage should be within the same region as the proposed offsetting project (local for local, like for like). However, the current HIBCF working paper does state that this is a topic of ongoing debate and that their position on this, and all other aspects is not final, nor is it meant to be taken as the only point of view. Considering HIFOR states that credits cannot be used to offset any carbon or biodiversity impacts period, whether caused by buyers nearby or elsewhere, this wouldn’t seem to have any bearing on the credits which will eventually be derived from the project in NNNP. However, this brings up the question of what other reasons companies would have for purchasing these credits, if not for satisfying their offsetting commitments. These ‘purely positive’ motives, apparently unrelated to offsetting, have been called into question as potentially just another way of continuing business as usual.

Conclusion

The principles outlined in the recommendations of the HIBCF working paper seem to address many of the concerns about biodiversity credits that have previously plagued carbon offsetting projects. Likewise, although not directly associated with these principles, the HIFOR standard and its methodology also takes into account many of the same ideas, pushing forwards in some, like use of credits as offsets, and leaning back in others such as Indigenous project leadership. Common ground between the two standards in terms of potential cause for concern would be the underlying issue of land tenure and recognition of customary Indigenous rights. This, however, is not an issue that these standards alone could hope to address, as it is such a globally diverse and complex issue, dependent on varying degrees of public and political will. While previous projects, mainly involving REDD+, have had their share of land tenure and rights issues, there has also been instances where these projects have provided an opportunity to revise outdated tenure policy, legal frameworks, and improve customary tenure rights. This gives us hope that the improvements in biodiversity credit methodologies could lead to even more of this improvement and maybe alleviate the concerns of those who fear that these projects are inherently a distraction from the underlying drivers of the issues of climate change, deforestation, and biodiversity loss.

The WCS HIFOR pilot project in Congo does offer a chance to see how these standards can be implemented in a real-life scenario. This case study has taken a look at how these standards have been developed, the reasons behind them and the goals they are looking to achieve. As more data becomes available as to some of the outcomes of these policies, and the first HIFOR credits and other project credits are eventually sold, a clearer picture will begin to emerge.

Recommendations

There’s no telling how big the market for biodiversity credits could end up being, but as it expands there will certainly be space enough for a variety of initiative types and project sizes. One type of initiative, which has often been overlooked and underfunded is that of Indigenous Peoples and local community (IPLC) led programs. A truly IPLC initiated and led project could really flip the script in terms of who was courting who. IPLCs, with their own land access, and experience would be running the program, and they would go out and source funding for their organization. In this scenario, by initiating the project themselves, on their terms, it would be like going beyond FPIC, because they would be the ones setting the terms, and only partnering with funding that agreed with them.

Taking this one step further in terms of implementation, there is the idea of setting up regional IPLC biodiversity credit co-operatives. In the same sense as smallholder farmers and small and medium forest enterprises (SMFEs) setting up co-operatives for selling their resources and products, these smallholder landowners could benefit from the collective strength of their fellow community members. This could help them in a number of ways to overcome the hurdles of accessing wider markets and certification. Standards like HIFOR are by their own standards, only interested in the biggest scale projects over 100,000 hectares, leaving a large section of smaller scale areas out of the potential funding loop. Bundling their collective forest properties together could address the issue with their projects being too small to be considered by larger investors and it would allow them to share costs of monitoring and reporting.

Finally, there is need to acknowledge the sheer complexity and scale of the issues that needed to be covered in order for countries, and carbon credit projects in REDD+ to move through the 3 phases of readiness, implementation, and results-based payments steps. As of 2021, most of the finance that has been put into it has been focused on the preparatory work for supporting countries to get ready for REDD+. This includes all the phase 1 issues like developing national and subnational strategies and safeguards as well as capacity-building for managing, accounting, reporting and verification. So, not only have the developers of biodiversity credit frameworks like HIBCF and HIFOR been able to learn from the mistakes in the carbon-credit industry, but now they will be able to reap the benefits from much of the groundwork which has been laid out in advance in many countries.